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üdited and * i t h a F o r c w o rd by

t’TJ T*KN ARD k


Le© Strauss {1 8 9 9 -1 9 7 3 ) w « che Roben Maynard Hulchins ftistinguíshed Scnice
Profesor Ementus o f PoÜdcal Science at thc Univereiry ofChicago. His many contributions
to poli Real philosophv includc The Potinca! PhiUnopky of'Hobbcs, Persccutúm an d thc A rt o f
Wnrinp, and On Tyranny, all published bv thc Unhcrsirv o f Chicago Press,
Seth Bcnardete i$ professorofclassics ¿c New York Univcrsiry and che aurhor, mosr recenilv,
OfPiato's "¡Jim9: The Discovery ofRcinjt

TIk Uwveraity o f Chicago Press, Chicago 60637


The Univerbirvof Chicago Press, Lrd.,Lcmdon
© 2001 by The Univcnityof Chicago
Afl ríght» reserved, PuWished 2001
Primed on the United States o f America

10 0 9 ns 07 06 05 04 05 02 5 4 3 2

ISBN (doth): 0-226-77685 9

We would likc co express ourgratiiude co che John M. Olin Cerner for Jnquiry meo che
Theorv and Pracrice o f Democracy, which, uith che support o f che John M, Olin Foundation
and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, provided inval uable assistancc in preparing
che manuscript o f this book for pubiication.

labran* ofCongress Catalogjngin-Publkation Daca

Strauss, Leo.
Leo Strauss on Placo'* Symposium / cdiced and wich a forcword by Seth
Ben árdete,
p. cm.
Ineludes índex.
ISBN 0-226 7768S-9 {alk. paperj
1. Plato, Symposium. 2 Polirical scicnce— Philosttphy—History.
I. Benardetc, Seth. H. Tille
B385 .$77 2001
184—dc21 00-012819

© T he paper used in this pubiícation meces the mínimum requirements ofehe American
National Standard for Information Sciences— Pcrmanencc o f Paper for Princcd Librarv
Materials, ANSI Z39.48 1992.
CONTENTS

F o rew o rd vii

1. In tro d u cto ry R em arks 1 7 . A ristop h anes 1 1 9

2 . T h e S e ttin g 17 8 . A g ath o n 1 4 3

3 . Phaed rus 3 8 9 . S ó cra te s ( 1 ) 1 7 4

4 . Pausanias ( 1 ) 5 7 1 0 . S ó crates ( 2 ) 1 9 8

5 . Pausanias ( 2 ) 7 3 1 1 . S ó crates (31 2 1 6

6 . E ry xim ach u s 9 2

In d e x 2 8 9
FOREWORD

ln the middle sixties o f the last century Professor Hilail Giidin o f


Queens College suggested that che lectures Leo Strauss had given on che
Symposiutn In 1 9 5 9 be published in a readabie form. Professor Strauss
agreed to this proposal, with the proviso that the translation o f the passages
he had read in dass be revised so as to conform more striedy with the orig-
inal>and in the summer o f 1 9 6 6 I set to work making the changes he had
requested. O n first reading, Professor Strauss fbund the resulting manu-
script unsatisfactory, but after a second reading he agreed to its publicación.
F or several reasons this versión never saw the light o f day and was subse-
quendy lost. In the summer o f 1 9 9 9 the project was resumed and done
again from scratch. A very few changes were required to make the lectures
flow smoothly on the printed page; heavier revisions are more frequent
early in the series than at its end, since Professor Strauss often repeated
points at the start o f the early classes in order to confirm what he had estab-
lished. O n occasion these repetitions involved new formulations o r in-
sights, and these have been carefiilly preserved. The transcript from which
this edition was made was not complete; the changing o f the tape resulted
in gaps o f various length. When a gap couid be filled in a fairly certain way,
this has been done; where more has been lost than couid safely be conjec-
tured, an indication is given o f the break in continuity, but it has n ot been
possible to determine the length o f the missing portions,
Professor Strauss gave this course on the Sytnposium partly in honor o f
his friend, Peter Heinrich von Blanckenhagen, who had accepted a posi-
tion at the Institute o f Fine Arts in New York and would leave Chicago by
the fall o f 1 9 5 9 . Judging from the transcript, they had often discussed the
dialogue in the past, and they continued to talk about it during the course.
I t is, I believe, the furthest that Professor Strauss ever strayed in his courscs
on Plato from the strictly political dialogues: he taught the Statesm an but
neither the T heaetetus ñor the Sophist. In his interpreta tion, however, this
distinction pro ves to be somewhat illusory; without dctracting from the
nature and experience o f E ros, Professor Strauss was able to show how p o­
litical philosophy couid still be a guide to its full understanding. The polit­
ical in a narrow sense frames the dialogue, for Alcibiades is singled out at
the beginning, along with Sócrates and Agathon, as o f interest to Apollo-

vu
F O R B W O R D

dorus’s acquaintance, and at the cnd it is he who disrupts che parry, forcé s
it to be come a symposium, and completes the series o f erotic speeches
with a praise o f Sócrates. The year o fth e party also politicizes the unpolit-
ical setting and cheme, for it immediately precedes the Sicilian expeditíon
that Alcibiades prom oted. His subsequent withdrawal, which virtually
guaranteed the failure o f the venture, was due to the hysteria that swept
Athens after the mutilation o f the Herm ac and the profanation o f the
mystcries, in which Alcibiades was thought to be involved. Strauss ínter-
prets the Symposium as Plato’s versión o f that profanation: Sócrates proves
through his mouthpiece Diotima that Eros is not a god. T h e political and
the theological thus come together and offer a way into Strauss’s abiding
concern.
Strauss’s capacity to discern the ultímate import o f seemingly minor
things is nowhere more conspicuous than in his interpretation o f the Sym-
posiunt. H e shows that Sócrates’ hubris, to which both Agathon and Alci­
biades cali attention, is equally involved In his teaching on Eros and his
con test with Agathon, in which Alcibiades, in the guise o f Dionysus, pro ves
to be the judge. The contest with Agathon for supremacy in wisdom is in
turn shown to be a contest becween poetry and philosophy: Sócrates had al-
ready observed to Aristodemus the hubris H om cr committed against the
good. The truly profound speech o f Aristophanes and the seemingly silly
spcech o f Agathon divide between them all that comedy and tragedy re-
spectivcly can muster against philosophy. Only Aristophanes, Agathon, and
Sócrates, Strauss shows, give speeches that do not subordínate Eros to any-
thing. Their speeches are the only inspired speeches, for Phaedrus looks at
Eros through sclfishncss, Pausanias through morality, and Eryximachus
through Science. In each case Eros disappcars into som cthingclse and docs
n ot emerge ineo its own until Aristophanes, recovered from the hiccups,
speaks. His hiccups dísturb the order o f speeches and put the two poets on
the same side as Sócrates. Strauss’s recognition o f this división o f the
speeches into two triads does n ot affect his carefol exposition o f the first
three speeches. Phaedrus’s selfishness has a connection with Sócrates’ shift-
ing o f Eros from a concern with the beautiful— the ordinary understand*
¡ng— to a concern with the good; Pausanias’s unstable advocacy offreedom ,
philosophy, and morality at various stages o f his argument cncapsulates the
polidcal problem that the R ep u blic sets out to solve; and Eryximachus’s co-
ordination o f Eros with Science already adumbrates the modern project
that Plato uncannily tbresaw and opposed.

vm
M ) R k W O R D

ln accordance with Sócrates’ own remarles on writing, Strauss somc times


compared the Platonic dialogues to animáis in a zoo, in which th c visitor is
encouraged to dassify the unique specimens on display into groups. Some
o f the more obvious taxonomic entena were whether thc dialogues were
reported o r n ot and, if reported, whether by Sócrates o r by others; whether
their settings o r times were given; and whether the characters were known.
T h e Symposiutn is a reported dialogue at several removes from the occasion;
it shares this peculiarity with the P arm en ides, where Plato’s relative reports
on Sócrates’ second venture into philosophy. Phaedo reports Sócrates’ own
account o f his first venture in the P haedo, and Apollodorus, who weeps
continuously throughout the P haedo, records Sócrates’ last in the Sympo-
siutn. Strauss observed that Diotima’s account o f Eros as a d aim on ion , mid-
way between gods and m or tais, is plainly meant to overeóme the diffiailty
Parmenides fbund in Sócrates’ ideas, which allowed there to be nothing ex-
cept ideas and their participants. Strauss proposed that Eros, o r the essence
o f soul, was meant to be an intermediary that could n ot be reduced to ei-
ther a paradigmatic idea o r its copies. Psychology therefore became paired
with ontology or cosmology and offered a way to get around the Par-
menidean paradox. Strauss went on to observe that the P rotag oras in d u d ed
all the characters in thc Symposium, with thc exception o f Aristophanes. H e
inferred that Aristophanes replaces Protagoras: the comic poet offers a
myth about man’s origin and nature that surpasses the sophist’s, for it puts
together man’s impiety and man’s civility, o r thc double nature o f man, in a
way that Protagoras utterly does n ot understand. The Symposiutn*s link
with the P rotagoras necessarily brings in its train the G orgias, which handles
the relation justice has with rhctoric, o r the issue o f rationality and punish-
m ent. N ot only does the Symposium gain natural ties with the K epublic
through its association with these dialogues, but ic al so links up with the
P haedrus, whose theme ¡s persuasión, dialectic, and writing in the element
o f Eros. H ere is where Strauss’s wholly unprejudiced viewpoint comes to
the fore; it is not cveryone who would see the kinship o f the P haedrusw ixh
the Law s o r o f the Symposium with the Epinom is, for writing connects thc
first pair and the notion o f occasion the second. Strauss did not always de-
velop these conncctions fiiily, but he suggestcd how one should procecd in
crying to put together the necessarily imperfect cosmos o f Platonic dia­
logues as an imitation o f the truc cosmos.
Seth B en ardete

ix
1 IN TRO D U CTO RY
REM A R K S

I his course will be on Placóos politicaJ philosophy and it will be


conducted m thc form o f an explanación and an interpretación o f the Sym-
posium . By way o f introduction I have to answer the se two questions: (1)
Why do we study Plato’s political philosophy? and (2 ) Why did I select the
Symposium? As for the first quesdon, one could say that to give courses on
Plato’s political philosophy is the decent thing to do. I t is admitted in the
profession that political Science scudencs are supposed to have some knowl-
edge o f the history o f political thought, the history o f political philosophy.
I f this is so one surely must study it thoroughly, at least in gradúate school,
and the thorough treatment o f the history o f political philosophy requires
specialized courses in the great political philosophers, henee also on Plato.
This reasoning is rather poor for two reasons. In the first place, it would
lead to the consequence that one should give such courses also, say, on
Locke o r Machiavelli, and I for one give such a course oniy on Plato. In the
second place, though in all practical matters it is indispensable, either al-
ways o r mostly, to foliow custom , to do what is generally done, in theored*
cal macters ic is simply untrue. In practical matters there is a right o f the first
occupant: what is established must be respected. In cheorctical matters this
cannot be. Differently Stated: The rule ofpractice is *íe t sleeping dogs lie,”
do n ot disturb the established. In theoretical matters the rule is ado n ot let
sleeping dogs lie.” Therefore, we cannot defer to precedent and must raise
the question, Why do we study Plato in particular?
W hen we look at the present situation in the world, this side o f the Iron
Curtain, we see that there are two powers determining present-day thought.
I cali chem positivism and historicism. The defect o f these powers today
compels us to look out tbr an alternative. That alternative seems to be sup-
plied by Plato rather than anyone else.
First positivism. Positivism makes the assertion that the only form o f
genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. Physics is the model o f all Sci­
ences and therefore o f political Science in particular. B u t this is more a
promise than an achievement. This scientific political Science does not exist.

I
C H A P T E R O N E

In spite o f this fact, wc must cake this posilion vcry seriously. Its motive can
be crudely staied as follows: The same Science— scientific method— which
produccd the H -bom b must also be able to prevent the use o f the H -bom b.
The Science which produced the H -bom b, physics; the Science dealing with
the use o f the H -bom b, political Science. Now, you see immediately that
this reasoning, that the same method which produced the H -bom b must
also be a ble to prevent the use o f the H -bom b, is very poor; the distinction
berween the use and misuse o f anything— H -bom b included— means a
distinction between good and bad, and this kind o f distinction is now called
a valué judgment. According to the positivistic view valué judgments are
outside the scope o f Science. Therefore this positivistic political Science
promises something which it is, strictly speaking, unable and unwilling to
supply. The characteristic thesis o f positivism can be said to be that all val­
úes are equal. Positivistic Science claims to be able to distinguísh between
attainable and unattainable ends. This is all. It cannot and does n ot claím
more. It cannot even say that the quest fbr unattainable ends is foolish and
therefore bad. This would be a valué judgment. It can say only that they are
unattainable. But it cannot say that the quest for unattainable ends is infe­
rior to the quest for attainable ends. Positivists sometimes reject the impu-
tation that according to their views all valúes are equal. But I can only say
that this is merely an attempt to befog the issue. What they say in fact is that
as far as human knowledge o r reason is concerned, or as far as we know, all
valúes are equal. This they certainly say, and there is no practica! difference
between the assertion ‘as far as we know and shall ever be able to know’ and
the assertion that all valúes are equal.
The positivistic position can be characterized as follows: There is no po-
sition between the objectivity o f Science and the subjcctivity ofevaluations.
The principies o f thought, o f thinking, o f underscanding, are objective.
The principies o f preference o r action are necessarily subjective. I leave it at
these brief remarks in order to characterize in a few words an alternad ve to
positivism which I cali historicism. There are all kinds o f overlapping be­
tween these two are as o f thinking, but it is unnecessary for us to go into
them.
In the clear case, historicism admits that a valué- free social Science is im-
possi ble. But it asserts that both principies o f thought and principies o f ac­
tion are essentially variable, or histórica!, and therefore in a radical sense
subjective. In the vulgar form ofth is position wc cannot arrive at any higher
principies o f understanding and o f preferring than those o f Western civi­
lización. There are no principies o f understanding and principies o f prefer-

2
I N T R O D U C T O R * ' R B M A R K S

ring which belong to man as man, who can never go beyond a historie ally
qualified humanity such as Western civilization. Historie ism stems from
Germany and is, therefbrc, far more developed there than, for cxample, in
this country. But even in this country you find it in various forms. Cari
Becker, I be lieve, was the most famous represe ntative o f historicism who
denied the impossibility o f any objective history. All historiography is based
on the climate o f the country and the age and can never transcend it. The
difficulty with historicism, simply stated, is this: it cannot help transcending
history by its very assertion. I f we say every sort o f man is radically histori-
cal, this assertion is no longer meant co be historical and therefore refutes
the position. I cannot go into any further detail. I can only assert he re that
both positivism and historicism are not viable. But this is not the subject o f
this coursc. Assuming that they are viable, they are admittcdly late posi-
tions. They are based on the experience o f the tailure o f an earlier approach.
This earlier approach is called in the loose language o f this kind o f literature
the absoiutist approach.
The absoiutist approach asserts that there are invariable, unchangeable,
universally valid principies o f chought and action. This, it is said, has been
destroyed by man’s deeper reflection or by man’s longer experience. From
this it follows that if we as positivists or historicists want to understand our-
selves we must understand our own ground, i.e., the absolutism o f the past
and the experience o f the failure o f that absolutism. Therefore a historicist
or relativist, if he refleets o n his position and wants to understand what he
says, is compelled to understand the older position, the absoiutist position,
which he replaces. In other words, reflection, o f which I have given here
barely a specimen, on the defeets o f the views prevale nt today, leads us to
take a serious interest in the opposite view, in an evaluating social Science
that refers to invariable and universal principies. Such a social Science was in
existe nce at least until the end o f the eighteench century. The notion o f a
value-free social Science emerged only in the last de cade o f the ninetcenth
century. The most talked about form o f this older form o f social Science is
the natural law teaching. This natural law teaching has its roots in the teach*
ing o f Plato and Aristode, but it was not developed by them. I t began to be
developed by a certain Greek school, the so-called Stoics, which emerged
after Aristode, but we have barely sufficient evidence to speak about the
Stoic natural law school. For all practica! purposes, the elassie o f the natural
law social Science is Thom as Aquinas. As that part o f the movement o f
thought which I have discussed up until now, Thomas Aquinas would be o f
the utm ost interest to us.

3
C H A P T B R ONE

But why concéntrate on Plato as distinguished fforn Thomas Aquinas?


In order to understand that, we have to consider a second meaning o f rela-
tivism which has nothing to do with a value-free social Science. Ifw e look at
what is going on Ln the Sciences proper, in the natural Sciences, and what ís
their peculiar character compared with earlier natural Science, say up to the
seventee nth and eighteenth centuries, we notice this: The se Sciences live in
an open horizon. N o results are regarded as definitive. All results, all theo-
ries, are regarded as open to fu ture revisión in the light o f ncw evidencc.
This is a new phenomenon, that the highest authority for human society—
and the highest authority for Western society is Science— has this peculiarly
open character. As someone who was very com petent to speak about the se
matters, Nictzsche, put it» “We are the first men who do n ot possess the
truth, but only seek it.” Níetzsche had in mind all dogmas, all systems
which predominated in the past and also sometime later. The novel thing
was a society which apparendy does n ot possess the truth. Now, there is an
apparent modescy, an apparent commonscnsical reasonableness in this
open-mindcdness, this re fosal to say, “I possess the tru th,* which has surely
some actraction for most o f us. When we look back from chis seeming pe-
culiaricy o f the late nineteenth century and twentieth century to the past,
we see thac there is only one great philosophcr who somchow scems to have
stood for this principie, that the questions are clearer than che answers to
the important questions. That was Plato.
E veryone knows, or has heard, that according to Plato man is incapable
o f acquiring fall wisdom; that the very ñame o f philosophy— a quest for
wisdom, love o f wisdom— indicates that wisdom proper is not accessible to
men. O r to use the other formula, philosophy is knowledge o f ignorance
rathcr than the complete system. One can also indícate this historieally as
foliows: Plato founded a school called the Academy. This school bccame, a
lew generations after Plato, the New Academy, a skeptical school. Whereas
traditional Platonism was one o f the most dogmatic schools, Plato gave rise
to a most skeptical school as wcll, and this can be explained by the fact that
while Plato himself was neither a dogmatist ñor a skeptic, his successors
were un able to remain on this level. There is a remarkablc sentence o f Pas­
cal according to which we know too little to be dogmatists and to o much to
be skeptics, which expresses beautifolly what Plato conveys through his di-
alogues. This peculiar openness o f Plato seems to make him particularly at-
trac tive to our age, which has gone through so many moral and other
disappointmcnts. I will n ot now develop this notion o f Plato as a thinker
who cannot be properly characterized as either dogmatic or skeptic. I will

4
1 N T R O D U C T O R Y K E M A R K S

Icavc it at the following remark. The very openness o f Plato— the assertion
that man does n ot possess wisdom, that he can only strive for wisdom— ¡n
a way al$o closes the íssue. Human knowledge is imperfcct. Human knowl*
edge is at best progressive and never final. This is, o f course, a final asser-
don. T h e great difference bctween Plato and his modern followers, or
seeming followers, is that Plato knew that men cannoc Uve and think with-
out a finality o f some sort. Plato contended that the finality o f the insight
that we are never fuUy knowing implies a final answer to the question o f the
good íife, including the question o f the best society. This is the problem we
have to understand while trying to understand Plato’s thought.
In what I said there is an impUcation which I would like to make explicit:
Plato never wrote a System o f phílosophy. In a way, no one until the seven-
teenth century had a system, striedy speaking, but Plato did n ot even write
treadses, as Aristotle did, for example. Plato wrote only dialogues. The dia-
logic character o f the Platonic wridngs has something to do with this pecu-
Uar openness o f Plato’s inquines. This, however, creates a difficulty which is
very great. In his dialogues Plato never appears as a character. Plato never
says a word. Sócrates speaks, and other men speak, but with what right can
we say that what Sócrates says is Plato’s view? I f you say it is obvious, I can
reply very simply that it is also obvious in the dialogues that Sócrates is an
ironical man. T o have as one’s spokesman a man most tamous for his trony
is almost the same as n ot having a spokesman at all. T o say it differently: No
one would dream o f ascribing to Shakespeare every sentence expressed by
any Shakespearean character, however attractive that character may be. It is
wise to begin the study o f Plato with this sober skepticism. W hether a cer-
tain sentiment or thought expressed by any character, however attractive, is
Plato’s view, we do n ot know. Plato expresses his views surely through his
dialogues, but n ot simply through the explicit utteranees o f his speakers.
From this foliows a variety o f rules o f reading which we will take up on the
proper occasions. But, to begin with, che rule can be stated in its universal -
ity as follows: Plato’s dialogues demand to be read with exceeding care.
There is nothing superfluous, nothing meaningless in a Platonic dialogue.
Sócrates in the P haedru s compares the good writing, the perfect writing, to
a üving being in which each part, however small, has a necessary function
for the life and activity o f that living being. The Platonic dialogue has a
function— the íunction is to make us understand. And the dialogue is com ­
parable to an organism insofar as every part o f it has a function in making us
understand. Therefore we must consider everything in a dialogue. I Icave it
at these general remarks about why we turn to Plato and turn now to the

5
C H A ? I E R ON h

question, Why do we choose the Symposium? W h zt can wc expect to learn


from thc Symposium that wc are not likcly to Icarn frora any other dialogue?
I give two reasons provisionally: There are many competitors with phi-
losophy or many alternad ves to philosophy. But the most important o f
them , according to Plato, is poetry, not Science. From Plato’s point o f view
what we cali Science is simply and obviously subordínate to philosophy and
therefore n ot a compcdtor. Ñ or can one say religión, because religión is not
a Greek term. O ne would have to say piety. B u t piety is from Plato’s point
o f view no com petitor with philosophy because philosophy, righdy under-
stood, is the truc piety. The com petitor is poetry, espccially tragedy, which
has the broadest and deepest appeal because it moves most men most deeply.
At the beginning o f the tenth book o f the K epublic, Plato speaks o f the
feud between philosophy and poetry. In the Apology o f Sócrates the poct
Meletus appears to be thc ch ief accuser o f Sócrates. H e acts against Sócrates
on behaif o f the poets. The class interests o f the poets have been endan-
gered by Sócrates. The foundation o f the formal accusation against S ó c­
rates was led by an informal accusation that Aristophanes, the cómic poet,
did n ot indeed origínate but expressed, in his Clouds.
Now what is the íssue between philosophy and poetry? I t is a contest
tbr supremacy regardin g wisdom. L et me illustrate this from Aristophanes’
C louds: Sócrates is presented there as a student o f nature, a student o f the
narure o f all things, o r o f the wholc, and also as a teacher o f rhetoric. H e is
presented as corrupting the young by letting them sec the victory o f the ar-
gument for injustice o ver the argument in favor o f justice. H e transcends
thc ephemeral, ordinary life o f man, the mercly human, and realizes the
conventional character o f those things which are regarded as sacred by all
men. Although he is a teacher o f rhetoric, he is unable co win thc argument
in thc end— he cannot persuade the many. His “think tank,” his school, is
bumed down. Philosophy, Aristophanes suggests, in contradistinction to
poetry, is unable to persuade o r to charm the multitude. Philosophy tran­
scends the ephemeral, the mundane, thc política!. However, it cannot find
its way back to it. The philosopher as such is blind to the context within
which philosophy exists, namely political life. He does n ot reflect on his
own doing, he lacks self-knowlcdge— he lacks prudence in the wide Pia-
torde sense o f the word, because he does n ot understand political things.
This is connccted with the fact— again I foliow Aristophanes’ indication—
that philosophy is uñero tic and a-music, unpoetic. Philosophy is blind to
the human things as cxperienced in life, in the acts o f living. These acts o f
living are prccisely the theme o f poetry. Poetry intégrates purcly thcorcti-

6
I NT R O P U C T O R Y R E M A R K S

cal wisdom into a human context. It completes the completely theoretical


wisdom by self-knowledge. Poetry ís the capstone ofwisdom. Poetry alone
makes for the most comprehensive knowledge. By the way, you are al1
aware o f this problem in prese nt-day life. There is hardly anyone among
you, I be lieve, who has n ot seen that a contemporary novelist with a rea-
sonable dcgree o f compe tence telis us much more about modern society
than volumes o f social Science analysis. 1 don’t question that social Science
analyses are very important, but stiil, i f you want to g ct a broad view and a
deep view you read a novel racher than social Science.
Plato and Xenophon defend Sócrates against this charge as follows:
Sócrates is so far from being blind to the political that he is truly the discov-
erer o f the political in its own kind. Precisely Sócrates undcrstood the polít­
ica! as such, namely, the fact that the political is characterized by a certain
recalcitrance to philosophy. In Plato’s K ep u blic we see that Sócrates is a po-
iidcally rcsponsible man. I t is Sócrates’ work that the argument in favor o f
jusdce wins out over the argument in favor o f injustice. Sócrates’ philoso­
phy is one act o f obedience to the Delphic injunction “know thyself.” His
wholc philosophy is self-knowledge o r prudence. And Sócrates, far from
being an unerotic man, is the erodcian. I t is n ot true that poetry is the cap­
stone o f philosophy. O n the contrary, philosophy is the capstone o f poetry.
This means n ot merely, as we shall see in the Sympostum, that philosophy
defeats poetry in the contest for supremacy regarding wisdom, it means
also that the right kind o f philosophy is more truly poetic than poetry ¡n the
com m on sense o f the term. Poetry presents o r interprets man’s expcrience
o f human things according to theír proper order, namely, the high is high
and the low is low. B u t poetry must admit that the human things are not
simply the highcst things o r the íirst things, that the true principies are no
longer human. For example, in H om er the principie, the arkhe, is the
O cean— Okeanos. Yet H om er does n ot let us see, and cannot let us see, the
principie becom ing manifest in man above everything else, and becom e dif-
ferendy manifest in different men. W hen you see H éctor o r Achilles, you
do not see Okeanos, the principie, in them. There is a crude juxtaposidon.
Plato ¡mplies, between the ultimare knowledge o f the principie and poetry
itself. Whereas Plato claims that by his understanding o f the principie he is
enabled to make the true principies transparent in human beings, in human
acdon, in his characters. T h e reason he can raise that daim is his particular
opinión, which we shall study later, o f the human soul. F or Plato, the hu­
man soul, and in a sense man, is, as it were, the concrescencc, the growing
together, o f the highest principies. Therefore, if you have understood the

7
C H A PT E R O N t

soul in its essence, you can make thesc highest principies transparen t in all
human beings and all types o f human beings. And this is prccisely what
Plato is trying to do in his dialogues. Platonic philosophy, by virtue o f a
deeper understanding o f the principies, is able to scc in men thc manifesta-
tions o f the principies.
T h e most extcnsive discussion o f poctry in Plato occurs in the R epu blic
and the Law s. B u t in those cwo dialogues we have no discussion with po-
ets— no poets are present. The meeting o f Sócrates with poets, the contest
o f Sócrates with poetry, is the Symposium. This is the first rcason why the
Sytnposium is o f special importance. Lest you think that this is a question
that invoíves a very special premise, namely, some sympathy for Plato, I as-
surc you that the question is nothing less than the status o f human reason.
They all believe in human reason, but the poets imply somehow that some-
thing other than reason is superior to reason and must take its place.
The second reason why the Symposium is important is this: the theme
com m on to poetry and phiíosophy is the human things. The human things,
however, are primarily the political things, for mankind’s greatest objec-
tivcs, most impressive objectives, are political— ffeedom and empire. One
might al so say peace and war are dearly political phenomena. D on ’t forget
that the tide o f what is somehow the greatest modern novel is W ar a n d
P eace. Even today, Khrushchev and Eisenhower feed the headtiñes to a
much higher degree than the White Sox or Ingrid Bergm an’s most recent
matrimonial adventure. And the relation o f Sputnik to the coid war is obvi-
ous to the meanest capacities. But what is the core o f the political? Men
killíng men on the largest scale in broad daylight and with the greatest
serenity. Today the most prominent fact is the coid war, communism versus
liberal democracy, i.e., an antagonism o f political orders, o f regimes. N ot
Russia and thc United States, n ot Russian culture and language versus En-
glish culture and language, they are only accidental.
The political in the political is the phenomenon which the Greeks called
p o liteia (the title o f Plato’s R ep u blic in the original). This word means,
looscly explained, some thing like constitution. The politeia designates the
character o f the govemment, the powcrs o f the government. Secondly,
however, and this is the more important mcaning, politeia designates a way
o f life. T h e way oflife o f a society is decisively determined by its hierarchy—
its stratification, as it is now called. The most massive form o f this stratifica-
tion is expressed by this question: Which type o f men predomínate in broad
daylight and with a view to compel power and obedience and respect?
W hich habits are fostered and admi red by the society as a whole as it ex-

8
I N T R O D U C T O R Y R E M A R K S

prcsses itseif in ics actions as a society? Which moral taste is opcrating


chrough che policical order? We sec immediately, on the basis o f our present-
day experiences, that there is a variecy o f such regimes- The conflice among
them is only a conflict in the minds o f men. Thus the question arises o f what
is the best re gime. The first answer given by such men as Plato and Aristo-
tic, and Sócrates before them , is that in which the wise rule, absolutely and
irresponsibly. Irresponsibly in the sen se that they are n ot responsible to
other human beings. That the wise should be responsible to the unwise
seems to be against nature. But chis regime is not possiblc, as both Plato
and Aristotle knew. The few wise are to o weak in body to forcé the many
unwise, and they cannoc persuade the many unwise sufficiendy. Wisdom
must be qualified by consent, it must be diluted by consent, i.e., by consent
o f the unwise. The political implies, in other words, something Uke a right
o f un-wisdom, a right o f tolly. This is the paradox o f the political, that such
a right o f un-wisdom is admitted. The polis— the people— demand the
highest respect without deserving the highest respect. This is the dilemma
o f the political. N ot the pronouncements o f wisdom, but laws rule. The
rule o f wisdom is possible only in this form: a wise legislator might devise a
code which is then adopted through persuasión o f the Citizen body. I t is
clearíy n ot enough that laws be adopted; there must also be thosc who are
capable o f applying and administering them equitably. The Greek word fbr
equitable is the same as the word for gendeman. The right kind o f rule is
the rule o f gendemcn. This does not mean exacdy the same as it means in
England; it means rather the urban patricians whose wealth is rural, not
commercia!. This is the famous econom ic condidon o f Greek thought, the
famous prejudice, as some others say. I am now concerned with the crucial
philosophic point, which is n ot afíected tlilly by diese things. The implica-
tion o f the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy is, then, that there cannot be a
rational society, meaning a society consisting o f fially rational human be­
ings- The polis as polis is characterized by an essendal, irremediable recalci-
trance to reason. O ne could give many examples o f that, which I will do on
the proper occasion. There is something harsh in the political, something
angry. Plato somewherc compares the laws with an angry and obstínate oíd
man who always says the same thing without considering open-mindedly
the circumstances { Statesm an 2 9 4 b 8 - c 4 ) . It is for this reason that Plato
calis the polidcal passion ‘spiritedness’ (thum os), which also means some­
thing like anger. This harshness and severity is essential for constituting the
polis and is, in a way, most characterisdc o f the polis.
In the R epu blic Plato teaches that this faculty which he calis spiritedness

9
C H A P T B I ONE

is higher than desire. You may recaí] that in the R ep u blic we have three parts
o f the soul: let u$ cali the first reason and then, the two nonrational ones,
spiritedness and desire. Desire is also called ‘eros\ a key word fbr our pres-
ent course. I would like to illustrate this by two more points. According to
che teachíng o f the R epubl¡cy the tyrant, the most abominable ruler, jusdce
and injustice incarnate, i$ eros incarnate. Another illustration: W hen Plato
speaks in the second book o f the R epu blic o f the modves o f men for estab-
lishing societies, he is completely silent about procreation. H e speaks o f
hunger and thirst and need for shelter. The whole argument o f the R ep u b ­
lic is based on a delibérate, and deliberately exaggerated, demotion o f
eros, inasmuch as the re is a tensión between the political passion— spirited­
ness— and the erotic passion. The tensión between spiritedness and eros
corrcsponds somehow to the tensión between the political and the nonpo-
litical. Now, whereas Plato’s R epu blic can be said to be the political dia­
logue, we will tentatively say that the Symposium is the most emphatically
nonpolitical dialogue o f Plato, insofor as he deais with that element in man
which is in essential tensión with the political element.
L et me explain: As political scientists we are interested in political phe-
nomena. But we must also be interested, simultaneously, in the political as
political. W hat is it that gives elections, for example, their peculiarly politi­
cal character? This more abstract question, What is the political, as distin-
guished from the study o f particular political phenomena?, is for Plato a
most important question. One cannot understand the political as such,
without understanding somehow the nonpolitical. When you speak o f the
political, you impiy that there is something outside the political and you
must have some awareness o fit. The nonpolitical may be entirely irrclevant
fbr the political, e.g., digestión, o r the backside o f the m oon, o r it may be
politic ally relevant. In the latter case, the nonpolitical is either subpolitical,
say the economical, or suprapolitical— religión. The nonpolitical, as politi-
cally relevant, is the foundation o f the political, either as condition o r as the
ultímate end. In both meanings, the nonpolitical was called traditionally
the natural. There may be something natural which transcends the political
in dignity and which gives politics its guidance. That is what was meant by
those thinkers who spoke o f the natural law and natural right. The word
n a tu ra l indicated the fbundations o f the political that are o f themselves not
simply political. The foundation o f the political is, somehow, nature, and
nature may be understood in difierent ways. One more thing: it is some­
how the contention o f Plato that the nature o f man and, in a way, the nature
o f the whole, is eros.

10
I N T R O D U C T O R Y U M A R K S

T o summarize: The Symposium ¡s the dialogue o f the conflict between


philosophy and poetry where the poets are in a position to defend them-
se Ivés. They cannot in the R epubltc and the Laws. Secondly, ¡ts subject is the
foundation o f the política)— the natural. Somehow this is strongly identi-
fied with eros, poetry and eros. Somehow we feel that there is a certain con-
nection between these two themes. Poets seem to be partícularly expressive
o f eros, and eros seems to require poede treatment. So much fbr the gen­
eral ¡ntroduction,
I begin in the beginning. In the beginning o f any book is a tide. The
Platonic ti des have this form: there is a general title, and then we have “or
on wine.” Then comes the description o f the [category) to which the dia­
logue belongs: it might be called ethical, dialectical, or natural; it might also
be called tentad ve o r what have you. The general view today is that all this
is surely n ot Platonic. I am inclined to betieve that the latter part, “ethical”
in the case o f our dialogue, is really a scholastic addition that somehow does
n ot fit the Platonic sryte. But the alternative title might possibly go back to
Plato. I wiU say a few words about the alternative tide o f our dialogue. Our
dialogue is called, in the subtitle, “on the good.” Now this is seemingly
strange because the theme o f the Symposium is eros, not the good. Never-
theless, there is a good reason for taking the tide “on the good” scriously:
in the development o f the theme o f eros the good will appear to be the
highest them e. In the R epubltc we have seen that the highest learning is
called the good. B u t what was only alluded to in the R ep u blic is developed
at somewhat greater length in che Symposium. Therefbre, the subtitle is o f
some meaning.
But let us turn to the tide, and here again I must begin from the most
externa!. As matters stand today, some o f the dialogues which have come
down to us as Platonic dialogues are regarded as spurious. I believe ¡t is wisc
to suspend our judgm cnt on this subject and simply to accept aÜ dialogues
which have come down to us as Platonic. The body o f Platonic writings
consists o f nine groups o ffo u r (nine tetralogies). Thirty-five o f these are di­
alogues and one consists o f thirteen letters. O f the thirty-five dialogues,
twenty-five have as their tides the ñames o f participants in the conve rsadon.
Se ven have as their tides a theme— that’s the rare case: R epubltc, Law s, Soph-
isty Statesm an, A pology o f Sócrates, M inos, H ipparchus. Six o f these seven
themes, as appears eithcr immediately or else if you look at them , are polit*
¡cal. In other words, when you look at a book called G orgiasyou can’t know
what is in it, but when we hear Statesm an, you have some notion o f what
will be in ¡t. Therefore, the more revealing tides are thosc which indícate a

11
CH APTE R O U t

theme. As I said, six are poiitical: R epu blic; Law s; Sophist; M inos, who was a
legislator; H ipparchus, an Athenian ryrant; and the A pology o f Sócrates,
which, as a forensic spcech, is obviously also about poiitical action. There
are thrce remaining dialogues: the R iv a ls (E rastae or A n terastae), where
the title indicates the partícipants. H ere thcy have no ñames; the only way
to indícate them was their com m on quaiiry, rivals in lo ve. E p in om ish as its
ñame from its position in the work, as a sequel to N o m o s , i.e., to the Laxos.
The only remaining title is that o f our work: the Symposium. This is a
unique case. The Symposium is the only dialogue whose title indicates the
occasion. Why n ot the ñame o f a participante The answcr: there is n ot just
one participant; there are six persons other than Sócrates and, God knows,
each m ay be as important as everyone else. lt is also possi ble to make this
tentative suggestion. The Symposium as you know o r will find out soon,
consists o f six speeches on eros, and the last one is by Sócrates. O ne is in-
clined to assume that there is an ascent from the least interesting o r least
wise speech to Sócrates’ speech, which is the wisest. T h e speaker before
Sócrates is Agathon. Agathon is the most important individual after
Sócrates. But we don’t know that. In Greek this ñame sounds almost like
agathon , “the good.” I f the subtitle were really “on the good* this would
n ot be a bad pun.
The Symposium, at any rate, is the only dialogue whose title designares
an occasion. Why did Plato single out this occasion, a symposium? Plato’s
contemporary rival, ultimately friend, Xenophon, also wrote a Symposium.
In the beginning this book says that it will treat the deeds o f gentlemen per-
formed in play, performed jocularly. In a way this is also true o f Plato’s Sym­
posium : playful deeds o f gentlemen. Symposia give rise to play and jokes,
but at the same time they are susceptible o f noble speeches. There are other
human gatherings which are not so likely to give rise to delicate and noble
speeches. You would have to reflect about the médium o f symposia, which
is wine, and the effeets o f wine. I mention only two o f them , which have
been articulated by Plato, so we are n ot substituting our own poor experi-
ences for whac Plato had in mind. But you will, I believe, recognize a phe-
nomenon known to you from the daily papers. In the first place, wine gives
rise to the ability o r willingness to say cverything— openness, frankness.
Connected with this is what the Greeks called hubris, wantonness, doing
things you would never do when sober, presumptuousness to take risks. In
other words, this occasion is really a particularly important one. We are
likely to hear interesting things which are not said on every occasion if we
can listen to a symposium.

12
I N T R O D U C T O R * R E M A R K . S

Another important distinction, apart from thc charactcr o f the titlc o f


the dialogue, is this: a dialogue is either performed o r narrated. A per-
formed dialogue looks like a drama; we get a list o f thc characters in the be-
ginning. In the narrated dialogue someone tells that he was present when
people had thi$ conversation— which is, o f course, cumbersome, be cause
he has to say all the time, “And then he said . . . but it has also certain
great virtues because the narrator can say certain things. F or example, i f A
and B were in a dialogue and at a certain point B made a particularly stupid
expression, then interlocutor A cannot in propriety say, “Why do you look
so stupid?” But the narrator can very well say, “Then he said, with a very
stupid expression . . . ” This has very broad implications.
O f the thirty-five Platonic dialogues, twenty-five are performed. We can
say that is the normal case. There is one intermedíate case in which we al-
most see a narrated dialogue transformed into a performed one, and that is
the Theaetetus. Nine are simply narrated. Our dialogue belongs to the nar­
rated dialogues. A narrated dialogue is either narrated by Sócrates o r by
someone else. Six are narrated by Sócrates. I f Sócrates is the narrator we
find in the beginning o f the dialogue either the ñame o f Sócrates without
any addition o r the ñame o f Sócrates and the man to whom he narrates:
simply Sócrates in the case o f the R epu blic, C b a r m ides, Lysis, and R ivals,
Sócrates to Crito in the Euthydem us o r to a comrade in the Protajjoras.
Narrated by someone other than Sócrates are three dialogues: P arm enides}
PhaedOy and the Symposium, which is narrated by a man called Apollodorus
to a comrade. I cali him a comrade because in Greek he is n ot called a friend
and he is also a bit closer than a mere acquaintance. The political implica-
tion that the word com rad e has acquired in our age was present in the
Greek, although from a difiere nt point o f view. The oligarchic clubs were
called comraderies. I only mention this point, which wil1 later on take on
some importance.
The Symposium and the P rota¿ oraszx t both explicidy told to comrades.
[Tape change.] . . . a man o f a very com m on sort, and this is a man
called Aristodemus. H e is a very important character, perhaps the most im­
portant character in thc book, but he does n ot say a word. That happens
some times in Platonic dialogues, that someone is silently there, and one
misunderstands the whole situation if one does n ot look at that silent indi­
vidual and what he shows by being present. Aristodemus, then, had told
the story to both Phoenix and Apollodorus. L et me put it this way, crudcly,
but n ot unreasonably, I believe. Aristodemus was present at the symposium
many years ago. H e is older than the two men to whom he told it. H e was

13
C H A l ’ T E R ONU

associated wíth Sócrates many years ago. Aristodemus is the Icak to the
younger friends o f Sócrates, and Apollodorus is the leak to the general pub-
lic. We have to raise this question: Why was the story dorm ant fbr so long?
And why is there only a one-way Street to the truth? Namcly, only through
Apollodorus and Aristodemus. This must be connected to the character o f
Apollodorus and Aristodemus. Apollodorus is an enthusiast; he cannot
help talking o f Sócrates, that marvelous man, al! the time. B u t what is the
place o f Aristodemus? That is more difficult to say, Aristodemus knew it for
many, many years, and only now does he talk about it. Was it n ot proper to
tell the story earlier? Was Aristodemus the man most likely to do something
perhaps slighdy improper? I believe we can answer that question, but I
postpone ¡t because no answer is given here. We know the year the Sympo-
siutn took place. I t was the year Agathon won first prize. This is somehow
known by tradición, and we arrive at the year 4 1 6 . W hen was it told? I
would like to give a tentative answer to this question, and develop it in
greater detail later on.
Before I can give a tentative answer to this I must introduce another
ítem. In the year 41S the Athenians began the ir expedition against Sicily,
for which Alcibiades was chiefly responsible. This was a terrific gamble, but
Alcibiades was such a genius char ít might very well havc been successful.
The Athenians committed the folly, politically speaking, ofcalling back Al­
cibiades al most immediately after the expedition had sailed. Alcibiades
didn’t like it and fled to Sparta. He ruined Athens. H e contributed more to
the ruin o f Athens than any other man. W hen the expedition was about to
sail, the Athenians awoke one morning to find that most o f the herms— pil-
lars surmounted by a bust, usually o f Hermes— had been defaced the night
before. This was a great act o f blasphemy, but it also had a certain polio cal
connotation. Somehow this Hermes statue was connected with the democ-
racy, and the people had the feeling that some subversive activity had taken
place. Then resident aliens (m etics) revealed that other defaccments o f stat-
ues had happened earlier, but the bíg scandal was the profanation o f the
Eleusinian mysteries, the most sacred mysteries in Athens. T h e rumor was
that the terrible fellow behind it all was Alcibiades. This was the back-
ground o f the recaí I o f Alcibiades and o f Alcibiades’ flight. H e knew that
condemnation o f death was the only possibility those days for, as people
now say, public hysteria.
O f the sevcn o r eight characters in the Symposiumytwo others beside Al­
cibiades were implicated in this very dangerous undertaking: Phaedrus and
Eryximachus. This has to be taken into considera ti on. A profanation o f

14
I N T R O D U C T O R Y R E M A R K S

mystery occurs only when someone reveáis it to another who is n ot already


initiated. Later on ¡n the Symposium we d o find an explicit presentatíon o f
mystery, given by Sócrates. I suggesc tentatively that the dramatic play un-
derlying the Symposium is that here you get the true report o f what hap-
pened in 4 1 5 o r 4 1 6 . N ot the vulgar, hysterical kind. This, aftcr all, was
very dignified, but we see how things be come distorted.
Apollodorus is surprised that Glaucon thinks that the symposium took
place only a shorc while ago. Glaucon knows only that there was in the
house o f Agathon a party at which Sócrates and Alcibiades were prese nt.
Apollodorus says, this is absurd. Agachón left Athens many years ago— how
could the party have taken place a short while ago? B u t why did he refer to
Agathon? Sócrates was always in Athens, his situation did n ot change. What
about the other man, Alcibiades? I f the thing had taken place in 4 1 5 it
would be perfecdy sufficient to say, “H ow can you say that that party took
place now, since everyonc knows Alcibiades left in 4 1 5 ncver to return?”
W hy refer to the obscure fact that Agathon won the prize? Answcr: Because
Alcibiades was in Athens. Alcibiades had returned to Athens in 4 0 7 . H e was
such a genius that he compelled the city which he had betrayed to permit
him to recurn, and to acquit him. That is also the reason why the story is
told now. The open hysteria and terrible indignación have now been over­
eóme. The most endangered Alcibiades is now restored. H e is the leader o f
the procession to the shrine in Eleusis o f De meter and Kore, the o b ject o f
this profanation o f the mysteries.
O f course you can raisc this question; Why does a serious man likc Plato
make such jokes? T h at will only gradually appear when we enter into the
subject, but it is important to keep this in mind: the Symposium is a dialogue
made unique by its title and by the fuct that it is narrated by someone other
than Sócrates, secondhand, for the second time. I t is a story that happened
some years ago, but now we can finally hear it.
I mention another point which, I think, will be o f some help. W hen you
com e to rcad the dialogue, you will see that the subject m atter is eros.
There is no question about that. But Phaedrus, a young man, proposes eros
more specifically, and perhaps as a m atter o f course, as a god— the god
Eros. Eros is not introduccd as a power o f the human soul, o r what have
you, but as the god Eros. Now, ifw e look around in the Platonic dialogues,
we find the greatest variety o f subject matter. We find many dialogues deal-
ing with god or the gods, most specifically the Lares, the only dialogue
which begins with the word g o d . We find som ethjng which is al most explic-
idy called the theology in the sccond book o f the R epu blic. B u t no other d¡-

15
C H A P T E R O N h

alogue is as a whole devoted to a god, goddess, o r god$. The R epublic, ob-


viously, is devoted to justice, the L aw sxo law. The only dialogue devoted to
a god— god with a small ¿ — is the Symposium. From the point o f view o f
the coramon notions prevailing at the time, a god is o f course an infinitely
higher subject than the just, o r laws, or rhetoric, o r any other subject. We
must put these things together: the uniqueness o f the character, the
uniqueness o f the circumstances o f the narradon, the uniqueness o f the
the me. Then we understand also this playful link-up with the profanation
o f the mystenes in 4 1 6 o r 4 1 5 . This is the gravest, the most dangerous
thing, the profanation o f the mysteries o f the gods. This is, I think, the tra-
didonal description o f what the Symposium is about.
Naturally we have to raise this question: I f this is so, why is Eros and no
other god singled out as the theme o f a Platonic dialogue? And other ques-
tions follow from this: the ambiguity o f eros as a god, the way the Greeks
understood a god, and also what we mean by eros, a charactcr o f the human
soul. This ¡s essential fbr understanding the dialogue. I will leave it at that.

16
2 THE SE T T IN G

I would like to say again a few words about the reasons whlch ent¡-
tic onc to speak o f Plato’s Symposium in a political Science coursc. I f scien-
tifie political sciencc wcrc thc highest fbrm o f the understanding o f politi cal
things then wc should cióse Plato and return to Taicott Parsons o r similar
writers. But if scientific social scicnce is n ot quite sufficient, then wc need
some supplemcnt. This supplcmcnt is gcncrally supplied by novcls today.
In other words, by utteranees which are n ot scientific, not rauonal, which
are subjective. This implies that there is a possible conflict bctween poetry,
which ineludes novéis, and philosophy. Perhaps philosophy can do the job
that poetry daims to d o and to some extent does.
A third conside radon: the subject m atter o f the Symposium is cros. This
does play a considerable role in scientific social Science. M ost o f you will
have heard the ñame o f Harold Lasswell, who brought psychoanalysis into
political Science. This has had a very great success with the profcssion. T o
judge psychoanalysis and its contribución to political Science onc wouíd
have to have some awareness o f alternad ve interpretations o f eros. T h e al-
ternative interpretation o f eros is supplied in Plato’s Symposium. O ne couíd
give other reasons o f a similar kind in case there is stiil someone among you
who does n ot sec the necesslty for political scientists to study Plato’s Sym-
posium yand I am perfectly willing to open such a discussion.
T o turn, then, to the Symposium: I said last time the theme is eros. The
Symposium scands out among the Piatonic titles in that its title is unique.
T h e title indicates the occasion o f the conversation. There is a connection
between the unique character o f the title and the unique character o f thc
subject. The subject ¡s n ot simply eros; it is thc god Eros. The Symposium
is the only Piatonic dialogue explicitly devoted to a god. We have to con-
sider also, and we began this last tim e, the peculiar position o f the Sympom
siu m within the body o f Piatonic writings. There is no completely isolated
Piatonic dialogue. Every dialogue is connected with every other dialogue
but sometimes in a very indirect way. O ne o f thc first steps one has to take
in trying to understand a Piatonic dialogue is to find out its nearest kin. I
mentioned one poínt last time: the Sym posium is one o f the three dialogues
which are n ot narrated by Sócrates. T h e two others are the P arm en ides
and the P baedo. They are the only Piatonic dialogues dealing with the

17
CHAPTF. R 1 w o

young Sócrates cxplicitly. The young Sócrates had been the subject o f
Aristophanes’ comedy the Clouds, which, in terms o f Sócrates’ biography,
is still an earlier stage than the one prcsented in the P arm en ides and the
Phaedo.
The Sympostum is the only diaJogue in which Aristophanes, the author
o f the C louds, appears. M ore obvious and cíear is the relation to another di­
alogue: the Phaedrus. The subtitle o f the P haedrus is “on eros,” whereas
our dialogue is explicitly devoted to eros. The leading character in the
P haedrus is Phaedrus, who is responsible, as you will see, fbr the discussion
in the Sympostum. Obviously, then, thcse two dialogues are dosely relatcd.
I would like to make only one rcmark, which later on might prove to be
helpful, about the relation o f the se two particularly beautiful dialogues—
the Symposium and the Phaedrus. 1 think that the dramatic date— the inner
date— o f the Sytnposium is 4 1 6 . 1 think the P haedrus is later. Phaedrus, who
is present in the discussion in the Symposiutn, as wc shall see, turns up later,
some years later, in a conversation which he has with Sócrates in strict pri-
vacy, somewhere outside o f Athens. I can only give one indication now. At
the end o f the P haedrus a reference is made to a famous tcacher o f rhetoric,
ISócrates, who was born in 4 3 6 , and therefore was twenty years oíd at the
time o f the Sympostum. B u t the reference at the end o f the P haedru s does
n ot fit a very young man, a man o f twenty. This is, I think, an indication that
Isocrates was already at least twcnty-five when the P haedru s took place.
This is fbr the time being a mere m atter o f information but will later on
prove to be o f some ¡mportance fbr the understanding o f the spcech o f
Phaedrus. His speech is the first one in the Symposium.
1 will leave it at these general remarks and would like to cum now to the
text.
I secm to myself to be not unpracticed in what you ask abouc. I hap-
pened co be going up to town from Phaleron the day befo re yescerday.
One o f my acquaintance spotted me from behind and callcd from a dis*
tance, making a joke o f his cali: “Phafcrian," he said. “You there, Apol*
lodo rus, aren’t you going co wait up for me?” And I stoppcd and let
him catch up. And he said, “Apollodorus, as a maeter o f fact I was just
recently looking for you, as I wanted co karn abouc the get-together of
Agathon, Sócrates, and Alcibiades, as well as o f all the rest who were
present ac the dinner party— abouc the erotic spcechcs, what thcy
wcrc. The rcason is that someone else, who had heard it from Phoenix
the son o f Philippus, was narrating it to me, and he claimed that you
too knew. He couldn’t in fact say anything clcarly. So you be the onc to

18
I HE SETT1NC

nárrate it to me, for it is most just that vou rcport the speeches o f your
comrade.” (1 7 2 a l-b 6 )

L et us stop here for a moment. O ne thing we see immediately: there is a


great kinship between this scene and the opening scene o f anothcr Platonic
dialogue; the R epu blic. The ñame o f the anonymous man has n o ty e t been
mentioned, but it is Glaucon. T h e R ep u blic cuiminates in the assertion that
the highest piece o f learning is the good, and I mentioned last time that the
subtitle o f our dialogue i$ “on the good .” But in the R ep u blic the speakers
stay outside the city, in the Piraeus, whereas the Sytnposium takes place in
the city. There will be no newfangled things in the Sytnposium, no utopia as
in the R epublic.
I would like to say a word about the very beginning o f the dialogue,
which does n ot come out in the transí ation: it opens with a tone o f extreme
subjeccivity. This will be o f some meaning later on. Now we see Apol-
lodorus is again away from hom e; two o r three days before the same had
happened. Probably he is on his way to Athens to seek Sócrates. Glaucon,
the anonymous man addressing him here, the day before had gone to
Phaleron, also on the seaboard, in order to seek Apoílodorus, the speaker.
Glaucon wanced to know about the symposium, but he did n ot know any-
one in Athens proper who could tell him about it. The refere he had to go
out to the suburbs to find out about it. The key ñames, as you see already
here, are Sócrates, Agathon, and Alcibiades. Sócrates, everyone knows who
that is; Alcibiades, the dangerous, gl amoro us politician, the most gifted
man, politicaUy, after Pendes; and Agathon, a tragic poet, o f whom we shall
hear later. Glaucon refers to a common me al which had takcn place, not a
coram on drinking. N ot drinking together, but eating together. They really
cat, and this is another nice dlfference from the R epu blic. In the R epu blic
they are promised a meal but d o n ot get it. The Sytnposium is much less as-
cetic than the R epu blic— they eat. And this is o f very great importance.
Therefore no utopia. They are satisfied, somehow.
Now, this Phoenix, the son o f Philip, is a figure in Xenophon’s Sytnpo-
siutn. B u t chis Philip is a d ow n, a maker o f laugheer. Philip, as we shall see
later, belongs obviously to the older generation. Phoenix and Apoílodorus
are the y ounge r generation. In H om er, Phoenix plays a certain role. H e
was the teacher o f Achilles, cursed by his father. Pcrhaps the Phoenix here
mentioned was also cursed by his father, Philip, for having turned to
Sócrates. Glaucon appeals to Apollodorus’s speciai obiigation to spread
the knowledge o f Sócrates' speeches, and Apoílodorus tacitly acknowl-

19
C HAPT £ R T W o

edges this special obliga tion. We can le ave it at these remarks for the time
being.

“But before anything else," he said, “tcll me, wcre you yoursclf prcscnt at
chis get-together or not?” And I said, “It docs scem that thc narrator was
giving you an absolutcly unclcar narration, if you believe that the get-
togcthcr you're asking about occurred so recently that I too was presenc.”
“Yes,” he said, “Indeed I did.” “How could that be, Glaucon?” I said.
“Don’eyou know that it’s bcen many years now sincc Agathon has bcen in
residencc he re, and since thc time I pass the time with Sócrates and have
made it my concern to know on each and every day what he says and does
has not yet bcen three years? Before that I used to run around haphazardly
and believe I was doing something, and I was more wretched than anyone
whatsoever, no less than you are now, you who believe you must do every-
thing rather than philosophize." And he said, “Don’t jeer, but te 11 me
when that get-together occurred.w(172b6-173a5)

L et us stop he re. A get-together is a being together, and being together has


also the meaning o f sexually being together. This is not unimportant. Later
on, very Interestingly, this becomes the term fbr lecturcs. O f being together
in all forms, even sexually, philosophy becomes the highest form o f eroti-
cism, and therefore also any com m on incellectual activicy o f some dignity.
Glaucon had heard o f that symposium only recently, and he thought that
it had taken place only very recently. But it could n ot have taken place re*
cently for Agathon had emigrated many years ago. This is the refutadon o f
the opinión Glaucon has. But why does Apollodorus use this argument?
What about the two other men, Sócrates and Aicibiades? Sócrates is still in
Athens. Therefore nothing has changed in his existence. But Aicibiades too
must be present in Athens, otherwise the remark doesn't make sense. As I
mentioned last time, Aicibiades had left Athens in 4 1 6 . At the beginning o f
the Sicilian expedid on (in 4 1 5 ), the re was a big scandal, and he returned in
4 0 7 after the reconciliad on with the Athenian city. So this, too, gjves an idea
o f the date o f the conversation. This is important, and I will mention it later,
because o f thc change that took place in the situation berween 4 1 6 and 4 0 7 .
You see that Apollodorus is an enthusiast for philosophy. Only philoso-
phizing is happincss, and everybody ought to philosophize. But Glaucon
does not take this quite seriously. H e takes the great rebuke rather as mock-
ing. He is a businesslike fcllow.

And 1 said, “Whcn wc wcrc still children, when Agathon won with his first
tragedy, on thc day after he and his chorus had oftered thc sacrifice for vic-

20
I HE S R T T J N C

tory.” "So íc was after all,” he said, “a very long rime ago, ic seems. But
who narrated it to you? Or did Sócrates himsclf?” “No, by Zeus,” I said.
(1 7 3 a 5 -b l)

May I s ay only this; God forbid that Sócrates would have told the story. The
idea that Sócrates could have told the story is impossiblc.

“It was the same one who told Phoenix. It was a cercain Aristodcmus,
from the deme Kydathenaion—small, always barefoot. He said he had
been at the get-together, being more a lover o f Sócrates, it seems to me,
than anyonc clse at that time. Howcvcr, it is truc that I also askcd Sócrates
before now about some o f the things I had heard from him [Aristode-
mus], and he agreed in just the way he narrated it.” wWhy, then, don’t you
nárrate ic to me?” he said. “The way to town in any case is as suitabte for
speaking as for hcaring as we go along. ” (1 7 3 b 5 -8 )

Now we see that the date o f the Symposiutn is herc clearly given: after
Agathon’s first victory. I t took place the day after che solemn celebración o f
that victory in the form o f sacrifices. In the R epubltc, you will recall, the sac­
rifico takes place simultaneously with the díscussion, Oíd Cephalus goes
out while they make the discussion. H erc the re is no overlapping o f sacrifice
and conversación buc a harmony becween chem becausc chcy are on differ-
ent days. The naive Glaucon thinks that Sócrates might have told o f the
symposium, but this is altogethcr unthinkable to Apollodorus. The source
for the account is n ot Sócrates but Aristodemus. W ho is that Aristodcmus?
The re is a referente co him Ln the fourth chapee r o f the first book o f
Xenophon’s M em orabiliay where he is presented as a man who ridicules
those who sacrifice to the gods and who use divination. In other words, he
is a man o f hubris, a word which is very hard to transíate, the negative
meaning o f pride. This Aristodemus, who is a somewhac strange fellow,
comes from the same deme— these were the administrative units o f
Athens— as Aristophanes.
Aristodemus is the only source o f the exact report o f that symposium.
Phoenix is also mentioned but not precisely. Aristodemus is the source by
way o f which the older generation o f Socratics informa the younger gener-
ation. Apollodorus is the only one who leaks that Information to the out-
side public. This is somehow connected with the fact that Apollodorus is a
very enthusiastic man and can not keep back such an exciting story. Apol­
lodorus checked with Sócrates some o f the points. Sócrates said, *Yc$,
that’s correct.” Sócrates takes an cnrirely passive role. W hcn he is asked he
says yes, but he would never tcü the story on his own account.

21
C H A P T B R T W O

T h e story is told on the way from Phaleron to Athens. Athens stands for
something in Plato— fbr many things, but cspecially for freedora o f speech,
for the ability to say everything. And it is a way up, from the coast i ni and, in
more than one respect. L t t u$ continué:

So as we were going on togcther wc wcrc talking about thcm, and henee,


as I said at the start, I am not unpracticcd. So ifthere’s any need co nárrate
it to you all as wcü, chcn that’s what I must do. For I too, whenever either
l myself do some talking about philosophy or I hear it from others, quite
apart from my belief that I am being benefited, you can’t imagine how
ovcrwhdmingly 1 enjoy it; but whenever I hear some difiere nc sort o f talk,
cspeciajly your kind, the talk o f the rich and moneymakers, 1 am as much
distressed for myselfas I pity those comrades ofyours, because you believe
you’re doing something while doing nothing. And perhaps in turn you al1
suppose me to be a miserable wretch, and 1 believe your belief is truc. I,
however, don’t believe it about you buc know it well. ( 173b9-d3)

In spite o f his missionary impulse, Apollodorus has learned this much from
Sócrates— that one must wait until the others feel a need, or a lack. In other
words, one must n ot teil a story unasked. H e tells the story on request. H e
is outstandingly glad when speaking o r hearing speeches about philosophy.
U p till now the interlocutors had only heard there were erotic speeches, but
some how that seems to be the same— unless we assume that speeches on
eros are by their nature philosophic speeches. Apollodorus is also fiiil o f
anger about the nonphilosophic speeches and full o f compassion for those
who turn their back on philosophy. Especiaíiy if they are wealthy, because
they do not have the excuse o f poverry. Now, ¡n spite o f his constantly hear­
ing speeches about philosophy, Apollodorus is cursed, most unhappy, His
turn to philosophy three years ago, when he met Sócrates for the first time,
has transformed his wretchedness, ofw hich he did n ot know, into complete
misery, o f which he knows. In other words, he is n ot exactly a model o f
happiness. We also observe that this very humble man raises a high daim to
superiority. The word I occurs all the time and also the word n arration .
This is o f importance in another contcxt which we may cake up later.

Comrade: You are aJways o f a piece, Apollodorus. You are always


speaking ill o f yoursclf and cveryonc clsc, and you sccm to me to suppose
that simply everyone, starting with yoursclf, is wrctched, exccpt Sócrates.
And how you cvcr got the dcsignation, to be callcd usoft,” I do not know,
for you are aJways o f the same sore in your speeches, raging like a wild
beast atyourselfand everyone else,except for Sócrates.” (173d 4-10)

22
THE S E T T I N G

T h e altérnate reading, how he g o t the sobriquet “crazy,” doesn’t make


sense because he is obviously crazy; but it is puzzüng how such a passionate
man should come to be called a softy. Now you $cc that chis comrade is
more fhendly to Apollodorus than even Glaucon. Perhaps he knows him
better. B u t why should this comrade ask Apollodorus after Glaucon had?
Glaucon went to Phalcron in order to hear the speechcs about that sympo-
sium. Perhaps Apollodorus had found, as an effect o f his telling it to Glau*
co n , that he should tcll it to others. Perhaps he induced that comrade and
hls companions to ask him, Apollodorus, for his report. This comrade finds
Apollodorus to be without compassion, “raging like a wild beast” and sav*
age in his condemnation o f everyone except Sócrates. Therefore, he rightly
asks, “How com e that they cali you softy?” Why is he called a softy? T o give
in to em otion is soft. T o be so full o f enthusiasm for Sócrates and so fiill o f
rage against the others is soft. This is a point o f view which is n ot so visible

Apollodorus: So it's perfeedy olear, is it, my dearest one, that in think-


ing this about myself and about you all that I am crazy and ouc o f my
mind?
Comrade: It’s not worthwhile to quarrel about chis now, Apollodorus;
but just as wc bcggcd you, don’t do othcrwise but nárrate what werc the
speeches.
Apollodorus: Well, then, they were somcwhat as fbllows— but rather, I
shall try to nárrate them to you from che beginning just as he [Aristodc-
mus] narrated them. (173el-174a2)

This is the end o f the introductory conversation. Apollodorus admits that


he is raging and out o f tune. You notice perhaps the irony; the fact that I
have a low opinión o f myself and everyone else is a p ro o f o f my madness, he
says. For it is sanity to think highly o f oneself and everyone else, which is a
good practica! rule. His comrade does n ot deny that this subject is seríous,
but he thinks it ¡s a subject n ot truthfully to be discussed with Apollodorus
now. It is a rarc case that a nameless comrade is somehow more sensible
than a comrade o f Sócrates.
L et us stop here for a moment and enter into some broader considera-
tions. T h e first point can only be a brief repetition o f what I said last time at
some length. T h e three participants, Phaedrus, Eriximachus, and Alcibi-
ades, remind us o f the great scandal o f 4 1 5 - 4 1 6 , the profanation o f the
mysteries. This was the great impious act undcrlying the accusation against
Alcibiades in the following year, and al1 the great political tragedics which

23
C H APT R R T WO

followed thereafter, because Alcibiades fled to the ene mies o f Athens. The
Symposium tells us whac reaily happened in that profanation o f the myster-
ies. The true story is entirely different from what popular hysteria held. The
mysteries divulged were n ot those o f Eleusis but mysteries told by an en­
tirely different priestess from Mantineia— we shall see that later— and the
man who divulged them was Sócrates himself. Alcibiades was compietely
innocent. He carne in only after the whole thing was over. Therefore also
the strange story about the dates; the story is told in 4 0 7 , after Alcibiades
had made his peace with Athens. The making o f the peace culminated in
the fact that the oíd procession to Eleusis, the seat o f the mysteries, was car-
ried on under the leadership and auspices o f Alcibiades. The hysteria o f 4 1 6
had compietely disappeared; if we may use such a word, everything was
fine. Now the story could with some safety be told. I do n ot agree with
what some people have said about Senator McCarthy, but you know the
popular language about it, and you know that there are quite a few things
which could not be said in this country with grace some years ago that can
now be said, after this hysteria has disappeared. This was a very small thing
compared to what happened in Athens. No onc was condemned to death
because he had some dubious relations with communists, whereas ¡n
Athens they were kiiled by the dozens. It was ccrtainly dangerous to te II
some thing about it. This is the ironic background o f the Symposium.
The allusion to an impious and criminal relation o f mysteries ceases to
be strange once onc refleets on what philosophy or Science is in Plato’s
view. Philosophy o r Science attempts to unco ver all secrets and in this sen se
to profane all mysteries— to discover the truth and to proclaim it. But there
is a difficulty here. Apollodorus proclaims the truth and this is connectcd
with the fact that he does n ot quite know what he is doing. Apollodorus is
not a theoretical man, Philosophy proper, while being concerncd with un*
covering the truth, does not reveal all mysteries to everyone, does not have
missionary zea!. Sócrates never told the story o f the Symposium.
Another point: In the Symposium there are seven speakers. The first ís
Phaedrus, then Pausanias, then Eriximachus, then Aristophanes, then Aga-
thon, and then Sócrates. Later o n , but not on eros, Alcibiades. T h e speak­
ers on eros are the first six. All seven speakers have one very superficial
characteristic in com m on: they are all Athenians. This is remarkable. I f we
think o f the R epu blic, for example, one very important individual, Thrasy-
machus, is obviously not an Athenian, but even Cephalus and his whole
family are, as we know from other sources, strangers. O r think o f the
P haedo-Sócrates’ death. T h e key in terlocu to r are from Thebes— Simmias

24
THE S E T T I N G

and Cebes. T h e Symposium is an Athenian affair. AJI speakers at the Sympo-


sium , with the exceprion o f Aristophanes, appear in another Platonic dia­
logue: the Frotadoras. These dialogues very much be Iong together. For the
F rotad oras is the only Platonic dialogue in which the cream o f intelectual-
ity is assembled, the chree leading sophists: Protagoras, Hippias, and Prod-
icus. Therc are fantastic fireworks. The Sytnposium is rclated to that. These
are all pupils o f sophists. That is important as the background o f the Sym­
posium . The Symposium is an assembly o f the creara o f Athenian intellectu-
alíty. This we raust never forget.
The reladonship bctween the Symposium and the F rotadoras is very im­
portant and very obvious, I think. I might mention some points. F or exam-
ple, in the beginning o f the F rotadoras, Sócrates has a brief conve rsation
with a young Athenian called Híppocrates. Hippocrates’ íuU ñame is Híp-
pocrates the son o f Apollodorus. This is, o f course, n ot our Apollodorus
he re, but a mere coincídence o f the ñame. And then another scenc which
you will see immediately: W hen Sócrates comes to the house in which all
the sophists are assembled— the house o f a culture vulture one couJd very
well say, Callias— they are n ot admitted, the door is closed. In our case we
shall see, the door is wide open. This very opposition indicares also a km-
ship. And, last but not least, when you look at the F rotadoras you will see
that Sócrates comes in rather late. The illustrious society is almost com-
pletely assembled. But two people com e in after Sócrates: Cridas and Al-
cibiades. H ete, to o , Alcibiades comes in at the end. The re are many more
such indicatíons which we will take up when we com e to it. I will leave it at
these points for the tíme being.
O ne more littlc point: Four Athenians who are reputed sophists appear
in this dialogue. This is reminiscent o f another collective scenc which I m en­
tion in passing for those who are interested in this sort o f thing— they will
n ot regret it. There is another dialogue with four Athenians, illustrious not
as pupils o f sophists but for the humbler quality o f being fathers— four
Athenian fathers. That is the dialogue Laches, which 1 rccommend you
read in connection with this. I t is seemingly very rem óte, but ¡n fact very
cióse.
Al1 speakers at the Symposium appear in the F rotadoras vn ih the excep-
tion o f Aristophanes. Why did Aristophanes not appear in the F rotad oras?
Obvious: Aristophanes is a reactionary, an enemy o f all newfangled things,
o f such things as the sophists and modern tragedy, o f people such as Aga*
thon, whom Aristophanes ridiculcs for his sofmess. But in the Symposium
there is no enmity— rather, perfect harmony. The element in which the

25
CHAP T E R TWO

sccne takes place— festivity, wine— is among well-bred human beings con-
ducive to amity and harmony. Nevertheless therc are important difFerences
in the Symposium>as wc shall see.
Aristophanes had attacked the new tragedy o f Eurípides and also
Agathon, contrasting it with the oíd, ancient tragedy o f Aeschylus. Aeschy-
lus— M arathón fighter, American Legión. Eurípides— what would be anal*
ogous co that in American life? I don’t know. Now, the document o f the
attack on this new tragedy, in the ñame o f the oíd tragedy, is Aristophanes’
play the Frogs. In the Frogs, Dionysus, the god ofw ine and the theater, goes
down to Hades where he be comes the witness to a venomous disputation
between Aeschylus and Eurípides for supremacy in tragedy. They behave
compietely like fishwives. Dionysus is made the judge between the two. He
makes the decisión eventuaiiy with a view not to the poetic quality but to
the political judgment o f the two tragedians. Eurípides is opposed to Alci­
biades; Aeschylus is willing to accept Alcibiades. Dionysus chooses Aeschy­
lus, the man favorably disposed toward Alcibiades. In the Frogsy then, we
have a contest between two tragic poets which is decided by Dionysus, the
god o f wine, with a view to Alcibiades. That is the model for the Sytnpo-
sium . In the Symposiutn the contest between che tragic poets is over:
Agathon has won. We have a contest, as will appear, becween a tragic poet,
a comic poet, and Sócrates. The scope is infinitely larger. Dionysus is ex-
plicidy said to be the judge, as we find near the beginning where Agathon
says “Dionysus shall be the judge.” B u t who judges? In a way Dionysus, but
actually Alcibiades. The place o f Dionysus is taken by Alcibiades who de­
cides in favor o f Sócrates. So you see how elegantiy Plato pays Aristophanes
back. The man who is made the point o f reference in a contest between
tragic poets decides at the Symposium in favor o f Sócrates, whom you,
Aristophanes, so unfairly ridiculed and attacked in your comedy. Wc can say
that the Sytnposium is the reply o f Plato to Aristophanes’ Frogs. Aristopha­
nes is the center figure among the seven speakers o f the Symposium} and he
appears nowhere else as a character in the Platonic dialogues. The Sympo-
sium is the Platonic reply to Aristophanes and to the poets altogether, be-
cause, as we shall see, Sócrates wins also against the tragic poet.
The Symposiutn is the contest between Sócrates and all other Athenian
wisdom— sophistic o r poetic— in which Sócrates is given the crown by the
most gifted Athenian statesman with a view to Sócrates’ whole life and not
only to his tirades. But, we have to add, as we shall find later on, Alcibiades
is drunk and he was not present at the contest proper, namely at the
spccchcs, whereas Dionysus in the Frogs was present when Eurípides and

26
IHB S E T T I N G

Aeschylus fought it out. W hat is the conclusión? We cannot defer to Diony-


sus or Alcibiades; we must judge and see who is right. I think we shall leavc
it at that and turn now to the beginning. Probably, the rclations to the P ro-
tag oras and the Frogs are most revealing. We see an cnorm ous feat: a com-
edy o f Aristophanes, which is a very grcat piece o f art, Plato claims to have
surpassed by this book— not only because it is more true theoretically, but
also as a work o f poctry, and we must see that. In other words, Plato’s Sym-
posiu m must also contain the comical, amusing element in which the
Aristophanic comedies are so rich.

He said that he met with Sócrates fresh from the bath and wcaring slip-
pers— which he was seldom in the habit o f doing— and he asked him
where he was going, having become so beautiful. “To dinner at Aga*
thon’s,” he said. WI avoided him yescerday at che victory celebration, in
fear o f che crowd, but l agreed I would come today. Accordingly, I beau-
tified myself, in order that a beauty I may go to a beauty. But you," he said,
“how do you fcel about it: would you be willing to go uninvited to din­
ner? ** And I said, “ In just the way you bid m e." “Come aJong then,whe
said, “in order that we may corrupt the proverb by a change, ‘Good on
their own go to Agathon’s feases.’ Though it’s probable Chat Homcr not
only corruptcd this proverb but also committed an outrage [hubris]
against ic: he made Agamemnon an excepdonally good man in martial af*
fairs, and Menelaus a ‘soft spearman,* but when Agamemnon arranged for
a sacrifice and a feasc he made Menelaus come to the banquet uninvited,
an inferior to that o f the better.” ( 1 7 4 b 3 -c4 )

The jokc consists partly in the fact that in all probability (it is an emenda-
tion, n ot in the manuscript) the good go on their own accord, i.e., without
invítation, to the meáis o f the good. “O f the good * (ag ath on ), in the
Greek, sounds exactly Üke Agathon. This would mean, then, that the good
go o f their own accord to the meal o f Agathon. So there is a Homeric basis
for this interlude. Now let us consider this: you see, Sócrates is rarely beau-
tiful. The word b ea u tifu l is, o f course, in a way the key word o f this book,
and it is translated differently by translators— understandably— because in
English it would have a more limited meaning than in Greek. In Greek, the
word b ea u tifu l means first o f all what ¡t does in English; it means also the
feir in the sense o f fair action. In English I don’t be lieve you can speak o f a
beautiful action, but you can d o it Ln Germán or French without difficulty.
In Greek the word beautiful means what is lovable, cspecially to the sense o f
sight, but also what is lovable tbr the eye o f the mind. It is the Greek word
for what we would cali moral. This needs a minor qualification: there is a

27
C H A P T E R J WO

Greek expression for what we cali the moral, the noble and the just. The
just things are things which you are obliged co do— pay debts, etc. But the
noble is, in a way, that which is beyond the cali o f duty, that which you can-
not expcct cveryone to do. The noble, then, has a higher status than the
merely just. B oth meanings are somehow always prcsent in any Platonic ref­
ere ncc, which can lead to all sorts o f ironies, for example the man who is
very beautiful to look at, but has a very lousy character. The contrast is
more no ti cea ble in Greek than íf we would say “a handsome crook,” and
the other way around.
Sócrates is rarely beautiful. H e has madc himself beautiful for the occa-
sion. He goes as a beautiful man to the beautiful Agathon. Agathon, the
host, is a beautiful man, notoriously beautiful. At Sócrates’ suggestion Aris-
todemus goes with him uninvited. The two o f them go, as Sócrates gra-
ciously suggests, o f their own accord— for Sócrates is, after all, invited; he
ineludes himself in the same category as Aristodemus— to the meal o f
Agathon. Sócrates is beautiful. He suggests that Aristodemus, to o , is beau­
tiful. But Aristodemus is obviously n ot dressed for the occasion. According
to the proverb, “The good go o f their own accord to the meal o f the good.”
Sócrates destroys the proverb by changing the good into the beautiful. The
good is n ot identical with the beautiful, and that is the great theme o f the
Symposiutn, which is already announced in the beginning: whether eros is
love o f the beautiful o r n ot rather lo ve o f the good. S o far we know only
that the two are beautiful; we don’t know whether they are good. Sócrates
changcs the good into the beautiful. What Sócrates does is bad, but not as
bad as what H om er did to the proverb. H om er presented a bad man going
o f his own accord to the meal o f an outstandingly good man. Sócrates
changcs the proverb, he makes a kind o f pun, but it is n ot so bad. The sub-
stitution o f beautiful for good is a corruption, a destrucción, but the substi-
tution o f bad for good, as H om er did, is a corruption and, in addition, an
insult. But Sócrates is not beautiful. He has made himself as beautiful as he
could, but the re are limits to that, limits imposed by nature. Aristodemus,
to o , is n ot beautiful. How d o we know that? H e was small, and according
to the Greek view small men cannot be beautiful, they can only be nicc.
Therefore we condude with utm ost precisión that Aristodemus is not
beautiful. Tw o non beautiful men go uninvited to the meal o f a beautiful
man. In other words, Sócrates does the same as H om er, he commits a
hubris as great as H om er’s. This them e, Sócrates’ hubris, will be very im-
portant in the sequel. L ct us go on from here.
L isttn er: Sócrates changed to go to Agathon’s, but Aristodemus did

28
I HK SETT1N Ü

n ot; he is without shoes. Could you explain che subsdtudon o f che one for
che other?
Mr. Strauss: Aristodemus is the most inconspicuous o f ail people there.
H e does not speak. He has a ve ry distinguished seat somewhere, as we shail
see later. H e and his appearance are undisringuished. Aristodemus is in a way
the true image o f eros. Eros is n ot brilliant. Eros is a being in quest— needy.
H e is the oppositc ofluxurious, sleepingon hard floors, exposed co ail sores
o f difficulties. Sócrates is a much greater man, better known, and thereforc
he is invited. Aristodemus is not invited. Aristodemus lo ves Sócrates, just as
the others do, jusc as Apollodorus does. We wiil com e co this question later,
buc I wish co indícate the general character o f this question.
There are six speeches on eros. In a way the first five are wrong. They are
ail refuted. But there cannot be absolute error; every theory contains an el-
ement o f truth. You can easily see that if you take an atrocious untruth like
“The sun is not shining now,” which is obviously untrue, it nevertheless
contains such important verides as “There is a sun” and “The sun is shin­
ing.” At any ratc, there is no untruth without primary truth. Therefbre,
none o f these speeches is simply untrue. This is reflectcd in a complicated
way in the characters. Each character is an erotic individual. S o is Sócrates.
But whereas Sócrates presents the erotic character on the highest level,
the others represent the erotic character partially. Sócrates is a completely
erotic man, the others are incomplete. We must see therefbre what kind o f
croticism is characteristic o f Aristodemus. One thing one can say to begin
wíth: Aristodemus lovcs Sócrates, Sócrates does n ot love Aristodemus.
Sócrates is a lover, but a lo ver o f some thing else.
There is a passage in the Second Lctter o f Plato, which is generally, per-
haps universally, regarded as spurious, but this should n ot prevent one from
reading it and enjoying it. I t says that there are no writings o f Plato’s in
existence. There are only speeches o f Sócrates having becom e young and
beautiful (3 1 4 c 1 - 4 ) . Socratic speeches are n ot simply the speeches o f
Sócrates, realistically, but those o f the Sócrates who has been transformed,
who has been beautified and rejuvenated.

When he heard this, he [Aristodemus] said he said, “ Perhaps, however, I


too shall run the risk, not as you are saying, Sócrates, but ajong the lines o f
Homer, o f being no good and going uninvited to the banquet o f a wise
man. See what deíense you will make for bringing me, since I shall not
agree that I have come uninvited, but invited by you.*
“Wc shall plan what wc shall say,” he said, “as the pair o f us go forward
on the way together. But let’s go ” ( 1 7 4 c5 -d 3 )

29
C H A P T F. R T W O

[Tape change.]
. . . the beautifuJ go to the beautífiil, buc the Homeric versión is that the
bad, the low, the inferior go to the good. Aristodemus knows that Agathon
is surely wise, being a tragic poet, and Aristodemus is not aware o f posses-
sing such gifts. But, in spite o f knowing the facts, he is a reasonably proud
man. He does n ot like to com e in as a beggar.

After some such conversaron, he said they star ted o ff Then Sócrates, pay-
ing attendon to himselffor some reason or other, fell behind as he was go*
ing on the way, and when he waited for him co catch up [Sócrates] urged
him to go on ahead. (1 74d4 - 7)

Apparently they do n ot talk while walking. This is a famous the me whích


comes up frequently. The dífficulty behind it is that íntellectuaJ activity and
boddy activity d o not go to o well togethcr. But this must be judiciously un-
dcrstood. In the Law s, for example, a large part o f the conversation is ex-
plicitly made while they walk. H ere, Sócrates suddenly turns from paying
attendon to the goal, Agathon’$ housc, to paying attcntion to himself.
From Plato’s point ofview this means self-knowledge, as developed in an-
other Platonic dialogue, the C harm ides; It is n ot morbid brooding; self-
know ledge is to recogn ize o n e ’s g o o d o r bad qualities. T h is presupposes
standards. The refere, self-knowledge is based and, in a way, consists in
knowledge o f the good. So, when Sócrates turns to paying attendon to
himself, that means he is paying attendon to the good. H e turns to a silent
meditation. Aristodemus again obeys Sócrates without any fuss. Sócrates
stops be cause o f his meditation and they come to the neighborhood o f
Agathon’s house.

When he goe to Agathon's house he found the door open, and he said
somcthing funny happcncd to him thcrc. Some boy, onc o f thosc within,
met him at once and led him to where the rest were lying down, and he
carne upon them as they were about to diñe. Agathon, in any case, when
he saw him, said, wOh Aristodemus, you*ve come at a fine time to diñe
with us. I f you carne for something else, put ie o ff to another time, since
even yesterday I was looking for you in order to invite you, but 1 was not
able to see you. But how come youVe not bringing Sócrates to us?"
(I7 4 d 7 -8 )

You see the problem is very elegantly solved. Aristodemus does n ot have to
give an excuse, he does not have to say anything, because Agathon, the gra-
cious Athenian poet, has a beautiful, noble line.

30
T H E S B T T 1 NG

U sten er: This does n ot seem so nice on the part o f Sócrates. There he
had promised to take him and now he lets him walk in by himself.
M r Strauss; But what ¡f Sócrates had anticipated that such a perfectly
well-brcd man would be gracious. This is n ot unreasonable to assume. I
mentioned before that this scene reminds us o f a similar scene in the P ro-
ta b ora s where they com e to the house o f Callias where all the inteiiectuals
are assembled, and the door is locked. A eunuch watches the door. H e does
n ot want any other inteiiectuals to com e in. H ere the door is wide open, a
much more liberal atmosphere prevails. There is an atmosphere o f free-
dom , as distinguished from that o f eastern despotism, as one could say on
the basis o f the reference to the eunuch. But we must also add that there is
no me al in the F rotadoras>where as here the meal reinforccs the atmosphere
o f freedom. Now, where is Sócrates? l t is well known that Aristodemus
would n ot appear anywhere without the company o f Sócrates.

And I, he said, tuming around, sce that Sócrates is not foliowing any­
where. So I said that I had in fact come with Sócrates, invited by him to
dinner there.
“ It was good ofyou to d o so,” he said. “But where is he?"
“He was coming in just behind me, and I too am wondering where he
could be."
“Go look, boy,” Agathon said, “and bring Sócrates in. And you," he
said, “lie down beside Eryximachus.” (1 7 4 c 9 -1 7 5 a 5 )

There is nothing in particular to say here, but we must kcep this in mind:
gradually we will get a picture o f the sitting arrangement which is not unim-
portant. Aristodemus will sit with Eryximachus, one o f the six pcople, and
a very important figure. We will see later on what this means. L et us go on.

And he said che boy washed him o ff so he could lie down; and anocher o f
the boys carne back to report, “Your Sócrates has retreated into the door-
way o f the ncighbors and scands there, and when I caJIed him he refused
to come in."
“That is strange," he said. “Cali him and don*t let him go.”
And he said, “Don'c do it, kc him be. This is something o f a habic with
him; sometimes he withdraws wherever he is and stands. He will come im*
mediately, I believe. So don’tbudge him, but ieave him.” (1 7 5 a 6 -1 7 5 b 3 )

Aristodemus knows the habits o f Sócrates and proteets him, Agathon tries
to disturb. By the way, servant is in Greek always boy, which ¡s not entirely
irrelevant, because the lo ve o f boys is in a way the grcat theme o f the Sym-
posiutn.

31
C H A P T t R T W o

“Wcll,” he said Agathon said, “that’s whac we must do, if you think so.
But, my boys, fcast ¿U thc rest o f us. You serve whatever you want, in any
case, whenever someone does not stand over you— something I have
never yet done— so now, in thc bclicfthat I as wcQ as all thc rest here have
been invited by you to dinner, trcat us so we may praise you.” { 1 7 5 b 4 - c l )

This ís also meant to indicate che atmosphere: perfect absence o f command,


perfect anarchy in the literal sense o f thc term. The door is open and no one
commands. Perfect liberty. Naturally Agathon pretends to be more anar-
chic than he actually is. Why does he have to give this command to the
boys? There is, then, a certain element o f pretense in this elegant man.
Everyone is alrcady there. Agathon is particularly gracious, and who would
n ot be, after having won such a prize? We can assume that he is not always
in such a festive m ood and then he may give commands to his servants for
all we know. Sócrates comes in last, in the midst o f dinner.

After this he said they were dining, but Sócrates did not come in. Agathon
often bid them to send for Sócrates, but he did not allow it. (1 7 5 c 3 -4 )

You see this conflict: Agathon the alleged perfect liberal, tried to interfere
very much with Sócrates’ liberty, and Aristodc mus proteets him once again.
Then he did come, having passed the time as he usually did; and it was not
very long, but they were about halfway through dinner Then Agathon—
he was lying alone in the last place— said, “Come here, Sócrates, and lie
down beside me, in order that 1, in touching you, may enjoy thc wise
thing that occurrcd to you in thc porch. Ic’s dcar you found it and have it;
you would not have otherwise desisted.” { 1 7 5 c6 -d 2 )

This ¡s the first indication we have o f the seating arrangement. Agathon sits
at the end. Since the order ofspeakers is that Sócrates is last, the order o f sit-
ting is n ot Identical with thc order o f speaking. Somewhere Eryximachus
sits with Aristodemus. S o far we don’t know any more. Agathon begins
with a joke: “Sócrates you may have found some wise thought, and I am
very anxious to hcar that by just touching you.”

Then Sócrates sat down and said, “It would be a good thing,” he said, “if
wisdom were o f the sort as to flow out from thc fiillcr into thc emptier o f
us if we touch one another, just as the water in wine cups flows through
wool from the fullercup into che emptier. For if wisdom too is o f this sort,
I put a high pricc on my lying beside you. My own [wisdom] would be a
poor sort, or maybc disputable, being just likc a dream, but your own is
brilliant and admits o f much progress, inasmuch as it flashed out so in-

32
I HE S E T T I N ü

tcnscly from you whilc young and became conspicuous the day before
ycsterday bcforc more than chirty thousand Grcck witnesses." (1 7 5 d 3 -
« 6)

L et us stop he re. “Sócrates you are a man ofinsolentpride” (1 7 5 e 7 ). L et us


see if Agathon is n ot rude here or if he says something which is proper.
What does Sócrates say? H e says it would be wonderful if mere bodily prox-
imity and bodily touch— don’t forget the dialogue deais with eros and
therefore with bodily proximity— if mere bodily proximity would be the
bese purveyor o f wisdom. Thcn it would flow from the futí into the empty.
“I f wisdom were o f such a nature, it would be a real boon to sit with you,
Agathon.” Think for a moment: is wisdom o f such a nature? N o. Henee it
is n ot a boon and an honor to sit there. And what Agathon tells him lateron
is perfeedy deserved. You see also here, “Since wisdom is n ot o f this nature,
I put not great store on sitting next to you.” This ís very nasty. And you see
here also, though only provisionally, the contrast betwcen poetic andphilo-
sophic wisdom regarding splcndor. Poetic wisdom is not questionable.
Poetic wisdom is, in the first place, splendid; philosophic wisdom is not.
Secondly, philosophic wisdom is dubtous, questionable, whereas poetic
wisdom is n ot, which is ironical. Why is poetic wisdom n ot ambiguous? The
tragic poet moves successfiilly many men. There must be something to it.
Agathon does not say here, as others sometimes d o, you are ironical, but
rather, you are insolent, proud, overbearing. In a way Sócrates is that, and
we will find quite a fcw cxamples o f that later on. We see from this remark
right in the beginning that Sócrates is hubristic. But, as I said, the ordinary
reaction to Sócrates’ remarks is that he is ironical, not that he ¡s proud.
What is the relation? W hat is irony? Starting from the outside the word
means dissimulation, dissembling. But it takes on, in Plato and Xenophon,
thanks to Sócrates, the meaning o f noble dissimulation. Now, what is noble
dissimulation? The dissimulation on the part o f a superior mind o f his su-
periority. Something like politeness. A rich man who does n ot display his
wealth but looks like an ordinary taxpayer. That is ironical, because it is a
noble dissimulation. Sócrates does this all the time, since he i$ manifestly
wiser than almost anyone in the dialogues. He says he knows nothing, he
always asks questions. “W hat do you think couragc is?” This seems to imply
that he doesn’t know it, but the other feUow must. This is irony. Aristotle
says somewhere in the E thics that the magnanimous man is ironical toward
the many, meaning he conccals his superiority in speaking to the many. But
what has this to do with insolence? This is not a far-fetched question and I

33
CHAPTKB. TWO

think you all know the answer from our presen t-day use o f the word ir úni­
ca!. A man conceals his superiority out o f politeness. His superioríry is per-
ce ¡ved but not heard. W hen the other man perceives it the irony ceases to
be a consideradon. Very frequently when we say a man is ironieal we mean
that he is a nasty fellow in the guise o f politeness and self-effacement. Now,
is it cíear that if irony means the dissimulation o f a man’s superiority, when
this dissimulation is noüced by the other it is insolent? There is something
to that. We must not forget this side o f Sócrates.
In the vulgar sense o f the word Sócrates was, o f course, n ot insolent.
But we are concem ed here with a somcwhat more subtle thing. Irony is one
o f those things which fulfills its purpose only when unnodeed. Does this re­
mi nd you o f a problem which has been touched upon on other occasions?
That there are things which are ctfective regardless o f whether they are no-
ticed o r not and others which are effective only when noticed. In the so-
called doctrine o f the sophists the distinction was made bctween the virtues
other than justice and justice. Take temperance. I f the doctor prescribes for
you not to drink cocktails because you will g ct into trouble, obediencc to
this prescription will have its effect regardless o f whether anyone norices it
or not. In other words, you may drink the cocktails in utm ost secrecy but
you will be punished for it. There are certain rules with which one must
comply because o f the consequences. L et us take the case o f tax evasión. I f
someone evades taxes and he is an extremely elever tax lawyer and he is
lucky, the tax evasión will pass unnodeed. Strictly speaking, crimes against
justice are punished only, at least on ean h , when one is caught, when they
are noticed. Irony has something strangely in com m on with justice. Its ef­
fect depends entirely on not being noticed; whether it is noticed or not
noticed is an essential element o f its work. Therefore, the reference to inso-
lence is a point in the right direction. Now let us go on.

“Anyhow, we shall arrange for a trial, you and I, about wisdom a littic
later, using Dionysus as the judge; but now fim turn to dinner." ( 175e7-
10)

You see, Dionysus shall be our judge. That is, in a way, the formula for the
wholc thing. Dionysus shall judge which wisdom is the highest. H ere un-
derstood by Agathon in a limited way. Agathon’s wisdom or Sócrates’ wis­
dom. In the course o f the evening it will be a contest between Sócrates and
everyone else regarding wisdom. But it also indi cates that the contest be-
twecn Sócrates and Agathon is o f special importance, and therefore Aga­
thon’s last spccch is, in a way, the decisive specch, as we must see later.

34
THE SE T T IN G

After this, he said, when Sócrates had lain down and dined along with thc
rest, thev made libations, sang o fth e god, and did all che resc o f the cus*
tomary things, and then turned to drinking. He said then chat Pausanias
began a spcech o f this sort. “Weli then, men, in what manner shall wc
drink most easily? Now I tell you for my part I am having a really hard time
o f ir, on account o f yesterday'* drinking, and I need somc respite— I sus-
pcct that many ofyou do too, for you were here yesterday— so consider in
what manner we would drink as casily as possiblc.” ( 1 7 6 a l - b l )

Thosc o f you who were ever drunk, which I trust is the minority, will know
the relevanee o f that remark. This is, o f course, a negad ve proposa1 which
pavés the way for the positive proposaJ, namely to make speeches inste ad o f
drinking.

Then Aristophanes said, “That is a good proposal, Pausanias, to arrange in


any way possible for some case o f drinking, for I too am onc ofycstcrday’s
soaks.” He then said that Eryximachus, son o f Acoumcnus, when he
heard them, said, “You are speaking bcautifully. But I still need to hear
from onc o f you, Agathon, whether hc's feeling up to drinking.”
“I myself am not," he said, “up to it either.”
“It would,ieseems, be alucky find for us," he [Eryximachus] said, “for
me, Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and thosc here, if you who are most capable
o f drinking have now given up, for we are always unable. I leave Sócrates
out o f account, for he is capable cithcr way, so it will suffice for him
whjchever we do. Since, then, it sccms to me that no onc o f thosc present
is eager to drink much wine, perhaps 1 would be less disagreeablc if I
should speak thc truth about drunkenness, what sort o f thing ic is. On the
basis o f the art o f medicine it has become, I believe, perfeedy plain to me
chat drunkenness is a hard thing for human b ein p ; I myself, as far as my
will gocs, would be unwilling co drink any further, and I would advise any*
one else not ro either, especial ly if he is still hung over from th cd ay b c-
fore.” (1 7 6 b 2 -d 4 )

We must watch thc individuáis. Pausanias and Aristophanes say they are still
soaked from yesterday. But then Eryximachus takes over, who is, in a way,
the most com petent man, being a physician. “My Science tells me that
drunkenness is very bad.” In addition, he is a very poor drinker. There is a
perfect agreement betwcen Science and necessity. Wc lcarn certain things
which are important for later developments about the characters o f certain
individuáis. Phaedrus, for example, is also a poor drinker. Eryximachus and
Aristodemus are both in a love relación. There is a similarity between them.
Aristodemus, to o , is n ot a good drinker, which shows a difference between

35
C H A PT E R T Wo

him and Sócrates. But the other fellows are very good drinkers. The re is no
moral principie involved, they ju$t can’t stand a second night. Sócrates is an
absolutely particular case, he is n ot anxious to drink, but if compelled he
drinks more than anyone else without ili efFect. The re is a peculiarity which
appears right in the beginnlng.
You see also something about the procedure which is not unimportant.
Eryximachus had already found out before by a quiet opinión poli that
Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and some others wouldn’t drink any more. Pausa-
nias and Aristophanes had already given their Opinión. The only one who
has not been asked is Sócrates, but this is not rudeness because it is weü
known that Sócrates can drink.

Here Phaedrus ofMyrrhinus intervened and said, WI, for my part, am ac-
customed to obey you, especially in whateveryou say about medicine; and
now, if they delibérate well, the rest will too.” When they heard this, they
all agrecd not to make the present get-together chrough drunkenness, but
to drink as it plcased them. (1 7 6 d 5 -e 3 )

D o you notice anything about the charactcr o f this speech here, the lan-
guage he uses? First they make the proposal not to drink. It is unanimously
accepted. This is important— the unanimíty o f decisión. The atmospherc
o f friendship, perfcct harmony, in a way the atmospherc o f eros. This is o f
some importance. Phaedrus is a younger man and he is, in a way, the lead-
ing individual as wc shall see. He comes in after his older friend Eryxi­
machus had taken over and becom e the chairman o f the assembly. O f
course the she-flute player is practically thrown out. She should play to the
womenfolk; this i$ a strictly male affair, Only males are present.
L isten er: In the only other dialogue where there is a woman, the P baedo,
she is also thrown out.
Mr. Strauss: That is not bad. But to be ftrir to the fair sex as well as to
Plato we must make one remark right away: There is the highest speech at
the peak, and it is presented to us is a woman, so they com e back with a
vengeance.
L isten er: I get the impression that the strong drinkers can drink and are
uncomfortable if they don’t get a chance to , and the weak drinkers can’t
and are uncomfortable if they are made to. In both cases the capacity and
the desire coincide. In Sócrates’ case the capacity is there but the dcsire is
n ot such that he would be uncomfortable in either circumstance. Isn’t
there a case exeluded ofsom ebody with the desire but without the capacity?
In other words he likes to drink but he is a bad drinker, he gets drunk.

36
T H E $ B T T I S' G

Mr. &r4M¿r; T h at’s a good point. O f coursc it is clear that everyonc may
drínk as much as he likes. Thcrc is no fixed rule. Now, thc deliberación, the
assembly, goes on. T h e main point, which is so emphatic here, is that all
aspeets o f ordinary symposia— drinking plus flute playing, maybe other
things— are exeluded from the very beginning by unanimous decisión. But
it is ímportant that some o f these people who vote o r steer the Symposiuttt
are induced to do so by a hangover from yesterday. In other words they are
n ot always so severe. For Sócrates it wouldn’t have made any difíerence if it
were yesterday. The poor drinkers would, o f course, also have voted against
heavy drinking, n ot because they are stronger than drinkers but because
they are weaker.

37
3 PHAEDRUS

I repeat: thc Sym posium is the only Platonic dialogue explicitly


devoted to a god, and ¡t is, o f course, a Socracic dialogue. Sócrates is the
chief speaker on the subject. Sócrates denies the divinity o f that being, eros,
which is generally regarded as a god. H e denies the divinity o f the only
being generally accepted as a god that is the theme o f a Platonic dialogue.
This forces us to remind ourselves o f the accusation against Sócrates.
Sócrates was accused o f having denied that the gods worshiped by the city
o f Athens are. And this was preceded by Aristophanes’ C louds, in which
Sócrates was presented as saying, among other things, Zeus is not. In his
A pology, written by Plato, we see that Anaxagoras said the sun is a stone,
that is to say, n ot a god. In his A pology Sócrates does n ot refute the chargc
that he does n ot believe in the existcnce o f the gods worshiped by the city
o f Athens. H e evades the charge in two ways: In the first place the accusa­
tion had committed the folly o f saying that Sócrates introduced new de-
m onic things. Sócrates asked, “What is a demon? A demon is an offspring
o f a god and a human being. H enee, by beüeving in demon, I believe o f
course in gods.” The other point is the reference to the Dclphic Apollo.
Sócrates had spent his whole life serving the Delphic Apollo, who had com-
manded him to de vote his life to him. But, as a m atter o f fací, n ot Sócrates
had gone to Delphi but his younger friend Chaerophon, in order to ask
whether there was anyone wiser than Sócrates. W hen the orade replied no,
Sócrates didn’t believe him. H e tried to refute the Oracle. This was his Ser­
vice to the Delphic god. This is n ot a very convincing refutation o f the
chargc.
There is one great Platonic dialogue which takes up this problem very
obviously. That is the Law s. The L aw s is the only Platonic dialogue begin-
ning with the word g o d . In the tenth book o f the L aw s Plato presents what
one might cali his theology and also his political doctrine regarding gods. It
consí sts in a substitution o f the gods o f the cosmos fbr the gods o f the city.
The impiety which is to be condemned is the impiety against the gods o f
the cosmos, but n ot the impiety against thc gods o f the city, which are
merely a figment o f the imagination. We can say Plato subsdtutes a natural
theology for a civil theology.
In the Sym posium , as distinguished from the A pology o f Sócrates, we find

38
I» H A K r> R U s

Sócrates’ frank State me nt about a god. He is the only speaker who denies
that eros is a god. The occasion is a symposium, where peoplc drink wine,
or are supposed to drink wine, and therefore a perfect time cvcn for inso-
lence o r what is popularly thought to be impiety. Why did Plato choose the
god Eros for this purpose? Eros was not an object o f pubüc worship in
Athens, ñor in most Greek cities. Therefore ¡t was n ot protected by the law
the way Zeus was. B u t, o f course, the re is another re ason too. What was de-
ified in the god Eros, namely, the phenomenon eros, is a natural phenome­
non, for the knowledge o f which we are n ot dependent on myths. I t is a
human phenomenon o f the utmost importance, most poweríul and most
amiable, a kind o f new god. I remind you that the charge against Sócrates
was that he had introduced new gods.
Eros is not simpiy above m en, in the way Zeus is thought to be above
m en, but in men. One could, therefore, $ay, and this has been suggested by
a vcry philosophic intcrpretcr, Gerhard Krüger, in E in sicht u n d L eid en -
schafty which appeared originally in 1 9 3 9 , that belief in the god Eros is the
mythical expression o f man’s sovcrcignty. It is a question whcther this is ad-
equate. The basis o f this view is that the Greek rationalism o r Greek en-
iightenm ent, in contradistincdon to the m odem enlightenm ent, is able and
compeüed to give its vicws a mythical expression. M odem enlightenment is
wholly unmythical. I f it uses mctaphoric expressions, like Prometheus etc.,
that is wholly unnecessary. According to this view, however, the Greek en­
lightenm ent was incapable o f such unmythical expression.
Now, let us consider this for one m om cnt, because it has vcry much to
d o with our themc. The speakers in the Sym posium are enlightened people,
pupils o f sophists. They d o n ot believe in the myths, but thcy expréss thcm-
selves in mythical language. I will n ot go now into the historical question o f
what this means; I will rather limit myself to the question o f what is the
characteristic the sis o f the sophists according to the generally acceptcd
view. Answer: the fundamental distinction between nature and convention.
Nature and convention are distinguished and to some extent even op-
posed. And the gods exist merely by virtue o f nomos. Thcy owe their being
to human enaetments, tacit o r explicit. This opposition between nature and
convention implies the supremacy o f nature. Man owes his best to nature,
to gifts, as distinguished from his own achievements. Nature, therefore, can
be called by these people divine. There is no sovereignty o f man in Greek
enlightenment, no conqucst o f nature. Law, convention, art, technology—
all are subject to nature. The human things are a vcry small province within
the whole. Inferior not only in size but also in dignity. The originating prin-

39
C H A P T K R l ' HRKB

ciples are not human. Therefore, all these men admit, in one way or an-
other, standards o f human conduct which are natural. They differ as to the
content o f these standards— they deny, for exampie, that the just is nat­
ural— but that the re is something good by nature is not denied by anyone.
From this it follows that all human activity, and especiaUy the most highJy
rcnowncd— poli tic al activity— is inferior to theoretical activity, to the un-
derstanding o f the whoíe. This is an intellectuai activity that transce nds the
political and can never be fiilly integrated into the political. There is a ten­
sión between intellectuai perfection and political o r social perfection.
Therefore one can al so say, though in the fbrm o f a footnotc, that accord*
ing to the classical enlightenment there is no harmony between intellectuai
progress and social progress. At any rate, from this older, this pre-Socratic
rationalism which is ordinarily called sophistic, there follows o f necessity
that there cannot be a popular enlightenment. This is the re ason why they
are all compellcd, more or less, to engage in a mythical presentadon o f their
doctrines. In purely histórica! and external terms one can only State the
massive fact, obscured by a certain eighteenth-century myth, that the
Greek city was noc liberal and therefore there werc nccessary limits to what
a man could publicly teach. One way o f evading this limitadon was mythi­
cal speech. The most obvious example o f that is the myth o f Protagoras ín
Placo’s dialogue F rotadoras.
The SyfHposium, I said, presents Sócrates’ hubris. I t presents his devia-
tion from the accepted views with al most perfect frankness. What Plato fur-
ther does in the Sym posium is to link up this special case o f Sócrates with the
biggest scandal related to impiety which cver happened in Athens, the pro-
fanation o f the mysteries i n 4 1 6 o r 4 1 5 . The worst offender, according to
the rumor o f the tim e, was Alcibiades, and the whole ching was followed by
severe persecución, In 4 0 7 , howevcr, at the time the dialogue is told, a rec­
onciliación has taken place. In 4 0 7 the true story can be told. It is told, be-
cause now ¡t can be told. And what Aristodemus suggests is that the pop­
ular rumors about these terrible things were all wrong. Alcibiades was
innocent. H e carne ¡n after the whole thing was finished. T h e offender
was Sócrates. But he didn’t offend the way popular rum or had it. There was
nothing o f black magic, as we would say, or o f the mutilation o f statues etc.,
nothing o f vulgariry. W hat happened was very delicate and refined and took
place at a symposium in the most refined society.
The original accuser o f Sócrates was Aristophanes, as Sócrates himself
suggests in his A p o lo s and the accusation was made in Aristophanes’ com-
edy the C louds. H erc Plato shows us that Aristophanes was present, that he

40
P H A B D R U S

was an eyewitness o f whac happened. Plato rcplies on behalf o f Sócrates


to Aristophanes’ true accusation, which goes much beyond thcsc vulgar
things. The true accusation was that philosophy is inferior to poetry. H e re,
Sócrates is contrasted with Aristophanes, indeed, with cornedy and tragedy
and all Athenian wisdom. This is modeled on an Aristophanic comcdy, the
Frogs, in which Aristophanes presents a contest betwecn the tragic poets.
Plato goes infinitely beyond that. The re is no longer a con test berween two
tragic poets. That has alrcady been finished, Agathon has won. Now we
have a contest between all torms o f Athenian wisdom, which Sócrates wins
with flying colors.
I have to say a word about the connection between the Sym posium and
another Platonic dialogue— the P rotagoras. I mentioned last rime that all
speakers at the Sym posium are Athenians, even the two reporters, Apol-
lodorus and Aristodemus. This is very un usual in Platonic dialogues. I re-
mind you only o f the R epu blic, wherc the foreigner Thrasymachus plays
such a large role. T h e Sym posium is a disrinctly Athenian affair. All speakers
at the Sym posium , with the excepción o f Aristophanes, appear in the P ro­
tagoras, i.e., in the company o f the most illustrious sophists. W hen Sócrates
enters the house o f Callias, where the most illustrious sophists stay, he finds
Phaedrus and Eryximachus, speakers one and three at the Sym posium, in
the company o f the sophist Hippias, and Pausanias and Agathon, speakers
two and five, in the company o f the sophist Prodicus. After Sócrates enters,
Alcibiadcs enters with someone else, just as Aldbiades enters at the end o f
the Sym posium . W hat does this relarionship o f the P rotagoras and the Sym­
posiu m mean? In the P rotagoras, Protagoras is presented as a teacher o f
good counsel and ofvirtuc. There is a certain difficulty, which derives from
the fact that there are many virtues, tor example, couragc and jusricc. This
difficulty is to some extent overeóme by the fact that one virtue is the hígh-
est, and that virtue is called knowledgc o r Science. Yet knowledge o r Science
does n ot guarantee goodness o f action. Wc all know that we may know
what is better and yet do what is worse. This difficulty is evcntually over­
eóm e, at least apparendy, by concc ivi ng o f knowledgc as the calcularion o f
plcasurcs. We all seek only pleasure, that is the assumprion. We wanr a máx­
imum o f pleasure without any moral conversión, merely by greater shrewd-
ness and calcularion, i.e., by greater intelligencc, by Science, a calculus o f
pie asures. This is the the me o fth e P rotagoras.
Sócrates refutes Protagoras’s claim. Protagoras is n ot a man o f good
counsel. Protagoras’s actions in the dialogue always indícate the wrong
choices. For example, he knows that his acrivity is very unpopular as a

41
C H A P T E R I H R E B

sophist. He thinks he can avoid all the difficulties by frankly professing to


being a sophist, by revealing the myscery o f his activity. B u t he fails in this.
H e is compeLicd to tell a myth. O n the other hand, Sócrates proves to be
the man o f good counsel. Sócrates is presented, through some allusions, as
Odysscus— the shrewd, wily man who can keep a secret. The relation o f the
F rotad oras to the Sym posium is this: In the Sym posium Sócrates is not pre-
sented as a wily man o f good counsel. Odysseus is never mendoned. There
is pertect frankncss o f speech, revelation o f a mystery. This is an important
part o f the reladon o f the two dialogues.
We began to read the dialogue last time and wc carne to the passage
where we tound the silent meditation o f Sócrates. I would like to say a few
words about that. As you recall, Sócrates comes late because he had fallen
into a silent meditation. Later on Alcibiades will speak o f another occur-
rence o f this kind. I would like, as I always do, to scart fforn the most pop­
ular side o f a man. The most obvious presentation o f Sócrates i$ given by
Xcnophon. In the first chapter o f Xenophon’s M em orabilia, vulgarly the
memoirs o f Sócrates, Xenophon defends Sócrates against the accusation o f
impiety as foliows: Sócrates had no secrets, he was always in the open, there
was no monkey business ofany kind. He was always talking. O f course this
cannot be entirely maintained, bccause somcümcs he had to stop, he had to
sleep and go home. The opposite o f that is, o f course, silent meditation.
There you do not know what a man thinks. This is an indication o f the
problem. We do n ot know whether what Sócrates says later in the dialogue
was the thought he discovered during that silent meditation.
Aftcr Sócrates has begun his conversation with Agathon, he speaks o f
the lowness, the inconspicuousness o f his wisdom. It cannot be moving,
it cannot be charming in the way Agathon’s, the tragic poet’s, wisdom
moves.
Tw o more points about what wc discussed last time: The first concerns
the order o f sitting. I must indicare this now, because I cannot be certain
that every one o f you has reread the Sym posium . The order o f sitting is this:
At the top is Phaedrus, who is called the father o f the speeches. Then there
are some missing, i.e., they are sitting but their ñames are not mentioned
because they do n ot speak. Then wc come to a man called Pausanias. Im-
mediately following is Aristophanes, the comic poet; then the physician
Eryximachus, and then com e Agathon, the host, and then Sócrates. This I
learned only since the last meeting from Professor von Blanckenhagen, be-
cause I always thought that Agathon was sitting last. I am now satisfied that
it’s just the other way around. Sócrates is sitting at the end. This is probably

42
M U E n r u s

duc to thc fact that thc uninvited Aristodemus took Sócrates’ place. This is
the order o f sitting, which is also the ordcr o f speaking, with one great ex-
ceprion; Eryximachus and Aristophanes changc places be cause Aristopha-
nes is temporarily disabled, as we shail see.
Someone made this point: W hcn we get a descripción o f che characters at
the beginning they are cataloged with a view to drinking. We find those who
are unable and unwilling to drink, people who are able but unwilling to
drink— they have a hangover— and one who is able to drink yet indifferent:
Sócrates. Mr. Gildin made the point that this disjunction is not complete.
This is quite truc. Which is omitted? Ablc and willing and unable and willing
are, o f course, omitted because we want to have unanimity. N o one must be
positively eager to drink. People who are unable to drink and yet indifierent
are omitted too, I suppose because they are not worth mentioning. But
there is another cype which we could think of. We have people who are able
to drink and unwilling because o f hangover. What about people who are
able to drink and unwilling on principie? I believe they to o are out o f place,
because they would hate thc pleasure o f drinking and, the refere, they would
be likely to be haters o f eros as well. This is my tentarive suggestion.
There has been a unanimous decisión to de vote the evening to speeches,
as distinguished from hard drinking. There is a proposal to de vote this be-
ing together to speeches on eros. Sócrates is silent in this first section, just as
he was absent for such a long time before. This is in accordance with the
general characterof the Sym ponutn. In all Socratic dialogues, that is in all di­
alogues in which Sócrates occurs, he is the chief figure. But in the Sympo-
siu m Sócrates rules visibly in less than half o f the book. First there was a
negative proposal about the procedure for this evening. It was started by
Pausan ias, continucd by Aristophanes, and concludcd by Eryximachus, in
thc order o f sitting. Thrcc speakers who are not young and who sit, some-
how, farthest to thc left. Phacdrus speaks after these threc men, for the very
simple reason that he is young and modest. Sócrates was not prese nt yester-
day for the drinking bout. The strongest drinkers are Aristophanes, Pausa­
d as, and Agathon, to say nothing o f Sócrates. Phaedrus and Eryximachus
are n ot good at drinking; they are valitudinarians, which ís o f some impor-
cance for thc later happenings. Eryximachus is that by profession, being a
physician. Wc have noted the unanimity o fth e decisión and the parliamen-
tary procedure. Now let us read.
uWell, then,* Eryximachus said, “since this has been resolved, to drink as
much as each one wants but there is to be no compulsión, I propose after
this that we dismiss the ilute girl who has just now ente red, and let her

43
C H A P T E R THREfc

fíate for herselfor, ifshe wants, for che womcn within. But wc are co be to-
gether with one another for today chrough speeches, and, if you want, I
am wíliing to expíala to you through what kind o f speeches.”
They aJl said they did want to and urged him to makc thc proposal.
Then Eryximachus said, ‘‘The beginning o f my spccch is in line with the
M elanippe o f Eurípides: ‘The story is not mine.' What I am about to say
belongs to Phaedrus hcrc. Phaedrus on seve ral occasions said to me in an-
noyancc, ‘Isn't it terrible, Eryximachus,' he says, 4that hymns and paeans
have been made by thc poets for some o f the other gods, but for Eros,
who is so oíd and so grcat a god, not even one o f the innumerable poets o f
the past has made even one cncomium? And if you want in turn to con-
sider thc sophiscs, they compose in prose praises o f Heracles and others,
as, for example, the excellent Prodícus did— and this is less astonishing.
But I have carne across a cercain book o f a wisc man in which salt had
amazing praisc for its usefulness, and you would see that many other
things o f the kind have rcccívcd encomia. Isn'c ic terrible to be in great
earnest about things o f this sort, and for not one human being to have yet
dared, up to this very day, to hymn Eros in a worthy manner, but so grcat
a god has been so neglcctcd?’ Now Phaedrus, I think, speaks wcll. So I de-
sire not only to offer him a voluntary contribution and grarify him, but it
sccms to me appropriate as well at the presenc time for us who are present
to adorn the god. Ifyou also think so, thc re would be an adequate pasóme
in speechcs. It seems to me each o f us ought to speak, staróng on thc left,
a praisc o f Eros as bcaudful as he can make it, and Phaedrus should be thc
fírst to speak, since he is lying in ñrst place and is the father o f the logos as
wetl." (1 7 6 e 4 'l7 7 d 5 )

Eros has never been praised, at least n ot propcrly, and therefore th¡$ sym-
posium will be thc first adequate praise o f the god Eros. This proposal is
again unanimously acccptcd— accepted, however, in a different way. The
acceptance in the sccond place is strikingly different from the acceptancc o f
the negative proposal. T o mention this only bricfly now, in the second case
wc have n ot a democradc decisión but a dictatorial, authoritarian decisión,
made by Sócrates. He decides it without having asked anyone. This is an­
other sign o f his strange hubris. O f course Sócrates sensed the meaning o f
the assembly and therefore didn’t have to take any votes. Aftcr this has been
done, Phaedrus becomes the first speaker, first o f ail because it was his pro­
posal and also because he sits at the front o f the table. H e is the first in the
sitting order and therefore also the first in the speaking order.
He re, then, the the me is introduced— the god Eros. W hy was Eros sin-
gled out? H e was not worshiped in Athcns. It is easier, less dangerous. The

44
P H A K D R U S

thcm e ¡s proposed by Phaedrus. Why docs Plato make Phaedrus propose it,
and why for the Sym posium as a whole? In order to answer the question, we
would have to know Phaedrus’s point o f view, which we do n ot know. We
get a provisional answer in the im medíate sequel where Sócrates is said to
have no other art except the erotic art. I said before, Eros ts a god cxperi-
enccd by everyone. O ne could say this applies also to H elios, but there it is
n ot cvident; the sun might be a stone. Eros is the only god experienced by
everyone o f whom it is ccrtain that he is a god, i.e., that he is living and su*
perhuman, a living power stronger than us. This superhuman beíng which
is experienced by everyone is lovable. A t any rate, Eros is somehow the
m ost important god, which does n ot neccssarily mean the highest.

“No one, Eryximachus,* he said Sócrates said, “will vote against you.*
( !7 7 d ó -7 )

You can compare this with the similar situation regarding the negative pro-
posal. Eryximachus had the decency to look around and see what the oth-
crs think. H ere Sócrates givcs the answer without asking anyone, which is
an insolent decisión. You must keep in mind this thcm e o f insole nce, which
is very important.

“For justas I surely would not re fuse, I who asscrt that I know nothing ex­
cept the erotic things, so surely would neither Agathon and Pausanias—
let alone Aristophancs, whose wholc pasóme is about Díonysus and
Aphrodite— any more than anyone else o f those I see here.* ( 177d7—e3)

Aristophanes’ whole activity is devoted to the praise o f wine and to the


praise o f love. His subjeets are two gods, Dionysus and Aphrodite. O ne o f
them has nothing to d o with love as love— Dionysus— where as Sócrates is
undividedly committed to eros.

“Yet for us who are lying down last it is not cqual, but if those before us
speak adequately and beaudfully it wiU be enough for us. Well, let Phae­
drus scart, and good luck to him. Let him praise Eros.*
Everyone else then assented and urged just what Sócrates had. Now
what cach onc said o f aíi who spoke, Aristodemus could hardly remember,
any more than I could rccall all that he said, but I shaU tell you the points
in the logos o f each o f those I thought especially worth remembering.
(1 7 7 e 3 -1 7 8 a 5 )

You see the the me is designated not only by the god E ros, but by the praise
o f the god Eros. l f it is indeed the task o f the poet to adore and magndy the
god Eros, one can say all are partisans o f the tragic and the comic poets for

45
CHAI'TER i H R E E

the cvcning. This is n ot a vcrbatím rcport be cause Aristodemus had forgot-


ten somc things, and Apollodorus had too. N o one can use this fbr official
purposes.
Wc begin, then, with the first speech, the speech o f Phaedrus, and his
spcech will aJso gíve us an answer as to why Phaedrus suggested that sub-
jcct.
He re there is a general reference to the missing speeches. A t the end o f
Phaedrus’s speech the missing speeches wiil be located; they are ail herc im-
medí ate ly after Phaedrus and before Pausanias. It must have something to
do with Phaedrus’s speech, at least indirectly.
Now we come to Phaedrus, the first speaker. H e is responsible for the
choice o f the the me. The reason given was that Eros has never received his
due praise, although he is so great a god. There werc somc difficulties
someone suggested last time, and I myself had that question— what about
the praise o f eros in Sophocles’ A nti/fone? Well, if you read it you see that
eros is n ot praised as highly as it is here. Phaedrus appears in two dialogues
in important roles: in the Sym posium and in the dialogue called the P h ae­
dru s. This o f course does not prove that he is an important individual: the
sophist Hippias was a very ridiculous figure, much less important than
Prodicus, whom Sócrates respected to somc extern, yet Plato never wrotc a
Prodicus and he wrote two dialogues called Hippias. Why is Phaedrus se-
lected? Well, he has two qualities: he is a modest man, a young man, and he
is handsome; a most desirable combination as far as it goes. B u t he is also in
both respeets the opposite o f Sócrates. Sócrates is ugly and he is n ot m od­
est, as we have seen. There is another reason. H e studies both physics and
rhetoric. This combination reminds us o f the young Sócrates. In this dia­
logue he appears as connccted with the physician Eryximachus. In the Sym­
posium we see that Phaedrus ís a very enlightencd young man. H e doesn’t
believe the oíd tales about the gods. In the P haedru s he doesn’t know by
which god to swear. He says perhaps by the tree in front o f him, it doesn’t
make any difterence. Phaedrus was also accused o f having profaned the
mysteries in 4 1 6 . So we see h¡m as an avant-gardist, as we would say today.
Now let us read.
Now first, as I say, he said Phaedrus began to speak from somewhere like
this, in saying that Eros was a great god, and wondrous among human be*
ings and gods both in many other respeets, but not least in point o f birth.
“For che god to be among che very oldest,” he said, “is a point o f honor,
and there is proof o f this. There are no parents o f Eros, and they are not

46
P H A B 1H U S

spokcn o f by anyonc, cithcr by prosc writcr or poct, but Hesiod says


Chaos first carne co be—
‘Then chercafter
Broad-bosomed Earch, aiways a safe seat o f all,
And Eros.1
Hesiod says after Chaos these two have come into being, Earch and Eros.
And Parmcnides says o f génesis:
‘She devised first o f all thc gods Eros.1
Acousilaus agrees also with Hesiod.*' ( 1 7 8 a 6 -c l)

The re is a seeming tautology when Phaedrus renders Hesiod» but he does


n ot render h¡m slavishly. First wc have the verses, in which Hesiod says after
Chaos these two have com e into being, Earth and Eros. Phaedrus then
changes something. He omits broad-bosomed Earth» aiways a safe seat o f
all. Since the earth has com e into being it cannot be aiways, and it is, o f
course, not the seat for all things, as Hesiod erroneously said. I t is n ot the
seat for the gods, for example, o r for the stars. Eros is the oldest, for he has
no parents. All other gods have parents. He is not preceded by anyonc, he
is the founder o f the race. According to Hesiod he is the second o f the two
first-born. So he is n ot so high according to Hesiod, but according to Par*
menides, the philosopher, Eros is simply the first god invented by génesis,
by bringing into being.
There is a general rule, which I know only from practice and for which I
cannoc quote chapter and verse, that the most important in Plato is aiways
in the center. T h e most important does n ot mean absolutcly the most im­
portant. I t means the most important in the context. Parmenides is the
most important in this context because he is thc only one who simply says
Eros is the first god, whereas Hesiod makes him second to Earth. Par-
menides’ praise o f Eros is the greatest, because he says Eros is the first and
the oldest one, and secondly Parmenides’ account is more ratíonaJ than
Hesiod’s. He gives the cause o f eros— génesis— a nondivine cause, o f
course, because if Eros is the first god, génesis cannot be the first. Hesiod
doesn’t gjvc any cause, he simply says they jumped into being. Parmenides
is, as you know, thc only great philosopher who was honored by Plato with
a book tide. Plato indicatcs by this that he regarded Parmenides as the most
important o f all the earlicr philosophers. According to Parmenides1 poem»
Eros and all other gods bclong to the world o f génesis, o f coming into be­
ing and perishing. But, according to the first part o f Parmenides1 poem,
génesis— com ing into being— cannot be, because com ing into being

47
CH APTE R THRKE

means a movcment from nothing to being and nothing is noc; henee, there
cannot be génesis. This impiies that the gods as having com e into being
cannot be. Only unchangeable being is. Parmenides replaces the gods by
the unchangeable being.
Phaedrus’s speech, being the first speech, is the most frenetic speech.
B u t there is a cióse relation between the beginning and the end, between
the seed and the fruit containing a new sccd. There is a cióse kinship be­
tween Phaedrus’s speech and its reference to Parmenides and Sócrates’
speech. Sócrates no longer accepts the simple Parmenidean view, but it still
reveáis its origin from Parmenides.
The first praise o f Eros is that he is the oldest one, and the oldest is the
highest. This is an axiom for all earlier thinking. It has a deep root in human
nature and, therefore, we still say “the good oíd times.” There is a certain
veneration fbr the oíd as oíd, which needs a long analysis and which is not
sufficiently explained by our desire for stability. But in olden times “the good
cqual to the oíd” can be regarded as a primary axiom, which is then ques-
tioned. I f the good is che oíd, the best must be the oldest. Eros being the oíd-
cst, must be the best god. In the sequel Phaedrus wili draw this conclusión.

“So it is agreed, on the basis o f many sources, that Eros is the oldest. Be*
ing che oldest he is the cause o f the greatest goods for us, fbr I cannot say
what greater good there is fbr one, straight from youth on, than to have a
good lovcrand for a lovera betoved.” ( 1 7 8 c l - 5 )

Since Eros is the oldest he is responsiblc for the greatest good. This is ele-
mentary, but Phaedrus is an enlightened young man and cannot leave it at
that simple equation. He needs additional p ro o f that the oldest is the best.
H e gives the p ro o f in the following way; Goodness is virtue, but the cause
o f virtue is higher than virtue and, therefore, the best. Yet eros is the cause
o f virtue and that he will now prove.

ttFor that which should guide human beings throughout their wholc Life,
for thosc who are going to live nobly, neither kinship, honors, wcalth, ñor
anything else can implant this as bcautifiiUy as eros. What do I say this is?
It is shame for the shamcful things and honorable ambition for the beau-
tiful things, for it is impossible without thcm for cither a dey or prívate
person to accomplish great and beautiñil things. I say accordingly that a
man, whoever is in love, if it should be evident that he is doing someching
shamcful, or undergoing something shameful at someone clsc’s hands, on
account o f unmanlincss and without defcnding himself, neither were he
seen by his fiathe r ñor by his comradcs ñor by anyone else would he be dis-

48
I’ H A B D R U S

tressed as painfully as werc he seen by his beloved. And wc see this same
occurrencc in thc onc who is loved, that he is exceptionally ashamed be-
fore his lovers, whenever he is seen to be engaged in something shameful.
If, then, there should be some possi bility for a city or army to come to be
o f lovers and beloveds, it is impossible that they woold not manage their
own cicy berter than by abscaining trom ali shameful things and being am-
bitious for honors before one anocher; and besides, in fighting alongside
onc another, people o f this sort would win, though they wcrc fcw, over
virtualiy aU human beings. For a man in love would surcly choose to be
seen either leaving his post or throwing away his arms to a lesscr degree by
his beloved than by ali others; before this he would prefer to die many
times over. And as for desercing his beloved or not coming to his aid when
he was in danger, no onc is so bad [cowardlyj that Eros himselfwould not
make him inspired for virtue, so as to be like the best by nature; and
simply, as Homcr said, thc strength the god breaehed into some o f thc
heroes— this, in coming from him, Eros supplies to lovers.” (1 7 8 c 5 -
179b3)

W hat is Phacdrus’s argument up to this point? Eros is the oldest, he is there-


fore thc best. Now, he says, I will prove this independently o f all mythical
views. W hat is so productive o f virtue as eros? Nothing else. N o honor, no
wcalth, no kinship. Eros is the best because it is productive o f virtue. This is
true both in thc lover and in the beloved. This is the thesis. Now, what does
he understand by virtue? Virtue means here primarily courage, manliness,
and eros produces manliness.
There are two sides to Eros. This motive for virtue is subdivided; One is
sense o f shame, and the other is love o f honor. W hich does Phaedrus cm-
phasize? Shame. Eros, then, produces a sense o f shame, bringing about
virtue in general but manliness in particular. H ow does this show? In which
case does he prove it? In thc case o f the lover, thc beloved, o r both? In thc
lover. L et us, then, make the thesis more precise: Eros produces a sense o f
shame in the lover which makes him courageous. This is the emphasis o f thc
speech. How does this efFect com e about, how does it appear? W hen the
lover is seen by the beloved. Therefore the question arises, wili Eros have
this efFect when thc lover is n ot seen by the beloved? This ¡s n ot immedi-
ately clear, but Phaedrus goes on to say, “No one is so low that Eros would
n ot inspire him to virtue, so as to be like the best by nature.” The erodcally
inspired is n ot the best by nature. He is n ot even cqual to him, he is similar.
T h e best by nature will fight against the heaviest odds; so will the lover, but
only when seen. The best by nature will d o it simply. The praise o f Eros,
then, is amazingly qualified.

49
C H AP T E R VHKEB

What he says is this: Eros acts as a tolerable substitute ¡n the absencc o f


virtue and produces something which looks like virtue. W hether Phaedrus
is prctty clear about that ¡s not our queso on. This is decisive fbr the rest o f
the speech.

“ Lovcre alone, morco ver, are willing co die on behalf [o f their bclovcds],
and not only men but women too. Alcesds, the daughter o f Pe lias, offers
adequatc tcstimony for this to the Greeks on behalf ofthis logos: she alone
was willing to die on behalf o f her husband, though his father and mocher
werc alive. She sarpassed thcm tosuch a degree in íriendship on account o f
her eros as co prove that thcy wcre alien to their own son and were rclatcd
only in ñame, and in accomplishing this deed she scemcd, not only to hu*
man beings but also to gods, to have accomplished so beautiful a deed
that, though many accomplished many beautiful deeds, che gods gave this
as a reward co some easily countable number, to send up the souJ again
from Hades; but in admiration o f her deed they sent up hers. So the gods
too honor espccially the zeal and virtue in regard to eros.” (1 7 9 b 4 -d 2 )

Up to now we have spoken o f eros and virtue as two different things. Eros
as productivc o f virtue. Now he speaks o f a virtue concerned with eros. For
cxample, the virtue regarding eros is different from the virtue regarding the
polis, o f which he had spoken before. He re he turns to women as well, and
to the love o f a woman fbr a man. T h e previous examples were all implicitly
o f pederasty. I have to say a word about this some what unusual subject. The
com m on view, o f course, is that pederasty was the manner and custom o f
G rccce, and Plato and Sócrates suffered from this defect. It is usual the re­
fere to give a kind o f apology for this. I believe that this is really wrong.
[Tape changc.]
Today a man o f principie will not always underline that he is a man o f
principie. We must n ot be squeamish about these matters, but on the other
hand we must be principled. I suggcst aiready now that in a very playful and
gracefel way, the Sym posium is among other things a criticism o f pederasty
and n ot a praise o f it. Certain speakers praise pederasty as higher than het­
erosexual love. Buc the beauty is that they try to find a foundation for their
habits and they fail in that. In the Socradc speech pederasty occurs only in a
way which has nothing to do with certain criminal and indecent pracdccs.
And the drunken Alcibiades shamelcssly te!l$ a story that only redounds to
the praise o f Sócrates’ perfect propriety. It is an improper account o f proper
conduce. From Sócrates’ and Plato’s point o f view, pederasty, this deviation
from the natural, points to something truc and natural. I can only give one
word, which Is n ot an answer, and that word is philosophy.

50
P H A B I) R l ) S

You scc he re that Phacdrus himsclf turns to bisexual love, and appar-
ently he admits it as equal in dignity to homosexual love. Which is a lot be-
cause the next speaker will assert that pederasty is much higher in dignity
than heterosexual love.
Eros ovcrcomes the fcar o f death. We have se en this before. Eros o ver-
comes the greatest obstacle to manliness— fear o f death. But this only
means, according to what was said carlier, that eros is an inferior means for
producing virtue and manliness, by making men ashamed to be have like
cowards. In other words, eros would be inferior to nature, to the best na-
ture. Now a turn takes place, a new logos begins. Alcestis had no concern
with shame, meaning what others say, but she is possessed by the genuine
thing, by friendship. She was truly a friend o f her husband, whereas her
husband’s father and m other had only the ñame in com m on. This shows
that eros, by nature, culminates in death for the beloved. Eros is n ot a
means for virtue, but the object o f virtue, the end o f virtue. The virtue rc-
garding eros, as dlstinguished from the virtue regarding the polis, for ex*
ampie. It is heroic virtue. Alcestis's husband was one o f the Argonauts. Tw o
other examplcs, Orpheus and Achilles, also have roles in this account. This
heroic love is admired even by the gods, who, being immortal, do n ot pos-
sess it. B u t therc is a difficulty. He refers he re to the Greeks. Is this admira-
tion o f heroic love limited among men to the Greeks? And is this heroic
eroticism n ot also in need o f wicnesses, if only o f gods?

“They sent Orpheus the son o f Oeagrus out o f Hades unfulfilled; they
showed him a phantom o f his wife tor whom he had come but did not give
her herself, because he was thought to be soft inasmuch as he was one who
sang to the lyre and had not dared tbr the sake o f eros to die, as Alcestis
did, but contrived to enter Hades whilc alive. Accordingly, on account o f
this, they imposed a penalty on him, and made his death occur at the
hands ofw om en." ( 1 7 9 d 2 - c l)

Orpheus, the husband o f Eurydice, was punished by the gods because he


did not daré to die for the sake o f eros. We see he re that therc are demands
o f eros which are reinforced by the gods. There are external punishments,
also rewards, for this virtue regarding eros, which consists in self-saciificc.
In the second o f the thrce examples eros does not make the lover coura-
geous. Eros Is n ot as such self-sufficient. But o f course one could say this
lover happened to be a singer, a poet. Perhaps we could say the poets have
failed to praise Eros properly in their poems because they have failed to
praísc him properly in their actions in the first place. Orpheus was n ot pun-

51
C H A P T R U THR.EE

ishcd simply for not having died for his beloved, but for having tried to
evade death and yet cnter Hades. What is the conclusión? H e would not
have been punishcd if he had died. B u t he also would not have bcen pun-
ishcd íf he had limite d himself to evadlng death and to merely lamenting
the death ofEurydice, i.e., Ifh e hadpracticed vaietudinarianism. L et us not
forget that the praiser o f hcroic dying is the valctudinarían Phacdrus. Now
let us turn to the third example.

ttNot as chcy honored Achillcs, the son ofThecis, and sent him away to the
islcs o f the blesscd, becausc, having learncd from his mother that he
would die ifhe killed Héctor, but if he did not do it he would go Home and
die an oíd man, he dared to choose, in coming to the aid o f his lovcr Pa-
troclus and avenging him, not only to dic on his bchalf but also to dic af-
ter him, when he was alrcady dead. It was in great admiración for this fact
that the gods honored him excepdonaJly, becausc he was holding his lovcr
in such high esteem. Aeschylus talks nonsensc in asscrdng that Achillcs
was in love with Patroclus, he who was more beautiiul not only than Pa-
troclus but than all che heroes cogether; and he was still beardless and, in
the sccond pl ace, far you nger, as Homer says.w(1 79c 1- 1 8 Oa7)

Achilles is an entirely different case. Phacdrus has shown up to now the ef-
tect which cros has on the lover, n ot on the beloved. H e re we find for the
first time a case where the beloved bccomes inspired by being beloved to dic
for his lover. Achilles is the beloved who dies for his lover Patroclus. This is a
paradoxical asserdon o f Phacdrus. He defends it against Aeschylus who had
said that Achillcs was the lover, which would be the normal case. AchlUes
was the beloved for he was the most beautiful. How can we understand this
absolutely paradoxical acdon o f Achilles under the premise he had made?

“As a marte r o f fact, though the gods rcally honor in the best possi ble case
this virtuc in regard to eros, thcy wonder at and admire and benefit more
whenever the onc who is loved chcrishcs the lovcr than wheneverthe lovcr
does the beloved. The rcason is that a lovcr is a more divine thing than a
beloved, for he has the god in him. On account o f this thcy honored
Achillcs more than thcy did Alccstis, by sending him away to the islcs o f
the blessed.” (18 0 a 7 -b S )

D o you understand this reasoning? Why do the gods honor the beloved
more than the lover? L et me try to explain this: The virtue regarding cros is
more admired by the gods in the beloved than in the lover, for the god is in
the lover, n ot in the beloved. You can interpret this in two ways: either the
beloved who cherishes the lover is pious— he bows to the god— o r it is

52
P H A E n R ü S

much more difficult to have that virtue which consists in dying if onc does
n ot love than ifo n c does. The gods themselves bear witncss to the fact that
virtue which is n ot god-insp¡red is higher than the virtue which ¡s god-
inspired. Lack o f eros is superior to eros. In the P haedru s, which in my
opinión follows dramatically the Sym posium , the whole thing begins with a
speech elaborated by the orator Lysias, in which the nonlover is preferred
to the lover. L et me take chis example; I f a girl today would raise the ques-
tion W ith what kind o f man would I like to have ffiendly rclations, with a
lover o r with a nonlover? Lysias says with the nonlover; precisely be cause he
has no passion, he will not d o anything improper. This is what attracts
Phaedrus, the preference for the noniover. It is paradoxical that the non-
passionate Phaedrus should wish Eros to be praiscd. We must try to under-
stand that. T h e lover is older than the beloved, as appearcd from the discus*
sion o f the Homeric example. The oldest god is in the older men, in the
homosexual, n ot in the younger. But the younger, in whom the god is not,
who is n ot inspircd by the god, is superior in the eyes o f the gods them-
selvcs, and, I might add, in the eyes o f men. The lover recognizcs by his
pursuit a certain superiority o f the pursued.
W hat is Phaedrus driving at? We know the contradiction between the
two statements he made, the one at 179 b and the other at 179c. H e says
only lovers are willing to die for the beloved. Later on he says Achillcs the
belovcd was willing to die for his lover. Achilles rece ived a unique honor
from the gods. But what happens if we disregard this divine honor, o r if we
draw the proper lesson from Orpheus’s half-hearted action. The beloved
will n ot die for the lover, he wiií only be the beneficiary o f other m en’s love.
The beloved, especially if he is very beautiful, will be beloved by many peo-
ple and will thus be the beneficiary precisely because the god is not in him,
While the god is in the lover, the grcatest benefit accrues to the belovcd. It
is really a triumph o f valetudinarianism, or, to introduce a more precise
term , what Phaedrus wittingly o r unwittingly does is to subject eros to the
criterion o f gain, a selfish consideradon. Therefore his speech is the lowest
o f all the speechcs. I refer again to Phaedrus’s admiradon o f Lysias’s speech
in the P haedru s, where it is said that the young should prefer the nonlovers
to the lovers— a calculadng rule. I think that Lysias’s speech in the P kae-
d ru s ¡s altogethcr a rcflection on Phaedrus’s speech here, modified by the
other speech es we hear later on. In other words, Phaedrus, induced by the
experience o f our evening, has abandoned the admiration for eros com*
pletely. From the point o f view o f the calculadng recipient the nonlover is
preferable to the lover. Now, Ict us read the end o f Phaedrus’s speech.

53
CH APTE R THKEB

-Ic ’sin this way that I asscrt chat o f the gods Eros is thc oldest, most hon*
ora ble, and most authoricative for thc acquisition o f virtue and happiness
for human beings when they are alive and dcad.” (1 8 0 b 6 -8 )

As we see, then, it is a limited praise even at the end. I shall suggest a provi-
sional answer to the question o f why Phaedrus chinks that Eros has not
becn sufficiently praised. H e thinks that the benefits which lovers bestow
on the beloved have never been sufficiently praised. Phaedrus speaks from
the beloved’s point o f view, and this is very important because thc next
speaker wil1 be a lover, with a completely different perspective.
Perhaps I should give now a presentation o f the whole Sytnpostutn as
it appears to me now. I am n ot only willing but eager to learn that I am
wrong. It seems to me that we have six speeches on eros, because Alcibi*
ades' speech at the end is a speech on Sócrates, not on eros itself. The
speeches fall naturally into two parts, the first three and the sccond three.
Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus— Aristophanes, Agathon, and Sóc­
rates. I believe that the first three speeches are deficient as praises o f eros be-
cause they subject eros to something oucside o f eros: Phaedrus to gain,
Pausanias to moral virtue, Eryximachus to techne, to Science o r art. The
three others do not subject eros to something outside, they praise eros as
such. Sócrates, too, does n ot subject eros to something outside because
that to which Sócrates seemingly subjeets eros is the natural end o f eros. I f
the natural end o f eros is wisdom in the highest case, then the lovc o f wis-
dom doesn’t subject eros to something alien to it. The distribution I think
is this: Aristophanes* speech is characterized by ugliness, Agathon’s is
beauty incarnate; in Sócrates eros is neither ugly ñor bcautilul. The last
word, the key word, in Sócrates’ speech is neither ugliness ñor beauty but
che good. I believe the re is a connection here with Phaedrus* speech. L o ve
o f gain was ordinarily regarded, and I believe in some quarters still is, as
something mean, ugly. The connection betwccn moral virtue and beauty is
obvious, because in Greek it is the same word. Techne— Science, art— cor­
re sponds on the lower level to what Sócrates means by the good.
I would now like to summarize what I believe are the m ost important
lessons o f Phaedrus’s speech. His speech is obviousiy o f very great impor-
tance since he is the one who suggested the the me, on the grounds that
eros had never been sufficiently praised. This evening is to be devoted to
such praise. Phaedrus’s speech ¡$ the beginning, just as Sócrates’ speech is
the end. Phaedrus combines in his life physics and rhetoric, just as the
young Sócrates did. Then we have the key authority appealed to by Phae-

54
PHAEDR.US

drus, Parmcnides. Parmenides is the onlv one with whora he fully agrees.
W ith H om er he doesn’t quite agree, and surely not with Aeschylus and the
others. Parmcnides means that the place ordinarily occupied by the gods is
taken by purely ¡ntelligible principies. Phaedrus’s speech is set o ff frora all
other speeches and in this respect it is akin to Sócrates’ speech, which by
other devices is set o fffro m all other speeches. There is, in spite o f the low-
ness and poverty o f Phaedrus’s suggestion, a certain connection between
Phaedrus and Sócrates. Both say the bel oved is higher than the lover; both
say the oldest is the highest. Buc o f course there is a differencc. Plato un-
derstands by the oldest the most fundamental— soul. The soul is higher
than the body. Last but not least, Phaedrus invokes Parmenides. And a
modification o f Parmenides’ phUosophy wil1 be the background to what
Sócrates says in his speech, namely, the so-callcd Platonic background o f
¡deas, the heterogencous ideal cosmos, will replace the Parmenidean one—
the homogeneous one— the puré intelligcnce. 1 will try to explain this
when we get to it.
I f we read the speech with some care and concentration, we sce that
Phaedrus gives a very strange praise o f eros. In the first place he makes it
olear that lovers, to say nothing o f the beloved, are, as such, inferior to
those who are by nature best, in regard to virtue. Furtherm orc, the motive
o f these lovers is a sense o f shame rather than lo ve o f honor. They are con-
cem ed with acting nobly in the sight o f the be loved. We hear nothing about
their concerns when they are unobserved. Finally, the virtue which he
praised is one virtue only, namely manliness or courage, which, ffom a cer­
tain point o f view, is the lowest o f the virtues. Phaedrus’s speech is also
made distinctive by an extraordinary emphasis on dying, on sacrifice. This
will be important for the next two speeches, in which any allusion to these
harsh things will be avoided. Phaedrus makes a distinction. H e turns from
virtue in general, i.e., the virtue primarily concerned with the polis, to the
virtue concerned with eros— the virtue which does n ot only stem from lo ve
but is also concem ed with love. But here we see also that this love does not
neccssarily culminare in what, from the point o f view o f courage, is the
highest, namely the willingness to die. We have se en the example o f Or-
pheus, who had this love to a high degree but could not bring him sclf to die
for Eurydice. This erotic virtue is least effective in the case o f the beloved.
External rewards and punishments, rewards and punishments by the gods,
are required for bringing this erotic virtue into its own. In his culminaring
thesis, the god is in the lover, n ot in the beloved, and yet the beloved proves
to have a higher status than the lover. This is a very strange eros, that the

55
C H A P T E R T H R E E

one who does not have eros in himself should be higher. I suggest this ex-
planation: Phaedrus looks at the phenomenon o f love from the point o f
view o f the beloved, che beneficiar y o f other men’s love. This man— or
woman— does not need as such virtue. Their attractiveness, their beauty, is
perfectly sufficient. Phaedrus's point o f view, to State it succinctly, is that o f
profit, o f calculación, o f gain. Phaedrus also says Eros is the oldest god. The
oldest means the most venerable. But why is Eros mosc venerable? Because
he is most use tul to the beloved, to such peoplc as Phaedrus himself. I t is
not most use ful to man as man, and he re we shall see the great change oc-
curring later in the fourth speech, Aristophanes’ speech, where Eros is pre­
se nted tor the first time as the most philanthropic god, as the god who loves
man as man.
H ere, Apollodorus says, Phaedrus has made a speech o f this kind, more
or less exact, a remark which he makes in no other case. After this wcrc
some speeches which Aristodemus did n ot remember. There is a hiatus be-
tween Phaedrus's speech and all the other speeches. It is set o f f from all the
others. It is the shortcst o f all speeches, but to its credit it indi cates much.
All the motives o f Phaedrus’s speech return in Sócrates’ speech in a modi-
fied way. Take oniy this crucial point, that the beloved is higher than the
lover. What about Sócrates? He says exactly the same thing, though he
doesn’t think o f the beloved in terms o f a human being. There is a one-way
Street o f love from the lover to the beloved. Essentiaily love is oniy one-
sided. We know this, in its highest theoretical development, in Aristotle’s
doctrine o f the unmoved mover. The unmoved mover moves as beloved,
not as lover. This is what Sócrates indicates in his speech by making some-
thing which we may loosely cali the ideas the highest object o f love. The
ideas do noc love the men, the men love the ideas. Ultimately there must be
principies which are self-sufficient, o r not in any need, and the refere do not
love o r long for anything else. This applics to the metaphysics o f both Plato
and Aristode. Today, people make the distinction between two understand-
ings o f love— eros and agape. Agape, the biblical understanding, means
love out o f abundance comes down.

56
4 PAUSANIAS (1)

I here is one point which I would like to make right now: there is
no Platonic dialogue which does noc abstract from somethmg important.
Every dialogue is deliberately one-sided. In the P haedru s just as in the R e ­
p u b lic y you have a tripartition o f the soul. There is a base eros, there is a
noble eros, and above them is reason or ¡ntellect. Whac is called base lo ve in
the P haedru s is called appedte o r desire in the R ep u blic; noble love is called
spiritedness in the R ep u blic. This tripartition does n ot occur in the Sympo-
siurn. Instead you get another tripartition o f eros in the simple sense, i.e.,
heterosexual love for the end ofprocreation; love o f im mortal femé, which
has a certain kinship to spiritedness in the R ep u blic but is n ot identical with
it; and the third is love o f wisdom. How these two tripartitions are related
is a question. H e who could give a truc answer to that question could claim
to have understood Plato’s doctrine o f man. T h e task o f understanding this
work completely is o f enormous difficulty. Even if this schema which I pre-
sent is true, it would only constitute a very small part since we would also
have to understand the characters o f the speakers. W hy did Plato entrust
the defense, say, o f moral virtue to an elderly lover o f a certain kind? Why
did he entrust the defense o f gain, the submission o f eros to gain, to a
young belovcd, etc. These difierent attitudes toward love are connected
with certain human characters, and one must also understand these charac­
ters, not only the atdtudes in thcmselves.
[This incorporaron o f attitudes into characters] brings the nature o f the
thing into the open. That means, however, that it does n ot present the na­
ture o f the thing as that nature presents itself, but as hidden o r h alf rcvcaled
or overlaid by opinión. Plato reproduces the natures o f things as they first
come to sight; he imitates them as they show thcmselves at first. This being
the case, Plato always discusses, whatever he discusses, in a human context.
Human beings talking about the phenomena at question. A human indi­
vidual, a man with a proper ñame, a member o f this o r that socicty, is the
one who talks about it. The reason is as follows: Philosophic inquiry, spec-
ulation, theoria, is in danger o f forgetting itself, o f losing itself in the con­
templación o f the subject. By this very fect speculation becomes very un-
philosophic. Philosophy, or whatever you cali this pursuit, must always know

57
C H A P T E R F O U E

what it is doing— it must aJways be sclf-knowledge— and thcretbre it must


aJways entail rcflection on the philosophízer.
Philosophy cannot leave it at trying to find out what knowledge is— the
problem o f so-called episcemology; ¡t must also raise the question Why
knowledge? W hat ¡s the meaning o f knowledge in the human contcxt?
These pro ble ms are kept alive by the re presentad on o f philosophy which
Plato gives. H ere in the Sytnposium the human context ¡s this: eros is to be
praised and adorned as a god. This is imposed on eros. As critical men o f
Science we narurally raise the question, “Is Eros a god?” Does he deserve
praisc? Perhaps lo ve is a humdrum phenomenon as so many others. The re­
fere Plato is under obligadon in some way to prove that eros de serves
praise. T o begin with the favor o r prejudicc we have regarding eros is only
Opinión, Yet it is not cntirely groundless opinión, as simple refleca on
shows. Suffice it to compare the bodily pie asures somehow akin co eros, the
desi re for food and drink. H om er calis the pleasure o f lo ve the golden
words and deeds o f Aphroditc. It is obviously inappropriatc to apply such a
term to food and drink. But it is more than that. Food and drink are related
to self-preservation, whereas eros has an essential relation to the prese rva-
tion o f the species. Eros, therefore, as such, raises men above the concern
with self-preservation. Eros contains in itself the possi bility ofself-sacrifice,
which we cannot say about the concern for food and drink. Therefore eros
has a natural relation to heroism, as Phaedrus indicates in his specch. A man
who dares everything in order to g ct food and drink can be somehow im-
pressive, but no one would cali him a hcroic man.
In the Syntposium, the analysis o f eros is modified n ot only by the com -
mand to praise Eros. I refer to the allusions to the year 4 1 6 , the gross im-
picty com m itted at that tíme and then somehow forgiven in 4 0 7 . The
background o f that is the accusarion against Sócrates, and this means the
question o f the life o f the philosopher in tensión with the life o f the polis.
By the link-up o f the ycars 4 1 6 and 4 0 7 Plato indicates that in studying eros
we must not forget for one moment the highest activitics o f men— political
and philosophic. This raises the question o f the relationship o f eros to po-
lidcal life on the one hand and to philosophy on the other. As to politicaJ
life, we have seen in the R ep u blic that in the purely political consideration
on the highest levcl silence is preser ved regarding procreation. In the sec-
ond book, where he gives reasons for the dcsirc o f men to form society he
mentions food, drink, and shelter but is compíetely silent about procre­
ation. Later on, in the ninth book, the tyrant, the worst degradación o f
political life, is identified with eros. Furtherm orc, in the psychology o f the

58
F A U S A N I A S ( 1 )

R epubltc, eros, which ¡s thc same as desire— in the Greek ep ith u m ia-~ *s we
shall see later in the Symposiunt, is presented as thc lowest part o f man,
lower than spiritedness, to say nothing o f re ason. The polis, we can say, ne-
cessitates law, nom os, and eros is n ot essentially legal. I think that everyone
muse admlt that— the final and essential concern o f eros is n ot legality. Yet
we could say, is n ot love o f country a modification o f eros? There is this dif-
ficulty: W hat is the opposite oflove o f country? L et us say treason. B u t what
is thc primary objcct o f high treason? Is it selling out a given country, o r is
it not at least as much selling out the established order? Polidcal crimes are
never really crimes against the country; as political crimes they are directed
against the constitution. T h e polity, however, never letsyou meet the coun­
try naked. We always meet it clothed in a political form. And the loyalty
which is demanded, as every loyalty discussion shows, refers not to the un-
dothed country but to the country defined in terms o f its consdtudon.
Love o f country, then, is in a concrete form a love o f country as modified
and consututed by its polity, and the polity expresses itself in law. This
means that the country is unthinkable without the element o f compul­
sión— laws— and therefore o f punishment. There is a certain harshness
which essentially belongs to political life, which shows the tensión between
eros and political life.
T o take a Platonic example, which is always best when discussing a Pía-
tonic problem , the best polity as presented in the R ep u blic stands and falls
by the noble lie. The ¡ndication is not that in imperfect polities we do not
need a lie, but that they are based on base lies. There is an elem ent o f the ar­
tificial and untruth that is essential to political life. Philosophy, on the other
hand, is love o f truth. There is an oíd presentation o f this difference; thc
naked soul confronted with the naked truth, in a gym n asion, the Greek
word fbr gymnasium. In other contexts, this is also taken as a place for in-
tcllcctual stripping. Bros is connected with stripping. Philosophy is a strip-
ping on the highest level, the mind. The political life is never a life o f
stripping. I can also State this as follows: political Ufe is, o f course, public
life. The erotic life is prívate life, and therefore there is a fundamental ten ­
sión between the two. I can ¡Ilústrate this as follows: There was a man who
in a way demanded absolute politicizadon and that was Marx. Marx spoke
o f the collectivization o f man to be brought about by the communist soci-
ety. All privacy, all prívate property, as well as all misery, is connected with
the división o f labor, and therefore thc perfect socicty would be one in
which the división o f labor is completely abolished. B u t the same M arx, at
least in his early writings, mentí ons the fact that the root o f the división o f

59
CHAPTE& * O U R

labor is man’s bisexual ity. He says in so many words that the fundamental
act o f the división o f labor is the sexual act. The paradoxical conclusión
would be that perfect communism would have to abolish sexual difieren ce
and produce men in test tubes. W hether Marx intended this is n ot for us to
investígate he re, but it only shows that if you think through the problem o f
public, publicity, collectivization, you see with the greatest clarity that there
is something fundamentally and absolutely irreducible in man on the most
massive level— the erotic life, which in this respect agrees with the life o f the
mind— which is not susceptible o f being collectivized.
This difference between the polieical, which is akin to compulsión, and
philosophy, which like eros is incompatible with compulsión, plays a cerrain
role also for the externáis o f the Platonic dialogues. I have said on occasion
that to begin one must look at the Platonic dialogues from the most obvi-
ous point o f view, namely the titles, and also whether they are narrated or
performed dialogues. A slightly more subde distinction is that between the
dialogues which are voluntary and the dialogues which are compulsory.
This disdnetion refleets the distinction between the political and the philo-
sophic. You can see this if you look at that dialogue which is the most com-
pulsory. That is, o f course the A polqgy o f Sócrates, which is called a dialogue
with the Athenian demos in the Apology itself. The R cpu blic, too, is a partíy
eompulsory dialogue. At the beginning Polemarchus tries to keep thcm
back by main torce. The Symposiutn is an unusually voluntary dialogue, as
you can see from the opening, Sócrates dresses up and goes on his own.
In this conncction I would like to mention in passing this characterisdc
feature o f the Symposium; at the celebration o f eros, the intellectual crcam
o f Athens is assembled. Sócrates is fifty-three years oíd, thac is to say at the
peak o f his life, and the theme eros, which explains the atmosphere o f
the dialogue and which contrasts so sharply with a kindred dialogue, the
P haedo— Sócrates’ death, no celebradon o f anything. Yet they are closely
akin be cause lo ve and death are akin, as we shall hear later from Sócrates’
own mouth.
We have some prospect already, though very insufficient, to what is go-
ing to com e. We see in the first place a specific point o f view from which one
can look at eros. This point o f view is indecd the lowest, that o f selfish gain.
We must see what other points ofvicw can arisc. We must also considcr how
this is connectcd with the character o f the speaker. There are two things
about Phaedrus’s character: he is young, he is at least potentially loved, and
he is a valetudinarias You remember he goes with the physician, he doesn’t
drink, and he is afraid o f getting drunk. So, by merely finding out the con-

60
P A U S A R I A S < l i

notations o f these ítems— young and beloved and valetudinarian— we find


tour possi bilities, the other three being oíd, beloved, and valetudinarian;
young, lovcr, and valetudinarian; and oíd, lo ver, and valetudinarian. Wc
must sec if any o f these occur. What is much more important, however, is to
see what other forms o f character traits could take the place of, say, the vale­
tudinarian. In the end we must sce whether the typology implied in that is
complete. W hether Plato has succeeded in discussing all character traits rel­
evan t to eros and all possi ble approaches to eros. Then and only then can
we say whether he has written through his dialogue the definitive treadse
on eros.
[In answer to a question:] Many lovers, as we see ¡n so many books,
were very uncalculating precise! y beca use they were young. I would say that
a calculating young lover is the exceprion rather than the rule. The re is a
certain contradicción between calculación and eros. We know that peoplc
sometí mes combine them but that is n ot the deare st phen orne non o f eros.
As i f a man were to speak o f this woman who is absolutely wonderlul be-
cause shc has miliions. Calculation is one thing and love is another thing. I f
I now take in the scholastic term fo rero s, natural inclination, calculation is
n ot natural inclination and vice versa. One can roughly divide all political
doctrines into two kinds: whether they say political society rests on natural
inclination o r whether it rests on calculation. The Aristotelian doctrine is
the m ost femous case o f one where the polis is natural, which means the re
is a natural inclination in man for political society.
Listener: Is it nccessary to view the notion o f love as calculation in Phac-
drus as a delibérate intention on his pare? It seems to me that the wholc ex-
ampie o f Achillcs suggcsts a notion o f love that he is not fully awarc of.
Mr. Strauss: l don’t believe that Phaedrus understands the implication
o f what he says. T o a great extern the irony is involuntary. B u t that it is not
entirely involuntary can be proved as follows: Wc know (rom the Phaedrus,
for examplc, that he was very skeptical, that he did not believe in the oíd
tales. Now, whatever he says about Achilles, etc., is based on the oíd tales.
In this case I believe he knew what he was doing. Also, we have the parallel
o f the P rotagoras myth, where Protagoras consciously speaks ironically
about these things, but there is a kind o f irony beyond his irony o f which he
is n ot aware.
Pausanias begins with the very simple remark that it is preposterous to
say, as Phaedrus seemed to have said in general, that eros is conducive to
virtue, since we know o f so many cases where eros has led to vice. H e makes
the distinction between a virtuous love and a vicious love. From this point

61
O H A P T E R M U IR

ofvicw Phaedrus’s spccch is obviously impcrfect, and therefbre we get Pau-


sanias’s spccch. L ct us remembcr whac we know about Pausanias: Pausa-
nías, in contradistinction with Phaedrus, is good at drinking, and he is a
lovcr. He loves Agathon, the tragic poet, who is also good at drinking.
B oth, he and Agathon, are pupils o f Prodicus, a sophist, whom Sócrates re-
garded most highly. S o there is an intellectual kinshlp. Pausanias’s spccch is
the longest, apart from that o f Sócrates; Phaedrus’s spcech is the shortest,
so they reaiJy are opposites,
The theses peculiar to Pausanias are at first glance two: First, there are
two ero tes, one for the noble and one for che base. Therefbre, the noble
eros wül be committed to virtue and the base eros wiil be committed to
vice. Secondly, the noble eros, the proper eros, is presenbed by the law o f
che land. Phaedrus has been completely silent about the law. Naturally, a
man who is concerned predominan dy with gain wiil think o f law only when
he has to. Now, the first thesis, the two fbrms o f love, is directed against
Phaedrus’s speech, according to which nothing is as conducive to virtue,
namcly to courage, as eros. That thesis is open to the objection that eros
may very well lead to vice. We do n ot have to go into any examples from the
newspaper; we have the great exampie o f París and H elen. I f that was not
love it is hard to see what is love. Yet París was n ot outstanding for courage.
The solution to the problem is that there is a noble eros leading to virtue
and a base eros leading to vice. But virtue means now the whole virtue, not
merely courage, and that seems to be an improvement.
The second thesis, namely that the right form o f eros is presen bed by
the law, is directed against Phaedrus’s thesis according to which the virtue
concerned with eros, that one is willing to die for the other, is rewarded by
the gods, and in i es absence one is punished by the gods. That thesis is open
to the objecdon that the goodness o f this kind o f virtue depends on the
truth o f these oíd tales, which Phaedrus himself does not believe. Therefbre
Pausanias, in a positive spirit, says, “N o, this is caused by a human love, by
a surely effective love, effccrive here and now.*
Phaedrus says eros leads to courage by nature. Pausanias says the noble
eros, in contradistinction to the base eros, leads to the whole virtue but is in
need o f support by the law. That means that both Phaedrus’s and Pausa-
nias’s praise o f eros are very weak, compared to the position that eros, with-
out the need o f man-made support, wouid lead to the highest virtue. This
comes out, ofcourse, in Sócrates’ spccch. Ify o u contrast the final remark o f
Phaedrus with the final remark o f Pausanias you wouid see that Pausanias’s
praise o f eros is actuaüy weaker than Phaedrus’s praise. But we must not

62
I' A U S A N I A S ( 1 )

forget that Phaedrus has some kind o f irony which Pausanias lacks. Now Ict
us read che sequel.

He said that Phaedrus spokc a spcech o f chis kind, and after Phaedrus
there were some other speeches which he could hardly remember, and
omittíng them he proceeded to nárrate thc speech o f Pausanias. He said
that he said, “The logos, Phaedrus, seems to me co have becn not beau-
tifully proposed to us, the command to praise Eros so unqualifiedly.”
( 1 8 0 c l- 5 )

Pausanias takes issue n ot only with Phaedrus's thesis but with the theme
proposed by Phaedrus.

“I f Eros wcrc onc, it would be fine; but, as it is, it is not, for he is not one;
and if he is not one, it is more corrcct to have it stated beforehand which
one is to be praised. So I wiil try to corrcct this, firse co point out the Eros
which one must praise, and chen to make a praise worthy o f thc god.
Everyone knows chat there is no Aphroditc without Eros. Now if she were
one, Eros would be onc; but sincc in fact there are ewo, ic is a necessity that
there be two Eroces. How aren't there two goddcsscs? One is surely che
oldcr and thc motherless daughter o f Uranus. It is she whom wc ñame
Urania. The other isyounger, daughter o f Zeus and Dionc. It is she whom
we cali Pandemus. So it’s a necessity, in the case o f Eros, that the one who
is a coworker with the second [Aphroditc] be catlcd correctly Pandemus,
and the ochcr Uranios.” (180c6~ e3)

Pausanias is very much concerned with correctness o f speech, duc to his


connection with Prodicus, who was very much concerned with semantic
problems. Now, which Eros is to be praised? There is more than one Eros
and only one is to be praised. Pausanias does n ot refer to any myth in the
beginning, as Phaedrus did. H e refers to a com m on Opinión implied in the
official Athenian cult. N ot an oíd story but a present opinión. Tw o Aphro-
dites were worshíped, the heavenly and the pandemian. P an d em ian does
n ot necessarily have a negad ve connotation because pandemian means
com m on to all human beings. N o Aphrodite without eros. B u t that has o f
coursc also another meaning. Eros is a condition o f Aphrodite. Eros is,
then, at least coeva! with Aphrodite and not her son, as he was sometimes
said to be. But there are two Aphrodites, henee there must be two erotes.
That does n ot necessarily foliow from the condition. Also, as I mentioned
betbre, we must ñame things correcdy, there fore we must give the two
erotes different ñames. Dione is, o f course, also a goddcss. B u t the noble
Aphrodite, and henee the noble eros, is older than the other. We sce also

63
C H A PTER M> U R

that Ero$ is no longer simply the oldest god. This assertion o f Phaedrus has
gone. The best is no longer simply iden tic al with the oldest. This is natural
sin ce he is going to dcfend the present Athenian law.
I think his argumcnt is this, which is o f course a poÜtical o r popular ar-
gument: Every Athenian knows there are two Aphrodites; secondly, there is
no Aphrodite without eros. H enee, sin ce there are two Aphrodites there
must be two ero tes. He draws a new conclusión.
Listener: His ínsistence on two Aphrodites, o f which one is best, would
be much stronger if he had said there is no eros without Aphrodite, but this
he could not say.
Mr. Strauss: I f I uadem and you correctly, if there are erotes already at
this time without Aphrodite, and Aphrodite is a kind o f leftover from oíd
mythology, why does he n ot drop her altogcther? Then this thing would be
much d e are r. I have the impression that Simonides for ex ampie says that
Aphrodite is the m other o f Eros, but it is denied here that eros has a
mother.
There is this difficulty in the beginning (1 8 0 c ). H e says if there were one
eros Phaedrus’s proposition would be all right, but now as ít is there is not
only one eros. Since there ¡s n ot only one it would be more correct to say
which Eros should be praised. There is more than one eros, i.e., there may
be many erotes. Then the question arises, with what right does he limit
himself to two. S orne times a logical lacuna occurs in one speech which is re­
solved later on. Sócrates speaks o f three erotes. In other wwds, this possi-
bility remains sterile as far as Pausanias is concerned.

wNow onc must praisc all gods, but rcgardlcss o f that onc must try to say
what each o f the two has obtained as his lot.'* ( 1 8 0 c 3 -4 )

This pious statement, that all gods must be praised, is contradicted by quite
a few things, past and futurc.

“Every acción is o f chis kind. An action in being done alone by itself is nci-
ther bcauhfbl ñor ugly. To drink, for examplc, as wc are now doing, or to
sing, or to converse, not onc o f thesc things is in itself bcautiful, but in
wh atever way it is done, it turns out to be ofthat sort in the doing. I f it is
beau titul ly and correedy done it proves to be beau tiltil; if incorrectíy, ugly.
So too loving and Eros is not in his en tire ty bcautiful, anv more than he is
deserving ofpraise, but che [Eros] who [bcautifully) induces one to lovc
beautittilly.” (1 8 0 e 4 -1 8 1 a 6 )

This, o f course, is a very ¡mportant assertion, which has very grave conse-
quences. Every action can be done nobly o r basely. What about that propo-

64
P A U S A R I A S (1)

sition? Is every acción susceptible o f beingdone nobly o r basely? N o. Mur-


der, for example, cannot be done nobly. The re are, then, actions which in
themselves are base. We must keep this in mind in order to underscand Pau-
sanias, because Pausanias is so much concerned with nobility, he only wants
to praise thc noble and he says all actions can be noble. In other words, he
who is so concerned with the morality o f eros is rather im moral.

ttNow the [Eros] o f Aphrodite Pandemus is truly pandemus and docs his
work haphazardly; and this is he in rcspect to whom the base among hu­
man beings love. People o f this sort lovc, in thc first place, women no less
than boys; sccond, o f thcm, thcy love their bodies rather than their souls;
third, [they love] those who are as mindless as possible, looking solely to
the accomplishmcnt and neglecting whether it is beautifully done or not.
From this it follows thae whatever they do they do haphazardly, thc good
as indifferendy as its opposite. The rcason is that he is from the goddess
who is far younger than the other, and she partakes in her birch in female
and male. The [Eros] o f uranian [Aphrodite]— in che first place, she does
not partakc in female buc only male— and this is the eros o f boys; in the
sccond place, she is older and has no share in hubris. It is on this basis that
those who are inspired by chis eros curn co the male, cherishing the
stronger by nature and who have nous to a higher dcgrcc.” (18 Ia 7 -c 6 )

H e gives first the descripción o f the base eros. The base eros is directed to-
ward the female sex to o ; secóndly it is directed more toward the body than
the soul and it prefers the m ost unintelligent beloved. Why? Because it is
concerned only with what we may cali sexual success. Therefore, and chis is
somewhat paradoxical, it is accidental whether the devotees o f this vulgar
eros act well or badly. Can you act well on that basis? We surely notice that
mere concern with sexual success does n ot necessarily lead to virtue. While
the base eros is concerned only with sexual success it may act well. I think
this is connected with his general proposition that there is no action about
which you can speak universally with respect. Though this is truc, the base
eros will lead to a good action only accidentally, and therefore it is base.
This eros is base because it is not directed toward the good. What are the
reasons for this? The younger Aphrodite has a mother, therefore she is bi­
sexual as ¡s also the Eros who accompanies her. Secondly, she is younger,
and the younger are more unreasonable. Therefore she goes in for the love
o f the unreasonable, for very young boys.
A few more points; At 1 8 0 c2 , when he speaks o f the other eros he does
not mention the word eros, he only implies it. T hat, o f course, does not
com e out in the translatíon, But the more important conclusión is this: no

65
C H A T T E R l ' O U R

action is in itself noble o r base. Every action is capable o f belng done nobly
or badly. B u t how do we distinguish? H erc we get a certain inkling o f it.
H e re we have the noble eros put in terms o f the male, which is by naturc
stronger and possesses intelligence to a higher degree. Love for those who
are by nature stronger and m ore inteüigent is noble r than love for the
wcaker and less intelligent. In the sequel the emphasis shifts immediately to
intelligence alone. Homosexual love is noblcr because it is concerned with
the nobler sex. May I ask the Iadíes here to forgive me for introducing these
statements, which are n ot my statements. N ot even Plato makes thcm ; they
are statements o f Pausanias. L et me make one general statement here: What
Pausanias is after is a defense o f pederasty.
[Tape change.]
I t is directed toward the noble because it i$ directed toward intelligence,
toward nous. H ere we have already one difficulty, which is uldmately the
downfall o f Pausanias. L et us assume the noble love is love for intelligent
human beings. What follows? The noblest love is love for the most intelli­
gent. W ho are, generaily speaking, the most intelligent males? [Gap in the
tape.] H e tries to find a ground for pederasty and what he gets is the oppo-
site. T o make this a bit more clear, where d o we find thac noblest love pre-
senced in the Sympostutn? Aristodemus, the silent fellow, and in a cruder
way Apollodorus.

wAnd onc would recognize also in pederasty itsclf those who have been
purcly prompted by this eros, for they do not love boys, except when they
already begin to have nous, and this is cióse in time to the growth o f the
beard. I believe that those who begin to love from this time are fiilly prc-
pared co be coge the r their whole lite and live together in common, and
not, once they have taken him asyoung in his folly and deceived him, then
disappear in scornful laughter and run ofF to another. There should also
have been a law forbidding the love o f boys, in order that much zea! would
not have been expended for an unclear resuit. It is unclcar where the end
o f boys ends up in regard to the virtuc and vicc o f soul and body. Now the
good voluntarily lay down this law for thcmsclvcs, but there should have
been a compulsión ofthis kind imposed on those pandemian iovers, just as
we compel chem, co the excenc thac we are able, not to love fice women. It
is these who have made it a reproach, so as for some to daré to say thac it is
shamelul co gratify lovers; and they say this looking at them, seeing their
unomeliness and injustice, sincc it is surely the case that there is no matter
whatsocvcr, if it is done in an ordcrly and lawful way, that would justly in-
cur blame.” (1 8 1 c7 -1 8 2 a 6 )

66
P A U S A S I A S { I )

Pausanias, in contradistinction to Phaedrus, looks at the problem from thc


point o f view o f the lovcr, as distinguished from the beloved, that I think is
cicar. H e is n ot priman ly worricd about thc corruption o f the boys by base
lovers, but about the waste o f rime on the part o f the lovcrs. H e ¡s con-
cerned with the self-interest o f the lovers. Phaedrus is concerned with the
self-interest o f the beloved. This is a great difference because there is no
perfect parallelism between the lo ver and the beloved. O u t o f this self-
interest o f the lovers good men im pose upon themselves a law. And you
must not think here o f Kant o r Rousseau, that would be misleading, al-
though the expression is the same. W hat he means is this: the good men are
n ot merely by nature directed toward those above sixteen. I f they were
there would be no need tor a law. Thcrefbre they must impose on them­
selves a law. There is no natural difference between the devotecs o f the n o ­
ble cros and the devotees o f the base eros because there is no narural or
intrinsic difference between good and bad actions. F or example, thc base
eros direets itself equally toward free women and toward slave girls. B u t the
nom os, the law, speaks. This is based on the fact that the law is the work o f
the free man, o f the fathers, par excellence. These fathers protect n ot only
their wives, they protect also thc young boys naturally. The same fathers are
concerned with the well-being o f their young sons and thus make it dis-
graceful to be a corrupter o f a boy. They go even beyond this and say all
such love i$ disgraceful. T h e re asonable lovers anticípate this and impose
the law on themselves n ot to run after young boys.
I f there is no intrinsic or natural difference between the noble and the
base eros but only a view to the consequences— you becom e disgraced in
one case and n ot in the other— would one n ot have to show that love o f
women is inferior, and n ot only because it is more troublesome than love o f
boys? Why ¡s love o f adolescent males superior to love o f girls as well as to
love o f women? L et us see how he goes on. I f there were no defeets in the
so-called noble eros, ¡f the noble eros were an entirely natural phenome-
non, there would be no need for law. But somehow it is constituted by
nomos. T h at nomos wc find almost only in Athens. O f course it is not
enough to defer to the positive law. W hat is the principie underlying thc
positive law? Is it nous, is it intelligence? But we scc intelligence wouldn’t
work.
“Further, the law about eros in all other cines is easy to understand, for it
has been defined without qualification; but the law here and in Sparta is
complicatcd. In Elis and among Boeotians, and wherever they are not

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C H A P T B R Í O U R

wisc in speaking, it has bccn laid down by law that without qualification it
is noble to gratify lovers, and no one, either young or oíd, would say Chat
ic is shamcful, in order, I suspect, chey might not have any trouble in try-
ing to persuade the young by speech, bccause chey are incapablc o f spcak­
ing; but in che case o f Ionia and many other places, all who dwell under
barbarians, it has been laid down by law as shameful. For in the eyes o f bar-
barians, on account o f cheir cyrannies, chis in foct, as wcll as philosophy
and love o f excrcise, are shamcful; for it is, I suspcct, not advantagcous to
the rulers that there come co be greac and proud thoughts among the
ruled, any more than that there be scrong friendshtps and partncrships. It
is this that all the rest and cspecially eros are wont to instill. Even the
tyrants here understood chis in deed; the eros o f Aristotogeicon and the
fncndship o f Harmodius, in províng to be stcadfast, destroyed the ir rule.
So whcrcvcrit is laid down to be shameíul to gratify lovers, it has been laid
down by the vice o f those who laid it down, by the overreaching o f the
rulers and the unmanliness ofthe ruled; but wherever it was he Id by law to
be unqualifiedly noble, it was on account o f che idleness o f the soul o f
those who laid it down. But here ic has been laid down by law in a far no-
bler way than cbcwherc, and, as I said, it*s not easy to understand it.”
<182a7-d6)

Up to now we have only the assertíon, and we see that it is a very character-
istic one. There are two extremes and a mean. O ne extreme is never to
grant favors, that’s the barbarie one. The savage Greeks say grant favors as
you pie ase. The Athenians say grant favors with discretion. The Athenian
and Spartan law regarding eros is praised. Elis and Boeoda have no restrie -
tion whatsoevcr— this is charactcristic o f the undvilízed Greeks— and ac­
tual prohibition is characteristic o f the Greeks living under barbarían rule,
but it is a reflection o f the barbarians themselves. The praise o f the oldest is
rcplaced by the praise o f what is established, and as a political man he
chooses the most renowncd, Athens and Sparta.
There is a distinction berween noble and base eros, therefore a distinc-
tion berween virtue and vice. Virtue itself is a mean betwecn complete ab-
stinence and complete self-indulgence. This is the theme o f Pausanias’s
speech— moral virtue. Pausanias’s speech is characterized by the artempt to
look at eros from the point o f view o f moral virtue. B u t this is n ot the
speech o f an entircly disinterested man. I t is the speech o f a man who wants
freedom for his practices, o f which he says they are legal, but we shall see
later on that they are not legal. He has to make them legal. His whole
speech is, under the guise o f a praise o f the Athenian nomos, a suggestion
o f how to improve the Athenian nomos. Such speechcs are cailed delibera-

68
PAUSA NIAS M i

tive speeches, and I believe that Pausanias's speech is the only deliberan ve
speech occurring in Plato. According to Aristotle there are three kinds o f
specches: forensic, epideictic, and deliberativo. Forensic conccrns acquittal
o r condemnation under the law. Epideictic is a display o f power which
serves no practical purpose, for example, after-dinner speeches. Delibera-
tive speeches are polideal specches about peace and war, finance, and also
law. That chis is a political speech, i. e., a speech inspired by interest and pos-
sibly by self-interest o f the speaker, may be shown by the fact that he is con-
cem ed with the law which permits the beíoved to grant their favors. That’s
the tensión. As for Sparca, which is omicted in some editíons, that is awk-
ward. He has this división: either they can’t speak or they can and are, likc
the Spartans, sensitive about pederasty. The Greeks living under barbarían
rule drop philosophy and love o f exercise ( 1 8 2 c l) , but the Greek savages
also have no philosophy. T h e reason he mentions Sparta is because Sparta
adds luster to his law; the praise o f the law is greater if it ineludes both
Athens and Sparta. But then he must drop Sparta for a very good reason.
N ot because the practice o f pederasty is necessarily different, though there
are some indications, as we know ffom other Platonic dialogues, that there
are differences. But the main point is that the connecdon bctween the
noble eros and the cuitivation o f the mind is endrely different in Athens.
T h e cuitivation o f the body is at least as good in Sparca. In his whole speech
manliness o r courage does n ot appear. There is a certain softness essential
to Pausanias as well as to his beloved Agathon. H e is not a valetudinarian.
In Elis and Boeotia che law was made by the lovers as such, therefore
there is perfect freedom for the lovers. It was n ot made by the fathers as
such, though the fathers may also be lovers. B u t in which capacity did they
act when they made the law? T h e explanation suggested here is insufficient.
W hy is love ofyoung men superior to that o f boys and women? L et me State
it as follows: In Elis there is no iaw forbidding this kind o f thing; therefore
the lovers are n ot interested in restraint. W hat is wrong with the law in Elis?
That is n ot clear. L et us therefore look at the other example o f the Greeks
in Asía M inor living under barbarían rule. Freedom . Freedom requires
ero tic bonds among those who are best ablc to carry arms. Those who are
best able to carry arms are, o f course, neither women ñor young boys. We
get, then, an entirely different point o f view. H itherto we had nous— intcl-
ligence; this wilt never justify pederasty, as we have seen, because it will lead
to love o f the wiser, the older. But if it i$ a marter o f political freedom, o f
those who can defend it best, then there is a link between men who are still
ablc to carry on (rom the older generation— forty-five according to the Ro-

69
C H A f T P . R F O Ü R

mans— and the youngcr gcneration, say ofscventcen. We must see whether
this is suíficient.
We see here by various examplcs, in 182c 3 - 4 , that cros produces lofty
souls, but it i$ not the only thing that produces lofty souls. Here we have an-
other consideration. Frecdom is used as a support fbr pederasty. But why
doesn't it work? Why is freedom insufficient? Anyone who has continued to
read Pausanias’s spcech should know the answer. Why is the relation between
cros and freedom n ot safe? The lover is supposed to serve as a slave. Nous—
mind— fails. Freedom , to o , is no good, since the relation is a slavish one.
There are some more points which we can briefly consider. One is o f
poli ti cal interest in a narro wer sense, when he speaks o f the barban ans.
“Wherever it is laid down to be shameful to gratify lovers, it has been laid
down by the vice o f those who laid it down.” I t was due to greed, to the de-
sire to have more on the part o f the rulers, and to unmanliness o f the ruled.
That ís a very interesting remark. The ruled, even those ruled by a tyrant,
are as much legislators as the ruler o r the tyrant. This contains, ofcourse, an
elem ent o f truth which is so grossly overdone by certain trends in modern
scientific political Science. For examplc, in Bendey’s theories o f political
government there doesn’t exist simple tyranny. There is always some infiu-
ence o f the subjected population on the rulers. Therefore, in the spirit o f
this view, Pausanias says the legislators, even in a tyranny, are the ruled as
wcll as the rulers. In the other case— where he speaks o f the barbarie Greeks,
wherc it was made a law to be simply noble, namcly without any restraint—
there it was done through the laziness o f the soul o f the legislators. Here
you see he does n ot make any distinction between the rulers and ruled.
Why? Obviously— they are republics; the distinction between rulers and
ruled does not exist. They are truly free men. What do they say regarding
pederasty? They say do as you wish. Therefore freedom does not requirc
the noble eros. We have another p ro o f that the second attempt o f Pausanias
to find a basis for pederasty— this time n ot in nous, in intelligence, but in
freedom— breaks down. Where will he find the basis? Plato doesn’t say,
“T h at’s my valué judgment’1; every idiot can say that. H e asks, W hat’s the
reason fbr your valué judgment? Why is pederasty good? W hy should it be
permitted by the law? You must give reasons. The fact that some people
wish to engage in ¡t or suffer from its prohi bidón is o f course no reason for
changing the law. There must be good reasons. Give me a good reason.
Nous? N o. Freedom? N o. Because freedom would lead to an indiscrimi-
nate permission which no substantíal part o f the Athcnian electora te would
go tbr. So, he must find a third principie.

70
P A U S A R I A S i 1 i

The third principie, to which he is going to appeal in the sequel, is moral


virtue, n ot nous, not freedom. We have to see whether the moral education
o f a boy o f seventeen is impro ved by doing all kinds o f fevors to a man o f
thirty o r forty. That’s a practical proposition; you have to think it out. The
point toward which he is driving is this: You have a decent man, say o f
thirty, and you have a potentially de cent boy o f seventeen. They become
friends so that the young boy might becom e de cent. Wonderful. B u t why
have this kind o f bodily relation? Can anyone see any connection between
the moral improvement o f that boy and these bodily relaoons? So he
doesn’t find an answer. Ñ or will Eryximachus be able to find an answcr.
Only Aristophancs succeeds in giving an answer, but we must see about
that. But, as far as I understand Pausanias’s speech, I would say that Pausa-
nias tries to establish the distinction between noble and base eros by giving
threc principies: nous, political freedom, and moral virtue. H e does not
succeed in any. This is by no means the fiill meaning o f this speech because,
moral freedom being his them e, he must give some analysis o r at least some
indication o f an analysis o f what moral virtue is. It will prove that nous and
freedom are in a strange way che elements which compose moral virtue. So
the re is a real unity there. You see also the selfish motive o f this political
speech. This man as a lovcr has an entirely different interest, self-interest,
frora the bclovcd Phacdrus. H e needs his reputación as a decent man fbr his
erotic success. Therefore he must boost moral virtue.
L isttn tr; Are there rwo problcms in Pausanias’s speech o r merely one,
namely homosexuality? O r does he really think that there are two different
kinds o flo v c intrinsically indistinguishable?
Mr. Strauss: The two things are united because he says the noble eros, in
contradistinction to the base eros, is essentiaíly homosexual. As I said in the
beginning, Plato never presents an issue in a purely theoretical form . H e
presents he re n ot a professor, discussing dispassionatcly this problem , but a
man who has an interest in a ccrtain solution. According to Plato there is
only one self- interest which is legitimate; that is the self-interest o f the vir-
tuous man as virtuous man. The self-interest o f the calculating beloved is o f
course entirely different from the self-interest o f the elderly lover. Trans-
form it into heterosexual rclations: Think o f an attractive secretar y who is
a gold digger, who would have an entirely different self-interest ffom an
older man who falls in love with that girl. We must n ot snobbishly smile
about these things, but we must take into consideration that these possibil-
itics belong essentiaíly to love, and although they are n ot very high they
must be understood too. T h at is in a way more delicate but in a way more

71
C H A P T E K F O U X

corrupt in the Greek examples, because it is n ot heterosexual but homosex­


ual. Through this médium the truc meaning o f love gradually appears. To
mendon only one point, in Sócrates’ final speech bodily eros is legitímate
only, according to nature, in heterosexual love for procreation, as all sensi­
ble people always said, though their saying it does n ot always have a univer­
sal effect on human practice. What Sócrates and Plato added i$ that in the
more dignified forms o f homosexuality which they knew, some striving is
recognizable which goes much higher than the concern with procreation.
The first who brings up this distinction is Phaedrus. H e says that people in
love were so divine that it saved them. That is a more radical versión ofw hat
Sócrates says: eros is the human souJ. Even in these problematic Ibrms there
is some striving o f which ordinary practitioners are absolutely unaware but
which has something to d o with the right o f the two sexes. Greek philoso-
phy never deais with man without taking into consideration the difference
between man and women. I t docs not de al with man as a purely spiritual
thing, and this difference is for them o f the greatest importancc becausc it
has something to do with philosophy. Plato’s tcaching in the R eputóte, as
you tecali, that the two sexes are equal, must be judiciously understood.
Plato has no doubt that women could be political rulers, queens. But re-
garding philosophy there is a pro ble m, and that has something to do wtth
the single difference o f the two sexes re garding procreation. The woman is
much more involved in that. In fairness to Plato one must say, when one
disregards all the bewildering faets and looks at the history o f philosophy
on the one hand and political history on the other, we see that the top men
in che history o f philosophy were all males. Among the top people in his­
tory were quite a tew women. Somehow they are more earthy. This is not
simply a Greek prejudice, and yet we must never forget: the teacher o f the
truth in the Symposium is a woman. Nevcrtheless the difference between
the sexes is a great theme throughout Plato and particularly in the Sympo-
sium . These threc speechcs— Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Aristophanes—
have the speciai theme o f investigacing the problem o f pederasty in the lit­
eral and narrow sense, and these attempts fail, But Plato does more than
this; to mentí on only one point, Pausan ias looks at pederasty ífom the point
ofvicw o fth e moral, Eryximachus from the point o fv iew o fth e medical art.
These things, moral virtue and art, are subjected to analysis in this connec-
tion.

72
5 PAUSANIAS (2)

[ I he question ofm an] must be on ourm inds to che extent thatwe


are social sáentists. Social Science tries to understand man and human af-
fairs, but Science icself is a human activity. Therefore, in a way, natural Sci­
ence presupposes man and the question is whether man as a presupposition
o f Science muse n ot be understood in a way which is n ot scientific. M an, as
a starting point fbr the understanding o f scientists, is perhaps n ot an object
o f Science. The starting point for the understanding o f Science would be, in
an expression which is coday very frequently used, the situation o f man.
One can say that this is the initial theme o f every Platonic dialogue. As cx-
pcrienced, the human situation is, o f course, the experience o f individuáis
in individual situad ons. In the case o f Plato, it is almost always the situation
o f Sócrates. The individual philosopher Sócrates with these and these traits
o f body as well as o f charactcr, as Athenian Citizen, etc., in his individual sit­
uation, transcends his individual situation insofar as he is a philosopher.
There was an ínfinity o f possiblc Solutions which Plato could choosc. For
example, he could have chosen a situation between Sócrates and Xan-
thippe. He did n ot do that, and we can perhaps discuss that for a moment.
Even Xenophon never gave a conversation between Sócrates and Xan-
thippe, but he did gíve a conversation between Sócrates and his son about
Xan thippe; a conversation with Xan thippe herself was out o f the question.
W hat both Plato and Xenophon did was to select situations fertile for the
development o f philosophic the mes.
In our situation, the Symposium, we find the cream o f Athenian wisdom.
They are men who have transcended the traditional belieis and therefore
have an unusual freedom o f speech— frankness— verging on hubris. Even
Sócrates hímself is presented in the Symposium as hubristic. Sócrates is not
presented as a man o f prudent counsel but rather as surrendering to the
greatest power. This ís brought out in contrast with alternatives, at least
with the Athenian alternad ve. For somc reason, Plato preferred to prese nt
Sócrates in the Symposium only in contrast to other Athenians. These alter­
natives are presented, so it scems, in an ascending order. T h e first speaker
was Phaedrus, who looks at the phenomenon o f love, o r rather o f the god
o f love, from the point o f view o f the beloved, from the point o f view o f the
bcneficiary o f love, o f the man in whom the god Eros is n ot, the simply

71
C H A P T K R ¥ I V k

uninspired. AU other speakers are inspired, either by eros— the lovcrs— or


else as poets they are inspired by the muse. Phaedrus’$ thesis, you will recall,
is that eros leads to virtue, here understood as courage, manliness. We
know that this is not simply true, that eros may also lead to vice o r cow-
ardice. The simple st solution to this difficulty is to say there are cwo kinds o f
eros, a noble and a base eros. This is the thesis o f the second speaker, Pau­
sanias, and this thesis is accepted by the third speaker, Eryximachus. But
since it is dropped, this solution to the problem o f the distinction between
a noble and a base eros is tacidy rejected by Plato. I t is only a provisional
solution. How this is compatible with the undeniable fact that eros leads
sometí mes to vice we must find out later, when we see what Sócrates has to
say on the subject.
Pausanias, the oíd lo ver, speaks from the point o f view o f the lover. His
the se s are two: first, there are two e rotes, one noble and one base, and sec­
ond, the noble eros is the concern o f the law o f the land, o f the nomos. The
first thesis is directed against Phaedrus’s assertion that eros simply leads to
virtue; the second thesis is directed against the assertion o f Phaedrus that
virtue regarding eros, virtue concerned with eros, not concerned with the
polis, is supported by divine rewards and punishments. O f these rewards
and punishments we know only by way o f tales, as Phaedrus himself will ad-
mit, and therefore it is n ot a good point. T h e noble eros is supported by hu­
man law, by laweffective here and now. Pausanias starts n ot as Phaedrus d¡d
from myth, but from focts o f the Athenian cult. There are two Aphrodites
and there is no Aphrodíte without eros. H enee, there must be two erotes
corresponding to the two Aphrodites. Pausanias does n ot say no eros with­
out Aphrodite. It is important to observe that Pausanias leaves it open
whether there may be an eros without Aphrodite— a male god o f lo ve with­
out a fe male goddess o f lo ve. But Pausanias is n ot fully awarc o f this.
Sócrates will draw the conclusión. Why is Pausanias n ot aware o f this? H e is
in need o f support by accepted opinions, by the law, as his whole speech
shows. The distinction between noble and base eros needs support by the
law because it is n ot simply based on nature. Pausanias does n ot daré to say
that thosc who are by nature best have the noble eros and those who are by
nature inferior have the base eros. Phaedrus had spoken o f those who are by
nature best, and Aristophanes will reintroduce the natural hierarchy o f
men. B u t Pausanias as weii as Eryximachus are sllent about it. We must
gradualiy see the re ason for this. As far as Pausanias is concerned, I will say
he is silent about the natural hierarchy because his point o f view will pro ve
to be that o f moral virtue, and moral virtue as such is meant to be equally

74
P A U S A N I A S ( 2 I

accessible to all men. The natural hierarchy is not o f crucial importance as


far as moral virtue is concerned. Pausanias speaks all the time o f moderation
and ju Stic c.
As we know from the R epu blic the re are four virtues— wisdom, cour-
age, moderation, and jusdee. Moderation and justice are the only virtues
which are equally accessible to all. Courage is the preserve o f the higher-
ups, and wisdom is the preserve o f the cream o f the higher class, the
philosophers.
One more word I must add about what is meant by nomos. N om os has
a much broader meaning than law has now. It ineludes also what we mean
by custom and usage. Thus, when he speaks o f the Athenian law regarding
eros, we must n ot think that these were written laws enforced by legal offi-
cers o f some kind, but it was the custom. In other words, that by virtue o f
which yon eam disgrace. I prefer the simple word because it is important to
realizc that chis sharp distinction betwccn the written law properly enacted
and radically distínguished from custom is n ot common to all o f mankind
and took a very long time until it became 100 percent clear as is believed to-
day.
T o come back to Pausanias’s assertion: no Aphrodite without eros. This
does n ot mean that Eros is the son o f Aphrodite. Pausanias does n ot ques-
tion Phaedrus's assertion that Eros has no parents. Eros is indeed con-
nccted with Aphrodite, who has parents. Ñ or does Eryximachus question
that. The first to question this assertion that Eros has no parents or, more
precisely, that Eros is the oldest o f the gods, is Aristophanes; then Agathon
and then Sócrates. This is, incidentally, one o f the difierences bctween the
first h alf o f the SytnpoHum and o fth e second half. The first is based on the
premise that Eros is the oldest god and the second is based on the denial o f
that premise. Pausanias asserts that no action ín itself is noble o r base. Every
action is capable o f being done nobly o r basely. However, we need a prin­
cipie o f distinction between the noble and the base. T h e general answer
would be naturc. W ith a view to what is according to nature we make the
distinction between what is noble and what is base. Accordingly, Pausanias
says that nous— intelligence, mind— is by nature higher than unreason or
nonreason. From this it tollo ws that lo ve o f the re asonable, o f the more in-
telligent, is noble, and love o f the less reasonable is base. B u t this wouldn’t
do as we have seen, because from this it follows that the true eros would be
directed toward mature, wise men and never toward youths who, gene rally
speaking, are presumed to be less wise. O r, as was suggested, there is cer-
tainly no necessary relation between love o f nous and love o f bodily beauty

75
( H A P T B R FJ Vf c

in bloom. From this ic would follow that an ugly, intelligent youth is prefer-
able as a bcloved to a beautiful, stupid youth. Pausanias does n ot say that
those who are by nature good are by nature directed toward male adolcs-
cents. He does say that cercain men are directed toward what is by nature
better, i.e., intelligence. B u t this does n ot justify his kind o f pedcrasty.
Thcsc men whom he praiscs avoid boys n ot so much because the boys are
less intelligent than youths but out o f fear o f disgrace. The boys are pro-
tected by thcir fathcrs. N ot nature but deliberarion limits the desire ofped-
erasts like Pausanias. These men impose upon themsclvcs a law, a nomos.
This law is in part a response to a preceding law laid down by the fathers,
who protect their boys.
We ha ve seen that such a law is by no means necessary o r universal or ac*
cording to nature. In Elis and Boeotia we scc that no such law exists. The
reason is this: the fathers who lay down the law are also potential lovers. In
the latter capacity they may per mi t perfect liccnse, which in their capacity as
reasonabk fathers they would, in ail probability, restrict. Disgrace, then, is
the reason which restrains these people from boys. Disgrace falls on the
base eros, but this difFers in different cities. We turn, thercforc, to the laws
o f the intelligent and free cities, the two cities which have the quaiities de-
cisive for judgment o f any city, that it is intelligent or highly civiüzed and,
secondly, that it is free. These cities are Athens and Sparta. Pausanias refers
to thcm in the beginning but he drops Sparta immediately; this is con-
nected with the fact that in his whole speech there is no reference to manli-
ness o r courage. Pausanias is a softy; that is o f some importance. H e loves
ano the r softy, the poet Agathon, and this brings up a broad theme which
we can here only m ention, namely, to what extent poetry as such is, from
Plato’s point o f view, a form o f softness. For the time being I refer only to
the poet Orpheus who, as we have seen, was n ot disdnguished by courage.
T o summarize: intelligence does n ot justify pederasty, political freedom
might. We see it in Athens and among the free people o f the west who prac-
ticc unlimited pederasty, whereas the Greeks subjcct to barbarians d o not.
But here is the troubie: political liberty does n ot as such justify limitación to
the noble lo ve. Those people concerned only with freedom cncourage ped­
erasty without making any distinction. Also, there is a conflict betwecn free­
dom and enslavemcnt implied in pederasty, as Pausanias him self under-
stands it. Eros is n ot even conducive to lofty thoughts and to freedom.
Pausanias's bcloved Agathon lived at the court o f Archesilaos o f Macedo-
nia, whom some o f you will remember from the G orgias, where his evil
deeds are described with grcat forcé.

76
P A U S A N I AS { 2 >

What is thc basis o f che discinction between noble and base eros? Hith*
erto we have no answer to that question. Now let us turn to our text.
“But here it has bcen laid down by law in a tar noblcr way than clscwhcrc,
and, as I said, it is not easy co understand.” ( 1 8 2 d 4 -5 )

H e has betbre discusscd the law, the law o f the Greek savagcs o f thc west
and che laws o f the Grceks living under Persian domination in the east.
Both are wrong, for different reasons. Now he turns to the Athcnian law.
Here at home in Athcns everything is fine. The thesis which he wtll devclop
now in the first part o f the scquel is that the Athenian law declares it is no­
ble to love and it is noble to be gracious to the lover.
“For if one considcrs that to love openly is spoken o f as nobler than to love
in sccret, and especially to love the noblest-born and best, even if they are
uglicr than othcrs, and in turn that the universal exhortación to che lover
is amazing, not as if he werc doing somcthing shamcful, and that if he
seizes the beloved it is thought noble, and if he does not scizc, disgracefiil.
And with regard to trying to seize, thc law has grantcd to the lover the
possibilicy ofbcingpraiscd in performing amazing deeds.” (1 8 2 d 5 -c 3 )

You see now he gives enumerations o f what the Athenian law, i.e., custom,
signifies. The style reminds one o f Aristotle’s R betoric, when Aristotle gives
the enumeration o f, for cxample, what is noble, o r just, etc. H ere is an enu*
merarion o f ítems from which one can see what people gene rally think, The
Athenian law cncourages the lover, that becom es perfeedy dear by implica-
tion. It does n ot encouragc the beloved. We shail see that later. There are
five Ítems here mentioned, the center one is the universal encouragcmcnt
given to the lover.

“ . . . for which, if one should daré to do thcm in pursuing anything else


whatsocvcr, in wanting to accomplish it, except this, one would reap the
greatest rcproachcs hurled against phiJosophy. For if one should want to
get money from someone or to occupy a magistracy or any other power
and wcrc willing to do the sorts o f things lovers do in regard to cheir
beloved— making supplications and entreaties in their requests, swearing
oaths, sleeping in doorways, and willing to perform thc sorts o f slavcry
that not cvcn one slave would— he would be hindered from doing an ac*
tion o f this kind both by friends and enemics, the latter reproaching him
for his fiattery and illibcrality, thc former admonishing him and being
ashamed on his behalf. But there is a grace upon the lover if he does all
these things, and it has been graneed by thc law for him to act without re-
proach, on thc grounds that he is accomplishing some very noble thing.”
(1 8 2 e 3 -l8 3 b 5 )

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CHAI* i f R P I VB

The Athenian law gives the lover amazing frccdom regarding the accions
leading to ero tic success, but no such freedom in regard to the pursuit o f
anything else, for example, money or political power. The greatest servility,
which is dlsgracefuJ in other pursuits, is praised in the case o f love. I f some-
one were to swear falseiy in order to get money* for example, he would earn
the greatest reproaches leveled against philosophy, namcly— if you would
look up Plato’s A polqgy you would see that it is n ot to believe in gods. Per-
jury in the case o f love is not regarded as impiety, whereas perjury for the
sakc o f money would be a sure proof o f n ot believing in the gods. You see
he re al so why Pausanias wisely started from the principie that no action is
simply base. Scrvilc actions, begging, are noble in the case o f love; even per-
jury is not base in the case o f love.

“And what is most terrible, as the many say at léase, there is also forgive-
ness from the gods for him alone if he swcars and then departs from his
oaths— they deny that an oath holds in matters o f sex. So both gods and
human beings have made cvcry possi bilíty open to the lover, as the law
here asserts. Now in this way one would believe it is lawfully maintained in
chis city that to love and be friends with the lovers is very noble.” ( 1 8 3 b 5 -
c4)

You note that the Athenian law as stated hitherto encourages all love, not
only the devotees o f the noble love— no such limitation is mentioned.
Phaedrus said that to die for one’s beloved, and cspecially for one’s lover, is
highly rewarded by the gods and n ot to die is severely punished by the
gods. Pausanias says to perjure oneself is forgiven by the gods to the lovers.
The implication is clear. According to Pausanias lovers do n ot need a stim-
ulus, they need only to be forgiven afterwards, especially since Pausanias is
silent about the supreme sacrifice. H e speaks o f felse oaths, but he does not
speak o f any obligation which is put on the lover to die.

“ But whenever fathers set up guardians over those who are loved and do
not allow thcm to converse with their lovers, and these things have been
presenbed to the guardián, and his contcmporaries and comrades re-
proach him if they scc anything o f the sort happening, and the clders in
turn do noc reproach those who are linding fault, on the grounds that they
are not speaking correctly, then if one looks at these things onc would be •
lieve again that this sort o f thing is lawfully maintained here to be most
disgracefijl." (1 8 3 c4 -d 3 )

Now we see the other side. Athenian law, which encourages the lovers, dis-
courages the beloved from seeing the lover regardless o f whether the lover

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P A U S A N I A S ( 2 }

is prompted by noble o r base love. It forbids even conversation. This is not


so difficuit to understand for those ofy o u who remember an older order o f
society antedating che psychoanalyzation o f the Western world. At that
time there was a thing called battle morality which gave great freedom to
male lovers and very small freedom to the female beloved. Everything is fair
in love and war, I believe people said. Obviously there is something like ¡t in
Athens. In a way the law is simply inconsistente though in a way it is n ot be-
cause it simply says, as in business matters, the buyer should bcware— in
this case the girl should beware. Legislators in Athens are both fathers and
lovers and in these two difíerent capacities the same legislators have differ-
em interests, and they lay down the law according to this differencc o f in-
terests. Pausan ias is trying to overeóme the contradiction by a distinction o f
his own which he imputes to the Athenian law. This he will do in the sequel.

“But this is the way it is, I believe. It is not unqualified, but as it was said at
the beginning, it is neither noble in itsclf ñor shameful, but if it is nobly
done it is noble, and if shameíully shameful. Now to gratify a base person
and in a base way is shamefully done, but to gratify a good person and in a
noble way is nobly done. Thae lover, che pande mi an lover, is base; he loves
the body rather than the soul. For he does not even last, becausc he is not
in love wich a lasting thing either. Along with the cessation o f the bloom
o f the body, which was what he was in love with, ‘he flics o ff and is gone,*
and disgraces his many speeches and promises; but the lover o f the good
character lasts chroughout life, because he is fused with thac which is last-
ing." (1 8 3 d 3 -e6 )

The primary distinction made by Athenian law refers to what ¡s proper for
the beloved. T h e iover has perfcct freedom. H e produces now the crucial
distinction. T h e noble lover loves a decent character. I t is n ot his intelli-
gence o r his courage but his decent character. O n this basis, Pausanius be-
lieves, he can make the distinction stick. W hat is noble for the beloved
depends on the quality o f the lover. H ere Pausanias begjns to answer the
dccisive question: W hat is the ground o f the distinction becween noble and
base love? The signs o f noble love were, you will recall, that it is (a ) for
males rather than females, (b ) for souls rather than for bodies, and (c) for
adolescents rather than for boys. The guiding point o f view was mind or
intelligence. B u t this doesn’t work, as we have seen. Here things changc.
H ere the point o f view is abiding bloom o r excellence. Since the bloom o f
the body does n ot abide the soul is prefe rred to the body. In other words,
abidingness, lastingness, is a criteríon for distinguishing betwcen noble and
base love, which makes some sense. But this does not lead to love o f males

79
(* H A P T E R FI VK

in particular. Why could there n ot be abiding love o f males for womcn? He


$ecs che most lasting excellence as the excellence o f souls who havc thc
longest time to live. W ho are those? They are thc adolcscents. Oldcr mcn
have Icss time to live than young ones. B u t again, this apptics also to ado-
lesee nt girls. Pausanias sttill cannot give an account for the superiority o f
love for adolcscent males to love o f adule males and to love o f women. Still,
he sees in this that the noble lover loves a decent character rather than the
body. This, however, does not necessarily mean, and we must keep this in
mind, that thc lover possesses a decent character. The point o f view is abid-
ingness, and from abidingness he gocs to that which is rclativeiy most abid­
ing in men, the character.

“Our law wants to pat them to the test in a good and noble way, and wants
to have them gratify some and shun others. On account o f this it encour-
ages them to pursue and the ochen to flee, setting up a contest and tesdng
to which group the lover bclongs and to which the one who is loved.”
(1 8 3 e 6 -1 8 4 a 5 )

The Athenian law commands to the beloved, on the basis o f the requests o f
thosc who love, a decent character. You may not accede to thc request o f
thc base lovers. You see also that Pausanias's concern ¡s for what is proper
for the beloved. Then he makes the transition from the distinction berween
noble and base lovers to thc distinction betwecn lovers and beloved. The
Athenian law commands the lovers on the one hand and the beloved on the
other in order to make manifest to either side the noble o r base character o f
the partner. The Athenian law says you must wait some time beíbre you see,
and this offers the test o f thc character o f the lover and to some extern o f
the beloved,

“This is why, in thc first place, to be caught quickly has been laid down by
law as disgraceful, in order that time may pass— time is often thought to
test bcautifully— and in the second place, to be caught by money and by
political powers is shameftil, regardless o f whether one cowers in being
ill-treated and does noc resise or, in being benefited in regard to money
or political achievements, one does not despise them, for none o f thesc
things is thought to be either solid or lasting, even apart from the face that
there is not by nature a genuine fnendship from these things.” (184a 5 -
b5)

Now for this reason, as he says, namely because noble love is love for the
lasting, for decent character, our laws prescribe to the beloved to run away
and n ot to get caught. Thus the lovers are tested. The lovers are only com-

80
P A U S A N I A S <3 )

manded to pursue and to catch. It is noble for them co catch quickly, as we


have seen, but it is base tbr the beloved to be caught quickly. T o be caught
by money or political preferment is simply base, rcgardless ofw hether one
is caught quickly o r after a long time. For money and political power are not
thought to be firm ñor abiding. But what is then firm and abiding? Charac-
ter. H enee, n ot only the beloved but also the lover must be o f decent char-
acter. The noble erotic relation is, then, between a mature man o f decent
character and an adolescent o f decent character. There is no tensión be­
tween the noble lover and the noble beloved. O ne could still wonder
whether the game ofpursuit is so necessary if this is the esscnce o f the erotic
relation.

“So onc way is left for our law, if a beloved is going to gratify a lover in a
noble manner.* (1 8 4 b 5 -6 )

T h e problcm is how can the beloved nobly grant favors to the lover accord-
ing to the Athenian law? I f both possess decent character and after a decent
interval o f waidng the beloved can be assured o f the decent intentions o f
the lover, has the problem n ot yet been solved? Yet this long period tests the
tenacity rather than the dccency o f the lover. S o the problem is n ot solved.
I t is obvious that a base lover m ay be as tenacious as a de cent lover.

“Our law is that, just as it was agreed in the case oflovers that co be a slave
voluntarily to a beloved in any sort o f slavcry whatsocver was not flattery
or an object o f reproach, so too there is only onc voluntary slavery left that
is not an object o f reproach, and this is [slavery] in regard to vircuc. It has
been established by law for us, ifone is willing to serve someone in the be*
lief that one will be better on his account, eithcr in terms o f some wisdom
or any other part o f virtue, then this voluntary scrvicude is not shamcful or
fla tte ry "(1 8 4 b ó -c7 )

You remember he has spoken o f two laws, encouraging the lover and dis-
couraging the beloved. N othing satisfactory carne out o f this solution be-
cause the testing o f tenacity is n ot a test o f dccency. Now he brings in
another Athenian law. T o repcat: the first Athenian law entides the lover to
all kinds o f things which are permitted in no other pursuit, to every kind o f
slavery, while discouraging the beloved. The new Athenian law, to which he
turns now, encourages the beloved to thralldom toward the lover in order
thus to acquire virtue. Think o f a young Athenian looking up to Pendes as
a man o f outstanding virtue, and he may do for Pendes all kinds o f things
which in no other human relation would be regarded as proper. T o take an
example from Aristotle’s Politics, he might even shine his shoes o r shave

81
C H A T T E B . F I V E

him, which would ordinarily be slavish, but in such relations it would do.
U p to now we have seen that thralldom ¡s encouraged in the case o f thc
lover. Now we bring in another law, which has to do with virtue, n ot with
eroticism, which encourages slavery in the case o f the younger, thc beloved.
L et us sce whether this leads to a satisfactory solution.

“One must bring this pair o f laws together, the law about pederasty and
che law about philosophy and the resc ofvirtue, if the result, thc gratifica*
tion o f the lover by the beloved, is going to tum out fine.” ( 1 8 4 c7 -d 3 )

This is the proposition that he is trying to establish: it is noble for the


beloved to grant favors to the lover. He is working toward it. H e tried it
with the Athcnian law regardlng love, and that was not good enough. Now
he says we must combine these two laws— the law regarding eros and the
law regarding the acquisition o f virtue.

“Whenever lover and beloved come together, cach with a law, one that he
would justly serve, in serving ¿n anything whatsoever, a beloved who grat-
ified him, and the ocher that he in tum would justly serve in anything
whatsoever the one who is making him wisc and good, and the one is able
to contri bute to intelligence and the rest o f vjreuc, and thc other needs to
acquire education and thc rest ofwisdom, then, when these laws come co­
gedle r, only in chis case does it tum out that for the beloved to gratify the
Iover is n oble, but in no othe r case .” (18 4d3 - e 4 )

Now let us try to understand that. O ne thing is clear now: the Athcnian law
as it stands now is insufficicnt for Pausanias’s purposes. In thc guise o f a
praisc o f thc established Athenian law Pausanias proposes a subde change
o f the Athcnian law. His speech is a deliberative speech, a speech about a
change o f law, As I mentioned at the end o f the last m ccting, it is the only
deliberative speech occurring in Plato. Now, every deliberative speech, ac*
cording to a vulgar interpretation, must raise the question, W ho expeets
benefits from it? H ere the answer is clear— the proposcr. The lover de-
mands that the prohibition addressed to the beloved be rescinded or that a
new law be addressed to the beloved. The new law is the consistent formu­
lación o f two contradictory ones. Why does Pausanias want a change o f the
law? Because like every man o f his character he needs legal support for his
practice. He is decent— yes— but one couid also say soft. There are two
laws: one regarding pederasty, the other regarding philosophy, T h e former
encourages the lovers and discourages the beloved; the latter encourages
the beloved. But the law regarding pederasty is concem ed with the protec-
tion o f the boys’ virtue. The law regarding philosophy is concerned with

82
P A O 5 A N I A S ( 2 I

the boys’ acquisirion o f virtuc. The law enades the boys to com e together
with respectable m cn o f outstanding virtue. But it does n ot encourage
them for that purpose, o f course. W hat, then, is the solution? T h e adole s-
cent seek$ virtue, the iover possesses virtuc. The adolescctit is prompted by
love o f virtue; the lover> however, is prompted n ot by love o f virtue but by
love o f youth in bloom . The motives o f the two partners are heteroge-
neous. The allegediy pcrfectly virtuous relation is consdtuted by heteroge-
neous modves. O ne can, in a way, compare this to the relation between
buyers and sellers, which brings about, in a way, a satisfactory relation. Still,
the harmonious relation o f buyer and seller remains a question even if they
make a de al because o f their opposing interests.
You will recaí! that in 183e Pausanias had ascríbed to the adolescent a
noble character, meaning possession o f virtue.

“Even to be deceived for this re ason is in no way disgraceful; but it brings


disgracc for all other reasons whether one is deceived or not. I f someone
should gratify a Iover on the grounds that he is wealthy and then be de­
ceived and not gct any money when the Iover shows up as poor, it is no less
disgraceful; for he who is o f chis sort is thoughe co show his very self, that
for the sake o f money he would serve anyone ac al) in anything at all, and
this is not noble. So on the basis o f the same argument, should one gratify
another on the grounds that he is good and that one would bccome good
onesclf on account o f fnendship with the Iover, and were one then de­
ceived when he showed up as bad and noc possessing virtue, the deception
ai1 the same is noble, for he too is thought to have shown what he is, that
jusc for the sake o f virtue and o f becoming better he would be wholly ca-
ger for anything, and this in curn is the noblest ofall.” (1 8 4 e 4 -1 8 5 b 4 )

T h e adolescent seeking virtue may fail into the hands o f the mature man
who merely pretends to be virtuous. I t is n ot disgraceful for the adolescent
if he grants favors to that pretender. T h e freedom given to the beloved is
still more enlarged. H e does not have to be certain that the Iover is virtu­
ous, it is suffident i f he believes him to be virtuous. T h e adolescent may
grant any favor, in any manner, to anyone, provided that he believes that by
so doing he acquires virtue. You must admit that Pausanias gets in this way
absolutely everything. This is brought about by this wonderful combina-
tion o f the Athenian law regarding pederasty and the Athcnian iaw regard-
ing the acquisition o f virtue.

“So it is totaily noble in every way to gratify just fbr the sake o f virtue only.
This is che eros o f the uranian goddess, and it is uranian, and worth much

83
C H A P T B R F I V B

for cicy and prívate persons, compelí ing the lover and the one who is loved
to exert much care each for his own virtue. AJI the other lovers are o f the
other [ Aphrodite], the Pandcmus. Thesc are the things, Phaedrus, that on
the spur o í the moment i con tribute toyou about Bros.’* (I8 5 b 4 -c 3 )
The noble eros is worth much for the acquisition ofvírtue on the part o f the
lover and the beloved. This seems to mean that both still have to acquire
virtue, and we are n ot conftonted with the situation o f an established char-
acter who has already acquired virtue. Neither o f them rcally possesses
virtue; both acquire virtue in the proccss o f their unión. We see this atso
(rom the formulation that eros is neither indispensable ñor sufficicnt for
acquiring virtue. This, I think, becomes dear. Eros is altogether unrelatcd
here to happiness o r bliss. At the end Pausanius speaks o f the vulgar Ap­
hrodite but not o f the vulgar eros per se. The last word, for which the best
translation is “I contribute” (sutnballom at), is the same word he used be­
fare when he spoke o f the bringing together (sutnbalein) o f the two laws. I
think this is the final refcrence to this crucial bringing together, the novel
bringing together o f two hitherto disjointed Athcnian laws.
Now, let us cry to understand this as a whole. Whereas Phaedrus had
complete ly disregarded the conflict betwcen eros and morality or taken it in
stride, Pausan ias starts from that conflict betwccn eros and the noble, and
therefore he says there are two erotes. The noble eros consists in decent
men loving decent youths with a view to the lattcr’s decency, and decent
youths will in their turn love the decent marure men in order thus to ac-
quíre deccncy. But why should the decent lovers love decent young men?
Why not decent young gjrls? Why should the decent youths, possessing de­
cency, grant all kinds o f erotic favors to decent lovers in order thus to ac-
quire decency? I d on't want to develop this, but with a littlc imagination
you must see the fantastic suggestion for a way to virtue. W hy should de-
cent lovers seek all kinds o f erotic favors, especially from de cent youths?
You see, it really is a fantastic situation. Pausanias wants to make his kind o f
erodeism legal and proper. He is not impudent, he is rather a coward. With-
out knowing it, Pausanias refutes the sophisticated pederasty which he
wants to establish. We will see there are two fiircher defenses o f pederasty
com ing in the next two speeches. B u t is this all that emerges from Pausa­
nias’s speech? What comes to sight through his speech?
Pausanias’s position arises from the conflict betwecn eros on the one
hand and the noble and the law on the other. For this purpose he must rep­
rese nt the noble o r the law, what we would cali morality, in terms o f the de*
cent character. As you could see from the end o f the first book o f the L a w s

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P A U S A N I A S ( 2 )

(6 5 0 a -d ), characters are the the me o f political Science, and in Aristotle’s


Ethics we find that the chief work o f the political art is to make the citizens
good and doers o f noble things. There is an essential connection betwccn
charactcr and law. From the Greek point o f view the function o f the law is
n ot merely to establish pe ace but to make men noble. The noble regarding
eros is a mean between repression and complete license, as we have seen.
This is, according to Aristode, the character o f moral virtue. We may expect
to learn something from Pausanias's speech about moral virtue.
In order to establish the distinction between the two kinds o f eros Pau­
san ias refers successively to three diffcrent principies: intelligence (nous),
freedom, moral virtue. Moral virtue does not legitimate his eroticism. In*
teüigcnce exeludes love o f boys and women and yet supports lo ve o f older
men. Freedom leads to love o f all those who can carry arms, the fighting
men. Freedom would justify Pausanias’s requirements but, as he points
out, the principie o f freedom alone leads to barbarie eroticism, n ot to the
sophisticated eroticism with which he is concerned. I t does n ot exelude
boys, as the Greek cxample to which he refers shows. F or his purpose, then,
he needs a combination o f these two principies, nous and freedom.
Pausanias demands a combination o f two laws— the law regarding phi-
losophy and the law regarding pederasty. The law regarding love o f wis-
dom , i.e., the actualization o f intelligence, and the law regarding the love o f
the bloom o f the body. Is there a link between body and nous, its perfec­
ción, and freedom? Is there a connection between freedom, political free­
dom , and the body? This is the question we have to raise. Freedom is re-
garded as a desirable State for the polis. Why? Freedom needs consent, and
consent is something fundamentalty different from the principie o f intel­
ligence (I refer to Law s 6 S 4 c). Consent means precisely that not-intelligence
as such is the solé guiding principie. Because if intelligence were the solé
guiding principie then we would have che dictatorship o f the wise. Free­
dom means exaedy the oppositc. There ís no dictatorship but consent, i.e.,
a decent contribution o f nonwisdom to political life. Now the polis, which
is essentially linked up with freedom, is primarüy concerned with the well-
being o f the body, according to Plato. What do you say to this suggestion?
Is it not obviously false to say that the polis as polis is primarüy concerned
with the wcil-being o f the body? In the sccond book o f the R ep u blic Plato
speaks o fth e city o f pigs which has no other purpose than to satisfy the bod-
ily needs o f men. He calis this the true city and in some other place he calis
it the city. The cicy as city is concerned with the body.
In order to reach its fiill stature the polis must com bine freedom and

85
C H A P T K R M V h

wisdom. And thc virtue directed toward the self-sufficient polis is moral
virtue. T h e tully developed polis combines the satisfaction o f the require-
ments o f the mind and o f the requirements o f the body. But the same is in­
tended by Pausanias’s perfect erotic association. Pausanias’s perfect erotic
association, however, suffers from a fundamental defect: the motivations o f
the lover and the beloved d o n ot agree. But the same ¡s true o f the polis and
o f moral virtue. T h e motivations o f the body and those o f the mind d o not
jibe. The necds o f the body Icad to society. Society as such requires política!
o r vulgar virtue, which is mercly a shadow o f virtue, a daylight virtue. The
needs o f the mind, however, require genuine virtue {R ep u blic, book 6).
This is onc o f the great themes o f the R ep u blic; the se four virtues, which are
courage, wisdom, moderation, and justice, have the same ñame through-
out. They mean something very difFerent whether they occur on the level
o f the philosophcr or on the lower level. The justice and moderation o f the
uneducated part o f the population, we can say, is only a shadow, a very poor
imitación, o f the genuine virtues. Now, what is true o f this most perfect city,
the city o f Plato'$ R epu blic, is still m ore true o f ordinary cides. Phenomena
o f great variety which have a superficial rescmblance and agree perhaps in
their externa! action, are thought to be identical, and this is n ot the case.
M oral virtue is a combination o f these two heterogeneous moralitics. I f this
is so, from Plato’s point o f view, there cannot be a natural desire for ¡t.
The re is a natural desire for the protection o f the body, there is a natural de-
sirc for the protection o fth e mind, but this necessary but n ot simply natura]
combination is n ot an objcct o f a natural desire. There is no connection,
certainly no identity between moral virtue and büss or happiness. This is by
no means completely changcd in Aristode or, for that matter, in Thomas
Aquinas. I could refer you forexam plc to Thomas Aquinas’s Sum tna con tra
¿ en tiles, book 3, chapter 3 4 , where this is developed, and where thc follow-
ing remark is made: uThe operadons o f justice are ordered for the purpose
o f preserving peace among men, through which each and every one pos-
sesses quiedy what is his own.” The ends are n ot these actions; the end is
peace and quiet. Man cannot find his end in love o r virtue as such. O ne can
make this objection: Pausanias does n o t mention all moral virtues, in foct he
puts a much stronger emphasis on the intellectual virtues— wisdom, nous,
prudence. H e barely alludes to justice and moderation, and he merely men-
tions unmanliness, n ot manliness itself. T o this I would repíy as follows:
Pausanias presents morality o r moralism as modified by a certain kind o f
eroticism— the love o f a mature man for a youth who is afraid o f impropri-
cty. Pausanias’s position is based on a clear idiosyncrasy. But what he says

$6
I' A Ü $ A N r A s ( 2 )

awakens us to the qucstion as co the status o f moral virtue in Sócrates"


speech. T h e re we have to watch íbr the relation between eros and moral
virtue. Secondly, Pausarüas’s position is a particular position, but so is that
o f every other speaker except Sócrates. Sócrates" speech supplies the syn-
thesis o f these particular positions, both regarding the tcaching and re-
garding the life and character, o r whae is now calícd the attitude, o f the
speaker.
For the time being wc know only Pausadas and Phaedrus. L et us look,
in conclusión» at the relation o f their eros to what they say about ¡t. Phae­
drus speaks ffom the point ofview o f the beloved. Every eros is welcome
ffom the point o f view o f the prudent recipient o f favors who is very beau-
tifiil. H e apparendy assigns to eros therefore the highest place. But in fact
he assigns the highest place to those who are by nature the best, cith cr by
beauty o r by insight. H e is satisfied with the law, for the law encourages
the lovers to woo and to serve and discourages the beloved to seek, whích
suits him well. Therefore his speech is the shortest speech. Pausanias, on
the other hand, speaks írom the point o f view o f the lover who competes
with others because he does n ot outshine all others. H e must prom ote his
quaiities and, in particular, his respectability. He needs external support
against his more attractive com petitors. Therefore he must have recourse
to the law. B u t unfortúnately the law is n ot quite suffident for his pur-
pose, and therefore he suggests an improvement o f the law. Since the law
is n ot cntircly on his side and yet he needs the law, his speech is the longest,
apart ffom Sócrates". This is very striking: the first speech is the shortest,
the second the longest. We com e now to the transídon and Eryximachus’s
speech.
L isten tr: I f all Pausanias wants is a justificaron for his particular kind o f
eroticism, why i$n"t he satisfied with allowing the greatest ffeedom to all?
M r Strauss: What you say, I think, is this: The striking thing he re is the
emphasis o n thralldom in eros and n o t something grudgingly given. But
does this n ot mean, sínce ffeedom is o f the essence o f moral virtue as he un-
derstands it, that eros is essentially in conflict with moral virtue? And there­
fore it brings out al1 the more the impossibility o f what he i$ affer. H e never
uses the word freed o m ; he only describes it indirectly. The reason is that if
one wcre to think o f ffeedom and give it its normally assigned place, one
could n ot defend eros. T h e question would then be this: Is there n ot an el-
ement in this thralldom which ¡n a true doctrine o f eros must be preser ved,
and is it preserved in Sócrates" speech? There are two possibilities: ( I ) it is
n ot preserved, and then there is a fundamental defect in the Platonic doc­

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C H A P T K R M V E

trine o f eros. (Gap in the tape.] I am noc sure whether Plato did n ot mean
to bring out very massively the contradictor y character o f the attempt to
rcconcílc, to subject eros to moral virtue. Pausanias makes the remark
“Every action can be noble o r base.” This is also a principal question o f
morality as morality. You have to take the two things together. H e who pre-
sents the standpoint o f moral virtue brings out two principies: (a ) every ac­
ción may be moral and (b ) thcre ís a thralldom superior in dignity to the
fteedom belonging to morality. We must keep this in mind. We must keep
in mind how this clement in the context o f the Platonic analysis o f eros
comes o u t . . . .
In the next speech you will see an attempt to subject eros to art. In the
last three specches no attempt is made to subject eros to anything cxternal.
In Sócrates’ speech there is something higher than eros, but that is not ex­
terna!.
U sten er: I t seems to me that the stress you put on definíng Pausanias’s
speech as essentially defending pederásty . . .
M r Strauss: There is no question about that, that he makes very dear.
We must face that. I think this is part o f the argument. Whereas there is still
a certain ambiguity in Phaedrus’s posidon, Pausanias, Eryximachus, and
Ariscophanes are defenders o f pederasry. In the last two speechcs this
changes again. This implies that a careful study o f these three speechcs will
reveal to us why Plato regarded pederasry as wrong. I think in the case o f
Pausanias it bccomes feirly clear: the very comical presentation o f uniting
for the purpose o f virtue and doing something which has no relation with
it. . . . In a much more sophisdcated way this com es out in the next speech.
I f we sdck to what Pausanias’s speech does, its unique character among
the six speeches— the emphasis on the Athenian law, and the fact that con-
trary to the original daim merely to reinterpret the Athenian law he sug-
gests a change in it— I believe it is necessary to conclude that it is a
deliberative speech. A deliberative speech is o f course n ot a detachcd, ratio*
nal analysis. That it is a scductive speech, líke Agathon’s for examplc, may
very well be, but it is more than that. While it may be truc that every speaker
has in mind an individual, with the exception o f Aristophanes— and I be­
lieve that Sócrates had particularly Phaedrus in mind— it still means more
than that. The engine used by individuáis must be understood in its own
terms, precise ly if we want to understand the effect on certain individuáis. I
am sure there is a connecdon, but nevertheless we must also understand—
in spite o f the rhecorical elements which every speech contains— we must
also consider it as it presents itself, a speech praising eros, presenting eros as

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P A U S A N ] AS ( 2 >

the speaker sees it. In the case o f seduction it is clear. Agathon later on pre-
sents eros as sheer beauty endowed with all virtues.
I will draw a picture here o f the six speakers:

1 Phaedrus: gain :: 4 Aristop Kanes : ugliness


2 Pausanias : moral virtuc :: 5 Agathon : bcaucy
3 Eryximachus: a r t :: 6 Sócrates: philosophy

Listencr: From Agathon’s poínt o f view, and I imagine from Pausanias's


also, there is a ccrtain conflict between Pausanias and Sócrates. I t seemed to
me what Pausanias is saying is that there is a nobility in accepting a lover as
virtuous even when he is not. That is, it is noble to be deccived in these
terms. In a certain sense what he says is that it is a good thing to accept an
imitation virtue. And I wonder whether this is not the re ason why he places
such emphasis on nomos. That is to say he tries to claim that he has the
virtue which is by nomos, which is perhaps not the truest virtue, but which
it is noble to accept.
Mr. Strauss: There are an infinite variety o f levels. And that this could be
higher than low suspiciousness is obvious. Though this does n ot guarantee
that in itself it is very high. We are quite reasonably easily satisfied, and we
admire many things which, on reflccdon, though they may have an elcment
o f nobility in thcm , looked at dispassionately are n ot very high. Pausanias is
taken in completely by his desire and his understanding. Therefore we must
distinguish between what Pausanias intends by his speech and what we are
enabled, by Plato’s superior art, to discern in his speech. Pausanias surely
does n ot go beyond the description o f what he regards as the perfect erotic
association. I believe that Plato wants us to see something in that perfect
erotic association, which in principie is n ot true o f the perfect erotic associ­
ation but is true o f the polis. The polis is such a strangc mixture o f hetero-
geneous elcm ents, unlike the perfect erotic association where both are
animated by the same em otions. In Sócrates’ speech both love something;
that is the truth, T h e eros for the truth, motivating both, makcs possible
the highest erotic association. I am sorry if I givc the impression that I
tried to denígrate the beauties o f Pausanias’s speech. B u t ¡n the short time
at our disposal I have to think o f the Symposiunt as a wholc and see what
the wholc work is after. Otherwise I could be blamed very sevcrely for de-
voting so much time to a coursc such as this in the Department o f Political
Science.
L isten cr: I wonder whether Sócrates has not already answercd one o f
Pausanias’$ main points, and that is that moral virtue is transmitted by this

89
CHAP T E R FJVE

erotic contact, in his general rebu ff against Agathon in the beginning when
Agachón says, “I f you touch me I will gec wisdom.”
Mr, Strauss: Yes, this is o f course o f almost Aristophanean indecency. I
didn’t want co develop this because I know chat you have read the literature
on that one.
[In answer to a question:] The question is, W hat makes it possible that
mind and body are united? I f you answer moral virtue, that is n ot unrea-
sonable. Thercfore Plato makes the suggestion in the R epu blic, to which wc
might rcturn, that what unítes the highest and the lowcst is philosophy.
This, to o , is enigmade but indicates the problem. The SympoHum is silent
about that. But, as I said befóte, we ñnd in Sócrates* speech a doctrine o f
threc eróte s, none o f which is base, only high and low. The low is n o t base.
All are natural, and we must see whether we find there moral virtue as an
object o f a natural desire. In scholasdc language we can say, although this
will displease many who think o f these matters in more poctic terms, the
Platonic doctrine o f eros is idéntica] with his doctrine o f the natural inclina*
dons. I think Pausanias’s speech brings this problem more into the open
than any other speech. In a general way, all six speakers are decent men, that
goes without saying.
[In answer to a question about the polis and caiculation:] That is the
way in which he presents it in the R epu blic. Eros is radically different from
calculadon. Eros is a kind o f possession, therefore he uses the term madness
in the P haedrus. The R epu blic, howevcr, is silent about eros in the second
book when he speaks about the foundation; he presents the case as some-
thing which can be put together and should be put together entirely on the
basis o f calculadon. The one who comes nearest to this in the Sytnposium is
Phaedrus. The word which Sócrates uses for virtue, which can be translated
as prudence or practical wisdom, contains the elem ent o f calculadon, and
Sócrates is by no means completely adverse to it. T h e true virtue is the one
in which calculadon and possession coincide. Throughout the Platonic di­
alogues we find that one and only one phenomenon will solve the problem
he has stated in a particular dialogue, and that is philosophy. W hether he
takes justice, and he shows u$ the just city— uldmately we do n ot find jus-
tice in any city, however virtuous; the only perfect form o f justice is phi-
iosophy. O r, he takes freedom. The only onc who is genuinely free is the
philosopher. The same regarding eros. Only in philosophy does eros come
fuliy into its own. T h at is not meant to be something superimposed, as Pau-
sanias tries to superimpose. Contrary to all enthusiasts Sócrates says love is
not directed coward the beautiful. The elem ent o f splendor is absolutely

90
P A Ü S A N I A S < 2 )

unessential. T o that cxtent Aristophanes is right when he presente an agly


creature. Agathon presente only the beautiful [Eros. F or Sócrates, eros] i$
neither ugly ñor beautifuJ but good. And the good is the prímary theme o f
human deceney, as we would say. T hen he tries to show that heterosexual
desire for procreación does n ot get what it wants. The desire for a lasting
good, transcendlng one’s death, can com e only in theoria.

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6 ERYXIM ACHUS

I suggested last time in my statements on Pausanias’s speech . . .


that it is inadequate for the work o f Plato as a whole. O n the basis o f further
readings the re is always new light shed on things which one has read. Sin ce
I do n ot possess a complete interpretación o f che whole Platonic body, I
know that whatever I say is provisional. Some o f you raised objcctions to
my interpretación. Thcse objections were based on powerful impressions.
Such impressions are never, or hardiy ever, groundless. They are in need o f
exam inaron, but examination in the light o f what? In the light o f Plato’s
guiding intención. What is this guiding intention?
First, o f the Sytnposium in general, the praise o f the god Eros as a prob-
lem— that eros is a god and ought to be praised is imposed o n them by
Phaedrus and will be examined later. The second important consideración
for establishing Plato’s guiding intention is to consider Pausanias’s speech
in particular with regard to its guiding intention. Tw o considerations are
decisive; First, the distinction bccween the noble and the base eros, a dis*
tiñe don not made by Phaedrus and not made by Aristophanes and the iater
speakers. This distinction is linked up with a praise o f the Achenian law, a
praise which c onceáis a suggested change o f the Athenian law. These are the
peculiar features o f Pausanias’s speech. Now there is a theme which I played
down, if I may say so: Pausanias’s emphasis on the element o f slavcry or
thralldom in eros. Does Pausanias n ot bring out an essential element in
eros, which must n ot be tbrgotten in the final reckoning? Is the emphasis
on this slavery o r thralldom not Pausanias’s particular contribution? I be-
lieve that this element in eros is surrender without concern for one’s dig-
nity, without concern for the noble. W hat does this serving o r slaving
mean? The lover is the slave o f the beloved so that the beloved grants favors
to the lovcr. This is explicitly described in I 8 3 b 5 as something terrible; but,
as appears from the contcxt, this is not the most awfui. Worse than this is a
kind o f perjury. This kind o f undignified begging is bad enough, but folse
oaths are even worse. This ¡s the context.
What Pausanias wants to bring out is the immoral element in eros. Eros
is immoral somehow and yet noble. Pausanias is concem ed with legitiman
ing eros in terms o f the noble and the law. Therefore he must first State the
difficulty, the opposition between eros and the noble, oryou can say moral-

92
E R Y X I M A C H U S

ity— I know chis has a somcwhat diffcrcnt connotadon, but in th c Greck it


is expressed by their word for the noble. H e must bríng out the opposition
between eros and morality by stating the principie that no action is in itself
noble o r base, whereas morality would always say the re are certain actions
which are in themsclvcs eithcr noble o r base. T h e emphasis on this thrall-
dom belongs to the context o f the opposition, o r tensión, between eros and
morality. This can be understood very simply as follows: V irtue, as Pausa*
nias and other men o f this kind understood it, means gendemanship, and
the gendeman is the opposite o f the slave. Now if the erotic man behaves
like a slave, he behaves contrary to the gentleman and the re is surely a prob-
lem. B u t this does n ot do away with the fact that this slavcry is o f the
essence o f eros— surrender without concern Ibr one’s dignity. Yet, pre-
cisely, according to Pausanias, the noble eros ís understood in contradis-
tinction to thc base eros. This must affect the meanlng o f slavery. Surrender
for the sake o f what? Surrender fbr the sake o f bodily gratification o f him
who surrendcrs, surrender to the practice o f pederasty for the sake o f ac-
quiring and dlsseminadng moral virtue? T h at is an absurd suggesdon. Nev-
ertheless, something o fth is notion o f surrender without concern for one’s
dignity and for the noble o r beautiful remains o n the highest level, namely,
in the Socratic suggesdon that the highest form o f eros is philosophizing.
Philosophizing is surrender to the truth without concern for one’s dignity
and without concern for even the noble, since the truth is n ot simply noble
or beautiful but in a certain sense ugly.
The other clem ent raised in the discussion concerns the elcment o f de-
cepdon in eros. Reference was made to the two remarks, one near the be-
ginning and the other near the end o f Pausanias’s speech. First, perjury,
which is, o f course, a form o f deception. Perjury by the lover is noble. Later
on, being deceived on the part o f the beloved is noble. In other words, love
can be noble even if it cxists in an clem ent o f deception. W hether this is the
highest love is o f course anothcr question. I think what would hclp us to
understand better what appears in Pausanias’s speech is the polis. Think o f
the noble lie in the R epu tóte. The ruiers, the philosophers, dcceive thc
demos, and it is noble fbr the demos to be deceived. I t is aJso noble for
the philosophers thus to deccive. M ore generaily: the lover is th c statesman,
the beloved is the demos. That this is n ot an entirely fantastic suggesdon
can easily be seen, because in Plato’s dialogue G orgtas, Callicles, in a way
the political man, is dcscribed as the lover o f the demos. Callicles is domi-
nated by eros for the demos just as he is said to be dominated by love for an
individual called Dem os, a handsome young man. T o com e back to thc main

93
C H A P T E R ÜI X

poínt, the ordinary poiitician, which includes all those we cali S t a t e smen,
has eros fbr the demos. This also throws light on the fact that the R ep u blic
is silent on eros, ultimately because the most interesting case o f eros,
namely eros o f the ruler for the ruicd, ls not admitted on the highcst level.
The philosopher in the R ep u blic rules n ot out o f eros but o u t o f compul­
sión, as is dearly stated in the sixth and seventh books.
T o recapitúlate In a few words the comparison between Pausanias’s
erotic association and the polis to which I referrcd: You wilt recall that Pau-
sanias explicitly says the perfect erotic assodation is onc in which mature,
decent males edúcate potentially decent males. This, however, is exactly
what the polis claims to do. Mature gendemen edúcate potential gentie-
mcn— the next generation. B u t, o f course, we sec the absurd combinadon
o f educado n for virtue and pederasty. Pausanias demands a nonexistent
com binadon o f the law on philosophy and the law on pederasty. The se laws
exist in Athens but they are not combined. In demanding the combinadon
o f these two disdnct laws, he refers to two independent principies: intelli-
gence— nous— and body. In his speech he refers to three principies alto-
gether: intelligence, freedom, and moral virtue. He refers to them in ordcr
to justify pederasty. We have seen that intelligence, as he understands it,
does n ot justify pederasty. I t rather jusdfies love o f oíd men like Sócrates. As
for política! freedom, according to the argument it does justify pederasty
but n ot the dístinction between the noble and base eros. The third princi­
pie— moral virtue— is sufficient in Pausanias's own opinión. I think reflec-
don shows that moral virtue itself is a unión, a com binadon o f these two
different things— intelligence and freedom. Freedom is specifícally polid-
cal, what we ordinarily cali consent. The polidcal, in its tu m , is primarily in
the Service o f the body, in modcrn ianguage o f self-preservation. We have,
then, cwo principies ultimately: intelligence and the body. Thcir unión,
which is complicated and difficult to understand, explains moral virtue.
The basis is this: the requirements o f intelligence and the requirements o f
the body, and therewith ofsociety, m eet. It is strange that they should meet
because intelligence and the body are entirely different. Their m eeting can
be shown very simply: both in order to live with others and in order to
think, you musí have a certain amount o f temperance. Ify o u are constandy
drunk you cannot be a Citizen, ñor can you be a thinker. Also courage: you
cannot be a good soldicr if you are absolutely cowardly, ñor can you be a
good thinker if you are absolutely cowardly. You would be constandy in
fcar and not have a free mind. O ne can say, then, strange as it sounds, that
the requirements o f the mind and the requirements o f living together meet

94
E R Y X I M A C H U S

somehow; they are for practical purposes almost the same. B u t they are rad-
icaily difierent in principie o r in spirit. The purposes in each case are radi-
cally different. Moral virtuc, which is for the sake o f understanding, o f
theoria, and for the sake o f soeiety, presents itself as the end— the simple,
clear, and homogeneous end o f human Ufe. We can cali this position moral-
ist. Although Aristotle prese nted this view to some extent, it was fully
developed only by Kant. This will suffice as a summary o fth e points we dis-
cussed last time. Though this is an occasion for further discussion we must
make some headway.
L et us turn to the beginning, 1 85c4. After Pausanias had paused which
is, first o f all, an ailuslon to the length o f Pausanias’s speech.

When Pausanias had made a pausation— the wise tcach me to speak in


equal phrases in just thisway— Atistodemus said that Aristophanes should
have spoken . . . (1 8 5 c 4 -6 )

W ho makes this pun— Pausanias and pause? Could it not have been made
by Aristodemus in his report and stuck in Apollodorus’s mind? They are
very different men but they have something in com m on: they are young
lovers o f Sócrates. I think this ambiguity, that we don’t know who made
this joke, is n ot unintended.

, . . but hiccups had just come over him, cithcr by saticty or by something
else, and he was unable to speak. But he did say— the physician Eryxi-
machus was lying in the couch below his— “Eryximachus, it is just that
you either stop my hiccups or speak on my bchalf, until I have stoppcd.”
And he said Eryximachus said, “Well, 111 do thcm both. I shall speak in
your turn, and you, when you stop, will speak in mine, and while I am
speaking, see whecher the hiccup is willing to stop ifyou hold your breath
for a long time; ifn o t, gargle with water. But if it is very severe, pick up the
sort o f thing by which you might irricate your nose, and sneeze. And ifyou
do this once or cwice, even if it is very severe, it will stop.” “You couldn’t
speak too soon,” Aristophanes said, “and I shall do this.” (1 8 5 c 6 -e 5 )

This is a fimny interlude which is probabiy not entirely meaníngless. We see


immediately that they speak in the order in which they sit. O ne change is
made: Aristophanes and Eryximachus change the order o f speaking. This is
o f some importance. T h e general meaning o f such changes ¡s that the
speakers are interchangeable— they are in an important respect identieal,
though n ot simply identieal. Plato had apparently some reasons for cmpha-
sizing such an identity in the case o f Eryximachus and Aristophanes and
only in that case. It leads also to the consequence that Eryximachus con-

95
CHAPTF. R $ IX

eludes the first half o f the speeches and Sócrates the second half. By virtue
o f this change we get Sócrates and the poets in the second half. Incidentally,
also only strong drinkers; the weak drinkers are in the first h a lf Still, could
Plato not have arranged it in the first place so that we would have the order
Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus in the first h a lf and in the second Aris-
tophanes, Agathon, Sócrates? We must see the dramatic meaning o f this
change. This sensible order is brought about by accident. Why is this better
than if it had been planned? T o put these three m ost outstanding m en to-
gether would have been impolite. There is a disproportion between wis-
dom , which requires that they go together, and politeness, o r the polis and
society. This is a consideradon in cvery Platonic dialogue. In this way Ar-
istophanes’ speech becomes the ccnter o fth e whole. Aristophancs acquires
this ccnter position by a defect o f his body. The body asserts itself after Pau-
sanias's somewhat disingenuous attempt to put the body entirely in the sec­
ond place: bodily gratifications are only in the Service o f moral education.
You see also that Eryximachus shows that he is a physician, very clear and
precise, but also very pedantic, As you can also see, he is eager to speak*
There is a certain contrast between him and Sócrates, as we shall see. Now
let us turn to Eryximachus’s spcech.

Then Eryximachus said, “Wcll, then, ic seems co me to be ncccssary, sincc


Pausanias scarccd out coward the logos bcautihilly but did not complete ic
adequately, that I must try to put an end on the logos.” (1 8 5 e 6 -l8 6 a 2 )

This is important for the understanding o f the whole. There was no such
connection between Pausanias’s and Phaedrus’s speeches. Eryximachus’s is
a continuation or, as he claims, the consummation o f Pausanias’s spcech.
But he carefiiily says, “I must try,” and we will see later on that he does not
condude it. The man who condudes the series which began with Pausanias
is Aristophanes. These three speeches form an important subtheme.

wHis assertion that Eros is doublc seems to me to be a bcautifiil división;


but I sccm to have observed (rom the art o f medicine, our are, that he is
not only over the souls o f human beings in regard to the beauties but also
in regard to many other things and in cvcrything clse, the bodics o f all an­
imáis, the things that grow in the earth, and virtual!y in all the beings, and
how great and wonderfiil is the god, and how he pereains to everything
throughout both human and divine matters. I shall begin speaking trom
the art o f medicine, in order that we may also dignify the art.” (1 8 6 a 2 -
b3)

96
KR V X I M AC H U S

A physician is speaking, a poor drinker, valetudinarian, and a pupil o f the


sophist Hippias, who in his way loves thc young Phaedrus, also a poor
drinker and a pupil o f Hippias. H e agrees with Pausanias that eros is
twofold— noble o r base. Pausanias and Eryximachus are the only ones who
speak o f thcse rwo erotes. They are the only moral ists. But Pausanias had
said that eros, both the noble and the base, exists only in thc souls o f human
beings and is dircctcd toward beautiful males, whereas medicine teaches
that eros exists also in other things and is directed toward many things
which are n ot noble. For examplc, there is an eros directed toward evacua-
tion o f thc body. Eros is a cosmic principie, affecting all human beings at
least. This is the new notion introduced by Eryximachus, foreshadowed
(bu t only foreshadowed) by the fect that Pausanias spoke o f the noble eros
as the heavenly eros. This nonhuman, even subhuman, phenomenon to
which Eryximachus refcrs is the onc he calis the divine things, as disrin-
guished from the human things. There is no reference to myth o r to the
Athenian cult, as in the case o f Phaedrus and Pausanias. The authority o f
myth is abandoned. B u t it is n ot simply abandoned. I t is replaced by an-
other authority; art, medicine. The m odem analogy to that is Science.
Phaedrus looks at eros from the point o f view o f gain, Pausanias from
the point o f view o f the noble o r virtue; Eryximachus looks at it from thc
point o f view o f art. H e embraces eros and his art in one breath as appears
from the following sentcnce: “I shall begin speaking from the art o f medi­
cine, in order that we may also dignify the art.” H e gives th c cosmic doc­
trine o f thc two erotes, but this cosmic doctrine is modified by a concern for
the praise o f his art. This implies, as we shall see later on, that the noble eros
is n ot by nature. For Pausanias, to o , it was n ot according to nature, but
brought about by law. In this case it will be brought about n ot by law but
by art, by his art-medicine.
L isten er: Isn’t it implied here already that eros is a god?
Mr. Strauss: I think this wiil becom e the themc in a mcthodical way only
when we get to Agachón. Agathon is the only one who praises eros as a god.
T h e others talk o f eros as a god but mean by it a natural phenomenon.
L isten er: B u t Eryximachus doesn’t even seem to talk about him as a god.
Mr. Strauss: This is quite true, and to this extent he is an enlightened
physician. But he pays for it dearly, because his speech cnds with the praise
o f the art o f divination. Just as Aristophanes, who is more ¡mpious than any
o f his predecessors, ends with a praise o f piety. The obvious point is that he
begins in a very positivistic spirit, no nonsense. We will see whether his

97
C H A P T B R SI X

pride w¡|| not be humblcd. In 1 8 6 b -e he speaks o f eros in thc nature o f


bodics as revealcd by medicine. By bodies he means here human bodies,
since medicine is human medicine. Eryximachus does not yet transcend che
human things. H e wiil do thar later but he has this in mind.
“The naturc ofbodics has this doublc Eros. The hcaJth and thc sickncss o f
thc body are universally agrecd to be differe nt and dissimilar, and the dis-
similar dcsircs and lovcs díssimilars. Now the eros for the hcalthy is diñer-
ent, and thc onc for the sickly is different. As Pausanias was saying just
now, it is noble to gratiíy thc good o f human beings and disgraccful to
gratify thc dissolute; so too in bodics che mselves, it is noble to gratiíy (and
onc should) the good and hcalthy things o f the body o f each, and thc
ñame for this is the medical, but it is disgraccful [to gratiíy] thc bad and
diseased things and onc should disobligc thcm ifonc is going to be skillcd
in thc art." (18 6 b 4 - c 5 )

Pausanias had said it is noble to grant fávors to the good lovers, it is base to
grant favors to the dissolute lovers. In medicine it is noble to satisfy love felt
for what is healthy in che body, and it is base to satisfy the love felt for what
is sick in thc body. In other words, medicine identifies the good with thc
hcalthy and the dissolute with the sick. However, he brings in another co n ­
sideración: the healthy body lovcs X , and thc sick body loves Y. H e says sim­
ilar things love similar things. T h e word sim ilarm W be crucial in the sequel,
thereforc I mention it here. The physician does n ot feel love for that which
he satisfies o r for that which he does not satisfy. T h e loveless art rcgulates
love. This is a certain difficulty which onc must keep in mind. Just as virtuc
was n ot love in Pausanias and Phaedrus but either produced love or regu-
lated it.
Up to this point Eryximachus has explained who o r what is the lover.
The lover is thc body, but what does thc body love? So far we d o n 't know.
L isten cr: Isn’t there nobility in the action o f the physician in his permit*
ting and helping to satisfy desi re?
Mr. Strauss: This is an important question. The healthy body is good,
and thc sickly body as such is a bad body. W hat the physician does is either
noble o r base. This is very interesting bccause what is loving— the body—
is caUed good o r bad, whercas the loveless art is now called noble o r base.
Pausanias had distinguished betwcen noble and base eros. Eryximachus
here, at any ratc, seems to distinguish between good and bad eros and a
noble o r base cxercise o f the art. H ow much this means wc shaU see.
L isten er: He agrecs with what Pausanias had said that it is right to grat­
iíy good men and base to gratify dissolute men. Pausanias ended with a

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E R Y X I M A C H U S

contradiction. Wouldn’t this show Eryximachus’s ability to rcason o n mat-


ters ofvirtue?
Mr. Strauss: We can sec all kinds o f chings even if we are much Icss intel*
ligenc than Eryximachus. But in hearing a speech once it is impossible to
look up the beginning. You cannot study a speech while giving it. That re-
quires an enormous intelligence, which Sócrates apparently had, as ¡ndi-
cated by hi$ conversations. Eryximachus understands about as much as a
summary o f the speech would givc him, perhaps a bit more since he is in-
telligent. The hopeless difficulties in which Pausanias g o t entanglcd are not
apparent to him, one reason being that he also shares Pausanias’s preju-
dices; he, to o , is a pederasc. In addition, he is a bit rigid because o f his mas-
tery o f his art. Mr. Gildin’s point is very important. It could perhaps mean
this: it might be connected with his concern with his art.

“Medicine is, to speak summarily, the Science o f the crocic things o f the
body in regard to replction and cvacuation, and he who discerns in them
the noble and base eros, he is the most skillcd in medicine; and he who
makes chem alter, so as to acquire che onc cros instead o f the other, and in
which things cros is not but should come to be in them, if he knows how
to implant ic, and if it is there to remo ve it, he would be a good crafts*
man.” (I8 6 c 5 -d 5 )

The question here is: We know who o r what is the lover— the body either
healthy or sick— but who is the beloved? Repietion or cvacuation. The
body has love for either the right kind, and then it is noble, or for the wrong
kind, and then it is base. The Greek verb from which repledon is derived is
used as well for the pregnaney o f females. So you see the connection with
the erotic phenomenon. Medicine distinguishes between two kinds. I t en-
courages and even allows o r causes the right kind and takes away the wrong
kind. We also see a distinedon within medicine as knowledgc. The one who
recognizes, diagnoses, eros, and the other who is concem ed with doing
things— he is called a good craftsman. Thus the theoredeal and practical as-
peets are distinguished and we shall see later that this is very important. In
the case o f bodies the beloved is repietion and evacuation. T h e quesdon is,
could this have any applicability to the soul? In other words, does the soul
love repietion and evacuation? Perhaps we could connect repietion with
knowiedge, and evacuation might be the evacuation o f ignorance o r per­
haps also the bad evacuation, namely forgetting o f knowiedge.

“He must be able to makc the most hatcful things in the body friends and
love one another. The most contrary things are the most hatefiil, coid to

99
CHAPTE K SIX

Kot, bi etc r to swcct, dry to liq uid, c vcrythin g o f thc kind. Ou r anccstor As-
clcpius kncw how co instill eros and unanimity in these things, as thc poces
here say and I am persuaded, and so he put together our art.’1 ( 186d 5-c3)

H e drops thc subject o f repletion and evacuation, as we have seen, and, per-
haps, replaces it by something more general— opposites. Clearly repletion
and evacuation are opposites, but he looks at ít now from a different poínt
o f view, opposites in the body, n ot opposites which the body seeks. The
body contains opposite elements. This is the basis fbr the very need for re­
pletion and evacuation. Medicine must establish harmony between these
opposite elements, i.e., love o f the most hostile. The lover is the beloved
and the beloved is the lover. The lover and beloved are no longer distin-
guished in the subject, eros, as they were in the speeches o f Phaedrus and
Pausanias. Eryximachus drops now all one-sided love. A one-sided love
would be, for example, the love o f the body for food. H e is only concerned
with things capable o f mutual love, namcly, the elements o f the body.
Ifo n e were to appty this simply to human beings, a rather fantastic rcsult
would seem to com e about— the best man must love the most dissolute
man, and the art regarding the soul would exist in establishing an equi-
librium o f mediocrity between thc best and the worst. Surely in Eryxi*
machus’s own case, because he and Phaedrus are similar people, chere
would be base love, since true love seems to be only among opposites.
What strikes us immediately is the siJcnce about male and female. In his
whole speech this is the most relevant opposite, if you talk about love.
There was this famous list o f opposites drawn up by the Pyth agoré ans, and
male and female naturally figured in an important place. Eryximachus goes
so far as to be silent even about m en— males. O ur physician is silent about
the normal unión o f opposites in living beings. Why? Noble love is usually
love o f opposites, and this is the work n ot o f nature but o f art. This, o f
course, constitutes the highest praise o f art. I f the noble love is never
brought about by nature, but only by thc medical art, he also implies some­
thing else. I f by nature opposites hate each other, it means that similar
things by nature love each other. Simply and crudcly expressed— pederasty.
Pederasty is natural, and this is, o f course, what he is trying to prove. Eryx­
imachus’s cosmic doctrine o f eros is nullified n ot only by his concern with
medicine but by his kind o f eroticism as well. His cosmic doctrine o f eros
pro ves to be an expression o f these two concem s: art and pederasty. The
difficulty you see at this time is this; His art is opposed to his eroticism bc-
causc his art is supposed to establish harmony between opposites. It is

100
E R Y X 1 M A C H U S

thereforc a grcat problcm for him to praise eros and his art in the same
breath.

‘‘The entirecy o f medicine, as I say, is govemed through chis god, and like-
wise gymnastics and farming as wcll." (1 8 6 c 4 - 187a 1)

These three arts— medicine, gymnastics, and farming— are mentioned to-
gether also in the tenth book o f the L aw s (8 8 9 b - e ) in the context o f a
represe ntation o fth e doctrine o f the subve rsive people: Art is lower than na-
ture, and the most respectable arts are, therefore, medicine, farming, gym­
nastics, because these are the arts which most cooperare with nature. In the
política! art there is nothing natural, it de ais only with human artifaets,
laws, etc. This is derivadve from the view that to be means to be body. At
this point Eryximachus has finished his discussion o f medicine and we keep
only one thing in mind: Medicine consists in bringing about love o f op-
posites which are by nature hostile, which implies that by nature similars
attract each other— love each other, Applied to human thíngs this would
mean that pederasty is natural and heterosexual love is to be brought about
artificially by medicine, which is a very funny suggcstion.
In the sequel he speaks o f eros in music. M usic, to o , establishes har-
mony between opposites, i.e., the eros o f opposites fbr one another.

“It is plain to anyone who pays attention with even a licde nous that music
too is along the same lines as them, just as perhaps Heraclitus too wants co
say, since if one just takes him litcrally he does not speak beautifully. He
says o f the one that in differing with itsclf it agrccs with itself, ‘just as is the
harmony o f bow and oflyre.’ It is overwhelmingly irrational to assert that
a harmony difTcrs or is out o f things that are still differing. Buc perhaps he
wanted to say this, that o f the prior differenccs o f high and low a subsc*
quent agreement has come about by the musical art. It is surcly not the
case that a harmony would be out o f high and low while they were still dif-
fering. Harmony is consonance, and consonancc a kind o f agreement, but
it is ímpossi ble that there be a harmony out o f differing things as long as
they are differing, just as rhythm too has come to be out o f swift and slow,
which have prevíously differed but subscqucntly carne to an agreement.”
(1 8 7 a l-c 2 )

As you see, this i$ a somewhat pedantic correction o f the saying o f Heracli­


tus. Heraclitus wrongly asserts the persistence o f disharmony, o f the oppo­
sites. O nce you have harmony, Eryximachus says, the original disharmony
has ccased to exist. Heraclitus, however, says the survival o f the desire in the
harmony is essential to make it a true harmony. O ne could say thc Hcra-

101
C H A P T E R S1X

clitean rule is deeper than this somewhat schematic view o f Eryximachus.


T h e fact that he refers to He rae li tus is n ot accidental, because Hcraclitu$ is
the opposite number to Parmenides and Parmenides was the authority for
Phaedrus and his speech. O ne can say that Phacdrus agrees with Plato,
who, ultimately, prefers Parmenides to Heraciirus, as is indicaced in various
ways.
The characteristic point here is this: Parmenides has said that eros is the
first and oldcst o f all gods. W hat did Heraclitus say about the same subject?
War is the father o f all things. In a way Eryximachus agrees with him when
he says the fundamental fact is the war o f the opposites. H e says in effect
that discord is by nature and harmony is by art, which is cióser to Heracli­
tus than he sccms to think.

“In this case music instills harmony in all these things, just as ín the oeher
case medicine did, by the insertion o f cros and unanimity among one an-
other. Music too is in turn a Science o f erotic things, in regard to harmony
and rhythm. And in the system itself o f harmony and rhythm, it is not at all
difficuk to discern the erotic things, and the twofold eros is noevet diere.”
(187c2-c8)

We find no instances o f one-sided love, only noble love. We find a sphere in


which there exists only noble love, in the case o f music, whereas in the case
o f the body, and, anticipating later developments, in all spheres except one,
there are both noble and base love. There is one sphere in which there ¡s
only noble love, and we have to consider that carefully. Music and medicine
both produce love; that means mutual love o f opposites. The difiere nce be-
tween music and medicine is this: both consist o f a theoretical part and a
praedeal part. Theoretical music has to do with objeets composed by art,
and these objeets do n ot know the twofold love. There is only the noble
love among them. Eryximachus says that the distinction between noble and
base is a universal distinction. There is only one little sphere in which ¡t does
not apply, regardless o f whether Eryximachus sees it. T h at is the sphere o f
theoretical music, or, to identify it more simply, mathematics. From Plato’s
point o f view, the root o f all art, the art o f arts, is mathematics, m ore specif-
ically, arithmetic. This much i$ secn by Eryximachus. But, characteristically,
he does not make any use o f it. In other words, there is the first indication
o f what Sócrates later on describes as the true object o f eros— these puré
beings, the ideas. I f there is such a sphere, in which there is only noble eros,
this would have to be the model for all eros. True eros would be the love o f
this sphere o f puré harmony. But Eryximachus cannot accept that. F or him

102
E R Y X I M A C H U S

love ¡s mutuality. T h e sphere o f pare numbere docs n ot lo ve the mathe-


matician.

“Buc whenever one has to employ rhythm and harmony in relation to hu­
man beings, either by making— it is what they cali lyric poetry— or by us-
ing correctíy the songs and meters ihat have been made— it is what has
got the ñame educación— then it is here that it is difficuit and there is need
o fa good craftsman.” (I8 7 c 8 -d 4 )

Eryximachus has spoken before o f the craftsman, when speaking o f the


practical art o f medicine in 186d 3 - 5. While there is a radical diffcrence be-
tween theoretical medicine and theoretical music— theoretical medicine
has also to d o with the base form o f love, theoretical music does n ot know
a base relation— there is a basic kinship be tween practica! medicine and
practical music. H e refers to education. But education as he understands it
exciudes gymnastics. H e is a mere physician. W hat is the true relation be-
cween medicine and gymnastics according to Plato? Gymnastics is the pos-
idve art, medicine is a cor recove art, just as education is a positive art and
punishment a negadve art. Eryximachus deais only with sick bodies, and his
emphasis on the dignity o f art implies that by nature there are only sick
bodies and that the art is required to cure the natural sickness.

“The same argument has come back, that one must gratify the orderly
among human beings and scc how the not yet orderly might become
more orderly, and one must guard the eros o f these— and chis is the beau-
tiful eros, che uranian, the Eros o f the uranian muse. But the eros o f the
pandemian Polyhymnia, that one must cautiously apply co whacever one
applies ic, in order that they may rcap the pleasure o fit, and not inscrt any
licendousness, just as in our art it is a great task to use the dcsires o f the art
o f cookery bcautifuUy, so as to reap the pleasure without discasc. So in
music, in medicine, and in all other things, both the human and the di­
vine, one must guard each Eros, co the extenc it is allowcd, for the pair is
in them.” (1 8 7 d 4 -1 8 8 a l)

The art o f cooking must be supervised by the medical art. T h e art o f cook-
ing is an art which supplies pleasure; the art o f medicine does n ot, as wc all
know. H e de ais here with croticism as a subdivisión o f music. H e de votes
only a small part to human love. A very smal1 part o f his speech is devoted
to what was the solé subject o f Pausanias and Phacdrus. The lesson den ved
ffom medicine and music is that noble love is love for harmony, which con-
sists o f opposites. Therefore, it is noble to grant favors to the well-behaved
human beings and to the not yet well-behaved with a view to the ir becom-

103
CHAF T E K $ IX

ing wdl-behaved and to preserve the ir love. It is base co grant favors to


the dissolute. This base love should be extirpated, for it is sick love. B u t this
is n ot what he says. N oble love— heavenly love— is love o f che heavenly
muse. Base love— vulgar love— is love o f Polyhymnia, the love o f vulgar
music. T h e latter, however, is not to be extirpatcd but to be purged. Why is
this base muse* corresponding to the base eros, n ot to be extirpated? F or­
me ríy, when he spoke o f medicine, he said that the base love is to be extir-
pated. The noble muse does not give us pie asure, but the base muse gives
us pleasure.
The re is a certain connection with the principie o fth e Phtlebus, the dia­
logue preceding the Sym posium in the traditional order. The theme o f the
P hilebu s is the whole human good, that it consists o f two parts: knowledge
and pleasure. Whatever this may mean in Plato, Eryximachus’s the sis is in a
certain way akin to it. But let us tu m to our subject: noble love is related to
base love as medicine is related to the art o f cooking. This i$ more o r less
said in Plato’s G orgias, too. From herc wc understand the reference to the
opposites o f sweet and bitter. When he spoke o f opposites he put this in
the middle, already foreshadowing the crucial importance o f this example.
Now, the sweet is according to nature, the bitter is against nature. This is
not a metaphysical but an empirical Statement. W hat is sweet does not go
against the grain, what is bitter goes against the grain o f the palate. Just as
nomos, the law, had to bring together in Pausanias’s speech a few things, so
the art regarding eros must bring together the two forms o f eros and over­
eóme their separation; but the opposites which it reconciles, which it in­
duces to love one another, are the noble and the base eros, n ot the lover
and the beloved. This problem does not exist because we have only mutual
love. The eros which lacks pleasure and the eros which supplies pleasure,
the eros which is directed toward good behavior and the eros which is di*
rected toward bodily pleasure— this is the function o f the art o f eroticism.
Eryximachus is willing to praise eros most highly. Eros is the power
which moves everything by nature, for every happening is due cither to
love o f similars or love o f opposites. You can put it in mechanical terms o f
attraction and repulsión, though you would miss something. It is, in hu­
man terms, either to homosexuality o r to heterosexuality. But Eryximachus
cannot leave it at this, since he must distinguish between noble and base
eros; and when you speak o f love o f similars and love o f opposites, are not
both noble? The distinction is in this case supportcd by his preference
for homosexuality. Noble eros is love o f similars— pederasty. Yet, he also
wishes to praise his art, che art o f medicine. The noble eros does n ot rule by

104
E R Y X I M A C H U S

nature, bccausc there is aíso a base eros. The supremacy o f the noble eros i$
the product o f art, it is n ot by nature. The unnatural character o f pederasty
permits Eryximachus to praise tn one breath pederasty and art. L et me ex-
ptain. At first glance you would say this: Those which are by nature oppo-
sites, the male and the female, tend by nature to lo ve one another. This
unión is according to nature and is healthy. Those which are by nature sim­
ilar— males— tend away from one another. Their unión is against nature; it
is sick. T h e art must bring about their separation if it should n ot act against
nature. M edicine, in other words, would be for the cure o f pederasty and
n ot for heterosexual íove which ¡s natural. Buc this ¡s, o f course, unaccept-
able for Eryximachus. The principie o f pederasty can be stated as follows:
Things which are by nature similar tend by nature toward one another.
T h en, o f course, it follows that those which are by nature opposite— males
and females— tend away ffom one another and we need an art in order to
make these opposites— males and females— lovc one another. Males and
females must be brought together by art for the prese rvation o f the human
species. This would mean that the prese rvation o f the human species de-
pends entirely on the art o f medicine, which is a gross exaggeration. B u t, on
the other hand, this art has nothing to do with Eryximachus’s kind ofcroti-
cism. H e must praise both his art and his eroticism and must conceive o f
both as akin to each other. Otherwise he cannot be satisfied. I f the principie
stated— that things opposite tend away from one another and art is needed
ín order to make them love one another— if these principies are to be pre-
served and if his art is to be ¡n harmony with his kind o f eroticism, there
must be some oppositeness which his art alone, o r art alone, can overeóme.
This is the opposition n ot o f male and female but o f virtue and pleasure. He
must seek for harmony between opposites, the artificial harmony between
the opposites o f males and females won’t do. He finds what he seeks in the
opposition o f good behavior and pleasure. B u t then, o f course, it is music
rather than medicine which overcomes this opposition. I f virtue and plea­
sure are opposites, then the noble and the pleasant are opposites, and the
pleasant is the base, I t is a tall order that the solution o f the human problem
should consist in establishing a working harmony between the noble and
the base. This much, I think, appears up to this point.
Eryximachus told us o f one sphere in which only one o f the two forms
o f eros exists, what I cali theoretical music and which reminds us somehow
o f mathematics. This is forgotten, o r perhaps n ot forgotten. H e implies
that it does n ot belong co the human things, ñor to the divine things. The
divine things are practically idéntica! fbr him with the natural things. There

105
C H A P T E R S1X

was a doctrine which held that mathcmatical things are not natural, and, o f
course, they are not human things, in the sense that in themselves they have
anything to do with human well-being. I want to repcat one point. Origi-
nally he had said that the base eros must be taken away, meaning the lo ve o f
the sick body for things which increase its sickness. Now he says the base
eros must he preser ved but subordinated to an integra ted end, the noble
eros, and that means pleasure. H e wants to praise in one breath pederasty
and his art, What would help? By nature man is heterosexual; his art brings
about homosexuality. But for any sensible Greek to say something is against
nature is a degradación. He cannot praise both. I f he would say pederasty is
according to nature, then his art, in bringjng about the artificial unión o f
male and female, has nothing in com m on with pederasty. A rt and pederasty
are mutually exclusive and this has something to do with the truc nature o f
man as an animal and a thinking being. B u t these two different functions
are m ore o r less in a certain harmony which exeludes this fanciful and ad­
verse attempt o f Eryximachus. In the rest o f che speech he deais with the
eros in divine things. H itherto he had spoken o f eros in human things and
made a subdivisión— eros in medicine, eros in music. The erotic doctrine
proper was only a subdivisión o f the doctrine o f eros in music. Now he
ttirns to t h e eros i ti divine things. By th e divine things he means th e natural,
the cosmic things, as we wül see.
One could say Eryximachus has tour subjeets: medicine, which deais
with the visible body; music, which deais with invisible sounds; astronomy,
which deais with the visible bodies far away; and divination, which deais
with the invisible gods. This is an ascent from the most obviously visible
bodies nearby to the least accessible invisible gods. H e implies that as a
physician he deais with visible bodies nearby; his art ¡s the most solid o f all
the arts mentioned. This was seen by Krüger in his book, to which I ha ve
referred on another occasion. B u t one must n ot overlook the other side,
namcly the following proportion: the nearby visible is to the nearby audible
as the far away visible is to the far away audible. The connection between
the first parts is clear. W hat about the audible? Where in the case o f the gods
does the element o f audibility com e ¡n? The gods are known by sounds, by
hearing, by tradition. Hearsay is a basis o f knowledge o f the gods. Yet we
must also see the distinction between the human and the divine. Medicine
and music dea! with human things, astronomy and divination with divine
things. T h e relationship between astronomy and divination wilí n ot prove
to be like the relación between medicine and music. I t is rather like the re­
lación o f theoretical medicine and music to practica! medicine and music.

106
E R Y X I M A C H U S

Now Ict us read thc sequel.

wSincc cvcn thc system o f the scasons o f che year is ful! o f both o f these,
and whenever those things ofwhich I was just speaking— thc hot and coid
things and che dry and liquid— obtain che ordcrly eros in rclation to onc
another, and get a harmony and modérate blcndíng, thcy bring in their
coming a good season for human beings, al) che other animáis, and planes,
and theycommit no injustice; but whenever thc Eros that gocs along with
hubris is more in power in regard to the seasons ofthe year, they do a grcat
deal o f damage and commic injustice. Plagues are wont to arisc from
things o f this sort, and many other varictics o f discase for beasts and
plants. Frosts, for examplc, hailstorms, and rusts come about from the
greediness and disorderliness o f erotic things o f this sort in relación to onc
another, the Science o f which, conce rning the movemenes o f the stars and
seasons o f theyears, is called astronomy.” (1 8 8 a l-b 6 )

In other words, the first subdivisión o f human knowledge o f divine things


is astronomy, thc Science dealing with the heavenly bodies, which were re-
garded by the pagans as divine. He speaks here o f the noble eros, which is
not a work o f art, and o f the corresponding base eros, which is, o f course,
also n ot a work o f art. The modérate eros o f hot and coid, dry and wec,
brings about the health o f m en, brutes, and plants. This noble eros does
n ot does n ot d o any injustice. T h e dissolute eros among these elements
brings about plagues and commits injustice. Ifyou contrast this with an ear-
Üer passage, 1 8 6 d -c , you sec this: mutual lo ve o f the most opposite— o f
h ot and coid— fbr example, brings, as such, health. Now he says no, only a
ccrtain kind o f such mutual love brings about health. Why this change? In
the earlier passage he started from the primacy o f opposites, i.e., the pri-
macy o f war. T h e love o f opposites is, therefore, entircly thc work o f art.
Now he makes a distinction. War o f the opposites is itself a special kind o f
love o r unión. W hich kind o f unión could be the war o f opposites? The love
o f similars. T h e war o f opposites, the mutual attraction o f everything h ot, is
disunity o f the h ot from the coid. We com e now to the root o f the problem:
eros rules universally, by nature. Art, in this particular case astronomy, can-
n ot affect these two torms o f eros, the eros o f the similar for the similar and
the opposite for the opposite. A rt can only foresec them and, therefore,
help man by warning him.
This doctrine o f which he makes use, is the doctrine o f a famous
philosopher, Empedocles. You can read a bricf sketch o f his doctrine in thc
first book o f Aristotle’s M etaphysics, especially in 9 8 5 a 2 1 - 2 8 . H e was a
philosopher somewhere in Sicily who wrote a poem ofw hich large strctches

107
CHAP T B R SJX

have been preserved. There is a funny thing: Empedoclcs add ressed that
poem to a young man whose ñame was Pausanias, ju$t as Eryximachus, in a
way, addresses his speech to Pausanias. L et us see what these funny things
mean: Empedocles said there are four eícm ents and everything that hap-
pens is either unión o r disunion, either iovc or destruction. But this has a
subdety: war is only another form o f Iovc, namely the love o f the similars. I f
the different elemcncs com e togethcr, the cosmos disintegrates. The love o f
similars leads to chaos; the love ofopposltes leads to the cosmos. The joke
consists in linking this up with the issue o f pederasty and heterosexuality.
From Empedocles’ point o f view, both forms o f eros are effective in the
whole and are, as such, divine. The fact that the one is harmful to men and
beasts, leading to chaos, and the other helpful to men and beasts, the love
o f opposites, was o f no ultímate concern to Empedocles as a thcorctician.
Both are equally necessary, equally divine; there must be disintegration and
there must be integración. The spirit in which Empedocles said it is illus-
tratcd by the fbllowing remark o f an earlier philosopher, Heraclitus: “For
the god everything is noble, good, and just. But men have made the sup-
position that some things are unjust and others are just.” From a divine
point o f víew the destruction o f the cosmos is as noble, just, and good as its
contrary, but men from their narrow perspcctivc say the one is noble and
the other base.
In other words, this Em pedodean doctrine is a purely theorerical doc­
trine. It looks at the whole with perfect dctachment from human needs; it
is not sufficient for practical purposes. Eryximachus tries to link this up: he
must cali one o f these noble love and the other base. Homosexuals or het-
erosexuals are consistent if they love the opposites, namely, when they say
yes to the conditions o f human life, the cosmos. They are inconsistent if
they love similars, be cause in chis way they contri bute to the restoration o f
chaos, and thcrcwith the destruction ofreason and art itself. Reason and art
can only be if the opposites are united. Eryximachus takes the well-known
physiological, scientific doctrine and puts it to use ín his understanding o f
eros. And don’t believe that this Em pedodean doctrine, in making use o f
the four elements and discord and love, is scientifically inferior to more re-
cent suggestions. We cannot accept it in these terms; it leaves many ques-
tions open. The correction which comes out in Eryximachus’s doctrine is
this: What is according to nature is love o f the opposite, which alone makes
possi ble the cosmos; love o f pederasty means saying yes to the chaos, the
destruction o f nature. Eryximachus, however, is n ot aware o f this. N ow let
us condude his speech.

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KA11 che sacrifices, more over, and those chings over which the art oí'div-
ination presides— these are thc community o f gods and human beings
with one another— are concemed with nothing else than the guarding
and cure o f Eros. For cvery impiccy is wonc to arísc if someone docs not
gratify the orderly Eros and honor and dignify him in cvcry deed, both in
regard to parents living and dead and in regard to gods. In these matters it
has been assigned to the art o f divination to examine the loves and cure
them, and divination is in turn thc craftsman o f friendship o f gods and hu­
man beings, by its scientific knowledge o f the erotic chings o f human be­
ings, as manyas pertain to sacred right and piccy.” (1 8 8 b 6 -d 3 )

Astronomy, as we have seen, cannot aftect these divine laws— namely, these
opposite elements— cannot predict them , but divination can. Why? Be-
cause if you assume that behind the things going on in he aven there are
gods, and the gods can be influenced n ot by astronomy but by divination in
the widest sense, including sacrifices, etc., it becomes possi ble to estabüsh
love between gods and men. Astronomy culminates in divination, just as
medicine culminated in musíc. The latter is easy to understand, for no mat-
ter what a physician may tell you, if your conduct is n ot températe, the pre­
scripción s o f the physician are o f no use. Similarly, astronomy is incomplete
if it is n ot completed by divination, by the art which allows you to control
these potcntially hostiic torces. Divination produces eros between m en and
gods. We can say divination ¡s a kind o f cosmic medicine, a human art es-
tablishing a cosmic order tavorable to men and beasts by cstablishing fricnd-
ship between gods and men.
I t seems there is either war between gods and men o r love. But this is
n ot strictly true on the basis o f the Empedoclean doctrine, where we have
seen war as a fbrm o f love. Even if we take the final formulation o f Eryxi-
machus we have to say there is always love between gods and m en, either
orderly or disorderly. The art o f divination brings about orderly love be-
cween gods and men. I f either o f thc cwo partners loves the other dis-
solutely, impiety follows on the parts o f gods o r men. The two must learn to
follow the noble eros, which ís done by influencing the gods through sacri*
fices. You improve the gods by appeasing them.
O ne more word about the central thesis o f Eryximachus: aii love is mu­
tual, therefbre love between gods and men must be mutual. The only ques-
tion is whether it is sober or dissolute. Think o f the love stories about Zeus
and humans. An art is necessary to sober up the gods; this is part o f the art
o f divination. While Eryximachus surcly means this with tongue in cheek,
he does n ot quite see the trony beyond the irony, namely, why he is com-

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C H A P T E R SI X

pdled to admit such a fantastic art as divination: it is a nccessary conse-


quence o f his belief in techne. Thcrc must ulrimately be an art to control
chance. Every art has a limitation. Asimple example: you build a house with
the best architect, but you d o n ot know whether you will live to inhabit it.
You marry in the hope o f being happy, but the art o f marriage can not guar-
antee happiness. You plant the best possi ble garden, but the fruit depends
on chance. There is an element o f chance which limits all art$. So ifvou are
a radical believer ¡n art you must look for an art which enables you to co n ­
trol chance. This art would be the highest and most simple solution— the-
oretically, at any rate— and since the gods control chance, men would need
an art to control the gods— divination, We smile about this, though we also
have an art which tries to control chance; today they are called the social Sci­
ences in their capacity as prediedng Sciences. This is something very cióse to
that art o f divination.
{T he remainder o f this lecturc was n ot recorded.]

I shall give a summary o f Eryximachus’s speech. You may recall this


point, which I would like to repeat: Eryximachus makes use o f a certain
cosmológica! doctrine according to which the fundamental faets— four
elements and repulsión o r attracúon— are the cluc to cverything there is.
We can very well cali attraction and repulsión love and hate. T h at was the
doctrine o f Empcdocles, to which I referred and which underlies Eryxi-
machus’s doctrine. But Empedocles was more profound: he discerned love
in that hatred, what is called strife ¡n the atomists— in fect, love o f the sim­
ilar. S o i f fire repels water, it means also that firc seeks its kindred, firc, and
water seeks its kindred, water. S o there are cwo phenomena o f love: love o f
the similar and love o f the opposites. This is a universal cosmic phenome-
non which explains cverything.
T h e joke which Eryximachus makes is this: H e identifies the love o f the
similar with pederasty, and love o f the opposite with heterosexual love.
(Eryximachus is in a way akin to the mathematician Theodorus in Plato’s
T beaetctu s. Som e o f you will remember this very nice and respecta ble man,
a completely tactlcss individual, who says to Sócrates, Theactetus looks cx-
aedy like you, for he is as ugly as you. He re we have a pedan tic physician,
which is n ot quite the same, but neither laughs.) That leads to very funny
conclusions, some o f which we discussed last time. Love o f the similar leads
to the consequence that the similar always assembles in one place, and that
means there is no cosmos. I f all elements are sepárate no composites can cx-
ist. Love o f the opposite therefore is idendcal with the for marión o f the cos­

110
E R Y X I M A C H U S

m os, o f beings which are composites. T o simpllíy matters I will say lo ve o f


similars leads ro chaos, at least from our human poínt o f vicw, and love o f
opposites leads to cosmos. Now you must admit that a pede rast gets into
difficuJries. Because if he says that tove o f similars— homosexuality— is
good, he says yes to chaos. Whereas he who says heterosexuality-love ofop -
posítes— is good, says yes to the cosmos. Which o f course makes sense, be-
cause heterosexuality is acondition o f human life.
Could one not, howcver, makc this objection: Eryximachus should not
have assumed either the superiority o f homosexuality to heterosexuality or
the opposite. Why n ot have a valué-free discussion, as Mr. Kinsey and oth*
ers have done, and say both are símply natural? We could say that this pre-
supposition is his failure. What is the reasoning behind this seeming prej-
udice? What is the tacit premise o f Kinsey and the others? One could say the
separation o f the sexual act from its fimetion, its natural fw iction, its telos,
its end. I f you take into account the end the re can be only one type o f nat­
ural sexuality. This point ofview , then, decides against homosexuality. But
why does Plato make him a spokesman for homosexuality? Is this a mere
idiosyncrasy? W hat Plato implies is this: in this perversión something is di-
vined, i.e., n ot understood. Namely, eros, which is primarily bodily dcsire
o f different sexes, is n ot exhausted in procreation. Man cannot find his sat-
isfaction in procreation. Procreation is n ot man’s complete telos, complete
end. Pederasty may be understood as a divination o f this fáct, and from
this point o f view pederasty would be more true in what it divines than self-
satisfied heterosexuality.
O ne can State this also as follows: T h e valué-free consideration, which
takes all forms o f sex life as equally valid, is wrong because it is abstract, con-
trary to its claim to be concrete, to give every case and every possibility. The
charactcristic thesis o f Eryximachus, then, is that love is a cosmic phcnom-
enon; it is n ot mereíy directed toward beautiftil human beings, beauriful
males, it is also directed toward things other than beautiful. T h e second
charactcristic is the praise o f his art. H e completes the consideration oferos
as subject to something extraneous to it. 1$ there a conncction between
these two most striking characteristics, eros as a cosmic forcé and concern
with his art? T o the universaiity o f eros there corrcsponds a unlversality o f
techne, n ot merely o f Eryximachus’s art, but o f art in general. This is con-
nected in Eryximachus’s thought in such a way that it means the supremacy
o f tcchne. Ultimately, n ot eros rules, but techne. This is the greatest diffi-
culty in understanding Eryximachus’s speech: why the universaiity o f eros,
as he understands it, leads to the assertion o f the supremacy o f techne. I use

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CH A PTBR SIX

the Greck word tcchne because there is no strict equivalen t in modern lan-
guage. Art today exeludes the shoemaker and the carpentcr, whereas in
Greek they would be cxamples o f an art. Tcchne has much to do with what
¡s called today science, namely, a subphilosophic pursuit o f high exaetness.
T h e connection between pederasty and the other matters is this; Ped-
erasty is un natural love. The expectation from art increases as the expec-
tations from nature decrease and bccom e insufficient. Ify o u prefer the un*
natural, consciously or unconsciously, you demand thereby an art that
supports this unnacural thing.
Love is universal; it is mutual. B oth pareners are inspired by the same
motive. This is different in Phaedrus and Pausanias, where the motive o f
the lover and the beloved were clearly distinct. Love is universal; everything
that is loves. Attraction and repulsión are only different forms o f love, love
o f the similar or love o f the opposite as the case may be. Now, if you look
at this scheme— love o f the same, chaos, pederasty; love o f the opposite,
cosmos, heterosexuality— what is the function o f art here? I f love o f the
similar is against nature, as we here presuppose, then heterosexual love is
according to nature. The medical art, then, has the function to cure ped­
erasty. O n the other hand, love o f similars is according to nature. Nature
abhors love o f opposite s. Then art alone can bring about procreation. I f all
men were by nature homosexual, there would still be a need for the procre­
ation o f the human race. Art alone can bring about procreation. Eryxi-
machus’s attempt to establish a harmony between his art and his eroticism
failed. Therefbre he turns to an alternad ve, He says the proble m o f art is to
bring together opposltes which by nature abhor one another. T o rcconcile
this with pederasty is his problem. H e does this in the foliowing wayr the
oppositcs which have to be rcconciled are noc the two sexes but virtuc and
pie asure. T h e highest art, the musical art, brings about this harmony o f
virtue and pleasure and thus makes pederasty possible as a noble love. But
in this understanding, virtue and pleasure are conccived as opposites. That
means, o f course, that pleasure is base, n ot jusc morally neutral. N ot the ex­
tirpación o f the base, o f the ugly, which he originally demanded, but its rec-
onciliation with the noble o r beautiful is the task o f the highest human art.
Yet, as he indicatcd in his criticism o f Hcraclitus, does the base n ot cease to
be base when the harmony between pleasure and virtue is achievcd? What
becomes, then, o f the distinction between noble and base eros? Is the base
eros more than an inchoate eros, i.e., n ot truly eros? Thus, he prepares the
way for Aristophanes’ tacit rejection o f the distinedon between a noble and
a base eros striedy speaking.

112
E R Y X I M A C H U S

Eryximachus’s the me is mutual lo ve, and chis is connected with his si-
lence on hierarchy. H e does not have the possi bility o f distinguishing ranks
o f eros corresponding to ranks o f human beings. You may rcm em ber that
Phaedrus alluded to this hierarchy by speaking o f those who are by narure
best; but in his understanding these people had as such nothing to do with
eros. Pausanias had dropped that. His distinction between noble and base
eros had nothing to do with the natural distinction. The silence here on hi­
erarchy and, the refere, the stress on simple mutuality Icad to the conclusión
that the love o f similars is n ot superior to the love o f opposites. There is no
distinction; both are equal, which means, o f course, that chaos and cosmos
are equal. This we understand immcdiately today, because ffom our Science
we learn that the State in which it was six billion years ago is just a different
State o f the world; there is no objective superiority o f one State to the othcr.
We humans prefer the latter, but this is only a subjective and external dis­
tinction, not one inherent in the subject matter. We can put it this way per-
haps: the highest praise o f eros in the whole work occurs here. Eros rules
cverything. Evcrything loves. Therefore the distinction between lover and
beloved ultímately makes no sense. AJI love is mutual. There is nothing
which rules by nature. The complete silence in Eryximachus’s speech about
maje and female— for Plato and Aristode the most simple example for the
natural difference between ruiing and ruled— indicates this. N o natural hi­
erarchy. Therefore art rules, because we must makc distinctions between
the better and the worse. I f it is n ot in nature it must be brought in by man,
inteliigendy and reasonably— it must be done by art. Pan-eroticism implies
the rule o f art. This I wanted to say in conclusión to our discussion o f Eryx­
imachus’s spcech last time, and before we turn to the seque 11 would like to
see whether you have any difficulties which we may o r may n ot be able to
solve.
U sten er: In 18 6 b he says that the healthy State and the sick State o f the
body are dissimilar. Directiy after that he says dissi milars love dissimilars.
Would that imply that the healthy State loves the sick State and vice versa?
M r Strauss: I discussed this last time. This is an inicial statement. which
he retracts later on. I will try to re trace it. He starts from the distinction be-
rween two ero tes— the noble and the base. As a physician he identifies the
one with the healthy, and the base with the sick. Then he says the healthy
body loves healthy things, the sick body loves sick things. T h en , since there
is this fundamental distinction, he says dissimilar things love dissimilar
things. W hat does the body love? Repletion and evacuation. T h e healthy
body loves the right kind o f food and the sick body the wrong kind o f food.

113
C H A P T E R S I X

T h en, for some reason, which is n ot given, he docs n ot like that. The rea-
son, I believe, is that the food does n ot lovc the body. I f you thínk o f a little
lamb, potencial food, it does not like to be eaten. In the case o f rcpletion
and evacuation, it is a nonmutual love and he ¡s driving toward a concep­
ción o f lovc which would be mutual. H e is n ot satisfied and so he turns to
the lovc o f opposites, which has to be brought about by art. You see, not
every statement is o f equal weight and that applies to us too. In the begin-
ning o f an argument we might make a statement which \vc would n ot re -
peat a half hour later, be cause in the mean time it might have been proved
insufficient. Still, it is important as a stage in the dcvelopment o f the argu-
ment.
[In answcr to a quesdon:] The fundamental difficulty was taken carc o f
by Empedocles. He called it also a State o f love, but the love o f similars. H e
also called it strife. What is behind this notion: love o f similars leading to the
collection o f similars and love o f dissimilars which leads to the emergencc o f
composite beings— plants, brutes, men? What is the difference between
thcm? T o which I think, Empedocles’ answer ¡s that from the point o f view
o f god they are equally good; but we humans— and the same would apply
to brutes and plants if they could speak— we say this is cosmos and that is
chaos. Once you accept that, you have the jusdficadon for medicine, that
which enables the body to grow and fulfill its function properly. This is o f
course the standard for medicine. It is the funedon o f art to bring opposites
together, and even on the highest Icvcl— even in astronomy, which dcals
with the visible bodies tar away— there exists, Eryximachus says, a noble
cros and a base cros. T h e noble eros leads to health, the scasons, e tc.; the
base eros leads to plagues and similar phenomena. In the case o f the conflict
between the two erotes in the visible bodies nearby, medicine can be efifec-
tive; there medicine is ineffectual.
But we can’t leave it at that: we have to find an art which Controls the
heavenly bodies, and that is the art o f divinadon. Hís whole speech ends
with his praise o f the art o f divinadon. Through the art o f divinadon the
noble eros o f these things holds the balance. Why? Because the gods do
that. B u t who moves che gods? The human arrisan— the problem o fth e £ « -
thyphro. W hat we find in the cosmos, according to Eryximachus, is the fight
between the two erotes, the noble and the base, the cosmic and the chaotic.
H e asserts an ultímate rule o f cechne, n ot o f medicine. The grand bodies
with which astronomy deals are indirectly controlled, vía the gods, by the
mande art. All arts are concerned with the human good, subordinately or
architectonically. From the theoredeal point o f view, from the point o f view

114
KR VX I M A C H ü S

o f god, the human good i$ o f no interese. But from man’s point o f view it is
predominan!. Therc is a necessary connection bctween pan-croticism and
thc rule o f tcchne. I f pan-croticism means that everything that is loves and
there are n o beings which are lovcd o r beloved, then therc is no hierarchy,
and che disdnetion betwccn good and bad must com e from a subjecdvc
point o f view. The elassie statement, in the Fragments o f Heraclitus, 102:
“F or god everything is just, noble, and good; but men have made the sup-
position that somc things are just, others n o t.* That is exaedy what Sóc­
rates, Plato, and Aristode deny. They assert that the distinction between
good and bad, noble and base, just and unjust, are n ot merely human, al-
though m ost o f the use wc make o f these distinedons is merely human.
I have to add a few points regarding the Eryximachus speech which I ei-
ther forgot o r which were brought to my attendon. First, Plato tries to
show in Eryximachus the typical physician, just as in Theodorus in the T h ea-
etetu s he shows the typical mathemaucian. There is a certain pedanticism
about Eryximachus but also a ccrtain lewdness, i f I may use this strong
word. In a certain contemporary medical treatm ent o fe ros I always was re-
minded o f a statement o f Burkc regarding certain doctrines o f the eigh-
teenth century: he uses the expression wan unfashioned, indelicate, sour,
gloomy, ferocious medley o f pedanticism and lewdness. * I think this has
some contemporary application.
T h e next point: I mentioned that the background o f Eryximachus’s
speech is the philosophy o f Empedocles, who addressed his philosophic
poem to someone called Pausanias. Eryximachus addresses his speech to
this Pausanias. Empedocles is the natural target here behind Eryximachus
because Empedocles’ philosophy is truly a pan-erodc philosophy. Love, ei-
ther for the similar o r for the opposite, rules everything. Therc is anocher
strange thing about Empedocles. I read to you Fragment 111 in Kathleen
Freeman’s transladon: “You shall learn al1 the drugs that exist as a defense
against illness and oíd age. For you alone will I accomplish all this. You shall
check the forcé o f the unvarying winds which rush upon the earth with
their blasts and lay waste the cultivated fields. And again, if you wish, you
shall conduct the breezes back again. You shall créate a seasonable dryness
atter the dark rain for mankind, and again you shall créate after summer
drought the water that nourishes the trees and which will flow in the sky.
And you shall bring out o f Hades a dead man restored to strength.” In
other words, Empedocles also teaches a universal power o f tcchne, o f art.
As far as my recoUection goes this is the only docum cnt in a philosophic text
prior to Plato wherc the notion o f Science for the sakc o f power, the famous

115
C H A P T fe R S I X

Baconian formula, i$ somehow approached. Now, we have seen in Eryxi-


machus’s spccch also thi$ combination o f pan-croticism and a univcrsality
o f technc.
I would likc to rcmind you o f two things. The first is that there are three
speeches in which cros is viewed frora a point o f view outside o f it— those
o f Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, who view eros with regard to gain,
moral virtue, art. Eros is rcgardcd as sovcrcign in Aristophanes, Agathon,
and Sócrates. This overlaps with another principie o f the structure. Phae­
drus speaks from the point ofview o f the bcloved, Pausanias from the point
o f view o f the lover; for Eryximachus they are not mutual lovers but they
could be. Eryximachus and Aristophanes are both mature men and they do
not spcak from the point o f view o f lovcr and beloved, but they take for
granted that love in íts pcrfection is mutual. Agathon and Sócrates could be
lo ver and beloved— the young Agathon and the older Sócrates. The central
couple speaks o f (ove in terms o f mutuaüty and we must scc later on what
that means. This is only a specification o f the general problem o f an appar-
ent arbitrariness, charactcrizing the Sym posium in particular and the Pía-
tonic dialogues in general. We fínd he re individuáis with individual char-
acteristics— such as ñames, scx, noses, etc.— and they discuss eros. This
is an imitation o f Ufe. W hcncver we see people discussing something, or do-
ing anything, they are always specified individuáis with individual charac-
teristics. Life is in this sense random. The intenóon in trying to understand
Ufe is to sec the reason o r causes o f what happens, to discover the pattern,
but the order does not explain cverything, for there are always loose ends
which cannot be understood in terms o f any pattern. This is what the
Greeks meant by tychc> chance. This is the way it is in Ufe, and Placo in his
dialogues imitates lite. But this imitation is artistic be cause it is in a way a
falsification o f life. A simple rcproduction o f lifc would n ot be artistic. The
principie o f this artistic imitation is the deniaJ o f chance— cverything is nec-
essary. And we can say that the Pfatonic dialogue as a wholc is based on this
noble delusion, noble lie, that in the dialogue everything is necessary.
Strictiy speaking, this would apply even to the ñames, but naturally there
are limits to that.
The the me here is eros, a universal subject, discussed by individuáis with
all kinds o f accidental charactcrs. There is a disproportion between the uni­
versal and the individual. There are infinite individual possi bilí ties on eros
and only a few are selected. We must see through those individuáis pre-
sented and see in them the typical. W hat Plato must presume to daim is
that he has selected the typical possi bÜities about eros. Said in another way,

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B R V X I M A C H Ü S

you must see thc connection between thc doctrines and the human types o f
the speakers, n ot understood as mere individuáis. This implies also that
therc must be a completeness in the selection o f types presented. I f the ty-
pology is n ot com plete, which might be the case, then one cannot simply
say Plato forgot about that; one must raise the question W hy did Plato om it
that type? Perhaps because he did n ot wish to present it, either because it is
uninteresting, irrelevant, or for some other re ason.
L et us consider the question o f completeness. As I indicated by my
schema we have here eros subject to something extraneous or sovereign
eros. T h e first is subdivided into three— eros subject to gain, eros subject to
moral virtue o r law, and eros subject to art. We have to raise the question Is
this a complete description? Is the re an al tem ad ve to gain, virtue, tcchne,
something to which eros could be thought to be subject, and for which we
have to find a speech? I be lleve that on rcflection we find that it is complete.
Have we n ot at this point, at any rate, laid bare the principie governing the
whole work? The dass agreed with me by silence— the re is no alternadve.
B u t, later o n , a friend o f mine who does n ot wish to be mentioned said,
“W hy n ot procrearon?” In a way, this is indeed truc. Procreation, we can
say, comes in as the theme in the next three speeches in different ways. But
I must add one point: gain, virtue, techne are striedy extraneous to eros;
procreation is not. Therefbre, your silence and my assertion wcre justified.
This creates a prejudice in favor o f the view that we will find at the end o f
the dialogue a complete discussion o f eros. But once this is setded, and I do
n ot claim that this remark o f mine settles it, we have to raise this question:
Is there a proper correiation between the se types— gain, moral virtue, and
art— and the human beings who present them? For instance, moral virtue:
Could we n ot say that the best representad ve o f the moral supervisión o f
eros would have been a stern moralist, say, a puritan? In other words, by not
taking a stern moralist, did not Plato tbrget something important? Should
n ot the moralist be the speaker about the conflict between eros and moral -
ity? It is absolutely necessary to consider the altcrnatives for oneself in order
to understand what Plato is doing. Plato made a decisión— this book. The
grounds o f the decisión he did n ot teü us, wc have to find out ourselves. To
understand a Platonic dialogue is not mercly to take cognizance o f the de­
cisión, but to understand the grounds o f the decisión. W hy did Plato not
present a severe puritan to present the moral point o f view?
U sten cr: It is possible that the severe puritan escapes the realm o f love.
Mr. Strauss: I am not speaking o f Calvin o f course, but there have been
other puritans who have been bothered by eros. That is n ot an impossibil-

117
C H A P T B K S I X

ity; Calvin may have been unaware o f the problem, but n ot evcry puntan
was. What ís thc truc reason? He supprcsscs thc problem. The supremacy o f
moralicy is so certain and evident that a conflict cannot rcally arise. The pu­
ntan would have been unable to praise eros, and that is an clementary con-
dition for every speech here. StUl, one could say it is a bit narrow o f Plato
n ot to give us this spectaclc o f puntan versus eros. T o which the answer is
cxtrcmely simple; he did that in the R epu bltc. O ne could say he wrote a
whole book to show us this conflict. T h e R ep u bltc begins with thc story
where a poct— and what a poet, Sophocles— complains in thc strongest
terms about eros as a terrible tyrant which he has fom m ately escaped now,
being an oíd man. I f this is n ot a rejection o f eros cven by a poet, I don’t
know what it is. Plato did not forget that problem, but it was n ot proper in
the Sym posium . But why Pausanias? There are perhaps alternad ves. I t is not
only necessary that the man know the problem from his own expcrience; he
must also have a special concern. In other words, it is necessary to raise in
cach case this question: Does n ot the speaker have a selfish interest in his
doctrine? D oes he n ot speak pro domo? And I think we would have to make
a distinction ac thc end berween those speakers who do n ot simply speak
pro domo and those who do. Pausanias surcly does: an oldish lover who has
not sufficicnt crotic rccommcndation and whose best rccommcndation is
his respectability. H e is naturally, in this context, the best speaker about this
aspect o f eros. I do noc say that this sufficcs— very far from it. I only wanted
to say that it is necessary, and a full understanding o f any work o f this kind
would requere a full demonstration.
T o turn to Eryximachus. He represents the point o f view o f art in regard
to eros. H e is a physician. That is n ot difficult to understand. W ho are the
spccialists regarding eros today? T h e psychoanalysts, they are physicians.
Medicine is the art concerncd with eros and its conscqucnces— think o fo b -
stetrics and gynccology, which are surely medical disciplines. B u t, it is o f
coursc also true, medicine deais with sick bodies, not as gymnastics with
healthy bodies. The whole problem o f sickness and health is thc the me o f
medicine; therefore the distinction bctween sick and healthy eros foUows,
from the medical point o f view, the two crotes, just as it had for Pausanias,
from his moral point o f view.

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7 ARISTOPHANES

L c t us tum then co Aristophanes ’ specch and a few introductor y


remarks. L ct us remember Phaedrus’s and Pausanias’s speeches: one must
n ot look at eros from the point o f view o f thc lo ver, espetially th c mere ben­
eficiary o f love, ñor from the point o f view o f the self-interest o f the lover
who wants to use his doctrine o f eros fbr succeeding with his beíoved, ñor
from thc point o f view o f the possessor o f a techne who treats eros from
above and Controls it. The lover, the man who has felt che power o f eros,
must give adequate expression to his experiences.
Aristophanes i$ a man filled with eros, n ot for this o r that individual, as
Pausanias is for Agathon. T o use a term which is later on used in Sócrates’
speech, there is n o pettiness involved. From Sócrates’ point o f view there is
a pettiness, a limitation, involved in this essendally accidental individual,
and love in the fuller sense has a wider scope. This revolts our feelings, but
we must sce whether this is justified.
All earlier speakers had some concern other than eros— gain, virtue, art.
Aristophanes is exdusively concerned, as we have seen in the beginning,
1 7 7 b , with Dionysus and Aphrodite, the god o f wine and theater and the
goddess o f love. O r should Dionysus, the god o f the theater, and in partic­
ular o f comedy, exercise a deflecting influence on Aristophanes’ presenta-
tion?
Further: Eryximachus was led to imply, as I tried to explain, that the
pleasant is as such base. The true musical art reconciles virtue and pleasurc,
but it reconciles them as opposites; henee pleasurc is base. This baseness or
ugliness is the theme o f comedy. In order to ridicuie the base, the poet must
present it. But how can we reconcile this art o f prese nting the base with the
praise o f eros? Aristophanes is confronted with the seemingly impossible
task o f praising eros in the element o f ugliness o r baseness. Furtherm orc,
Eryximachus’s art and his eros contradice one another. I f pederasty is to be
preser ved, one must abandon art. Aristophanes can be said to draw that
conclusión: he abandons art. The altemative would be another art such as
midwifery and matchmaking, o f which a ccrtain individual— Sócrates—
boasts. B u t that comes later. Eryximachus, in contradistinction to Phaedrus
and Pausanias, had known only mutual love, but he had divorced eros from
the natural hierarchy to which Phaedrus had, indeed, referred. Aristoph-

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C H A P T E R S E V F N

anes will link up the hierarchy o f erotes, n ot a crude opposition o f noble


and base eros, but a hierarchy o f erotes with a natural order o f human beings.
As we have seen, he changes places with Eryximachus, and that means
he ¡s in a way exchangeable with him. Eryximachus is a physician and a
physicist; Aristophanes wiil also prove to be a physiologist in the Greek
sense o f the word— a student o f n ature— but in such a way as to lead up to
a natural hierarchy. In contradistinction to the two preceding speakers— Pau-
sanias and Eryximachus— he will again put the emphasis on manliness, a
virtue which was completely forgotten by the soft Pausanias and the valetu-
dinarian Eryximachus. Now, let us turn to the transition to Aristophanes’
spccch. I will discuss the se transitions later coherently. In the beginning the
speeches fbllow without interruption, now we always have interludes. Why
this is so we will discuss later. aThen [Aristodemus] said that Aristophanes
took o ver” from Eryximachus. Aristophanes1speech is thus connected with
Eryximachus’s speech; and Eryximachus’s speech, in its turn, was con­
nected with Pausanías’s speech. Apart from these two principies o f con-
struction, Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Aristophanes forra a unit: they are
explicit defenders o f pederasty. Aristophanes will complete what Pausanias
began. Why will Aristophanes be able to complete what Pausanias and
Eryximachus wcrc unable to complete? I t has something to do with the fact
that Aristophanes is a comic poet. Those o f you who have ever looked at
Aristophanes in the original, o r even in a translation, will know that his
plays are indcscribably indecent. Perhaps the clement o f extreme indecency
permits things which can not be done in any other way.

“It [the hiccup] did indeed stop; not, however, before the sneezc was ap-
plicd to it, so 1 am wondering whecher the orderlincss o f the body desires
these kinds o f noises and ticklings, such as the sneczc is, for it stopped at
once when I applied the sneeze to it.” (189a 1 - 6 )

The word orderly is a derivative from the word cosmos. What do we learn
from it? T h e orderly, the decent, the well-behaved needs, apparendy, the
ugly— sncezing and such things— in the case o f the body. Perhaps it is also
true in the case o f the soul. I f this is true, then the praise o f eros would re-
quire the praise o f the base or ugly. We see also that Aristophanes’ hiccup
was quite severe.

And Eryximachus said, “My good Aristophanes, see what you are doing.
Being about to speak you make a joke, and you compel me to be a
guardián ofyour own speech, if you say anything laughable, though it was
possiblc for you to speak in peace.” (1 8 9 a 7 -b 2 )

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A R I 5 T O P H A S B S

L et us see whethcr we understand that. Eryximachus says, “Being about to


spcak you make a joke.” He seems to imply that speaking and joking are in­
compatible. D oes this make sense? Making funny noises is exactly what
Aristophanes had been doing. Specch is serious. “ By your remarks you
com pci me to watch your speech in case you say something ridiculous, and
you compel me to watch your speech by tracing your ability to speak, as dis-
tinguished ffom your ability to make funny noises, to my art. But you do
not have to worry— there will be no fiirther need for funny noises, for
sneezing o r joking.” I think that is what he means.

And Aristophanes said with a laugb, “That’s a good point, Eryximachus,


and pie ase let what I have said be unsaid. But don’c keep watch over me,
since I fear, in regard to what is going to be said, not that I not tell jokes
[pelota] — this would indeod be a gain and native to our Muse— but that
they be a joke [k a ta p ela sta ]” (1 8 9 b 3 -7 )

Aristophanes laughs— that is very rare he re. L et us see if we find another


case. What does this mean, if someone laughs? For example, in the third
book o f the R epu blic} a man o f laughter is one fbrm o f intempe ranee.
Therefbre, Sócrates never laughs, except on the day o f his death. The same
intemperance which showed itsclf in the hiccup is shown in this laughing.
Aristophanes retraets what he has said. Does he mean that orderly things
require funny noises, o r that they requirc ugly things? wO ur muse”— Eryx­
imachus had referred to “our art.” T h e obvious difference between the
muse and art is that the music man is inspired. Aristophanes’ speech is the
first inspired speech. We can say there are three uninspired speeches and
three inspired speeches. We would have to make a mi ñor subdivisión— the
simply uninspired specch is that o f Phaedrus.
(Tape change.]

“You think you can hit and run, Aristophanes,” he said. aBut pay atten-
tion and speak on the condi don that you will give an account [logos]. Per-
haps, however, if I decide to, 1TI let you go.” ( 1 8 9 b 8 - c l)

Eryximachus says, you think you can g ct away with jokes; but be respon-
sible to m e, complete my logos, and d o n ot make jokes. N ot Dionysus will
be the judge, but medicine. The radical difference between Eryximachus’s
and Aristophanes’ speeches comes out in this short exchange, and yet they
are exchangeable as I said. T h e com ic poet, and only the comic poet, can
bring out the fuíl truth o f this o r any other physiology.
L tsten er: Is there any reference here to laughter as a funny noise itsclf?

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C H A P T E S S E V E N

M r Strauss: Is Aristophanes likely to laugh at his own jokes?


L isten er: I f other peoplc laugh at what he says, and l f it is a diseasc, then
Eryximachus has a right to put a stop to it.
Mr. Strauss: I have to think that over. I can’t answer that at the moment.
I would al so like to repeat again Mr. Gildin’s remark regarding the inter-
iude between Eryximachus and Aristophanes, where Eryximachus appar-
ently makes a distinction between speaking and causing laughter. This
seems to imply that speaking cannot créate laughter. W hat creates laughter
will be ftmny noises, and we have seen that the re were some funny noises
like hiccups and sneezes. Mr. Gil din rightly points out that laughing, ín
contradistinction to mere smiling, can o f course also be called a funny
noise. From this point o f view Eryximachus’s remark would mean, Just as I,
as a physician, was under obligation to stop the funny noises o f hiccups and
sneezing, I am under obligation to stop the funny noise o f laughing. This
would again indi cate his pedan tic character.

“And yet ¡kat m enJ, Eryximachus,” Aristophancs said, “I intend to speak


in a somewhat different way from how Pausanias and you spoke. Human
beings sccm to me not to have perceived at all the power o f eros, since,
were they aware o f it, they would have built the greatest sanctuarics and
altars to him, and would be making besides the greatest sacrifíccs, and not
be doing as they are now when nonc o f thesc things are being done abouc
him, though they most certainly ought to be done. The reason is that he
is the most philanthropic o f gods . . .” (1 8 9 c 2 -d l)

You see herc that he refers only to Eryximachus and Pausanias. Only thelr
speeches are relevant to his subject. W hat does he say> M en act as if they
had never experienced the power o f eros, for otherwise they would worship
him more than any other god. They do n ot worship him propcrly now.
What Aristophanes suggests is what wc would cali now a religious revolu-
tion, n ot merely the mild change o f the law suggestcd by Pausanias. Aris­
tophanes introduces in a way new divinities. In a way he com m its the crime
o f which Sócrates was accused. Eros deserves the greatest worship be cause
he is the most philanthropic o f all gods. N ot becausc he is the oldest, the
most powerful, or the most just god. Phaedrus had praised eros as most
useful to the beloved— to him. Aristophanes says eros is m ost useful to
mankind, a much broader conslderation. We have, o f course, to raise the
question ofw hat will be the rightful status o f the worship o f the other gods
after Eros will have come into his own. M ust there n ot be a certain derü*
gration o f the others?

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A R I S T O P H A N E S

. . bcing a helper to human bcings and a physician o f thosc things


which, should they be curcd, there would be the greatesc happincss forthe
human race.'* ( 1 8 9 d l- 3 )

Eros is the physician, n ot the medical art. Eros, including pederasty, as will
appear from the sequel, is n ot a sickness but a cure. The cure brings about
the greatest happiness. T h e sickness is unhappiness. In other words, eros
cures n ot only this o r that deficiency, it cures the essen dais o f human life, as
will appear later. N o such praise o f eros has appeared hitherto.

“I shall try to explain to you his powet\ and you will be the tcachcrs o f
everyone else.” (1 8 9 d 3 -4 )

H e will initíate thosc present into something hitherto unknown, a mystery.


H e will n ot be the one who is going to divulge it to the others. The others
may divulge it.
“You must first undcrscand human nature and its cxpcrienccs " (1 8 9 d 5 -6 )

Aristophanes seems to opposc the cosmological doctrine o f Eryximachus


and limit himself to human things. But he says “first.” H e only starts from
human things, o r rather from human nature. He promises to discuss the na­
ture o f man, he does n ot promise to discuss the nature o f eros. This will be
the starting point for Agathon later. The nature o f eros will remain obscure
in spite o f everything Aristophanes says.

wOur nature long ago was not that which it is now, but o f a difíerent sort.
First, there wcre three genera o f human beings, not just as now, male and
female, but there was a third besides, common to boch o f them, the ñame
for which remains but ic icself has disappeared. There was one then that
was androgynous, common in looks (eidos) and ñame from both, male
and fe male, but now it is noc, except for the ñame, which occurs as a re-
proach.* (1 8 9 d 6 -e 5 )

Aristophanes begins with the extínct sex o f man. Naturally, because it is the
most striking; also, now, the most in disrepute. That there were such men
was taught by Empedocles, the originator o f this scheme, who was Eryxi-
machus’s authority. Whereas today there is merely a shadow, a ñame, origi-
nally there was the thing itself and a rcspectable ñame. Now this has a
general application. W hat if acccpted opinión is not authoritative for Aris­
tophanes, but the respected, the accepted, is an important form o f the no­
ble o r fair. Aristophanes makes it clear from the beginning: precise ly the
disreputable will be brought out by him, the com ic poet living in the ele-
ment o f the despicable and base.

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C H A P T E R S fe V K N

“Sccond, the looks ofcach human being was as a whole round, with back
and sides in a arde, and he had four arms and hands, legs and fect cqual to
the arms and hands, and cwo faces on a circular ncck, similar in all respeets.
Thcrc was single hcad for the two faces lying opposite, and four ears,
two genitals, and everything else as one mighc conjecture from these.”
(189e5-190a4)

Every being was a whole. This means it was round. All parts o f the body
were doubled, except the head and the neck. A fantastic being, very ugly,
but we must see what he does with ¡t.

“He used to walk upright, as he does now, in whichever direction he


wanccd; and whenever he started to run fast, just as acrobadc jumpers whirl
around in a circlc with their legs straight out, they, suppordng thcmsclvcs
with thc cight limbs they then had, used to rocate quickly.” ( I9 0 a 4 -8 )

Now these round beings were also capable o f fast circular motion. They
could ha ve rolled even without stretching their legs, as indicated here in
190a6. Why this is so we shall see in thc sequcl.

“The re ason why thc genera were thrcc and o f this kind was this: thc male
was at the start the offspring o f the sun, the female o f the earth, and that
which partakes o f both o f the moon, becausc che moon too parcook of
both. They were spherical, both they thcmsclvcs and their movement, on
accounc o f their being similar to their parents." (190a8-b5)

Now we know why man was originally a circular thing, moving in circular
motion. He gives che re ason explicidy. We see, then, that Aristophancs
transce nds already here thc merely human and enters into the sphere o f
cosmology. The very word stroggulos, which he uses in 189 c 6 , occurs, for
example, in Plato’s P h a cd o( 9 7 e l ), where the question is discussed whether
the earth is flat or round. Sun, m oon, and earth are gods. T o quote from an
Aristophanean comedy, P eacc 4 0 6 - 1 1 , the sun and the m oon are the gods
to whom the barbarians sacrificc, where as the Grccks sacrifice only to thc
Olympian gods. In Herodotus, book 1.131, the Persians worship sun,
m oon, earth, firc, water, etc., and they do not believe like the Greeks that
the gods have human shapes. Aristophanes here refers us to a barbarie no-
don. Originally men had the shape o f the cosmic gods, because they were
the deseendants o f thc cosmic gods. In that shape, as will becom e clcar in
the sequel, they did not yet have eros, because the androgynous did not
have eros. Each kind o f man had the single shape o f sun, m oon, o r earth.
But where do the gods o f human shape com e in? They are decisive for the

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A R |S T O P H A N R S

emergence o f eros, as we can suspect. Original man had lofty thoughts,


these round desee ndants o f the cosmic gods, We can say the head o f each
was the head o f two bodies. This could perhaps alrcady explain it. But the
phrase “lofty thoughts” reminds us o f an earlier passage, in Pausanias’s
speech 1 82c2. T h e lofty thoughts are the thoughts o f those n ot subject to
tyrants. Being the descendants o f the cosmic gods, they had lofty thoughts;
they were not subject to tyrants, henee, they did n ot respect the Olympian
gods, the gods o f human shape. N othing is said here whether original men
were happy. W hat did they do?

“They were awesome in their strength and vigor and had greac and proud
thoughts, and they made an attcmpt on the gods. And what Homcr says
about Ephialtes and Otus, that they tried to mount up to the sky, is said
about them, with their intent to assault the gods. Then Zeus and the other
gods were deliberadng as to whac they should do and were perplexed.
They did not know how they could kili them and, as they had blasted the
giants with lightning, wipe out the race— the honors and the sacrifices
they had from human beings would be wiped out— any more than they
could allow them to wax wancon .” (19 0b5 - có )

Aristophanes replaces the speech, the logos, o f the individual H om er by a


general logos, a general story. M en, being the descendants o f the cosmic
gods, were from the begiiining subject to the Olympian gods. They were
from the beginning meant to be subject to the Olympian gods. B u t the
Olympian gods were n ot the descendants o f the cosmic gods, for otherwise
they, to o , would have globular shapes, and we know that the gods have hu­
man shape. These original men o f cosmic origin refused to be subject to the
Olympian gods. Their re be Ilion failed as a matter o f course. Aristophanes
doesn’t even mention that. Every rebellion against the living gods fails nat-
urally. I t seems that originaUy men had honored the Olympian gods and
brought sacrifices to them prior to the rebellion. T h e gods could n ot possi-
bly tolérate man’s licentious behavior, for, by so doing, they would have
lost their power and everything else. Ñ or could they destroy m en, for they
needed the honors and sacrifices. The word means also sacrificial animáis
thcmselves, in a very material sense. This is, incidentally, a theme o f the
Aristophanean comedies, the gods being starved by the withholding o f sac­
rifices. T h e gods, as you see here very clearly, were n ot prompted by phi-
lanthropy. Eros is the only philanthropic god. You understand, then, the
predicament o f Zeus. Every government could be in such a position. They
can’t destroy their subjeets, and on the other hand they ca n 't let them do

125
C H A P T E R S E V E N

what they want. You scc Zeus thinking and finally he got a bright idea.
Thcn he says, “I seem to myself.” Does anything strikc you? Wcll, that’s the
very beginning o f the dialogue. The Symposiutn begins with the same two
words. I regard it as possible that Plato dirccts our attention in advancc to
this speech o f Zeus and that Aristophanes* spccch is the central speech o f
the whole work. Zeus is introduced as a speaker by Protagoras in Plato’s di­
alogue F rotad oras and by Sócrates in the G orgias. In the dialogue C rin a s,
where Cridas is the ch ief speaker, the dialogue ends, “thcn Zeus said”— but
the speech doesn’t come. According to the accepted opinions the C rin a s
has not been completed. I believe that Plato did not want Cridas to make
such a speech. Aristophanes at any rate gives he re a speech by Zeus.
“Thcn Zeus with difficulty conce ived o f a plan and says, ‘I secm to mysdf,’
he said, ‘to have a devíce, how human beings may [still] be and by becom-
ing weaker stop their licenciousness. I shall now cut each ofthcm in two,
and they will simultancously be weaker and more use ful to us on account
o f their having become more in number. And they will walk upright on
two legs. And if they are still thoughc to wax wancon and are not willing to
remain quiet, then I shall,’ he said, ‘cuc chem again in two, so they will go
around hopping on one leg.’” ( 1 9 0 c6 -d 6 )

Zeus, who is presented by H oracr as the perfect ruler, and therefore, o f


course, also as the most wily ruler, comes up with a solution: preserve men
and weaken them. His scheme is an improvement in every respect; more
men and weaker men. I t increases man’s usefulness to the gods, no ques-
tion o f philanthropy. Through Zeus’s puní uve action men became erect.
Through Zcus's punid ve acuon— this is a grcat paradox o f this speech—
men became men. For they also became tame, orderly. They ceased to be
universally dissolute o r unjust. So they lost their lofry thoughts, as wc shall
see. They became like the subjeets o f tyrants, i.e., they became civilized.
Civilization is the acquisition o f ¡ustice and orderliness, accompanied by the
loss o f lofty thoughts. This road has been repeated many times since. Civi-
lizadon is domestication and does to men what it does to animáis. M en be-
carne men, they ceased to be similar to the nonhuman carth and they took
on the shapc o f the Olympian gods. This is very ¡mportant.
But are the gods themselves really orderly and just? N ot at all, as we have
seen. They are prompted only by their sclf-interest. That which makes men
just, the action o f Zeus, is n ot itself just. But, we ask now, independent o f
the Platonic utteranee, what ¡s it that makes men just, simply, without any
sophistication? Law makes men just. But is the law itself just? We have an in-
ceresting discussion o f that, for example, in the first book o f Plato’s R ep u b ’

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A R I S T O P H A N E S

lie. I am referring co Thrasymachus: thc laws imposed by the stronger with


a view co che stronger’s self-interest. Zeus imposes something with a view
to his self-inceresc. L et me make a big jump: The Olympian gods stand for
the nom os, for the law. M en cannot becom e men without being subject to
law, and to divine law. Man owes his humanity to divine law; henee the
cause o f law must be manlike, anthropomorphic, must have a human shape.
This ¡s the refere the proble m o f Aristophanes and Plato, and in the histori-
cal life o f Sócrates: the tensión between original nature and law in the wide
sense, what we cali today civilization. The general thesis o f Aristophanes’
speech will be that eros is a barbarization o f man’s impaired nature against
that imposition. Therefore the final problem is how to establish a working
relation between this rebeIIion, the attempt to retum to the original nature,
and the Olympian gods, to whom men owe their life. Aristophanes’ speech
is the only speech which ends with a praise o f píety. Eryximachus’s speech,
you may recail, ended with a praise o f the man tic art, and that’s n ot piety.
[In answer to a question:] The question is whether Zeus acted on this
considera tion: Original man, visibly akin to the cosmic gods; derivative
man, visibly akin to humanly shaped gods, brought about by the gods not
out o f love for men but out o f self-interest. I f it had been done out o f love
the nomos would be sacred, but if ¡t is done out o f se If-interese it is not. And
the re be Ilion, which is the essence o f eros, is made even olearer latcr on
when eros becomes much more than the desire for self-gratification. Aris­
tophanes indicates the problem o f the being o f these gods by being ab-
solutely silent about their origin. I t is dear by implication that they cannot
be o f cosmic origin. I f they were o f cosmic origin, they would be round.
And who would have split them? The only beings capable o f splitting them
were the gods themselves. The question o f the origin o f the gods is taken
up only in Agathon’s speech and even the re only in a very general way. The
question for Aristophanes is what is the power o f eros. And the crucial point
he makes is this: You cannot understand eros if you do not see in it the ele-
m ent o f rebellion. That is deeper than any desire for pie asure o r for that
matter for procreación. This is a thought that I would n ot dismiss as irrele-
vant. All asceticism, all religión, has some such notion. I will explain this
next time.
[In answer to another question:] A ndrogynous we use as a term for a
womanish man o r a mannish woman. B u t to say there were such people lit-
erally is a fantastic thing. We must n ot forget that the dramatic poet is con­
cerned with stage effeets and that is much more striking. Later o n , after
they are split, there are only males and females.

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CHAI* f R R S EV E N

A last poinc regarding the following question: What is the doctrine o f an


individual speaker, and what is the connection between the doctrine and
this particular character? I t must fit that character in such a way that this
character, say a physician o f this particular kind like Eryximachus or an old-
ish lovcr like Pausanias o r a comic poet like Aristophancs, is the proper rep­
resentad ve o f the doctrine which he presents. I t is, indeed, neccssary to in­
vestígate this, and one cannot claim to have undcrstood a Platonic dialogue
if one has n ot answered this question. In che case o f the Platonic dialogues,
be cause o f their great wealth, this is very difficult. I have tried to show the
necessity o f this procedure in an essay o f mine called “On Tyranny” in a
much simpler case, a dialogue o f Xenophon. Therc only two characters oc-
cur, and other things, to o , are very simple. Therc one can show that this se-
lecdon o f speakers, a tyrant and a lyric poet, is the necessary combinadon
for having such a dialogue on tyranny. N o other com binadon, say, for ex-
ampie, a tyrant and a philosopher, would be as good and as perfect a setting
as this one. One must also consider the tide. You remember I said in the be-
gínníng o f the course that the Symposium has in a way a unique títle. The
ordinary Platonic tide is the proper ñame o f a pardcipant o r else a subject
matter. For example, G om ias would be an examplc o f the first kind and
L a w s o f the second. Apology, I would say, indicatcs the subject matter. The
tide Symposiunt doesn’t indícate either. I f we look over the whole body o f
Platonic udes we find only one dialogue which has a tide akin to that o f the
Symposium and that is the Epinom is. It is a kind o f appendix to Plato’s Laws.
I suggcst that thcre is a connection o f some importance between these two
dialogues, and this remark will be more easíly intelligible after we have be-
gun to study Aristophancs’ speech.
Aristophancs’ speech, which is the center speech o f the Symposium, per­
m ití us to answer this question. Aristophanes cacidy makcs the distinctíon
between the Olympian gods and the cosmíc gods. Now the theme o f the
Symposium can be described as foliows: the Symposium is the only dialogue
devoted to a god— the god Eros. A Greek god allied to an Olympian god-
dcss— Aphroditc. But a litde god, n ot the object o f public worship in
Athens, for example. T h e Symposium as a whole, and especially Aristoph­
anes, quesdons the Olympian gods, the gods worshiped by the city. But
only Aristophanes speaks o f the cosmic gods, though even he does not
speak o fth em expticidy as gods. The question o f the cosmic gods does not
becom e the theme o f the Symposium. It is, howcver, the theme o f the E pi-
nomisy the only Platonic dialogue devoted to the cosmic gods. This, I think,

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A R l S T O t K A N E S

is the conncction between thcse dialogues, and it shows the crucial impor*
tance o f the theological problem for Plato.

“With this remark he proceeded to cut human bcings in two, just as chose
who cut sorb-apples whcn they are going to pickle them, or just as those
who cuteggs with hairs.” (I9 0 d 7 -e 2 )

This, ofcou rse, recalls Aristophanic examples in his comedies. You see also
the contrast betwcen the gods in their solemnity and thesc very humdrum
things.

“And whomcvcr he cut, he told Apollo to turn the face and half o f the
neck around toward che cuc, ¿n order Chat che human being might, on see-
ing his slicing, become more orderly, and he ordered him to cure thc rest.
And he turned the face around, and drawing together the skin at what is
now callcd thc bclly, by making a single mouth, just as in string bags, he
bound it up at the middle o f the belly. Ic is what wc caU che navel. And he
smoothed out all the other many wrinkles and straightened out thc chcst,
with the sorc o f too! shoemakers use in smoothing out che wrinkles
around the last; but he left a fcw around thc nave) itsclf and thc bclly, to be
a rem inderofthe ancicntcxpchenee.” (1 9 0 c2 -1 9 1 a 5 )

Natural men are transformed by the art o f the gods so as to becom e orderly.
Apollo is a kind o f physician but also a shoemaker. You see thc example o f
domesdeated apples, ifw e can use the expression, and domesticated eggs.
They are no longcr capa ble o f bearing fruir. Man’s civilización is a kind o f
castration. Apollo, as you may have observed, did n ot turn around the neck
as Zeus had told him. Did Zeus, in Apollo’s opinión, lack anatómica!
knowledge? There is a strange parallel to this story ín Plato’s dialogue P ro-
tagora$> which I would like to read to you:

As often as men banded together they did wrong to one anochcr, through
the lack o f civic are, and so they began co be scattered again and to perish.
Zeus, then, fearing chat our race was in danger o f ucter destruction sent
Hermes to bring shamc and right among men, to che end that there
should be regulation o f cides and friendty des to draw them together.
(3 2 2 b 6 -c 3 )

T h e gods are responsible for man’s civilization.

Thcn Hermes askcd Zeus in what manner was he to give men right and
sense o f shame. “Am I to deal them out as thc arts have becn dealt? The
dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing the medical art is

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C H A P T E R . S E V K N

ablc to treac many ordinary mcn, and so with thc other crafts. Am I to
place among men right and respect in this way also or deal them out to
all?” “T o all,” rcplicd Zeus. (3 2 2 c 3 -d 2)

Now the implicación is chat Hermes has to tell Zeus how the arts are <li-
vided. I raise this question, though I am by no means sure that I am right,
but it’s the bese I can do. Zeus cut them to pieces; then Apollo sewed up
the side on which they were cut. We see the re was much skin. There were
wrinkles and he had to use a shoemaker’s instrument to sm ooth them out.
W here did Apollo get the additional skin required so that there were even
additional wrinkles which had to be smoothed out? H e acts as if the skin o f
the whole man were now available for the half man, which o f course was a
mistake. Did he in cach case discard one half; leaving it skinless and letting
it perish? Did Apollo, in other words, behave like that Epimetheus o f whom
Protagoras speaks in the same story? I can read you that p a r t:44Epimetheus
being not so wise as he might be heedlessly squandered his stock o f proper-
ties on the brutes. H e still had left unequipped the race o f man and was at a
ioss what to do with it” (3 2 1 b ó -c 3 ). Man was left nakcd and only the theft
o f firc from Hephaestus on the part o f Prometheus could save the human
race. Are we n ot confronted here with a similar situation by the blundering
activity o f a god? In that situation a savior, Prometheus, was needed; there
is no reference to such a savior here. Why? Because the place o f Prometheus
as a founder o f civilization is in Aristophanes’ speech taken by eros. Aris-
tophanes gives no account o f the origin o f the arts in his speech. H e disre-
gards art altogcther. However this may be, the sequel surely shows that the
gods lacked foresight. This cutting and sewing together did n ot solve the
problcm at all. Apollo left man a sign to remember thc original act, but this
was also superfluous, as we shall see immediately.

“When the nature was cut in two, cach half in longing for his own carne
together, and throwing cheir arms around one anochcr and intertwining,
in their desire to grow together, were being killcd offb y hunger and the
resc o f their idleness on account o f their unwillingness to do anything
apart from one another. And whenever onc o f thc halves died, and one
was left, the one that was left went scarching for another and intertwined
itself with either half o f a whole woman ic encountered— it is what we cali
woman— or o f a man, and so they kepton perishing.” (1 9 1 a 5 -b 5 )

You see the problem is not yet solved for the gods. The nature was cut in
two, man’s nature was ímpaired, namcly, by nomos. I t is for this reason that
the universal expression “the nature,” not merely human nature, is used. It

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A R I S T O P H A N E $

is not uninteresting that “to cut” also means to cástrate. O ut o f this sitúa-
don eros aróse. Eros is surely n ot the oldest god. You see Phaedrus’s thesis,
which was hitherto uncontested, is Kerc ímpiieidy conte sted. Agathon will
question it explicidy. Eros is in no way connectcd with the Olympian gods
and, therefore, in particular n ot with Aphrodite. Aristophancs makes true
what Pausanias had only implied. As Profcssor von Blanckenhagen pointed
out to us, eros is possi ble without Aphrodite. As desire for the restitution o f
the cosmic, globular shape, eros belongs to the cosmic gods. Eros, we can
say already now, is a moveraent o f nature, o f impaired nature, against law.
T h e direction o f eros is inverse to the direction o f the action o f the
Olympian gods. T o overstate it in order to makc it perfectly clear, eros is
radically impious. 1 think this is n ot a wholly unintelligible thought, though
it may n ot be theologically wholly correct. I f you look at all innate actions
o f which man is capable, all his acdons can in their performance be directed
to the glory o f god. The only acdon o f which this is n ot possi ble in the per­
formance is the sexual act. There was always a tensión between the biblical
religión and eros. Think only o f the second chaptcr o f Génesis, where the
disobedience o f Adam has some connection with the loss o f sexual inno-
cence.
You see at the end o f the passage that we read, Aristophanes om its an-
drogyncs from the enumeration because there are no longer androgynes.
Now there are only males and fcmales. In the immediate sequel he says that
Zeus becamc pitiful, merciful. O n the basis o f what we have heard before,
this ¡s a euphemism. Zeus’s pity for man is prompted by his self-interest, as
we have seen before.
wIn pity Zeus provides another dcvice: he changes the place o f their geni-
tais to the front— for up to this time ehey also had them on the oucside,
and chey used to generate and give birth not into one another butinto the
earth, just as cicadas do— so he changcs them to the front and through
this made gencration in one another, through the mate in the female, for
these reasons: if a man should encounter a woman, they might generate in
the embrace and the race continué, and ifa male should encounter a maJe,
repletion o f intercourse [being togetherj ac any race might occur in the
embrace, and they might stop and turn to deeds and takc carc o fth e rese
o f their life [liveühood].* ( 1 9 lb 5 - c 8 )

Now Zeus does the whole thing. He was dissatisfied with Apollo's blunder.
Original man already possessed sexual organs and used them. In this re*
spect, and in this rcspect only, they were originally similar to the Olympian
gods as distinguished from the cosmic gods, sun, m oon, and earth. What

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C H A P T f, R S E V B N

docs this mean? This is, o f course, a very malicious suggestion. According
to Aristop Kanes, the specific differencc o f men is sexuality as distinguished
from radonalíty. This needs a long com m ent because the brutes are also ca*
pable o f sexuality. The point on which men agree in origin with the Olym­
pian gods was n ot their ereetness but sexuality. This connects man with the
Olympian gods and separates him from the cosmic gods. Perhaps this fact
was the reason why men were from the outset subject to the Olympian
gods. Their dissoluteness in the use o f their sexual organs catled fbr subjec-
tion, if only to beings which were themselves n ot immune to dissoluteness.
But this sexuality has as little to do with eros proper as any dissoluteness o f
the gods. That’s the crucial thesis— sexuality is n ot eros. B u t how did orig­
inal men use their sexual organs? They begot into the earth, namely the
males, and they gave birth into the earth, namely the females. I can under-
stand this only in this form; the males fertilized eggs left by the females ¡n
the earth. Originally ai! men carne from the earth, like the oíd Athenians,
and it was claimed for the Athenians alone. T h e changc which Zeus ef-
fected was to change man into his own image as regards sexual relations
to o , but with this difference, what is mere pleasure in the case o f the
Olympian gods is for men a dire necessity. The survival o f the human race
and its sadsfaction, so that men are frcc to work, depend on the change ef-
fected by Zeus. These two things, the survival o f the human race and the
sadsfaction o f the individual, uldmately serve one function: man can serve
the Olympian gods. Therefore, Aristophanes’ speech is bound to end with
a praisc o f piety.
In the case o f the meeting o f male and female you see procrcation, not
sadsfaction. In the case o f the meeting o f male and male— satisfacción, but
n ot procrcation. H e is silent here about the meeting o f female and female,
a subject which he wili take up later. You see the pcdcrastic element in
Aristophanes’ speech, which will com e out more fully, and which is a
particularly malicious suggestion because pederasts are presented in the
Aristophanean plays, at least in the first lines, as something ridiculous.
Through the Olympian gods men acquired orderliness. Eryximachus had
said that both orderliness and its opposites are o f cosmic origin. Loves o f
similars— chaos; love o f opposites— cosmos. B oth are cosmic forces. For
Aristophanes orderliness does not stem from the cosmic gods. This, we can
say, is his cosmology. This is important in connection with Aristophanes’
tacit de nial o f the significance o f mind, o r nous, and therefore his silence
about the arts as well.

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A M S T O P H A N E S

I havc to procced stcp by step, leaving loose cnds while I go. At the cnd
o f the discussion I shall try to pulí it together. Through the Olympian gods
men acquired ordcrliness, erect stature, and the possibLUty o f embrace.
Originally, sexual rclations were reí ate d to the earth. Erect stature and the
possibility o f embrace línk men to the Olympian gods. In the case o f the
Olympian gods there is no con ñeco on between orderliness, on the onc
hand, and an erect stature and em brace, on the other. B u t in the case o f
man there is. Why? M en and the Olympian gods, we may say, and I use a
crude expression which in the case o f Aristophanes 1 don’t think is com ­
plete ly improper, are the only sexy beings. H ere we answer the question re-
garding the brutes. In the case o f the brutes, the sex life is limited by nature
to the seasons. This is surely not true o f man and surely n ot o f the
Olympian gods. I f we may cali this for convenience’s sake scxiness, thcn
this is what leads men to the Olympian gods— they are n ot limited to mat-
ing seasons. But there is one obvious difference between men and the
Olympian gods in this rcspect. There is a limitación without which man is
noc thinkable, and which is absent in the case o f the Olympian gods: the
prohibición against incest. In the case o f men, incest, always a great theme
in the Aristophanean comedies, comes Ln. Man has a natural latitude re-
garding sex. I remind you o f the farnous passage in the beginning o f Aris-
totle’s P olin es 1253a39:

By nature there is in all men the impulse toward polirical association, and
he who first establishcd it is responsible for che greacest good. For, just as
man, when perfected, is the bese o f the animáis, so he is when divorccd
from law and right the worst o f all. For injusticc is harshest if it has
weapons. But man is bom having che possession o f wcapons such as pru-
dcncc and virtue which he can use to the highest degree foropposite ends
Thcrcfore man is most impious and mostsavage without virtue, and worst
with regard to sexual things and food.

Sexual things— incest; food— cannibalism. Because o fth is latitude man is


by nature capablc o f living on members o f his own species, which would
n o t apply to lions and tigers. There is the same thought in Aristophanes,
only from an entirely di fferent point o f víew. Whereas Aristode presents it
from the point o f view o f civilizadon, Aristophanes presents It from the
point o f view o f rebellion against civilizauon, as will becom e clear. Man has
a natural latitude regarding sex, therefore the need for limitación, for
nom os, law— for a divine law. Since it is o f man’s essence to be limited by

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C II A P T t R S E V h M

divine law, eros cannot be understood exccpt in relation to the gods, o r law.
A mere physiological understandingof eros is absolutely impossible.

alt is, then, from ancient times that eros for one another is inbom in hu­
man beings, a bringer-together o f the ancient nature in trying to malee
onc out o f cwo and cure human nature.'* ( 1 9 Ic 7 -d 3 )

Sexual satisfaction should enable man to survive for the purposc o f wor-
shiping the gods. From the gods’ point o f view the end o f sexual satisfac­
tion is piety. From man’s point o f view the end is sexual gratification. These
are two cntirely different ends. We had a similar problem in Pausanias’s
speech, where the two partners, the lovcr and the beloved, are united in the
perfect erotic association but inspired by different motives. Eros is the nat­
ural desi re o f human beings, n ot o f brutes, for restorarion o f the ancient
nature, the healer o f human nature. T o repeat: in Aristophanes’ under-
standing eros is peculiar to man. Eros is a natural conscqucnce o f the artifi­
cial división o f the ancient nature. Eros is n ot a gift o f the Olympian gods,
Aristophanes’ doctrine o f eros is the counterpart o f Plato’s doctrine o f
recollection, a return to the ancient nature in the case o f Aristophanes, a
recollection o f the originally perfect knowledge in the case o f Plato. You see
also the difFerence: For Plato the guiding consideration is the mind, the in-
tellect, nous; for Aristophanes it is something else, and it can provisionally
be described as the negad ve reladon to nomos. This negative relation to
nomos is more meaningful to Aristophanes than mere procreation and
mere gratification.
Eros is striving for something unattainable, and this is also impiied in
procreation. This unity can never be achieved. I t is esscntially unsatisfac-
tor y. I t is, therefore, man’s present nature— man as wc know him— to be
unhappy, to be sick. I t is n ot that some men are sick and others healthy, as
Eryximachus had said, but that all men are sick. This misery o f man is traced
to hubris. It reminds strangely ofbiblical doctrines. Although Plato started
from cntirely different things he carne up with notions similar to the bibli­
cal notions. Furtherm ore, what eros longs for is this unión, this original
unit, something which we would cali, not being tutored by Aristophanes,
something ugly. T h e beauty o f the body is completcly denied in favor o f
these strange round beings. All concern with the beautiful tends beyond
the beautiful to something else. The striving forcé o f the beautiful in erotic
feelings leads cventually to the defeat o f the beautiful. Eros is tragic, cer-
tainly in the sense in which we understand the word. It is interesting that
this is imputed to the cómic poet.

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A R 1 S T 0 P H A S E S

“Each o f us is a tokcn o f a human being, beca use each has been sliced, jusc
as flat fish, two out o f one. So each is aiways seeking his own tokcn."
( !9 1 d 3 - 5 )

The seeking is aiways, there is no folfillment. For each human being seeks
n o t simply some other human being, but that individual human being
which is by nature its other half. T o show the impossibility o f this situation
we must remind ourselves o f the possibility that through Apollo’s blunder
the other h alf might have been left skinless and m ight, therefore, have per-
ished. M en will, therefore, never find the other half. Al1 love is unhappy, vis-
ibly o r invisibly— comically unhappy or tragically unhappy. This is a strange
problem for a comic poet. B u t Aristophanes is not an ordinary comic poet.

“Now aii men who are a slicc o f the common— it was then called androg-
ynous— are lovcrs o f women, and many o f the adukcrers have come co be
from this genus, and all the women in turn who are lovers o f men and
aduiteresses come to be from this genus. But all women who are a slice o f
woman, these hardly pay any attention to men, but rather they are turned
toward women, and the lesbians come to be from this genus. But all who
are a slice o f male, they pursue the males, and as long as they are children,
because they are cuts o f the male, they love men and rejoice in lying down
cogether wíth the men and embracing them, and these are the best o f the
children and youchs, because they are most manly by nature." (1 9 1 d 6 -
192a2 )

H e re we find the question o f the natural hierarchy brought up for the first
time. T h e large majority o f m en are heterosexual, for they descend from
original androgynes. This new doctrine o f eros legitimares adultery as a
m atter o f course, i.c., it legitimates what is forbidden, it legitimates the ig-
noble, the disgraceful, the base, and the ugly. Aristophanes is silent o n jus-
tice, here as elsewhere. Eros, we could paradoxically say, ¡usdy overrides
justice. In 1 9 2 d 8 , as you will have seen, he does n ot say all adulterers, only
most o f them. Why n ot all? There are adulterers, as Aristotle in his wisdom
tells us, who are prompted by love o f gain, therefore they would n ot be
prompted by eros. By the use o f different tenses, he indicates that in former
times adulterers werc mostly prompted by love for the female sex. N ot so
now. Why are the women loving women in the center? There are only three
cases. H e started from the most com m on case, heterosexual love, and he
wants to end with the highest case, the male homosexuals. T h e second case
is n ot com m on but below the highest. That means that what is most dis­
graceful, the least high, i$ in the center. Why? Because the most disgraceful,

135
C H A P T P . R S E V B N

thc ugliest, is the theme o f Aristophancs. In another specch the highest


would be in thc center.
Listener: How do thc se various divisions continué beyond thc first gen­
eración?
Mr. 5fr««jy;T hcre is a limit to literalness in such an account.

uSome say indeed thac thcy are shameless. They lie. Ic is noc by shameless*
ness that thcy do this but by confidence, manJiness, and a manly look, cm-
bracing what is like themselves. The evidence is great: on becoming
complete [perfect] only men o f this sorc go into politics.” ( 1 9 2 a 2 -7 )

T h e best males, the homosexual males, turn to politics when they become
oíd, and this pro ves n ot only that they are the best men but that they are
free from shamelessness. Is it not a strange thing to say that politicians are
characterized by absen ce o f shamelessness? What does he mean? T o prove
that the homosexuals are not shameless he refers to che fact that they alone
go ¡nto politics. Politics would seem to be the médium o f bashful behavior.
Let me return. I say first that Aristophanes succeeds where Pausanias and
Eryximachus failed, namely in proving the supremacy ofpederasty, because
he links it up with the natural hierarchy. Pederasty is the preserve o f those
who are most male by nature. I d o n ot deny that thc re is a certain joke in
that— courageous, manly, and male. Maiüincss is the criterion. Why? The
puré males, the males interested only in males, are deseendants o f the sun,
as distinguished from the earth and the m oon, from whlch the others are
descendant. They are as little shameless as the sun, which sees everything,
and no one would cali the sun shameless.
Apparently he legitimates pederasty by referente to the polis, and then,
o f course, the argument would run as fbllows: T h e polis, according to a
preposterous etymology, stems from war (poletnos). War is that in which at
first glance the polis shows itself in aü its splcndor and forcé, and manliness
is, o f course, the virtue ofw ar. In Pausanias’s speech we have seen that po-
litical freedom jusdfics unlimitcd pederasty. In opposidon to Pausanias,
howcvcr, Aristophancs abolishes the distinction bctween noble and base
pederasty. There is only a hierarchy o f eros, none o f which is base, for each
is according to nature. Also here, in contradisdncdon to Pausanias, the
boys are lovers o f the adult men and vice versa. Mutual love ¡s present here,
just as it was in Eryximachus. Yet, to return to the m a n point: I t seems that
thc polis is used for establishing the hierarchy o f nature. W hat is most con-
ducive to poli tica! life in its greatest splendor is the highest. B u t must not
the hierarchy o f eros be established on the basis o f eros itself and n ot on the

136
A f U S l ' O P H A N t S

basis o f som cthing extemal to eros, such as thc polis? W hat has thc polis to
do with the essence o f cros, with man’s desire to return to his original na-
turc? D ocs n ot the polis belong togcthcr with nomos, and henee with thc
Olympian gods, o r is there an eros for thc polis? L et us see thc sequel.

“Whenever they bccomc full-grown men, they are pederasts and naturally
do not pay anention to marriages and acts o f procreador», but they are
compelled by the law; but it suffices for them to live with each other un-
married. Nowhe who is o f this kind proves to be in any case a pederast and
fond o f lovers [philerastes], always embracing that which is akin.” ( 1 9 2 a 7 -
I9 2 b 5 )

These he-men have no cros for the polis; they regard nomos mercly as com ­
pulsión. They lo ve only what is akin to them , and the ir fellow citizens are
n ot akin to them . T h e political point o f view has no legitimate place in
Aristophanes’ argument. For example, he does not refer to the obvious link
between polis and eros which will come out in Agathon’s speech, namely
eros as love for honor, which tum s naturally into thc political. This is not
even alluded to by Aristophanes. Precisely because he has expericnced the
power o f cros o r because he does n ot subordínate eros to any extraneous
consideration, he cannot refer to the polis in order to legitimate eros. Does
he basely bow to the taste o f the public in the theater? N o. Eros is a desire
for the ancient nature, for the State in which man had the loftiest thoughts,
in which he thought o f conquering heaven, o r rather Olympus. Eros is re­
be Ilion against nomos. Through eros men cease to be cowed and acquire
again the loftiest thoughts. I f this is the essence o f eros, the community o f
those which are most manly by nature is most highly ero tic to the deepest
degree in regard to what eros is ultimately after— the State o f completeness
in which men could challenge the gods. Therefore Aristophanes succeeds
where Pausanias and Eryximachus iailed. Because he frees eros from sub-
jection to anything n ot inherent in e r o s . . . [Tape ch a n g e .]. . . therefore it
can be understood only in terms o f the extremes.

“ N o w w h e n e v e r t h c p e d e r a s t a n d c v c r y o n c c ls c m e e ts u p w ith th a c v ery
own half o f his, then they are wondrously thundcrstruck by fricndship,
kinship, and eros, unwilling to be separated from one another for virtually
even a short time. And these are the ones who continué with one another
throughout life, but who could not even say what they want for them-
selves from one another. No one wouJd think that it was the intercourse
[being together] o f sex, that for its sake onc, after all, would enjoy being
with the other with such great seriousness; but it is evident that the soul o f

137
C H A P T E R SHVEN

cach o f thc rwo wants something else, which it is not abJe to say, but it di*
vincs and hints at what ir wants in riddles.” (1 9 2 b 5 -d 2)

This is a cypically Platonic expression: the soul divines something which it


cannot express and this is truer than what the soul can say. In this scction,
we have seen, Aristophancs turns to all lovers and he speaks no longer o f
homosexuals in particular. H itherto he had put the emphasis on desire,
secking, trying to be one. Now he strcsscs the achievement, the fact that
man gets the h alf which he seeks and therefore friendship arises. B u t he
adds eros. The eros survives in thc embrace itself, for the danger o f se para-
tion remains, nay, separation is inevitable. The ability to comply with the re*
quirements o f eros is n ot equal to the requirements o f eros. The dcsire o f
the lovers is incompatible with the desire o f the gods. I f the lovers had their
way the gods would never be honored, because the lovers would always stay
together. The desire o f the lovers is incompatible even with love itself. The
lovers would simply perish if they could foliow thc requirements o f eros,
and love would perish i f they could succeed. There is then in this way a har-
mony between the dcsire o f the gods and the desire o f love itself.
N ot all men are genuinely erotic, either because o f the effect o f their na-
ture o r else because n ot all men íind their natural alcer ego. Many human
beings ceasc to have desire Ibr being together after the partner has lost his
or her youthful bloom . The genuinely erotic human beings cannot say what
they desire because the desire is in a way self-contradictor^ But the self-
contradiction points to a deeper truth which the soul divines without being
a ble to State it clearly. There is a disproportion between che infirúty o f the
love and the finiteness o f che embrace. M en cannot say what they desire; a
god must say it for chem.

“And ifwhilc they were lying down in the same place, Hcphacstus should
stand over them with his tools and ask, 'What is ít, human beings, that you
want to get from one another?’ And if he should again ask when they were
at a loss tor an answcr, 'D o you actuaily dcsire this, to bccome, in the best
possiblc case, in thc same place with onc another, so as not co be apare
from one another day or night? I f ic is this Chat you dcsire, I am wiiling to
melt you together and fuse you into the same, so as co bccomc onc, being
two, and as long as you live, both, as if being one, to live in common, and
when you dic, there in turn in Hades, with the pair o f you dead, instead o f
two, to be onc in common. Well, see whether you love this and it is
enough for you if you obtain chis.* We know that not cvcn one, if he heard
this, wouid re fuse, and it would be evident that he wants nothing else. He
would simply believc he had heard that which for some time he had been,

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A R I S T O r H A N h S

after all, desi ring, to come together and mclt together into the one being
loved and become one out o f two. The cause is this: ihac was our ancient
nature, and we were wholes. So the ñame for the desi re and pursuit o f the
wholc is eros.” (1 9 2 d 2 -1 9 3 a l)

The god who speaks to the lovers is Hephaestus, the blacksmith. Does
this remind you o f something you may know from other readings? H e ­
phaestus comes up in a similar situation in the Odyssey, in the eighth book,
where the story o f Ares and Aphrodite is told. Aphrodite was the wife o f
Hephaestus and had an adultcrous affair with Ares. Som ehow Hephaestus
carches them in the act. I read to you a few words from the prose transla-
tion. Hephaestus naturally makes a fuss and aJI the gods assemble. H e com-
plains bitterly to Zreus.

His mouthing gathered the gods to the housc o fth e brazen floor. Posei-
don the Harth-girdlcr, bcncficcnt Hcrmcs, and royal Apollo the far-
darting carne: but the Lady Goddesses remained at home, all o f them,
quite out ofcountenance. In Hephaestus’ forccourt collected the Givers
o f Weal and unquenchable was the laughter that aróse from the blesscd
Gods as they studied the tricky devicc ofHcphacstus. One would cacch his
neighbor’s eye and gibe: “Bad deeds breed no merit. The slow outrun the
speedy. See how poor crawling Hephaestus, despite that limp, has now
overtaken Ares (much the mosc swift o f all divine dwellers upon Olympus)
and cleverly caught him. Ares will owc him the adultéreos fine.” Words
likc this one whispered to the other: but o f Hcrmes did Zeus’ royal son
Apollo loudly ask, “Hcrmes, son o f Zeus, messenger and giver ofgood
things: would you not choose even the bondage o f chese cough chains, if
so you might slccp in the one bed by golden Aphrodite?” And to him che
Gods’ messenger, Argus-bane replied: “Ifonly this might be, kingly, far*
darting Apollo! I f there werc chains withouc end, thrice as many as are
he re, and all you Gods with all che Goddesses to look on, yet would I be
happy beside the Golden O ne.” (Odyssey ü.3 2 1 - 4 3 )

This story is now transfcrred from the immortals to the mortals. The un­
quenchable laughter about the two immortals caught in the act ofadultery
and the frank expression by Hermes about his desire to üe publidy with
Aphrodite, while fettered to her literally, is the comcdy in eros. H e contra­
dices propriety. W hat he says is improper but it is natural. W hen these two
things clash laughter arises. N ot in every case, naturally, but in the case o f
certain clashes we laugh. For example, at the story o f a murder we don’t
laugh, but at a confidence man we do. N ot all successful crimes are laugh-
able.

139
C H A P T E K . SE V E N

Aristophanes’ Hcphaesrus doesn’t address god$ but m or tais. There is


the refere love only until death, o r rather, beyond death, and tragedy ls nec-
essary in human love. The Olympian gods love eros because they are death-
less. Hephaestus is not angry here but fnendly; he is philanthropic. H e was
connected with Prometheus because Prometheus stole Hephaestus’s art—
fire. Here there is complete silence about Aphrodite because Aristophanes
knows only eros without Aphrodite. But, however philanthropic Hephaes­
tus may b e>and that is a crucial implication o f chis speech, he cannot bring
about what men so deeply desire. The unity can never be restored. Eros is
infinitely more than the desire o f lust, it is the desire for onene ss, whole-
ness, and integrity in the literal sense, everlasting integrity, a desire which
cannot be felfilled.
W hat is the conseque nce o f the fact that eros cannot be satisfied? Ever-
new embraces— that's Tantalus. The consequence o f Aristophanes seems
to suggest piety. The gods could make possi ble what is by nature impos-
sibie. Yet the gods would thus expose themseíves to the original danger by
restoring the original units. Furtherm ore, piety could fulfill what eros
pro mises if the objects o f piety, namely the gods, were themseíves wholes.
But the Olympian gods, being the models o f human beings, are n ot wholes
in this sense. T h e true wholes are sun, m oon, and earth. Piety would then
consist, in the highest possi ble case, n ot in restoring the original unity but
in looking at the cosmic gods, sun, m oon, and earth. The fulfillment o f eros
would be contemplation. In that case eros would tend byits own nature to-
ward contemplation. The looking at available in amorous embrace would
be only a foretaste o f the true looking at. Yet, if the end is unión, it cannot
be theoria, contemplation. The unity would destroy the possi bility o f con­
templation, in modern ianguage, the vis-á-vis o f subject and object. Only a
part which remains apart can have contemplation.
We can also say that eros, as understood by Aristophanes, is, in modern
Ianguage, cxtinction o f the self. Aristophanes is unable to recogníze eros in
phÜosophy— that should be clear— because the end o f man as he under-
stands it is a being incapabic o f philosophy. Therefore, he tacitly accuses
Sócrates in his comedies o f being uñero tic. He cannot conceive o fe ro s ex-
ccpt horizontaily, on the same level, not vcrtically, as Sócrates understands
it. H e can conceive o f eros only in terms o f mutuality. H e does n ot under-
stand the mind— nous— and its one-sided direction. Pausanias, we may re-
call, brought in the mind in connection with pederasty. You may remem-
ber, his first attempt to justify pederasty was by arguing that the males are
superior in intellect to the females. Eryximachus was silent about the mind,

140
A R I > T O 1’ H A N E $

but he brought in art, and especially theoretical music, which reminds o f


the problem o f the mind. Aristophanes drops the mind altogether. The re is
accordingly is a strange connection berween that and his successful defense
o f pederasty.
In what sense can piety solve the problem which eros cannot solve? The
ultímate answer in Aristophanes’ speech will be that piety does n ot solve the
problem. Piety is merely compatible with eros; it is even required fbr eros,
but it does n ot solve the problem. T h e end o f Aristophanes’ teaching re-
garding eros is that eros cannot be fulñlled; it is striving for the impossible.
I t is very hard to say what is tragic and what is cómic and, naturally, we think
o f it in modern terms. T h e question o f what is tragic in the Platonic sense
we have to take up when we com e to the tragic poet Agathon. I may be per­
m ití ed to use the term tragic now in the modern sense, the com m on sense.
Aristophanes, the com ic poet, is the only one who te aches that eros is es-
sentíatly tragic. Behind the play and fian and absurdity o f the Aristophanean
comedies there is a very serious and profound teaching.

“Formcrly, as I say, we wcre onc, but now, on account o f our injusticc, we


have been settled apart by the god, just as the Arcadians were by the Spar-
tans. So there is a fear, if we are not ordcrly in regard to the gods, that we
shall be split again and go around in the State o f thosc who have been
seulpeed in relief on stelae, sawed apare along our noses, and become like
dic cut in tw o." ( 1 9 3 a l-7 )

T h e motive o f piety, it appears here, is fear, fear o f superior power like the
power o f the Spartans. This fear demands n ot orderiiness regarding eros,
but orderiiness regarding the gods. T h e example he gives here is recorded
by Xenophon in his G reek History> book 5, chapter 2 . 1 will tcll you the gist
o f the story: There were people üving in the Peloponnesus who had been
the allies o f the Spartans and then carne over to the Athenian side, i.e., they
became democratic. The Spartans vanquished them and estabiished an aris-
tocracy and destroyed the democracy. They restored the original way o f Üfe
o f the Mantineans, which was to Uve in villages. Xenophon uses the phrase
“as they Uved in the olden tim es.” This is difficult to understand. From a
Platonic point o f view the Spartans deserve rcspect and not merely fear be-
cause they estabiished aristocracy, which from Plato’s point o f view is supe­
rior to democracy, o r because they restored the ancient. The gods can de-
mand only fear because they do n ot estabUsh the ancient, they prevent the
establishment o f the ancient. Yet, on the other hand, the Spartans, by com-
peUing the Arcadians to Uve in villages and n ot ¡n the city, may be said to

141
CH A P T E R SE V E N

havc dccivilized the Mantineans, and the gods are somehow the cause o f
civiiizadon. Even according to Aristophanes’ doctrine, or prccisely becausc
o f Aristophanes’ doctrine, it would seem that the gods deserve respect and
n ot merely fear. W hat I am driving at is thísr the story told by Xenophon i$
absolutely ambiguous in connection with this passage. I t can be under-
stood to mean that the gods deserve only fear, o r they may also de serve re­
spect.

“ But for these reasons everyone must exhort every man to be pious about
gods, in order that wc may escape one [fatc] and obtain the other, as Eros
is our guide and general." ( 1 9 3 a 7 -b 2 )

Aristophanes says he re that one must admonish every man, male man. He
is n ot concerned with the picty o f women. Piety is required so that the
other gods d o n ot prevent us from getting what the god Eros leads us to.
T h e Service o fth e other gods has merely a negad ve function, likc evil ghosts
as it were. T h e positive good comes from the god Eros alone. Yet Eros is the
leader o f an army and, as you know, an army consísts o f males. Eros is the
leader o f an army o f males which strives for original unity, for the rccovery
o f lofty thoughts, which implies the thought o f rebellion against the gods.
T h e fundamental antagonísm betwcen the Olympian gods and eros re-
mains preserved. Piety in this sense is merely a dire necessity and conces-
sion. We will complete our discussion o f Aristophanes’ speech next time.

142
8 AGATHQN

loday I plan co finish my discussion o f Aristophanes’ speech and


begin the discussion o f Agathon’s speech. I have no quarrel with thosc
among you who say that we proceed too fast. My defense is that one must
also have a view o f the whole and this rcquires necessarily some neglect o f
details if one has only sixteen raeetings. It would do us no harm to rcflect
on the fect that the understanding o f the whole must cooperate with the
understanding o fth e parts and vice versa; and on how the understanding o f
the whole is and is n ot identical with the understanding o fth e parts. Espe-
cially we must consider that this applies n ot only to Plato’s Symposium or
any other Platonic dialogue but to all human understanding. O ne is always
troubled about where to begin, with the whole o r the parts. Unfortunately
we cannot d o this here. Others among you might say that we proceed too
slowly, but I can only repeat, if polítical theory is a legitímate subject one
must also study the classics o f political theory and if they are to be studied,
they must be studied carefuüy. There may be other complaints, other ob-
jections, other questions, and I am perfecdy willing to discuss them but not
at this moment. I think we should first finish our discussion o f Aristoph­
anes’ spccch.
Aristophanes is, as I said, the first inspired speaker. T h e first who speaks
o f eros as something not subscrvíent to somethlng extraneous to eros.
Also, Aristophanes completes something which Pausanias had begun and
Eryximachus had continued, namely, to show the superiority o f pederasty.
Pausanias had started from the distinction between the noble and the base
eros. Yet, as became dear, according to him this distinction is n ot by nature
but by law. H e tried to find a natural principie o f that distinction by having
recourse to nous, to the mind. The male sex, as the more intellectual sex,
should be preferred. But he failcd. Therefore Eryximachus and Aristoph­
anes abandon this attempt. Eryximachus refcrs indeed to art, to technc,
which is an intellectual thing, but this tcchne is unerotic. Aristophanes is
silent about nous altogether. In abandoning the orientation by the mind,
Eryximachus and Aristophanes are compelled to concelvc o f eros as mu­
tual.
The two preceding speakers, you will recal I— Phaedrus and Pausanias—
spoke o f eros from the point o f view o f either the lover o r the belovcd. Why

143
i ' HA P T í R E I ü HT

is this so? Mu cuati ty, hori2ontality> as disringuished from verdcaüty, eros di-
rected toward the highcr— this is connected with the p roble m o f the mind
as folio ws: The object o f the mind is higher than the mind itself, since the
mind folio ws its object and not the other way around. Eryximachus had
also made the distinction between noble and base eros. The distinction, as
he presented it, is not a natural distinction but is established by art with a
view to what is useful to man. Remember particularly what he said about
the seasons. The healthy seasons and the unhealthy seasons are equally nat­
ural. T h e prevalence o f one or the other is achieved by art. Therefore he
ends with the assertion o f the supremacy o f art. I f the distinction between
noble and base eros, then, is n ot by nature, it ought to be dropped. And this
is exactly what Aristophanes does. Aristophanes does ha ve recourse to a
natural hierarchy among men. Yet that hicrarchy is determined n ot by nous
buc oniy by maniiness. Eros, according to him, is rebellion and militar y ac-
tion; eros is the leader o f an army.
A few words about Aristophanes’ story. M an, the desee ndant o f the cos-
mic gods, therefore round, was to be subject to the Olympian gods. But
since he had lofty thoughts he refused to submit. Why was man subject
from the beginning to the Olympian gods? M an, in contradistinction to
his p r o g e n ito r the cosmic gods, is in need o f procreation. And, in contra­
distinction to the brutes, he is not limited to mating seasons. In the latter
respect, and only in that respect, he is likc the Olympian gods. The rela-
tionship between man and the Olympian gods is based on the sexual lat-
itude o f both. The specific difference o f man among the animáis is this
sexual latitude.
Through the punid ve acción o f the Olympian gods men becom e wcll
be haved, kosm ios in Greck, which recalls “cosm os.” This orderliness does
n ot com e from the cosmic gods but from the Olympian gods. M en ac-
quired erect stature, the shape o f the Olympian gods. The Olympian gods
molded men in the ir image, you could say, to use the biblical parallel. M en
be carne human through the action o f Zeus, for man becom e s human
through law, nomos. And the cause o f the nomos, which makes man hu­
man, must be manlike. T h e Olympian gods are manlike. O n the basis o f the
comedies o f Aristophanes one could say, since man’s sex Ufe is n ot Umited
by nature to seasons it must be limited by law. T h e most massive limitation
o f man’s sex life by law is the prohibí don against incest. The Olympian gods
are n ot Umited by seasons or by prohibítions against incest. Man is n ot lim­
ited by seasons but is Umited by the prohibidon against incest; n ot by na­
ture but by convention. T h e brutes are Umited by nature and n ot by con-

144
A Ü A T H O N

vention. They have mating scasons but no prohibition against incest, a


cheme which occurs repeatedly in Aristophanes, tbr instancc ¡n thc Birds.
Man acquired his humaniry by Zeus’s punitivc action. That action lim-
ited man’s sexuality by imposing thc prohibition against incest, but he ac-
quircd erect stature. Thus men were cnabled to see one anothcr in amorous
embrace. M en d o n ot possess erect stature, as in the Platonic view, for look-
¡ng up to hcaven and to thc cosmic gods. Thcy do n ot have erect stature in
ordcr to be astronomers in the highest sen se, but so that they can lie to-
gether. Bliss consists in amorous embrace.
Man seeks his alter ego, the other part o f himself. W hat docs this mean?
H e seeks his nearest relative, his own flesh and biood. Eros is essentiaUy in-
cestuous. I exaggerate, but this cxaggeradon is justified by a crucial part o f
the Aristophanean comedies. However this may be, it is man’s essence to be
constituted by both— limidess sexual desire and law. Law is as essential to
man as is sexual desire: eros must be understood in the light o f this duality.
You cannot disre gard nomos and regard it as endrely extraneous. This
means, however, that eros must be understood in the light o f the antago-
nism betwecn nature and convention. Eros is at the same time desire for
amorous embrace and rcbeUion o f nature against convention, nay, eros is
that rebellion rather than sexual desire, as Aristophanes makes clear when
he says, “They could n ot even say what they want for thcmselvcs from one
another* ( 1 9 2 c 3 - 4 . That they want embrace they know, but the deeper
meaning they do n ot know, the desire for the original oneness. I t ¡s the de­
sire for the ancient nature n ot impaired by convention, for original whole-
ness o r ¡ntegrity. But i f this is eros, ¡ts goal is n ot attainable. Zeus has taken
care o f that. I t is at this point that thc necd for piety seems to arise. Eros can
never be fulfillment and a supplement is needed.

“Let no onc act contrary to him— and he acts contrary whoever incurs the
enmity o f the gods— for ifw e become friends and reconciled to the god
we shall find and meet up with our very own bclovcd, which few nowadays
do.” (1 9 3 b 2 -6 )

One must follow Eros, who is a leader o f an army, the refere a male. This in-
cludes avoiding becom ing hateful to the gods. As for Eros, one must be-
com e a friend o f Eros and becom e reconciled to him. Aristophanes does
not speak o f friendship between men and the Olympian gods, whereas
Eryximachus had ended his speech with the demand for friendship. There
is need for reconciliation with Eros. Why? So that we can disco ver and en-
counter our young beloved, which Aristophanes ordinarily refers to as a

145
C H A P T R R B I C H I

male be lo ved by males. At prese nt this happcns only to a fcw. Why? At pres­
ent there ¡s no proper worship o f E ros, i.e., there is to o great a worship o f
the other gods. Eros is angry with us for this ncglect. I f he were properly
worshiped he would help us find our natural alter ego. Surely the Olympían
gods are o f no positive help as regards the crotic pursuit.

“And picase let not Eryximachus supposc, in making my logos inco a com-
edy, chat I mean Pausanias and Agathon— for perhaps they in fact do ob-
cain this, and both are males, in thcír naturc manly.” { 1 9 3 b 6 -c 2 )

Aristophancs does n ot for onc moment regard Eryximachus and Phaedrus


as lovers. O f thosc present, he reters only to Pausan ias and Agathon as
lovers. But he ironically imputes to Eryximachus the desire to mísrepresent
comically his speech, namely, to suppose that Aristophancs had been ad-
monishing Pausanias and Agathon in particular to be pious. Perhaps,
Aristophanes says in his own ñame, Pausanias and Agathon belong to the
tew who are c rodea! ly successful but are endangered by the ir lack o f piety.
And, perhaps, they are by nature males— which implies that by convention
they appear to be fe males. This is natural, for they were notorious for their
softness, their womanish behavior. And there is another little joke— the
ñame Pausanias ends in as, and according to Aristophancs> C.louds ñames
ending in orbespeak a female nature. T o com e back to the main point: only
those who are by nature males can be ftill devotees o f eros, the fulfillment o f
eros, the regained unity; this goes together with lofty thoughts, which as
such are directed toward dethroning the gods, and this is particularly a male
affair. From this it would seem that the restoration o f our ancient nature is
possible.

“ But, rcgardJcss o f this, I am speaking o f al) men and women, in saying


that in this way our race would be happy, if we should complete our eros
and each one, in obtaining his own bclovcd, should go back co his ancient
nature. And if this is the best, itisneeessary that in the present that which
is nearesc to it is the best; and this is to obtain a bclovcd who is naturally to
one’s mind.” ( 1 9 3 c 2 -8 )

H e speaks he re explicitly o f men and women but by the use o f this word
beloveds (p a id ib a )3 which means predominandy male favorites, a prepon-
derance o f the pederastic thought remains. The return to the original na­
ture pro ves now to be a utopia. I t is the best in itself but at present is not
available. Only the closest approximadon to it is the best possible as matters
stand. And what is that best possible? T o find n ot one’s natural male alter

146
C H A P T B R El üH' l

Eros, as Aristophanes understands it, i$ longing for a fantastic oneness, for


an unnaturaJ oneness. B u t, as such, ¡t is the most important case o f unnat*
ural oneness: it is the nomos. Namely, the law presents ¡tself, if n ot righdy
understood, as something ultímate, which applies equally to all and is just
because o f this equal vaüdity. But since mcn are difiere nt and human situa-
tions are difierent, the law is inferior ín this rcspect to the wise decisions o f
wise men on the spot. This is a great the me throughout Plato, but also in
that littlc dialogue, Minos> which is an introduction to Plato’s L a m , wherc
the problem o f the spurious oneness o f the law is contrasted with genuine
oneness.
Aristophanes’ norion o f original unity is a fantastic and grotesque ex-
pression o f his concern with nomos, with the polis, which comes o u t in
spitc o f his concern with nature as the opposite o f nomos. W hat is sug-
gested here can be expressed as follows: eros is conccrned with the natural
one, but that is the human species, because eros serves procreación. But the
preservarion o f the human species is effected onJy by heterosexual love.
Pederastic, unnatural love refleets satisfacción with the unnaturaJ unity o f
the nomos. Aristophanes’ daring attack on nomos and the gods is harmless
because it is based on an insufficient understanding o f what the issues are—
it is a harmless untruth, a harmless evil. But what do wc cali harmless evil?
Ridiculous. Aristophanes’ doctrine is, contrary to what he intends, n ot only
amusing but ridiculous.
A word about the connection between the speeches o f Eryximachus and
Aristophanes, the two central speakers. First the difference: Eryximachus
says that eros rules everything, but he is led to say that techne rules every-
thing. Aristophanes is wiser than Eryximachus; he says, as it werc, that
nomos is the ruler o f everything. Now, Eryximachus and Aristophanes are
exchangeable, they are identícal in the decisive rcspect. Both say that all
love, if not imperfect, is mutual, i.e., the motivations o f the partners are
identícal. There are no different motivations on the part o f the lover and
the belovcd. And another important similarity: Eryximachus ends with a
praise o f the art o f soothsaying; Aristophanes ends with a praise o f piety.
This implics that according to Eryximachus there can be friendship be­
tween gods and m cn, for there is an art, soothsaying, which brings about
that friendship. Aristophanes implies that there cannot be friendship be­
tween gods and m en, for art and law are weaker than nature. Eryximachus
asserts the ultímate suprcmacy o f art, but art, whatever fbrm it takes, is lim-
ited by chance. Therefore, what we would wish to have is an art o f all arts,
an art which Controls chance. That is the art o f soothsaying, the art which

148
A ti A ! '! ( O N

Controls the gods. There is some strange corollary in Aristophanes. Eros is


desire fbr unión with the altcr ego, che other part o f yourself. W hat does
this mean? I t means that thc importancc o f chance in eros is denied. You
know from literature and your own experience that when two people are
truly in lo ve they believe it could n ot have been another person— we were
destined fbr one another. Aristophanes, and this is part o f the charm o f his
speech, makes him self the spokesman o f thc delusion o f eros. W hat we ulti-
mateíy seek is something wherein chance does not enter. His inspiración
seems also to be under the spell o f the delusion; but Aristophanes knows
that it is n ot truc: we can n ot find the other partner if Apollo was a blun-
derer, as 1 expect him to be, namely, if he left the other half skinless and it
perished. We have, then, no techne, no art for fínding the truly other half,
and the only way o u t is piety. In other words, what Plato suggests is, aHow-
ever ironical you, Aristophanes, might have been regarding piety, if you had
been consistent you would have been seriously pious.”
T o summarize: Plato comedizes, if I may say so; he makes Aristophanes
the subject o f a comedy, just as Aristophanes made Sócrates an o b ject o f
comedy. Plato’s tacit claim is that his comedy is much more spiritual and
much more refined than the rather crudc, if still subtle, comedy o f Aris­
tophanes. Plato apparently makes a mere caricature o f Aristophanes, just as
the C louds at first glance is a mere caricature o f Sócrates. This bccomes
cspecially clear if you compare Aristophanes’ speech in Plato with Aristoph­
anes’ comedies: there is almost a complete absence o f Aristophanes’ poliá-
cal concepts from the speech which Plato put into his mouth. In Aristoph­
anes there is a constant politic al preoccupation, and the standard by which
Aristophanes judges the mischief done in Athcns in his time is that o f
the oíd Athens— the good oíd times, Marathón fighters, American Legión.
Those who were responsible for the greatest glory o f Athens are naturally
the representa tives. T h e ancestral is the standard for ridiculing the contem-
porary extreme democracy. The oíd polity is somehow much more rural
than present-day Athens. The oíd is the more rural, and that means, how-
ever, that thc plcasures o f country Ufe and ofpeace are identical with thc an-
cient polis, the ancient, stern polity o f the M arathón fighters, people living
on their farms, large o r small, enjoying the pie asures o ffarm life, wine, and
women. Uldmately, then, the standard is prívate pleasurc rather than the
glory o f che city. There proves to be a tensión even between that prívate
pleasure and the glory o f the city, a tensión which is ultimately the same as
that between nature and convention, In other words, Plato’s silence on thc
political orienta don o f Aristophanes is based on the profound understand-

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ing o f what is raally going on in the Aristophanean comedies. The other


striking fe ature about Aristophanes is the massivc indeccncy and obscenity
with which his comedies abound. That again is beautifiilly represe ntcd by
Plato in the pansexualist Weltanschauung which Plato imputes to Aris­
tophanes in his speech. T h e link between mcn and gods is sexual latitude.
T h e purpose o f the erect staturc o f man is to see the partner in amorous em ­
brace and not be reduccd to thc situation o f the brutes. Furthermore,
Aristophanes attackcd Sócrates in the C louds in thc ñame o f piety. Aris­
tophanes’ speech in Plato culminatcs in what looks likc a praise o f piety,
but, if cara ful ly considerad, not Sócrates but Aristophanes is the impious
man. Aristophanes1impiety is linked up with his sexualism, if I may say so,
by the fact that his impiety is the cora o f eros as he understands it, since eros
is esscntially re be ilion against the gods.
Aristophanes1 attack on Sócrates is an attack on phifosophy, on the su-
premacy o f thc mind. Aristophanes therefore presents eros as incompatible
with the mind. Eros is the desire for becom ing merely cosmic again. Aris­
tophanes says in his speech that the Olympian gods are the origin o f civility
and are despicable, given thc contrast between claim and hilfillment. They
are n ot even, let alone that they should be, venerable. T h e cosmic gods, on
che other hand, are, as understood by Aristophanes, akin to what we would
cali chaos. His position can be stated as fbllows: T h e Olympian gods are de­
spicable; they are not the cosmic gods but are akin to nous and are the ori­
gin o f civility. Now this much about Aristophanes.
L isten er: Does Aristophanes ever mention pie asura in his speech?
M r Strauss: T h at is a very good quesrion. I am sorry to say I can’t an-
swer that. 1 haven’t waeched for it.
[In answer to a question:] There are two difíerent elements here in what
you say. What I said was that Plato speaks o f racollection, i.e., man had an
original State ofperfect visión o fth e ideas, which he has lost. B u t he lives on
that racollection. Similarly, Aristophanes speaks o f an original State o f per-
fection which man has lost. The differanee is this: for Plato, racollection is
o f an original visión; for Aristophanes, the desire for reunión is for a condi-
tion in which a visión would be impossible. There is a parallel, but it oniy
points out the radical amagonism. The fact that Plato can also speak o f the
highest love as lovc o f one’s own is true. But love o f one’s own ¡s n ot meant
as love o f x o ry but o f that in you which is no longer thc individual individ-
uality. Plato can very well say that this is the true self, but that true self is, to
use later language, not the empirical self. In thc simpler term love o f one’s
own means the love o f the whole being in his individuality and his relatives

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A C A r H o N

the evening, there was also a unanimous view expressed by Eryximachus.


But chis time Eryximachus does n ot wait for the others to express their ap*
provai. Why? How does he know that the others liked the speech? How
could they have expressed their approvai o f Aristophanes’ speech? By
laughter. Should Sócrates have joined in the laughter? Eryximachus is the
first speaker in this interiude. We are reminded o f the preponderant role he
played in the beginning. We note that his speech was the center speech in
the spceches prior to Sócrates, and this is not insignificant. I remind you
only that behind Eryximachus there is a great philosophical doctrine, the
doctrine o f Empedocíes, and this doctrine— which says that eros rules the
whole— is ultímately the target o f Plato’s doctrine o f eros. According to
Plato this is n ot true and we shall find the reasons later on. You see that
Eryximachus changes the order: he puts Sócrates in the first place. Sócrates
and Agathon are somehow exchangeable.

Then Sócrates said, “The reason is, Eryximachus, that you yourself have
competed bcautifully; but ifyou should be where I am now or rather, per-
haps, where I shaU be when Agathon too speaks well, then you would be
very afraid and at total risk, as 1 am now.* (1 9 4 a l-4 )

Sócrates praises here Eryximachus’s speech; he does not praise Aristoph­


anes’ speech. This shows again the special significance o f Eryximachus’s
speech. The remark here recalls a parallel in the dialogue C r itia s ( 1 0 8 c 5 -
6 ), in which there is a similar scene where Critias says, MYou are posted on
the last rung o f the speakers and therefore courageous.” H ere, Sócrates is
posted on the last rung.
[Tape change.]
Did n ot Plato deliberately arrange the dialogue in such a way so as to
prevent legitimate criticism o f Sócrates’ speech? We must see whether this is
true.

“You want to bewicch me, Sócrates,” Agathon said, “in order that I be
thrown into confusión on account o f my bclicf that the audiencc [the-
atron] has great expectations that 1 will speak wcll.” ( 194a5 -7 )

In other words, he suspeets Sócrates o f a slightly unfair trick. H e links up


this exchange o f speeches with his contest regarding tragedy. Unwittingly
he tells us that hearers o f the speeches must also be lookers-on [theatron
means the place o f sceing], lookers at the speakers.

“In that case, Agathon, I would be forgecful,” Sócrates said, “if—though


I sawyour manlmess and greatness ofpridc when you went up on the plat*

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C H A P T R R E 1 G H I

form with thc actors, and wich a gjancc straight out at so large an audience
whcn you were about co make an exhibición o f your own specchcs, and
you were not at ali baffled— I should believe that now you will be in con­
fusión on account o f a few human beings likc us.' ” ( 1 9 4 a 8 -b 5 )

In other words, You, Agathon, who had the courage to appear o n the stage
in your own play, will n ot be afraid to address us few fellows.

“What, Sócrates?" Agathon said. "You surely don’t bebeve 1 am so ful! o f


the audience that I am not awarc that for a man o f intclligcnce a few who
are sensible are more to be feared that the many who are senseless."
“Well, in that case, Agathon, should 1 imagine there was anything un-
refined about you, it wouldn’t be a fine thing for me to do; I know well
that should you meet up with some who you bebeve are wisc, you would
have greater regard for thcm than for the many. But I am afraid we are noc
they— we too were present there and wcrc o f the many— though if you
should meet up with others who are wisc, perhaps you would be ashamed
before thcm, should you perhaps believe that you were doing something
shamcful."
“You speak the truth * he said.
“But would you not be ashamed before the many should you bebeve
you were doing something shameful?"
And he said that Phacdrus interrupeed and said, “My dear Agathon, if
you answer Sócrates, ic wib no longer make any diffcrencc to him how any
o f the things here curn out, oniy provided he has anyonc to converse with,
especially if he i$ beaudful. I myselfwould hsten with pleasure to Sócrates’
conversaron, buc it is necessary for me to tajee care o f the encomium to
Eros and to rece ive from each onc ofyou the logos; so let cach ofyou Ten­
der his due to che god and chen on this condición go on conversing.”
“Well, Phacdrus, you speak w dl," Agathon said. “There1s noching to
prevent me from speaking, for it will be possible at many other times to
converse with Sócrates." (1 9 4 b 6 -e 3 )

Phaedrus thinks that Sócrates and Agathon will have their dialogue imme-
diately after their speeches, and Agathon thinks that he and Sócrates will
have their dialogue frequendy here after. W ho is the better diviner o f the
two? The main point, however, is the fourfold reference to conversation.
Now, what is the meaning o f this interlude? As you know, it is n ot the first
interludc. The first interlude carne prior to Eryximachus’s speech and was
due to Aristophanes’ incapacitaron. In the course o f the evening, with the
Progressive exhaustíon o f the subject, che general incapacitaron mercases,
n ot only the particular one o f Aristophanes. There is a general incapacity

154
A G A T H O N

fór long speeches. W hen people are to o tired to make long speeches, they
are n ot to o tired to make conversation, engagc in dialogue. The dialogues
com e in as a mere substitute for long speeches. This, however, is changed
with Sócrates’ speech, which is, as it were, nothing but a dialogue, although
it claims to be a speech. The first interludes were the dialogues betwcen
Eryximachus and Aristophanes. They dealt with Aristophanes1 ridiculous
bodily handicap, o f which Aristophanes himself was in no way ashamed.
The present interlude is chiefly a dialogue between Sócrates and Aga-
thon— Aristophanes is completely silent— and it deais with fear o f disgrace,
as distinguished from hiccups. Agathon and Sócrates claim to have fear o f
disgrace, and this is a natural introduction to the subject o f the beauty o f
eros. But Sócrates and Agathon only claim to have such fear; in fact they
don’t fear it. Yet only Agathon is found out, as you have seen. Agathon
walks into the trap which Sócrates had set. There was no rcason for Aga­
thon to speak at this point in the presence o f Sócrates. Agathon becomes
ridiculous; hi$ beauty, his grace, his charm, is somewhat spurious. H e is a
beautiful young man, as wc have seen, and, as we will see later, with a not so
beautiful inside, contrasted with the ugly, oldish Sócrates with a beautiful
inside. Perhaps this applies to the ir speeches too. We must also consider
this, and this is a good introduction to Agathon’$ speech; nowhere in the
dialogue do we find perfect beauty. It is always tainted, if only by a snub
nose. Now we turn to Agathon’s speech.

“I wanc first to speak o f how I must speak, and then speak. AIl chose who
have spoken befbre seem to me not to be praising che god but blessing hu­
man beings for the goods for which the god is responsible; but as to what
sort he himself is in bestowing chese gifts, no one has spoken. There is one
correet manner o f every praise for everything, to go through in speech,
whomever the speech is about, and say in being o f what sort he is in fact
the cause o f what sort o f things. So too in the case o f Eros, it is just for us
to praise him first as to what sort he is, and the n his gifts. * (1 9 4 e 4 - 19 5a5)

As it appears in the Greek, Agathon is the only one who begins with an em-
phatic I— ego. Naturally, he is beautiful and successful and he knows it. H e
makes the distinction between how one ought to speak and when one
speaks. T o speak o f how one ought to speak Ls n ot truly to speak. Is this in-
telligiblc? For example, ifyou have a methodology o f the social Sciences, do
you say anything about social phenomena? In a way you are silent. There is
a formality about it which ¡s empty. I t would be different in one case: i f the
art o f how to speak were the other side o f psychofogy, knowledge o f the

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C H A P T E K F. U i n

soul; then the sciencc o f how to speak would be fiiil o f content. This is, o f
coursc, Plato’s notion o f rhetoric: it is only the doctrine o f the soul viewed
fforn thc point o f view o f how to influcnce o r persuade other pcople.
Aristophanes had blamed all earlier human beings for not having wor-
shiped Eros; Agathon blames only all earlier speakers tonight. From this
poínt o f view he is much more modest. H e certainly is no revolutionary, as
Aristophanes was, an iconoclast. Iconoclasm is incompatible with beauty. I
cannot always repeat that the latitude o f the Greek word k a lo n — which is
beautiful, fair, respectabíc— ineludes everything resplcndent for the eyes or
thc mind. In Agathon’s spcech for the first time the god him sclf becomes
the the me, not as something existing merely in the soul o f man, but as self-
subsistent, and the question is raised, O f what quality is the god? Aristoph­
anes aimost touched on that. H e spokc o f the power o f eros and the nature
o f man. He did not speak o f the nature o f eros; he did n ot even speak o f that
quality o f eros which Agathon refers to. We have to raise this question: Will
Agathon discuss the nature o f eros o r only his quality? You see also in the
way Agathon speaks that it is a very orderly spcech, with an orderly begin-
ning. A universal statement on every kind o f praise, regarding every possi-
ble thing. Then the appücation: this and this is the right way to praise
anything. But now wc are supposed to praise eros, and this is thc right way
for praising eros in particular. The gifts o f eros— that means that o f which
eros is thc cause— is a metaphoric expression.

“ I asscrt that though all thc gods are happy, Eros, if sacred right permits it
and it is not offensive to say so, is the happiest o f them, being thc most
beautiful and the best.” (1 9 5 a 5 -7 )

This gives the plan o fh is spcech. First, Eros’s qualities: (a ) the most beau­
tiful; (b ) the best. Second, Eros as cause o f things outside o f himsclf. The
whole speech o f Agathon is characterized by an unusuaíly clear order. This
has very much to do with beauty, because clear order is an elem ent o f
beauty. But he does not raise the primary question, namely, What is eros?
What is its essence, its nature? This will be done only in Sócrates’ speech.
His praise o f Eros is nccessarily a critique o f the other gods. His very excuse,
“i f . . . it is not offensive to say so,” indicatcs that there is some prima fecic
re ason for offense; othcrwise he would never say that. The other gods are
all less chan pcrfect regarding both beauty and goodness; otherwise Eros
could n ot be the m ost beautiful and the best.

“Being most beautiful he is o f thc following sort. First, he is thc youngest


o f gods, Phacdrus. He himself offers great evidence to che logos, avoiding

156
Aü A T H O N

by fiight oíd age, though ít is plainly swift, for it approachcs us ac any race
faster than it should. It is that which Eros has a nature co hate and not to
come cven within.hailing distancc o f ” ( 1 9 5 a 7 -b 4 )

We all believe, we older people, that we get oíd to o fast.

“He is always with thc young and is himselfyoung, for the oíd logos holds
good: like always draws near to like." ( 1 9 5 M - 5 )

The first subdivisión regarding Eros’s beauty is his youthfulness, proven by


the fact that Eros is always with the young and runs away from the oíd. This
o f course does n ot yet pro ve chae he is the youngest o f the gods. What
Agathon implies is that Eros is wholly young, young in every respect.
The refere, he is the youngest. His youthfuíness would be defecdve i f he
wcre n ot the youngest. This is a very Platonic way o f looking at it. T h e idea
o f beauty is the most beautifitl thing the re is. You can bring out the paradox
by saying, ¡n un-Platonic terms: the concept o f beauty is the most beautiful
thing in the world; the concept o f justice is the m ost just thing in the world.
Plato surely says that beauty itself, as disünguished from any particular
manifestación o f beauty, is the m ost beautiful. (This means, o f course, that
Plato’s ideas are n ot concepts.) All other gods are older than E ros, but if
oldness is defícient beauty, that means that al1 other gods are m ore o r less
ugly, o r at least not perfectly beautiful, Only love o f similar for the similar—
the theme o f pederasty as we ha ve seen. But this is n ot used by Agathon for
this purpose; he does n ot makc a defense o f pederasty.

“Though I agree with Phaedrus on many points I don’t agree with him on
this, that Eros is older than Cronus and Iapetus; but I assert that he is the
youngest o f gods and ever young, and the ancient business about gods,
which Hcsiod and Parmcnides speak of, happencd, if they wcre celling thc
truth, by Ncccssity and not by Eros. Otherwise, there would not have
been castrations, any more than bindings o f one another and many other
violent things, if Eros wcre among thcm, but there would have been
fnendship and peace, just as there now is, since the tíme that Eros has been
king ofthe gods.” (1 9 S b 6 -c 6 )

H e refere to Phaedrus and says that he agrees with him in many things.
W hat things, he doesn’t tell us. D oes he grant, for example, that eros is not
in the beloved? We must see. Agathon disagrees with Hesiod and Par-
menides, n ot with H om er, though H om er, too, speaks o f terrible fights
among the gods. H e does n ot wish to blame Hom er. There is a strange dif-
ficulty here since H om er is the oldest poet. Is there n ot a contrast betwccn

157
A G A T H O N

soul he encounters with a rough character, he gocs away from it, and
whatever souJ he encounters with a soft character, he takes up rcsidencc
there. So if he is always touching with his feet and everywhere the softest
o f the softest, it is a necessity that he be most tender. So he is youngest and
tenderesc and, besides this, fluid in respect to his shape [ e i d o s ( 1 9 5 c 6 -
196a2)

You see the praise o f Homer. Yet H om er did n ot praise Eros, he praised
Ate, the goddess o f mischief, an avenging god. The oíd gods, as seen by the
oíd poets, are basically avenging gods. H om er did n ot praise a male god in
this way but a female god, and he didn’t praise in this way love but mischief.
H om er conceived o f eros as something much sterner than the soft, modern
Agathon does. W ith due euphemism, the elegant Agathon suggests that
the oldest o f all poets could n ot have done justice to the youngest o f all
gods. Only the youngest poet, who is in his way etemaily young, can do
this, probably by means o f cosmetics. In the thought o f the ancients, Ate,
the daughter o f Zeus, occupies the place which in the thought o f the mod-
erns is occupied by Eros. You know this phenom enon: the softening o f
manners. Agathon transforms Ate into E ros, something n ot beautiftil into
something beautiful. There is a parallel to that in Aristophanes’ speech. For
Aristophanes, the god who solves the ríddie o f the human soul is Hephaes-
tus, the limping god who, in addition, was deceived by his wife.
In Agathon the world o f beauty rules unimpaired. H om er places the
softness o f Ate only in her feet, n ot in her whole being. H ere, to o , Agathon
improves. H om er, in the nineteenth book o f the lita d , continúes, when
speaking o f Ate, ushe who damages or hurts human beings.” This is com -
pletely suppressed by our refined poet. Eros walks only on delicate, soft
things— on souls— and only on som e; he walks o n the softest o f the soft, on
the souls o f the soft. Souls are the softest o f beings; souls as souls are soft.
Characters which are somehow made out o f souJs may be hard o r soft, but
the souls as souls are soft. Eros does n ot dwell in the souls o f all, he does not
dwell in the souls o f harsh gods. W hich god is harsher and harder than Ares,
the god o f war? And Eros dweils in the soul o f Ares. Perhaps Agathon
would say Eros makes Ares soft, but that remains to be seen.

“Otherwise he would not be ablc to fold himsetf about everywhere, any


more than he could, if he were rough, be unobserved in entering every
soul and exiring it. His gracefulness is a grcat piccc o f cvidence for his
commensurate and fluid form [id ea], and this is agreed upon by all to be
something that Eros has to an exceptional degree, for there is always a mu­
tual war bctwccn gracclessness and Eros. The god’s way o f Ufe among

159
AÜ AT H O S

beauty o f the body. T herc is a peculiar parallelism bccween the praise o f


Eros’s beauty and the praise o f Eros’s goodness. We have four qualities o f
beauty and four virtues; in beauty we have youth, delicacy, pliancy, and
beautiful color; in goodness we have justice, moderation, courage, and wis-
dom . The quesdon would be whether therc is any meaning to that paral-
lelism, o r are they perhaps opposites* I would suggest that you look at a
paraüel in another Platonic dialogue, the first book o f Plato’s L aw s (6 3 1 b
ff.), where you find a similar parallelism o f the virtues o f the body and the
virtues o f the soul. T herc we have a strict correspondente o f the two.

“Aíter this one muse speak about the virtue o f Eros. The greatcst is that
Eros neicher commits injuscice against a god or human being ñor suífers
inj ustice at the hands o f a god or hum an being. ” (19 6 b 5 - 7)

Agathon is very far from denying what Aristophanes had said, that he was
the m ost philanthropic god. N ot justice is the greatest but the combinatíon
o f justice and immunity from injustice. I f you do n ot d o injusdee to others
and at the same time you cannot be hurt by others, this is the m ost desirabic
condition.

“Ncithcr does he suffcr anything by violcncc, if he suffers anything— for


violence does not touch Eros— ñor does he in acting act [by violente]—-
fbr everyone serves Eros in cverything voluntarily, and whatever one
agrecs to voluntarüy with someone who is wiiling, che laws o f the city say
isju st.” (1 9 6 b 7 -c 3 )

As we have seen, Eros rules over the gods, and the laws are the king o f the
city. Is there a connection between the se two ruler-ruled relationships?
The re is a difficulty, for Eros’s rule is gentle, the rule o f law not necessarily
gentle.
*

“In addition to justice, he pareakes in the greatest portion o f moderation.


T o hold the uppcr hand { kratein] over pleasurcs and desires is agrecd to
be moderación, but [it is agreed] no pleasure is stronger [kreitton] than
Eros; and if they are weaker, chcy would be mastered [kratotto] by Eros,
and he would have che upper hand ( k ratoij, and in mastering [krutón]
pleasurcs and dcsircs Eros would be exccptionally modérate.” ( L 9 6 c 3 -8 )

I trust you see the difficulty o f this argument: uncontrollablc dcsire is mod-
.eration and temperance.
*

“And further, in poinc o f manliness, ‘not even Ares resists’ Eros. For Ares
does not have Eros, but Eros has Ares— [eros] o f Aphrodite— as is the

161
C H A P T E R E [ G H 1

story, and he who has is sironger [kreitton] than him who is had, and in
prevailing [k ra to n j over him who is more manly than anyone else, he
wouJd be thc most manJy o f ali. Now about ihe justice, moderation, and
manliness o f thc god it has been stated, but it is left [to speak about] wís-
dom .’” (1 9 6 c8 -d 5 )

You see che emphasis on thc ordcrly path all thc time. What about this ar-
gument about Eros’s courage o f manliness? This is as weak, I take it, as the
preceding argument: a very great coward o f thc gre atest pliancy could co n ­
trol the bravest very well without being thc bravest. W ith a view to the later
developmcnts o f thc speech, ¡t is important to observe that when he speaks
o f the love o f Ares he says, “E r o s . . . has Ares,” to which he adds, “the eros
o f Aphrodite, as is che story.” Eros is a self-subsisting being; but then the
eros o f Aphrodite is n ot a seif-subsisring being but something in Ares. In
the first case eros is something outside o f Ares and keeps him; in the other
case eros is something in Ares. This will be very important later on. The
word in Greek is sophia, and Agathon adds, “S o , as far as possrble, I must try
to om it nothing.” The account o f Eros’s wisdom will be as complete as
Agathon can makc it. T h e previous accounts were n ot so complete.

“So, as fer as possiblc, I must try to omit nothing. And first, in order that
I too, in turn, may honor our art, as Eryximachus did his own, the god is
so wise a poet as to make another a poet as well; everyone at any race be-
comes a poet, ‘cven if he is un*mu$ic before,’ whomever Eros touches. It
is fitting that wc use this as a witncss to thc cffcct that Eros is a good poet
in general in all poetry that involves music, for whatever one does not have
or does not know, he would neither give co another ñor teach another.”
( 196d 6-c6)

Agathon praises his art, techne, as Eryximachus did his. H e does n ot praise
his muse, as AristopKanes did, which was connected with the fact that in
Aristophanes’ spccch the intellectua! part o f man is played down. Thereforc
he spoke o f the Muse (1 8 9 b 7 ), something inspiring and not radonal as an
art is. Eros is wisc in the first place because he is a poet and one who makes
others poetic. You will see that Agathon does n ot say that eros is indispens­
able for poetry. He does n ot say that all poets be come poets through eros.
O n the contrary: all m en, including all nonpoedc men, becom e poets un-
der the influence o f eros, n ot the other way around. This reminds us o f
Phacdrus’s speech in thc beginning, where Phaedrus made a distinctíon be-
tween those who are by nature best and who are imitated in a lesser way by
those who are inspired by eros. Those who are by nature best are brave.

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A G A C H O N

W hen the greatest cowards whiie in lo ve behave ¡n the presence o f their


beloved like the brave, they are n ot truly brave. T o repeat this point: g a ­
chón does n ot say that eros is indispensable for poetry, but eros may incite
people to becom e poetic.

“And furthermore, who will object, in the case o f the makíng [ p o ie s iíjo f
al! animáis, and deny that chis is the wisdom o f Eros by which ah animáis
come to be and are bom?’ * (1 9 6 e ó -1 9 7 a 3 )

Again he uses the word potesis, which underlies the word poetry and which,
literally, means making, producing. The first form o f producing was poetry
in the ordinary sense; the second is the making o f ah living beings, all ani­
máis. In the wide sense this ineludes man. Eros is effective in generation.
Agathon tacitly exeludes pederasty. There is no com ing in to being, no
emergence o f any living beings prior to eros. You remember, he had said
before there was a rule o f compulsión. There could n ot have been genera­
ción then. In particular, the gods could n ot have com e into being by gener­
ation through parents because eros is the youngest o f the gods. W hat about
the gods then? Were they always, o r if n ot, how did they come into being?
Agathon does not answer this question, for it is only with one god, with
Eros, that he is concerned. Eros was not always, for he is the youngest god.
H e was surely n ot generated by parents. This is n ot surprising because
Phaedrus had said in the beginning that nothing is known o f Eros’s par­
ents, and no one had contested that. You will remember that Agathon said
he agrees with many things that Phaedrus had said but did n ot say with
which. O ne o f them is that eros has no parents.
Every generation by parents presupposes eros, but where does Eros
him selfcom e from? T h at’s the question. And this becomes the question for
the first time here again. It was for a moment the question in Phaedrus’s
speech, when he quoted the verse from Hesiod saying that eros emerged
first together with the earth, and that was superseded by the words o f Par-
menides, in which génesis, com ing into being, produced eros first. Coming
into being was given as the cause o f eros. T h e question comes up again now
o f the cause o f eros. L ct us continué now with the third and final sign o f
Eros's wisdom.

“And in the case o f the craftsmanship o f the ares, don’t we know that o f
whomever this god is the eeacher, he tums out notcworthy and bril-
liant, but whomever Eros does not touch, obscure? Apollo, moreover, dis-
covered archery, medicine, and divinaúon when desire and eros led the
way, so that he too would be a pupil o f Eros. And the Muses o f music, He*

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C H A I* T B R E I G H 1

phacstus o f forging, Athcna o f wcavíng, and Zeus ‘to pilot gods and hu­
man beings.*” (1 9 7 a 3 -b 3 )

Eros is wise, chirdly, in being the ¡nspirer o f {literally by putting his hand
on) the arts. Fame in any art is due to one’s being touched by eros. F or ex-
ample, femé in poetry as distinguished from poetry itself. You see that po-
etry is mentioned twice in two different contexts. T h e emphasis now is on
femé. Agathon mentions only gods who be carne femous in the arts, not
men. These gods became femous in the arts because they were led by desire
and eros; desire and eros are used synonymously. Eros is desire, but no one
cvcr said desire is a god o r goddess. H e mentions five gods and seven arts;
the central art is the musical art. This is intelligible, so that we may better
see the contrast between what he says here about music arts, poetry in par­
ticular, and what he said befbre regarding poetry Poetry, as distinguished
from femé for poetry, does n ot require eros. T h e central god o f the five
gods is Hephaestus. Love for whom makes Hephaestus femous in his art?
Love for his wife, Aphrodite? Hephaestus is also femous for his wife
Aphrodite’s love for Ares. Did Aphrodite and Ares becom e femous as in-
ventors by vircue o f their love? Did they becom e femous as inventors at ali?
There is something new com ing up here which has never occurred before
and that ¡s a new kind o f eros. Eros n ot as erotic desire strictly understood
but as love o f fem é, which will com e out in the immediate sequel. You see
also in passing that, contrary to Aristophanes, Agathon conceives o f eros as
a civilizing forcé; it was eros which inspired the invention o f the arts. Eros is
n ot directed toward that ancient nature, toward that aboriginal State ante-
dating all arts. Eros is in harmony with clvility or civilization.
The last god mentioned was Zeus. Through eros Zeus leamed to rule
gods and men. Zeus rules men too. B u t the cities are ruled by laws. W hat is
the relation between the rule o f Zeus, which in itself goes back to the rule
o f eros, on the one hand, and the rule o f laws, on the other? Zeus rules gods
and m en, but eros rules Zeus. But if Zeus ruled the gods, he rules also Eros.
Did Eros teach Zeus how to rule him, E ros, or is Eros not a god at all? This
would be another way to solve the difficulty.

“ It's from him also that the affeirs o f the gods were arranged when Eros
carne to be among thcm— clearly the eros o f beauty, for there is no eros
for ugliness. Previously, as I said at the beginning, many dreadful things
occurred among the gods, as it is said, on account o f the kingship o f Ne-
cessicy; but once this god was born, from the lovingof the beautiful things
all goods have come to be for gods and men.’” (1 9 7 b 3 -9 )

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A G A T H O N

Since eros taught Zeus to rule gods and m en, there aróse friendship and
peace among the gods. M ust the gods rule men so that there can be peace
among the gods. Are men absorbed into the gods o r vice versa? T h e most
important point here: eros is no longer an absolute, an absolute in the very
simple sense, like a tree. Eros is eros o f— o f beauty. You see also that
Agathon now explícitly grants the truth o f the scories told by H csiod and
Parmenides. But the m ost important point: peace and friendship aróse
among the gods n ot since eros ruled as a king, as was said before, but since
eros carne into being o r sprang fbrth; his kingly rule is coeval with his being.
Eros carne into being o r sprang fbrth— from what or through what? O u t o f
nothing and through nothing? Then he is nothing. And, in a way, this is
true: he is nothing as a self-subsisting being. We have seen some changes:
from Eros as a self-subsisting being, i.e., a god, to eros as an acovity o f the
soul, or as something directed toward— toward the beautiful. As a god
Eros is nothing. B u t he is m ost powerfiilly in the soul, henee he has no hu­
man shape, for instance. As a self-subsisting being Eros is nothing. Yet we
speak o f him as a self-subsisting being. In a way he is a self-subsisting being.
In whích way? H e becom es a self-subsisting being through poetry, through
tragic poetry. For poetry as poetry precedes eros and eros rules Zeus. M ore
simply: the other gods prcsuppose eros, for they have parents. T h eir self-
subsistence breaks down with Eros’s self-subsistence.
Eros is eros o f beauty. M ore precisely— the verbal expression in 1 97b 8,
“from the loving o f the beautiful things*— it is not a being, it is an action.
The loving o f the beautiful— that is eros. Now we have seen that Agathon
uses beautiful, noble— k a lo n — originally only in the sense o f bodily beauty,
and he never applies this word to the virtues. From this it seems that the love
o f bodily beauty is the ground tbr everything good for gods and men. But
this expression, “the loving o f the beautiful things,* has a broader meaning.
I t may also mean the love o f honors. There is a particularly dear passage
regarding this usage in the beginning o f the third book o f Xenophon*s
M etnorabilttij where Xenophon says, “In this book I want to discuss how
Sócrates treated those who were longing for the beautiful things.” But this
means primarily the people who were ambitious, desirous o f honors. Love o f
honor— ambition— is not merely a by-product o f eros, as Phaedrus had said,
but a kind o f eros, the love o f femé. The gods who became femous as artisan
artists were indecd inspired by eros, not by eros for bodily beauty but by eros
for femé; and that is the difference betwcen Hcphaestus, on the one hand,
and Ares and Aphrodite, on the other. The latter loved only bodily beauty, so
that they did not becom e femous as inventors, whereas Hephacstus did.

165
A C A T H O N

fame and I suppose also by othcr eros. W hat is the connection? T h e líe im-
plied in the metaphoric description o f the true effects o f eros, naniely, that
it appeases passíons o f hatred and this kind o f thing, leads to a lie regarding
the effects o f eros. So that it is a kind o f parody o f what poetry does with
eros, i.e., ¡t goes over from the truth regarding eros— if a limited truth, be-
cause one could also question whether eros is simply a peace maker, though
it is this to some extent o f course. This is, 1 think, the meaning o f these two
verses. W hether or n ot they are good as verses is hcre n ot my concern, but
they are meaningful in this speech by the poet.

“It is he who emptics us o f estrangement, filis us with attachment, arrang-


ing for us to come together with one another in ail sores o f gatherings o f
this kind, becoming the leader in festivals, in choruses, in sacrificcs; pro-
viding gentleness, banishing wildness; the loving giver o f amity, no giver
o f enmity; gracious, good; to the wise spectacular, to the gods wonderfuJ
[note the contradistinction o f gods and the wisc); to be cmulated by the
have-nots, to be possessed by the haves; the father o f daintiness, delicacy,
luxury, gracc, dcsirc, longing; caring o f the good, careless o f the bad; in
toil, in fear, in longing, in speech, captain, mariner, cxcellent fellow war-
rior, and savior; ornament [hornos] ofall gods and human beings together
[this implies eros is neither god ñor man], most beauciful and best leader
[ not leader o f an army; for Aristophanes, the alJ-male eros was leader o f an
army], whom every man must follow, hymning him beautifully, partaking
o f the song which he sings, cnchanting the mind o f gods and human be­
ings ” (1 9 7 d l-e 5 )

The thesis developed here is that eros is simply the good. N ot only desire
for the good, it is the good. B u t if this is so, eros— desire— is no desire. This
is another expression o f the absurdity in deifying eros. I f eros is deified he
becomes the good and he is no longer desire. And now the concluding re-
marks:

“Hcre you have it, Phaedrus," he said, “the speech from me: let it be ded-
icated to the god, partly partaking o f playfiilncss, partly o f a measured se-
riousness, to the extent that I am able." (1 9 7 e 6 -8 )

An amusing play with a proper seriousness. H e addresses Phaedrus at the


end, and he had done this before. This is meaningful because Phaedrus
started the whole thing with the remark voiced through Eryximachus, that
the god had never been praised properly by the poets, and what Agathon
now says is, I , Agathon, am the poet who has done what according to you
n o poet has ever done, namcly to praise eros properly. I have done my ut-

167
C H A P T B R B I 6 H T

most, he says. Pausanias, for example, had only said, I did whac I could im­
provise; and the remarks o f Eryximachus and even o f Aristophanes are aJI
much more rcstrained than this rcmark o f Agachón’s,
I would now like to give a summary o f Agathon’s spcech and thcn wc
may discuss it; T h e starcing point for understanding Agathon’s speech is
the fací that he is a tragic poet. Somehow he represents tragíc poetry, just as
Aristophanes represents comic poctry. But he is not as a tragic poet what
Aristophanes is as a com ic poet. His vanity, his ínsíncerity, his softness and
the to o obvious and to o external beauty o f his speech indícate the lower
level. The delicacy, n ot only o f eros as he describes him, but also o f his own
speech on eros has nothing harsh. T h e souls are the softest o f things. Eros
harmonizes everything. His speech is, as he says at the end, h alf playful, free
from all passion, because eros, as he presents it, does n ot constrain any suf-
fering, in contrast to eros as Aristophanes presented ¡t, where there ¡s pas­
sion because there is suffering in eros.
Agathon’s art is lovclcss; it ¿s n ot inspired by eros and yet is enchanting.
The sound and the rhythm are beautiful. ShaU wc then say that he is a de­
generare tragic poet, an cpigonic tragic poet? Perhaps. This would even be
historieally correct. O ne has only to read Aristotle’s Poetics to get this ¡m-
pression. But Agathon is doser to Sócrates than any other speaker. H e sits
closest to him and he aJone is awake at the end together with Sócrates,
when everyone else is drunk. This applies not only to the face that he can
drink so well but also to his doctrine. It is Agathon who teaches that eros is
eros o f beauty o r the beautiful things. H e does not say, as some o f the car-
lier speakers had said, that eros is lo ve o f beautitul human be íngs, o r lo ve o f
opposites, o r love o f the ancient naturc. H e is in agreement with Sócrates in
saying that eros is love o f the beautiful and he does not recognize anything
superior to eros which is alien to eros.
Secondly, ¡n this brief scntence, when he speaks o f eros’s wisdom, he
says eros i$ universal among the animáis. How sober! H e doesn’t go as far
as Eryximachus, who had said that eros rules everything— even the general
phenomena o f attraction and repulsión are erotic phenomena— ñor does
he limit eros, as Aristophanes had done, to human beings alone. You will
remember, eros as understood by Aristophanes is a mercly human phe-
nomenon.
Thirdly, and this is perhaps the most important point, Agathon is the
only one who raises the question regarding eros him self and n ot only his ef-
fe a s . H e does not say, W hat is eros?, but he comes very cióse to raising this
question. As an epigonic tragic poet he has undergonc the influence ofphi-

168
A G A T H O N

losophy. He cannot take tragedy as seriously as the original tragic poets. But
even in his degeneracy tragedy seems to be superior to comedy. How is this
intelligible? Agathon praises the ares; he is n ot a re bel against the law, the
nom os, the intellect. Comedy, Aristophanean comedy, is such a rebellion.
Agathon is in harmony with civility and civilization, with cosmos. For cros
is also, and above all, love o f fame. Therefore, the positive presentation o f
the Olympian gods. T h e Olympian gods, as the originators o f civilizadon,
are praised, contrary to Aristophanes, where they also come up as origina­
tors o f civilization, but eros is directed against them. Yet Agathon does not
believe in the Olympian gods. H e is the only one who makes the being o f
the god his the me. H e faces this problem, where as the others dismiss it.
Surely the others don’t believe in the Olympian gods, but they don’t face
the problem. His thesis is that Eros is the youngest god and yet has no par-
ents. H e makes the question o f his origins more clearly felt.
Eros, as presen ted by him, has no human shape, though he speaks o f his
bodily beauty more than anyone else. Eros is nothing sclf-subsisting: Eros
is era n ; Love is loving. He is the youngest god. T h e Olympian gods cannot
have been generated because they antedate eros. The Olympian gods carne
into being out o f nothing and through nothing, if they are taken as they
present themscIves. But they were made, they do have an origin. By whom?
Answer: by the makers, the poets, the tragic poets. They are the makers o f
the gods o f human shape. They deify what in itself is n ot divine. They cré­
ate the gods. Why? Because they are inspired by love o f beauty. They ideal -
ize man, as wc say. They do this out o f love o f beauty— the human beauty
which they see does n ot satisfy them— and in doing so they raise the stature
o f man. They visualize something which looks likc man but which is dcath-
less and free ffom any other defect. They create the gods because they are
inspired by love o f beauty. They are the truc founders o f civility insofar as
they are solemn. The solemnity o f tragedy is higher than comedy, which is
a rebellion against the gods, an attempt to undo what the tragic poets did.
Tragedy is higher than comedy provided the tragic poet knows what he
is doing, provided he himself is free irom the spell which he ere ates, and
Agathon is obviously free trom that spell. The tragic poet establishes the
beauciful delusion, che salutary delusion, which the com ic poet destroys.
B u t this superiority o f tragedy is n ot simply true. At the end we shall find a
remark to this effect. Both tragedy and comedy are cqually necessary. I f
tragic poetry ene han ts, comic poetry disenchants. Wc don’t have to go
back to Aristophanes; think only o f D on Q uixote, the whole splendor o f
knight-errantry. Cervantes raises the low, practical, commonsensical ques-

169
C II A P T E R B I G H 1

tion: did the knights not have olean shirts with them on their trips? This is
ncver mentioned in the books on knight-errantry. Disenchanting, but true.
This question must be raised.
Comedy is essentially commonsensical and prosaic, in spite o f the
verses. There is a fragment o f Heraditus o f which one cannot help thinking
in this connection. There is one thing and only one thing which is wisc,
which wishes and does n ot wish to be called Zeus, i.e., to be seen ¿n human
shape. Ic wishes to be seen, to be called Zeus— tragedy; it does n ot wish to
be called Zeus— comedy, which destroys that. Tragedy, then, is not simply
superior to comedy. This superiority in the Symposium is due to the partic­
ular situation in the Symposium.
I will mention one or two points: The Symposium is, among other
things, Plato's reply to Aristophanes, as I have said before. Aristophanes
had attacked Sócrates and Euripides in the same breath, and Eurípides in
his turn was connected with Agathon. But why was there a sympathy be-
tween Sócrates and Euripides, i.e., tragedy, in the íirst place? In other
words, what is the principie behind the antagonism, the obvious and mani-
fest antagonism between Sócrates and Aristophanes which led Aristoph­
anes to attack Sócrates? The philosopher is n ot a tragic figure from the
classical point o f view, but a cómica! figure necessarily, because he must ap*
pear comical to the nonphilosophers. From the very begínning, in the story
o f Thales, the first philosopher, he feU into a pit because he looked at the
stars; this is surely comical. Concerned with the highest he is Ibolish as no
ordinary human being would be. The philosopher is a comic and n ot a
tragic figure, and therefore he can be presented only in comedy. In the
comedy he is necessarily presented from the point o f view o f the common
opinions, i.e., as ridiculous. Comedy is able and compelled, i f it takes a suf-
ficiendy large view o f its fieíd, to attack philosophy. Comedy muse present
itself as antiphilosophic if it makes full use o f its possibilities. Tragedy can
never do that. Comedy has to do with the ridiculous in opposition to the
serious o r the solemn. In fact, tragedy and comedy present both, the ridicu­
lous and the solemn, but in different ways. Comedy presents the serious be-
neath the ridiculous. W hat meets the eye is the ridiculous. Tragedy, on the
other hand, presents the ridiculous beneath the serious. The first impres-
sion is the solemn and serious, the dignified. Philosophy, however, must
present itself, because it is the most serious, as dignified, if it is to fulfill its
function and n ot destroy itself. This much for the speech o f Agathon and
the most obvious suggestions which it leads to.
Before we get co Sócrates’ speech, are there any questions?

170
A G A T H O N

Listener: I am not sure what Agathon says. At one point he seems to say
eros is the good, at another point he says it is lo ve o f fame.
M r Strauss: One must always start from the mo$t massive and obvious.
First he says eros is the youngest. But even before that he says how eros
himself is, as distinguished from its eftects. Therefbre, whereas in the for-
mer speeches it could legitimately be doubted whether eros i$ a self-
subsisting being o r something which is only in other things, in Agathon’s
speech this can no longer be doubted. I t must be come the them e. H e de-
scribes first, at great length, eros as a self-subsisting being. T h en , precisely
for this reason, the reduction o f eros as love to the acts o f loving shows the
difficulty. The fact that he is the first to speak o f eros himself means that he
is the first to raise the question almost explicitly whether eros is a self-sub*
sisting being. This is, I think, the crucial point, and one must connect this
with the fact that he is a tragic poet. Aristophanes docsn’t even suggest that
eros is a self*$ub$isting being, H e conce ived o f eros as rebelÜon against the
Olympian gods. In Agathon there is a perfect harmony between eros and
the Olympian gods. T h e Olympian gods, inspired by eros, by love o f fame,
are the originators o f civilization. How can this be understood? I f tragedy,
by creating the gods o f human shape, lays the tbundation for civilization
and therefbre also limits human Ufe, comedy is the rebellion against this
and, therefbre, restores the original freedom. In the center o f che R epu blic,
more o r less, there occurs the simile o f the cave, in which human life is com-
pared to living in a cave, seeing only shadows o f things. O f what do men see
shadows in the cave? In the first place, one can show that the cave is also the
polis, and this is especiaJíy important in our connection. They see the shad­
ows o f artifacts, imitating living beings which are carried around the cave.
These are the visible gods, created by artisans. This limits the polis, there -
fore it also makes possible the polis and yet, at the same time, keeps the
polis from seeing the truth. Therefbre, the men who le ave the cave, the
philosophers, never see these shadows. This is perhaps the most striking
parallel to what I suggested here, to which Agathon comes very cióse in his
own speech.
T o repeat: Tragedy and comedy are from Plato’s point o f view equally
necessary and equally problematic. He has indicated in the dearest possible
way how problematic they are in the R epubltc, in the famous criticism o f
poetry in the second and third book and, to some extent, also in the tenth
book. B u t this i$ really only the crudest polidcal expression o f what Plato
thinks about poetry. His serious views are, o f course, much more favorable
to poetry and, therefbre, also more particularly to tragedy and comedy.

171
C H A P T t R E I G H 1

One could show this, perhaps, in the Law s, a political work, very clearly,
that, while it is true that poetry is in need o f política! supervisión, censor-
ship— Plato was n ot a liberal— he knew very well that from ano the r point
o f view the poet is the te ache r o f the legislators. The legislator has to learn
to understand men by studying the poet. Otherwisc he wtII be a very poor
legislator. In spite o f that, the legislator must judge on the basis o f his own
responsibility which poetry may or may n ot be publicly used. There is no
contradiction there. There is a tensión between the two things, but Plato
admits this tensión in this or that form throughout his work.
Ltstener: Why is it so easy to recognize what is comical in Aristophanes’
speech and so difficult to recognize what is tragic in Agathon’s speech?
Mr. Strauss: There is nothing tragic about it, I believe. O n the contrary,
I would say that Aristophanes’ speech shows both the comic and tragic ele-
ments in eros. That is the greatness o f Aristophanes. The com ic element is
obvious. I f you take part o f his argumein Üterally and think it through, you
arrive at the conclusión that all love is unhappy. This is, obviously, somc-
thing that is both comic and tragic.
Ltstener: Why didn’t he have a tragic poet trying to show both? Would
the pie ture have been the same even if he had been great enough to show
both?
Mr. Strauss: A great tragic poet might not have been willing to bring in
this great element o f playfulness o f which Agathon boasts. I f Plato found
the most fertile setting was a Sympostum after Agathon’s winning the con­
test, he could not very well bring in Eurípides, tor example, instead o f
Agathon. These defectivc things, imposed on a man by chance, present also
very great opportunities. The overly swect in Agathon’s speech is very help-
ful in Sócrates’ speech later on.
[Tape change.] . . . and then the polis arises as somehow above these
things. That’s not the doing o f the philosopher, that is human nature. The
philosopher tries only to understand that, perhaps to impro ve it to the ex­
tern to which it can be impro ved. That there be tragedy and comedy is a de-
mand o f the nature o f man. I f this were simply a Greek phenom enon, Plato
would simply show that the Greeks were in this respect a particularly lucky
peoplc. B u t you know that this is n ot simply true.
The fact that Aristophanes is a much more powerful individual and his
speech much deeper and richer than anyone else’s speech, I take for
granted. O n the other hand, from Sócrates’ point o f view it is the most
wrong, because it gocs in the felse direction most passionately. I use this
hesitant language partly because I d o n ot want to anucipate a very blg sur*

172
A G A T H O N

prise which comes later. Agathon is n ot as right as he would seem to be


up to this point, and Aristophanes got a very important point to which
Agathon is blind, and which Sócrates knows but will refrain from pointing
o u t in this dialogue. Therefore, when Sócrates is through, Aristophanes
wants to speak and is prevented by the m ost unfair means, by the chairman,
so to speak.
Love o f the beautiful is Agathon’s principie. There is an entirely differ-
ent kind o f love from that which Aristophanes had in mind, and that is the
love o f o n c’s own. T h e love o f the beautiful, which is so ímperfecdy ex-
pressed by Agathon, though externaliy wonderful, is truly expressed by
Sócrates. But Sócrates docs n ot bring out in this dialogue the true cicm ent
in Aristophanes’ speech, and the justification is that the love o f the beauti­
ful is higher from Sócrates’ point o f view than the love o f one’s own. Both
together are the complete phenomenon o f eros and, in a sense, the com ­
plete phenomenon o f man. B u t if you have to abstract, you should abstract
from the lower rather than the higher.

173
9 SOCRATES (1)

When Agathon had spoken, Aristodcmus said cvcryone prcsent ap*


plaudcd loudly, on thc grounds chai thc young man had spokcn in a way
as fitting for himself as for thc god. Then Sócrates said, with a glance at
Eryximachus, “D o I really scem to you, son o f Akoumenos, to have feared
for some time now a fear not to be feared? Did I not manticaliy say what I
was just now saying, that Agathon would speak in an amazing way, and I
would be ataloss?" (198a 1 -7 )

A g a th o n ’$ speech is the only one treated with universal enthusi-


asm. This is, o f course, partly due to the youth and special position o f
Agathon. But, also, tragedy, for which he stands, is the most pleasing, most
pleasing for the demos, for thc multitude. S o Sócrates says, I am defeated in
advanee as a speaker on eros, but my honor as a diviner, a soothsayer, has
been saved. I prcdicted the outeom e. Sócrates here treats eros and sooth-
saying as two entirely different thlngs. The secret o f Sócrates is that, rightly
understood, they are identical, and the word for that is the dnitnonion,
which Sócrates daims to posses and which is both Sócrates’ eroticism and
his divining powcr. In a crude way, you all know that love makes onc keen-
sighted. W hat docs Eryximachus reply?

“ In the one case,'* Eryximachus said, wyou seem to me have spoken man-
tically, in saying, ‘Agathon will speak well’; but in the other, that you
would be ata loss, I don’t believe ic.w(1 9 8 a 8 -1 0 )

Eryximachus says, You did not prophesy that Agathon would speak mar-
ve lously; you said that he would speak well, and this was not difficult to
prophesy. As for your prophecy regarding yourself, I think you are mis-
taken. In other words, Sócrates, you are no good as a soothsayer. Sócrates’
attcm pt to save his honor as a soothsayer, if n ot as a speaker, has failed. Now
let us see how he goes on.

“ But just how, you blcsscd innoccnt,” Sócrates said, “am I not to be at a
loss, both mysclf and anyonc cJse whatsoever, if he is going co speak after
thc speaking o f so bcautiful and varied a spcech? Now aD thc rest was not
equally marvelous, but the things at the end— who would not be thun-
derscruck on hearing the beauty o f the words and phrases? As for mysclf,
on reflecting that I won’t mysclf be ablc to speak anything that is even

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S O C R A T E S il)

closc to it, I almost ran o ff and disappeared ouc o f shamc i f l knew o f any
place to go. The speech even reminded me o f Gorgias, so thac I simply ex-
pcricnced thc remark o f Homer. I was afraid that Agathon would finally in
his speech send in the head o f Gorgias— an uncanny speaker— against my
spccch, and makc me mysclf a stone in voicelessness.” (1 9 8 b l-c 5 )

L et us see. Sócrates says, I am truly embarrassed; no one can possibly com ­


pete with Agathon, Al] o f you, including Eryximachus, have been sur-
passed. Except, o f course, Gorgias himself, the teacher o f Agathon. I f you
would look up H om er you would see n ot the head o f Gorgias, o f course,
but the head o f the Gorgon. W ho is in that position in the Odyssey?
Odysscus. Sócrates tacitly compares hlmself here to Odysseus in Hades.
This, incidentally, shows also the connection between the Symposium and
the P rotagoras. In the P rotag ow s Sócrates presents himself as another
Odysseus; he has gone down to Hades, only now the illustrious shades are
the living sophists. Sócrates compares himself to an Odysseus trapped in
Hades by a promise. This wil1 com e out in the immediate sequel. An
Odyssean proble m— trapped by an oath. How can he get out?
“And then I realized that I was, after a!J> ridiculous when I carne to an
agreement with you that I would praise Eros along with you in my tum
and said that I was skiiled [uncanny] in erotic things, knowíng nothing o f
thc matter, as it turned out, how onc should praise anything whaesoever.
For I, in my siliiness, believed thac one had co tcll che truth about each
thing that was being praised, and this was the starring point, and on this
very basis we should select the most beautiíul things and arrange them as
fittingly as possiblc. And I was very gready proud, on che assumpdon that
I would speak wel1, since I knew che truch about praising anything.”
(1 9 8 c5 -d 7 )

W hat is Sócrates’ embarrassment? H e is com m itted to making a speech and


now he can’t do it. In the fbrmer interlude it was because he is such a poor
speaker compared to the others. Now he has a slighdy difierent versión. He
made his promise honesdy. But since he was siliy, he did n ot understand the
terms o f the promise. All the others understood the terms o f the promise
and kept thc promise. In the context this means that he criticizcs no longer
merely Agathon but all previous speakers. Sócrates thought that praise
must be truc, whereas the others believed that praise may be entirely untrue
and they acted on that belief. All the others were liars and he is the only
honest man.
Sócrates believed that a praise must be true. What does this mean here?
H e gives his own interpretation. Praise must consist in selecting the most

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C H A P T E R N I N K

bcautiful things out o f che crue qualities o f the thing to be praised. In other
words, he admits that a praise cannot possi bly be true, thac ic demands si-
lence about the seamy síde o f the thing to be praised- I f you make a euiogy
you must say this man is a model o f virtue, though in reality he is a miser:
H e g o t up at four o 'd o c k in the morning, he cxposed himself to the most
terrible disgraces and bore them like a man, he lived on bread and water, he
was the m ost patient man— but you never say a word o f why he did that.
T h en you have said the truth. B u t you have sctected only the m ost beauti-
ful things. What Sócrates says is rcally m ost ironical, o f course, but we draw
one conclusión: Sócrates' praise o f eros will be selectively true; he will speak
only o f the most beautifuJ si de o f eros and n ot o f its seamy side. This fits
very well with something I mentioned before: every Platonic dialogue ab-
stracts from something, and the Sympostum will abstract from important
and essentiaJ elements o f eros. For example, he may abstract from certain
features o f eros which have been mentioned by earlier speakers. We have to
be watchful. Crude insolence in Plato's Sócrates is impossible. In Aristoph-
anes’ Sócrates it is a bit different. H ere he is always weil be haved. As I m en­
tioned before when we discussed irony: irony noticed by the one who is
being ironized is insolence. T ry this expcriment and you will see that this is
true. Irony ¡s a very interesting phcnom enon because its primary inspira-
tion is humanity, o f course. N ot to hurt other people by showing one’s own
supcriority— this is the primary meaning o f irony in che higher sense o f the
word. B u t if this is noticed, if the superior man is indelicatc, stupid in his
irony, then he hurts someone. W e, who have so much time to read this at
leisure, can o f course find out what the people present at the m om ent could
not. They couldn’t rehear it, they couidn’c say, as a student I knew said, re-
peat that sentence you just said and repeat it again. Ordinarily in conversa*
tion one cannot do this. Xenophon aJways tries to suppress the unpleasant
things. W hen he comes to a deser ted town with his expedítion he never says
the town was de serte d; he wiil say it was a big town and will n ot add that it
was inhabitcd. H e will not say that someone is a coward, he will speak o f his
moderation and his skill and om it the rest.
Sócrates says, I know the truth regarding the praise o f things, and that
truth is knowlcdge o f the truth regarding the thing concerned; secondly,
selección o f the most beautiful parts o f it; and thirdly, prescnting them in
the most becom ing manner. This is a good rudimentary statemem ofw hat
a perfcct speaker is. Sócrates claims here, in his perfecc modesty, that he be-
lieves him self a pe rfect orator.

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C H A P T B R NI Nf c

I will n ot speak in your manner, he says, lest I de serve laughter. You see this
is much stronger. N ot because I cannot d o what you d o, but because this is
in itselfridiculous.
“See eo ie, then, Phaedrus, whether you at all necd a spccch o f this kind, to
hear the truth being said about Hros, with the nomenclature and arrangc*
mcnt o f phrascs to be o f wh atever sort it happens to be as it occurs.” He
said Phaedrus and all the rest urged him to speak in whatever way he him-
sd f believed he should speak. ttWcll, then, Phaedrus,” he said, waUow me
still to ask Agathon some smaJl things, in order that with the gain o f an
agreement from him I may then speak on thiscondition.”
“Well, I allow it,” Phaedrus said. “Go ahead and ask." So after this, he
said, Sócrates began from some poinc like chis. (199b2-c2)

Sócrates will n ot begin with a speech, he will begin with a dialogue, with
asking others. He picks Agathon because he is dosest to him, both ¡n space
and in kind. This Socratic rhetoric is essentially dialogic. This is only meant
to prepare the speech, the speech will com e later.
The difference betwccn Sócrates and all the other speakers is made clear
by this interlude. It is greater than the difference among any others o f
them. There is a radical difference regarding the meaning o f rhetoric.
Sócrates is, as you must have seen, a master o f the mi se -en-see nc, o f a cer-
tain theatrical art o f presenting himself. You only have to contrast these re-
marks o f his, these extremcly modest remarks o f his, with the comparatively
weak and conventional protestad ons in the beginning o f even Aristoph­
anes’ speech, where he says, MI will speak in a different way.” How weak this
is compared to this challenge he re. Sócrates shows by deed that he is differ­
ent from all other speakers. We must also see how Aristophanes, his great
antagonista introduced himself. H e introduced him self by his hiccuping.
That was Aristophanes’ apon a, his lack o f a way out. Sócrates’ embarrass-
m ent, on the other hand, was moral. H e had com m itted him self to some-
thing which he couldn’t achieve. But he doesn’t need a physician; he is his
own physician, being, in a way, Odysseus himself.
At this poínt the dialogue with Agathon stares. As a preparación for our
discussion o f Sócrates’ speech I would like to read to you a passage which is
absolutely crucial for the understanding o f Socratic rhetoric or dialccric,
but which is neglected coday because o f the contem pt for Xenophon which
has been so powerful since the last century. Xenophon carne to be regarded
as a rerired colonel, who was chiefly interes ted in dogs and horses and could
n ot possibly have had any understanding o f Sócrates. In the M em orabilta,
book 4 , chapter 6 , paragraphs 1 3 - 1 5 , we get the tbllowing account:

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S O C R A T E S i 1 >

I f someone contradicced Sócrates on any point without being able co make


himself dear, but asserted without proof chat so and so was wiser or an
abler stacesman, or braver or what not than someone else, Sócrates wouid
lcad che wholc discussion back to thc definidon requíred in about this way:
*You say that your feliow is a better citízcn than mine.” “I do.” “Then,
why don't wc lin t considcr the ümetion o f the good citizcn.” Then thcy
cstablish it. By this process o f teading back to thc premise, cvcn his oppo-
nent carne to seo thc truth clearly. That was one way. But when he himself
argued something, then he marched through the most gene rally agreed
upon chings, believing that in this consisted thc safccy o f spcech. Accord-
ingly, whenever he argued, he gained a me asure o f assent from his hearers
greater than any man I have known. He said that Homer gave Odysseus
the credit o f being a safe speaker because he had a way ofleading the dis­
cussion through those things which appcar co be true to human beings.

A word o f interpretador!. T hcre were two kinds o f rhetoric: when Sócrates


talked to contradictors he chose a way which led to the truth; but when he
did n ot talk to contradictors, when he had entirely thc initiadve, he argued
only on thc basis o f accepted premises, in the first place accepted by the
men to whom he talked, and secondly gene rally accepted pre mises. This
second kind o f rhetoric is the Odyssean rhetoric, the rhetoric which H om er
ailegedly ascribed to Odysseus. This is a simple State me nt, simplified bc-
yond what Xenophon him self needed tbr his purposes, but it indio ates the
proble m. What Sócrates does very manifestly in the discussion with Aga-
thon is to argüe o n the basis o f what Agathon agrees upon. T h cre wil1 be
constant reference to the fact o f agreement bcrween them . M en may agree,
and that doesn’t have to be true: universal agreement could claim the truth.
We will have to take up this question next time. The main point you must
kcep in mind is that wc have be en given advancc warrung that Sócrates’
speech on eros will n ot be the simple truth but a selective truth. Sócrates
will select the most beautiful things about eros, and if eros should have a
seamy side, Sócrates wouid not mention it. We cannot take for granted that
our view o f eros and its seamy side is Sócrates' view. We have to watch the
speech very caretully and see whether there is n ot some indication in his dis­
cussion o f something which is omitted.

44And yet (b a i m en), my dear Agathon, 1 thought you led the way into
your speech bcautifuUy, in saying that you first had to show what sort Eros
is, and lacerhis deeds. I akogether admire this beginning.” (1 9 9 c 3 -6 )

T h e first two words o f Sócrates are the same as those with which Aristoph-
anes’ speech begins. These are the only speechcs beginning in this way, and

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C H A P T E R N I N E

this is only a confirmation o f what we all felt, that Aristophanes’ speech ¡s


particularly important. I t is the oppositc o f Sócrates’ speech as far as its thc-
sis is concerned, but almost on the same level. You see also how this begm-
ning— “I aitogether admire”— is also a cautious stacement. H e does not
say that he admired the whole speech.

“So picase, sincc you went through everything etse bcautifully and mag-
nificcntly about what sort Eros is, tell me also this: Is Eros o f the sort as to
be eros o f something orofnothing? I am not asking whecher he is o f some
mother or father*^ che question whether Eros is eros o f a mother or a fa-
cher would be ridiculous— but just as would be che case wcre I asking
about this very thing ‘father’: ‘Is a father a father o f someone or not?’ You
would surely have cold me, if you wanced to answer bcautifully, kYes, the
father is father o f a son or daughter.’ Or is he not?”
“Yes, o f course,” Agathon said. (1 9 9 c ó -d 8 )

The question here is a fairly simple one: is eros n ot something like father or
m other, i.e., something which is essentially o f something. Is eros n ot essen-
tially rclative, ¡n this sense o f the word relative. For example, “tree.” Trec is
n ot essentially of. I t is accidental that it is thc trec o f Mr. Sm ith. The tree as
trec is a tree. But father is essentially related to a son o r a daughter. Is eros
n ot something o f this kind?
In passing, as a joke, he says, I d o n 't mean that eros is eros o f a father or
a mother, o r the eros o f a father for his daughter, o r a m other fbr her son.
This is not quite uninteresting bccause it has something to do with thc
problem o f inccst. W hat Sócrates implies here is that incestuous eros does
not exist. This is a grcat the me in Aristophanes, where thc problem o f incest
is brought up, also in connection with Sócrates’ teaching, in the CÁoudsy
where Sócrates is accused o f teaching his pupils to beat their fathers. This is
a simple proposition, which follows in strict logic from the principie that
the only tide co rule is wisdom. T hen, o f course, the wisc son is by nature
the ruler o f his unwise father. But ruling may inelude compulsión and this
may inelude beating. Thus, it follows that the son may beat his father, This
seems to be a perfcctly innoccnt thesis, but when thc pupil gocs on to say he
may also beat his m other; then the pupil’s father is shocked. The indication
in thc conte xt, which I cannot now develop, is the whole problem o f incest.
H ere, Sócrates seems to say that incestuous eros simply does n ot exist. In
thc immediate sequel he gives another example.

“Isn’t that also the case fbr the mother?” This too was agrccd. “Wcll,
then,” Sócrates said, “answer a little bit more, in order that you may un-

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C H A F T E R N I N E

“And ycc for all o f that, Agathon," he said, “you spoke bcautifully. But
speak stil! o f a small poine. D on’t you thínk that the good things are also
beautiful?"
“Yes, I d o ” (2 0 1 b 9 -c 3 )

In the contcxt good and noble are ¡nterchangeable. B u t they are n ot ínter-
changeable, as the very context shows.

“I f then Eros is in need o f the beautifii) things, and the good things are
beautiful, he would also be in need o f the good things."
“Sócrates," he said, “ I could not contradict you, but lee it be as you
say.”
“N o ," he said, “It is the truth, rather, my dcar Agathon, that you are
unable co contradict, since it is not at aJI difficult to contradict merely
Sócrates." (2 0 1 c 4 -9 )

This is the height o f irony, naturally, tbr it is impossible for Agathon to


contradict Sócrates. H e can easily contradict the unarmed truth. Truth
wouldn’t shout when violated by Agathon’$ State m ent, but he can never
contradict Sócrates. That this is in an ultímate sense true I do n ot deny. In
the dramatic context it is ironical.
Sincc cros can’t be beautiful, he can't be good. But fbr the same reason,
sincc the gods, according to Agathon, are prompted by lo ve o f the beauti-
fiil and therefore iack beauty, they also lack goodness. Love o f the beautiful
equals lack o f beaury; beautiful equals good; therefore that which loves
beauty is charactcrized by absence o f beaury, which equals absence o f good.
T h e gods are also prompted by love o f beauty. This is the end o f the first
part o f Sócrates’ speech, the dialogue between Sócrates and Agathon. I
would like to summarize.
The argument starts from the premise that love cannot be love for the
available, and that can also mean, properly enlargcd, love for one’s own.
First, there cannot be eros for one’s parents, bothers, and sisters; inccsruous
eros is impossible. Second, there cannot be eros for one’s wife, ñor third,
fbr o n c’s polis; fourth, n ot for sexual gratification. The copre se nce o f desire
and satisfaction is impossible. Fífth, only human beings who are n ot beau­
tiful can have eros, if it is true that only the nonbeautiful can love the beau­
tiful. Sixth, the gods are neither beautiful ñor good. Se ven, onc cannot dis-
tinguish between beautiful and ugly, noble and base eros. The latter follows
from the fect that there cannot be eros for sexual gratification, which, after
all, was the phenomenon which made it necessary to distinguish between
noble and base eros. All these points, with the exception o f the statement

182
SO C R A TE S 11)

regarding the gods, offer a perfect justification for Sócrates’ eros. Sócrates
is n ot Interested in incestuous eros, n ot in eros for his wife, n ot for his p o­
lis, n ot for sexual gratification; that only human beings who are n ot beauti-
ful can have eros suits him excellently, and that one cannot distinguish
between noble and base eros. So much for the dialogue with Agathon.
A t this point begins the high point o f the Sytnposium, the conversation
between Sócrates and Diotima. For the better understanding, I would like
to make a prefatory remark which I hope I can prove when wc go on. The
whole speech o f Sócrates, which is, after all, that toward which we have
been building, consists o f the following parts: (1 ) the introduction, the dis-
cussion o f Sócrates’ rhetoric; (2 ) Sócrates and Agathon, the dialogue which
we have scen and which culminates in the assertion that eros is neither
beautiful ñor good, which ineludes, in this context, that the gods are nei­
ther beautiful ñor good. Then we g ct (3 ) the dialogue with Diotima. This
dialogue is subdivided into three parts [later referred to as IIIA , IIIB , and
IIIC ]. The first part stops at 2 0 4 c 7 ; the second part stops at 2 0 7 a 4 ; and the
third part at the end o f it. T h e third part is again subdivided into three parts
[IIIC 1 e tc.]. The interesting point is this: ifyou count the parts which are
no longer divisible you get seven parts, i.e., as many parts as the whole dia­
logue possesses. The real question would be whether there is somc real cor-
rcspondence between the seven parts o f Sócrates’ speech and the seven
speeches. The first part o f Sócrates’ speech deais with rhetoric; the first
speaker is Phaedrus, the interlocutor in the dialogue on rhetoric.
In my opinión Sócrates clearly abstracted from lovc o f one’s own. This
would make sense under one condition: A true speech o f praise must con­
céntrate on the most noble and beautiful and disregard the less noble. Now,
¡ f love o f one’s own is less noble than love o f the beautiful, he would at least
have the merit o f consistency. The question is, is this a sensible proposition,
that love o f one’s own is lower than love o f the beautiful? Is it an intelligible
thesis? Love o f one’s own we see constandy around u$. A m other loving her
child, etc. Is it possible to see this love as inferior to love o f the beautiful? I
do not mean cutdng oneself o ff from the love o f one’s own, but simply to
State that it is subordínate to something higher which docs n ot have that re-
lation to one’s own. There is one thing one can say: if there is such a thing
as philosophy, o r love o f truth, it is more akin to the love o f the beautiful
than to the love o f one’s own. In the realm o f speech on general matters,
the love o f one’s own leads to ideology; the love o f the bcautifiií leads to the
truth. I f the fundamental fact is love o f one’s own, one absolutizes one’s
own and one sceks reasons for it. This is ideology, if one can use this abom ­

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C H A P T E R M I N E

inable word, whcreas love o f truth is n ot primarily concerned with one’s


own. S o it docs make some sensc. Surcly this has nothing to d o with the ar-
gument here, the argument ís adapted entirely to what Agathon can digest
o r not digest at the m om ent. Surcly the analysis is ¡n no way com plete, be-
cause Plato o r Sócrates has a certain o b ject in mind which will gradually be-
come clear.
[In answer to a quesdon:] Can there be love for the ugly? I f love is only
love o f the beautiful, there cannot be love for the ugly, but there can very
well be love for the ugly which is one’s own. Love o f one’s own is compat­
ible with love o f the ugly.
lÁ sttner; Love o f one’s own is somehow identical with love o f the beau-
tiftil from the point o f view o f the subje ct, because it is my cros and I want
to make this o b ject mine.
Mr. Strauss: L et me State it a little more prccisely: I love the beautífiil, I
want to own the beautiful. Still, it is important that it is the beautiful you
want to own, There are three elements in volved, as will appear latcr: (a ) I,
as the tover, (b ) the beautiful beloved, and (c) its perpetual possession,
which will be the the me o f the central part. L et us then turn to the Diotima
sectíon.

“And I shall let you go for now; but the logos about Eros, which I once
hcard from Diotima, a Mancinean woman . . . “ (2 0 1 d l- 2 )

H erc the dialogue ends and Sócrates’s speech, the logos, begins. W hat was
said before? H e would give a speech after the dialogue. But we are in for a
great disappointmcnt. Sócrates’ speech does n ot begin, it is the speech o f
som eonc el se. This is strange. Sócrates reaíly breaks his promises, we must
say. As the ñame Diotim a indicates— from Dio~> genitive o f Zeus (D ios),
and tim a, honoring, and M antinea, the ñame o f a town, reminding o f
m antis, soothsayer— she is a prophetess. We have seen in our simple
schema o f the six speeches, Agathon and Sócrates are ¡nspired speakers. But
n o , Diotim a is the inspired speaker, Sócrates merely transmi ts what he has
heard from an inspired speaker. In addition, this tnspired speaker has the
strange quality o f being a woman. This contrasts with the all-male society.
You rcmember in the beginning there was a woman, the flute player, and
she was thrown out— and now she comes back. In addition, she is a fbreign
woman, which makes it worse. This contrasts with the fact the we have here
an all-Athenian society. There is a parallel to that in Plato elsewhere, in the
small dialogue called M enexenus. There, Sócrates reports a conversadon he
has had with a foreign woman, But this was n ot a prophetess from M ano-

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S O C R A T E S ( 1 )

nea but the famous Aspasia, che quasi m¡stress o f Pendes. The contcxt is
particularly comicaJ, because the question is a funeral speech which is to be
given, and Sócrates gíves the sketch o f a funeral speech for the Athenian
falten which had been sketched by the foreign woman Aspasia, with the im­
plicación chac this funeral speech by a foreign woman was superior cven to
the famous funeral speech o f Pe rieles himself. Now, she comes (rom Manti-
nea, which is from the región o f Arcadia. The Arcadians were punished by
the Spartans, you may remember, and were reduced to village life, to a
primitive form o f life. What does he say? Diotima was wise in these things
and in many others.

“. . . who was wise in these things and many others, and once when the
Athenians cónsulted her on sacrificing, ten years before the plague, she
made adelayofthe disease." (2 0 1 d 2 -5 )

There is a parallel to that: there was a similar story about another prophetic
human being, Epimenides o f Crete, told in the first book o f Plato’s L a m .
Epimenides o f Crete was also a foreign soothsayer who had helped Athens
in a critical situation prior to the Persian war. The Cretans were famous, as
Plato indicates in the Laws, for pederasty, and Arcadia was a ncighbor o f
Elis, the country menrioned by Pausanias as particularly dissolute in this re-
spect. Diotim a was Sócrates’ teacher in erotic things. In other words, S ó c­
rates was young when he had this conversatíon. I f the plague referred to is
that o f 4 3 0 , o f which Pendes was the most famous victim, the dialogue
muse have taken place in 4 4 0 , if n ot earlier, when Sócrates was reladvely
young, thirty o r younger.

44It was she who taught also me the erotic things. So I will try co recount
to you the speech she spoke, as far as I am able, on the basis o f what has
been agreed upon by Agathon and me. So, Agachón, one muse account
for Eros himself in just the manner you explained, first, who is he and o f
what sort, and then his deeds.” (2 0 1 d 5 -e 2 )

It is n ot a question o f essence, but what kind o ía guy he is. One dialogue—


if I remember well, the Euthydcm us— begins with Grito asking Sócrates a
question, uW ho was it?”; that is the difference between the curious man
and the philosophic man. The question as stated here is n ot the philosophic
question W hat is eros? but W ho is eros?

alt seems to be easiese, in fact, to give an account in just the way the
stranger [female ] once went through it in quizzing me. I too was saying to
her pretty ncarly the sores o f things that Agachón just now was eelling me.

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CH A P T E R N'IHE

in saying that tr o s is a great god, and he is o f the beautiiul things. Then


shc proceeded co refute me by those kinds o f speeches by which I refuted
him, províng that he was neither beautiful ñor good according to my ar-
gumertt.* (2 0 1 e 2 -7 )

Diotima was Sócrates’ teacher. This is an extremely rare case, that Sócrates
appears in the role o f a pupíl. There is orüy one other case, and that is the di­
alogue P arm en ides, where Sócrates appears in the role o f a pupil o f Par-
menides. In the beginning o f this course I discusscd the fact that there are
only threc narrated dialogues which are not narrated by Sócrates: P a r -
m enides, P haedo, and the Symposium. The P arm en id es and the P haedo have
one thing in common: they tell us something about the young Sócrates. In
the P arm en ides this is obvious, and in the P h aed o Sócrates him self tells o f
his early youthful attcmpts at philosophy. Now we see that the Symposium,
to o , beiongs to this group, because he re we also have an account o f the
young Sócrates, the Sócrates who had not yet undergone the change to the
Sócrates we know from the Platonic dialogues. This is n ot merely a histori-
cal question, which, as such, would be o f no interest to us; it has great sub­
stantive importance, as we may see. The young Sócrates held m ore o r less
the same view held now by Agathon. Eros ¡s a great god, and eros is lo ve fbr
the beautiful things. His view ¡s n ot identical with that o f Agathon; he did
n ot say that he is the most beautiful and best god, ñor did he say in particu­
lar that eros is the youngest god. In other words, the young Sócrates had
not depreciated the other gods in favor o f eros as Agathon did. Ñ or had
Sócrates said, as Agathon did, that the other gods act from eros o f the beau-
tiAil. Diotima refutes Sócrates o n the basis o f his assertion that he was nei­
ther beautiful ñor good. She does exactly what Sócrates did with Agathon,
all o n the premise granted by the other. In other words, Sócrates has no
originality whatsoever. O ne point I would like to mention: Originally,
Sócrates was a natural philosopher— we have had a specimen o f the pre-
Socratics in Empedocles— until he read a book by Anaxagoras, who said
the cause o f everything is nous. H enee, he expected Anaxagoras to show
that everything was reasonably and beautifully ordered. But Anaxagoras
did n ot make use o f his intellectual principie, and therefore Sócrates threw
it away. In the P arm en ides Sócrates is presented to us as a man who says
there are no ideas o f the ugly. This is still in ac cordan ce with the first step:
mind rules everything, therefore everything is well-ordered, beautifully o r­
dered. And the view which he held o f eros fits beautifully: eros is only lo ve
o f the beautiful. From this point o f view the discovery which transformed

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S O C R A T E S l 1 >

the young Sócrates to the later Sócrates is che discovery o f the ugly, o f thc
recalcitrant.

“And I said, ‘How doyou mean, Diotima? Is Eros then agly and bad?' And
she said, ‘Don’t blaspheme! O rdoyou belicvc chacwhateveris not beauti-
ful is necessarily ugly?’ ‘Yes, o f course.' ‘And if it is not wise, it is ignorant?
O r have you not become aware that there is something between wisdom
and ignorance?’ ‘What is that?’ ‘Don’t you know,’ shc said, ‘that to opine
corrcctly withouc being ablc to give an account is neither to have precise
knowledge— for how wouJd precise knowledge be a matter without an ac*
count [irracional]?-—ñor is it ignorance— for how couid ignorance be the
hitting upon that which is?— but surcly corrcct opinión is o f this sort, be-
twcen understanding [phronesis]and ignorance.’” (2 0 1 e 8 -2 0 2 a 9 )

T h e blasphcmy o f Sócrates he re consists in his absurdity. The first lesson


which Sócrates gets from Diodma is that there is something between the
good and the bad. The example she uses is n ot the beautiful and the ugly
but wisdom and ignorance; that which lies in the middle is correct opinión.
C orreet opinión shares with knowledge the fact that it hits thc mark— the
truth. I t shares with ignorance the quality that it is ignorant ofw h y It is so.
This true Opinión, which is only true opinión, is a very complicatcd prob-
lem. O ne can put it perhaps as follows: According to Plato, man has a nat­
ural capacity, an untrained capacity, for hitting the truth. W ithout that he
couJd n ot be man. This natural capacity for hitting the truth concerns the
fact as distinguíshed from the why. O ne requires techne, conscious consid-
eration, to discover the causes. But there is one great difficulty regarding
this wonderíul thing, true opinión: can true opinión know that it is true
Opinión? How do we check without knowing that an opinión is a true opin­
ión? There is only one criterion: universal agreement. I f all men say it then
it is true, though we don’t know why ic is true. O r, difierentíy stated: Chat
which one cannot consistently question. In other words, what is here called
true Opinión has something to do with what in the R epu bltc, books 6 and 7,
is called confidcnce and trust. You can say that there is in us a natural faith,
but ¡n order to avotd the religious connotation, it is safar to say a natural
confidence, a natural trust. That there are such things as dogs, horses, jus-
tice— all those things we “know.” We know that they are, but we d o not
know why, we d o not know what they mean. B u t such a stratum exists.
H ow does Diotima go on?

“ ‘Well, then, don’c compel what is noe beautiful to be ugly, any more than
what is not good to be bad. So too in thc case o f Eros, since you yourself

187
CHAP T E R NÍNI

agrce that he is noc good any more than he is beautiful, don't any che
more believe that he must be ugly and bad, but something,’ she said, ‘be­
tween the v w o '” ( 2 0 2 b l- 5 )

She adds now that eros is not good. From the fact that he is n ot beautiful it
does n ot follow that he is n ot good. She assumes that Sócrates will take it
for granted that the beautiful ¡s identical with the good, so natural is it to
idendíy these cwo things, but it is also a question. The re is no universal
agreement. In some cases all m en make a distinction between the beautiful
and the good. Therefore, it is n ot truc opinión to say that they are identical.

“ ‘And yet,' l said, ‘it’s agreed upon by all that he is a grcat god.' ‘D o you
mean by all,' she said, ‘thosc who don’t know or also those who know?'
‘No, all inclusively.' And she said with a laugh, ‘And juse how,’ she said,
‘Sócrates, could it be agreed that he was a great god by those who deny
that he is even a god?1” (2 0 2 b 6 -c 2 )

Sócrates rcbels against the conclusión that eros, since he is neither good ñor
beautiful, cannot be a god. For there is universal agreement as to his being
a god. At this point Diotim a laughs, a very rare occurrence in this dialogue.
I t has happencd only in one case hitherto— Aristophanes laughed. She
lacks the solemnity which one wouJd expect from a prophetess. And now
she says something absol utely overwhelming: H e is n ot even a god— not
cven not a great god, but not a god at all. Diotim a said that, n ot Sócrates.

“ ‘Who are they?11 said. ‘You are one,’ she said, ‘and I am one.’ And I said,
‘How,’ I said, ‘do you mean this?' And she said, ‘Easily. Tcll me, don't you
asscrt that all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you daré to deny
that any onc o f the gods is not beautiful and happy?' ‘No, by Zeus, not I,'
I said.” (2 0 2 c 3 -9 )

D o you sec what she does? D o you see what pressure she puts on Sócrates?
“Would you daré to deny . . . ?” That is the first oath occurring in the dia­
logue itself. There was one in the beginning by Apollodorus.

“ ‘And don't you mean that those who possess the good things and the
beautiful things are happy? ' ‘Certainly. ’ ‘But you have agreed that Eros, on
account o f his lack o f good and beautiful things, desires those very things
o f which he is in nccd.' ‘I have agreed.’ ‘How then would he who has no
share in the beautiful and good things be a god?’ ‘In no way, it seems.' ‘Do
you sec then,’ she said, ‘You too hold Eros not to be a god?’ ‘WelJ, what
ehen,' I said, ‘would Eros be? Mortal?' ‘Noc Ln the least.’ ‘Well, what then?’
‘Just as before,' she said, ‘between mortal and immortal.’ ‘Whac's that. Di*

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S O C R A T E S ()>

otima?’ ‘A great daim on, Sócrates. For the daim onion is in its entirery be­
tween god and m o r t a l .( 2 0 2 c l 0 —e l )

Eros is n ot a god because he i$ neither good ñor beautiful. Then she says he
is neither a mortal ñor an ¡mmortal. As beforc, if there are things which are
neither beautiful ñor ugly, then there is something which is in between.
There can also be something between mortal and immortal. Is this pos-
sible, wc have to ask. We can easily see that something is neither beautiful
ñor ugly, but is it true in all cases that there must be something in between?
W hat about numbers? Neither odd ñor even. Can you say o f a number it is
between odd and even? I t wouldn’t work. I t seems that the case o f mortal
and immortal is like the case o f odd and even rather than o f beautiful and
ugly. In other words, Sócrates makes now the logical error opposite that
which he made in the beginning. In the begjnning he denied a mean where
a mean was possi ble. H ere he accepts a mean where a mean is impossible.
Eros is n ot a god but a dem on, he belongs to the demonic world. This is
very interesting with a view to the broad the me o f this dialogue. T h e Sytn-
posium is the only Platonic dialogue which deais with a god. Phaedrus had
said he is the oldest god, Aristophanes had said he is the m ost philanthrop-
¡cal, Agathon had said he is the youngest and the highest god. Diotim a says
that he is n ot a god at all. I f we assume that Sócrates accepted the lesson o f
Diotim a, as I think is dear at the end, we must say that Sócrates did n ot be-
lieve in any o f these gods, i.e., in the gods o f the city, and the refere he was
accused and conde mned, W hcn he was accused, the accuser said, “Sócrates
does n ot respect the gods o f the city, but introduces new d a im o n t a * And
then, in the argument with the accuser M eletus, Sócrates says, “W hat do
you mean to say, that I do n ot believe In the gods o f the city, but that I be-
lieve in other gods?” And thcy said, “N o , you are a simple atheist.” Sócrates
answered, “You say I believe in d a im o n ia , but what are d a im o n ia if n ot ci-
ther gods or children o f gods?* H enee, if he believed in demonic things as
the accuser admitted, he surely believed in the gods and even in the gods o f
the city. This passage is quite interesting, in the A poiojfy 2 6 c , where a cer-
tain notion o f d a im o n is devclopcd.
Still, there is a great difficulty: Diotima had said eros is between the
mortal and the immortal. T h e whole demonic realm is between god and
the mortal. And then Sócrates says, “W ith what power?* This is a very rich
and pregnant statement. T o begin with it is wholly unintelligible how there
could be a being which is neither mortal ñor immortal. I f such a being
should exist it must have a powcr. In Plato’s Sophist ( 2 4 7 D - E ) we find this

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C H A P T E R S I N b

declaration: This and this only truly is which has the powcr to act on some-
thing el se, o r to be actcd upon. O n what docs eros act and by what is eros
acted upon? This question is answered by Diotim a in th c seque!.

w<With what powcr?’ I said. ‘Interpreting and convcying thc things from
human beings to gods, and the things from gods to human beings, che re-
quests and sacri fices o f the latter, and o f the former the injunctions and ex-
changcs for the sacrifices, and being in the middle o f both it filis it up, so
as for the whole itselfco have been bound together by itself.'* (2 0 2 e3 -7 )

Everything demonic is between the mortal and the immortal. In a way, that
¡s truc, not bccausc ¡t itself is mortal o r immortal but because it is thc medi-
ator between the immortal— gods— and the m ortal— men. Therefore it is
the bond o f the whole. The implicadon is that the whole consists only o f
gods, m en, and demons, which can, o f course, n ot be the final truth. Both,
gods and men, need a bond. The demonic realm makes them complete.
N cither gods ñor men are self-sufficient; thc self-sufficiency is created by
the demons. Sincc the demonic afifeets gods and m en, it is. Because what-
cver acts, is. But how d o we know that there is any truth to this assertion
that there are such demonic things? Shc will say it in thc sequel.

**A II d iv in a tí o n m o v e s th r o u g h th is , as w c ll as t h c a r t o f t h c p ric s ts w h o
dea! with sacrifices, mitiacions, incancations, all o f divinadon, and magic.’“
(202c7-203al)

H e re is the cm pineal proof: there are arts o f divi ni ng and thc arts o f the
priests. Thcse are two difierent facets o f some importante.

aiGod does not mingle with human being, but through this there is the
entire associadon and conversación thae gods have wich human beings,
both aslccp and awakc.'” (203a 1 -4 )

God does n ot mingle with m en, and that ineludes also sexual relations.
There are no sexual relations between gods and m en— quite an assertion.
That means there are no heroes, generated by an immortal father and a
mortal m other o r vice versa, In this connection I ask you to look up the
A pology o f Sócrates ( 2 7 á ) where this question is discussed.

WiAnd he who is wise in things ofthis sort is a demonic man [daim m ios],
but he who is wise in anything clse, whether it be about arts or some hand-
¡crafts, is vulgar [banausos].}*( 203a4-6)

She speaks here only o f intercourse, o r dialogue, o f gods toward men. The
intercourse Icading from gods to men as distinguished from thc one lead-

190
S O C R A T E S ( I )

ing from mcn to gods. This intercourse requires a demonic man, a man
possessing the mande faculty as distinguished from the art o f the priest. You
$ce aJso that she speaks o f a demonic man— malc. Ts there no place for de-
m onic women? Strange. She, who should know, seems to speak only o f de­
m onic men.

MThe$e daimottesarc many and o f all sores, and Eros too is one o f them.'
‘And who is his father,' I said, ‘and who the mochcr?** (203a6-8)

Ero$ is a dem on, not a god. The distincuon between demon and god as two
distinct classes o f beings seems to be o f Platonic origin. As a dem on, Eros is
a mediator betwecn men and gods. There are said to be o f course many me-
diators, Eros being one o f them , yet it is n ot wrong to say that the mediator
is Eros. And Krüger, to whose book 1 have previously referred, makes the
remark that this is really the difference between Chrisdanity and Plato; the
mediator is not Christ, it is Eros.
As a dem on, Eros is not blessed o r happy. Eros is, but he was n ot always,
How do we know? That is n ot said. He is a living being, gods and demons
being living beings. Now, since he was n ot always, and is a living being, he
must have parents. This is Sócrates’ conclusión, Diotima did n ot say that.
H itherto, Phaedrus's contention that eros has no parents was never con-
tested. Now it is denied: Eros does have parents. O ne thing is dear on the
basis o f Diotima’s premise: Eros can not have one divine parent and one
human parent, since gods and mcn d o n ot mingle. Could Eros n ot have
sprung from one parent only? Pausanias spoke o f the noble Aphroditc, who
has only one parent, a male parent. Sócrates tacitly denies this. In this re-
spect he is rationalistic. I f he is a living being who has com e into being he
must have two parents. Diotim a says it would be to o long to nárrate, nev-
ertheiess I will tell you. She does n ot nárrate but only tell. The brief account
in the sequel is the only part o f the whole Sytnposium, with the possible ex-
ception o f Aristophanes’ speech, which one could cali a myth. There is an
infinite literature on the Platonic myth. They all suffer, as far as I know, and
I don’t know al1 o f them , from the fect that the scholar himseif decides what
is a myth, a m ost unscholarly procedure. One has to find out from Plato
what a myth is. In other words, I would regard only that as a myth o f which
Plato o r his characters say it is a myth. Howevcr this may be, in a loosc way
we can say that the génesis o f a dem on is in Plato a mythical statement. Pre-
cisely because this is so glaringly mythical, we see, when reading Diotim a’s
speech as a whole, how amazingly unmythical it is. I t is really a Socratic di­
alogue, but with the strange inversión that Sócrates is on the recciving end.

191
C H A P T t R N 1 N I'

“ ‘It is rather long to narrare/ she said, ‘but I shall cell you. When
Aphrodite was born, both al1 thc othcr gods and Resourcc, the son o f
Meds, werc hoíding a fcast. When they had dincd, Poverry carne to beg—
it was a festival after all— and shc hung around the door/" ( 2 0 3 b l- 5 )

The translación is perhaps not quite clear that Reso urce, o r power simply, is,
o f coursc, a god. That is clearly stated in the Greek. One other thing: There
is only one Aphrodite. Wc had been told that there were two by Pausanias
and Eryximachus. Since there is only one Aphrodite, there is only one Eros.
That is strict logic. There is, however, Aphrodite without Eros, for on the
birthday o f Aphrodite Eros was generated. Aphrodite precedes Eros. This
i$ also a corrcction o f Pausanias. In other words, the dem otion o f Eros leads
to a promotion o f the other gods.

“ ‘Resourcc then got drunk on néctar— there was not yet wine—
(2 0 3 b 5 -6 )

Why does she say there was no wine yet? Although it was in the very olden
times, Eros is not so young as he might seem to be on the basis o f
Agathon’s speech.

. and heavy with it he went into the garden o f Zeus and siept/"
(2 0 3 b 6 -7 )

W hcther Eros is a descendent from Zeus is, to say the least, n ot clear. Poros,
his fother, was the son o f M etis, the first wife o f Zeus, buc o f course we
don’t know whether Zeus was the fether. Eros has some rclation to Zeus
since he was generated in Zeus’s garden. His relation to Zeus is obscure.
This is n ot unimportant; we shall see later what it means.

“ ‘Povcrty then, plotting to gct a child from Resource because o f her own
resorcclcssness, lay down beside him and conccivcd Eros/" ( 2 0 3 b 7 - c l)

Sexual intcrcourse antedates Eros.

“ ‘It's for chis reason that Eros has become the artendant and servant o f
Aphrodite, being born on her birthday and, at the same rime, being by na-
ture a lovcr conccrncd with thc beautiful, is a lovcr o f Aphrodite beca use
she is beautihil. Eros then, because he is thc son o f Resourcc and Povcrty,
has got settlcdin the same sort o f fortune as theirs/" (203c 1 - 4 )

Since Eros was generated on Aphrodite’s birthday, Eros is her compan­


ión— that’s simple. And, since Aphrodite, to o , is beautiful, he is, by nature,
in lo ve with thc beautiful. T h e accident— generated on Aphrodite’s birth-

192
C HA n t R NI N t

becausc his m other is ignorant. This would be the only possi ble term o f
comparison. L ct us sce.

WiFor chis is the way it is. N ot one o f the gods phüosophizes, any more
than he de sires co bccome wisc— for he is— and whoever else is wíse, he
docs not philosophize either. And the ignorant in turn do noc philoso-
phize or desirc to becomc wise. For this is the very thing in which igno*
ranee is hard: not to be bcautiful and good and thoughrful but to sccm to
oncsclf to be sufficicnt. So he who believes he is not in need docs not de*
sirc thac which he believes he does noc need.’" ( 2 0 4 a l-7 )

So the gods are wise, therefore they do n ot philosophize, they d o n ot seek


wisdom. The most radical opponent o f Plato, Nietzsche, taught exactly the
opposite— the gods philosophize. H e regarded this as one o f his grcat in-
novations, which is, one could say, a mythical expression. There cannot be
self-sufficient beings. B u t there may be others al so who are wise. The igno­
rant are sadsfied with their condition. Was Poverty, Eros’s mother, satisfied
with her condition? Did she behave like the ignorant? I f she had been self-
sufficient in the way the ignorant are self-sufficient, Poros would ha ve takcn
the initiative in gencrating Eros. B u t he is a god and, henee, according to
the hypothesis, self-sufficient. Poverty must have been dissatisfied with her
State and n ot ignorant if Eros was to be conceived at all. E ros, I conclude,
resemblcs only his m other and n ot at all his father. You remember, there
was no rclation o f Eros to Zeus, only to Zeus’s garden, ñor was there any
natural re latí on to Aphroditc, but only the accidental one thac he was born
on her birthday. For the understanding o f Eros one need n ot have recourse
to his father, to the gods in general, but recourse to the m other and, per-
haps, something else which wc may provisionally cali the ideas, suffices.
L ct me State the difficulty as fbllows: I f the gods are, they are self-
sufficient, and Eros could n ot have been generated by any one o f them ; if
the gods are n ot self-sufficient, then they are n ot gods, and Eros could also
n ot have been generated by one o f them . U nder no circumstances can Eros
be a child o f a god, o r o f a mortal. W hat is the conclusión? H e must be al-
ways, and this is, ¡ndecd, the premise o f the foilowing argument. In the pre-
sentadon o f Poverty, Eros’s m other wc have an ambiguity: on the one hand
she appears as simple, se If-satisfied Poverty, se If-satisfied ignorance, and on
the other hand she appears as the one who wants to get out o f thac State o f
poverty, out o f that State o f ignorance. Exactly the same ambiguity is tound
in Aristophanes* presentation o f poverty in his play Ploutos. I think Aris-

194
S O C R A T E S ! I )

tophanes’ play ¡s the modcl for this passage herc. This wouJd be one o f thc
greater compíiments which Plato pays to Aristophanes in this pardcuJar
work. In that play, verses 5 5 0 - 5 5 4 , the view that povcrty is $clf-$ati$ficd
beggary ¡s thc view o f the vulgar. But the view that poverty ¡s love o f work,
to get out o f the misery, is the view o f that half-divine Poverty herself. Plato
herc imitates for his own reasons an ambiguity occurring in Aristophanes.
The issue is settled. We know the parents o f Eros by now and he turns to an-
other subject: W ho are these philosophers?

“ ‘Who then, Diotima,' I said, ‘are thosc who philosophize, íf thcy are nei-
ther the wise ñor the ignorant?’ ‘This,' shc said, ‘is by now clcar even to a
child: thosc who are bctwccn thcm both, o f whom Eros would be one.
For wisdom is o f the most beaucifiil things, and Eros is eros about the
bcautiful, and henee it is necessary that Eros be a philosopher, and being a
philosopher to be between wise and ignorant. His birth is the cause o f
this, for he is o f a wise and rcsourccful father, and a not wise and rcsourcc*
less mother.'” (2 0 4 a 7 -b 7 )

H e says his m other i$ not wise, he does n ot say she is ignorant, The philoso­
pher, to o , is n ot wise by definí tion.

“‘Now the nature ofthe daimonion>n\y dear Sócrates, is this.’” (2 0 4 b 7 -8 )

Diotima does n ot answer the question o f Sócrates regarding the philoso-


phers. She turns back to the nature o f eros. Why? Sócrates wa$ satisfied with
her answer regarding the nature o f eros. Why doesn’t she answer Sócrates’
simple question? She knows what philosophy is. Later o n she will give a
long lecture on that. Well, she does not yet know whether Sócrates is fit to
receive that lesson. This she can give only later.
There is another question which I must mention here. The opposites
which are ultimately important are those o f wisdom and ignorance. W hat is
in between? Philosophy. Is right opinión identical with philosophy? Have
there n ot been philosophers who had atrociously paradoxical, untrue opin-
ions? And cannot a man have right opinión and be satisfied with having
only right opinión and n ot care at all for transforming that opinión into
knowledge? Tw o entirely different things are here tacidy treated as identi­
cal. Perhaps Plato means that on the highest levcl they would be identical.
A man who has right opinión o n everything can exist only by virtue o f somc
philosophizing and, on the other hand, the philosopher who is truly a
philosopher is the one who starts from right opinions and does n ot throw
out the right opinions.

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C H A PTER H IÑ E

“ 'But whom you bclkved to be Eros, it’s not a surprising experience that
you undcrwcnt. You believed, as it seems to me in makíng an ¡nfcrcnce
from what you say, that that which is loved is Eros, not that which loves.
It’s for this rcason that Eros appearcd to you to be altogethcr beautiful.
For ¡n face thc lovablc is that which is really beautiful, delicace, perfect, and
blessed; but that which is just loving is with thc different kind o f look
(id e a ] that I described.*” ( 2 0 4 c l - 6 )

According to Diotim a, thc basic error o f Sócrates was that he believed eros
to be che beloved but not the loving. The truth is that eros is not thc
beloved but the loving. This subject is n ot wholly alien to us. Phaedrus said
that the lover is inferior to the beloved— more divine than thc beloved, but
inferior to him. The beloved Achilles was more honored than Patroclus.
Diotim a says the lover is less divine that thc beloved and interior to him.
W hat is the beloved according to her? The beautiful. The beloved is the
truly beautiful, but the lover offers another sight, has another shape. You
see al so the words here “that which is loving* and “that which is loved* are
ncuters, n ot eros or the gods. T h e word which Plato uses here Ln thc end
[id e a ]) is the word from which id ea is derived. At 2 0 4 b 7 he had spoken o f
the nature o f eros. The nature o f eros and the ¡dea o f eros are the same. T o
indicate the paradox one could makc this remark: In a way eros is, for Plato,
nature in the sense in which we commonly mean the word— things come
into being and perish. Eros, we can say, is thc heart o f com ing into being
and perishing. Eros, wc can say, is the nature o f nature, the essence o f na­
ture. This is at least part o f the Platonic argument.
A few words about IIIA . I f one were to insert here, in the argument
betwecn Sócrates and Diotima, Agathon’s thesis, one would arríve at the
conclusión that not only Eros, but all gods who are prompted by love o f
beauty, are not gods. But you see how difficult this is: it is divided bcrwcen
two difFerent pcople. Can you impute to Diotima o r Sócrates what Aga-
thon said? This implication is not brought up in thc conversación between
Sócrates and Diotima. The conclusión she draws is that Eros is n ot a god
but a dem on, a mediator betwecn gods and men, betwecn m or tais and im-
mortals. T o explain this she gives the genealogy o f Eros. Eros descended
from wealth and poverty. This means, Kowever, from a god— the tather—
and a dem on— the mother. Yet, as we have seen, Eros can be perfeedy un-
derstood from his m other'$ side. Eros can be perfeedy understood without
recourse not only to his father but to any o f the gods. All characteristics o f
Eros are tound in his mother. In granó ng that desi re, love, arises from lack,
from poverty ítself, do you n ot need another principie pointing toward full-

196
S O C R A T E S t i )

ness, indicating thc direction which desire, lack, takcs? And is n ot that to-
ward which dcsire movcs higher than the desire and thcrcforc divine? One
can say this: There must be someehing divine, something imraortal, some-
thing unchanging. This condición is sacisfied by the Platonic ideas, what-
ever they may mean. T h e beloved is higher than the loving, than eros, and
the beloved may very well be the ideas. We shall find some evidence for this.
We must keep in mind another difficulty. Poverty and Wealth are com*
pared to wisdom and ignorance. Eros is especiaUy in between wisdom and
ignorance* This State between wisdom and ignorance is described by D io-
tima in two entirely different terms: O n the one hand it is called right opin-
ion. Right opinión is in a way wisdom because it is truc opinión. On the
other hand, it is ignorance because it does n ot know why it is right. The
stage between ignorance and wisdom is also caíied philosophy. At first
glance philosophy and right opinión seem to be two entirely different
things.

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10 SOCRATES (2)

“And I said, ‘That’s all co the good, stranger, foryou are speaking beauti-
fully; but if Eros is o f ihis kind, whac use does he have for human beings?’”
(2 0 4 c 7 -8 )

H e r c begins thc next part (in my schema II1B ). T h e first partdcaJt


with thc nature o f eros, and it said that eros is n ot a god but a demon. Here
Sócrates says “stranger,” the oniy time Sócrates uses this expression. In or-
der to understand these litde things one must consider them , because they
tell us something about ourselves. The simplest explanation for his calling
her stranger is that he is particularly aware o f the fact here. She has evaded
his question and he is bewildered by that.
The utility o f eros, we can say, is the subject o f the rest. B u t there is a
very important subdivisión in this section. T h e distinction is at 2 0 7 a 5 ,
when he says she taught me all these things when she made specches about
erotic things and once upon a time she asked, etc. There is no comparable
incisión anywhere else. L et us begin at 2 0 4 c7 .

utlt is this, Sócrates, that I shall try to tcach you next. Eros is o f this sort
and has come to be in this way, but he is o fth e beautiful things, as you say.
I f someone should ask us, “In what respecc is Eros o f the beautiful things,
Sócrates and Diotima?” It’s more plain in the foliowíng way: He who
loves the beautiful things lovcs. What docs he love?’ And I said, ‘For thcm
to become his.’” (2 0 4 d l- 7 )

Sócrates is satisfied with the account o f Eros’ nature. H e brings up the


question o f Eros’ utility for human beings. Oniy in this section does
Sócrates take che initiative. This will be repeated in the central subdivisión
o f IIIC . This question, howcver, o f Eros’s utility for human beings has
been answered. Eros is a mediator in sacrifices, prayers, and all these things.
Why, then, does the question arise? The superficial re ason is this: The an-
swer was n ot given with a view to Eros in particular, but with regard to all
demons— it was a general answer. Now we shall learn what this medlation
betwecn gods and men means in terms o f Eros. That will be clear in the
sequel. Diotim a is willing to answer this question o f Sócrates, as distin-
guished from the question regarding thc philosophers, in 2 0 4 a , which, as
we have seen last tim e, she evades bccause she does not yet know whether

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C H A P T E R I' f N

and abovc ail there is something connecting thc rwo rcalms. It follows from
the very distinction between ideas and nonideas, thac there are no ideas o f the
connecting link. Now, we have secn that eros connects the unchangeable, the
immortal, with the mortal; the refere thcre cannot be, ¡n thc simplest terms,
an idea o f love, love being essentially in between ideas and nonideas.

“ ‘But the answer,' she said, ‘still longs for thc following question: What
wíll he have whoever gets thc beautiful things?' I saíd 1 was hardly able any
longer to give a ready answer to thi$ question. ‘Well,' she said, ‘if one
should c han ge the question and ask using the good instead o f the beauti*
ful. Come, Sócrates, he who leves the good things loves, what does he
love?’ ‘To bccomc his,’ I said. ‘And what will he have whoever gets the
good things?' ‘I can answer this more rcadiiy,’ I said. ‘He will be happy.'"
(2 0 4 d 8 -e 7 )

T h e subject is changcd from the beautiful to thc good and then thc answer
becom es casy. This implies one crucial thing: that the good is not idéntica!
with thc beautiful.

“ ‘The reason is,’ she said, ‘that by the possession ofgood things the happy
are happy, and there is no longer any need to ask further “And what does
h e w h o w a n ts t o b e h a p p y w a n t ? ," b u t t h e a n s w e r s e e m s t o b e c o m p le te .*
‘You'rc speaking the truth,' I said.” ( 2 0 5 a l- 4 )

Seems to be, she says. Happiness seems to be an answer which does not
need any further question. It seems to be thc end o f man. Wc have herc an
examplc o f what right opinión is. It is right opinión; it is n ot knowledge, for
“it seems.” It is n ot knowledge because ¡t leaves únelear what happiness
consists in. M en divine that they seek happiness, and they have a general
understanding o f what it is and we can crudely say, Happiness is a State o f
contentedness, you want nothing further, and at the same time an enviable
State. Because a m oron, for ex ampie, might be perfcctly conté nt but we
would no longer say he is happy. This all men divine.

“ ‘Now this wanting and this eros, do you believe it is common to all hu­
man beings and everyone wants the good things to be thcirs always, or
how do you say?' ‘In this way,' I said. ‘It is common to all.* ‘Why, then,
Sócrates,' she said, ‘do we deny that all (ove, if, that is, all love the same
things and always, but we say some love and some do not?' ‘I myself also
wonder,’ I said.” (2 0 5 a 5 -b 3 )

We have, then, at least a beginning for a possi ble interpretation. All men al­
ways desire to be happy. This is eros. Eros is n ot desire for the beautiful, as

200
C H A P T E R TEN*

from certain aspeas o f eros, from the seamy side o fe ros. Perhaps this is pre-
pared by com m on sense, which also calis certain forms o f the quest for hap-
piness eros.

- ‘So too in the case oferos. The cntirc dcsirc for the good things and for
being happy is, in general, “the greatest and dcceitful eros for cvcryonc."
But thosc who turn in many different dirccnons toward it, cithcr in terms
o f money making or lovc o f cxcrcisc or philosophy, they are not said to
love and are not callcd lovcrs; but thosc who go along a certain single
species o f it and are in earnest abouc it gec the ñame o f the whole: “eros,*1
“to love," and “lover$.m ‘You run che risk o f speaking che truth,* I said."
( 2 0 5 d l- 9 )

M en who seek their happiness in wealth, o r in strength and health, o r in


wisdom are n ot called lovcrs; but they are lovers bccausc they seek their
own happiness. The central example here is strength o r health. H e re we
have already a clear notion o f one point: the men who find their happiness
in wealth. They, to o , are lovers, but this is a base lo ve. Wc know, then, that
there are base forms o f lo ve, and therefore che distinction between noble
and base love made by Pausanias and Eryximachus is n ot wholly ground*
Icss.
Now the answer o f S ó crates;44You run the risk o f speaking the truth.”
This is the literal translation. But look at the preceding answer; Sócrates
said, “W hat you say is truc.” Why this strange change? It would require a
long and detailed statistical srudy o f the Sympostum and perhaps also o f the
other reported dialogues before one can answer that. One thing on!y is
clear: The Sympostum is a report given by Aristodemus to Apollodorus and
by Apollodorus to his comrade. This report contains Sócrates’ report o f his
conversation with Diotima. Look how complicated it ¡s: Sócrates reports to
Aristodemus, among others, at the symposium; Aristodemus reports to
Apollodorus, and Apollodorus reports to the comrade. W ith the beginning
o f Sócrates’ report o f his conversation with Diotima, all indication that
this report is itsclf reported, namely by Aristodemus o r Apollodorus, is
dropped. This does n ot solve the difficulty I mentioned but it is a condition
to be observed. W hen you read it you get the impression that it is reported
by Sócrates and not further reported, but it is. One could give another cx-
ample to illustrate this difficulty. For example, in 2 0 2 c 5 “And I said, ‘How,’
I said, *do you mean thi$?,n The redundaney would need an explanation
which I am unable to give. This is just one o f many questions which we
leave open.

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S O C R A T E S ( 2 )

L tsten er: It struck me that the threc examplcs o f lo ve Sócrates gives he re


corrcspond to the examples he givcs in h¡s first speech in the P haedru s. This
group scems to constitute a comprehensive list.
Mr. This is doubtless true. You mean one could solvc the diffi-
culty rcgarding love o f health by the fact that it is given in an ascending or-
der. Nevertheless, I believe that Plato, as all writers o f this kind d o, would
apparendy explain it by this simple rcason. B u t the question is also whether
Plato does n ot mean a bit more. Latcr on we will see that this is very mean-
ingful. Love will prove to be immortal possession o f the good. Therefore
the question o f immortality o f your body arises. This is one possibility
which one must consider. You cannot have by nature immortality o f your
body. This explains the eros that you can have can only be o f the body o f
someone gencrated by you.

utAnd still a certain logos is spoken of,1 she said, ‘that says that those,
whocverseek their own half, love . . (2 0 5 d l0 -c l)

You see the interesting thing; this allegedly antedated Aristophanes’ speech
by decades. B u t we know better.

U4. . . but my logos denies that love is either o f a haJf or o f a whole, unless
no doubt, my comrade, ic is ín face good, sincc human beings are willing
to have their fcct and hands cut off, if it seems to them that the ir own are
no good. For each o f them severally does not chcrísh their own, unless
someone calis the good one’s own and o f oneself and the bad whatever is
alien, since ehere is nothing elsc that human beings love than the good. Or
do thcy seem so coyou>’" (2 0 5 e I - 2 06a 1)

All eros is love o f the good, and all desire for the good, however under-
stood, is eros. This is the cxact view. Eros is, therefore, not in particular love
o f one’s h alf o r the whole, because there is no reason to assume that the
other half or the whole as such should be good. Diotima flady contradicts
Aristophanes. There is a joke here. She said at first that the ñame eros is as-
cribed to a pare o f eros, let u$ say to a h alf o f eros. Now she tums from the
error which limits love to half o f love to the error which limits love to love
o f half. I t seems to be a mere joke, but it is more chan that. Love consists o f
two p a ra — o f two halves; one half o f love is love o f the good, the other half
is love o f the half. Namely, as Aristophanes understood it, love o f onc’s
own. Diotim a denies the existe nce o f the latter. B u t it is m ore precise to say
she abstraets. Explicitly she denies that it exists. Yct on what grounds? Men
don’t carc for their own, she says. L ook at the people who have their legs

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C H A P T B R t e n

amputated, their tceth extracted, etc.; they throw away their own if they are
bad. T o dig a little decper, why d o they do it? Because they love to live, be-
cause they love their own life, their own psyche, which means n ot only soul
but also Ufe. I refcr you to L aw s 8 7 3 c , if you think this is n ot a thought
which could have occurred in Plato. M en love themselves and they love the
good things for themselves. They want to appropriate them , to make them
their own. In the passage we have rcad, Diodma says, “unless no doubt, my
comrade, it is in fact good.” I d o n 't know whether the re is another instancc
in dassical Grcek literature where a woman calis a man comrade. I regard it
as possi ble that Sócrates he re, as it were, drops the mask and speaks to
Aristophanes.

“ ‘No, by Zeus, not to me,’ Isaid. ‘Isit rcally the case, chen,' shesaid, ‘that
one is to say so unqualifiedly that human bcings love the good?' ‘Yes,' I
said.” (2 0 6 a 3 -5 )

In the sequel we shall see that it is n ot so simple. The young Sócrates was
simple in believing that men love the good. Now we get an addition.

“ ‘What about this?’ she said. ‘Mustn’t one add also that they love the
good to be thcírs?' ‘One m ustaddit.’ ” (2 0 6 a 6 -8 )

You see “theirs”— 1 want the good for myself. I want to make it my own.
You see the thing is more subde. Sócrates moves away from this self.

wtAnd not only that it be cheirs but also be always theirs?’ ‘One muse add
chis too.’” (2 0 6 a 9 -1 0 )

The re are two addidons made, three points: All men love the good, all men
love the good for themselves, they love to have it always. The center one has
to d o with one’s appropriatíng it, making it one’s own. T h en she summa-
rizes.

“ ‘So eros, in summary,’ she said, kis o f the good being onc’s own fbrever?'
‘You speakmost tnify,’ I said.” ( 2 0 6 a l l - l 3 )

Now we know: eros is love for the sempitemal possession o f the good. That
is the strict and exact definidon o f eros. M ore precise: the sempitemal pos­
session by oncsclf o f the good. These are the three Ítems and we must see
what will happen to them in the futurc.

w‘Since eros is always this,1 she said, ‘in what manner and in what action
would the zeal and ¿ntensicy o f those whopursuc it be called eros? What in
fact is this deed? Can you say?’” ( 2 0 6 b l- 4 )

204
S O C R A T E S ( J i

In o th cr words, Diotima says, you still haven’t answered my question. All


eros is desire fbr scmpitcrnal possession o f the good, however a man may
understand the good; but, in fací, we do n ot cali all men who desirc the
sempiternal possession o f money or o f health lovers. Our oíd question has
n ot yet been answered. Now, what does she say?

‘“ WeU, in that case, Diotima,* I said, ‘I would noc be admiring you fbr
wisdom and be frequently coming to you in order to learn these very
things.' ‘Wcll, I shaJl td l you,' shc said. ‘This [deed] is birth in the beauti-
luí both in terms o f the body and in terms o f the soul.' ‘As to what you
mean,’ I said, ‘thcre is necd o f divination, and I don't understand.’ ‘Wcll,’
she said, ‘I shall speak more plainly. All human beings, Sócrates, are preg-
nant both in terms o f the body and in terms o f the soul, and whenever
they gct to be o fa certain age, our nature desires to give birth.’” (2 0 6 b 5 -
c4)

All human beings are in a sensc women, they all are pregnant. There is then
a nonhuman begetter. This is said by a woman. She will corrcct herself later,
but this ís the way in which she begins. T h e subje ct o f the pregnaney o f all
men will com e up later, perhaps you know from another Platonic dialogue,
about Sócrates being a midwifc, which impües that m en, to o , in a way can
be pregnant. This whole subject is here alluded to. Now we get the answer.

“It is incapablc o f giving birth in the ugly, but in the beautiful. For the in-
tercourse [being together] o f a man and a woman is birth. This matter is
divine and is the dcathlcss in the animal that is mortal, the pregnaney and
the generation. And that which is in the disharmonious cannoc come to
be; the ugly is in disharmony with everything divine, and che beautiful is
harmonious. Beaucy [Kallone] is Fate [Moira] and Eilythuia for genera-
don. It is on account o f this that whenever the pregnant thing draws near
the beautiful, it bccomes cheeríul and in its cheerfolness it dissotves [be-
comes relamed] and gives birth and generates; but whenever it draws near
the ugly, scowling and in pain it coils up and turns away and rolls up and
does not generate, but in Holding on to the embryo it bears it hard. It is
from this so urce that for the one who is pregnant and already swelling the
excitement about the beautiful bccomes ovcrwhclming, on account o f its
releasing the one who has it from great labor pains.’” < 2 0 6 c 4 -e l)

T h e question was this: Lovc is desire for sempiterna! possession by oneself


o f the good, however that good may be understood. Yet, m en, in fact,
mean by love— eros— sexual love, especially o f men and women. H ow can
we understand this? Giving birth is possi ble only in the beautiful, for eros is
every desire for sempiternal possession o f the good. B u t only sexual desire

205
C H A P T 6 R TEN

is called eros. Why? M cn and women are attractcd to one another by


beauty, especially beautiful bloom. M cn think that cros is love o f thc beau-
tifiil. But the attractíon bccwecn the two sexes Icads to sexual unión. In
other words, love comes in only in an intermediate stage. I t seems to cuJ-
minatc in sexual unión. Yct sexual unión itselfis n ot thc end. The end is gív-
ing birth. The latter— gjving birth— and only it, is the divine thing, the
im mor tal within the mortal. We need no extraneous, divine begetter. The
unión o f mortal and mortal does n ot need an extraneous mediator, a de-
m on. T h e immortal is discordant with the ugly. T h e beautifiil is a reñection
o f the immortal in the mortal or, one can also say, the beautiful is only a
means, a de coy, a condi don for sempiternal possession o f the good. The
sempiternal possession o f the good is giving birth to an oflspring.

“ ‘For eros, Sócrates/ shc said, ‘is not o fth e beautiful, as you believe.’ ”
( 2 0 6 e l- 2 )

Now the break with Agathon occurs, if we fbrget for one m om ent that Di-
otima is said to be the speaker. In this section Sócrates rejeets the two no-
tions regarding eros: Eros is love o f onc’s own— Aristophanes’ assertíon;
eros is love o f the beautiful— Agathon'$ assertíon. Eros is not love for the
beautiful; the beautiful is only a transitional stage, a ruse o f nature you
could say.

“ ‘Well, what then?’ ‘O f the gene radon and birth in the beautiful.' ‘Al-
right/Isaid/’ (2 0 6 c 4 -6 )

“Alright" is here, in this connection, a somewhat grudging admission.


Sócrates is somchow disappointed.

“ ‘Indecd ic is/ she said. ‘Why then is it o f generation? Because generation


is always-becoming and deathjess, for a mortal. O n the basis o f what has
been agreed on, it is a necessíty to dcsire immortality along wich good,
provided eros is to be o f thc good being one’s own forever. So ic is a ne-
cessity on thc basis o f this logos that eros is also o f immortality.' ” ( 2 0 6 c 7 -
207a4)

T h at is the end o f this section which I cali IIIB . It i$ the central section o f
the Sócrates-Diotim a conversation, and we see why it deserves to be put in
the center. We have the two alternad ve interpretations regarding love—
íove as love o f one’s own and love as love o f the beautiful— both rejected.
The question which was raised is now answered. T o repeat: Love is love for
the sempiternal possession o f the good. But the only form o f love which we

206
S O C R A T E S { 2 i

P olitics 1 2 6 3 b 9 - l l , if you have any doubt about thc connccdon with


moderación. But the connection with justice is obvious because o f the fam-
iiy, and the polis stands and falls by the prohibítion against incest.
Now let me summarize the central part o f the dialogue with Diotima.
First, ¡t explicitly refutes the contentions o f Aristophanes and Agathon.
Lovc is neither lo ve o f one’s own ñor lo ve o f the beautihil. Eros is one’s de*
sire for sempiternal possession o f the good, but she drops one’s possession.
That means she drops the reference to oneself, to onc’s own. Eros is desi re
for sempiternity o f thc species, and theretore the individ ual’s immortality,
the individual^ good, is fbrgotten. Another more striking feature about
this sección, in contrast to the preceding sección, is the complete silence
about the gods. For example, in the section on poetry— poesis— reference
is made only to human making, no reference to thc gods as makers. T h e di­
vine, the neuter, is mentioned, n ot the gods. I believe there is a connection
between these two fcatures. W ith the rejecdon o f thesc two nouons o f lo ve
and the silence about the gods I can try to explain it, though we have to
wait for a confirmation o f a point trora what foliows. The gods are essen-
tially related to eros. We are speaking now o f the Olympian gods, n ot o f the
cosmic gods o f which Plato speaks elsewhere. T h e gods have been created
by eros and it is only another versión to say the gods have been created by
the poets, or the poets were guided by eros in creating the gods. How? It is
easiest to understand in the case o f eros as lo ve o f the beaudful, why lo ve o f
the beaudful should create thc Olympian gods— éter nal beauty, deathless
youth, something man can never achieve and which he loves. Sempiternal
strength and beauty o f one’s body. B u t what about love o f one’s own? The
love o f one’s own leads to the polis. I t leads first to the famiiy, and th c fam-
Uy cannot exist without the polis. T h e political socicty is, o f coursc, aíways
a closed society. By a closed sociecy I mean one which does n ot inelude the
human race. The universal society would be, striedy speaking, th c commu-
nity o f all human beings. The polis is never that. T h e polis is always some
m en’s own, even i f there are 1 7 0 million. The human race is by nature sem­
piternal, at least as said here; the polis is not by nature sempiternal, it can­
n ot be sempiternal but it wishes to be, and it is, therefore, in need o f gods.
These gods, as the guardians o f the polis, are primarily the guardians o f
ríght. They are the avenging gods. T h e unión o f the beaudful gods and the
avenging gods, which appcars direedy in the mythical presentation, has its
com m on root in eros, but in two difierent manifestations— the lovc o f
one’s own, on the one hand, and the lovc o f the beaudful, on the other.
W ith the provisional de ni al o f love o f one’s own and love o f the beaudful,

209
C H A P T E K T E N

thc basis for these gods is dcstroyed and the question is what will be the
next stcp. Because love o f the beautiful and love o f one’s own will have to
be rcstored. They exi$t and they are the most importan t manifestations o f
love. But the question is what will be thc fate o f the gods in this restoration.
L isten er: Why are they guardians o f the beautiful rather than the good?
Mr. Strauss: What is the good now herc as distinguished from the beau­
tiftil? What quaíity o f thc gods do you have in mind when you speak now o f
thc good?
L isten er: Perfection.
Mr. Strauss: Which perfection?
L isten er: Their immortality, happiness, beaucy.
Mr. Strauss: I think their most outstanding feature, at first glance, apart
from their beaucy, would be their concern wíth right. For example, Zeus is
thc king. W hat does that mean? As he is presented by Hom er, he is a very
superior king who is concerned with right. That H om er questions this is o f
course true; but d o n 't fbrget that it is a gross injustice, H clcn and París,
which underlies the Trojan War. I f you would say the wisdom o f the gods,
then the question is whcther this is truly achicved by the Olympian gods. I f
you take the notion o f gods as the most perfect beings, the question arises,
Can thc re be a pluraiity o f such beings? Thereforc the many monotheistic
remarks occurring in Plato. But, ifw e disregard this great difficulty for onc
m om ent, what is characteristic o f the gods? The mere fact that there is onc
goddess, Athena, singled out with a view to wisdom, Zeus more for his
royal wiliness, shows that this is n ot characteristic o f the gods. But what
stands out in each case is their immortal beauty, and even that is qualified in
the case o f Hephaestus with his limping, and shows that there are other el-
ements there too. These two heterogeneous elements— the sheer beaucy,
which in itsclf has no relación to guardianship o f right, and the other one,
thc concern with avenging, with concern for right, which can lead to an
aspee t o f the gods which is at least n ot emphatically beautiful— I beüevc
that is what he means.
L isten er: Eros understood as the sempiternal possession o f the good
does n ot exhaust eros because it still leaves the problem o f the individual.
D oes generación come under the heading o f the good?
M r Strauss: This is perfectly correct. That is what the good means herc.
We are told to find the answer to our question in the phenomenon o f hu-
man procreation. We have thc elem ent o f immortal ity in the fact o f sem­
piternal procreation. Where do we find thc fact o f thc good? I t must be
implied in there. Mere being. That might be, but I must tell you that this

210
S O C R A T E S ( 2 )

question w¡U be taken up by Diotima in che nexc part o f hcr specch. And in
this part, where the same phenomenon is discussed— procreation— the
good is dropped. Procreación supplics sempiternity. The good is o u t, be-
cause mere being in che narrow sense o f the word is hardiy good. L et us
wair for that.
L isten er: Procreation does n ot only mean the continuance o f a being or
o f the blood, but you could say the good comes in by carrying on a set o f
social valúes, a valué System which a person considere the good.
M r Strauss: May I take issue with the term ‘valué1 you used, this is not
translatable into Plato, and is a misleading term. You mean the good and
noble and just things. N o one every answered the question W hat is a valué?
Is an apple a valué, i f I desirc it? There ¡s really no clanty what a valué means,
whether it is an apple ifdesired o rth e principie why I desire it— say, because
it is healthy, o r pleasant. I think it is reaily a bad word. We can, o f course,
speak o f the valué o f an umbrella, which is an entirely legitímate use o f the
term. B u t to come back to your question and forget what some might cali
the se mande side o f the question, I would say this: The consideraron on
which you insist is absolutely reasonable and is, therefore, also considered
in the next part, in the central section o f the last part o f Diotima’s speech. I
will indica te in what way: Plato always insists that in order to understand
any human phenomenon you must look at the highest and most complete
manifestation o f it. Contrary to the tendeney o f social Science today which
looks mostiy at the poorest manifestauons o f it— it looks at the narrowest,
which can most easily be re produce d for quesdonnaire situations and
things like that. T o take up your question, Plato would say, let us look at
that. H e calis this, in a languagc which is some what metaphoric but at least
as intelligible as the valué terminology, the begetting, the generation in the
souls o f men. In other words, mere procreation will n ot produce the valúes
o f society, as you can easily see; when such a baby is transferred into an en­
tirely difierent society, it will n ot be affected by the valúes o f the society in
which it was generated. The question is, then, the begetting o f notions
which are noble and just in the souls o f men. Very well, Plato says, if you
want to study that, let us look at it on the highest leve!. O n the highest level
¡t does n ot take place by the parents as parents. Parents as parents may not
be the best, though they might be. O n the highest level it is done by the
highest form o f educators. By educators you must n ot think o f Columbia
Teachers College. W hat Plato has in mind is che greatest poets. In other
words, he has in mind, to speak o f the Anglo-Saxon countries, the highest
form o f begetter— Shakespeare. There may be perfect concord among par-

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S 0 C R A 1 F. S { 2 )

for sexual unión, but since sexual unión ¡s by nature dirccted toward gener­
ación it has chat.
L isten er: This passage which begins with the notion that all men are
pregnant, then shifts to the notíon o f procreación but with the earlier use o f
poctry— the ardst brínging fbrth a work o f art. Is this a kind o f begetting
and producing?
M r Strauss: Sócrates and Diotima have a certain malice against the po-
ets, and that will com e out. T o say briefly what wíl! happcn in the seque!: In
A there will be a restoration o f lo ve o f one’s own; in B again love o f onc’s
own, where the beautiful comes in as an indispensable means. This is where
he talks about the poets and he talks again about the mental parallel to bod-
ily begetting, where the purpose o f the whole thing is not beauty but im-
mortality, though it does go through beauty. H om er produces beautiful
children, the lit a d and the Odyssey>in order to becom e immortal. The pro-
duction o f beautiful things is n ot the end, which is a nasty accusation you
can say, but here we are. In the third part, the final part, where he speaks o f
what people would cali philosophy, the love o f the beautiful triumphs.
Sócrates’ whole speech is characterized by the following fact: It begins with
a refutation o fth e assertion that love is love o fth e beautiful and it ends with
an unbelievable re assertion that love is love o f the beautiful. This massive
contradiction is o f course n ot done because Plato had a loose mind, but be-
cause he wanted to do something. H e deliberately abstracted from the two
forms o f love— love o f one’s own and love o f the beautiful— to see what
com es out o f it, a perfectly com m on scíentific procedure, and then he re-
stores them. This has also the following meaning, that eros, which is the
subject, is subjected to a purification, to a catharsis. But what we calJ in the
moral sense purification is, intellectually, an analysis, dividing it into essen-
tial parts and seeing the difference.
L isten er: ln this section there seems to be sometí mes a false disjunction
between love o f the beautiful o r love o f the good versus love o f one’s own.
Perhaps there is a third, what Aristotic calis friendship. I think this has to be
taken into account.
M r. Strauss: Surely. B u t the question is only that what Aristotle under-
stands by friendship is n ot what one primarily means by eros. Aristotle also
mentions the remarkable fact that when people are truly friends they like to
be together. D on ’t underestimate that. This means n ot merely the writing
o f letters, but they themselves, i.e., the ir boches, together. This has nothing
to do with any indeccncies, but it is n ot unimportant that the so-called per­
sonal prescnce is required for the highest fulfillment o f friendship. But

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C H A P T F. R TEN

truly, it is n ot the same as eras as u sed here in this emphatic sense. Can one
speak as easily as one can speak o f passionate eros o f passionate friendship?
I believe that friendship is cooler than eros.
L istcn cr: Supposc you put ¡t in the realm o f eros and speak of, say, what
pcriains between husband and wife, that somehow there seems to be a faJ-
sification o f this reality by reducing it to an eros for the preservation o f the
race.
M r Strauss: That this ¡s true is perfectly clear. This was the question
which has been raised before, n ot only the procreation but also the educa-
non o f the offspring.
L isten cr: It seems to me that there is an essential part o f this relationship
which can be legitimately abstracted from.
Mr. Strauss: That ¡s a very great question and, as all these questions, it
has been treated by the very great minds. In marriage two people o f differ-
cn t sex lead a noble Ufe together which they couid n ot possibly do in any
other way, and yet there is no reference to offspring. Kant, who was very far
removed form Plato and Aristotlc and who was very much concerned with
universally valid fbrmulations, tried to solve this question by his notorious
definition o f marriage— because he was thinking o f this fact o f childless
marriage— and therefore he said, and 1 can only say I am n ot responsible
fbr this definition: marriage is a Ufelong unión for the purpose o f mutual
use o f the genitals. This happens when you try to have a universally valid
formula for a complicated phenomenon which does n ot allow it. Plato and
Aristotlc were wiser. They said we can give a formula for the best, for the
perfect, and we thus imply the various forms o f deficiencics. Therefore I
would say that a childless marriage between the noblest human beings is yet
defective. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that a given marriage,
productivc o f offspring, say twenty-five children, is humanly impossible
compared with such a childless marriage. Yet the essential relation o f the
living together, in the highest sense, is the intention o f nature, the procre­
ation and education o f children. This seems to me the only sensible view
unlcss we say, W ho cares for nature? D on ’t forget that the difference be­
tween men and women is also a bodily difference.
[In answer to a question:] This noble man and this noble woman, where
there is no relation o f the body but only friendship— why should they
marry? Why should they Uve together? This friendship between a man and
a woman may be very high, but it is n ot marriage. Human things are com ­
plicated and according to the Platonic and Aristotelian view the only uni-
versality we can legitimately find in human things is on the level o f per-

214
S O C R A T E S ( a j

fection, n ot on the behavioral level. O n che behavioral level che re is infinite


variety, and if you really think something uiüversally valid, which is true o f
al1 m en, you wil1 find o n reflecoon thac it is true only o f al1 m en who are noc
insane, lnsane men are also human. The universaily valid we cannot find
behaviorally, by which 1 d o n ot mean we should n ot watch human behavior
very carefully, but we should d o it in the proper perspective and with a view
to the normal and perfection.
L isten er: I stül find it difficult to understand why the gods in relation to
the city are products o f the desirc for beauty.
Mr. Strauss: N ot in relation to the city. The gods as beautiful have no re­
lation to the city, they are the product o f the human love o f beauty. This has
no essendal relations to the polis.
L isten er: Why could one n ot argüe that desire for bodily sempitemity
ere ates the beauty?
Mr,: SfrawavThe point is this; one must always consider the essential dif-
ferencc between the unqualifiedly natural human society and qualified nat­
ural association— the polis. L et us see how this question will com e out
when we have made some hcadway. L et us only read the beginning where
we left off.

tt*So ali these things shc used to tcach me, whenever shc talked about
erotic things, and once she asked m e . . .,w (2 0 7 a 5 -6 )

“Once she asked m e.” This is n ot a simple continuation o f the conversa-


tion, which a superficial glance at what follows might lead one to believe,
but a new beginning. The subject is n o longer the naturc o f eros, o r the
works o f eros, but, as appears írom the immediate seque!, the cause o f this
eros and desire. This eros, n ot eros with a capital E, the demon. Eros is used
here synonymously with desire, the re is no longer any personificación.
W hat is the cause o f that? T his, one can say, is the beginning, though only
sketched, o f a philosophic inquiry. T o use the older Greek term , o f a physi-
ological inquiry, which means making reasoned speechcs about nature, not
scientific as people would say today.

215
11 SOCRATES (3)

l oday wc must, if wc can, finish our discussion o f Sócrates1díscus-


sion with Diotim a, but ít is necessary that we remind ourselves o f some very
broad features o f the Sytnposiutn up to this polnt. The Sympostum contains
$¡x speeches on eros, three uninspired and three inspíred. The re is a paral-
lelism between these speeches: Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, on the
one hand; Aristophanes, Agathon, Sócrates, on the other. Gain, moral
virrue, techne: Phaedrus* s gain and uglincss belong togcther; Agathon’s
bcauty and moral virtue; and Eryximachus’s techne and the good, Sócrates’
principie, belong together. But there is another idea which runs through
the sccond, third, and fburth speeches: the defense o f pederasty. We arrive,
then, at this very interesdng suggestion, that prior to Sócrates are two
speakcrs, Phaedrus and Agathon, who are, to say the least, indifferent to
pederasty and d o n ot defend it. They are, o f coursc, judiciously choscn:
they are the young ones; they are only the objeets o f pederasty and n ot the
active pederasts.
A word about Sócrates’ speech in particular. This speech consists o f
seven parts; First, the introducción on how to speak, namely, the truth
about the most noble thing about the subject. Second, Sócrates’ dialogue
with Agathon; eros as love o f the beautiful is not itself beautiful ñor is he
good. The third part is the dialogue o f the young Sócrates with Diotima.
T h e first part o f that speech is about the nature o f eros; eros is n ot a god but
a demon. The second part, which we discussed last tim e— the only part
he re which is due to Sócrates’ iniriatíve— why is eros useful to human be-
ings. In other word s, what are the deeds, the actíons, o f eros. Diotima said
eros is love for one’s sempiternal possession o f the good, fbr one’s sem-
pitcrnal happiness. But not every form o f one’s dcsire for sempiternal pos­
session o f the good is called eros. For example, if one finds one’s happiness
in the accumulation o f gold, he is not called a lover. Eros, therefbre, is
desi re for immortality together with the good, and that immortality is
achicved by procrcation. So the usage when we speak o f íovers with a view
to sexual love is justifíed. The broader meaning is the de si re fbr sempiternal
possession o f any good. This is to o broad and the reconciliation is that eros
is desire fbr immortality together with the good, n ot mcrely for the good.
Such desire for immortality is n ot implied in the love o f money, fbr ex­

216
S O CR AT E S (i )

ampie. Thís immortality is achievcd by procreation, where the mortal naturc


participares in the deathless by the constan: re-creation o f human beings.
Tw o special points follow from that: eros is neither love o f one’s own—
this is said against Aristophancs— ñor is it love o f the beautiful, and this is
said against Agathon. l f two young peoplc o f different scx are attracted to
one another by their beauty they do n ot know that what attracts thcm truly
is the necd for procreation, n ot the need for beauty. The second striking
feature o f this part is the silcnce on gods and on immortality proper, the
immortality o f the individual. The last point; eros is here compared to po*
ctry. That eros has a very broad meaning, ¡ntelligently understood, but is,
in fact, limited to sexual love, finds its parallel in the fact that poetry— poe-
sis— means primarily all production, but is limited to poe tic production. In
this respcct there ¡s a similarity between eros and poetry.
The connection between these Ítems is the foliowing: By denying that
eros is eros o f one’s own and that eros is love o f the beautiful, one is led to
the rejection o f the gods, for the gods are ere ate d by poets, eithcr the great
poets, H om er and H esiod, as H erodotus said, o r anonymous poets ante-
dating H om er and Hesiod. T h e gods are created through poets by love o f
the beautiful, on the one hand— therefore they are etemally young and
eternally beautiful— and by eros o f one’s own, on the other. O f one’s own,
the descendant o f one’s own ancestor, the deification o f the ancestor, and,
on a higher level, the gods o f the polis who are conccrncd with right, the
avenging gods. Now wc come to the last part o f Diotima’s speech, and this
is the end o f Sócrates’ speech.

“ ‘What, Sócrates, do you believe is the cause o f this eros and desire?”'
(2 0 7 a ó -7 )

Diotima here begins the investigation o f the cause o f this eros o r desíre.
Eros is here n o longer treated as a dem on, for if he werc treated as a demon
the question o f his cause would no longer arise; the question o f the cause o f
Eros with a capital E has been answered. The inquiry which begins here is
philosophic and in no way mythological; it is physiologic, i.e., concerned
with the nature o f this particular phenomenon. Furthcrm ore, shc asks tor
the cause o f this eros, namely, eros as desi re for procreation. This eros alone
will be discusscd here.

“ ‘O r arcn't you awarc how uncannily all be ases are disposed whenever
they desire, both the terrestrial and the winged, that all are sick and croti-
cally disposed, first in regard to mixing together, and second in regard to
the raising o f what is born, and they are ready to fight on their bchalf, the

217
C H A P T E R El . B V E K

weakest againsc che scrongest and co dic for them, whilc chcy chcmsclvcs
are rackcd by hunger, so as co bring thcm up, and there is nothing eUc
which they don't do; for in che case o f human beings,* she saíd, ‘one mighc
believe thac they do these things on che basis o f calculación; bue what is the
cause in the case o f beasts chat they are so crotically disposed? Can you
say?'” (207a7-cl)

ln her investigation o f eros, Diotima, as physiologist, as a natural scicntist,


considere the brutes. The question raised by Sócrates at the beginning o f
the prcceding section was W hat is eros’s utiiity for human beings? By this
question Sócrates conceived o fero s somehow as controücd by man. What
is its use? How must wc guard against it? T h e consideration o f the brutes is
made in order to make dear that eros, in the case o f man, is n ot based on
calculation. The thought is not absurd. We find quite a few rcfcrcnces in
Aristophancs and in Xenophon to this cffect, that parents generate childrcn
in order to have someone take care o f them when they are oíd— social se-
curity. For ail we know this may play a role with many parents, but Diotima
is o f the opinión that it is insufficient as an explanadon, because the brutes
are incapable o f such social securiry calculation and there fore there must be
something deeper— an instinct, not a deliberarion. Since it is an instinct,
men can not control eros. Man is driven and can never overeóme it.
The second point to observe is that we see here two elements o f this eros
com m on to all animáis. The first is the direction toward sexual unión; the
second is the direction toward care for offspring, a point n ot made befbre.
These two, sexual unión and care for offspring, are the things with which
animáis are preoccupied, as distinguished from begetting and giving birth,
for this, in principie at least, takes place without them . O nce sexual unión
takes place the begetting takes place and giving birth foilows in natural o r­
der without man interfering, except accidentaiiy. These two elements, then,
are described as a kind o f sickncss, there is nothing beautiful about it. O r, to
look forward to another Platonic dialogue, the Phaedrus> they are a kind o f
madness, madness being the opposite o f calculation. This means a com ­
plete forgerting o f oneself. The calculating man never forgets himself. The
madman, mad for good o r iil, forgets himself. This self-forgetting can
merely be low, but it can also be hlgher than any calculation. In eros, then,
there is a complete forgerting o f oneself, a complete forgerting o f one’s
own. In this there is an element o f beauty in eros, even in this limited form.
L et us never forget that the central figure in chis dialogue, if wc disre-
gard Sócrates, is Eryximachus, the physicían. T h e medical point o f view is
that o f the valetudinarian, which is the clcarest opposition to the ero tic

218
I . H A P T B R E L E V E N

The cause o f eros is the subject. The mortal nature craves immortaiity. Pre-
viously she had said, in section IIIB , that he craves immortaiity togcther
with the good. Now she says eros is desire only for immortaiity; the good i$
tacidy dropped.

* 'i t is only possiblc in this way, by becoming, because it is always leaving


behind another young in place ofthe oíd. Since in whatever time each one
o f the animáis is said to be alive and be che same— for example, he is spo-
ken o f as the same from childhood up to his bccoming oíd— he, howcvcr,
though he never has the same things in himsclf, nevertheless is called the
same, but he is always becoming young, losing something, hair, flesh,
bones, blood, and che body altogether.'” (2 0 7 d 2 -e l)

Immortaiity is possi ble only by the substituid on o f one individual o f the


species for another. In a way, this is the preservation o f the same individual.
F or what we cali preservation o f the same individual, is also a constant sub-
stitution o f the new for the oíd. The change from a man to his offspring is
n ot essencially different from the change in the same man from childhood
to oíd age. This, I would say, is some exaggeration in order to make us swai-
low the bitter piü o f our mortality. She speaks o f a continuous loss o f parts
o f the body; she does n ot place equal emphasis on the ir constant recovery.
This is important. In Krüger’s interpretation, this is taken to mean the fol-
lowing: Man is a being in time, a temporal being. T o be in time means to
decay. Tim e is the ground for decay because time is passing away. This ap-
plics even to science as will be stated shortly. This is apparently the doctrine
o f Aristotle in Physics, book 4 . Aristode makes some powerful remarks
about this. B u t if one reads on, one sees that for Aristotle this is only a pri-
mary aspect o f time. T o the extent to which we can speak o f time as a cause,
Aristode says time is aiso the cause o f coming into being. Thercfore the fa-
mous State me nt: truth is the fruit o f dme. That which underlies the modern
idea o f progress is, o f course, also an effect o f time. The “pessimistic” no-
don o f dme was a popular notion, n ot the view o f Aristode and Plato. The
Ufe o f the individual is already a constant dying. The death o f the individual
is n ot so important. Therefore the concern with one’s own immortaiity is
not important. That is the meaning o f this passage.

“ ‘And noc only in his body, but also in his soul, his ways, characters, opin-
ions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears— cach o f these never is prese nc in
him as the same, but some are coming to be, and some are perishing.’ ”
( 2 0 7 e l- 5 )

220
S O C R A T E S ( 3 }

What ¡s truc o f the body, that it doesn’t last, is true also o f what in modern
languagc would be called consciousness— thc Greeks say thc soul. But, in-
terestingly enough, now she speaks n ot only o f the loss talán g place in time*
but o f the recovery as well. I f living is dying, which, in a sense, is truc, it is
also reviving. There is a fundamental difference between the dying o f a ce 11
in m e, o r o f hair by being cut off, and my death simply, becausc 1 ccase to
be.

“‘And still far stranger chan this is thac the Sciences too, not only do some
o f them come to be and others perish for us, but also each one o f che S c i­
ences undergoes the same thing. For what is called “to practice” is so on
the grounds that the Science is going out, for thc going out o f a Science is
forgetting and practice is the relnsertion again o f a new memory in place
o f that which is going away, and it preserves the Science, so as for it to be
thought to be thc same. In this manner everything mortal is preserved,
not by absolutely being always che same, as the divine is, but by thc fact
that that which is going away and getting oíd leaves behind anocher young
such as it itself was. By this device, Sócrates/ she said, ‘mortal partakes of
immortality, both body and everything else, but che immortal does it in
another way. So don’t wonder that everything by nature honors its own
of&pring, for chis kind o f zea! and eros attends on everything for the salce
o f immortality/” (207e5-208b6)

The key the me seems to be, eros is love o f immortality. T h e good as good
is n o longer the theme. L et us consider a few details: We chan ge constantly,
she says, and that means, o f course, we are. We remain alive. We could not
change if we were not. We constantly change so much that every part o f us
changes; for instance, every single piece o f knowledge we have changes. Let
us assume you have complete possession o f a mathcmatical theory— even
that changes. In what sense? It is the same piece o f knowledge which is re-
covered. In spite o f the change there is permanence, whereas in the case o f
blood and bones it is n ot the same that is recovered. I f a cell disintegratcs a
new cell is formed. But the Pythagorean theorem comes back as identically
the same theorem. There is, then, also permanence o f the same; but in thc
case o f every individual living being there is a finite permanence. T h e tran-
sition from a living being to its offspring is esscntially dififerent from the
transítion o f one stage in the life o f one living being to thc next stage. In
other words, the immortality o f the species is radically dififerent from the
immortality o f thc individual; but the immortality o f the individual is not
available to the brute, and tacidy to aii living beings. M ortal beings partake

221
C H A P T E R E L E V E N

o f immortaüty rcgarding body and cvcrything else only by gcneration or


procreation. Henee , and now we com e to che paradoxícal conclusión, every
mortal being honors its own offspring. That means that love o f immortal-
ity, as discussed in this subsection, is love o f one’s own. The care for thc off-
spring is care for one’s own offspring, as can be shown by the many cases o f
stepmothers and stepfathers and by the famous stories told by biologists
o f how easily rats can be deceived about the identity o f their offspring,
whereas thc human m other cannot be so easily deceived by such substitu-
tions. In the R ep u blic 3 3 0 c , ít is mentioned in thc conversaron with
Cephalus that fathers love their children, as the poets love their poems, dlf-
ferently from the way they love someone else’s poems. Love o f o n c’s own,
which is in many ways silly, is nevertheless a phenomenon o f human nature.
I summarize what we have seen in this section: It is a physiological study
o f the ground or reason or cause o f thc love for sexual unión plus love o f
offspring. This study leads to the recognition o f the fact that eros is eros o f
onc’s own but n ot o f thc beautifui. In this section there is no mention o fei-
ther the beautifui o r the good. Ñ or is there any mention o f thc gods o fin -
dividual immortaüty. This part o f the Diotima section— I will now intro­
duce subdivisión I II C 1 — corresponds somehow to Agathon’s speech.
There is an important parallel: W hen Agathon praises eros, eros is wisdom,
eros is the highest virtue; he mentions in the central part that wisdom is
played by eros in procreation. You have an allusion to that here. She speaks
o f “this device” (2 0 8 b 2 ). This has something to d o with wisdom in the
wider sense. But in contradistinction to Agathon, Diotima does n ot say that
this is the deverness o r wisdom o f eros. O n the contrary, eros is the clcvcr-
ness o f nature. This much about the first subdivisión. T o repeat: At this
point love o f the beautifui and love o f one’s own have been dropped. There
is only love o f sempiterna! possession o f the good. But this love o f immor-
tality proves to be love o f one’s own. W hen people generate children they
are n ot concerned with preserving thc human species; that is the intention
o f nature, but they are concerned only with perpetuating themselves. Love
is love for one’s own children. Love o f one’s own, then, has been restored.
W hat happens to the other forms o f love will com e out in the next two sec-
tions.
listc n er : In what sense can it n ot be said that men are willing to die be-
cause o f their love o f happiness?
M r Strauss: Because they regard their own, their children, as higher
than their own in the more literal sense, their own body, which is destined
to die sooner. This question will be answercd as we go along.

222
S O C R A T E S { i i

“And 1, when I hcard che logos wondered and said, ‘Very w dl.’ I said,
4Wisest Diotima, is chis the way thcsc things cruly are? ’ And she, just as the
perfecc sophists,said. . . ” (2 0 8 b 7 -c l)

Sócrates again takes the initiative, the only other time he took it was at IIIB
(2 0 4 c 7 ), the central part o f the whole speech with Diotima; and now again
in IIIC , the central part o f the subdivisión. Sócrates had been told at 2 0 7 C
n ot to wonder, but after he heard Diotim a’s argument, he began to won­
der, i.e., he is incredulous. Yet at the end he says, I have been persuaded by
Diotima. I f that is the case, it can only be by I1IC 2 and 3. While Sócrates
was still incredulous, he called Diotima “wisest.” W hen he delivers the
speech to the symposium, he calis her the perfect sophist. In the Sympo-
siu tn , sophist is a term o f praise; eros himself, fbr exampie, is called a sophist
and at the same dme a philosopher. As a philosopher he doesn’t possess wis-
dom , he only seeks it; when he is called a sophist, he is n ot a perfect sophist,
a complete possessor o f wisdom.

“‘Know well, Sócrates, since ifyou are willing to glancc at the love o f honor
in the case o f human beings, you would wonder at its irTationality íf you
don’t understand what I have said, when you rcflect on how uncannily they
are disposed by the eros o f becoming renowncd and “to lay down deathless
fame for ever.” O n its behalf they are prepared to run all risks to a still
greater degree than on behalf o f their childrcn, and to spend money and
toil at any kind o f toil whatsocvcr and to die fbr ic. (2 0 8 c l-d 2 )

Ambidón is the theme in I I I C 2 , as procreation was in I I I C 1 , but ambidon


in the fuíl sense, immortal femé. Can other than human beings have ambi-
tiort? W ho else can have love o f honor, passion for honor? The gods. In par­
ticular, the gods as presented by Agathon; in 1 9 7 a -b he speaks o f the god’s
ambidon. H ere the argument is limited to human am bidon, and human
ambidon shows the same irrationaüty, to an even higher degree than the
desire for procreation and offspring does. W hat does irrationaüty mean
here? Rationality, here, means calculation in the Service o f self-prescrvation.
I f you calcúlate correctly with a view o f self-prese rvation, then you are a ra­
cional man. Ify o u iack such calculation, you are an irrational man. Now, the
parents dying for their children and the heroic man dying for immortal
fame d o n ot calcúlate with a view to their self-prese rvation, and, in th¡s
sense, they are irrational. This refers, o f course, also to the fect that it is not
something which can be controlled by calculation. I t is the same instinctive
power as eros in the narrower sense. Am bition to o is concerned with im-
mortaüty, immortaíity o f fame. U p to now, eros is eros n ot for one’s own,

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( HA PT E R ELEVEN

or for the beautifui, but for immortality. In the first case we have seen that
love for immortality through procreation, is, in fect, an extended love for
onc’s own. L et us see what love o f eterna! femé pro ves to be on closer in-
spection.

a 'Since do you believe,' she said, ‘that Alcestis would have died for Ad-
mctus, or Achilks dicd after Pacroclus, or your own Codrus die beforc on
bchalf o f the kingship o f his children, if they were not believing there
would be an immortal memory o f themselves about virtuc, which we now
have ofthem ?’” (2 0 8 d 2 -6 )

Ambición i$ concem ed with immortal farne for virtuc— thesc are the reaüy
important cases o f immortal femé. That means that ambition is not con­
cerned with virtue as such. Virtue comes in only as an indispensable means
for getting immortal femé. Can you see he re an implication? I f ambition,
love o f immortality in the form o f immortal femé, is concem ed with the im­
mortality o f femé and n ot with virtue, what kind o f eros is it then? Eros o f
onc’s own. In the children your bodily image is perpetuated; here a shadow,
your shadow, is perpetuated. The first two examples, as you may recall,
were used by Phaedrus, 1 7 9 b -1 8 0 b , as examples o f eros for other human
beings, lovers and beloved, which prove that such sacrificial deaths were
honored also by the gods. Diotim a uses these two examples as examples o f
eros for femé and speaks only o f their femé among men. Silcnce about the
gods here. Phaedrus’s central examplc was that o f thc singer Orpheus, who
cut a poor figure, who was n ot prepared to die for his beloved, ñor, it seems,
for immortal femé. Diotima replaces Orpheus with an Athenian example,
the oíd Athenian king Codrus. In Codrus’s case, as distinguished from that
o f Alcestis and Achilles, love o f offspring was combined with love o f femé,
and that throws light on the love o f fame. Love o f offspring and love o f
femé are akin to one another. B oth forms o f love are forms o f love o f one’s
own.

“ ‘That is fer from being the case,’ she said, ‘but I suspcct cvcryonc toils at
everything for the sake o f deathless virtue and a famous repucation o f this
kind, and to the extene that they are better, to that excent they do it more;
for they love the immortal.’ ” (2 0 8 d 6 -e l)

In what sense is immortal virtue immortal? By memory. T h e three human


beings mentioned have died. They died for those they loved, though actu-
ally for his femé, for his immortality. Love for immortal fem é, it is said here,
inspires all human action. Is this n ot a preposterous assertion? Think o f the

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also rcmember Agathon’s remark about the gods who were inventor crafts-
m en— Hcphacstus, etc.— prompted by lovc o f the beautiful. Now wc know
one thíng: gíving birth to prudencc.

“ 'B u t by far the greatest and mosc beaudful kind o f prudence is the order-
ing and arrangement o f cides and houscholds, the ñame for which is mod-
eradon and justice .*** (2 0 9 a 5 - 8 )

T h e sccond kind o f eros strives in the híghest case for giving birth to polit-
ical o r econom ic prudence. According to Plato there is no essential difFcr*
en t betwcen city and household, a thesis with which Aristodc takes issuc at
the beginning o f che P olitics. Political o r econom ic prudence is the highest,
and is identified here with moderation and justice. There is a passage in the
P haedo, 8 2 a -b , wherc it is said: “T h e vulgar and political virtue which men
cali moderation and jusdee and which aríses from habituation without phi-
losophy and intellect.” T h at is not the same as what he means here. There
is no reference to habituation here, for example. We must take this as a
much higher thing.
We must see n ot only what Plato mentions but also what he does not
mention. Three virtucs are mentioned here, but there are four. Diotima is
silent about courage. As appears from the sequel, the begetters o f this high-
est practical wisdom d o n ot die for the sake o f thcír offspring. T h e States-
men must die, but their begetters sit home. H ere the case o f Orpheus
comes in, a poet who díd not want to die and therefore becamc infámous in
a sense, though he was still famous as a poet.

14‘And whenever in turn someone from youth onward is pregnant with


these in his soul, being a bac helor and o f a suitablc age he by then dcsircs
ro give birth and genérate. In going about this he seeks, I suspect, the
beaudful in which he would generate, for he will never gene race in the
ugly. So he cheríshcs the beaudful bodies rather then the ugly bccausc he
is pregnant, and if he meets up with a beautiful, noble, and naturally gifted
soul, he very much cherishes the two together, and at once he is well sup-
plicd with spccches about virtue toward the human being, both about
what sort the good man ought to be and what he must practiec, and he
tries to edúcate.”' (2 0 9 a 8 -c 2 )

I t appears that not everyone is pregnant with such political o r econom ic


prudence, henee, not everyone has the prospect o f gaining immortality by
generating such prudence. Those who are pregnant with ¡t be have similarly
to those who are pregnant in the body; they prefer beautiful bodies, but in
this case only males, and beautiful souls too. But as in the first kind o f eros,

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S O CR AT E S (Si

the eros directed toward procreation, does this makc the second kind o f
cros ambition ortovc o fth e beautiful? B oth are lovers ofim m ortaiity, each
o f his own immortality, o f his own.
You have here been given a brief description o f what scems to be the
highest form o f educator. Anywhere in Plato one must aiways think o f
Sócrates, even when he is not the speaker, as here. Is this n ot Sócrates who
begets the highest form o f practical wisdom by generating in the proper
souls ofyoung men, preferably beautiful in body but surely beautiful in soul?
H e refcrs to himself as a midwife. B u t what does this mean? According to the
explicit description, T heaetetus 1 4 9 b , he is n ot productive. I t ’s not Sócrates.
We shall sce laten In this passage, he says, uHe is well supplied with speeches
about virtue toward the human being, both about what sort the good man
ought to be and what he must practice ” There is a fine distinction here, the
virtue o f a man is n ot identical with how a man must be and what he must
pursue. Latcr on we shall see the solución to this problem.
L isten er: He is resourceful in discoursing about virtue, that is to say, in
something specifically human. Your earlier analysis o f the myth, the parent-
age o f Eros, may have been right in that context, but it seems to me as if Di-
otima is now allowing the father o f eros to have his say.
M r. Strauss: I would draw just the opposite conclusión, because in the
lover there is both wealth and poverty Is n ot the root o f both poverty? Pov-
erty knows itself to be poverty. I f you take poverty as mere destitution, that
is something else. But if Poverty implies the will to overeóme poverty, then
she does n ot need an outside incentive for seeking, she only needs, indeed,
something outside. T h e question is W hat is che poverty o f this rich man?
The cros consists n ot in his wealth but in his poverty. Qua rich he is not
an erotic man. Why does he need the poor young man? Immortality. In
Sócrates’ concluding remark, 2 1 2 b , he says that one could n ot easiiy take
hold o f a better helper for human na ture than eros. That means that there
might be an equally good helper or even a better helper, though he is not
easy to com e by, the natural gift. Eros is n ot a complete analysis o f man; an-
other very important point is what the Greeks cali a good nacure. Phaedrus
made it perfeedy clear that the men who are virtuous out o f cros are only
simulating the best natures. This rich man, as rich man, is the most gifted
man. We will ¡dentify him very soon. Now the question is what is the m o­
tive o f the poet in his poetic production. 1$ this eros? W hat kind o f eros?
wtFor I suspcct in touching the beautiful and associating with it, he gives
birth to and generates the things with which he was long pregnant, both
when he is present and when he is absent, in remembering, and he raises

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S O C R A T E S ( 3 )

The mendon o f Solon, the Athenian legislator, is a concession o f the foreign


woman to the Athenian Sócrates. In this school, which had a certain party
Une, it wa$ undcrstood that Lycurgus was much higher than Solon. The
treatment given these two legistators in Aristotle’s P olin es, book 2 , is exactly
the same as the onc given here. Solon is mendoned together with the bar-
barians, and they generated “every kind o f virtue.” The deification o f the
legislator is the last point mendoned, and that is important. The poets are
much higher than the legislators here, and yet n ot the poets but the legisla-
tors are deified. Ultímately the ambitious gods were, in fact, deifíed humans.
L et me summarize this section: It occupies the same place in the Dio-
tima-Socratcs dialogue as Sócrates’ speech as a whole occupies in the Sym-
posiunt as a whole, number six. This is perhaps the key to this section. L o ve
o f honor, ambition, the highest form o f love o f one’s own, namely, lovc o f
one’s own immortality, is concerned with the beautiful or noble to a much
higher degree than with procreation and offspring. This second form is
essentially concerned with the production ofvirtue and, in the highest case,
with the production o f the most beautiful prudencc, namely political pru-
dencc, the prudcnce o f the statesman, This immortality is the preserve,
above all else, o f the good poets, who are im mortal in the ir works. This im-
pÜes that poetry at its best ge ñerates political prudencc, educates great
statesmen and legislators. B u t is this not Sócrates’ pcculiarity, as indicated
n ot only in the R ep u blic but even in such sober statements as Aristotle’s
M ctaphysies, book 1, when he says that Sócrates turned completely away
from all ‘metaphysical’ things and limited himself entirely to the human
things, i.e., to the things o f concern to the statesman? O r is Sócrates a com ­
petí tor o f the poets? The poets are concerned with virtue, and that means
something beautiful for the sake o f immortality, for the sake o f their own.
T h e poets are, then, n ot prompted by love o f the beautiful o r noble; they
are n ot prompted by eros for morality as morality. Could this be the differ-
ence between Sócrates and the poets, that Sócrates is prompted by eros for
the noble o r the beautiful and is in love with moral virtue? We cannot yet
answer this question. At any rate, this much is clear: the poets’ eros is not
the highest. The poets are pregnant, n ot Sócrates. W hat does that mean?
T h e poets are makers, producers, inventora. Sócrates does n ot make, he is
n ot a maker. And why is he n ot a maker? Be cause he is a philosopher. The
philosopher is concerned with di seoveri ng the truth, not with inventing it.
In this section there is again silence about the gods and about immortality
proper. B u t in contradistinction to the preceding section, pederasty, as love
o f the souls o f the young, is readmitted. This section is o f special interest.

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c H a P T F R E L E V E N

is by now vasc, no longcr cherishing the bcaucy io one— as if he were a ser*


vant— o f a lirtle boy or some human being or one practice, and in being a
slave be base and pecty, but having tumed toward the vast open sea o f the
beautiful and observing it, give birth to many beautiful and magniñeent
spccchcs and thoughis in bountiful philosophy , . , (2 1 0 c6 -d ó )

This seems no longer to belong to the love o f the soul, as the contempla-
don o f iaws o r pursuits did. T h e next step is love o f the Sciences. N o reason
is given here o r befbre why the latter form o f the beautiful is superior, i.e.,
more truly beautiful than the preccding one. But it is indicated. T h e pur-
suits are less beautiful than the Sciences becausc the pursuits are nccessary.
They are necessary, for example, for boxing or wrestÜng, for thc strength o f
the body, whereas che Sciences are beautiful in thcmselves. U p to this point
the beautiful was viewed as this o r that beautiful thing. Whenever every-
thing o f the kind is contemplated, for example, thc beauty o f all bodics,
there was already ímplied Science. L et us compare three passages which are
re levant. In 2 1 0 a Diotima said the lover o f one beautiful body generares
beautiful speeches. In 2 1 0 c she said the lover o f one beautiful soul gives
birth to such speeches as malte the young better. H ere she says the lover
o f the beautiful Sciences gives birth to many beautiful and magnificcnc
spccchcs and thoughis.
I f you take these three passages together, you see that the love o f the
beautiful Sciences is not in every respect superior to the love o fo n e beauti­
ful soul. Only the love o f onc beautiful soul can generate speeches which
make the young better. O n the other hand, thc speeches produced by the
love o f one beautiful soul are not necessarily beautiful, which makes sense.
Is this not the case o f Sócrates? T h e lover o f one beautiful soul who gives
birth to such speeches that make the young better. Is this not the difference
becween Sócrates and thc poets? Is this n ot the reason why Sócrates did not
write poetry? H ere the transition from the love o f one beautiful body to
the love o f all beautiful bodies does n ot lead beyond gencrating beautiful
speeches. Love o f the beautiful Sciences is here presented as love o f beauty,
not as love o f truth. W hat does that mean? What are the beautiful Sciences
anyway? The mathematical Sciences. A puré music o f which Eryximachus
spokc in 187c. Why are they beautiful? Bccause their objeets are beautiful.
Because o f their ciarity and order. N ote that the beautiful Sciences are de-
scribed as objeets o f beholding, contem plation, n ot o f eros. I f eros is di-
rected toward the beautiful, that does n ot mean that all beautiful things are
objeets o f eros, there may be beautiful things which are n ot objeets o f pas-
sionate desire. In the first two stages, onc body and all bodies, we had love

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S O C R A T E S | 3 i

but no beholding. In che second rwo stages, pursuits and Sciences, we had
behoiding but n ot love. There wiil be a fifth and final stage. O ur expecta­
ción would seem to be, and that would be very fortúnate for us, if on the
highest level love and beholding would come together. T h en we would
have the unity o f man on the highest plañe, where his loving life, his affec-
dónate life, his passionate life and his intellectual life would merge. Whether
this is the case o r not can be settled in one way: by reading what foliows. T o
my great regret I must say that this problem is n ot so easily solved. There is
again almost complete silence about love in the last part.
We are now at the third section o f the third part. This is again subdi-
vided. The third part deais with the highest form o f eros, love o f the beau­
tiful and there are five stages: the first stage, love o f one body; second, love
o f all bodies; third, love o f beautifiil pursuits and íaws; fourth, love o f the
beautiful Sciences; and we now turn to the fifth.

Wi. . . until with strength and increase gathered there he catchcs sight o f
one Science ofthis kind, which is o fth e following kind o f beautiful. Try to
pay attention [apply your mind] to me,1 she said, ‘as best you can. Who-
ever up to this point has been guided to the crotic things, observing the
beautifiil things in order and corrcctly, in going chen to the end o f the
erotic things he will suddenly cacch a glimpse o f somethíng amazingly
beautiful in it$ nature— and this is it, Sócrates, for che sake o f which there
were also all the previous toils— (2 l0 d 6 - e 6 )

Toward the end o f the erotic inidadon he who has foílowed the way step by
step and correcdy sees some single sight o f a beautiful thing o f a certain de-
scription. What is beautiful is that with which the sight deais. H e will sud­
denly see something strange. There is a kind o f break o f continuity here.
There is a radical differencc bctween this beautiful thing to be described in
the sequel and all beautiful things either mentioned or not. On the basis o f
the rcmark in 2 1 0 e l - 2 , one could perhaps say, try to apply your mind as
much as you can and try to follow the parallel in 210a 4 . This section is subdi-
vided into three parts: eros o f the body, eros o f the soul, and eros o f the mind.
W hat, then, is this one beautiful thing which appears at the end o f the way?

Uk. . . [somethíng beautiful] that in the first place always is and neither
comes into being ñor perishes, neither increases ñor diminishes, and in the
second place, is not in one rcspect beautiful and in another ugly, ñor
sometí mes is and sometimes is not, ñor in respect co one thing is beautiful
and in respcct to another ugly, ñor here beautiful and there ugly, as being
beautiful to some and ugly co some. ’ ” (2 1 0 e 6 - 2 11 a5)

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C H A P T E R E L E V E N

Now ihis is a description o f thc beautiful, that beautiful thing which comes
at thc end. This beautiful thing is in every respect, and that implies, o f course,
that it is always, because that which is not always is also not. That beautiful
thing is in every respect and is beautiful in every respect. Thcse two consider-
ations are inseparable, because for Plato, to be means to be something. There
is nothing which merely is and is not something. There is no such thing as
puré being. The whole Platonic notion o f being is implied in this.
This may com e as a surprise to us in modern times. W hen we speak o f
existence, d o we necessarily mean that existence must be something, mean-
ing something which is n ot implied in existence? This may n ot be so clear,
but for Plato it is a matter o f course. AJI other beautiful things, including all
laws, pursuits, Sciences, souls, etc., are n ot simply beautiful, they are also
ugly in certain respeets. How do wc know that this beautiful is, which will
pro ve to be the beautiful itself? I f thc meaning o f eros is understood, we see
that eros implics that there is such a thing, which is the beautiful itself. But
is this perhaps a delusion? Could eros in its deepest meaning, namely, as
tending toward thc beautiful itself, not be a delusion? Think o f Aristoph-
anes* myth, where we have a description o f the deepest meaning o f eros.
This deepest meaning o fero s proves to be a delusion: that unión is impos-
sible. O r is the desire o f the soul n ot necessarily the crown and c rite rio n o f
true thoughts, as a modern interpreter says? M eaning, if eros is the deepest
desire o f our soul directed toward something, this something must be.
Eros as desire for the simply beautiful, the unqualifiedly beautiful,
vouches for the being o f the eternally beautiful. But before we know that
the eternally beautiful and the unqualifiedly beautiful is, we do not know
whether eros is simply natural o r simply good. First we have to discover the
true na ture o f eros before wc can say that that which it divines is. I also draw
your attention to the fact that ¿n diese sections o f thc spccch eros is not
mentioned, Now, what is this beautiful itself? I t is the example in the Sym-
posiutn o f what is gene rally known as the idea in the Platonic sense. B u t it
is not called an idea here, and that is n ot negligible. Ideas seem to be seif-
subsisting and simply unchangeable, the only beings which are truly. The
usual view o f this notion is that Plato hypothesizes universals o r concepts.
Plato says the universals o r concepts are, and are more truly than any other
thing. The question is whether this is based on a proper understanding o f
Plato. I can only remind you o fa few things here: The word eid o smeans pri­
maríly the shape o f a thing, the shapc which can be seen only with the
mind’s eye, the character o f a thing. Later on this was called the essence.
Yet, if onc says essence, one must consider this fact: essence as used later,

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S O C R A T E S < 3 i

“ ‘Whenever someone on the basis ofthese things, on account ofhis being


a pederast correctly, goes on up and begins to catch sight o f that beautiful,
he would be touching pretty neariy the cnd. For this is to go correctly to*
ward the ero tic things, or to be led by someone else, beginning from those
beautiful things to go on up for the sakc o f that beautiful, cmployíng thcm
as if they were steps, from one to two and from two to all the beautiful
bodies, and from the beautiful bodies to the beautiful prácticos, and from
the practiees to the beautiful teachings, and from the teachings to end up
at that teaching>which is a teaching o f nothing else than that beautiful,
and rccognize finally what is beautiful itself.’" (21 I b 5 - d l )

H e re we have a summary. It is thanks to the correct love o f boys that the as-
cent takes place. That is the crucial point. Thls correct love o f boys ineludes
love o f the beautiful body. Contemplation o f the idea o f the beautiful is
from this point o f view only the last and highest stage o f the means for the
correct love o f boys. This should n ot be surprising, but in the R ep u bltc we
have a strict parallel to that. In the R epu bltc, philosophy is introduccd only
as means for the good polis. H ere philosophy is introduccd only as a means
for the correct love o f boys. But then, just as in the R epu bltc, what first
com es to sight as a means, pro ves to be the end. Philosophy n ot only as a
means for good politics but as the cnd; similarly here regarding pederasty.
You see also initiation is not indispensable. W hether one goes, o r whether
one is led by someone else, does n ot make a difference.
H ere we have a repetition o f the stages: one beautiful body, two beauti­
ful bodies, all beautiful bodies, beautiful pursuíts, beautiful teachings, and
the teaching regarding the beautiful itself; six stages, i.e., as many as there
are speeches on eros in the dialogue. What does he omit? General rule;
there is never a repetition in Plato which is an idéntica! repetition; there is
always a change, though sometimes seemingly trivial. W hat is the change?
T h e change is in the second step, and that means much greater emphasis on
the body, accompanied by something else. When he makes the transítion in
the first statement from bodies to the other things, he speaks o f the souls.
There is no mention o f the souls here, and that has grave implicadons re­
garding the meaning o f the work itself. In the presentation itself, as dístin-
guished from the summary, we have one body, all bodies, souls, pursuíts
and laws, Sciences, and the onc Science. O ne other subde thing; here he
goes from one to two and then to all beautiful bodies, and from that to
beautiful pursuits, to the beautiful pieces o f learning, to that piece o f learn*
ing, etc.; but whereas he repeats beautiful in the case o f the bodies, he does

237
S O C R A T E S (? )

is dropped. B u t in the central prese ntation, where he had spoken o f always


being, he had said that the beautiful itself will be imagined as aJways beíng.
L et us kccp this in mínd.

“ 4Or don’t you realize,* shc said, ‘that hcrc alone it will be possible fot
him, on seeíng the beaudful by that by which it is visible, to give birth not
to phantom images o f virtue, beca use he is touching on that which is not
a phantom, but to true virtue, because he is touching on the truth; and
once he gives birth to true virtue and raises it, it is open to him to bccome
dear to the gods, and if it is open to any ochcr human being, fbr him too
to bccome immortal?’” (212a2 - 7 )

The question remains conditional. H ere she describes the conscquencc o f


the visión o f beauty itself, and this beauty stands for the good itself. The
consequence o f that visión, and only o f that visión, is giving birth. N ot to
beautiful speeches, o r to images o f virtue, but to true virtue. The genera-
don o f true virtue is not intended. In the preceding part, where the poets
and legislators were spoken of, they do n ot give birth to true virtue, obvi-
ousiy because they do n ot have that visión. He is n ot concerned with gen-
erating true virtue, he is only concerned with beholding beautiful things
and beauty itself. Ñ or is he concerned with immortality, although he, more
than anyone else, is most llkely to becom e immortal. In what sense? The
parallel in 2 0 9 c - e shows: immortal in fame. Now the conclusión:

“Here you have, Phacdrus and everyone else, what Diotima said and I
have been persuaded of; and sincc I have bcen persuaded I try to persuade
everyone else as well that onc would not easÜy get anyone better than
Bros for helping human naturc gain this possession. Accordingly, I asserc
that cvery man should honor Eros, and I myself honor the erocic things
and praccice them to an cxccptional degree, and I urge everyone else to do
so, and now and always I celébrate the power and manJiness o f Eros to the
extent that 1 can. So regard this logos, Phaedrus, as an encomium to Eros
ifyou want, but if not, whatever and however you enjoy naming it, ñame
it chat.” (2 1 2 b l-c 3 )

“This possession”— possession is frequently used as a synonym for good.


W hat is that possession? The visión o f beauty fbllowcd by the gencrating o f
true virtue and immortality o f femé. The acquísition o f this possession does
n ot simply require eros. Human nature cannot easily find a better helper—
there may be a better helper; there may, at least, be an equaily good helper.
As the helper which can most easily be found, he addresses every man, but
it may n ot be the best helper. This is the question which carne up in the dis-

239
S O C R A T E S í 3 )

the beautiful. L o ve o f immortality in generation pro ves to be love o f one’s


own. The parents want to live on in their children; thcy are n ot merely con-
cerncd with producing human beings In general. This stage is striedy h et­
erosexual. In the second stage, love o f immortality through femé, there is
also love o f one’s own immortality, but through the beautiful things as
means. He re pederasty o f the soul emerges. In the last stage, love o f the
bcautifiil, which ineludes pederasty o f the body, culminates in the visión o f
the beautiful itself. W hen speaking o f the higher levéis, shc speaks only o f
beholding the beautiful, n ot o f eros for the beautiful. Why? Love o f the
beautiful is essenrially dirccted toward bodies, this must be intelligendy un-
derstood. We love essentially the soul, but we never love merely the soul.
Eros can never be divorced from body. We cannot love a human being with-
out loving his head. The first words o f Antigone is a good illustrarion o f
that. Antigone says to her sisterr “O h, com m on head o f Ism cne.” Antigone
in loving Ismene loves her head. There is no eros except for living human
beings, and this corresponds to usage. W hen we speak o f an erotic man we
mean that. Therefore the pederasty o f the bodies is admitted. Yet the
whole, and especially the visión o f the beautiful itself, bclongs, as is expire-
idy said, to the erotic things. S o , in a way, there is an eros beyond the eros
o f bodies o r connection with bodies. But this is no longer eros o f the beau­
tiful, and this is important. T h e eros o f the beautiful leads to transcending
the beautiful. In the highest stage the o b ject o f eros is no longer the beau­
tiful but the good— beholding the good and being together with the good
is true happiness. Erotics transce nds love o f one’s own and love o f the beau­
tiful and is as such eros o f the good as such, as is, indeed, also said.
L et us try to understand it as for as is possible on the basis o f what is
given here. It surely makes sense to distinguish empirically the following
threc forms o f eros: First, love o f one’s own, love o f one’s kin, and, in the
broadest form , love o f the fetherland. Secondly, love o f the beautiful, o f
glory, o f moral virtue, but also what is known now as acstheticism. The
third, love o f the good, the crudest and most massive form ; if a man is a
lover o f gymnastics with a view to getting a strong and healthy body, that is
n ot love o f the beautiful, ñor love o f one’s own, but love o f the good—
valctudinarian, the lover o f gain. From this point o f view, and this is not
unimportant, love o f the good, as distinguished from love o f one’s own and
love o f the beautiful, is the lowcst and most inconspicuous form o f eros.
And that is a typically Platonic notion, that what is so inconspicuous at first
glance reflects, in a way more directly, the highest. Yet we have leamed that
al1 eros is eros o f the good and, therefore, also the love o f one’s own and

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C H APT ER ELEVES*

love o f the beautiful must be love o f the good. Diotima indicates how this
is possi ble. Eros o f the good is lo ve for my well-being, my own perfection,
virtue, the noble, and may even inelude fame. O n the highest level all threc
elements are presen*. I f a man loves what is most his own, namcly his soul,
he loves the truth, the good, and is attractcd by boys and youths who are his
kindred be cause they have the same potentialíty.
We may distinguish, I have said, one’s own, the beautiful, and the good;
buc this is n ot the tripartí tion made by Diotima. H er tripartí tío n is procre-
ation, glory, and, let us say, philosophy, or, perhaps, the beautiful instead o f
philosophy. What is the relation? Why does she replace the beautiful with
glory and the good with the beautiful? As for the first question: why does
she not speak o f the beautiful in the second stage but o f glory? This is iden-
tical with the dem otion o f poctry which she effeets. The poets, she says, do
not love the beautiful but their own. They are concerned with the beautiful
only as a means for their own. But what is that beautitiil? It is moral virtue
and, in the highest case, politieal prudencc, ultimately the p olis. But they
do not love these things for their own sake; they love them for their im-
mortality. Thcre is no eros for the polis and, henee, not for moral virtue and
politieal prudence. For moral virtue and política] prudence depend essen-
tially on the polis, and the polis is n ot natural. It is constituted by an arbi-
trary selection from the natural whole, the human species, toward which
eros is dircctcd— procreation. There is no natural inclination comparable
to procreation which is directed toward the polis as polis. There is no nat­
ural inclination toward moral virtue and the polis, that is, indeed, the cru­
cial implication.
T o understand that let us look at another tripartition which occurs
much later but is relaced to it. That is Thomas Aquinas’s distinction o f
man’s threcfold natural inclination, Su m m a, I I , 1, question 9 4 , article 2.
Self-preservation is the first, then preservation o f the species and raising o f
childrcn, then knowledge o f god plus social lifc, which is the equivalent o f
the polis. You see that he re, too, there is no natural inclination toward
moral virtue as moral virtue. Diotima is silent about se If-preservation.
Why? Because it can be said co be suberotic. We can n ot cali a man con-
cerned with preserving himself an ero tic man. She rcplaces, moreover, life
in socícty with immortal fáme, for the polis is noc natural.
Lee us also compare these distinction s with the three parts o f the soul in
the R ep u blic: desire, spirit, and re ason. Spiritedness is replaccd with love o f
glory, eros for immortal fame. Why? Spiritedness, which ineludes indigna-
tion, is relatcd to justice o r right, and the Symposiutn abstraets from right

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S O C R A T E S ( 3 'i

be cause thc right o r the just is not, as such, an object o f natural inclin adon.
Furtherm ore, spíritedness means, more gene rally, rcpelling thc hostile, the
alien. From this point o f view spíritedness is essentially related to love o f
one’s own. But love o f one’s own is lower than love o f the beautiful. The
Symposium transcends the love o f one’s own. Eros is homeless. T h e R ep u b’
IxCy as a political work, does not transcend the sphere o f one’s own. Perhaps
more precisely: the R ep u blic also suppresses Ln its way one’s own and that is,
indeed, the subdety o f the R epu blic. Proof: thc so-called communism o f
the R epu blic. O ne can say in thc R epu blic, to o , onc’s own is abandoned ln
favor o f the beautiful. W hen he speaks o f the education o f the guardians, in
the ccnter is education in music, and the tunction o f this education is to
make them love thc beautiful. Nevertheless, che R ep u blic does n ot tran­
scend one’s own in the way the Symposium does, because one can say one’s
own ís transferred to the polis, which is also a limited part o f the human
race. In the R ep u blic you no longer love your natural brothers and sisters
but every fellow Citizen o f your age as an artificial brother and sister, and
every older man and woman as your artificial parents. O ne’s own, then, ís
radically modified in the R ep u blic, it is n ot transcended. Bccause the R e-
pu blic remains within the limitations o f the love o f one’s own, the emphasis
on spiritedness, repelling the foreign o r the alien, is crucial. The Sytnpo-
siutHj by transcending the sphere o f one’s own, is silent on spiritedness. We
may learn from this the general point that spiritedness is essentially the
companion o f the lower forms o f eros, and that is thc crudity, ifyou will, o f
the psychology o f the R epu blic. O n the higher stages o f eros therc is no
thumoSy no spiritedness, as a companion. The simple proof o f that is that
philosophy can justly be called a torm o f eros, but there is no ingredient o f
spiritedness in philosophy as philosophy. Indignation has n o place in phi­
losophy proper. In its utteranees o r Ln its ccaching, this is another matter.
Listener: Isn’t there an immediate transcendence o f one’s own in the
R epublic?
Mr. Strauss: But it still remains one’s own city. As ordlnary human be-
ings we love our polis. But there can be a split. For example, a nice man in
Poland loves, in a way, the United States more than Poland. You can never
completely sepárate the matter— the Polish soil, the Polish people— and
the form , the government. Therefore, the faino us problcm ofloyalty. But,
on the highest level, you have undivided loyalcy because you live in the best
polis; it is precisely on the highest level also love o f one’s own polis as dis-
tinguished from the others. Never forget the complete silence in the R e -
p u blic about the relations o f the best polis to any other best city. Each city is

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S O C R A T E S {^ >

way o f Thrasymachus, by which you can persuade nondocile people who


must be frightened and terrified. Sócrates did n ot write because he could
n ot write, more precisely, because he could n ot write on thc highesc level,
and writing on the highest level ¡neludes the ability to write tragedy, the
tragedy behind which are the avenging gods. T h e pcrfect speechmaker
would write a tragedy, and as such he would also be a comedian. The in-
verse is n ot truc. Sócrates could have written comedies, and better ones
than Aristophanes, though probably not such tough ones. B u t chat was not
enough because it would not becom e a philosopher to write comedies.
Yet Plato and Xenophon learned from Sócrates how to make punítive
speeches and how to act punitivcly. In the case o f Xenophon wc know it
from his own mouth. W hen he carne to Cyrus, he met a pupil o f a sophist,
Proxenos, a fine man, wonderlul in handling gendem en, but inept in han-
dling nongendemen. The pupil o f Sócrates, Xenophon, was excellent also
in whlpping people, in punid ve action. Xenophon5s whole affair in Asia
M inor, where he almost founded a city and was even asked to becom e a
monarch, and Plato’s action in Syracuse show that they werc poliocally ac­
tive m en, to some extent. The fact that Sócrates was n ot politically active
and the fact that he did n ot write are ultimately identical— the weakncss o f
his thumosy o f his spiritedness. And to that extent, Aristophanes’ criticism o f
Sócrates, that he was an unpolitical man, has a great element o f truth.
Sócrates traced his withdrawal from politics, for which he was blamed, to
his daitn on ion , to the demonic thing in him. In late antiquity it was said by
commentators, the divine Plato and the demonic Aristode, and that is, I
think, a convincing though pagan statement o f thc order o f rank o f the two
men. B u t it is more heipful for the understanding o f Plato if we say that
Sócrates was demonic and Plato knew him. Plato had a gift which Sócrates
lacked. W hether there is a connecdon between Sócrates’ non writing and
other Umitadons o f Sócrates would be an extremely interestmg question.
You know there are some dialogues where Sócrates doesn’t speak— in thc
Ttm aeus, C ritias, Sophist, and Statesm an. Does Plato indícate by that what
Sócrates could n ot have done? That’s a m oot question. But o f one thing wc
can be certain: Sócrates did n ot write and Plato did write, and that, I be*
lieve, can ultimately only be understood in the way in which I sketched it.
As for thc fact that in one dialogue Sócrates is completely absent,
namely, in the Laws, one must also consider the connection between poetry
and legislación as indicated by Diotim a, as well as Sócrates’ being nonpolit-
ical. So chis absence in the Laxos fits beautifriliy into what I said.
T h e philosophic presentación o f poetry is the central sección o f the last

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CHAP T E R ELEVEN

part o f Diotim a’s speech. What about the presentation o f philosophy in che
last sección? We observe the complete sil ence about che ideas; only one such
thing is mentioned, the beautiful itself, but not as idea. The idea o f che
beautiful is introduced and has, in eftect, the function o f the idea o f the
good, which, according co Plato, has an absolutely unique position. This is
done withouc any preparation as well as certain other difficulties which I in-
dicated. I suggest that the last part has the function o f giving a poetic pre­
sentación o f philosophy. What philosophy is does not in any reasonable way
appear from these two pages. It gives an image to the imagination o f the in-
credible superiority o f philosophy to any other beautiful thing. In the light
o f what I said, this poetic presentation o f philosophy is surely n ot tragic, ul-
timatcly it would perhaps appear to be highly comical. Unless we would say
that this poetic presentation is given by Diotima, not Sócrates, and Diotima
perhaps did n ot suffer from Sócrates’ limitation. Sócrates wins the contest
wich the poets by being able to give a phllosophic presentation o f poetry
and a poetic presentation o f philosophy. N o poet has cver succeeded in do-
ing that.
This poetic presentation o f philosophy leads us to see that eros is, strictly
speaking, only eros tbr human beings. Eros, then, is n ot the best helper for
human naturc. In other words, che dialogue ends with a depreciation o f
eros. This is, I think, the beginning o f the P haednts. T h ere, young Phae-
drus, in his opinions entirely uncrotic, prefcrring nonlovers to lovers, is
corrcctcd by Sócrates who gives there an unqualified praise o f eros. But
preciscly the P hacdrus i$ the only Platonic dialogue which ends with a
prayer, not to eros but, above all, to the god Pan, who has much to do with
fertility and, to that extern, with eros. Buc fcrtilicy in the wide sense: the
god o f natural wcalth. Even he re we are not permitted to forget the crucial
importancc o f the love o f gain, which is a humble represe ntative o f the love
for true gain, true wealth, the wealth o fth e soul, wisdom. S o much for this
section.
Listener: Are you suggesting that Sócrates lacked spiritedness whereas
Plato and Xcnophon did not?
M r Strauss: I am compclled to say that. Difierenriy stated and perhaps
more intelligibly, Sócrates was more unqualifiedly the philosophcr. I am
also n ot satisfied with this as an answer, because I am surc there is some-
thing hidden there, but I have not been able to crack that nut. You might
say Plato and Xenophon, to o , were not angry but played angry when ncc-
essary. Apparently Sócrates could n ot even d o that. There is only one scene
wherc Sócrates is almost angry, in Xenophon’s M em orabilia, in the first

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S O C R A T n f 3 >

book, chaptcr 3 , I believe. The o b ject o f his quasi anger is Xenophon. But I
admit, what I said is not perfectly clear and satisfactory.
Ltstener: I f eros is only eros fbr human beings, what would be th c status,
o r what would you cali the affinity, o f the sensitive person to the good?
Mr. Strauss: I f we take eros ín this strict and proper meaning, what
Aristophanes says could very well be true, that it contains more than the
lovers know. But if this implication is brought out, it would no longer be
eros proper. For example, the re is ¡mplied, as you may know from the liter-
ature, in every deep erotic relación a desire tor immortality o f that relación,
which cannoc in this form be fulfilled. The re is no such desire implied in the
desire for fbod o r drink. Would this implication o f eros n ot lead us beyond
eros? There are various other ways; for example, people are con cerned
whether their love is genuine o r not. Therefbre the question o f human sin-
cerity comes up. There are infinite ways which lead from the love o f human
beings in the strict sense beyond it. M ore gene rally stated: man cannot find
his completion, his fulfillment, in the erotic Ufe striedy understood. You
can, o f coursc, cali it eros, but thc question is whether this is n ot a meta-
phoric use o f che cerm. But ic is perhaps the best term we have.
L isten cr: I f in t h e h i g h e s t S t a t e m a n b e c o m e s purified o f e r o s , is t h i s his
h ig h e s t p e r fe c tio n ?

Mr. Strauss: Apparently this is the case. I f you see something beautifiil
without having looked for it, docsn’t it strike you and attract you without
any desire to possess it in any way? Whereas there is a lower kind o f love
which has necessarily a reflection to the self, health o r wealth. But there is a
love o f the beautiful which is really self-forgetcing and which is, in a way, o f
higher nobility than that love which i$ not selfrforgctting. The rcmarkable
fact is this: on the highest level self-forgetting is n ot possi ble. Love o f the
truth is higher than love o f beauty, and love o f the truth, if it is anything, is
something you want to possess. This can be absent in love o f the beautiful.
T h at is what Plato means. There is that strange kinship between the highest
and the lowest.
Ltstener: D oes love o f the good also presume that kinship with the low-
CSt?
Mr. Strauss: In one way: the concern with self, with thc health o f the
soul, is present on the highest level. Certain kinds o f love o f the beautiful do
n ot have that implication.
Listencr: Are you saying, then, that love o f the beautiful is higher in a
certain sense?
Mr. Strauss: That i$ probably n ot the only case in which a certain thing is

249
12 ALCIBIADES

L ast time we completed the study o f Sócrates’ specch. All pcople


present, invited o r uninvited, with the exception o f Aristodemus, ha ve spo-
ken. We are at the end. But the dialogue docs n ot end with that— an erup­
ción takes place, Alcibiades comes in. Why does the dialogue on eros end
with Alcibiades’ speech on Sócrates? The re is, o f coursc, a dramatic motiva­
ción given, which we shall read. But let us first regard the issue without re-
gard to specific evidcnce. One could argüe as follows. The primary theme
o f the Symposium is n ot eros, but Sócrates’ hubris. This leads to the fact that
the dialogue is placed in the year 4 1 6 , at the time when the profanaron o f
the mysteries took place, where Alcibiades was involved more than anyone
else. So Alcibiades had to com e in for this reason. Since the poet accused
Sócrates, o r the philosophers in general, o f hubris, it was necessary to link
up the presentation o f Sócrates’ hubris with the rebuttal o f the poets. This
required a contest with the poets, and che most elegant fbrm in which this
could be done by Plato was to rake as his model Aristophanes’ Frogs, where
Alcibiades is, in a way, the key personage, for with a view to Alcibiades the
contest between the tragic poets is decided in favor o f Aeschylus. So Alcibi­
ades had to com e in from this considcration too. Yct we must, o f course,
understand Alcibiades’ speech also as the fitting conclusión to a dialogue
on eros; otherwise this would be a bit far-fetched. Sócrates alone says o f
him sclf that he is only an expert in erotic things; therefore it is natural to
present at the end o f the dialogue someone who should best know Sócrates
as an erotician, if I may coin a word.
But perhaps more simply: eros, strictly understood, is lovc o f human bc-
ings, a desire to be together with a human being o r human beings whom
one loves, and this means the being together o f the bodies, not in any nar­
ro w sensc. W hat we now cali personal presence is, o f course, presence o f the
body. Talk can only occur when both are present. Now if this is eros, eros is
essentially limited to onc’s lifetime. B u t eros tends beyond one’s lifetime
and, therefore, it becomes desire for immortality for the sakc o f eros, o f be­
ing together always, o f bodily immortality. This would require incamation
o f the soul so that it can survive the death o f the body. T h e only natural
form o f this incarnation is writing. For a bookis a bodily thing which can be
present with human beings after the author’s death. From this point o f view

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ALCIR IADBS

the fe cc that Sócrates did n ot write would seem to indícate that he scorned
this kind o f immortality. I t indicates, we can also say, the problematic char-
acter o f Sócrates’ eros, o f hisdesire to be togethereithcr in his body proper
o r in this kind o f body— the book— with those he loved. Was Sócrates a
lover? This question is imposed on us by the very fect that he did not write.
The man who, at first glance, would secm to have known Sócrates best as a
lo ver was Alcibiades, and Alcibiades will give an answer to our question,
which is n ot sufficient but part o f our evidence. Sócrates was not a lo ver. I f
you remember the argumcnt I stated before, it means therefore he did not
write. B u t we must go deeper into the argument. I believe thc rime has now
com e, before we turn to the text, tor a consideration which I have post­
poned many times.
The Symposium contains six speeches on eros, six different views o r the-
ories o f eros. B u t in a work such as this there must be some connection be-
tween the theory and the theoretician, between the speech and thc speaker.
The theories must somehow reflect typical human attitudes, as we would
say today. Now, what are these altitudes? I f the Symposium is n ot complete
in its consideration o f the possible human attitudcs, it is, o f course, incom­
plete as a presentation o f eros. We must, therefore, get a survey o f the pos­
sible attributes o f eros on the basis supplied by the Symposium. This can be
done by a simple mathematical operation. There are three considerations
which are obviously relevant: (1 ) the speaker may be a loveror be loved; (2 )
he m ay be oíd o r young, because it is n ot necessary that the lo ver be oíd and
the beloved young; (3 ) as indicated by the attitude toward wild drinking ¡n
the beginning, is he cautious o r not? T h e incautious are subdivided into
two fbrms: the incautious who is soft and the incautious who is manly. We
have, then, three different points o f view, two consisting o f two airernatives
and one o f three— twelve alternad ves altogether.
Now let us look at the combinations and see whether we can identify
them . Young, cautious, lover; young, cautious, beloved; oíd, cautious,
lover; oíd, cautious, beloved; young, soft, lover; young, soft, beloved; oíd,
soft, lover; oíd, soft, beloved; young, manly, lover; young, manly, beloved;
oíd, manly, lover; oíd, manly, beloved. I don’t claim that what I am going
to say now is the last word on the subject. I will make now one premise
which will not sound absurd, I believe, namely that oíd, manly, lover and
oíd, manly, beloved are one and the same in our dialogue— Sócrates. Oíd
does n ot mean seventy, but oíd relative to his beloved. That he is loved is
shown clearly by Aristodemus; that he is a lover is, at Icast, his claim; that he
is neither soft ñor cautious is evident. The total number o f characters would

253
CH A P T E R I' VV É L V B

violcts, along with a great many fillcts on his head, and he said, “Men,
helio! Wil1 you weleome an extremely drunk man as a fellow drinker, or
are wc to go away once we have crowned Agathon? ít ’s why we carne. I,
you scc," he said, “could not come yesterday, buc now I have come with
fillets on my head, Ln order that from my head I may crown just likc this
the head o f the wisesc and most beautífuJ, if I may say so. Wiil you really
laugh at me because I am drunk? But even ifyou do laugh, all che same I
know that I am telíing the cruth. But telJ me, from wherc I am standing,
am I co enter on these conditions or not? Will you drink wich me or not?"
(2 1 2 d 5 -2 1 3 a 2 )

Since Alcibiades has not yet seen Sócrates he calis Agathon the wisest. H e is
sure that he telis the truth, as you see, in spite o r because o f his being drunk.
In vino peritas— there is something to that. But, on the other hand, we can
also say drunkenness docsn’t necessarily guarantee the truth. H ow true wili
it then be, what he is going to say about Sócrates later on in his speech? You
see ln the earlier part o f this passage the decisión is made by Alcibiades and
his atiendan ts, n ot by Agathon’s servants. Alcibiades crashes the party.

All then cried out loudly and urged him to enter and He down, and Aga­
thon invited him. And he carne, being led by human bcíngs. (2 1 3 a 3 -5 )

“Led by human beings.” A n thropoi, as distinguished from real men, hom ­


bres. In this particular corm cction, I believe, it means something very em-
phatic. W ho is led by human beings emphatically? One who is n ot a human
being, a kind o f god. I suggest that Alcibiades is he re presented as, let me
say, the raw material out o f which the poets make gods.

And raking offthc fillcts as if to crown, he was holding thcm in front ofhis
eyes and did not catch sight o f Sócrates, but sat down beside Agathon, be*
tween Sócrates and him, for when Sócrates saw him he made room for
him. Then sitting down beside Agathon he grccted him and wascrowning
him. Then Agathon said, “Táke o ff Alcibiades’ shoes, boys, so that he may
lie down as the third." “Yes, o f coursc,” Alcibiades said, “but who is our
third fellow drinker?" And as he turned around he saw Sócrates, and on
secing him he jumped up and said, “Heracles!" (2 1 3 a S -b 8 )

You will scc that Alcibiades swears more than anyone else.

“What was this? Here’s Sócrates! Once more you wcrc lying down he re
waicing in ambush, just as you’re accustomed to pop up suddenly wher-
ever I was thinking you would léase be. And now why have you come? And
why in turn did you recline just here? It wasn’t by the side o f Aristophanes

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A L C I B I A D E i

or anyone clse who is ridiculous and wants to be, but you contrived to lie
down by the side o fth e mosc beautihil ofthosc within." (2 1 3 b 9 -c 5 )

Sócrates' presen ce comes as an entire surprise to Alcibiades. B u t the point


made at the end is particulariy remarkable. Whcre would Alcibiades expect
to find Sócrates? By the com ic poet. Sócrates prefers the most beautiful
youth only to the comic poet. Th¡$ i$ five years after Aristophanes wrote the
Cloudsy his famous “attack" on Sócrates. T herc was no enmity between
them , and we must keep this in mind, for it is o f the greatest impor canee for
what follows.

And Sócrates said, “Agathon, scc to it that you protect me» since the eros
o f this human being has proved to be not a trivial matter for me. From the
time when I feli in love with him, it is no longcr possiblc for me eithcr to
glance at or converse with even a single beauty, or else he is jcalous o f me
and in his resentment does amazing things and reviles me and hardly
keeps his hands off. Sec to it that he docs not do something now, but rec-
oncile us» or ifhe tries to use forcé» defend me, since I am very much afraid
ofhis madness and love ofalover.” (2 1 3 c6 -d 6 )

W ho is the iover, Sócrates o r Alcibiades? Sócrates says that he fell in love


with Alcibiades, but Alcibiades is jealous o f Sócrates. Is the problem sufli-
ciendy solved by the fect that Alcibiades is the lovcr in responsc? You may
know from the literature A falls in love with B» a young man with a young
girl» and it may happen that B also falls in love with A, so there is nothing
absurd about that. But we must see if this is the situation.

“W dl, there is no possibílity o f rcconciiiation between you and m e," Alci-


biades said» “but I shall take my vengeance on you for this at another time.
But now. Agachón,* he said, “lend me somc o f the fiilcts, in order that I
may crown this wonderfu! head o f his too, and lest he find fault with me
because I crowned you, while he who wins over all human beings in
speeches, not only as you did the day before yesterday, but always, and de­
spite that I had the nerve not to crown him.” And he immediately took
somc o f the fiilcts and crowned Sócrates and lay down. ( 2 13d7—e6)

Thus Alcibiades fulíills the prophecy. In the beginning Agachón had said to
Sócrates, “Dionysus shall be the judge between you and m e." Now Diony-
sus, represented by Alcibiades, is the judge and crowns Sócrates. While
Agathon to o is crowned, Sócrates is given the highest praisc: he wins al­
ways, n ot only once in a while. Therefbre onc can say, with reference to an
earlier remark I made, the god, whose raw material is Alcibiades, would

257
C H A P T B R T W B L V B

seem to be Dionysus. B u t that does n ot yet settle the issue. There may be
other gods, greater gods, who couJd be made o f Ale ibi ades by a great poet.

When he had lain down, he said, “Alright, men. You seem to me to be


sober. You mustn’t be allowed to be, but you have to drink, for wc have
made this agreement. So 1 choose as thc rulcr o f the drinking, until you
drink enough, m ysdf ” (2 1 3 c 7 - 10)

You see the agreement is kept. There is a strange mixture o f tyrannicai and
constitutional procedure. It is only for the purpose o f executing what has
been agreed upon. He is a typical tyrant, who would always $ay, *1 fulñil
what all o f you want,” but surely he eleccs himself

“Well, Agathon, let someonc bring me some big cup, if there is any. But
there is no need. Come, boy,” he said, when he saw it had a capacity o f
more than eight pints, “bring me thatcooler.” He then had it filled up and
drank o u to fit himself first, then he urged them to pour it out for Sócrates
and at the same time said, “Against Sócrates, men, this sophism o f mine is
nothing, for howcvcr much onc bids him drink, so much he drinks up and
will never get any more drunk.”
Sócrates drank as soon as thc boy had filled it; but Eryximachus said,
“How do we do this, Alcibiadcs? Is it in this way, without either saying or
singing anything in our cups, but shall wc drink simply like thc thirsty?”
(2 1 3c 1 0 —214 b 2 )

Eryximachus protests. H e is in a way the guardián o f everyone, thc physi-


cian. He does n ot fbrbid drinking, he only forbids mere drinking.

Then Alcibiadcs said, “Eryximachus, the best o f the best and most mod*
érate [sober] father, helio!” (2 1 4 b 3 -4 )

H e does n ot say most sober son, his father was most sober. This may mean
that Eryximachus did have a lítele and is n ot altogether sober.

“Grcctings to you too,” Eryximachus said. “ But whac are wc to do?”


“Whatevcryou command. One muse o bey you, ‘For a physician is equiva-
lent in worth to many others.’ So order whatever you want.” (2 1 4 b 6 -8 )

Alcibiades gives in to Eryximachus without any ado. Why? H e quoces a


verse from the lita d , book 11, 5 1 4 , where a physician ts mentioned. This
physician was the son o f Asclepius who is, o f course, inferior co Asclepius,
just as Eryximachus is interior to his father, as we have seen. Machaon was
wounded by París, H elen’s husband, and the verse occurs in connection
with the valué o f physicians in war after a physician has been wounded. The

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tact that thc physician is n ot available is much worsc than if any hero were
n ot available because he can save many. Physicians are eminently useful in
war, and war is, o f course, as we shall see later, the most important business.
I f this is so, it follows strictly that one must listen to physicians in cvery af-
fair. I f one must listen to them in the most important things, one must
surely listen to them in less important things.
O ne more word about the situación in the eleventh book o f the Iliad: It
is a bad situation. H éctor is loose and slays many Greeks. The Greeks are in
greater danger than ever beíbre. Néstor, eloquence ¡ncarnate, gives an elo-
quent description o f the danger which Achilies’ aloofness irom the suffer-
ing o f the Greeks has brought about. Achilies is still sulking in his tcn t, and
the Greeks are in sore need o f Achilles. This situación exists again in 4 0 7 .
The Athenians, and in a way all Greeks, are in sore need. Alcibiadcs is aloof,
somehow aligned with the Persian king, and he is the only man who can
save Greece. By the way, this fits beautilully with Thucydides’ description o f
Alcibiades in this situation. Alcibiades divines the situation— he longs for
it— where he, a new and greater Achilies, will be the one ail Greece wants as
their savior. So this verse o f H om er is very revealing. O ne must always look
up quotations in their context if the context is preser ved. T o repeat; Is it
clear why Alcibiades obeys Eryximachus? That is surely a question. Why
should such a grand seigneur obey a physician, howcver famous, if the
physician was n ot, in a way, the most important man in war?

“ Listen then,” Eryximachus said. “We had dccidcd bcforc you carne in
that each o f us in turn, starting on thc left, ought to speak as beautiíul a
speech about Eros as he could and praise him. Now ail the rest o f us have
spoken, but you, sincc you have not spoken and have drunk, it is just for
you to speak and, once you have spoken, give any order you want to
Sócrates, and then he to the one on his right and so on for all thc rest.”
(2 1 4 b 9 -c 5 )

Alcibiades must speak on eros, o f course, likc cveryone clse, and then give a
commlssion to Sócrates, and then Sócrates to his neighbor on the right.
H erc wc have this difficuley: Is Sócrates n ot the last one on the right? And
here I am subject to correction by anyone who know$ better than I how the
seating arrangement was. B u t, as I understand it, Eryximachus must have
been mistaken, and if this is so, it would be addítionai proof that he is not
altogether sober.

“Well, Eryximachus,” Alcibiades said. “Though you speak well, sdll Tm


afraíd it w on't be quite cqual co set a drunk man against the speeches o f

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C H A P T E R r v v B L V E

the sobcr. And, you blessed innocent, docs Sócrates persuade you o f any-
thing o f thc things which he just now said? O r do you know that it is
wholly the opposiee o f what he was saying? For he, if I praise anyonc else
than him, while he is present, either a god or a human being, he will not
keep his handsoffm e.” “Be quiet!” Sócrates said. (2 1 4 c6 -d 5 )

Alcibiades says Sócrates wiil n ot tolérate it if I praise in his presence any god
o r man. Therefore he cannot praise ero$. For, contrary to what Sócrates
says, he is n ot a lover, n ot a worshiper o f eros.

“No, by Poseidont” Alcibiades said, “Say nothíng against it, since I would
praise no one else when you are presenC."
“Wcll, do it in this way,” Eryximachus said, “if you want. Praise
Sócrates. ”
“How do you mean?” Alcibiades said. “Is it thought that I should,
Eryximachus? Am I to attack the man and in your presence take my re­
vengo on him?"
“You, ehere,” Sócrates said. “What do you have in mind? T o praise me
to make things funnier? Or what will you do?”
“I shall tell the truth. But see whetheryou allow it.”
“WciJ, in that case,” he said, “I allow and urge you to tell the truth.”
UI couldn’t begin too so o n ," Alcibiades said. “However, do as follows.
I f I say something untrue, check me in the middle, if you want, and say
that 1 am lying on that point; for as fer as my will goes I shall tic about
nothing. If, however, in rccollccting, I jump from one thing to another,
don’t wonder; for it is not at all easy for someone in the condition you see
me in to enumérate fluencly and in order your strangeness.” (2 1 4 d 6 -
2 I5 a 3 )

Alcibiades will praise Sócrates. This is settled. Sócrates couldn’t bear any-
thing else being praised in his presence, at least when Alcibiades is the
praiser. At the same time Alcibiades will take his revenge. Still, he will tell
only the truth about Sócrates. Sócrates certainly cannot forbid that. S ó c­
rates does not refer to modesty for n ot wanting to be praised; he says that
he cannot prevent anyone from telling the truth no m atter what the subject
might be.
U stcn er: Sócrates spoke o f his d atm on ion as preventing him from doing
what is n ot proper, and this is cssentially what Alcibiades is asking Sócrates
to do for him.
Mr. Strauss: That is not a bad point. Very good as a m atter o f fact, be-
cause Alcibiades later on speaks o f Sócrates as a demonic being.
lÁ stentr: Where the English says, “in the condition you see me in,” docs

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A L O Bl A D E S

that specifically refer to Alcibiades’ drunkenncss or could it be a reference


to Alcibiades’ whole character?
Mr. Strauss: I believe ¡t refers to his drunkenness.
U sten er: Could it be construed as meaning that he is n ot the sort o f fel-
low who can sit down and give an orderly presentation o f the sort o f person
Sócrates is because he does n ot really understand him?
Mr. Strauss: This would be a subtlcty which Plato could have meant to
convey without Alcibiades being aware o f it. Surely. That is very good, if
you understand it this way. That is exactly what will happen. Alcibiades is a
man who does n ot know what he is talking about, and yet in a strange way
through a screen sees everything.
[In answer to a question:] Eryximachus is corrupted by Alcibiades’
tyrannical conduct to becom e a tyrant himself. Now let us begin with Al*
cibiades’ speech.

“I shall try to praise Sócrates, men, in this way— through images. Now he,
perhaps, will believe it is for making thtngs fonnier, but the image will be
for the sakc o fth e truth, not for the sake o fth e ridículous.” (2 1 5 a 4 -6 )

Alcibiades will praise Sócrates by use o f símiles and thus give a truthful de-
scription. That is important. I t is a new light on poetry which we have not
yet received. U p to now it seems that poetry does not tell the truth: poetry
magnifies, poetry adorns and thereforc distorts the truth. But poetry can be
truthful through símiles, and this means also that poetry does n ot limit it-
self to generadng political prudence. For example, the description o f S ó c­
rates has no relation to that. At any rate, Alcibiades will give a poetic pre­
sentation o f Sócrates, and this follows naturally the poetic presentation o f
philosophy in the last part o f Diotim a’s speech. B o th presentations o f phi-
losophy and o f Sócrates are inspired. D io tima is a prophetess and Alcibiades
is inspired by winc. The wine is that which makes possible the perfect frank-
ness o f his speech. This particular inspiration by wine is absent from the po­
etic presentation o f philosophy by Sócrates or Diotima.
It would seem, then, that we are likely to get a franker presentation here
o f Sócrates than we have received o f philosophy. Only one question remains:
Is Alcibiades competent? That we don’t know yet. H e speaks through simil­
itudes and the similitudes are, o f course, n ot litcrally true. The similitudes
refer to the whole Sócrates, n ot any individual action. All details are literally
true, that is Alcibiades’ claim. One could say what Alcibiades wants to give
is poetic history, where the whole is in símiles and all details are true. The
greatest example known to me at least o f such poetic history is Thucydides.

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C H A l* I E R I W E L V E

virtuc, ciaims for him sclf the highest honors. The mere fact that Sócrates
says nothing to contradict Alcibiades would, on the fece o f it, mean that
Alcibiades has n ot said an untruth. We must al so n ot forget that, whatever
hubris may mean, this dialogue serves the purpose o f presenting Sócrates’
hubris, and thercfore it would be ardstícally impossible to destroy that.
W ithin the limits o f his understanding he makcs clear what Sócrates’
hubris ís.

wBut yoa differ from him by only this much, that without instrumcncs,
wich bare speeches, you have che same effect.” ( 2 1 5 c 6 - d l)

That is the only different between Sócrates and Marsyas. T h at is to say the re
¡s no difference between Sócrates and Marsyas regarding the defeat by
Apollo. How could Sócrates have been defcated by Apollo, on the basis o f
what we know? Where did Apollo enter into Sócrates’ life? The Delphic O r­
acle. T h e oracle said Sócrates was the wisest man, and then Sócrates goes
around in Athens and examines every Athenian- Perhaps this was Sócrates’
defeat, that he had to walk around and examine every Athenian. You could,
o f course, say Alcibiades was drunk and every word would, therefore, not
have to be takcn seriously, but Plato wasn’t drunk.

wWe, at any ratc, whenever wc hear anyonc clsc speaking other speeches,
even o f a very good public speaker, vírtually no onc has any concern; but
whenever someo ne hears you speak or someone else speaks your speeches,
cvcn if the speaker is very poor, regardless ofwhether a man, a woman, or
a youth hears them, we are thunderstruckand possessed.* (2 1 5 d l-d 6 )

Sócrates is the only speaker whose speeches take possession o f the hearcr.
H e does n ot say now that his speeches, Üke Marsyas’s speeches, make mani-
fest those who are in need o f the gods. Every hearcr o f Sócrates’ speeches is
entranced, even if the speaker is a very low fellow, even women and young
men. Sócrates i$ a máster o f swaying the demos.

“I, at any race, men, if I were not going to be thoughc utterly drunk,
would have sworn to you exactly the sort o f things I myself have experi-
enccd by his speeches and how I still experience them even now. For
whenever I hear them, co a far greater extenc than Corybants, my heart
leaps and tcars pour out o f my eyes by the cffect o f his speeches; and I see
many many others experíencing the same things. In hearíng Pendes and
other good public speakers, though I was thinking they spoke well, I was
experíencing nothing like this, ñor was my soul in turmoi! and expcrícnc*
ing vexation at my slavjsh disposition, but this Marsyas put me in this State

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A L C I B I A D E S

quite o fren, so as to thínk that life was not worth living for me, being in
the State I am. And you won’t say, Sócrates, that these things too aro not
truc.” (2 1 S d 6 -2 1 6 a 2 )

You $ee the repetition: after all, Alcibiades should know best how Sócrates*
speeches affected him. How would you describe that effect o f Sócrates’
rhetoric, whích has no paral leí in present o r past according to Alcibiades?
Perhaps we should read on.

“And still even now 1 am conscious within mysclf that should I be willing
to (end my ears, I would not resist but I would experience the same things.
He compels me to agrcc that, in being need o f much mysclf, I still neglect
myself and handle the aftairs o f the Athenians. So forcibly stopping my
ears as if from the Sirens I ftee and am gonc, in order that I do not sit here
ídly beside him and grow oíd. I have cxperienced in relation to him alone
o f human beings what one would not suspect was in me, to experience
shamc before anyonc whatsoever. 1 feel ashamed only before him. I know
within myself that I cannot contradict him and say that I should not do
what he urges, but whenever I go away [I am conscious J that I have be en
defeated by the honor from the many. So I scurry away [like a runaway
slavc] and avoid him, and whenever 1 see him, I am ashamed about what
has been agreed upon. And often 1 would see him with pie asure no longer
among human beings, but ifthis should happen, I knowwell that 1 would
to a much greaeer exten t be grieved, and henee 1 don’t know what I am to
do with this human being.” (2 1 6 a 3 -c 3 )

This is the end o f the first part o f Alcibiades’ speech. H ow would you de­
scribe the effect o f Sócrates’ speeches as described here by Alcibiades? I
think there i$ one modern word, which has no equivalent in Greek, which
could be used to describe this: religión. Alcibiades feels like a sinner— to
use a biblical expression— like one who knows that he sins but cannot help
going on sinning. That is perfectly true, provided we make one distinction
which is now very popular, I understand, between shame cultures and guilt
cultures. Indeed, Alcibiades speaks only o f shame, n ot o f guilt, I do not
want to identify myself with this theory, because guilt plays, o f course, a
great role among the Greeks as well, but certainly n ot in the case o f Alcibi­
ades. Sócrates, we may say, successfully preaches repentance. In his effect he
appears almost like, what in an entircly different context would be, reli-
gious speakers. Sócrates is a successful p re ache r o f repentance, a religious
effect.
Alcibiades, howevcr, is defeated; he cannot live up to what he learos
from Sócrates. The thing that prevenís him from complying with Sócrates

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him sclf entirely to the moderation aspcct, that Sócrates’ ignorance to o is


mere pretense. H ow could Sócrates’ interior be beautifiii if he were also ig-
norant in his interior? Alcibiades surely does not say that.
One could say, o f coursc, that Alcibiades has refiited the charge o f
Sócrates’ ignorance by his praise o f Sócrates’ speeches. How could a man
makc such speeches without possessing knowledge? I used almost inadver-
tendy the expression “the charge o f ignorance.” B u t that is the point. Aid-
biades, seventeen years in advance, meets the charge against Sócrates. What
was the charge for which he was condemned? He does n ot be lieve in the
gods o f the city and he corrupts the young, also a biparrite charge, just as
herc. H ere it is his love for the beautifol ones and his ignorance. Is there a
possible connection between these two charges? The first impression you
get when you hear o f a man corrupting the young is, o f course, pederasty.
Plato does n ot allude to that, but Xenophon does. I contend that igno-
rance and the charge o f impiety also corre spond. I f he only says, UI do not
know whether Zeus is,” that has practically the same effect. H e cannot
simply worship the gods o f the city. H ere we come somewhat closer to the
problem o f Sócrates’ hubris. H is hubris has very much to do with the issue
o fth e gods, as indicated in the beginning, starting from the consideration
that the Sytnposium is the only dialogue devoted to onc o f the recognized
gods.
Aldbiades has some awareness o f treasures hidden in Sócrates which
would n ot appear in his speeches. H e has seen that the outsidc, love o f
beautiful young males and assertion o f ignorance, is mere dissimuladon.
The inside is divine, namely, puré modcradon. B u t what about the inner
side o f Sócrates’ ignorance? Alcibiades wanted to know Sócrates’ knowl-
edge, which he was sure was concealed behind his pretended ignorance.
W hat does he do in order to disco ver that hidden knowledge? That is told
at great length in the sequel. H e thinks that if he achieves bodily intimacy,
Sócrates will no longer be able to withhold from him anything he knows.
W hat he discovers in this very ambiguous story, verging on the unbearable,
is that Sócrates was a man o f perfect modera don. Sócrates’ knowledge, what
he was about, he never discovered. Alcibiades had undergone the effect o f
Sócrates’ ugliness and his pretended eroticism. H e had also undergone the
effect o f his moving speeches. Then he disccrns that there is something else
and he tries to disco ver it. He never discovers it. O n the contrary, it ends
with a great humiliation for Alcibiades. How does he get out o f it? H e tells
the story with great frankness, though he is n ot fuily aware o f the connec-
tion. How does he get out o f that State o f humiliation brought about, on

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C H A P T E R T W B L V E

S o that was the first artempt. At first Alcibiadcs was always in company
when he met Sócrates. Now he wants to find the secret. H e is alone with
him, but nothing happens. Yet one thing is dcar. Alcibiades expects o r di­
vines that Sócrates’ secret knowlcdge is o f an erotic kind.

“After that I invítcd him to join me in exercising, and I joincd him in ex­
ercising, as I intended that here I would gec somcwherc. So he exercised
with me and wrestled with me often when no one else was presen c. What
need is the re to speak any more about it? It did not do me any good. And
when I was getting nowhere in this way, I decided I should attack the man
at ñjU strength and not let up, inasmuch as I had now started on che at-
tempt, but I now had toknow what the business is.” (2 1 7 b 7 -c 6 )

T h e business o f Sócrates. That is the formula used in the Apology, the busi-
ness o f Sócrates. W hat is it? N o one knows. Alcibiades has the same embar*
rassment, but he has the particular nodon that this business has to do with
eros, and the refere he proceeds in an erotic fashion.

“So I invited him to join me at dinner, simply as a lover plots agaínst a


bclovcd. Not cven in this case did he quickly acccpt, but nevertheless in
time he was persuaded. When he had come che first tíme, he wanted to go
awav once he had dined; and chcrt out o f shamc T Icr him go. But on the
sccond occasion 1 plottcd, and when we had dined I kept on convcrsing
far into thc night, and when he wanted to go away, i pretended that it was
too lace and compe!led him to stay. He was resting on thc couch next to
mine, the one he had dined on, and no one else was sleeping in the room
except us.” ( 2 1 7 c 7 -e l)

S o that is the last stage, and an account o f it will follow. Alcibiades is driven
to reverse roles and piay the lover. Sócrates daimed to be the lover o f Alci­
biades, but that did not work. Alcibiades has to w oo Sócrates. Therc are six
stages. Alcibiades in the company o f attendants; Alcibiades alone; training,
i.e., stripping, together; thc invitación to dinner refosed; dinner without
conscquence; and six— I have to use the hard word— to sleep together.
That will com e now.

“Now up to this point in che logos it would be fair to tell it to anyone at


all; but what followed you would not have hcard from me unless, in the
first place, as the saying goes, wine without boys and with boys is after all
truc, and, in the second place, ic appears to me unjusc, now that I have
come to the praise, to hide from view the overwccning deed o f Sócrates.
And thirdly, the experience o f one bitten by a viper holds me too. They
surcly say that anyone who experienccs it is unwilling to say what sort it

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C H A P T E R T W K L V B

Ale ibi ades makes it olear and pro ves it that he is altogether frank. W hether
Sócrates is altogether frank remains to be scen. Alcibiadcs makes Sócrates
what wc can only cali an improper advance, and his problem is the same as
that o f Pausanias, who was also worried about decency. But in contradis-
dnction to Pausanias, Alcibiades does not suggcst a chango in the law. Alci­
biades has a tyrannical naturc, he disregards the law in favor o f the opinión
o f the sensible. T h e sensible will accept his conduct and that is sufficient;
the law is o f no interest.

aAnd he, when he heard me, very Lronically, and very charactcristically o f
him,saídin his usual way/Mydear Alcibiades, it's probable thatyou really
are not a bad sort, if it is in fact truc what you say about me and the re is
some power in me through which you would become becter. You must,
you know, be seeing some indescribable beauty in me and very far superior
to the beauty o f form in you. So ifin catchingsighc oficyou are trying to
have a share in ic and exchange beauty for beauty, íc’s not by a lítele
amount that you incend to gain an advantage over me, buc you are trying
to aequire the truch o f bcautiful things in place o f this opinión [sceming;
doxa]9 and you have in mind to exchange in rcality gold for bronze. But,
you blessed innocent, consider becter, lest I be, wichout your being aware
o f it, nothing. The sight o f thought, you know, begíns to look sharply
when the sight o f the eyes tries to fall o ff from its peak, and you are still far
from that.,w(2 l8 d ó -2 1 9 a 4 )

How does Sócrates get out o f this delicate situation? H e says, as it were,
you, Alcibiades, see in me an indescribable beauty, but precisely if you are
right you are trying to cheat me. You will get my true beauty and I would
get your spurious beauty, and that is n ot fair. I t is like the exchange o f Glau*
cus and Diomedes, exchanging gold for bronze weapons in the lita d . The
alternad ve is that you are mistaken as to my beauty. In that case I would
cheat you. Sócrates declines Alcibiades’ offer on grounds o f justice, perhaps
ultimately on the side o f law, seeing the connection between justice and
law.
Alcibiades is, o f course, unaware o f the ground o f this rejection, and
that is characteristic o f him because he has all kinds o f qualities but surely
no sense o f justice. Wc must also n ot ovcrlook the element o f sclfishness in
Sócrates. Sócrates, to o , does n ot wish to be cheated.

“And I, when 1 heard chis, said, ‘Nothing on my side has been stated in
any other way than how I think it; so on this condition you yourselfdelib­
érate and decide whatever you believe is best for you and m e.' ‘Well,’ he
said, ‘that is a good point. In the ensuing time we shall on deliberation do

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whatever appears to the two o f us thc bcst about thcsc things and every-
ching else.’ Now I, once I had spokcn and heard him say this, and with thc
discharge o f ai1 my wcapons as it wcrc, I bclicvcd he had been wounded,
and getting up, I did not ailow him to say anything anymore, but I
wrappcd my own himation around him— it was winter— and lying down
under that threadbare cloak o f his, I threw my arms around this truly de-
monic and wonderful being and lay down beside him the whole night.
And not even on chese potnts, Sócrates, will you say I am lying. And when
I had done this, he proved to be so far superior to my youthful bloom and
scorned and laughed at and insulted ic— and I was thinking I was some-
thing, in this regard at Icast. Oh, judges! You are judges o f che high and
mighty disdain o f Sócrates— know wel1, by che gods, by the goddesses, I
slcpt and goc up with Sócrates, and nothing more untoward occurrcd
than if I were slccping with my father or older brother.” (2 1 9 a 5 -d 2 )

Another oath o f Alcibiades, a very unusual oath. H e is a big swearer, as wc


have seen. H e calis those present the jury, the judges. This is a judgment o f
Sócrates, and wc must see the divination o f Alcibiades. Alcibiades knows,
divines, that Sócrates wiíl have to stand before a jury.
B u t Alcibiades’ speech is both an accusation o f Sócrates and a detense o f
Sócrates. Sócrates is guilty o f hubris. H e disdained arrogantly Alcibiades.
B u t he is n ot guilty o f corrupting the young. Why is he not guilty o f cor-
rupting the young? Becausc he is a man o f moderation. But the ground o f
his acquittal, moderadon, is at the same time the ground o f his hubris. His
hubris toward Alcibiades is a necessary consequence o f Sócrates’ modera-
don. Now let us transíate it into the terms o f the charge made later on: be-
cause Sócrates is moderare, because his eros has been purified, he does not
believe in the gods o f the city. The refere, because o f his moderadon he is
guilty o f hubris. N o one was ever as cióse as that to Sócrates in body, i f we
disregard Xanthippe. Yet Alcibiades leamed absolutely nothing about the
secret o f Sócrates’ business, he learned only o fh is moderadon. You can also
say Sócrates has no hidden business, he has no hidden knowledge. Thesc
beaudful statues within Sócrates, o f which Alcibiades spoke, are equally ac-
cessible to all through Sócrates’ speeches. W hich o fth esc interpretations ¡s
correct can only appear from the seque!. This bedroom scene, the most dar-
ing scene ever occurring in Plato, recalls another bedroom scene, but this
time in Sócrates’ bedroom , in the beginning o f the F rotad oras— which be-
gins, incidentally, with a brief dialogue, the main the me o f which is S ó c­
rates’ being in love with Alcibiades. There it is carly m om ing; here it is at
the end o f the dialogue, in Alcibiades’ bedroom , during the whole rüght.

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C H A P T E R rvtfELVfi

The implica don is clear: the Pro tab oras is ¡n finiré ly less intímate than the
Symposium. The Symposiutn alone reveáis Sócrates’ hubris.
But the re remains an entire ly unsolved problem. Sócrates despises all
men, as Alcibiades says, even Alcibiades. Yet he somehow cares for all men,
and especially for the young. How is this possible? F or Alcibiades this is one
aspcct o f the riddle o f Sócrates, o f Sócrates’ strangcness. Sócrates is not a
lovcr, ñor is he filled with lo ve o f glory o r prestige. W hat prompts Sócrates
to care for men? A very simple, perhaps too simple, solution, though wor-
thy o f consideration: O ut o f justicc, though it is clear that Alcibiades would
not undcrstand that motivation. This may be the re ason why Alcibiades has
no access to Sócrates’ business. I do n ot go into the dramatic situation now,
al though that would, o f course, require attention. But you must always
watch where they are. Tt is the most embarrassing situation in which Alcibi­
ades finds himself. You may have to transíate it into heterosexual relations
to rccognize it in modern literature.

wThcn what thought do you believe I had after this? While I believed 1 had
bcen dishonored, I solí admired his nature, moderation, and manliness,
havmg come across a human being o f this kind, such as I believed I would
never have encountercd in respect to prudence [phronesis] and cndurancc
[r c s is ta n c c J. H e n e e , ju s t as I d id n o t k n o w h o w I c o u ld g c t a n g r y a t h im
and be deprived o f the being-together with this man, so I was utterly at a
loss as to how I was to draw him over." ( 2 l9 d 3 - c l)

H e admired his nature as well as his moderation and manliness, and later on
he says, I didn’t ever believe I would encounter someone as outstanding in
prudence and in endurance. He apparently iden tifies moderation with pru­
dence and manliness with endurance.
O ne virtue, however, is glaringly absent: justice, H e did not discover
any justice in Sócrates; one reason, which is sufficient reason, is that ¡t was
not in him, in Alcibiades. Justice, we could perhaps say, is replaced by en­
durance. While Alcibiades has no sense for the just, he has a strong sense o f
the noble or beautiful. But o f what kind o f the beautiful? O f that kind o f
beautifiil which appeared at the peak o f Diotim a’s spccch on the poets—
prudence, politicaJ wisdom. Alcibiades had identified prudence with m od­
eration and in the sequel he is going to speak o f Sócrates’ endurance. I
conclude, the moderation o f which Alcibiades spoke is identical with en­
durance. T h e difference is trivial. M oderation has to d o with the right atti-
tude toward pleasures, and endurance with the right attitude toward pain.
This virtue swallows up everything, induding Sócrates’ manliness. Sócrates

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A L C I B I A D E S

is a compositc o f superhuman endurance and, as we must ñor forgct trom


the first part o f the speech, o f superhuman rhctoric. This superhuman, ab-
surd, dcmonic character cxplains for Alcibiades Sócrates’ care for other
men. B u t it is somehow connected with the two phenomena he sccs,
namely, Sócrates’ superhuman endurance and his superhuman rhetoric. ln
2 1 9 d 4 - 5 , “his natu re, moderation, and manlincss”— I believe this means
that Sócrates’ virrue is his nature. His nature is n ot something sepárate
trom his virrue. Alcibiades indicares it by saying that Sócrates is a dcmonic
man. He is by nature virtuous.

“For I wel1 knew that he was for more immime in ali respeets to money
than Ajax was to iron, and chat done by which I thought I would catch
him he had escaped me. I was going around at a loss, enslaved by that hu­
man bei ng as no onc had bec n by anvonc else.'n (2 1 9c 1 - 5)

Alcibiades is completely enslaved by Sócrates, as no man cver was by any


other man. The extreme humiliation he, a most beauciful human being,
had suffered, to say nothing o f the humiliations he had suffered beforc that
night by virtuc o f Sócrates’ speeches, which made him aware o f his dc-
feets— that was so many, many years ago. And now Alcibiades is a great
man, on the verge o f his greatest political action, the Sicíiian expedition. He
is no longer enslaved, he is almost the ruler o f Athens. How did he gct out
o f that enslavement? That story is told in the sequel. The general answer is
by military action.

“AJI these chings had happened co me earlier. Aítcr this we wcrc on cam-
paign together against Potidaca, and we were messmates there. Now first
o f aU, he surpassed not only me in coils but everyone else as wcll; whenever
w'e were compellcd— cuc o ff somewhere, the sort o f thing to be expecced
on campaign— to go without food, everyone else was as nothing com-
pared to his endurance. And in curn, in festivities he alone was able to en-
joy boch everythingelse and drinking, and though unwilling, whenever he
was compeUcd, he used to beat everyone; and what is the most amazing
thing o f all, no human being ever saw Sócrates drunk. Now o f chis peine
there will soon be proof, 1 think." (2 1 9 e 5 -2 2 0 a 6 )

Alcibiades shows first Sócrates’ endurance regarding hunger and drinking.


You see the lack o f parallelism; he doesn’t say hunger and thirst but hunger
and drinking. Sócrates did not boast that he could eat more than anyone
else. So the great the me o f Sócrates1endurance opene d here and continué d
in the sequet.

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C H A P T R H V W E I. V E

“And again in rcgard to his fcats o f endurante during winter— thc winters
are terrible there— everything etse he did was amazing. Once when there
was a most terrible frost—you can’t imagine— and everyone either did
not go out» or if they did go out wrapped themselves in amazing quand-
ties o f clothes and put on shoes and wrapped their feet in felt and sheep-
skins» he used to go out in those times with the sort o f himarion he used to
wcar even before, and without shoes he walked through thc ice more eas-
ily than everyone else who was shod, and the soldiers used to give him
sidclong glances as if he was despísing them. ” (220a6 -c 1)

H ere he describes Sócrates in winter. Even in winter he goes unshod. Go-


ing unshod was aJso used for a description o f eros, you will remember, and
onc can show throughout the description that unwittingly it is somehow a
description o f eros. But that is not thc main point. O nc point, however, I
would make: if Sócrates is eros, then his concern for human beings, espe-
cially for young human beings, would be explained. Unless we remember
the statement that Eros with a capital E d o es not love, only human beings
lovc.

“Now chis was the way it was; but it is worthwhile to hcar ‘thc sort o f
ching the enduring man did and endured there’ once on campaign.”
(220c 1 -3 )

This verse is from H om er’s Odyssey, book 4 , 2 4 2 ; it is said by H elen o f


Odysseus. Alcibiades compares Sócrates to Odysseus, whereas AJcibiades is
rather comparable to Achilles, as we have sccn on a previous occasion. The
¡nteresting point is that Sócrates, to o , is a man who sufters much. H e did
much and suffered much. Sócrates is a much-suffering man, just as Odys­
seus was.

“He conceivcd a thought there and stood from dawn considering it, and
when he couldn't makc any progress, he rciúscd to let up but kept on
standing considering. It was now already noon, and the soldiers bccamc
awarc o f it, and in amazement onc said to another, ‘Sócrates has been
standing there since dawn reflecting.’ Finally, some ofthe Ionians, when it
was evening, once they had dined— it was then summer— brought out
their bedding and slept in the coid while keeping watch on him, to see
whether he would stand aJso through the night. He stood till dawn and
che sun carne up; and then he went away after he had praycd to che $un.w
(2 2 0 c3 -d 5 )

The o b ject o f admiration here is not Sócrates’ contemplation but hls en-
durance. Here his endurance is shown in summer, as distinguished from his

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A I C I R I A D K S

endurance in wintcr in the preceding story. Contcmplation in summer as


distinguished from winter. W hat could that possibly mean? T h at theme is
known to those ofyou who have read C icero’s R epu blic and Law s. Cicero’s
R ep u blic is a dialogue in winter, where they seek the sun, and the L a m is a
dialogue in summer, where they seek the shade. Sócrates seeks the sun in
summer, when it is hardest to bear; he seeks the light o f the sun at its
strongest. In accordance with that he prays to the sun at the end. L et u$ not
forget that the sun is a cosmic god. But why did somc o f the Ionians and
n ot the Athenians watch Sócrates’ contemplation? I read a commentator
who said the Athenians knew all about it, but I think wc can dismiss chis
suggestion. I think the main point is that Alcibiadcs did not watch it. H e
watched Sócrates in batde, as we shall see in the immediate sequel.

*And if you wam, in battles— for it is quite just to give him this— when
there was a battle after which the generáis gave me the prizc o f valor, no
other human being saved me except him: he refused to leave me when I
had been wounded, and he saved me along with my weapons. And I,
Sócrates, cvcn then urged the generáis to give you the prizc o f valor, and
in this at least you won’t find fault with me or say that I am lying; but when
the generáis looked at my rank and wanted to give me the prize o f valor,
you yourself proved to be more cagcr than the generáis fbr me to calce ic
rather than yourself.” (2 2 0 d 5 -c 7 )

Sócrates admitted that he should get the prize. D on ’t forget that. I t is truc
that it had something to d o with the fact that Alcibiades carne from one o f
the noblest families and Sócrates <Üd n ot, but stUJ it is something to come
from one o f the noblest families. T hus, Alcibiades began to get out o f his
State o f inferiority to Sócrates.

“Scill furcher, men, it was worehwhile to observe Sócrates when che army
was retreating in flight from Dclium, for I happened to be there on a
horse, and he was a hoplice. He and Laches were withdrawing together
when the soldicrs had alrcady seattered. I happened by, and as soon as I
saw thcm I urged the paír to be confidcnt, and I said I would not desert
them. He re, indeed, I observed Sócrates in a fincr way than I had in Poti-
daca— for I was less in fear beca use I was on horse back— first, how far he
surpassed Laches by his keeping cool [em phron], and then, it seemed to
me— Aristophancs, that line o f yours— even there he was walking as he
does here, ‘swaggering and casting his eyes sideways,’ calmly giving side-
long glances ac the friendly and the enemy, making it clear to everyone
even from a great distance chat if anyone actacks this man here he will de-
fcnd himsclfvcry vigorously. Accordingly, he went away in safety, he and

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A I. ¡: I B 1 A D E S

applies both to him and to his speeches. In chis rcspcct he resembles no hu­
man being but only the Silenuses and satyrs. And then he gjves some ex-
amples o f contem perar y equivalents to he roes: Brasldas is comparable to
Achilles, Brasidas the Spartan gentlcmen general; and Pendes is compara­
ble as an orator to Néstor and Antenor. That Odysseus ¡s not mentioned I
noce in passing. Yon see here that Alcibiades inverts the times. H e treats
Achilles as a contemporary and Pendes as a mythical hero. In both cases it
amounts to the same thing. Just as he sees himself as an Achilles, o r perhaps
a super Achilles, he divines something o f Odysseus in Sócrates.

“I omitted this too in the first part, that his spcechcs are most similar to
the opened-up Silenuses. For should one be willing to hear the speeches
o f Sócrates, they would appear very ridiculous at first: they put around
themselves those kinds ofwords and phrases, on the outside— it’s the kind
o f hide o f a hubristic satyr. He speaks o f asses and pack-asses and black-
smiths and shoemakers and leather workers, and he appears to be always
speaking o f the same things chrough the same things, so that every inex-
perienccd and foolish human being would laugh at his spcechcs; but
should one see them opened up and get inside thcm, he will find that they
alone o f spcechcs had mind within and, sccondly, chai they werc most di­
vine and had the greatesc number o f statues o f virtuc in thcmsclves and
pertaining o ver the greatest range, or rather over the endre range that it is
fitting for him who is going co beautiful and good to survey.” (2 2 1 d 7 -
222a6)

H e turns now to Sócrates’ speeches in particular. Sócrates’ speeches are like


the Silenuses. These speeches have an ugly exterior and a beautiful interior.
In the first part o f Alcibiades’ speech he had compared Sócrates chiefly to
Marsyas and noted the contrast between Sócrates’ external shapc— his fa-
mous ugliness— and his quasi-internal flute playing, i.e., his speeches. But
now he will speak o f the external o f Sócrates’ speeches and the Inter nal o f
his speeches. Sócrates’ speeches, if heard, are ridiculous, let us say comical.
B u t lf one looks inside they pro ve to contain m ost wonderful images o f
virtue. He no longer says most wonderful images o f the gods, as he had said
in the beginning. Sócrates’ speeches are iike comedies. You remember in
the beginning, when he carne in, Alcibiades was surprised that Sócrates did
n ot sit with Aristophanes, where he belonged. These Socratic speeches
show only the inconspicuous things, which gentlemen wouldn’t talk about.
That o f course is true. Sócrates’ philosophy has the character o f ascent,
which means necessarily ffom the low to the highest, but they asccnd. What
d o they ascend from? What would we expect thcm to ascend from, on the

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CHAl’ TER IW ELVE

basis o f what we have Icarned from Diotima? Frora beautiful bodies. But
Sócrates speaks o f such inconspicuous bodies as tanners, etc. The mature
Sócrates is n ot the young Sócrates trained by D io tima, let us not forget
that. Sócrates had learned to realize the importance o f the nonbeautiful,
the dreary, the insignificant. The outside o f Sócrates is hubris, according to
this repeated statement; the inside o f Sócrates is an imitation ofvirtu e, im-
ages o f virtue, n ot virtue itself.
In the first part o f his speech, Alcibiades had not spoken o f the hubris in
Sócrates’ speeches but only o f the religious or tragic effect o f these specches
on everyone. In the second part o f his speech Alcibiades did speak o f
Sócrates’ hubris, but as a hidden hubris. The exterior o f his specches was
eroticism and ignorance, by which I mean the claim that he is a lover and
the claim that he i$ ignorant. The inside was hubris, somehow ¡dentieal with
moderation. I remind you again that according to the meaning o f the
Greck terms, moderation and hubris are opposites. In classicaJ times, as I
said before, moderation meant moderation in sensual pleasures— food,
drink, sex. But in a deeper sense, moderation means much m ore, and then
its opposite is either hubris, insolence, rebellion, o r madness o r insanity. To
repcat: the inside o f the speeches prove to be hubris and its opposite—
moderation. Now Alcibiades says that the external o f Sócrates’ speeches is
comical, hubris, and that the moral effect o f Sócrates is limited to a very
few. I can n ot now, at this advanced stage o f the course, put together all the
threads; you have to do some figuríng out yourself. You see also a little
point in 2 2 1 e 5 - 6 : Sócrates does not in fact always say the same things
about the same subjeets, this is only the appearance. This is only another
way o f saying that Sócrates i$ ironical, be cause irony consists in not saying
the same thing to everyone. The word pack-asses is very strange. D oes he
ever talk o f pack-asses? I can only say the Platonic lexicón does n ot give any
other passage, and Xenophon’s Sócrates doesn’t use it either. The word oc-
curs once in Xenophon’s E d u cation ofC yru s> book 7 , chapter 5, and that is
an interesting point. Xcnophon uses this expression when he describes the
deeds o f the Persian king Cyrus in connection with the siege o f Babylon, in
a military context, and Cyrus is presented as the political, military man. Prc-
ciscly the military, political man must speak o f these matters which are so
ridiculous and comical, according to Alcibiades. That is the greatest irony.
Think o f modern war: must the general not be concerned with engineers
and transportad on? So what Alcibiades conveys very unknowingly is that
Sócrates is so comical, so ungentlemanly, so ridiculous, because he speaks
o f political and military matters. He ridiculcs himself without knowing it.

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C H A P T E R T W E L V E

do him any good, but makc surc thac no one will set me and you apart."
(2 2 2 c3 -d 6 )

Sócrates had been asked by Alcibiades in the beginning to corree t him if he


said anything untrue. Sócrates never corrects Alcibiades at any point. He
even goes so far as to say at the end, You are sober; no drunkenness pre-
vented you from saying something wrong.
[Tapechange.]
Alcibiades is, I think, in a great error because the love affair which is
coming is the one betwcen Sócrates and Phaedrus, o f which Alcibiades is
completely unawarc. In the order o f che speeches we have these arrange-
ments: Agathon, Sócrates, Alcibiades. These are three speeches which are
related to another triad: Pausanias, Eryximachus, and Aristophanes. In the
first Sócrates is in the center, in the second Eryximachus, which is impor-
tant fbr other reasons too. The first triad, as you will re me m be r, had ped-
erasty as its common the me, and this culminated in Aristophanes' speech
on the understanding o f eros as love o f one’s own, which was idéntica! with
rebellion against the law. But if Alcibiades is the completer o f the triad he re,
as Aristophanes was the completer in the first triad, we must say again that
the whole thing culminates in the understanding o f love as love o f one’s
own. For chis is exactly what Alcibiades said at the end o f his speech:
Sócrates lo ves himself, he tries to bring the others not to love the beautiful
in Sócrates, but Sócrates. In other words, what Alcibiades unknowingly
suggcsts is an agreement between Sócrates and Aristophanes, becween the
two high points o f the dialogue. But there is still one great difference, be-
cause the love o f onc’s own as Aristophanes unde rstood it is something
outside the individual, the other half, however this may have to be under-
stood; but in Sócrates’ case it is n ot outside ofhim . L et us keep this in mind.
May I remind you o f another point I made in the beginning o f this
course: There are six speeches; there is a seventh speech, that o f Phaedrus in
the beginning, which is set o f f from all the other speeches by the interven-
ing omitted speeches. B u t Phaedrus’s point o f view, as I have tried to show,
is that o f gain o r profit— al so love o f one’s own. That is the great theme re-
maining almost underground in the Sympositttn, but yet very powerfii1, and
brought to the fore in other Platonic dialogues.
We must com m cnt on Sócrates’ remark when he calis Alcibiades’ speech
a satyric drama. W hat was it? A conclusión o f a tragedy. W hat would fbllow
from that? That che Sympostum prior to Alcibiades’ speech is a tragedy, and
that is very strange. How is this possiblc ¡f Sócrates is n ot capable o f tragic

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A L C I B T A D B S

speech, as I daim? I will try to answer chis question in four different ways,
though they are probably not sufficíent. First, by this remark Sócrates
seems to confirm Alcibiades’ i nidal description o f Sócrates’ speeches, whcn
he described their tragic effect. O ne couid then say that Sócrates describes
the Symposium with a vicw to its possible effect on Alcibiades. Sócrates’ cf-
fect on Aid bi ades was like that o f a tragedy. Alcibiades, this political man
par excellence, can understand the effect o f Sócrates on him self oniy in
terms o f the effect o f tragedy. But the following answer I believe goes
somewhat deeper: the Symposiutn does n ot contain a single speech by
Sócrates. That is a pedantic remark but a necessary one. The re are only the
speeches o f the five others, and Sócrates’ speech, as you know, is the speech
o f Diotima. T h e Sytnposium as a whole is an enchandng work, and a certain
kind o f cnchantm ent is the function o f tragedy. The Symposiutn as a whole
is a praise o f eros as a god o r at least as a demon and, therefore, it belongs
together with tragedy. T h e third consideration: the Sócrates who speaks in
the Symposium, i f we assume him to be the same as Diorima, is the young
Sócrates, the Sócrates who had not yet understood the place o f the ugly or
the base in the economy o f the world. This Sócrates who had n ot yet un-
derstood the necessity o f the ugly or base had a tragic effect. The last sug-
gestión I would make is this: Is not the tragedy which is beyond the
competence o f Sócrates strictly speaking the punitive speech— the speech
referring to the punitive gods? But punishment presupposes law, nomos,
and therefore we can say tragedy in a more radical, in a more primary sensc,
is the producción o f nomos or, more worthily, o f true nomos. I read to you
a passage from the J jt m . The tragic poets com e and wish to be admitted to
the city. T h e legislator says:

This should be the answer: Most cxccllcnt o f strangers, We ourselves, to


the best o f our ability, are the authors o f a tragedy, at once superlativdy fair
and superlativdy good. At least all our polity is framed as a representación
o f the fairest and best life which is in realicy as wc assert the truest tragedy.
Thus, wc are composcrs o f the same chings as yourselves, rivals ofyours as
ardsts and actors o f the fairest drama, which, as our hope is, true law and
ic alone is by nature competent to complete. (8 1 7b)

The Symposium, I wouid say, is “tragic” because it supplies the true


nom os regarding eros, which as a nom os, however true, is a problem. That
it supplies the true nom os, I believe, can be shown from the end o f
Sócrates’ speech, 2 1 2 b 5 , where Sócrates says, Every man should honor
E ros.” The Symposium supplies the true nomos regarding eros and, there*

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C I I A P T E R ( NVBL VB

fore, is in thc decpest scnsc o f the word tragic, where nomos means a bcau-
tiful, salutary, but spurious unit. Sócrates is a Icgislator regarding eros, but
only by virtue o f Diotima, n ot by his own power. The fact that he is n ot a
legislator is, o f coursc, aiso indicated by the fact that he is absent from
Plato’s Law s. B u t even i f Sócrates were ablc to give laws, he could n otp re-
sent properly the sanedons for violadons o f the law. Now let us go on.

Thcn Agathon said, “Well, Sócrates, you are probably speaking the truth.
I infer it also from the fact that he lay down in thc middle, becween me and
you, in order that he may kcep us apart, but ic won’t do him any good, for
I shaJI come to you and lie down beside you.” “Yes, o f course," Sócrates
said. “Come o ver here and lie down below me.” (2 2 2 d 7 -c5 )

So the order desired by Alcibiades is this: Sócrates, Alcibiades, Agathon.


The actual order was Agathon, Alcibiades, Sócrates. Agathon and Sócrates
suggest that the order should be Alcibiades, Sócrates, Agathon. L et us sce
what Alcibiades rcplies.

“Zeus!” Alcibiades said, “Think o f what I once more suffer at his hands!
He believes he must be superior to me cverywhere. Well, if nothing else—
you are a marvcl!— allow Agathon to lie down between us.” (2 2 2 e ó -9 )

So what he wants is Alcibiades, Agathon, Sócrates. There is again another


conflict. How do we get out o f that?

“But it’s impossible,” Sócrates said. “For you praised me, and I must
praise i n tu m the one on my right. So if Agathon lies below you, he surely
won't praise me again before, rather, he has been praised by me. Let it go.
Oh demonic one, and don't begrudge the youth to be praised by me, for
l very much dcsire to praise him.” (2 2 2 e l0 -2 2 3 a 2 )

D o you get the point? Why is Alcibiades’ suggestion impossible? Because


Agathon would have to praise Sócrates, and Sócrates Is very eager to praise
Agathon. Sócrates aggravates the situation.

“O h, joy! joy!” Agathon said, “Alcibiades, it’s impossible that I should re-
mam here, but as ccrtain as anything 1 shaU get up and move, in order that
I may be praised by Sócrates.” (2 2 3 a 3 -5 )

Sócrates wins completely, as usual, except at his trial.

“That’s it!" Alcibiades said. “It's just the usual. Whcn Sócrates is present
it’s impossible for anyone else to have a sharc in thc beauties, and now
how resourcefúlly he found a persuasivo speech as well, so as for him
[Agathon] to lie down beside himself.” Now Agathon was getting up to

2S4
(' H A P T B X U V B L V E

through the production o f thc beauiiful gods, by this very ftc t is disen-
chanted and therefore also can disenchant. But che man who can disen-
chant, the comic poet, is n ot yet, for this reason, able to enchant, co
produce the gods in their awfol beauty. Therefore I think Sócrates could
have written comedies, he could n ot have written tragedies; and therefore
he did n ot write. This implies the assertion, the proof o f which is quite a
jo b , that properly understood the works o f Plato, and to some extent also
ofX enophon, are in the more subde sense o fth e word tragedies. Tragedies
which carry within themselves the comedy.
In this course and in this cffort we have reached the end, which means
only that we are in a good posición, after a pause, to begin again on a higher
level o f understanding, and that may go on for many readings. Because, ul-
timately, as I said in the beginning, onc cannot believe that one has under­
stood hilly any Platonic dialogue ¡f one has n ot understood all the dia­
logues. We have be come aware herc o f a number o f difficulties which we
could not cxplain o r which we could explain only in a complicated and un-
convincing manner. But apart from this obvious observation one can say
this a priori: there will be other dialogues— the P baedrus, Eutbydem us,
Laws} etc.— crucial points o f which one would have to considcr for under-
standing any other dialogue and therefore the Syfttposiutn in particular. In
this way, Plato’s dialogues are truly in imitation o f what we cali reality. The
enigma o f reality is limitcd by the Platonic dialogue. People used to speak
o f art as imitation, and that is a vcry profound word. I t means the imitation
o f the riddle o f reality, and this riddlc Plato imitates by writing many dia­
logues, each giving some artículation o f a part. But even the greatest pos-
sible articulation o f any part cannot give more than partial truth, and that
means, o f course, partial truth about that part discussed in that dialogue,
and therefore one must go on.
Ltstener: What is it in Sócrates that Alcibiadcs admires and lo ves?
M r Strauss; I t is surely connected with the fact o f Sócrates’ amazlng ín-
telligence, that is clear. But that alone doesn’t do it, partly because Alcibi-
ades is not able and tough enough to follow Sócrates in his pursuit. There­
fore it must be something else. Sócrates is a demonic man, to use the
Platonic word. What does this mean? Did you cver hear the expression wa
magnetic personal ity”? That is as reveaiing as any answer you could give on
that level. Sócrates must have had an indescribable fascination which led to
either intense attraction or equally intense repulsión. Gencrally speaking,
the more noble natures were attracted by Sócrates and the lower ones were
repelled. That Alcibiades is unable to give a clear account o f Sócrates is ob-

286
C H A P T F . R i WE1.VE

and yet Sócrates had it. But we must n ot lose sight o f the fact, which Plato
conveys, that the man who is demonic, in the Greek sense o f the word, is
not divine; and Plato, I am almost certain, regarded himself as in this sense
divine. This is a very difficult question and our studies this quartcr are not
sufhcient to establish that.
L isten cr: Are you suggesting that the young Sócrates is also divine?
Mr. Strauss: I do n ot know. That Aristophanes intended that I could not
say. But the stacement o f Aristotle that nature is demonic and the nous di­
vine is also o f some help, W hat Plato means is also that Sócrates’ nature, his
physis, was singularly phUosophic, must less dependent on training, habit*
uadon, than that o f other philosophers— his instinctive awareness o f the
questions. There are some humorous iilustranons at che beginning o f the
C rito: Sócrates is in prison, he dreams, and Grito comes in to effect a jail-
break so that Sócrates can get out to Thessaly, far away, lawless but safe for
a fugjtive from justice. T h cn Sócrates tells him his dream. A woman o f su-
perhuman stature had appeared to him and quoted a verse from the lita d :
on the third day from now you will be in Phthia, which is n ot very far from
Thessaly. In other words, Sócrates had in a tantas tic way divined the plan
hitherto wholly unknown to him. This divinatory quality Sócrates must
have possessed ¡n a way in which philosophers do n ot possess it. This div­
inatory quality is, o f course, n ot essential to theorerieal perfection. B u t that
Sócrates had something in addition to that theorerieal quality which made
him as a human being both attractive and repulsive is part o f that mysteri-
ous point.
[In answer to a question:] Poet is to o general a term and among the
many objections you can raise to my prese ntation is that we have n ot gone
deeply enough into that problem. W hen we speak o f tragedy we cannot
help but begin understanding these terms as they are used now. W hen we
speak o f gods what do wc know o f the gods? Factual knowledge doesn’t
help us to know what is a god for a thinking Greek, o r for that matter also
for a nonthinking Greek. It is quite truc that what wc mean today by a poet
o r perhaps by an artist is some demonic quality. B u t is that the poetic qual­
ity in the way Plato understood it? I think one must pay great attention to
the information deri ved from the G orjfias about the limitations o f Sócrates’
rhetoric and how they are connected with the fact that Sócrates cannot pro­
duce very fine speeches.
I f there are no further questions I termínate this session and this course.

288
IN DEX

Achilles: as contemporary, 279; Diodma's of, 13; noblest lovcr in Symposium, 66;
intcrpretation of, 224; Phaedrus’s praise silence of, 152; in Xenophon, 21
of, 5 2 -5 3 Aristophanes. absence ofin Prosa¿ortu, 2 5 -
Adultcry: Aristophanes on, 13S 26; accuser o f Sócrates, 4 0 - 4 1 ; agrcc-
Agathon: argument ofwith Sócrates, 1 8 0 - me nt o f with Sócrates ,2 8 2 ; Alcíbiades'
82; belovcd o f Pauaanias, 61; character interruption of, 255; character of, 254;
of, 32; 254; difference from Aristoph* comedies of, 1 4 9 -5 0 ; diffcrencc from
anes, 147; on Homcr, 1 5 7 ,1 5 9 ; and “1" Agathon, 147; and Eryximachus, 1 4 8 -
(ego), 155; inside of, 155; and Phaedrus, 49; and Eurípides, 152; on gods, 142; on
1 5 7 - 5 8 ,1 6 2 -6 3 ; and Sócrates, 1 5 3 -5 4 ; hierarchy in Eros, 119; on inccst, 1 4 4 -
softncss of, 76; speech of, 156, summa- 4 5 , 180; laughter of, 121; next greatest
rized, 1 6 8 -6 9 ; thesis ofin relación to not highest, 151; nonpettiness of, 119;
Diodma’s, 1 9 6 ,206; verses o f on Eros, and order o f speakíng, 9 5 ; on philosophy,
166; victory of, 15 150; alone praises piety, 1 2 7 .1 3 2 ,142;
AJccstis: Diotima's interpretación of, 224; Ploutos<sfy 1 9 4 -9 5 : proponent o f reli-
praise of, 50-51 gious rcvolution, 122; and Sócrates, 140,
Alcibiadcs: accusation and dcfcnsc of 257; spcech o f summarized, 1 4 7 -4 8 ;
Sócrates, 268, 273; as Achillcs, 259; tragedy and comcdy o f Eros in, 172. See
in Athcns, 15; character of, 2 5 4 ,2 6 0 - atso Eryxímachus; Plato
6 1 ; humiliation of, 2 6 8 ,275; as raw Arístotlc, 226; on Empcdocles, 107. Etbics
material fbr a god ,2 5 6 - 5 7 ;“ religious" of, 85; on human narure, 151; on mag*
experíence of, 265; self-ridicuJe of, nanimity, 263; on mind and nature, 288;
2 7 9 -8 0 ; six stages ofin seducción of on moderation and endurance, 266; on
Sócrates, 2 7 0 -7 1 ; on Sócrates' specches, polis, 6 ; Polines of, 133; RbeUmc of, 77.
2 7 9 -8 0 ; superiority o f to Sócrates, 160; on Sócrates, 229; on time, 220
269 Art (rtcbne): abandonment o f by Aristoph-
A!-Farabi: achievement of, 2 4 6 -4 7 anes, 119, 132; as controller o f chance,
Ancestors: deificd, 217 110; and Eros. 9 7 .1 0 0 .1 1 1 -1 2 ; and
Ancestral: and thc good, 48. 158 law, 104; noble or base, 9 8 ; and pan-
Antigone: first words of, 241: praise o f Eros eroticism, 1 1 3 -1 4 ; theory and practice
in,46 o f.9 9 ,1 0 2
Aphrodite: in Díodma, 191; in Pausanias, Astronomy; and divinadon, 1 0 6 -7
6 2 -6 3 Ate: and Eros, 159
Apollo: in Aristophanes' speech, 1 2 9 -3 0 ; Athens: in Plato, 22; pederastv in, 6 7 ,7 7 -
defeat o f Sócrates by, 264 82
Apollodorus: character of, 1 4 ,2 0 ,2 2 ; as Attraction: and repulsión, 112
« 0 6 ,2 3 ,2 5 4
Apolojy o f Sócrates: as account o f Sócrates' Baibarism: cwo fbrms of, 68
magnanimity, 263; on business of Battle morality: in Athens, 29
Sócrates, 270; on gods and ¿sim onía, Beauty: o f actions, 6 5 ; o f body and soul,
189; on héroes, 190 231; o f Eros, 160; and good, 238; always
Aquinas: on beaury, 236; on justice, 86; on imperfect, i 55; refiection o f immortal in
natural inclinación, 242 mortal, 206; sdf-forgetting in lovc of,
Arisrodemus: image o f Eros, 29; importancc 249; and virtue, 161

289
I N n E X

B cginning: o f A ristophanes' and Sócrates’ 1 1 5 , 2 8 6 ; rep orted , 2 0 2 ; them e o f, 7 3 ;


s p c c c h ,179 three n o t narraced by Sócrates, 1 8 6 ; ocles
Beholding: and b e in g to g e th e r, 1 3 8 - 3 9 ; o f, 11
238 Dionysus: and Aristophanes, 1 1 9 ; as ju d g e,
B eing; Plato’s nodon o f, 2 3 4 3 4 ,2 5 7
Bendey, A. F.: th corics o f govcrnm cnt in, 7 0 D iobm a: addrcsscd as stranger, 2 9 8 ; on
Besóaltty: in Ariscocle, 133 Aristophanes* thesís, 2 0 3 - 6 ; ñam e of,
Blandee nh age, P. v o n , vii; su ggcsoon of, 1 8 4 ; nonm ythical spcech o f, 1 9 1 .2 1 7 -
4 2 - 4 3 .1 3 1 .2 5 4 18
Body: as being, 1 0 1 ; good and bad, 9 8 ; D ivínabon: as cosm ic m edicine, 1 0 9 . 1 1 4 .
opposites i n ,2 2 S ee a ls o A stronom v •

B u rke, E : q u o ted , 115 División o f labor: in M arx, 5 9 - 6 0

Callieles: in G o rg ia s, 2 4 6 Educadon: as pracbcaJ m usic, 103


Cannibalism ; and incese, 1 3 3 E iio s ; m eaning o f, 2 3 4 - 3 6 ; as natu rc, 160
C h ance: absence o fin dialogues, 1 1 6 Em pedocles; on androgyncs, 1 2 3 ; o n pow cr
Characccr: abidingness o f, 8 0 - 8 1 : cheme o f o f a r t , 1 1 5 - 1 6 ; d octrin e o f in Eryxi-
polibeal scicnce, 8 4 - 8 5 m achus, 1 0 7 - 8 ; as target o f P lato, 1 5 3
Characcers: in S y m p osiu m , 2 9 ; seacing E nd u ran te: as m oderadon, 2 7 4 - 7 5
arrangem ent in, 4 2 - 4 3 ; types o f, 4 3 . Epim enides: in La w s , IB S
6 0 -6 1 h p in o m is : con neetion o f with S y m p osiu m ,
C icero ; ¿ « jiv a n d K e p u b iic o f, 2 7 7 1 2 8 -2 9
City. S ee Polis Eros: as a cb o n , 1 6 5 .1 7 1 ; and agape, 5 6 ;
Civilización: as castración, 1 2 9 - 3 1 ; charac* antinom ianism o f, 5 9 ; w ith o r w ithout
te r o f, 1 2 6 ; ñor to be crusced, 2 2 8 ; in A phrodite, 7 4 * 1 4 0 ; o f th c beaubful,
P rorag oras, 1 2 9 -3 » 1 7 3 : birch o f, 1 9 2 - 9 5 : noc che beloved,
C lo u d s : on inccst, 1 8 0 : Sócrates in , 1 8 , 3 8 . 1 9 6 ; as bo n d , 1 9 0 : as civilizcr, 1 6 4 ; as
278 com plete ph enom en on o f m an, 1 7 3 ; as
C odrus: as lovcr o f fam c, 2 2 4 cosm ic principie, 9 7 ; and deach, 6 0 , 2 0 8 ;
C om edy; and tragedy, 1 7 0 : ¿n Sócrates* definidon o f, 2 0 4 ; delusion in, 1 4 8 . 2 3 4 ;
spccchcs, 2 7 9 ;a n d u g lin c s s , 1 1 9 - 2 0 , d em od on o f, 1 5 8 ; difiere nce o f in cwo
1 2 3 . 1 3 4 - 3 5 . S ee a ls o A gathon; parts o f S y m p osiu m , 7 5 ; divínabon in,
Ariscophancs; Tragedy 2 4 9 ; and cssence o f m an, 1 5 2 ; experience
Com m unism ; in R e p u b lie , 2 4 3 o f, 4 5 ; o f fam e, 2 2 4 ; as g od , 15* 17* 3 8 .
C ooking; and m edicine, 1Q3 1 5 6 , 1 7 1 ; n o t a g o d , 1 8 7 - 8 8 ; as che
Cosm os: and ch aos, 1 0 8 . 1 1 1 - 1 3 g o o d , 167: hicrarchy in , 1 1 9 * 1 3 5 ;
Courage: in Phaedrus, 4 9 - 5 3 : silence o f hom elessness o f, 1 9 3 ; as o f imm ortality,
D iotím a o n , 2 2 6 2 2 1 - 2 2 : as incesruous, 1 4 5 . 1 8 ; and law,
C r it ia s ; parallel in to S y m p osiu m , 2 5 3 ; Zeus 1 5 2 ; as m adness, 2 1 8 ; as m aker o fg o d s ,
¡n , 1 2 6 2 0 9 ; and morality, 9 2 - 9 3 ; m utual, 1 0 0 ,
C n t o : Sócrates’ divínabon in, 2 8 8 1 4 3 ; as natural power, 1 0 4 : as nacure o f
C y r o p a e d e ia : ciced, 2 7 9 che w hole, 10* 1 9 6 ; and neccssity, 1 5 8 ;
noble and base, 1 1 2 ; nonsexuaJity o f,
D a im o n t o n : o ( Sócrates, 1 7 4 . 2 6 0 1 3 2 ; as n o th in g , 1 6 5 ; o f o n e's ow n , 1 7 3 f
Death. acceptanee o f, 2 0 8 , 2 2 0 - 2 1 1 8 1 ; opposed to caJculabon , 2 1 8 ; w ith'
D eliu m : Sócrates' conduce ac, 2 7 8 o u t parents, 4 7 , 1 6 3 ; Pausanías' tw o
D iaJccb c: and rhctoric, 178 ki nds o f, 6 1 , 7 9 ; noc personified, 2 1 5 ;
D ialogues: abstracoon in , 5 7 , 1 5 2 , 1 7 6 ; philanthropy o f, 1 2 2 ; and poctry, 1 6 5 ; o f
wichin dialogues, 199;d ivi$ions am ong, polibcian, 9 3 - 9 4 ; praise o f, 4 4 - 4 6 . 1 1 9 .
1 1 - 1 3 , 6 0 ; fu n cb o n o f, 5 ; as im itatíons, 2 3 9 - 4 0 ; as Prom ctheus, 1 3 0 ;a s p r o -

290
I N D E X

m otcr o f vircuc, 4 9 - 5 0 : purification o f, G o y jia s : Archcsilaos in , 7 6 ; o n pleasure and


2 1 3 , 2 4 0 ; as rcb cllio n , 1 2 7 ± 1 3 7 * 1 4 5 * re­ g o o d , 1 0 4 ; poliucian as lover in, 9 3 ; on
lación o f to polidcs and phUosophy, 5 8 - Socratic rhetoric, 2 4 6 , 2 8 8
5 9 ; in RepubliCy 1 0 , 5 8 - 5 9 . 1 1 8 ; as ruler, Gorgias: ceacher o f Agachón, 175
1 6 4 - 6 5 : sclf-dcfcaring character of, Gym nastics: and m edicine in P lato, 1 0 3
1 3 8 - 3 9 ; as sclf-extinction, 1 4 0 ; as self-
sacrifice, 5 5 * 5 8 * 2 1 8 - 1 9 ; shapc o f, 1 6 0 , Happincss: as rig h t opinión, 20Ü
1 6 9 ; as slavery, 7 0 ; Sócrates' th rec kinds H ephaestus: in Aristophancs and H om er,
o f, 9 0 - 9 1 » 2 4 4 ; as subsrancc and qualicy, 1 3 9 - 4 0 , 1 5 9 ; lovc in, L64
1 6 2 ; as tragic, 1 3 4 - 3 5 ; cripartition o fin H eraclitus: co trecd o n o f, 1 0 1 - 2 ; on eos*
SympQsiunty 5 7 , 8 9 ; typology o f, 1 1 6 - 1 7 ; m os, 1 Q 8 ,1 1 4 ; o n tragedy and comedy,
utopianism o f, 1 4 6 ; vcrticalitv o f, 1 4 4 ; 120
vircuc and vicc in, 7 4 , 1 6 0 - 6 1 ; w hat it is H erodocus: o n H om er and H esiod, 2 1 7 ; on
noc, 1 8 1 ; wisdom o f, 1 6 2 - 6 4 , 2 2 2 P crsían g od s, 1 2 4
Eryxím achus: agreem ent o f with Pausanias, H iccups: as funnv noise, 121
9 7 . 1 1 8 ; and A láb iad es, 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; and Hippias; m P r o ia g o r a s , 2 5 5
Aristophancs, 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 4 8 - 4 9 , 1 5 2 ; on H istoricism , 2 - 3
art and E ros, 1 0 4 - 5 : character o f, 3 6 , H om er: and A gathon, 1 5 7 , 1 5 9 ; on
9 6 , 1 1 4 , 2 5 4 ; im plicatcd in scandal, 1 4 ; A phrodite, 5 8 ; o n gods, 2 1 0 ; o n G o i-
m ovem ent o f argum ent in, 1 1 3 - 1 4 ; sig* g o n , 1 7 5 ; hubris o f, 2 8 ; o n O cean , 7 ; on
nificance o f, 1 5 2 - 5 3 ; silence o f on male physicians, 2 5 8 - 5 9 ; o n Sircns, 2 6 6 ; on
and fem ale, 1 0 0 ; summary o f, L1 0 - 1 1; Z eu s, 1 2 6
valctudinarian, 2 1 8 Hubris ofman, 134; as moderador!, 2 6 6 -
Eurípides: o n pcrjnry, 1 7 7 ; and Sócrates, 6 7 ; o f Sócrates, 2 8 * 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 4 , 2 5 2 , 2 6 4
152 Hum dity: n o t praised by andenes, 2 6 3
E u th y d em u s: first quesdon ¿n, 185
E u th y p b r o : problcm o f, l l á WI " : A gathon begm s w ith, 1 5 5
Exam ples: in P lato , 2 0 1 Ideas: in A g ath on , 1 5 7 ; and E ro s, 1 9 6 - 9 7 ;
P latonic, 1 9 9 - 2 0 0
Fam c: and E ro s, 1 6 4 , 2 2 3 ; X enophon on, Id cology: as lovc o f o n c 's ow n, 1 8 3 - 8 4
165 Im agina don and th c beaubfuJ, 2 3 6
Fem ale: in ñam es, 1 4 6 . S ee a ls o M ale Im iu d o n : represents w hat is through opin­
Freedom : and co n sen t, 8 5 ; and nous in ió n , 5 2
m oral vircuc, 7 1 * 8 5 in Pausanias, 6 9 - 7 0 , Im m ortality: and E ro s, 2 0 6 - 8 ; issue of,
82 2 5 0 -5 1
F lo w e r (A m b o s ) : tragedy o f A gachón, 1 6 0 In cest: and E ro s, 1 8 0 - 8 1 , 2 0 8 - 9 ; as lovc o f
Fricndship: and E ro s, 1 8 8 , 2 1 3 - 1 4 o n c 's ow n, 1 4 7 ; p rohibition o f, 1 3 3 ,1 4 4
F r q g s : m odel for S y m p osiu m , 2 6 - 2 7 , 2 5 2 Individual: m ortaJity and perm ancncc of,
221-22
G il din, H . , v i i , 4 3 , 9 9 , 122 Interludes: betw ccn specchcs, 1 2 0 , 1 5 4 - 5 5
G ods: in A gachón, 1 5 6 ; in Aristophancs, Irony: in Phaedrus, 6 ; o f Sócrates, 5* 3 3 -
1 4 1 - 4 2 , 1 5 0 ; o f barbarians, 1 2 4 ; as civi- 34,176
liz e n , 1 6 6 , o fth e city, 1 8 9 ; knowledgc
o f, 1 0 6 ; made by p oets, 1 6 9 , 2 0 9 , 2 1 7 ; Juscicc: and E ros, 1 3 5 ,1 6 1 ; and modera*
Olympian vs. cosm ic, 1 2 5 ,1 2 8 - 2 9 ; d o n , 7 4 ; in Sócrates, 2 7 4
and sexualicy, 1 3 2 ; and Sócrates' hubris,
268 Kant, Lj on beauty, 236; on mamase, 214;
G o o d : and ancestral, 4 8 * 1 5 8 ; and beautiful, o n m oral v irtu e .9 5
2 7 - 2 8 , 2 0 0 ; lovc o f, 2 4 9 - 5 0 ; order of, Know ledgc: as hum an, 5 8
2 0 2 - 3 ;i n R e p u b ltc , 2 3 8 K ruger, G .: on E ros as m ediator, 1 9 1 ;

291
I N I> b X

Krüger, G.: [c o n tin u c d ) M ysterics: and D iotim a’s speech, 2 3 0


on Eryximachus, 106; interpretación of M yth: character o f, 3 9 - 4 0 ; in Plato, 1 2 1
Eros by, 39; on man as temporal being,
220 Nakedncss: and philosophy, 5 9
Natural Law : T h om as o n , 3
Laughtcr: canse of» 139: as ftinny noise, 121 — N ature: and manliness in Phaedrus, 5 0 - 5 2 ;
22¡aspraise, 153; in Symposium, 121. ISO and q u a lity o f E ro s, 1 5 6 ; as virtu ein
Law: in Aristophanes and Plato, 147; as Sócrates, 2 7 5
object o f contemplaron, 231; and Eros N ic c m c u h ta n E th u s : o n m o d eraro n , 2 6 6
in Pausanias, 61; and justicc, 1 2 6 -2 7 ; N ictzsch e, F.: o n gods as philosophers, 1 9 4 ;
and man, 144; meaning o f as nomes, 75; on irony o f Sócrates, 2 6 7
on pederasty in Athcns, 7 7 -8 2 ; sacred,
127: selfimposed, 67^ 2 6 O ath: firet in S y m p eriu m , 188
La jes: art and nature in 101; on Epimenides, Odvsseus: rhetoric o f, 179
185; on lovc o f life, 204: on man’s begin- O dyssey: q u o ted , 2 7 6
nings, 158; on poctry, 8 , 172; Sócrates' O pinión: in D io b m a, 1 9 5 .1 9 7 ; in Plato,
absencc in, 247. 284; thcology in, 15, 182
38; on tiagcdy, 283; on vircue o f bodv Opposites: in Eryxim achus, lü S
and soul, 161; and walking, 30 Orpheus: cridcism o f, 5 1 , 2 2 4 .2 2 6
Uberalism: not characterisdc o f Greek cides,
40 P a r m e n id c s : Sócrates in , 2 1 9
Lovc: and contemplaron, 231; five stages Parmenidcs: E ros in . 4 7 - 4 8 : and Heracli-
of, 233; as noun and verb, 165.217: of tus, 1 0 2 ; in Phaedrus* sp ccch , 5 5
soul in body, 241; o f truth, 249 Sce ttlso Patriodsm : and in ccst, 1 4 7 ; and treason, 5 2
Eros Pausanias: addresscd by Em pedocles, 1 0 8 :
character o f, 6 1 , 2 5 4 ; deliberarive speech
Machiavelli: agreement o f with Plato, 229 o f, 6 8 - 6 9 ; on m oral neucraliry o fa c d o n ,
Magnanimity: in Arístotle, 263 6 4 - 6 5 . 8 8 ; self-intcrest o f, 6 7 j 8 2 - 8 3 ;
Male: and female, 100; and polidcs, 136 softne&s o f, 7 6 ; silence o f about nature,
Man: heterogeneity of, 151; íofty thoughts 7 4 ; th rcc them es o f, 2 2
of, 12S; misery of, 134; nature of, 123; Pederasty, 5 0 ; as afFirmation o f chaos, 1 0 8 ;
sexual ladtude of, 144; as chinking ani­ Aristophanes’ defense o f, 1 4 0 - 4 1 ; in
mal, 106; unity of, 233; as woman, 205 C rctc , 1 8 5 ; defenders of» 1 2 0 : divinaron
Marsyas: likcnc&s o f Sócrates to, 2 6 2 -6 3 in, 1 1 1 ; and law, 1 4 8 : as lovc o f similars,
Marx, K: on communísm, S9-6Q 1 0 0 . Pausanias* defense, 6 6 ; in P lato, 7 2 ;
Mathcmatícs: beauty of, 232: hinted ac by and polidcs, 1 3 6 ; in X en op h on , 2 6 8
Eryximachus, 102; neither divine ñor Pcrjury: and n o b le lie, 9 3 ; in Pausanias, 7 8 ;
human, 1 0 S -6 in Sócrates, 177
Medicine: and Eros, 9 8 , 100 P h a e d o .t nd o f, 2 8 7 ; as purificadon, 2 4 0 ;
M em trabilia: on fame, 165; on inccst, 181 Sócrates ¡aughs in, 1 2 1 ; and Sym posiuM y
Menexenus: Aspada in, 1 8 4 -8 5 60
Metaphor: and poetry, 1 6 6 -6 7 P h a e d r u s : E ros in, 2 1 8 ; o n madness and
Mind: and Eros, 140.143 m od eratíon, 2 6 6 ; nonlover in . 5 3 ; reía-
Minos: spurious oneness o f law in, 148 d o n t o S y m p osiu m , 1 8 , 2 4 8 ; o n writing,
Moderaron: o f Sócrates, 266 246
Moral virruc: heterogeneity in, 86; as mean, Phaedrus: and A gathon, 1 5 7 ,1 6 3 ; character
85; theme ofin Pausanias, 68 - 7 1 . 7 4 - o f, 4 6 , 2 4 8 . 2 5 4 ; implicaccd ¡n scandal,
7 5 ,9 3 - 9 4 1 4 ; and Pausanias, 8 7 ; reí adon to
Music: doubleness in 1 0 1 -2 ; and mathe* Sócrates, 4 8 , 5 5 - 5 6 . 2 8 2 ; variedes o f
mares, 232; higher than medicine, 105 Phaedrus' traits, 6 0 - 6 1

292
I N O V. X

PbíUbus. chemc of, 104 i n , 31_¿ refutación o f Protagoras in , 4 1 -


Philosopher: as comic figure, 17Q 4 2 ; Zeus in, 1 2 6
Philosophy: and Anstophanes, 150¿not a Prudence (p h ro n en s) : and E ro s, 2 2 6
making, 229; as means, 237; Pascal on, 4¿ Psychology: and rhctoric, 1 5 5 - 6 6
in Pausanias, 8 2 -8 3 ; poete representa­ Psychoanalysis: in political Science, 1 2
ción of, 2 3 6 ,2 3 8 ,2 4 7 -4 8 ; and hght Public: and prívate, 5 2
opinión, 195,197; sclfforgctfiilncss in.
5 7 -5 8 ; as soluton in Plato, 2Q R ecoü ecd on: and E ro s, 1 3 4 , 1 5 0 - 5 1
Phoenix: in Xenophon, L2 R eligión: n o ancicnt equivalent o f, 2 6 5
P bysscs: on dme, 220 R ep eo tk m : in Plato, 2 3 7
Physics: and rhctoric, 51 R e p u tó te : ascenr and d escen t in, 2 4 4 ; cave
Picty: in Ariscophancs, 1 4 0 - 4 2 ,1 4 5 ;praisc in, 1 7 1 ; eid tsí in , 2 3 5 ; o n inccsc, 1 8 1 ; on
ofin SymposiuMj 127 lo ve o f one*s ow n, 2 2 2 ; philosophy as
Plague: in Athens, 185 means in, 2 3 7 ; o n poctry, 8 ; as purifica-
Plan: o f Agathon's spccch, 156; o f Sócrates* d o n , 2 4 0 ; silcnce ab ou t p rocrcation in,
speech, 1 8 3 ,2 4 4 -4 5 5 9 - 6 0 ; o n Sócrates’ d a im o n io n , 2 8 7 ;
Plato: and Aristophanes, 15 0 - 5 1; cholees S o p h o d c s in , 1 1 8 ; s o u lin , 2 4 2 - 4 4 ; che»
of, 117¿on city and household, 226; ology in , 1_5¿ tru c citv in , 8 5 ; tru st in , 1 8 7
importance ofcenter in, 4 7 . 1 3 5 - 36; R h c t o r ic : o n beauty, 160
lovcrof Aristophanes, 254; and Machia* R h cto ric: Plato’s understandíng o f, 1 5 5 -
velli, 230; and relativism, 4 ; second 5 6 ; o f Sócrates, 1 7 7 ; tw o kinds o f, 1 2 2
letter of, 29; and Thucydides, 261; on Rulers: and ruled , ZÜ
writing, 5
Pleasure: and bas e Eros, 104 Science: lovc o f, 2 3 2 ; and th c scicncc o f
Piornos: o f Ariscophancs, 194-93 m an, Z3
Poctry: demotion of, 2 4 2 ,2 4 4 -4 5 ; and S clfk n o w lcd g e : in Plato, 5 0
Eros, 201, 217; as making (poiesis), 163, Sclf-sacrificc: in E ro s, 2 1 8 - 1 9
169; as philosophy*$ rival, 6 - 7 ,1 7 ; R e­ Scrvility: in Pausanias, 7 0 * 7 7 , 8 1 - 8 2 ; in
putóte, 171; and cnich, 261 philosophy, 2 5
Poces: as begetters, 211* 213, 229 Scxes: d iffcrcncc o f in Plato, Z2
Polis: as elosed socicty, 209; and Eros, 209; Scxuality: antedates E ros, 1 9 2 ; as m an’s spe-
etvmology of, 136¿ heterogeneitv of, cific d iffcren cc, 1 3 2 - 3 3 , 1 4 4 ; in Pausa*
151; mind and body in, 86* 94¿ not nac* rúas. 6 5 ; and religión. 131
uraJ, 242; rcflection ofin Pausanias, 89¿ Sham e: and politics, L56
and wisdom, 96 Sicilian expedición: background o f S p n p o -
Political: in Aristophanes, 1 4 9 -5 0 ; charac- s iu m , L4
ter of, 8 - 9 ; concern o f with body, 85; Sim onidcs: o n E ros, 6 4
imdonality of, and patriotism, S9¿ cwo Sircns: in H o m er and X en op h on , 2 6 6
thcorics of, 61 Sócrates: accusadon against, 3 8 * 1 8 9 ; argu*
Polines: o f Aristotlc, 133* 2 0 8 - 9 ,226; m ent o f w ith A g ath on , 1 8 0 - 8 2 ; in
Lycurgus and SoJon in, 229 Aristophanes, 6 , biography o f in Placo,
Polus: in G en g ia s, 246 1 7 - 1 8 ; business o f, 2 7 0 ; as com ic p o ct,
Posidvism, 1 = 2 2 8 1 ; co n tem p laro n o f, 2 7 7 ; d a im o n io n
Praise: corrcct way of, 1 5 6 ,1 7 5 -7 6 o f, 1 7 4 . 2 6 0 ; dcccitfulncss o f, 2 8 1 ; dif­
Pravcr: to Pan in Pbaedrus, 248 fcrencc from Aristophanes, 1 4 0 ; differ-
Procrcation: and piety, 134; chcmc of, 112 ence from Plato, 2 4 7 ; as edu cator, 2 2 7 ,
Prodkus: tcachcr o f Agathon and Pausanias, 2 2 9 , 2 3 2 ; endurance o f, 2 7 5 - 7 8 ; hom e*
61 lessness o f, 2 8 5 ; hubris o f, 2 8 * 3 3 - 3 4 .
Protagoras: begimting of, 273; connection 4 4 * 7 3 * 2 5 2 * 2 6 4 * ¿rony o f, 5* 3 3 - 3 4 ;
with S p n p o s i u M y 2 5 , 175, 255; eunuch justice o f, 2 7 2 ; lack o f anger in , 2 4 8 - 4 9 ;

293
I N D E X

Sócrates (c o n ttn u e á ) T h eory: as fulfillment o f E ros, 1 4 0 S ee a lso


as lovcr, 2 5 2 - 5 3 ; magnetism o f, 2 8 6 ; as Art
midwife, 2 2 7 ; m oderación o f, 2 6 6 ; as Thrasym achus: on ju stice, 1 2 7
Odysseus, 4 2 * 2 7 6 ; plan o f spccch, 1 8 3 . Thucydides: on A Jdbiadcs, 2 5 9 ; p o ctic his-
2 1 6 , riddie o f, 2 8 7 ; siJcncc o f in dia­ to ry o f, 2 6 1 - 6 2
logues, 2 4 7 ; spccchcs o f, 2 7 9 ; way o f T im e: and morcality, 2 2 0
speaking, 1 7 9 ; youthiulncss o f, 2 1 9 , 2 8 3 ; Tragedy; and com edy, 1 6 9 - 7 2 . 2 8 5 - 8 6 ; o f
in X cn o p h o n , 4 2 E ro s, 1 4 1 ; cxperiencc o f, 2 6 6 , 2 6 9 ; S ym -
S o p b ist: o n b ein g as pow cr, 1 8 9 - 9 0 p o r iu m as, 2 8 2 - 8 3 S ee a ls o A gathon;
Sophists: character o f, 3 9 - 4 0 : as term o f Aristophancs; Com edy
praisg, 2 2 3 Triads: ofsp cakcrs in S y m p ostu m , 2 6 2 , 2 8 2
Soul: abstraction fro m , 2 5 1 ; divínation of, T ru st: in R e p u b lie , 1 3 7
1 3 8 - 3 9 ; in P lato , 7 - 8 ; tripartición o fin Truch: and love o f bcautiful, 1 8 3 . 2 5 0
P h a e d r u s , R e p u b lie , and S vtu posiu tn , 5 7 r Tyranny: and E ros, 5 8 - 5 9
2 4 2 -4 4 Tyrant: Alcibiades as, 2 5 8 . 2 2 2
Sparta: in Pausarías' spccch, 6 9 , 2 6
Spcech: and c o n v c m tío n , 1 5 5 ; punitive. Ugly: Só crates' discovery o f, 1 8 6 - 8 7
2 4 6 - 4 7 ; and speaker in P lato , 1 2 8 , 2 5 3 - U n ion: and distance in E ro s, 1 4 0
55 U topianism : o f E ros, 1 4 6
Spiritedness (th u m o s ): in R e p u b lie , 9 - 1 0 ,
5 9 ,2 4 2 = 4 4 VaJetudinarian. oppositc o f cro tic m an,
S ta te m a n : on cíty and household, 2 2 6 ; law 2 1 8 -1 9
in, 2 V irtu e: n o t bcautiful, 1 6 0 ; and fam c, 2 2 5 ;
Stendhal: on beautv, 2 3 6 and plcasurc, 1 0 5 ; tru c, 2 3 9
Strauss: on interpretación, viii; o n Plato's
dialogues, ix; on political philosophy, v ü - W a r primacy o f, 10 7
viii; on “valúes," 2 1 1 ; o n X cnop h on's W h o k : and pare, 1 4 3
H ie r o , 1 2 8 W ine-drinking, 3 5 - 3 7 ; occasion for, L2
S y m p osiu m : all Achenians in , 2 3 - 2 4 ; as W isdom : and bodüy unión, 3 3 ; and E ros,
con test w ith p oets, 8 , 1 1 ; and C r id a s , 1 6 2 - 6 3 ; and m ode radon o f Sócrates,
1 5 3 : date o f, 1 4 - 1 5 ; 2 4 ; first words 2 6 7 - 6 8 ; and u »*w i$d om ,9
o f, 1 9 , 1 2 6 : on a g o d , 1 6 ; kinship o f W om an: human b ein g as, 2 QS
with R e p u b lie , 1 9 - 2 0 ; ord er ofspeakers W riting: and im m ortality, 2 5 2 ; and Sócrates,
in , 7 3 ; plan o f th c w hole, 5 4 , 2 1 6 ; and 2 4 5 - 4 6 ,2 5 0
p rofanaron o f th c mysteries, 2 3 - 2 4 ;
and P r o t o s e r á s , 2 5 , 3 3 - 3 4 . 4 4 , 2 5 2 . X cnop h on: on Arcadians, 1 4 1 —4 2 ; o n di*
2 7 3 —7 4 ; as puriheation, 2 4 0 ; silent ajectic and rh etoric, 1 7 8 - 7 9 ; on fam c,
gucsts in, 2 5 4 ; cripartition o f E ros in, 1 6 5 ; o n inccst, 1 8 1 ; irony o f, 1 7 6 ; and
S 7 ; as tru c law, 2 8 3 - 8 4 ; uniquenesj» o f Plato, 7 ; on punitive spcech, 2 4 7 ; on
tille, L2 Sirens, 2 6 6 ; Xanthippe in , 2 3

T h e a e te tu s: m idwifcry o f Sócrates in, 7 2 7 Zeus: in A ristophancs, 1 2 6 , 1 3 1 ; and Eros,


T h eod oru s: resem blancc o f t o Eryxim achus, 1 5 8 , 1 6 4 ; in G o r g ia s , 1 2 6 ; in H om er,
1 1 0 .1 1 4 209

294
Phiiosophy / Political Science

The first major picce o f unpubíishcd work by Leo Strauss to appear


¡n more than thirty years, this volume oífers the public the unprece-
dcntcd experience o f encountcring this renowned schotar as his stu-
dents did. Given as a course in autumn 1959 under the title “Plato’s
Political Phüosophy,” these provocative lecturcs— until now, ncver
published, but instead passed down from one gcneration o f students
to the next— show Strauss at his subtle and insightful best.

wFinding a new book by the political phüosopher Leo Strauss more


than a gcneration after his death in 1973 is as startling and unex-
pected as discovering a lost manuscript by Bach in some dark and
remóte Germán basement. . . . This book on the Symposium is a
remarkable addition to his rcmarkable bodv o f work.”
— Mark Blitz, Weekly S tan dard

“It is not only fascinating but enlightening to hear Leo Strauss


express for an audicncc o f students aspects o f his thought that in his
writings he phrased more cryptically; to hear him repeat those
things with variations and bring out what is crucial. It is good to
hear him cracking an occasional joke and a pleasure to confirm how
frcsh and direct he could be.”
— G. R. F. Ferrari, University o f California, Berkcley

L eo Strauss (1 8 9 9 -1 9 7 3 ) w;as the Robert Maynard Hutchins


Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus o f Political Science at the
University o f Chicago. His many contributions to political philoso-
phy inelude The P olitical Philosoplry o f H obbes and On Tyranny, both
published by the University o f Chicago Press. Seth Benardete
(1 9 3 0 -2 0 0 1 ) was professor o f classics at New York University and
the author, most recently, o f P lato}s *Law s*: The D iscovery o f Reina,
also published by the University o f Chicago Press.

T h e U niversity o f C h icag o Press


www.prctt.uchtogM.edu

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