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We would likc co express ourgratiiude co che John M. Olin Cerner for Jnquiry meo che
Theorv and Pracrice o f Democracy, which, uith che support o f che John M, Olin Foundation
and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, provided inval uable assistancc in preparing
che manuscript o f this book for pubiication.
Strauss, Leo.
Leo Strauss on Placo'* Symposium / cdiced and wich a forcword by Seth
Ben árdete,
p. cm.
Ineludes índex.
ISBN 0-226 7768S-9 {alk. paperj
1. Plato, Symposium. 2 Polirical scicnce— Philosttphy—History.
I. Benardetc, Seth. H. Tille
B385 .$77 2001
184—dc21 00-012819
© T he paper used in this pubiícation meces the mínimum requirements ofehe American
National Standard for Information Sciences— Pcrmanencc o f Paper for Princcd Librarv
Materials, ANSI Z39.48 1992.
CONTENTS
F o rew o rd vii
2 . T h e S e ttin g 17 8 . A g ath o n 1 4 3
4 . Pausanias ( 1 ) 5 7 1 0 . S ó crates ( 2 ) 1 9 8
6 . E ry xim ach u s 9 2
In d e x 2 8 9
FOREWORD
vu
F O R B W O R D
dorus’s acquaintance, and at the cnd it is he who disrupts che parry, forcé s
it to be come a symposium, and completes the series o f erotic speeches
with a praise o f Sócrates. The year o fth e party also politicizes the unpolit-
ical setting and cheme, for it immediately precedes the Sicilian expeditíon
that Alcibiades prom oted. His subsequent withdrawal, which virtually
guaranteed the failure o f the venture, was due to the hysteria that swept
Athens after the mutilation o f the Herm ac and the profanation o f the
mystcries, in which Alcibiades was thought to be involved. Strauss ínter-
prets the Symposium as Plato’s versión o f that profanation: Sócrates proves
through his mouthpiece Diotima that Eros is not a god. T h e political and
the theological thus come together and offer a way into Strauss’s abiding
concern.
Strauss’s capacity to discern the ultímate import o f seemingly minor
things is nowhere more conspicuous than in his interpretation o f the Sym-
posiunt. H e shows that Sócrates’ hubris, to which both Agathon and Alci
biades cali attention, is equally involved In his teaching on Eros and his
con test with Agathon, in which Alcibiades, in the guise o f Dionysus, pro ves
to be the judge. The contest with Agathon for supremacy in wisdom is in
turn shown to be a contest becween poetry and philosophy: Sócrates had al-
ready observed to Aristodemus the hubris H om cr committed against the
good. The truly profound speech o f Aristophanes and the seemingly silly
spcech o f Agathon divide between them all that comedy and tragedy re-
spectivcly can muster against philosophy. Only Aristophanes, Agathon, and
Sócrates, Strauss shows, give speeches that do not subordínate Eros to any-
thing. Their speeches are the only inspired speeches, for Phaedrus looks at
Eros through sclfishncss, Pausanias through morality, and Eryximachus
through Science. In each case Eros disappcars into som cthingclse and docs
n ot emerge ineo its own until Aristophanes, recovered from the hiccups,
speaks. His hiccups dísturb the order o f speeches and put the two poets on
the same side as Sócrates. Strauss’s recognition o f this división o f the
speeches into two triads does n ot affect his carefol exposition o f the first
three speeches. Phaedrus’s selfishness has a connection with Sócrates’ shift-
ing o f Eros from a concern with the beautiful— the ordinary understand*
¡ng— to a concern with the good; Pausanias’s unstable advocacy offreedom ,
philosophy, and morality at various stages o f his argument cncapsulates the
polidcal problem that the R ep u blic sets out to solve; and Eryximachus’s co-
ordination o f Eros with Science already adumbrates the modern project
that Plato uncannily tbresaw and opposed.
vm
M ) R k W O R D
ix
1 IN TRO D U CTO RY
REM A R K S
I
C H A P T E R O N E
In spite o f this fact, wc must cake this posilion vcry seriously. Its motive can
be crudely staied as follows: The same Science— scientific method— which
produccd the H -bom b must also be able to prevent the use o f the H -bom b.
The Science which produced the H -bom b, physics; the Science dealing with
the use o f the H -bom b, political Science. Now, you see immediately that
this reasoning, that the same method which produced the H -bom b must
also be a ble to prevent the use o f the H -bom b, is very poor; the distinction
berween the use and misuse o f anything— H -bom b included— means a
distinction between good and bad, and this kind o f distinction is now called
a valué judgment. According to the positivistic view valué judgments are
outside the scope o f Science. Therefore this positivistic political Science
promises something which it is, strictly speaking, unable and unwilling to
supply. The characteristic thesis o f positivism can be said to be that all val
úes are equal. Positivistic Science claims to be able to distinguísh between
attainable and unattainable ends. This is all. It cannot and does n ot claím
more. It cannot even say that the quest fbr unattainable ends is foolish and
therefore bad. This would be a valué judgment. It can say only that they are
unattainable. But it cannot say that the quest for unattainable ends is infe
rior to the quest for attainable ends. Positivists sometimes reject the impu-
tation that according to their views all valúes are equal. But I can only say
that this is merely an attempt to befog the issue. What they say in fact is that
as far as human knowledge o r reason is concerned, or as far as we know, all
valúes are equal. This they certainly say, and there is no practica! difference
between the assertion ‘as far as we know and shall ever be able to know’ and
the assertion that all valúes are equal.
The positivistic position can be characterized as follows: There is no po-
sition between the objectivity o f Science and the subjcctivity ofevaluations.
The principies o f thought, o f thinking, o f underscanding, are objective.
The principies o f preference o r action are necessarily subjective. I leave it at
these brief remarks in order to characterize in a few words an alternad ve to
positivism which I cali historicism. There are all kinds o f overlapping be
tween these two are as o f thinking, but it is unnecessary for us to go into
them.
In the clear case, historicism admits that a valué- free social Science is im-
possi ble. But it asserts that both principies o f thought and principies o f ac
tion are essentially variable, or histórica!, and therefore in a radical sense
subjective. In the vulgar form ofth is position wc cannot arrive at any higher
principies o f understanding and o f preferring than those o f Western civi
lización. There are no principies o f understanding and principies o f prefer-
2
I N T R O D U C T O R * ' R B M A R K S
ring which belong to man as man, who can never go beyond a historie ally
qualified humanity such as Western civilization. Historie ism stems from
Germany and is, therefbrc, far more developed there than, for cxample, in
this country. But even in this country you find it in various forms. Cari
Becker, I be lieve, was the most famous represe ntative o f historicism who
denied the impossibility o f any objective history. All historiography is based
on the climate o f the country and the age and can never transcend it. The
difficulty with historicism, simply stated, is this: it cannot help transcending
history by its very assertion. I f we say every sort o f man is radically histori-
cal, this assertion is no longer meant co be historical and therefore refutes
the position. I cannot go into any further detail. I can only assert he re that
both positivism and historicism are not viable. But this is not the subject o f
this coursc. Assuming that they are viable, they are admittcdly late posi-
tions. They are based on the experience o f the tailure o f an earlier approach.
This earlier approach is called in the loose language o f this kind o f literature
the absoiutist approach.
The absoiutist approach asserts that there are invariable, unchangeable,
universally valid principies o f chought and action. This, it is said, has been
destroyed by man’s deeper reflection or by man’s longer experience. From
this it follows that if we as positivists or historicists want to understand our-
selves we must understand our own ground, i.e., the absolutism o f the past
and the experience o f the failure o f that absolutism. Therefore a historicist
or relativist, if he refleets o n his position and wants to understand what he
says, is compelled to understand the older position, the absoiutist position,
which he replaces. In other words, reflection, o f which I have given here
barely a specimen, on the defeets o f the views prevale nt today, leads us to
take a serious interest in the opposite view, in an evaluating social Science
that refers to invariable and universal principies. Such a social Science was in
existe nce at least until the end o f the eighteench century. The notion o f a
value-free social Science emerged only in the last de cade o f the ninetcenth
century. The most talked about form o f this older form o f social Science is
the natural law teaching. This natural law teaching has its roots in the teach*
ing o f Plato and Aristode, but it was not developed by them. I t began to be
developed by a certain Greek school, the so-called Stoics, which emerged
after Aristode, but we have barely sufficient evidence to speak about the
Stoic natural law school. For all practica! purposes, the elassie o f the natural
law social Science is Thom as Aquinas. As that part o f the movement o f
thought which I have discussed up until now, Thomas Aquinas would be o f
the utm ost interest to us.
3
C H A P T B R ONE
4
1 N T R O D U C T O R Y K E M A R K S
Icavc it at the following remark. The very openness o f Plato— the assertion
that man does n ot possess wisdom, that he can only strive for wisdom— ¡n
a way al$o closes the íssue. Human knowledge is imperfcct. Human knowl*
edge is at best progressive and never final. This is, o f course, a final asser-
don. T h e great difference bctween Plato and his modern followers, or
seeming followers, is that Plato knew that men cannoc Uve and think with-
out a finality o f some sort. Plato contended that the finality o f the insight
that we are never fuUy knowing implies a final answer to the question o f the
good íife, including the question o f the best society. This is the problem we
have to understand while trying to understand Plato’s thought.
In what I said there is an impUcation which I would like to make explicit:
Plato never wrote a System o f phílosophy. In a way, no one until the seven-
teenth century had a system, striedy speaking, but Plato did n ot even write
treadses, as Aristotle did, for example. Plato wrote only dialogues. The dia-
logic character o f the Platonic wridngs has something to do with this pecu-
Uar openness o f Plato’s inquines. This, however, creates a difficulty which is
very great. In his dialogues Plato never appears as a character. Plato never
says a word. Sócrates speaks, and other men speak, but with what right can
we say that what Sócrates says is Plato’s view? I f you say it is obvious, I can
reply very simply that it is also obvious in the dialogues that Sócrates is an
ironical man. T o have as one’s spokesman a man most tamous for his trony
is almost the same as n ot having a spokesman at all. T o say it differently: No
one would dream o f ascribing to Shakespeare every sentence expressed by
any Shakespearean character, however attractive that character may be. It is
wise to begin the study o f Plato with this sober skepticism. W hether a cer-
tain sentiment or thought expressed by any character, however attractive, is
Plato’s view, we do n ot know. Plato expresses his views surely through his
dialogues, but n ot simply through the explicit utteranees o f his speakers.
From this foliows a variety o f rules o f reading which we will take up on the
proper occasions. But, to begin with, che rule can be stated in its universal -
ity as follows: Plato’s dialogues demand to be read with exceeding care.
There is nothing superfluous, nothing meaningless in a Platonic dialogue.
Sócrates in the P haedru s compares the good writing, the perfect writing, to
a üving being in which each part, however small, has a necessary function
for the life and activity o f that living being. The Platonic dialogue has a
function— the íunction is to make us understand. And the dialogue is com
parable to an organism insofar as every part o f it has a function in making us
understand. Therefore we must consider everything in a dialogue. I Icave it
at these general remarks about why we turn to Plato and turn now to the
5
C H A ? I E R ON h
6
I NT R O P U C T O R Y R E M A R K S
7
C H A PT E R O N t
soul in its essence, you can make thesc highest principies transparen t in all
human beings and all types o f human beings. And this is prccisely what
Plato is trying to do in his dialogues. Platonic philosophy, by virtue o f a
deeper understanding o f the principies, is able to scc in men thc manifesta-
tions o f the principies.
T h e most extcnsive discussion o f poctry in Plato occurs in the R epu blic
and the Law s. B u t in those cwo dialogues we have no discussion with po-
ets— no poets are present. The meeting o f Sócrates with poets, the contest
o f Sócrates with poetry, is the Symposium. This is the first rcason why the
Sytnposium is o f special importance. Lest you think that this is a question
that invoíves a very special premise, namely, some sympathy for Plato, I as-
surc you that the question is nothing less than the status o f human reason.
They all believe in human reason, but the poets imply somehow that some-
thing other than reason is superior to reason and must take its place.
The second reason why the Symposium is important is this: the theme
com m on to poetry and phiíosophy is the human things. The human things,
however, are primarily the political things, for mankind’s greatest objec-
tivcs, most impressive objectives, are political— ffeedom and empire. One
might al so say peace and war are dearly political phenomena. D on ’t forget
that the tide o f what is somehow the greatest modern novel is W ar a n d
P eace. Even today, Khrushchev and Eisenhower feed the headtiñes to a
much higher degree than the White Sox or Ingrid Bergm an’s most recent
matrimonial adventure. And the relation o f Sputnik to the coid war is obvi-
ous to the meanest capacities. But what is the core o f the political? Men
killíng men on the largest scale in broad daylight and with the greatest
serenity. Today the most prominent fact is the coid war, communism versus
liberal democracy, i.e., an antagonism o f political orders, o f regimes. N ot
Russia and thc United States, n ot Russian culture and language versus En-
glish culture and language, they are only accidental.
The political in the political is the phenomenon which the Greeks called
p o liteia (the title o f Plato’s R ep u blic in the original). This word means,
looscly explained, some thing like constitution. The politeia designates the
character o f the govemment, the powcrs o f the government. Secondly,
however, and this is the more important mcaning, politeia designates a way
o f life. T h e way oflife o f a society is decisively determined by its hierarchy—
its stratification, as it is now called. The most massive form o f this stratifica-
tion is expressed by this question: Which type o f men predomínate in broad
daylight and with a view to compel power and obedience and respect?
W hich habits are fostered and admi red by the society as a whole as it ex-
8
I N T R O D U C T O R Y R E M A R K S
9
C H A P T B I ONE
is higher than desire. You may recaí] that in the R ep u blic we have three parts
o f the soul: let u$ cali the first reason and then, the two nonrational ones,
spiritedness and desire. Desire is also called ‘eros\ a key word fbr our pres-
ent course. I would like to illustrate this by two more points. According to
che teachíng o f the R epubl¡cy the tyrant, the most abominable ruler, jusdce
and injustice incarnate, i$ eros incarnate. Another illustration: W hen Plato
speaks in the second book o f the R epu blic o f the modves o f men for estab-
lishing societies, he is completely silent about procreation. H e speaks o f
hunger and thirst and need for shelter. The whole argument o f the R ep u b
lic is based on a delibérate, and deliberately exaggerated, demotion o f
eros, inasmuch as the re is a tensión between the political passion— spirited
ness— and the erotic passion. The tensión between spiritedness and eros
corrcsponds somehow to the tensión between the political and the nonpo-
litical. Now, whereas Plato’s R epu blic can be said to be the political dia
logue, we will tentatively say that the Symposium is the most emphatically
nonpolitical dialogue o f Plato, insofor as he deais with that element in man
which is in essential tensión with the political element.
L et me explain: As political scientists we are interested in political phe-
nomena. But we must also be interested, simultaneously, in the political as
political. W hat is it that gives elections, for example, their peculiarly politi
cal character? This more abstract question, What is the political, as distin-
guished from the study o f particular political phenomena?, is for Plato a
most important question. One cannot understand the political as such,
without understanding somehow the nonpolitical. When you speak o f the
political, you impiy that there is something outside the political and you
must have some awareness o fit. The nonpolitical may be entirely irrclevant
fbr the political, e.g., digestión, o r the backside o f the m oon, o r it may be
politic ally relevant. In the latter case, the nonpolitical is either subpolitical,
say the economical, or suprapolitical— religión. The nonpolitical, as politi-
cally relevant, is the foundation o f the political, either as condition o r as the
ultímate end. In both meanings, the nonpolitical was called traditionally
the natural. There may be something natural which transcends the political
in dignity and which gives politics its guidance. That is what was meant by
those thinkers who spoke o f the natural law and natural right. The word
n a tu ra l indicated the fbundations o f the political that are o f themselves not
simply political. The foundation o f the political is, somehow, nature, and
nature may be understood in difierent ways. One more thing: it is some
how the contention o f Plato that the nature o f man and, in a way, the nature
o f the whole, is eros.
10
I N T R O D U C T O R Y U M A R K S
11
CH APTE R O U t
theme. As I said, six are poiitical: R epu blic; Law s; Sophist; M inos, who was a
legislator; H ipparchus, an Athenian ryrant; and the A pology o f Sócrates,
which, as a forensic spcech, is obviously also about poiitical action. There
are thrce remaining dialogues: the R iv a ls (E rastae or A n terastae), where
the title indicates the partícipants. H ere thcy have no ñames; the only way
to indícate them was their com m on quaiiry, rivals in lo ve. E p in om ish as its
ñame from its position in the work, as a sequel to N o m o s , i.e., to the Laxos.
The only remaining title is that o f our work: the Symposium. This is a
unique case. The Symposium is the only dialogue whose title indicates the
occasion. Why n ot the ñame o f a participante The answcr: there is n ot just
one participant; there are six persons other than Sócrates and, God knows,
each m ay be as important as everyone else. lt is also possi ble to make this
tentative suggestion. The Symposium as you know o r will find out soon,
consists o f six speeches on eros, and the last one is by Sócrates. O ne is in-
clined to assume that there is an ascent from the least interesting o r least
wise speech to Sócrates’ speech, which is the wisest. T h e speaker before
Sócrates is Agathon. Agathon is the most important individual after
Sócrates. But we don’t know that. In Greek this ñame sounds almost like
agathon , “the good.” I f the subtitle were really “on the good* this would
n ot be a bad pun.
The Symposium, at any rate, is the only dialogue whose title designares
an occasion. Why did Plato single out this occasion, a symposium? Plato’s
contemporary rival, ultimately friend, Xenophon, also wrote a Symposium.
In the beginning this book says that it will treat the deeds o f gentlemen per-
formed in play, performed jocularly. In a way this is also true o f Plato’s Sym
posium : playful deeds o f gentlemen. Symposia give rise to play and jokes,
but at the same time they are susceptible o f noble speeches. There are other
human gatherings which are not so likely to give rise to delicate and noble
speeches. You would have to reflect about the médium o f symposia, which
is wine, and the effeets o f wine. I mention only two o f them , which have
been articulated by Plato, so we are n ot substituting our own poor experi-
ences for whac Plato had in mind. But you will, I believe, recognize a phe-
nomenon known to you from the daily papers. In the first place, wine gives
rise to the ability o r willingness to say cverything— openness, frankness.
Connected with this is what the Greeks called hubris, wantonness, doing
things you would never do when sober, presumptuousness to take risks. In
other words, this occasion is really a particularly important one. We are
likely to hear interesting things which are not said on every occasion if we
can listen to a symposium.
12
I N T R O D U C T O R * R E M A R K . S
13
C H A l ’ T E R ONU
associated wíth Sócrates many years ago. Aristodemus is the Icak to the
younger friends o f Sócrates, and Apollodorus is the leak to the general pub-
lic. We have to raise this question: Why was the story dorm ant fbr so long?
And why is there only a one-way Street to the truth? Namcly, only through
Apollodorus and Aristodemus. This must be connected to the character o f
Apollodorus and Aristodemus. Apollodorus is an enthusiast; he cannot
help talking o f Sócrates, that marvelous man, al! the time. B u t what is the
place o f Aristodemus? That is more difficult to say, Aristodemus knew it for
many, many years, and only now does he talk about it. Was it n ot proper to
tell the story earlier? Was Aristodemus the man most likely to do something
perhaps slighdy improper? I believe we can answer that question, but I
postpone ¡t because no answer is given here. We know the year the Sympo-
siutn took place. I t was the year Agathon won first prize. This is somehow
known by tradición, and we arrive at the year 4 1 6 . W hen was it told? I
would like to give a tentative answer to this question, and develop it in
greater detail later on.
Before I can give a tentative answer to this I must introduce another
ítem. In the year 41S the Athenians began the ir expedition against Sicily,
for which Alcibiades was chiefly responsible. This was a terrific gamble, but
Alcibiades was such a genius char ít might very well havc been successful.
The Athenians committed the folly, politically speaking, ofcalling back Al
cibiades al most immediately after the expedition had sailed. Alcibiades
didn’t like it and fled to Sparta. He ruined Athens. H e contributed more to
the ruin o f Athens than any other man. W hen the expedition was about to
sail, the Athenians awoke one morning to find that most o f the herms— pil-
lars surmounted by a bust, usually o f Hermes— had been defaced the night
before. This was a great act o f blasphemy, but it also had a certain polio cal
connotation. Somehow this Hermes statue was connected with the democ-
racy, and the people had the feeling that some subversive activity had taken
place. Then resident aliens (m etics) revealed that other defaccments o f stat-
ues had happened earlier, but the bíg scandal was the profanation o f the
Eleusinian mysteries, the most sacred mysteries in Athens. T h e rumor was
that the terrible fellow behind it all was Alcibiades. This was the back-
ground o f the recaí I o f Alcibiades and o f Alcibiades’ flight. H e knew that
condemnation o f death was the only possibility those days for, as people
now say, public hysteria.
O f the sevcn o r eight characters in the Symposiumytwo others beside Al
cibiades were implicated in this very dangerous undertaking: Phaedrus and
Eryximachus. This has to be taken into considera ti on. A profanation o f
14
I N T R O D U C T O R Y R E M A R K S
15
C H A P T E R O N h
16
2 THE SE T T IN G
I would like to say again a few words about the reasons whlch ent¡-
tic onc to speak o f Plato’s Symposium in a political Science coursc. I f scien-
tifie political sciencc wcrc thc highest fbrm o f the understanding o f politi cal
things then wc should cióse Plato and return to Taicott Parsons o r similar
writers. But if scientific social scicnce is n ot quite sufficient, then wc need
some supplemcnt. This supplcmcnt is gcncrally supplied by novcls today.
In other words, by utteranees which are n ot scientific, not rauonal, which
are subjective. This implies that there is a possible conflict bctween poetry,
which ineludes novéis, and philosophy. Perhaps philosophy can do the job
that poetry daims to d o and to some extent does.
A third conside radon: the subject m atter o f the Symposium is cros. This
does play a considerable role in scientific social Science. M ost o f you will
have heard the ñame o f Harold Lasswell, who brought psychoanalysis into
political Science. This has had a very great success with the profcssion. T o
judge psychoanalysis and its contribución to political Science onc wouíd
have to have some awareness o f alternad ve interpretations o f eros. T h e al-
ternative interpretation o f eros is supplied in Plato’s Symposium. O ne couíd
give other reasons o f a similar kind in case there is stiil someone among you
who does n ot sec the necesslty for political scientists to study Plato’s Sym-
posium yand I am perfectly willing to open such a discussion.
T o turn, then, to the Symposium: I said last time the theme is eros. The
Symposium scands out among the Piatonic titles in that its title is unique.
T h e title indicates the occasion o f the conversation. There is a connection
between the unique character o f the title and the unique character o f thc
subject. The subject ¡s n ot simply eros; it is thc god Eros. The Symposium
is the only Piatonic dialogue explicitly devoted to a god. We have to con-
sider also, and we began this last tim e, the peculiar position o f the Sympom
siu m within the body o f Piatonic writings. There is no completely isolated
Piatonic dialogue. Every dialogue is connected with every other dialogue
but sometimes in a very indirect way. O ne o f thc first steps one has to take
in trying to understand a Piatonic dialogue is to find out its nearest kin. I
mentioned one poínt last time: the Sym posium is one o f the three dialogues
which are n ot narrated by Sócrates. T h e two others are the P arm en ides
and the P baedo. They are the only Piatonic dialogues dealing with the
17
CHAPTF. R 1 w o
young Sócrates cxplicitly. The young Sócrates had been the subject o f
Aristophanes’ comedy the Clouds, which, in terms o f Sócrates’ biography,
is still an earlier stage than the one prcsented in the P arm en ides and the
Phaedo.
The Sympostum is the only diaJogue in which Aristophanes, the author
o f the C louds, appears. M ore obvious and cíear is the relation to another di
alogue: the Phaedrus. The subtitle o f the P haedrus is “on eros,” whereas
our dialogue is explicitly devoted to eros. The leading character in the
P haedrus is Phaedrus, who is responsible, as you will see, fbr the discussion
in the Sympostum. Obviously, then, thcse two dialogues are dosely relatcd.
I would like to make only one rcmark, which later on might prove to be
helpful, about the relation o f the se two particularly beautiful dialogues—
the Symposium and the Phaedrus. 1 think that the dramatic date— the inner
date— o f the Sytnposium is 4 1 6 . 1 think the P haedrus is later. Phaedrus, who
is present in the discussion in the Symposiutn, as wc shall see, turns up later,
some years later, in a conversation which he has with Sócrates in strict pri-
vacy, somewhere outside o f Athens. I can only give one indication now. At
the end o f the P haedrus a reference is made to a famous tcacher o f rhetoric,
ISócrates, who was born in 4 3 6 , and therefore was twenty years oíd at the
time o f the Sympostum. B u t the reference at the end o f the P haedru s does
n ot fit a very young man, a man o f twenty. This is, I think, an indication that
Isocrates was already at least twcnty-five when the P haedru s took place.
This is fbr the time being a mere m atter o f information but will later on
prove to be o f some ¡mportance fbr the understanding o f the spcech o f
Phaedrus. His speech is the first one in the Symposium.
1 will leave it at these general remarks and would like to cum now to the
text.
I secm to myself to be not unpracticed in what you ask abouc. I hap-
pened co be going up to town from Phaleron the day befo re yescerday.
One o f my acquaintance spotted me from behind and callcd from a dis*
tance, making a joke o f his cali: “Phafcrian," he said. “You there, Apol*
lodo rus, aren’t you going co wait up for me?” And I stoppcd and let
him catch up. And he said, “Apollodorus, as a maeter o f fact I was just
recently looking for you, as I wanted co karn abouc the get-together of
Agathon, Sócrates, and Alcibiades, as well as o f all the rest who were
present ac the dinner party— abouc the erotic spcechcs, what thcy
wcrc. The rcason is that someone else, who had heard it from Phoenix
the son o f Philippus, was narrating it to me, and he claimed that you
too knew. He couldn’t in fact say anything clcarly. So you be the onc to
18
I HE SETT1NC
nárrate it to me, for it is most just that vou rcport the speeches o f your
comrade.” (1 7 2 a l-b 6 )
19
C HAPT £ R T W o
edges this special obliga tion. We can le ave it at these remarks for the time
being.
“But before anything else," he said, “tcll me, wcre you yoursclf prcscnt at
chis get-together or not?” And I said, “It docs scem that thc narrator was
giving you an absolutcly unclcar narration, if you believe that the get-
togcthcr you're asking about occurred so recently that I too was presenc.”
“Yes,” he said, “Indeed I did.” “How could that be, Glaucon?” I said.
“Don’eyou know that it’s bcen many years now sincc Agathon has bcen in
residencc he re, and since thc time I pass the time with Sócrates and have
made it my concern to know on each and every day what he says and does
has not yet bcen three years? Before that I used to run around haphazardly
and believe I was doing something, and I was more wretched than anyone
whatsoever, no less than you are now, you who believe you must do every-
thing rather than philosophize." And he said, “Don’t jeer, but te 11 me
when that get-together occurred.w(172b6-173a5)
And 1 said, “Whcn wc wcrc still children, when Agathon won with his first
tragedy, on thc day after he and his chorus had oftered thc sacrifice for vic-
20
I HE S R T T J N C
tory.” "So íc was after all,” he said, “a very long rime ago, ic seems. But
who narrated it to you? Or did Sócrates himsclf?” “No, by Zeus,” I said.
(1 7 3 a 5 -b l)
May I s ay only this; God forbid that Sócrates would have told the story. The
idea that Sócrates could have told the story is impossiblc.
“It was the same one who told Phoenix. It was a cercain Aristodcmus,
from the deme Kydathenaion—small, always barefoot. He said he had
been at the get-together, being more a lover o f Sócrates, it seems to me,
than anyonc clse at that time. Howcvcr, it is truc that I also askcd Sócrates
before now about some o f the things I had heard from him [Aristode-
mus], and he agreed in just the way he narrated it.” wWhy, then, don’t you
nárrate ic to me?” he said. “The way to town in any case is as suitabte for
speaking as for hcaring as we go along. ” (1 7 3 b 5 -8 )
Now we see that the date o f the Symposiutn is herc clearly given: after
Agathon’s first victory. I t took place the day after che solemn celebración o f
that victory in the form o f sacrifices. In the R epubltc, you will recall, the sac
rifico takes place simultaneously with the díscussion, Oíd Cephalus goes
out while they make the discussion. H erc the re is no overlapping o f sacrifice
and conversación buc a harmony becween chem becausc chcy are on differ-
ent days. The naive Glaucon thinks that Sócrates might have told o f the
symposium, but this is altogethcr unthinkable to Apollodorus. The source
for the account is n ot Sócrates but Aristodemus. W ho is that Aristodcmus?
The re is a referente co him Ln the fourth chapee r o f the first book o f
Xenophon’s M em orabiliay where he is presented as a man who ridicules
those who sacrifice to the gods and who use divination. In other words, he
is a man o f hubris, a word which is very hard to transíate, the negative
meaning o f pride. This Aristodemus, who is a somewhac strange fellow,
comes from the same deme— these were the administrative units o f
Athens— as Aristophanes.
Aristodemus is the only source o f the exact report o f that symposium.
Phoenix is also mentioned but not precisely. Aristodemus is the source by
way o f which the older generation o f Socratics informa the younger gener-
ation. Apollodorus is the only one who leaks that Information to the out-
side public. This is somehow connected with the fact that Apollodorus is a
very enthusiastic man and can not keep back such an exciting story. Apol
lodorus checked with Sócrates some o f the points. Sócrates said, *Yc$,
that’s correct.” Sócrates takes an cnrirely passive role. W hcn he is asked he
says yes, but he would never tcü the story on his own account.
21
C H A P T B R T W O
T h e story is told on the way from Phaleron to Athens. Athens stands for
something in Plato— fbr many things, but cspecially for freedora o f speech,
for the ability to say everything. And it is a way up, from the coast i ni and, in
more than one respect. L t t u$ continué:
In spite o f his missionary impulse, Apollodorus has learned this much from
Sócrates— that one must wait until the others feel a need, or a lack. In other
words, one must n ot teil a story unasked. H e tells the story on request. H e
is outstandingly glad when speaking o r hearing speeches about philosophy.
U p till now the interlocutors had only heard there were erotic speeches, but
some how that seems to be the same— unless we assume that speeches on
eros are by their nature philosophic speeches. Apollodorus is also fiiil o f
anger about the nonphilosophic speeches and full o f compassion for those
who turn their back on philosophy. Especiaíiy if they are wealthy, because
they do not have the excuse o f poverry. Now, ¡n spite o f his constantly hear
ing speeches about philosophy, Apollodorus is cursed, most unhappy, His
turn to philosophy three years ago, when he met Sócrates for the first time,
has transformed his wretchedness, ofw hich he did n ot know, into complete
misery, o f which he knows. In other words, he is n ot exactly a model o f
happiness. We also observe that this very humble man raises a high daim to
superiority. The word I occurs all the time and also the word n arration .
This is o f importance in another contcxt which we may cake up later.
22
THE S E T T I N G
23
C H APT R R T WO
followed thereafter, because Alcibiades fled to the ene mies o f Athens. The
Symposium tells us whac reaily happened in that profanation o f the myster-
ies. The true story is entirely different from what popular hysteria held. The
mysteries divulged were n ot those o f Eleusis but mysteries told by an en
tirely different priestess from Mantineia— we shall see that later— and the
man who divulged them was Sócrates himself. Alcibiades was compietely
innocent. He carne in only after the whole thing was over. Therefore also
the strange story about the dates; the story is told in 4 0 7 , after Alcibiades
had made his peace with Athens. The making o f the peace culminated in
the fact that the oíd procession to Eleusis, the seat o f the mysteries, was car-
ried on under the leadership and auspices o f Alcibiades. The hysteria o f 4 1 6
had compietely disappeared; if we may use such a word, everything was
fine. Now the story could with some safety be told. I do n ot agree with
what some people have said about Senator McCarthy, but you know the
popular language about it, and you know that there are quite a few things
which could not be said in this country with grace some years ago that can
now be said, after this hysteria has disappeared. This was a very small thing
compared to what happened in Athens. No onc was condemned to death
because he had some dubious relations with communists, whereas ¡n
Athens they were kiiled by the dozens. It was ccrtainly dangerous to te II
some thing about it. This is the ironic background o f the Symposium.
The allusion to an impious and criminal relation o f mysteries ceases to
be strange once onc refleets on what philosophy or Science is in Plato’s
view. Philosophy o r Science attempts to unco ver all secrets and in this sen se
to profane all mysteries— to discover the truth and to proclaim it. But there
is a difficulty here. Apollodorus proclaims the truth and this is connectcd
with the fact that he does n ot quite know what he is doing. Apollodorus is
not a theoretical man, Philosophy proper, while being concerncd with un*
covering the truth, does not reveal all mysteries to everyone, does not have
missionary zea!. Sócrates never told the story o f the Symposium.
Another point: In the Symposium there are seven speakers. The first ís
Phaedrus, then Pausanias, then Eriximachus, then Aristophanes, then Aga-
thon, and then Sócrates. Later o n , but not on eros, Alcibiades. T h e speak
ers on eros are the first six. All seven speakers have one very superficial
characteristic in com m on: they are all Athenians. This is remarkable. I f we
think o f the R epu blic, for example, one very important individual, Thrasy-
machus, is obviously not an Athenian, but even Cephalus and his whole
family are, as we know from other sources, strangers. O r think o f the
P haedo-Sócrates’ death. T h e key in terlocu to r are from Thebes— Simmias
24
THE S E T T I N G
25
CHAP T E R TWO
sccne takes place— festivity, wine— is among well-bred human beings con-
ducive to amity and harmony. Nevertheless therc are important difFerences
in the Symposium>as wc shall see.
Aristophanes had attacked the new tragedy o f Eurípides and also
Agathon, contrasting it with the oíd, ancient tragedy o f Aeschylus. Aeschy-
lus— M arathón fighter, American Legión. Eurípides— what would be anal*
ogous co that in American life? I don’t know. Now, the document o f the
attack on this new tragedy, in the ñame o f the oíd tragedy, is Aristophanes’
play the Frogs. In the Frogs, Dionysus, the god ofw ine and the theater, goes
down to Hades where he be comes the witness to a venomous disputation
between Aeschylus and Eurípides for supremacy in tragedy. They behave
compietely like fishwives. Dionysus is made the judge between the two. He
makes the decisión eventuaiiy with a view not to the poetic quality but to
the political judgment o f the two tragedians. Eurípides is opposed to Alci
biades; Aeschylus is willing to accept Alcibiades. Dionysus chooses Aeschy
lus, the man favorably disposed toward Alcibiades. In the Frogsy then, we
have a contest between two tragic poets which is decided by Dionysus, the
god o f wine, with a view to Alcibiades. That is the model for the Sytnpo-
sium . In the Symposiutn the contest between che tragic poets is over:
Agathon has won. We have a contest, as will appear, becween a tragic poet,
a comic poet, and Sócrates. The scope is infinitely larger. Dionysus is ex-
plicidy said to be the judge, as we find near the beginning where Agathon
says “Dionysus shall be the judge.” B u t who judges? In a way Dionysus, but
actually Alcibiades. The place o f Dionysus is taken by Alcibiades who de
cides in favor o f Sócrates. So you see how elegantiy Plato pays Aristophanes
back. The man who is made the point o f reference in a contest between
tragic poets decides at the Symposium in favor o f Sócrates, whom you,
Aristophanes, so unfairly ridiculed and attacked in your comedy. Wc can say
that the Sytnposium is the reply o f Plato to Aristophanes’ Frogs. Aristopha
nes is the center figure among the seven speakers o f the Symposium} and he
appears nowhere else as a character in the Platonic dialogues. The Sympo-
sium is the Platonic reply to Aristophanes and to the poets altogether, be-
cause, as we shall see, Sócrates wins also against the tragic poet.
The Symposiutn is the contest between Sócrates and all other Athenian
wisdom— sophistic o r poetic— in which Sócrates is given the crown by the
most gifted Athenian statesman with a view to Sócrates’ whole life and not
only to his tirades. But, we have to add, as we shall find later on, Alcibiades
is drunk and he was not present at the contest proper, namely at the
spccchcs, whereas Dionysus in the Frogs was present when Eurípides and
26
IHB S E T T I N G
He said that he met with Sócrates fresh from the bath and wcaring slip-
pers— which he was seldom in the habit o f doing— and he asked him
where he was going, having become so beautiful. “To dinner at Aga*
thon’s,” he said. WI avoided him yescerday at che victory celebration, in
fear o f che crowd, but l agreed I would come today. Accordingly, I beau-
tified myself, in order that a beauty I may go to a beauty. But you," he said,
“how do you fcel about it: would you be willing to go uninvited to din
ner? ** And I said, “ In just the way you bid m e." “Come aJong then,whe
said, “in order that we may corrupt the proverb by a change, ‘Good on
their own go to Agathon’s feases.’ Though it’s probable Chat Homcr not
only corruptcd this proverb but also committed an outrage [hubris]
against ic: he made Agamemnon an excepdonally good man in martial af*
fairs, and Menelaus a ‘soft spearman,* but when Agamemnon arranged for
a sacrifice and a feasc he made Menelaus come to the banquet uninvited,
an inferior to that o f the better.” ( 1 7 4 b 3 -c4 )
The jokc consists partly in the fact that in all probability (it is an emenda-
tion, n ot in the manuscript) the good go on their own accord, i.e., without
invítation, to the meáis o f the good. “O f the good * (ag ath on ), in the
Greek, sounds exactly Üke Agathon. This would mean, then, that the good
go o f their own accord to the meal o f Agathon. So there is a Homeric basis
for this interlude. Now let us consider this: you see, Sócrates is rarely beau-
tiful. The word b ea u tifu l is, o f course, in a way the key word o f this book,
and it is translated differently by translators— understandably— because in
English it would have a more limited meaning than in Greek. In Greek, the
word b ea u tifu l means first o f all what ¡t does in English; it means also the
feir in the sense o f fair action. In English I don’t be lieve you can speak o f a
beautiful action, but you can d o it Ln Germán or French without difficulty.
In Greek the word beautiful means what is lovable, cspecially to the sense o f
sight, but also what is lovable tbr the eye o f the mind. It is the Greek word
for what we would cali moral. This needs a minor qualification: there is a
27
C H A P T E R J WO
Greek expression for what we cali the moral, the noble and the just. The
just things are things which you are obliged co do— pay debts, etc. But the
noble is, in a way, that which is beyond the cali o f duty, that which you can-
not expcct cveryone to do. The noble, then, has a higher status than the
merely just. B oth meanings are somehow always prcsent in any Platonic ref
ere ncc, which can lead to all sorts o f ironies, for example the man who is
very beautiful to look at, but has a very lousy character. The contrast is
more no ti cea ble in Greek than íf we would say “a handsome crook,” and
the other way around.
Sócrates is rarely beautiful. H e has madc himself beautiful for the occa-
sion. He goes as a beautiful man to the beautiful Agathon. Agathon, the
host, is a beautiful man, notoriously beautiful. At Sócrates’ suggestion Aris-
todemus goes with him uninvited. The two o f them go, as Sócrates gra-
ciously suggests, o f their own accord— for Sócrates is, after all, invited; he
ineludes himself in the same category as Aristodemus— to the meal o f
Agathon. Sócrates is beautiful. He suggests that Aristodemus, to o , is beau
tiful. But Aristodemus is obviously n ot dressed for the occasion. According
to the proverb, “The good go o f their own accord to the meal o f the good.”
Sócrates destroys the proverb by changing the good into the beautiful. The
good is n ot identical with the beautiful, and that is the great theme o f the
Symposiutn, which is already announced in the beginning: whether eros is
love o f the beautiful o r n ot rather lo ve o f the good. S o far we know only
that the two are beautiful; we don’t know whether they are good. Sócrates
changcs the good into the beautiful. What Sócrates does is bad, but not as
bad as what H om er did to the proverb. H om er presented a bad man going
o f his own accord to the meal o f an outstandingly good man. Sócrates
changcs the proverb, he makes a kind o f pun, but it is n ot so bad. The sub-
stitution o f beautiful for good is a corruption, a destrucción, but the substi-
tution o f bad for good, as H om er did, is a corruption and, in addition, an
insult. But Sócrates is not beautiful. He has made himself as beautiful as he
could, but the re are limits to that, limits imposed by nature. Aristodemus,
to o , is n ot beautiful. How d o we know that? H e was small, and according
to the Greek view small men cannot be beautiful, they can only be nicc.
Therefore we condude with utm ost precisión that Aristodemus is not
beautiful. Tw o non beautiful men go uninvited to the meal o f a beautiful
man. In other words, Sócrates does the same as H om er, he commits a
hubris as great as H om er’s. This them e, Sócrates’ hubris, will be very im-
portant in the sequel. L ct us go on from here.
L isttn er: Sócrates changed to go to Agathon’s, but Aristodemus did
28
I HK SETT1N Ü
n ot; he is without shoes. Could you explain che subsdtudon o f che one for
che other?
Mr. Strauss: Aristodemus is the most inconspicuous o f ail people there.
H e does not speak. He has a ve ry distinguished seat somewhere, as we shail
see later. H e and his appearance are undisringuished. Aristodemus is in a way
the true image o f eros. Eros is n ot brilliant. Eros is a being in quest— needy.
H e is the oppositc ofluxurious, sleepingon hard floors, exposed co ail sores
o f difficulties. Sócrates is a much greater man, better known, and thereforc
he is invited. Aristodemus is not invited. Aristodemus lo ves Sócrates, just as
the others do, jusc as Apollodorus does. We wiil com e co this question later,
buc I wish co indícate the general character o f this question.
There are six speeches on eros. In a way the first five are wrong. They are
ail refuted. But there cannot be absolute error; every theory contains an el-
ement o f truth. You can easily see that if you take an atrocious untruth like
“The sun is not shining now,” which is obviously untrue, it nevertheless
contains such important verides as “There is a sun” and “The sun is shin
ing.” At any ratc, there is no untruth without primary truth. Therefbre,
none o f these speeches is simply untrue. This is reflectcd in a complicated
way in the characters. Each character is an erotic individual. S o is Sócrates.
But whereas Sócrates presents the erotic character on the highest level,
the others represent the erotic character partially. Sócrates is a completely
erotic man, the others are incomplete. We must see therefbre what kind o f
croticism is characteristic o f Aristodemus. One thing one can say to begin
wíth: Aristodemus lovcs Sócrates, Sócrates does n ot love Aristodemus.
Sócrates is a lover, but a lo ver o f some thing else.
There is a passage in the Second Lctter o f Plato, which is generally, per-
haps universally, regarded as spurious, but this should n ot prevent one from
reading it and enjoying it. I t says that there are no writings o f Plato’s in
existence. There are only speeches o f Sócrates having becom e young and
beautiful (3 1 4 c 1 - 4 ) . Socratic speeches are n ot simply the speeches o f
Sócrates, realistically, but those o f the Sócrates who has been transformed,
who has been beautified and rejuvenated.
29
C H A P T F. R T W O
[Tape change.]
. . . the beautifuJ go to the beautífiil, buc the Homeric versión is that the
bad, the low, the inferior go to the good. Aristodemus knows that Agathon
is surely wise, being a tragic poet, and Aristodemus is not aware o f posses-
sing such gifts. But, in spite o f knowing the facts, he is a reasonably proud
man. He does n ot like to com e in as a beggar.
After some such conversaron, he said they star ted o ff Then Sócrates, pay-
ing attendon to himselffor some reason or other, fell behind as he was go*
ing on the way, and when he waited for him co catch up [Sócrates] urged
him to go on ahead. (1 74d4 - 7)
When he goe to Agathon's house he found the door open, and he said
somcthing funny happcncd to him thcrc. Some boy, onc o f thosc within,
met him at once and led him to where the rest were lying down, and he
carne upon them as they were about to diñe. Agathon, in any case, when
he saw him, said, wOh Aristodemus, you*ve come at a fine time to diñe
with us. I f you carne for something else, put ie o ff to another time, since
even yesterday I was looking for you in order to invite you, but 1 was not
able to see you. But how come youVe not bringing Sócrates to us?"
(I7 4 d 7 -8 )
You see the problem is very elegantly solved. Aristodemus does n ot have to
give an excuse, he does not have to say anything, because Agathon, the gra-
cious Athenian poet, has a beautiful, noble line.
30
T H E S B T T 1 NG
U sten er: This does n ot seem so nice on the part o f Sócrates. There he
had promised to take him and now he lets him walk in by himself.
M r Strauss; But what ¡f Sócrates had anticipated that such a perfectly
well-brcd man would be gracious. This is n ot unreasonable to assume. I
mentioned before that this scene reminds us o f a similar scene in the P ro-
ta b ora s where they com e to the house o f Callias where all the inteiiectuals
are assembled, and the door is locked. A eunuch watches the door. H e does
n ot want any other inteiiectuals to com e in. H ere the door is wide open, a
much more liberal atmosphere prevails. There is an atmosphere o f free-
dom , as distinguished from that o f eastern despotism, as one could say on
the basis o f the reference to the eunuch. But we must also add that there is
no me al in the F rotadoras>where as here the meal reinforccs the atmosphere
o f freedom. Now, where is Sócrates? l t is well known that Aristodemus
would n ot appear anywhere without the company o f Sócrates.
And I, he said, tuming around, sce that Sócrates is not foliowing any
where. So I said that I had in fact come with Sócrates, invited by him to
dinner there.
“ It was good ofyou to d o so,” he said. “But where is he?"
“He was coming in just behind me, and I too am wondering where he
could be."
“Go look, boy,” Agathon said, “and bring Sócrates in. And you," he
said, “lie down beside Eryximachus.” (1 7 4 c 9 -1 7 5 a 5 )
There is nothing in particular to say here, but we must kcep this in mind:
gradually we will get a picture o f the sitting arrangement which is not unim-
portant. Aristodemus will sit with Eryximachus, one o f the six pcople, and
a very important figure. We will see later on what this means. L et us go on.
And he said che boy washed him o ff so he could lie down; and anocher o f
the boys carne back to report, “Your Sócrates has retreated into the door-
way o f the ncighbors and scands there, and when I caJIed him he refused
to come in."
“That is strange," he said. “Cali him and don*t let him go.”
And he said, “Don'c do it, kc him be. This is something o f a habic with
him; sometimes he withdraws wherever he is and stands. He will come im*
mediately, I believe. So don’tbudge him, but ieave him.” (1 7 5 a 6 -1 7 5 b 3 )
Aristodemus knows the habits o f Sócrates and proteets him, Agathon tries
to disturb. By the way, servant is in Greek always boy, which ¡s not entirely
irrelevant, because the lo ve o f boys is in a way the grcat theme o f the Sym-
posiutn.
31
C H A P T t R T W o
“Wcll,” he said Agathon said, “that’s whac we must do, if you think so.
But, my boys, fcast ¿U thc rest o f us. You serve whatever you want, in any
case, whenever someone does not stand over you— something I have
never yet done— so now, in thc bclicfthat I as wcQ as all thc rest here have
been invited by you to dinner, trcat us so we may praise you.” { 1 7 5 b 4 - c l )
After this he said they were dining, but Sócrates did not come in. Agathon
often bid them to send for Sócrates, but he did not allow it. (1 7 5 c 3 -4 )
You see this conflict: Agathon the alleged perfect liberal, tried to interfere
very much with Sócrates’ liberty, and Aristodc mus proteets him once again.
Then he did come, having passed the time as he usually did; and it was not
very long, but they were about halfway through dinner Then Agathon—
he was lying alone in the last place— said, “Come here, Sócrates, and lie
down beside me, in order that 1, in touching you, may enjoy thc wise
thing that occurrcd to you in thc porch. Ic’s dcar you found it and have it;
you would not have otherwise desisted.” { 1 7 5 c6 -d 2 )
This ¡s the first indication we have o f the seating arrangement. Agathon sits
at the end. Since the order ofspeakers is that Sócrates is last, the order o f sit-
ting is n ot Identical with thc order o f speaking. Somewhere Eryximachus
sits with Aristodemus. S o far we don’t know any more. Agathon begins
with a joke: “Sócrates you may have found some wise thought, and I am
very anxious to hcar that by just touching you.”
Then Sócrates sat down and said, “It would be a good thing,” he said, “if
wisdom were o f the sort as to flow out from thc fiillcr into thc emptier o f
us if we touch one another, just as the water in wine cups flows through
wool from the fullercup into che emptier. For if wisdom too is o f this sort,
I put a high pricc on my lying beside you. My own [wisdom] would be a
poor sort, or maybc disputable, being just likc a dream, but your own is
brilliant and admits o f much progress, inasmuch as it flashed out so in-
32
I HE S E T T I N ü
tcnscly from you whilc young and became conspicuous the day before
ycsterday bcforc more than chirty thousand Grcck witnesses." (1 7 5 d 3 -
« 6)
33
CHAPTKB. TWO
think you all know the answer from our presen t-day use o f the word ir úni
ca!. A man conceals his superiority out o f politeness. His superioríry is per-
ce ¡ved but not heard. W hen the other man perceives it the irony ceases to
be a consideradon. Very frequently when we say a man is ironieal we mean
that he is a nasty fellow in the guise o f politeness and self-effacement. Now,
is it cíear that if irony means the dissimulation o f a man’s superiority, when
this dissimulation is noüced by the other it is insolent? There is something
to that. We must not forget this side o f Sócrates.
In the vulgar sense o f the word Sócrates was, o f course, n ot insolent.
But we are concem ed here with a somcwhat more subtle thing. Irony is one
o f those things which fulfills its purpose only when unnodeed. Does this re
mi nd you o f a problem which has been touched upon on other occasions?
That there are things which are ctfective regardless o f whether they are no-
ticed o r not and others which are effective only when noticed. In the so-
called doctrine o f the sophists the distinction was made bctween the virtues
other than justice and justice. Take temperance. I f the doctor prescribes for
you not to drink cocktails because you will g ct into trouble, obediencc to
this prescription will have its effect regardless o f whether anyone norices it
or not. In other words, you may drink the cocktails in utm ost secrecy but
you will be punished for it. There are certain rules with which one must
comply because o f the consequences. L et us take the case o f tax evasión. I f
someone evades taxes and he is an extremely elever tax lawyer and he is
lucky, the tax evasión will pass unnodeed. Strictly speaking, crimes against
justice are punished only, at least on ean h , when one is caught, when they
are noticed. Irony has something strangely in com m on with justice. Its ef
fect depends entirely on not being noticed; whether it is noticed or not
noticed is an essential element o f its work. Therefore, the reference to inso-
lence is a point in the right direction. Now let us go on.
“Anyhow, we shall arrange for a trial, you and I, about wisdom a littic
later, using Dionysus as the judge; but now fim turn to dinner." ( 175e7-
10)
You see, Dionysus shall be our judge. That is, in a way, the formula for the
wholc thing. Dionysus shall judge which wisdom is the highest. H ere un-
derstood by Agathon in a limited way. Agathon’s wisdom or Sócrates’ wis
dom. In the course o f the evening it will be a contest between Sócrates and
everyone else regarding wisdom. But it also indi cates that the contest be-
twecn Sócrates and Agathon is o f special importance, and therefore Aga
thon’s last spccch is, in a way, the decisive specch, as we must see later.
34
THE SE T T IN G
After this, he said, when Sócrates had lain down and dined along with thc
rest, thev made libations, sang o fth e god, and did all che resc o f the cus*
tomary things, and then turned to drinking. He said then chat Pausanias
began a spcech o f this sort. “Weli then, men, in what manner shall wc
drink most easily? Now I tell you for my part I am having a really hard time
o f ir, on account o f yesterday'* drinking, and I need somc respite— I sus-
pcct that many ofyou do too, for you were here yesterday— so consider in
what manner we would drink as casily as possiblc.” ( 1 7 6 a l - b l )
Thosc o f you who were ever drunk, which I trust is the minority, will know
the relevanee o f that remark. This is, o f course, a negad ve proposa1 which
pavés the way for the positive proposaJ, namely to make speeches inste ad o f
drinking.
We must watch thc individuáis. Pausanias and Aristophanes say they are still
soaked from yesterday. But then Eryximachus takes over, who is, in a way,
the most com petent man, being a physician. “My Science tells me that
drunkenness is very bad.” In addition, he is a very poor drinker. There is a
perfect agreement betwcen Science and necessity. Wc lcarn certain things
which are important for later developments about the characters o f certain
individuáis. Phaedrus, for example, is also a poor drinker. Eryximachus and
Aristodemus are both in a love relación. There is a similarity between them.
Aristodemus, to o , is n ot a good drinker, which shows a difference between
35
C H A PT E R T Wo
him and Sócrates. But the other fellows are very good drinkers. The re is no
moral principie involved, they ju$t can’t stand a second night. Sócrates is an
absolutely particular case, he is n ot anxious to drink, but if compelled he
drinks more than anyone else without ili efFect. The re is a peculiarity which
appears right in the beginnlng.
You see also something about the procedure which is not unimportant.
Eryximachus had already found out before by a quiet opinión poli that
Aristodemus, Phaedrus, and some others wouldn’t drink any more. Pausa-
nias and Aristophanes had already given their Opinión. The only one who
has not been asked is Sócrates, but this is not rudeness because it is weü
known that Sócrates can drink.
Here Phaedrus ofMyrrhinus intervened and said, WI, for my part, am ac-
customed to obey you, especially in whateveryou say about medicine; and
now, if they delibérate well, the rest will too.” When they heard this, they
all agrecd not to make the present get-together chrough drunkenness, but
to drink as it plcased them. (1 7 6 d 5 -e 3 )
D o you notice anything about the charactcr o f this speech here, the lan-
guage he uses? First they make the proposal not to drink. It is unanimously
accepted. This is important— the unanimíty o f decisión. The atmospherc
o f friendship, perfcct harmony, in a way the atmospherc o f eros. This is o f
some importance. Phaedrus is a younger man and he is, in a way, the lead-
ing individual as wc shall see. He comes in after his older friend Eryxi
machus had taken over and becom e the chairman o f the assembly. O f
course the she-flute player is practically thrown out. She should play to the
womenfolk; this i$ a strictly male affair, Only males are present.
L isten er: In the only other dialogue where there is a woman, the P baedo,
she is also thrown out.
Mr. Strauss: That is not bad. But to be ftrir to the fair sex as well as to
Plato we must make one remark right away: There is the highest speech at
the peak, and it is presented to us is a woman, so they com e back with a
vengeance.
L isten er: I get the impression that the strong drinkers can drink and are
uncomfortable if they don’t get a chance to , and the weak drinkers can’t
and are uncomfortable if they are made to. In both cases the capacity and
the desire coincide. In Sócrates’ case the capacity is there but the dcsire is
n ot such that he would be uncomfortable in either circumstance. Isn’t
there a case exeluded ofsom ebody with the desire but without the capacity?
In other words he likes to drink but he is a bad drinker, he gets drunk.
36
T H E $ B T T I S' G
Mr. &r4M¿r; T h at’s a good point. O f coursc it is clear that everyonc may
drínk as much as he likes. Thcrc is no fixed rule. Now, thc deliberación, the
assembly, goes on. T h e main point, which is so emphatic here, is that all
aspeets o f ordinary symposia— drinking plus flute playing, maybe other
things— are exeluded from the very beginning by unanimous decisión. But
it is ímportant that some o f these people who vote o r steer the Symposiuttt
are induced to do so by a hangover from yesterday. In other words they are
n ot always so severe. For Sócrates it wouldn’t have made any difíerence if it
were yesterday. The poor drinkers would, o f course, also have voted against
heavy drinking, n ot because they are stronger than drinkers but because
they are weaker.
37
3 PHAEDRUS
38
I» H A K r> R U s
Sócrates’ frank State me nt about a god. He is the only speaker who denies
that eros is a god. The occasion is a symposium, where peoplc drink wine,
or are supposed to drink wine, and therefore a perfect time cvcn for inso-
lence o r what is popularly thought to be impiety. Why did Plato choose the
god Eros for this purpose? Eros was not an object o f pubüc worship in
Athens, ñor in most Greek cities. Therefore ¡t was n ot protected by the law
the way Zeus was. B u t, o f course, the re is another re ason too. What was de-
ified in the god Eros, namely, the phenomenon eros, is a natural phenome
non, for the knowledge o f which we are n ot dependent on myths. I t is a
human phenomenon o f the utmost importance, most poweríul and most
amiable, a kind o f new god. I remind you that the charge against Sócrates
was that he had introduced new gods.
Eros is not simpiy above m en, in the way Zeus is thought to be above
m en, but in men. One could, therefore, $ay, and this has been suggested by
a vcry philosophic intcrpretcr, Gerhard Krüger, in E in sicht u n d L eid en -
schafty which appeared originally in 1 9 3 9 , that belief in the god Eros is the
mythical expression o f man’s sovcrcignty. It is a question whcther this is ad-
equate. The basis o f this view is that the Greek rationalism o r Greek en-
iightenm ent, in contradistincdon to the m odem enlightenm ent, is able and
compeüed to give its vicws a mythical expression. M odem enlightenment is
wholly unmythical. I f it uses mctaphoric expressions, like Prometheus etc.,
that is wholly unnecessary. According to this view, however, the Greek en
lightenm ent was incapable o f such unmythical expression.
Now, let us consider this for one m om cnt, because it has vcry much to
d o with our themc. The speakers in the Sym posium are enlightened people,
pupils o f sophists. They d o n ot believe in the myths, but thcy expréss thcm-
selves in mythical language. I will n ot go now into the historical question o f
what this means; I will rather limit myself to the question o f what is the
characteristic the sis o f the sophists according to the generally acceptcd
view. Answer: the fundamental distinction between nature and convention.
Nature and convention are distinguished and to some extent even op-
posed. And the gods exist merely by virtue o f nomos. Thcy owe their being
to human enaetments, tacit o r explicit. This opposition between nature and
convention implies the supremacy o f nature. Man owes his best to nature,
to gifts, as distinguished from his own achievements. Nature, therefore, can
be called by these people divine. There is no sovereignty o f man in Greek
enlightenment, no conqucst o f nature. Law, convention, art, technology—
all are subject to nature. The human things are a vcry small province within
the whole. Inferior not only in size but also in dignity. The originating prin-
39
C H A P T K R l ' HRKB
ciples are not human. Therefore, all these men admit, in one way or an-
other, standards o f human conduct which are natural. They differ as to the
content o f these standards— they deny, for exampie, that the just is nat
ural— but that the re is something good by nature is not denied by anyone.
From this it follows that all human activity, and especiaUy the most highJy
rcnowncd— poli tic al activity— is inferior to theoretical activity, to the un-
derstanding o f the whoíe. This is an intellectuai activity that transce nds the
political and can never be fiilly integrated into the political. There is a ten
sión between intellectuai perfection and political o r social perfection.
Therefore one can al so say, though in the fbrm o f a footnotc, that accord*
ing to the classical enlightenment there is no harmony between intellectuai
progress and social progress. At any rate, from this older, this pre-Socratic
rationalism which is ordinarily called sophistic, there follows o f necessity
that there cannot be a popular enlightenment. This is the re ason why they
are all compellcd, more or less, to engage in a mythical presentadon o f their
doctrines. In purely histórica! and external terms one can only State the
massive fact, obscured by a certain eighteenth-century myth, that the
Greek city was noc liberal and therefore there werc nccessary limits to what
a man could publicly teach. One way o f evading this limitadon was mythi
cal speech. The most obvious example o f that is the myth o f Protagoras ín
Placo’s dialogue F rotadoras.
The SyfHposium, I said, presents Sócrates’ hubris. I t presents his devia-
tion from the accepted views with al most perfect frankness. What Plato fur-
ther does in the Sym posium is to link up this special case o f Sócrates with the
biggest scandal related to impiety which cver happened in Athens, the pro-
fanation o f the mysteries i n 4 1 6 o r 4 1 5 . The worst offender, according to
the rumor o f the tim e, was Alcibiades, and the whole ching was followed by
severe persecución, In 4 0 7 , howevcr, at the time the dialogue is told, a rec
onciliación has taken place. In 4 0 7 the true story can be told. It is told, be-
cause now ¡t can be told. And what Aristodemus suggests is that the pop
ular rumors about these terrible things were all wrong. Alcibiades was
innocent. H e carne ¡n after the whole thing was finished. T h e offender
was Sócrates. But he didn’t offend the way popular rum or had it. There was
nothing o f black magic, as we would say, or o f the mutilation o f statues etc.,
nothing o f vulgariry. W hat happened was very delicate and refined and took
place at a symposium in the most refined society.
The original accuser o f Sócrates was Aristophanes, as Sócrates himself
suggests in his A p o lo s and the accusation was made in Aristophanes’ com-
edy the C louds. H erc Plato shows us that Aristophanes was present, that he
40
P H A B D R U S
41
C H A P T E R I H R E B
42
M U E n r u s
duc to thc fact that thc uninvited Aristodemus took Sócrates’ place. This is
the order o f sitting, which is also the ordcr o f speaking, with one great ex-
ceprion; Eryximachus and Aristophanes changc places be cause Aristopha-
nes is temporarily disabled, as we shail see.
Someone made this point: W hcn we get a descripción o f che characters at
the beginning they are cataloged with a view to drinking. We find those who
are unable and unwilling to drink, people who are able but unwilling to
drink— they have a hangover— and one who is able to drink yet indifferent:
Sócrates. Mr. Gildin made the point that this disjunction is not complete.
This is quite truc. Which is omitted? Ablc and willing and unable and willing
are, o f course, omitted because we want to have unanimity. N o one must be
positively eager to drink. People who are unable to drink and yet indifierent
are omitted too, I suppose because they are not worth mentioning. But
there is another cype which we could think of. We have people who are able
to drink and unwilling because o f hangover. What about people who are
able to drink and unwilling on principie? I believe they to o are out o f place,
because they would hate thc pleasure o f drinking and, the refere, they would
be likely to be haters o f eros as well. This is my tentarive suggestion.
There has been a unanimous decisión to de vote the evening to speeches,
as distinguished from hard drinking. There is a proposal to de vote this be-
ing together to speeches on eros. Sócrates is silent in this first section, just as
he was absent for such a long time before. This is in accordance with the
general characterof the Sym ponutn. In all Socratic dialogues, that is in all di
alogues in which Sócrates occurs, he is the chief figure. But in the Sympo-
siu m Sócrates rules visibly in less than half o f the book. First there was a
negative proposal about the procedure for this evening. It was started by
Pausan ias, continucd by Aristophanes, and concludcd by Eryximachus, in
thc order o f sitting. Thrcc speakers who are not young and who sit, some-
how, farthest to thc left. Phacdrus speaks after these threc men, for the very
simple reason that he is young and modest. Sócrates was not prese nt yester-
day for the drinking bout. The strongest drinkers are Aristophanes, Pausa
d as, and Agathon, to say nothing o f Sócrates. Phaedrus and Eryximachus
are n ot good at drinking; they are valitudinarians, which ís o f some impor-
cance for thc later happenings. Eryximachus is that by profession, being a
physician. Wc have noted the unanimity o fth e decisión and the parliamen-
tary procedure. Now let us read.
uWell, then,* Eryximachus said, “since this has been resolved, to drink as
much as each one wants but there is to be no compulsión, I propose after
this that we dismiss the ilute girl who has just now ente red, and let her
43
C H A P T E R THREfc
fíate for herselfor, ifshe wants, for che womcn within. But wc are co be to-
gether with one another for today chrough speeches, and, if you want, I
am wíliing to expíala to you through what kind o f speeches.”
They aJl said they did want to and urged him to makc thc proposal.
Then Eryximachus said, ‘‘The beginning o f my spccch is in line with the
M elanippe o f Eurípides: ‘The story is not mine.' What I am about to say
belongs to Phaedrus hcrc. Phaedrus on seve ral occasions said to me in an-
noyancc, ‘Isn't it terrible, Eryximachus,' he says, 4that hymns and paeans
have been made by thc poets for some o f the other gods, but for Eros,
who is so oíd and so grcat a god, not even one o f the innumerable poets o f
the past has made even one cncomium? And if you want in turn to con-
sider thc sophiscs, they compose in prose praises o f Heracles and others,
as, for example, the excellent Prodícus did— and this is less astonishing.
But I have carne across a cercain book o f a wisc man in which salt had
amazing praisc for its usefulness, and you would see that many other
things o f the kind have rcccívcd encomia. Isn'c ic terrible to be in great
earnest about things o f this sort, and for not one human being to have yet
dared, up to this very day, to hymn Eros in a worthy manner, but so grcat
a god has been so neglcctcd?’ Now Phaedrus, I think, speaks wcll. So I de-
sire not only to offer him a voluntary contribution and grarify him, but it
sccms to me appropriate as well at the presenc time for us who are present
to adorn the god. Ifyou also think so, thc re would be an adequate pasóme
in speechcs. It seems to me each o f us ought to speak, staróng on thc left,
a praisc o f Eros as bcaudful as he can make it, and Phaedrus should be thc
fírst to speak, since he is lying in ñrst place and is the father o f the logos as
wetl." (1 7 6 e 4 'l7 7 d 5 )
Eros has never been praised, at least n ot propcrly, and therefore th¡$ sym-
posium will be thc first adequate praise o f the god Eros. This proposal is
again unanimously acccptcd— accepted, however, in a different way. The
acceptance in the sccond place is strikingly different from the acceptancc o f
the negative proposal. T o mention this only bricfly now, in the second case
wc have n ot a democradc decisión but a dictatorial, authoritarian decisión,
made by Sócrates. He decides it without having asked anyone. This is an
other sign o f his strange hubris. O f course Sócrates sensed the meaning o f
the assembly and therefore didn’t have to take any votes. Aftcr this has been
done, Phaedrus becomes the first speaker, first o f ail because it was his pro
posal and also because he sits at the front o f the table. H e is the first in the
sitting order and therefore also the first in the speaking order.
He re, then, the the me is introduced— the god Eros. W hy was Eros sin-
gled out? H e was not worshiped in Athcns. It is easier, less dangerous. The
44
P H A K D R U S
thcm e ¡s proposed by Phaedrus. Why docs Plato make Phaedrus propose it,
and why for the Sym posium as a whole? In order to answer the question, we
would have to know Phaedrus’s point o f view, which we do n ot know. We
get a provisional answer in the im medíate sequel where Sócrates is said to
have no other art except the erotic art. I said before, Eros ts a god cxperi-
enccd by everyone. O ne could say this applies also to H elios, but there it is
n ot cvident; the sun might be a stone. Eros is the only god experienced by
everyone o f whom it is ccrtain that he is a god, i.e., that he is living and su*
perhuman, a living power stronger than us. This superhuman beíng which
is experienced by everyone is lovable. A t any rate, Eros is somehow the
m ost important god, which does n ot neccssarily mean the highest.
“No one, Eryximachus,* he said Sócrates said, “will vote against you.*
( !7 7 d ó -7 )
You can compare this with the similar situation regarding the negative pro-
posal. Eryximachus had the decency to look around and see what the oth-
crs think. H ere Sócrates givcs the answer without asking anyone, which is
an insolent decisión. You must keep in mind this thcm e o f insole nce, which
is very important.
“For justas I surely would not re fuse, I who asscrt that I know nothing ex
cept the erotic things, so surely would neither Agathon and Pausanias—
let alone Aristophancs, whose wholc pasóme is about Díonysus and
Aphrodite— any more than anyone else o f those I see here.* ( 177d7—e3)
“Yet for us who are lying down last it is not cqual, but if those before us
speak adequately and beaudfully it wiU be enough for us. Well, let Phae
drus scart, and good luck to him. Let him praise Eros.*
Everyone else then assented and urged just what Sócrates had. Now
what cach onc said o f aíi who spoke, Aristodemus could hardly remember,
any more than I could rccall all that he said, but I shaU tell you the points
in the logos o f each o f those I thought especially worth remembering.
(1 7 7 e 3 -1 7 8 a 5 )
You see the the me is designated not only by the god E ros, but by the praise
o f the god Eros. l f it is indeed the task o f the poet to adore and magndy the
god Eros, one can say all are partisans o f the tragic and the comic poets for
45
CHAI'TER i H R E E
46
P H A B 1H U S
47
CH APTE R THRKE
means a movcment from nothing to being and nothing is noc; henee, there
cannot be génesis. This impiies that the gods as having com e into being
cannot be. Only unchangeable being is. Parmenides replaces the gods by
the unchangeable being.
Phaedrus’s speech, being the first speech, is the most frenetic speech.
B u t there is a cióse relation between the beginning and the end, between
the seed and the fruit containing a new sccd. There is a cióse kinship be
tween Phaedrus’s speech and its reference to Parmenides and Sócrates’
speech. Sócrates no longer accepts the simple Parmenidean view, but it still
reveáis its origin from Parmenides.
The first praise o f Eros is that he is the oldest one, and the oldest is the
highest. This is an axiom for all earlier thinking. It has a deep root in human
nature and, therefore, we still say “the good oíd times.” There is a certain
veneration fbr the oíd as oíd, which needs a long analysis and which is not
sufficiently explained by our desire for stability. But in olden times “the good
cqual to the oíd” can be regarded as a primary axiom, which is then ques-
tioned. I f the good is che oíd, the best must be the oldest. Eros being the oíd-
cst, must be the best god. In the sequel Phaedrus wili draw this conclusión.
“So it is agreed, on the basis o f many sources, that Eros is the oldest. Be*
ing che oldest he is the cause o f the greatest goods for us, fbr I cannot say
what greater good there is fbr one, straight from youth on, than to have a
good lovcrand for a lovera betoved.” ( 1 7 8 c l - 5 )
Since Eros is the oldest he is responsiblc for the greatest good. This is ele-
mentary, but Phaedrus is an enlightened young man and cannot leave it at
that simple equation. He needs additional p ro o f that the oldest is the best.
H e gives the p ro o f in the following way; Goodness is virtue, but the cause
o f virtue is higher than virtue and, therefore, the best. Yet eros is the cause
o f virtue and that he will now prove.
ttFor that which should guide human beings throughout their wholc Life,
for thosc who are going to live nobly, neither kinship, honors, wcalth, ñor
anything else can implant this as bcautifiiUy as eros. What do I say this is?
It is shame for the shamcful things and honorable ambition for the beau-
tiful things, for it is impossible without thcm for cither a dey or prívate
person to accomplish great and beautiñil things. I say accordingly that a
man, whoever is in love, if it should be evident that he is doing someching
shamcful, or undergoing something shameful at someone clsc’s hands, on
account o f unmanlincss and without defcnding himself, neither were he
seen by his fiathe r ñor by his comradcs ñor by anyone else would he be dis-
48
I’ H A B D R U S
tressed as painfully as werc he seen by his beloved. And wc see this same
occurrencc in thc onc who is loved, that he is exceptionally ashamed be-
fore his lovers, whenever he is seen to be engaged in something shameful.
If, then, there should be some possi bility for a city or army to come to be
o f lovers and beloveds, it is impossible that they woold not manage their
own cicy berter than by abscaining trom ali shameful things and being am-
bitious for honors before one anocher; and besides, in fighting alongside
onc another, people o f this sort would win, though they wcrc fcw, over
virtualiy aU human beings. For a man in love would surcly choose to be
seen either leaving his post or throwing away his arms to a lesscr degree by
his beloved than by ali others; before this he would prefer to die many
times over. And as for desercing his beloved or not coming to his aid when
he was in danger, no onc is so bad [cowardlyj that Eros himselfwould not
make him inspired for virtue, so as to be like the best by nature; and
simply, as Homcr said, thc strength the god breaehed into some o f thc
heroes— this, in coming from him, Eros supplies to lovers.” (1 7 8 c 5 -
179b3)
49
C H AP T E R VHKEB
“ Lovcre alone, morco ver, are willing co die on behalf [o f their bclovcds],
and not only men but women too. Alcesds, the daughter o f Pe lias, offers
adequatc tcstimony for this to the Greeks on behalf ofthis logos: she alone
was willing to die on behalf o f her husband, though his father and mocher
werc alive. She sarpassed thcm tosuch a degree in íriendship on account o f
her eros as co prove that thcy wcre alien to their own son and were rclatcd
only in ñame, and in accomplishing this deed she scemcd, not only to hu*
man beings but also to gods, to have accomplished so beautiful a deed
that, though many accomplished many beautiful deeds, che gods gave this
as a reward co some easily countable number, to send up the souJ again
from Hades; but in admiration o f her deed they sent up hers. So the gods
too honor espccially the zeal and virtue in regard to eros.” (1 7 9 b 4 -d 2 )
Up to now we have spoken o f eros and virtue as two different things. Eros
as productivc o f virtue. Now he speaks o f a virtue concerned with eros. For
cxample, the virtue regarding eros is different from the virtue regarding the
polis, o f which he had spoken before. He re he turns to women as well, and
to the love o f a woman fbr a man. T h e previous examples were all implicitly
o f pederasty. I have to say a word about this some what unusual subject. The
com m on view, o f course, is that pederasty was the manner and custom o f
G rccce, and Plato and Sócrates suffered from this defect. It is usual the re
fere to give a kind o f apology for this. I believe that this is really wrong.
[Tape changc.]
Today a man o f principie will not always underline that he is a man o f
principie. We must n ot be squeamish about these matters, but on the other
hand we must be principled. I suggcst aiready now that in a very playful and
gracefel way, the Sym posium is among other things a criticism o f pederasty
and n ot a praise o f it. Certain speakers praise pederasty as higher than het
erosexual love. Buc the beauty is that they try to find a foundation for their
habits and they fail in that. In the Socradc speech pederasty occurs only in a
way which has nothing to do with certain criminal and indecent pracdccs.
And the drunken Alcibiades shamelcssly te!l$ a story that only redounds to
the praise o f Sócrates’ perfect propriety. It is an improper account o f proper
conduce. From Sócrates’ and Plato’s point o f view, pederasty, this deviation
from the natural, points to something truc and natural. I can only give one
word, which Is n ot an answer, and that word is philosophy.
50
P H A B I) R l ) S
You scc he re that Phacdrus himsclf turns to bisexual love, and appar-
ently he admits it as equal in dignity to homosexual love. Which is a lot be-
cause the next speaker will assert that pederasty is much higher in dignity
than heterosexual love.
Eros ovcrcomes the fcar o f death. We have se en this before. Eros o ver-
comes the greatest obstacle to manliness— fear o f death. But this only
means, according to what was said carlier, that eros is an inferior means for
producing virtue and manliness, by making men ashamed to be have like
cowards. In other words, eros would be inferior to nature, to the best na-
ture. Now a turn takes place, a new logos begins. Alcestis had no concern
with shame, meaning what others say, but she is possessed by the genuine
thing, by friendship. She was truly a friend o f her husband, whereas her
husband’s father and m other had only the ñame in com m on. This shows
that eros, by nature, culminates in death for the beloved. Eros is n ot a
means for virtue, but the object o f virtue, the end o f virtue. The virtue rc-
garding eros, as dlstinguished from the virtue regarding the polis, for ex*
ampie. It is heroic virtue. Alcestis's husband was one o f the Argonauts. Tw o
other examplcs, Orpheus and Achilles, also have roles in this account. This
heroic love is admired even by the gods, who, being immortal, do n ot pos-
sess it. B u t therc is a difficulty. He refers he re to the Greeks. Is this admira-
tion o f heroic love limited among men to the Greeks? And is this heroic
eroticism n ot also in need o f wicnesses, if only o f gods?
“They sent Orpheus the son o f Oeagrus out o f Hades unfulfilled; they
showed him a phantom o f his wife tor whom he had come but did not give
her herself, because he was thought to be soft inasmuch as he was one who
sang to the lyre and had not dared tbr the sake o f eros to die, as Alcestis
did, but contrived to enter Hades whilc alive. Accordingly, on account o f
this, they imposed a penalty on him, and made his death occur at the
hands ofw om en." ( 1 7 9 d 2 - c l)
51
C H A P T R U THR.EE
ishcd simply for not having died for his beloved, but for having tried to
evade death and yet cnter Hades. What is the conclusión? H e would not
have been punishcd if he had died. B u t he also would not have bcen pun-
ishcd íf he had limite d himself to evadlng death and to merely lamenting
the death ofEurydice, i.e., Ifh e hadpracticed vaietudinarianism. L et us not
forget that the praiser o f hcroic dying is the valctudinarían Phacdrus. Now
let us turn to the third example.
ttNot as chcy honored Achillcs, the son ofThecis, and sent him away to the
islcs o f the blesscd, becausc, having learncd from his mother that he
would die ifhe killed Héctor, but if he did not do it he would go Home and
die an oíd man, he dared to choose, in coming to the aid o f his lovcr Pa-
troclus and avenging him, not only to dic on his bchalf but also to dic af-
ter him, when he was alrcady dead. It was in great admiración for this fact
that the gods honored him excepdonaJly, becausc he was holding his lovcr
in such high esteem. Aeschylus talks nonsensc in asscrdng that Achillcs
was in love with Patroclus, he who was more beautiiul not only than Pa-
troclus but than all che heroes cogether; and he was still beardless and, in
the sccond pl ace, far you nger, as Homer says.w(1 79c 1- 1 8 Oa7)
Achilles is an entirely different case. Phacdrus has shown up to now the ef-
tect which cros has on the lover, n ot on the beloved. H e re we find for the
first time a case where the beloved bccomes inspired by being beloved to dic
for his lover. Achilles is the beloved who dies for his lover Patroclus. This is a
paradoxical asserdon o f Phacdrus. He defends it against Aeschylus who had
said that Achillcs was the lover, which would be the normal case. AchlUes
was the beloved for he was the most beautiful. How can we understand this
absolutely paradoxical acdon o f Achilles under the premise he had made?
“As a marte r o f fact, though the gods rcally honor in the best possi ble case
this virtuc in regard to eros, thcy wonder at and admire and benefit more
whenever the onc who is loved chcrishcs the lovcr than wheneverthe lovcr
does the beloved. The rcason is that a lovcr is a more divine thing than a
beloved, for he has the god in him. On account o f this thcy honored
Achillcs more than thcy did Alccstis, by sending him away to the islcs o f
the blessed.” (18 0 a 7 -b S )
D o you understand this reasoning? Why do the gods honor the beloved
more than the lover? L et me try to explain this: The virtue regarding cros is
more admired by the gods in the beloved than in the lover, for the god is in
the lover, n ot in the beloved. You can interpret this in two ways: either the
beloved who cherishes the lover is pious— he bows to the god— o r it is
52
P H A E n R ü S
much more difficult to have that virtue which consists in dying if onc does
n ot love than ifo n c does. The gods themselves bear witncss to the fact that
virtue which is n ot god-insp¡red is higher than the virtue which ¡s god-
inspired. Lack o f eros is superior to eros. In the P haedru s, which in my
opinión follows dramatically the Sym posium , the whole thing begins with a
speech elaborated by the orator Lysias, in which the nonlover is preferred
to the lover. L et me take chis example; I f a girl today would raise the ques-
tion W ith what kind o f man would I like to have ffiendly rclations, with a
lover o r with a nonlover? Lysias says with the nonlover; precisely be cause he
has no passion, he will not d o anything improper. This is what attracts
Phaedrus, the preference for the noniover. It is paradoxical that the non-
passionate Phaedrus should wish Eros to be praiscd. We must try to under-
stand that. T h e lover is older than the beloved, as appearcd from the discus*
sion o f the Homeric example. The oldest god is in the older men, in the
homosexual, n ot in the younger. But the younger, in whom the god is not,
who is n ot inspircd by the god, is superior in the eyes o f the gods them-
selvcs, and, I might add, in the eyes o f men. The lover recognizcs by his
pursuit a certain superiority o f the pursued.
W hat is Phaedrus driving at? We know the contradiction between the
two statements he made, the one at 179 b and the other at 179c. H e says
only lovers are willing to die for the beloved. Later on he says Achillcs the
belovcd was willing to die for his lover. Achilles rece ived a unique honor
from the gods. But what happens if we disregard this divine honor, o r if we
draw the proper lesson from Orpheus’s half-hearted action. The beloved
will n ot die for the lover, he wiií only be the beneficiary o f other m en’s love.
The beloved, especially if he is very beautiful, will be beloved by many peo-
ple and will thus be the beneficiary precisely because the god is not in him,
While the god is in the lover, the grcatest benefit accrues to the belovcd. It
is really a triumph o f valetudinarianism, or, to introduce a more precise
term , what Phaedrus wittingly o r unwittingly does is to subject eros to the
criterion o f gain, a selfish consideradon. Therefore his speech is the lowest
o f all the speechcs. I refer again to Phaedrus’s admiradon o f Lysias’s speech
in the P haedru s, where it is said that the young should prefer the nonlovers
to the lovers— a calculadng rule. I think that Lysias’s speech in the P kae-
d ru s ¡s altogethcr a rcflection on Phaedrus’s speech here, modified by the
other speech es we hear later on. In other words, Phaedrus, induced by the
experience o f our evening, has abandoned the admiration for eros com*
pletely. From the point o f view o f the calculadng recipient the nonlover is
preferable to the lover. Now, Ict us read the end o f Phaedrus’s speech.
53
CH APTE R THKEB
-Ic ’sin this way that I asscrt chat o f the gods Eros is thc oldest, most hon*
ora ble, and most authoricative for thc acquisition o f virtue and happiness
for human beings when they are alive and dcad.” (1 8 0 b 6 -8 )
As we see, then, it is a limited praise even at the end. I shall suggest a provi-
sional answer to the question o f why Phaedrus chinks that Eros has not
becn sufficiently praised. H e thinks that the benefits which lovers bestow
on the beloved have never been sufficiently praised. Phaedrus speaks from
the beloved’s point o f view, and this is very important because thc next
speaker wil1 be a lover, with a completely different perspective.
Perhaps I should give now a presentation o f the whole Sytnpostutn as
it appears to me now. I am n ot only willing but eager to learn that I am
wrong. It seems to me that we have six speeches on eros, because Alcibi*
ades' speech at the end is a speech on Sócrates, not on eros itself. The
speeches fall naturally into two parts, the first three and the sccond three.
Phaedrus, Pausanias, and Eryximachus— Aristophanes, Agathon, and Sóc
rates. I believe that the first three speeches are deficient as praises o f eros be-
cause they subject eros to something oucside o f eros: Phaedrus to gain,
Pausanias to moral virtue, Eryximachus to techne, to Science o r art. The
three others do not subject eros to something outside, they praise eros as
such. Sócrates, too, does n ot subject eros to something outside because
that to which Sócrates seemingly subjeets eros is the natural end o f eros. I f
the natural end o f eros is wisdom in the highest case, then the lovc o f wis-
dom doesn’t subject eros to something alien to it. The distribution I think
is this: Aristophanes* speech is characterized by ugliness, Agathon’s is
beauty incarnate; in Sócrates eros is neither ugly ñor bcautilul. The last
word, the key word, in Sócrates’ speech is neither ugliness ñor beauty but
che good. I believe the re is a connection here with Phaedrus* speech. L o ve
o f gain was ordinarily regarded, and I believe in some quarters still is, as
something mean, ugly. The connection betwccn moral virtue and beauty is
obvious, because in Greek it is the same word. Techne— Science, art— cor
re sponds on the lower level to what Sócrates means by the good.
I would now like to summarize what I believe are the m ost important
lessons o f Phaedrus’s speech. His speech is obviousiy o f very great impor-
tance since he is the one who suggested the the me, on the grounds that
eros had never been sufficiently praised. This evening is to be devoted to
such praise. Phaedrus’s speech ¡$ the beginning, just as Sócrates’ speech is
the end. Phaedrus combines in his life physics and rhetoric, just as the
young Sócrates did. Then we have the key authority appealed to by Phae-
54
PHAEDR.US
drus, Parmcnides. Parmenides is the onlv one with whora he fully agrees.
W ith H om er he doesn’t quite agree, and surely not with Aeschylus and the
others. Parmcnides means that the place ordinarily occupied by the gods is
taken by purely ¡ntelligible principies. Phaedrus’s speech is set o ff frora all
other speeches and in this respect it is akin to Sócrates’ speech, which by
other devices is set o fffro m all other speeches. There is, in spite o f the low-
ness and poverty o f Phaedrus’s suggestion, a certain connection between
Phaedrus and Sócrates. Both say the bel oved is higher than the lover; both
say the oldest is the highest. Buc o f course there is a differencc. Plato un-
derstands by the oldest the most fundamental— soul. The soul is higher
than the body. Last but not least, Phaedrus invokes Parmenides. And a
modification o f Parmenides’ phUosophy wil1 be the background to what
Sócrates says in his speech, namely, the so-callcd Platonic background o f
¡deas, the heterogencous ideal cosmos, will replace the Parmenidean one—
the homogeneous one— the puré intelligcnce. 1 will try to explain this
when we get to it.
I f we read the speech with some care and concentration, we sce that
Phaedrus gives a very strange praise o f eros. In the first place he makes it
olear that lovers, to say nothing o f the beloved, are, as such, inferior to
those who are by nature best, in regard to virtue. Furtherm orc, the motive
o f these lovers is a sense o f shame rather than lo ve o f honor. They are con-
cem ed with acting nobly in the sight o f the be loved. We hear nothing about
their concerns when they are unobserved. Finally, the virtue which he
praised is one virtue only, namely manliness or courage, which, ffom a cer
tain point o f view, is the lowest o f the virtues. Phaedrus’s speech is also
made distinctive by an extraordinary emphasis on dying, on sacrifice. This
will be important for the next two speeches, in which any allusion to these
harsh things will be avoided. Phaedrus makes a distinction. H e turns from
virtue in general, i.e., the virtue primarily concerned with the polis, to the
virtue concerned with eros— the virtue which does n ot only stem from lo ve
but is also concem ed with love. But here we see also that this love does not
neccssarily culminare in what, from the point o f view o f courage, is the
highest, namely the willingness to die. We have se en the example o f Or-
pheus, who had this love to a high degree but could not bring him sclf to die
for Eurydice. This erotic virtue is least effective in the case o f the beloved.
External rewards and punishments, rewards and punishments by the gods,
are required for bringing this erotic virtue into its own. In his culminaring
thesis, the god is in the lover, n ot in the beloved, and yet the beloved proves
to have a higher status than the lover. This is a very strange eros, that the
55
C H A P T E R T H R E E
one who does not have eros in himself should be higher. I suggest this ex-
planation: Phaedrus looks at the phenomenon o f love from the point o f
view o f the beloved, che beneficiar y o f other men’s love. This man— or
woman— does not need as such virtue. Their attractiveness, their beauty, is
perfectly sufficient. Phaedrus's point o f view, to State it succinctly, is that o f
profit, o f calculación, o f gain. Phaedrus also says Eros is the oldest god. The
oldest means the most venerable. But why is Eros mosc venerable? Because
he is most use tul to the beloved, to such peoplc as Phaedrus himself. I t is
not most use ful to man as man, and he re we shall see the great change oc-
curring later in the fourth speech, Aristophanes’ speech, where Eros is pre
se nted tor the first time as the most philanthropic god, as the god who loves
man as man.
H ere, Apollodorus says, Phaedrus has made a speech o f this kind, more
or less exact, a remark which he makes in no other case. After this wcrc
some speeches which Aristodemus did n ot remember. There is a hiatus be-
tween Phaedrus's speech and all the other speeches. It is set o f f from all the
others. It is the shortcst o f all speeches, but to its credit it indi cates much.
All the motives o f Phaedrus’s speech return in Sócrates’ speech in a modi-
fied way. Take oniy this crucial point, that the beloved is higher than the
lover. What about Sócrates? He says exactly the same thing, though he
doesn’t think o f the beloved in terms o f a human being. There is a one-way
Street o f love from the lover to the beloved. Essentiaily love is oniy one-
sided. We know this, in its highest theoretical development, in Aristotle’s
doctrine o f the unmoved mover. The unmoved mover moves as beloved,
not as lover. This is what Sócrates indicates in his speech by making some-
thing which we may loosely cali the ideas the highest object o f love. The
ideas do noc love the men, the men love the ideas. Ultimately there must be
principies which are self-sufficient, o r not in any need, and the refere do not
love o r long for anything else. This applics to the metaphysics o f both Plato
and Aristode. Today, people make the distinction between two understand-
ings o f love— eros and agape. Agape, the biblical understanding, means
love out o f abundance comes down.
56
4 PAUSANIAS (1)
I here is one point which I would like to make right now: there is
no Platonic dialogue which does noc abstract from somethmg important.
Every dialogue is deliberately one-sided. In the P haedru s just as in the R e
p u b lic y you have a tripartition o f the soul. There is a base eros, there is a
noble eros, and above them is reason or ¡ntellect. Whac is called base lo ve in
the P haedru s is called appedte o r desire in the R ep u blic; noble love is called
spiritedness in the R ep u blic. This tripartition does n ot occur in the Sympo-
siurn. Instead you get another tripartition o f eros in the simple sense, i.e.,
heterosexual love for the end ofprocreation; love o f im mortal femé, which
has a certain kinship to spiritedness in the R ep u blic but is n ot identical with
it; and the third is love o f wisdom. How these two tripartitions are related
is a question. H e who could give a truc answer to that question could claim
to have understood Plato’s doctrine o f man. T h e task o f understanding this
work completely is o f enormous difficulty. Even if this schema which I pre-
sent is true, it would only constitute a very small part since we would also
have to understand the characters o f the speakers. W hy did Plato entrust
the defense, say, o f moral virtue to an elderly lover o f a certain kind? Why
did he entrust the defense o f gain, the submission o f eros to gain, to a
young belovcd, etc. These difierent attitudes toward love are connected
with certain human characters, and one must also understand these charac
ters, not only the atdtudes in thcmselves.
[This incorporaron o f attitudes into characters] brings the nature o f the
thing into the open. That means, however, that it does n ot present the na
ture o f the thing as that nature presents itself, but as hidden o r h alf rcvcaled
or overlaid by opinión. Plato reproduces the natures o f things as they first
come to sight; he imitates them as they show thcmselves at first. This being
the case, Plato always discusses, whatever he discusses, in a human context.
Human beings talking about the phenomena at question. A human indi
vidual, a man with a proper ñame, a member o f this o r that socicty, is the
one who talks about it. The reason is as follows: Philosophic inquiry, spec-
ulation, theoria, is in danger o f forgetting itself, o f losing itself in the con
templación o f the subject. By this very fect speculation becomes very un-
philosophic. Philosophy, or whatever you cali this pursuit, must always know
57
C H A P T E R F O U E
58
F A U S A N I A S ( 1 )
R epubltc, eros, which ¡s thc same as desire— in the Greek ep ith u m ia-~ *s we
shall see later in the Symposiunt, is presented as thc lowest part o f man,
lower than spiritedness, to say nothing o f re ason. The polis, we can say, ne-
cessitates law, nom os, and eros is n ot essentially legal. I think that everyone
muse admlt that— the final and essential concern o f eros is n ot legality. Yet
we could say, is n ot love o f country a modification o f eros? There is this dif-
ficulty: W hat is the opposite oflove o f country? L et us say treason. B u t what
is thc primary objcct o f high treason? Is it selling out a given country, o r is
it not at least as much selling out the established order? Polidcal crimes are
never really crimes against the country; as political crimes they are directed
against the constitution. T h e polity, however, never letsyou meet the coun
try naked. We always meet it clothed in a political form. And the loyalty
which is demanded, as every loyalty discussion shows, refers not to the un-
dothed country but to the country defined in terms o f its consdtudon.
Love o f country, then, is in a concrete form a love o f country as modified
and consututed by its polity, and the polity expresses itself in law. This
means that the country is unthinkable without the element o f compul
sión— laws— and therefore o f punishment. There is a certain harshness
which essentially belongs to political life, which shows the tensión between
eros and political life.
T o take a Platonic example, which is always best when discussing a Pía-
tonic problem , the best polity as presented in the R ep u blic stands and falls
by the noble lie. The ¡ndication is not that in imperfect polities we do not
need a lie, but that they are based on base lies. There is an elem ent o f the ar
tificial and untruth that is essential to political life. Philosophy, on the other
hand, is love o f truth. There is an oíd presentation o f this difference; thc
naked soul confronted with the naked truth, in a gym n asion, the Greek
word fbr gymnasium. In other contexts, this is also taken as a place for in-
tcllcctual stripping. Bros is connected with stripping. Philosophy is a strip-
ping on the highest level, the mind. The political life is never a life o f
stripping. I can also State this as follows: political Ufe is, o f course, public
life. The erotic life is prívate life, and therefore there is a fundamental ten
sión between the two. I can ¡Ilústrate this as follows: There was a man who
in a way demanded absolute politicizadon and that was Marx. Marx spoke
o f the collectivization o f man to be brought about by the communist soci-
ety. All privacy, all prívate property, as well as all misery, is connected with
the división o f labor, and therefore thc perfect socicty would be one in
which the división o f labor is completely abolished. B u t the same M arx, at
least in his early writings, mentí ons the fact that the root o f the división o f
59
CHAPTE& * O U R
labor is man’s bisexual ity. He says in so many words that the fundamental
act o f the división o f labor is the sexual act. The paradoxical conclusión
would be that perfect communism would have to abolish sexual difieren ce
and produce men in test tubes. W hether Marx intended this is n ot for us to
investígate he re, but it only shows that if you think through the problem o f
public, publicity, collectivization, you see with the greatest clarity that there
is something fundamentally and absolutely irreducible in man on the most
massive level— the erotic life, which in this respect agrees with the life o f the
mind— which is not susceptible o f being collectivized.
This difference between the polieical, which is akin to compulsión, and
philosophy, which like eros is incompatible with compulsión, plays a cerrain
role also for the externáis o f the Platonic dialogues. I have said on occasion
that to begin one must look at the Platonic dialogues from the most obvi-
ous point o f view, namely the titles, and also whether they are narrated or
performed dialogues. A slightly more subde distinction is that between the
dialogues which are voluntary and the dialogues which are compulsory.
This disdnetion refleets the distinction between the political and the philo-
sophic. You can see this if you look at that dialogue which is the most com-
pulsory. That is, o f course the A polqgy o f Sócrates, which is called a dialogue
with the Athenian demos in the Apology itself. The R cpu blic, too, is a partíy
eompulsory dialogue. At the beginning Polemarchus tries to keep thcm
back by main torce. The Symposiutn is an unusually voluntary dialogue, as
you can see from the opening, Sócrates dresses up and goes on his own.
In this conncction I would like to mention in passing this characterisdc
feature o f the Symposium; at the celebration o f eros, the intellectual crcam
o f Athens is assembled. Sócrates is fifty-three years oíd, thac is to say at the
peak o f his life, and the theme eros, which explains the atmosphere o f
the dialogue and which contrasts so sharply with a kindred dialogue, the
P haedo— Sócrates’ death, no celebradon o f anything. Yet they are closely
akin be cause lo ve and death are akin, as we shall hear later from Sócrates’
own mouth.
We have some prospect already, though very insufficient, to what is go-
ing to com e. We see in the first place a specific point o f view from which one
can look at eros. This point o f view is indecd the lowest, that o f selfish gain.
We must see what other points ofvicw can arisc. We must also considcr how
this is connectcd with the character o f the speaker. There are two things
about Phaedrus’s character: he is young, he is at least potentially loved, and
he is a valetudinarias You remember he goes with the physician, he doesn’t
drink, and he is afraid o f getting drunk. So, by merely finding out the con-
60
P A U S A R I A S < l i
61
O H A P T E R M U IR
62
I' A U S A N I A S ( 1 )
forget that Phaedrus has some kind o f irony which Pausanias lacks. Now Ict
us read che sequel.
He said that Phaedrus spokc a spcech o f chis kind, and after Phaedrus
there were some other speeches which he could hardly remember, and
omittíng them he proceeded to nárrate thc speech o f Pausanias. He said
that he said, “The logos, Phaedrus, seems to me co have becn not beau-
tifully proposed to us, the command to praise Eros so unqualifiedly.”
( 1 8 0 c l- 5 )
Pausanias takes issue n ot only with Phaedrus's thesis but with the theme
proposed by Phaedrus.
“I f Eros wcrc onc, it would be fine; but, as it is, it is not, for he is not one;
and if he is not one, it is more corrcct to have it stated beforehand which
one is to be praised. So I wiil try to corrcct this, firse co point out the Eros
which one must praise, and chen to make a praise worthy o f thc god.
Everyone knows chat there is no Aphroditc without Eros. Now if she were
one, Eros would be onc; but sincc in fact there are ewo, ic is a necessity that
there be two Eroces. How aren't there two goddcsscs? One is surely che
oldcr and thc motherless daughter o f Uranus. It is she whom wc ñame
Urania. The other isyounger, daughter o f Zeus and Dionc. It is she whom
we cali Pandemus. So it’s a necessity, in the case o f Eros, that the one who
is a coworker with the second [Aphroditc] be catlcd correctly Pandemus,
and the ochcr Uranios.” (180c6~ e3)
63
C H A PTER M> U R
that Ero$ is no longer simply the oldest god. This assertion o f Phaedrus has
gone. The best is no longer simply iden tic al with the oldest. This is natural
sin ce he is going to dcfend the present Athenian law.
I think his argumcnt is this, which is o f course a poÜtical o r popular ar-
gument: Every Athenian knows there are two Aphrodites; secondly, there is
no Aphrodite without eros. H enee, sin ce there are two Aphrodites there
must be two ero tes. He draws a new conclusión.
Listener: His ínsistence on two Aphrodites, o f which one is best, would
be much stronger if he had said there is no eros without Aphrodite, but this
he could not say.
Mr. Strauss: I f I uadem and you correctly, if there are erotes already at
this time without Aphrodite, and Aphrodite is a kind o f leftover from oíd
mythology, why does he n ot drop her altogcther? Then this thing would be
much d e are r. I have the impression that Simonides for ex ampie says that
Aphrodite is the m other o f Eros, but it is denied here that eros has a
mother.
There is this difficulty in the beginning (1 8 0 c ). H e says if there were one
eros Phaedrus’s proposition would be all right, but now as ít is there is not
only one eros. Since there ¡s n ot only one it would be more correct to say
which Eros should be praised. There is more than one eros, i.e., there may
be many erotes. Then the question arises, with what right does he limit
himself to two. S orne times a logical lacuna occurs in one speech which is re
solved later on. Sócrates speaks o f three erotes. In other wwds, this possi-
bility remains sterile as far as Pausanias is concerned.
wNow onc must praisc all gods, but rcgardlcss o f that onc must try to say
what each o f the two has obtained as his lot.'* ( 1 8 0 c 3 -4 )
This pious statement, that all gods must be praised, is contradicted by quite
a few things, past and futurc.
“Every acción is o f chis kind. An action in being done alone by itself is nci-
ther bcauhfbl ñor ugly. To drink, for examplc, as wc are now doing, or to
sing, or to converse, not onc o f thesc things is in itself bcautiful, but in
wh atever way it is done, it turns out to be ofthat sort in the doing. I f it is
beau titul ly and correedy done it proves to be beau tiltil; if incorrectíy, ugly.
So too loving and Eros is not in his en tire ty bcautiful, anv more than he is
deserving ofpraise, but che [Eros] who [bcautifully) induces one to lovc
beautittilly.” (1 8 0 e 4 -1 8 1 a 6 )
This, o f course, is a very ¡mportant assertion, which has very grave conse-
quences. Every action can be done nobly o r basely. What about that propo-
64
P A U S A R I A S (1)
ttNow the [Eros] o f Aphrodite Pandemus is truly pandemus and docs his
work haphazardly; and this is he in rcspect to whom the base among hu
man beings love. People o f this sort lovc, in thc first place, women no less
than boys; sccond, o f thcm, thcy love their bodies rather than their souls;
third, [they love] those who are as mindless as possible, looking solely to
the accomplishmcnt and neglecting whether it is beautifully done or not.
From this it follows thae whatever they do they do haphazardly, thc good
as indifferendy as its opposite. The rcason is that he is from the goddess
who is far younger than the other, and she partakes in her birch in female
and male. The [Eros] o f uranian [Aphrodite]— in che first place, she does
not partakc in female buc only male— and this is the eros o f boys; in the
sccond place, she is older and has no share in hubris. It is on this basis that
those who are inspired by chis eros curn co the male, cherishing the
stronger by nature and who have nous to a higher dcgrcc.” (18 Ia 7 -c 6 )
H e gives first the descripción o f the base eros. The base eros is directed to-
ward the female sex to o ; secóndly it is directed more toward the body than
the soul and it prefers the m ost unintelligent beloved. Why? Because it is
concerned only with what we may cali sexual success. Therefore, and chis is
somewhat paradoxical, it is accidental whether the devotees o f this vulgar
eros act well or badly. Can you act well on that basis? We surely notice that
mere concern with sexual success does n ot necessarily lead to virtue. While
the base eros is concerned only with sexual success it may act well. I think
this is connected with his general proposition that there is no action about
which you can speak universally with respect. Though this is truc, the base
eros will lead to a good action only accidentally, and therefore it is base.
This eros is base because it is not directed toward the good. What are the
reasons for this? The younger Aphrodite has a mother, therefore she is bi
sexual as ¡s also the Eros who accompanies her. Secondly, she is younger,
and the younger are more unreasonable. Therefore she goes in for the love
o f the unreasonable, for very young boys.
A few more points; At 1 8 0 c2 , when he speaks o f the other eros he does
not mention the word eros, he only implies it. T hat, o f course, does not
com e out in the translatíon, But the more important conclusión is this: no
65
C H A T T E R l ' O U R
action is in itself noble o r base. Every action is capable o f belng done nobly
or badly. B u t how do we distinguish? H erc we get a certain inkling o f it.
H e re we have the noble eros put in terms o f the male, which is by naturc
stronger and possesses intelligence to a higher degree. Love for those who
are by nature stronger and m ore inteüigent is noble r than love for the
wcaker and less intelligent. In the sequel the emphasis shifts immediately to
intelligence alone. Homosexual love is noblcr because it is concerned with
the nobler sex. May I ask the Iadíes here to forgive me for introducing these
statements, which are n ot my statements. N ot even Plato makes thcm ; they
are statements o f Pausanias. L et me make one general statement here: What
Pausanias is after is a defense o f pederasty.
[Tape change.]
I t is directed toward the noble because it i$ directed toward intelligence,
toward nous. H ere we have already one difficulty, which is uldmately the
downfall o f Pausanias. L et us assume the noble love is love for intelligent
human beings. What follows? The noblest love is love for the most intelli
gent. W ho are, generaily speaking, the most intelligent males? [Gap in the
tape.] H e tries to find a ground for pederasty and what he gets is the oppo-
site. T o make this a bit more clear, where d o we find thac noblest love pre-
senced in the Sympostutn? Aristodemus, the silent fellow, and in a cruder
way Apollodorus.
wAnd onc would recognize also in pederasty itsclf those who have been
purcly prompted by this eros, for they do not love boys, except when they
already begin to have nous, and this is cióse in time to the growth o f the
beard. I believe that those who begin to love from this time are fiilly prc-
pared co be coge the r their whole lite and live together in common, and
not, once they have taken him asyoung in his folly and deceived him, then
disappear in scornful laughter and run ofF to another. There should also
have been a law forbidding the love o f boys, in order that much zea! would
not have been expended for an unclear resuit. It is unclcar where the end
o f boys ends up in regard to the virtuc and vicc o f soul and body. Now the
good voluntarily lay down this law for thcmsclvcs, but there should have
been a compulsión ofthis kind imposed on those pandemian iovers, just as
we compel chem, co the excenc thac we are able, not to love fice women. It
is these who have made it a reproach, so as for some to daré to say thac it is
shamelul co gratify lovers; and they say this looking at them, seeing their
unomeliness and injustice, sincc it is surely the case that there is no matter
whatsocvcr, if it is done in an ordcrly and lawful way, that would justly in-
cur blame.” (1 8 1 c7 -1 8 2 a 6 )
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P A U S A S I A S { I )
67
C H A P T B R Í O U R
wisc in speaking, it has bccn laid down by law that without qualification it
is noble to gratify lovers, and no one, either young or oíd, would say Chat
ic is shamcful, in order, I suspect, chey might not have any trouble in try-
ing to persuade the young by speech, bccause chey are incapablc o f spcak
ing; but in che case o f Ionia and many other places, all who dwell under
barbarians, it has been laid down by law as shameful. For in the eyes o f bar-
barians, on account o f cheir cyrannies, chis in foct, as wcll as philosophy
and love o f excrcise, are shamcful; for it is, I suspcct, not advantagcous to
the rulers that there come co be greac and proud thoughts among the
ruled, any more than that there be scrong friendshtps and partncrships. It
is this that all the rest and cspecially eros are wont to instill. Even the
tyrants here understood chis in deed; the eros o f Aristotogeicon and the
fncndship o f Harmodius, in províng to be stcadfast, destroyed the ir rule.
So whcrcvcrit is laid down to be shameíul to gratify lovers, it has been laid
down by the vice o f those who laid it down, by the overreaching o f the
rulers and the unmanliness ofthe ruled; but wherever it was he Id by law to
be unqualifiedly noble, it was on account o f che idleness o f the soul o f
those who laid it down. But here ic has been laid down by law in a far no-
bler way than cbcwherc, and, as I said, it*s not easy to understand it.”
<182a7-d6)
Up to now we have only the assertíon, and we see that it is a very character-
istic one. There are two extremes and a mean. O ne extreme is never to
grant favors, that’s the barbarie one. The savage Greeks say grant favors as
you pie ase. The Athenians say grant favors with discretion. The Athenian
and Spartan law regarding eros is praised. Elis and Boeoda have no restrie -
tion whatsoevcr— this is charactcristic o f the undvilízed Greeks— and ac
tual prohibition is characteristic o f the Greeks living under barbarían rule,
but it is a reflection o f the barbarians themselves. The praise o f the oldest is
rcplaced by the praise o f what is established, and as a political man he
chooses the most renowncd, Athens and Sparta.
There is a distinction berween noble and base eros, therefore a distinc-
tion berween virtue and vice. Virtue itself is a mean betwecn complete ab-
stinence and complete self-indulgence. This is the theme o f Pausanias’s
speech— moral virtue. Pausanias’s speech is characterized by the artempt to
look at eros from the point o f view o f moral virtue. B u t this is n ot the
speech o f an entircly disinterested man. I t is the speech o f a man who wants
freedom for his practices, o f which he says they are legal, but we shall see
later on that they are not legal. He has to make them legal. His whole
speech is, under the guise o f a praise o f the Athenian nomos, a suggestion
o f how to improve the Athenian nomos. Such speechcs are cailed delibera-
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PAUSA NIAS M i
tive speeches, and I believe that Pausanias's speech is the only deliberan ve
speech occurring in Plato. According to Aristotle there are three kinds o f
specches: forensic, epideictic, and deliberativo. Forensic conccrns acquittal
o r condemnation under the law. Epideictic is a display o f power which
serves no practical purpose, for example, after-dinner speeches. Delibera-
tive speeches are polideal specches about peace and war, finance, and also
law. That chis is a political speech, i. e., a speech inspired by interest and pos-
sibly by self-interest o f the speaker, may be shown by the fact that he is con-
cem ed with the law which permits the beíoved to grant their favors. That’s
the tensión. As for Sparca, which is omicted in some editíons, that is awk-
ward. He has this división: either they can’t speak or they can and are, likc
the Spartans, sensitive about pederasty. The Greeks living under barbarían
rule drop philosophy and love o f exercise ( 1 8 2 c l) , but the Greek savages
also have no philosophy. T h e reason he mentions Sparta is because Sparta
adds luster to his law; the praise o f the law is greater if it ineludes both
Athens and Sparta. But then he must drop Sparta for a very good reason.
N ot because the practice o f pederasty is necessarily different, though there
are some indications, as we know ffom other Platonic dialogues, that there
are differences. But the main point is that the connecdon bctween the
noble eros and the cuitivation o f the mind is endrely different in Athens.
T h e cuitivation o f the body is at least as good in Sparca. In his whole speech
manliness o r courage does n ot appear. There is a certain softness essential
to Pausanias as well as to his beloved Agathon. H e is not a valetudinarian.
In Elis and Boeotia che law was made by the lovers as such, therefore
there is perfect freedom for the lovers. It was n ot made by the fathers as
such, though the fathers may also be lovers. B u t in which capacity did they
act when they made the law? T h e explanation suggested here is insufficient.
W hy is love ofyoung men superior to that o f boys and women? L et me State
it as follows: In Elis there is no iaw forbidding this kind o f thing; therefore
the lovers are n ot interested in restraint. W hat is wrong with the law in Elis?
That is n ot clear. L et us therefore look at the other example o f the Greeks
in Asía M inor living under barbarían rule. Freedom . Freedom requires
ero tic bonds among those who are best ablc to carry arms. Those who are
best able to carry arms are, o f course, neither women ñor young boys. We
get, then, an entirely different point o f view. H itherto we had nous— intcl-
ligence; this wilt never justify pederasty, as we have seen, because it will lead
to love o f the wiser, the older. But if it i$ a marter o f political freedom, o f
those who can defend it best, then there is a link between men who are still
ablc to carry on (rom the older generation— forty-five according to the Ro-
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C H A f T P . R F O Ü R
mans— and the youngcr gcneration, say ofscventcen. We must see whether
this is suíficient.
We see here by various examplcs, in 182c 3 - 4 , that cros produces lofty
souls, but it i$ not the only thing that produces lofty souls. Here we have an-
other consideration. Frecdom is used as a support fbr pederasty. But why
doesn't it work? Why is freedom insufficient? Anyone who has continued to
read Pausanias’s spcech should know the answer. Why is the relation between
cros and freedom n ot safe? The lover is supposed to serve as a slave. Nous—
mind— fails. Freedom , to o , is no good, since the relation is a slavish one.
There are some more points which we can briefly consider. One is o f
poli ti cal interest in a narro wer sense, when he speaks o f the barban ans.
“Wherever it is laid down to be shameful to gratify lovers, it has been laid
down by the vice o f those who laid it down.” I t was due to greed, to the de-
sire to have more on the part o f the rulers, and to unmanliness o f the ruled.
That ís a very interesting remark. The ruled, even those ruled by a tyrant,
are as much legislators as the ruler o r the tyrant. This contains, ofcourse, an
elem ent o f truth which is so grossly overdone by certain trends in modern
scientific political Science. For examplc, in Bendey’s theories o f political
government there doesn’t exist simple tyranny. There is always some infiu-
ence o f the subjected population on the rulers. Therefore, in the spirit o f
this view, Pausanias says the legislators, even in a tyranny, are the ruled as
wcll as the rulers. In the other case— where he speaks o f the barbarie Greeks,
wherc it was made a law to be simply noble, namcly without any restraint—
there it was done through the laziness o f the soul o f the legislators. Here
you see he does n ot make any distinction between the rulers and ruled.
Why? Obviously— they are republics; the distinction between rulers and
ruled does not exist. They are truly free men. What do they say regarding
pederasty? They say do as you wish. Therefore freedom does not requirc
the noble eros. We have another p ro o f that the second attempt o f Pausanias
to find a basis for pederasty— this time n ot in nous, in intelligence, but in
freedom— breaks down. Where will he find the basis? Plato doesn’t say,
“T h at’s my valué judgment’1; every idiot can say that. H e asks, W hat’s the
reason fbr your valué judgment? Why is pederasty good? W hy should it be
permitted by the law? You must give reasons. The fact that some people
wish to engage in ¡t or suffer from its prohi bidón is o f course no reason for
changing the law. There must be good reasons. Give me a good reason.
Nous? N o. Freedom? N o. Because freedom would lead to an indiscrimi-
nate permission which no substantíal part o f the Athcnian electora te would
go tbr. So, he must find a third principie.
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P A U S A R I A S i 1 i
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C H A P T E K F O U X
72
5 PAUSANIAS (2)
71
C H A P T K R ¥ I V k
74
P A U S A N I A S ( 2 I
75
( H A P T B R FJ Vf c
in bloom. From this ic would follow that an ugly, intelligent youth is prefer-
able as a bcloved to a beautiful, stupid youth. Pausanias does n ot say that
those who are by nature good are by nature directed toward male adolcs-
cents. He does say that cercain men are directed toward what is by nature
better, i.e., intelligence. B u t this does n ot justify his kind o f pedcrasty.
Thcsc men whom he praiscs avoid boys n ot so much because the boys are
less intelligent than youths but out o f fear o f disgrace. The boys are pro-
tected by thcir fathcrs. N ot nature but deliberarion limits the desire ofped-
erasts like Pausanias. These men impose upon themsclvcs a law, a nomos.
This law is in part a response to a preceding law laid down by the fathers,
who protect their boys.
We ha ve seen that such a law is by no means necessary o r universal or ac*
cording to nature. In Elis and Boeotia we scc that no such law exists. The
reason is this: the fathers who lay down the law are also potential lovers. In
the latter capacity they may per mi t perfect liccnse, which in their capacity as
reasonabk fathers they would, in ail probability, restrict. Disgrace, then, is
the reason which restrains these people from boys. Disgrace falls on the
base eros, but this difFers in different cities. We turn, thercforc, to the laws
o f the intelligent and free cities, the two cities which have the quaiities de-
cisive for judgment o f any city, that it is intelligent or highly civiüzed and,
secondly, that it is free. These cities are Athens and Sparta. Pausanias refers
to thcm in the beginning but he drops Sparta immediately; this is con-
nected with the fact that in his whole speech there is no reference to manli-
ness o r courage. Pausanias is a softy; that is o f some importance. H e loves
ano the r softy, the poet Agathon, and this brings up a broad theme which
we can here only m ention, namely, to what extent poetry as such is, from
Plato’s point o f view, a form o f softness. For the time being I refer only to
the poet Orpheus who, as we have seen, was n ot disdnguished by courage.
T o summarize: intelligence does n ot justify pederasty, political freedom
might. We see it in Athens and among the free people o f the west who prac-
ticc unlimited pederasty, whereas the Greeks subjcct to barbarians d o not.
But here is the troubie: political liberty does n ot as such justify limitación to
the noble lo ve. Those people concerned only with freedom cncourage ped
erasty without making any distinction. Also, there is a conflict betwecn free
dom and enslavemcnt implied in pederasty, as Pausanias him self under-
stands it. Eros is n ot even conducive to lofty thoughts and to freedom.
Pausanias's bcloved Agathon lived at the court o f Archesilaos o f Macedo-
nia, whom some o f you will remember from the G orgias, where his evil
deeds are described with grcat forcé.
76
P A U S A N I AS { 2 >
What is thc basis o f che discinction between noble and base eros? Hith*
erto we have no answer to that question. Now let us turn to our text.
“But here it has bcen laid down by law in a tar noblcr way than clscwhcrc,
and, as I said, it is not easy co understand.” ( 1 8 2 d 4 -5 )
H e has betbre discusscd the law, the law o f the Greek savagcs o f thc west
and che laws o f the Grceks living under Persian domination in the east.
Both are wrong, for different reasons. Now he turns to the Athcnian law.
Here at home in Athcns everything is fine. The thesis which he wtll devclop
now in the first part o f the scquel is that the Athenian law declares it is no
ble to love and it is noble to be gracious to the lover.
“For if one considcrs that to love openly is spoken o f as nobler than to love
in sccret, and especially to love the noblest-born and best, even if they are
uglicr than othcrs, and in turn that the universal exhortación to che lover
is amazing, not as if he werc doing somcthing shamcful, and that if he
seizes the beloved it is thought noble, and if he does not scizc, disgracefiil.
And with regard to trying to seize, thc law has grantcd to the lover the
possibilicy ofbcingpraiscd in performing amazing deeds.” (1 8 2 d 5 -c 3 )
You see now he gives enumerations o f what the Athenian law, i.e., custom,
signifies. The style reminds one o f Aristotle’s R betoric, when Aristotle gives
the enumeration o f, for cxample, what is noble, o r just, etc. H ere is an enu*
merarion o f ítems from which one can see what people gene rally think, The
Athenian law cncourages the lover, that becom es perfeedy dear by implica-
tion. It does n ot encouragc the beloved. We shail see that later. There are
five Ítems here mentioned, the center one is the universal encouragcmcnt
given to the lover.
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CHAI* i f R P I VB
The Athenian law gives the lover amazing frccdom regarding the accions
leading to ero tic success, but no such freedom in regard to the pursuit o f
anything else, for example, money or political power. The greatest servility,
which is dlsgracefuJ in other pursuits, is praised in the case o f love. I f some-
one were to swear falseiy in order to get money* for example, he would earn
the greatest reproaches leveled against philosophy, namcly— if you would
look up Plato’s A polqgy you would see that it is n ot to believe in gods. Per-
jury in the case o f love is not regarded as impiety, whereas perjury for the
sakc o f money would be a sure proof o f n ot believing in the gods. You see
he re al so why Pausanias wisely started from the principie that no action is
simply base. Scrvilc actions, begging, are noble in the case o f love; even per-
jury is not base in the case o f love.
“And what is most terrible, as the many say at léase, there is also forgive-
ness from the gods for him alone if he swcars and then departs from his
oaths— they deny that an oath holds in matters o f sex. So both gods and
human beings have made cvcry possi bilíty open to the lover, as the law
here asserts. Now in this way one would believe it is lawfully maintained in
chis city that to love and be friends with the lovers is very noble.” ( 1 8 3 b 5 -
c4)
You note that the Athenian law as stated hitherto encourages all love, not
only the devotees o f the noble love— no such limitation is mentioned.
Phaedrus said that to die for one’s beloved, and cspecially for one’s lover, is
highly rewarded by the gods and n ot to die is severely punished by the
gods. Pausanias says to perjure oneself is forgiven by the gods to the lovers.
The implication is clear. According to Pausanias lovers do n ot need a stim-
ulus, they need only to be forgiven afterwards, especially since Pausanias is
silent about the supreme sacrifice. H e speaks o f felse oaths, but he does not
speak o f any obligation which is put on the lover to die.
“ But whenever fathers set up guardians over those who are loved and do
not allow thcm to converse with their lovers, and these things have been
presenbed to the guardián, and his contcmporaries and comrades re-
proach him if they scc anything o f the sort happening, and the clders in
turn do noc reproach those who are linding fault, on the grounds that they
are not speaking correctly, then if one looks at these things onc would be •
lieve again that this sort o f thing is lawfully maintained here to be most
disgracefijl." (1 8 3 c4 -d 3 )
Now we see the other side. Athenian law, which encourages the lovers, dis-
courages the beloved from seeing the lover regardless o f whether the lover
78
P A U S A N I A S ( 2 }
“But this is the way it is, I believe. It is not unqualified, but as it was said at
the beginning, it is neither noble in itsclf ñor shameful, but if it is nobly
done it is noble, and if shameíully shameful. Now to gratify a base person
and in a base way is shamefully done, but to gratify a good person and in a
noble way is nobly done. Thae lover, che pande mi an lover, is base; he loves
the body rather than the soul. For he does not even last, becausc he is not
in love wich a lasting thing either. Along with the cessation o f the bloom
o f the body, which was what he was in love with, ‘he flics o ff and is gone,*
and disgraces his many speeches and promises; but the lover o f the good
character lasts chroughout life, because he is fused with thac which is last-
ing." (1 8 3 d 3 -e6 )
The primary distinction made by Athenian law refers to what ¡s proper for
the beloved. T h e iover has perfcct freedom. H e produces now the crucial
distinction. T h e noble lover loves a decent character. I t is n ot his intelli-
gence o r his courage but his decent character. O n this basis, Pausanius be-
lieves, he can make the distinction stick. W hat is noble for the beloved
depends on the quality o f the lover. H ere Pausanias begjns to answer the
dccisive question: W hat is the ground o f the distinction becween noble and
base love? The signs o f noble love were, you will recall, that it is (a ) for
males rather than females, (b ) for souls rather than for bodies, and (c) for
adolescents rather than for boys. The guiding point o f view was mind or
intelligence. B u t this doesn’t work, as we have seen. Here things changc.
H ere the point o f view is abiding bloom o r excellence. Since the bloom o f
the body does n ot abide the soul is prefe rred to the body. In other words,
abidingness, lastingness, is a criteríon for distinguishing betwcen noble and
base love, which makes some sense. But this does not lead to love o f males
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(* H A P T E R FI VK
“Our law wants to pat them to the test in a good and noble way, and wants
to have them gratify some and shun others. On account o f this it encour-
ages them to pursue and the ochen to flee, setting up a contest and tesdng
to which group the lover bclongs and to which the one who is loved.”
(1 8 3 e 6 -1 8 4 a 5 )
The Athenian law commands to the beloved, on the basis o f the requests o f
thosc who love, a decent character. You may not accede to thc request o f
thc base lovers. You see also that Pausanias's concern ¡s for what is proper
for the beloved. Then he makes the transition from the distinction berween
noble and base lovers to thc distinction betwecn lovers and beloved. The
Athenian law commands the lovers on the one hand and the beloved on the
other in order to make manifest to either side the noble o r base character o f
the partner. The Athenian law says you must wait some time beíbre you see,
and this offers the test o f thc character o f the lover and to some extern o f
the beloved,
“This is why, in thc first place, to be caught quickly has been laid down by
law as disgraceful, in order that time may pass— time is often thought to
test bcautifully— and in the second place, to be caught by money and by
political powers is shameftil, regardless o f whether one cowers in being
ill-treated and does noc resise or, in being benefited in regard to money
or political achievements, one does not despise them, for none o f thesc
things is thought to be either solid or lasting, even apart from the face that
there is not by nature a genuine fnendship from these things.” (184a 5 -
b5)
Now for this reason, as he says, namely because noble love is love for the
lasting, for decent character, our laws prescribe to the beloved to run away
and n ot to get caught. Thus the lovers are tested. The lovers are only com-
80
P A U S A N I A S <3 )
“So onc way is left for our law, if a beloved is going to gratify a lover in a
noble manner.* (1 8 4 b 5 -6 )
T h e problcm is how can the beloved nobly grant favors to the lover accord-
ing to the Athenian law? I f both possess decent character and after a decent
interval o f waidng the beloved can be assured o f the decent intentions o f
the lover, has the problem n ot yet been solved? Yet this long period tests the
tenacity rather than the dccency o f the lover. S o the problem is n ot solved.
I t is obvious that a base lover m ay be as tenacious as a de cent lover.
“Our law is that, just as it was agreed in the case oflovers that co be a slave
voluntarily to a beloved in any sort o f slavcry whatsocver was not flattery
or an object o f reproach, so too there is only onc voluntary slavery left that
is not an object o f reproach, and this is [slavery] in regard to vircuc. It has
been established by law for us, ifone is willing to serve someone in the be*
lief that one will be better on his account, eithcr in terms o f some wisdom
or any other part o f virtue, then this voluntary scrvicude is not shamcful or
fla tte ry "(1 8 4 b ó -c7 )
You remember he has spoken o f two laws, encouraging the lover and dis-
couraging the beloved. N othing satisfactory carne out o f this solution be-
cause the testing o f tenacity is n ot a test o f dccency. Now he brings in
another Athenian law. T o repcat: the first Athenian law entides the lover to
all kinds o f things which are permitted in no other pursuit, to every kind o f
slavery, while discouraging the beloved. The new Athenian law, to which he
turns now, encourages the beloved to thralldom toward the lover in order
thus to acquire virtue. Think o f a young Athenian looking up to Pendes as
a man o f outstanding virtue, and he may do for Pendes all kinds o f things
which in no other human relation would be regarded as proper. T o take an
example from Aristotle’s Politics, he might even shine his shoes o r shave
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C H A T T E B . F I V E
him, which would ordinarily be slavish, but in such relations it would do.
U p to now we have seen that thralldom ¡s encouraged in the case o f thc
lover. Now we bring in another law, which has to do with virtue, n ot with
eroticism, which encourages slavery in the case o f the younger, thc beloved.
L et us sce whether this leads to a satisfactory solution.
“One must bring this pair o f laws together, the law about pederasty and
che law about philosophy and the resc ofvirtue, if the result, thc gratifica*
tion o f the lover by the beloved, is going to tum out fine.” ( 1 8 4 c7 -d 3 )
“Whenever lover and beloved come together, cach with a law, one that he
would justly serve, in serving ¿n anything whatsoever, a beloved who grat-
ified him, and the ocher that he in tum would justly serve in anything
whatsoever the one who is making him wisc and good, and the one is able
to contri bute to intelligence and the rest o f vjreuc, and thc other needs to
acquire education and thc rest ofwisdom, then, when these laws come co
gedle r, only in chis case does it tum out that for the beloved to gratify the
Iover is n oble, but in no othe r case .” (18 4d3 - e 4 )
Now let us try to understand that. O ne thing is clear now: the Athcnian law
as it stands now is insufficicnt for Pausanias’s purposes. In thc guise o f a
praisc o f thc established Athenian law Pausanias proposes a subde change
o f the Athcnian law. His speech is a deliberative speech, a speech about a
change o f law, As I mentioned at the end o f the last m ccting, it is the only
deliberative speech occurring in Plato. Now, every deliberative speech, ac*
cording to a vulgar interpretation, must raise the question, W ho expeets
benefits from it? H ere the answer is clear— the proposcr. The lover de-
mands that the prohibition addressed to the beloved be rescinded or that a
new law be addressed to the beloved. The new law is the consistent formu
lación o f two contradictory ones. Why does Pausanias want a change o f the
law? Because like every man o f his character he needs legal support for his
practice. He is decent— yes— but one couid also say soft. There are two
laws: one regarding pederasty, the other regarding philosophy, T h e former
encourages the lovers and discourages the beloved; the latter encourages
the beloved. But the law regarding pederasty is concem ed with the protec-
tion o f the boys’ virtue. The law regarding philosophy is concerned with
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P A O 5 A N I A S ( 2 I
the boys’ acquisirion o f virtuc. The law enades the boys to com e together
with respectable m cn o f outstanding virtue. But it does n ot encourage
them for that purpose, o f course. W hat, then, is the solution? T h e adole s-
cent seek$ virtue, the iover possesses virtuc. The adolescctit is prompted by
love o f virtue; the lover> however, is prompted n ot by love o f virtue but by
love o f youth in bloom . The motives o f the two partners are heteroge-
neous. The allegediy pcrfectly virtuous relation is consdtuted by heteroge-
neous modves. O ne can, in a way, compare this to the relation between
buyers and sellers, which brings about, in a way, a satisfactory relation. Still,
the harmonious relation o f buyer and seller remains a question even if they
make a de al because o f their opposing interests.
You will recaí! that in 183e Pausanias had ascríbed to the adolescent a
noble character, meaning possession o f virtue.
T h e adolescent seeking virtue may fail into the hands o f the mature man
who merely pretends to be virtuous. I t is n ot disgraceful for the adolescent
if he grants favors to that pretender. T h e freedom given to the beloved is
still more enlarged. H e does not have to be certain that the Iover is virtu
ous, it is suffident i f he believes him to be virtuous. T h e adolescent may
grant any favor, in any manner, to anyone, provided that he believes that by
so doing he acquires virtue. You must admit that Pausanias gets in this way
absolutely everything. This is brought about by this wonderful combina-
tion o f the Athenian law regarding pederasty and the Athcnian iaw regard-
ing the acquisition o f virtue.
“So it is totaily noble in every way to gratify just fbr the sake o f virtue only.
This is che eros o f the uranian goddess, and it is uranian, and worth much
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C H A P T B R F I V B
for cicy and prívate persons, compelí ing the lover and the one who is loved
to exert much care each for his own virtue. AJI the other lovers are o f the
other [ Aphrodite], the Pandcmus. Thesc are the things, Phaedrus, that on
the spur o í the moment i con tribute toyou about Bros.’* (I8 5 b 4 -c 3 )
The noble eros is worth much for the acquisition ofvírtue on the part o f the
lover and the beloved. This seems to mean that both still have to acquire
virtue, and we are n ot conftonted with the situation o f an established char-
acter who has already acquired virtue. Neither o f them rcally possesses
virtue; both acquire virtue in the proccss o f their unión. We see this atso
(rom the formulation that eros is neither indispensable ñor sufficicnt for
acquiring virtue. This, I think, becomes dear. Eros is altogether unrelatcd
here to happiness o r bliss. At the end Pausanius speaks o f the vulgar Ap
hrodite but not o f the vulgar eros per se. The last word, for which the best
translation is “I contribute” (sutnballom at), is the same word he used be
fare when he spoke o f the bringing together (sutnbalein) o f the two laws. I
think this is the final refcrence to this crucial bringing together, the novel
bringing together o f two hitherto disjointed Athcnian laws.
Now, let us cry to understand this as a whole. Whereas Phaedrus had
complete ly disregarded the conflict betwcen eros and morality or taken it in
stride, Pausan ias starts from that conflict betwccn eros and the noble, and
therefore he says there are two erotes. The noble eros consists in decent
men loving decent youths with a view to the lattcr’s decency, and decent
youths will in their turn love the decent marure men in order thus to ac-
quíre deccncy. But why should the decent lovers love decent young men?
Why not decent young gjrls? Why should the decent youths, possessing de
cency, grant all kinds o f erotic favors to decent lovers in order thus to ac-
quire decency? I d on't want to develop this, but with a littlc imagination
you must see the fantastic suggestion for a way to virtue. W hy should de-
cent lovers seek all kinds o f erotic favors, especially from de cent youths?
You see, it really is a fantastic situation. Pausanias wants to make his kind o f
erodeism legal and proper. He is not impudent, he is rather a coward. With-
out knowing it, Pausanias refutes the sophisticated pederasty which he
wants to establish. We will see there are two fiircher defenses o f pederasty
com ing in the next two speeches. B u t is this all that emerges from Pausa
nias’s speech? What comes to sight through his speech?
Pausanias’s position arises from the conflict betwecn eros on the one
hand and the noble and the law on the other. For this purpose he must rep
rese nt the noble o r the law, what we would cali morality, in terms o f the de*
cent character. As you could see from the end o f the first book o f the L a w s
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P A U S A N I A S ( 2 )
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C H A P T K R M V h
wisdom. And thc virtue directed toward the self-sufficient polis is moral
virtue. T h e tully developed polis combines the satisfaction o f the require-
ments o f the mind and o f the requirements o f the body. But the same is in
tended by Pausanias’s perfect erotic association. Pausanias’s perfect erotic
association, however, suffers from a fundamental defect: the motivations o f
the lover and the beloved d o n ot agree. But the same ¡s true o f the polis and
o f moral virtue. T h e motivations o f the body and those o f the mind d o not
jibe. The necds o f the body Icad to society. Society as such requires política!
o r vulgar virtue, which is mercly a shadow o f virtue, a daylight virtue. The
needs o f the mind, however, require genuine virtue {R ep u blic, book 6).
This is onc o f the great themes o f the R ep u blic; the se four virtues, which are
courage, wisdom, moderation, and justice, have the same ñame through-
out. They mean something very difFerent whether they occur on the level
o f the philosophcr or on the lower level. The justice and moderation o f the
uneducated part o f the population, we can say, is only a shadow, a very poor
imitación, o f the genuine virtues. Now, what is true o f this most perfect city,
the city o f Plato'$ R epu blic, is still m ore true o f ordinary cides. Phenomena
o f great variety which have a superficial rescmblance and agree perhaps in
their externa! action, are thought to be identical, and this is n ot the case.
M oral virtue is a combination o f these two heterogeneous moralitics. I f this
is so, from Plato’s point o f view, there cannot be a natural desire for ¡t.
The re is a natural desire for the protection o f the body, there is a natural de-
sirc for the protection o fth e mind, but this necessary but n ot simply natura]
combination is n ot an objcct o f a natural desire. There is no connection,
certainly no identity between moral virtue and büss or happiness. This is by
no means completely changcd in Aristode or, for that matter, in Thomas
Aquinas. I could refer you forexam plc to Thomas Aquinas’s Sum tna con tra
¿ en tiles, book 3, chapter 3 4 , where this is developed, and where thc follow-
ing remark is made: uThe operadons o f justice are ordered for the purpose
o f preserving peace among men, through which each and every one pos-
sesses quiedy what is his own.” The ends are n ot these actions; the end is
peace and quiet. Man cannot find his end in love o r virtue as such. O ne can
make this objection: Pausanias does n o t mention all moral virtues, in foct he
puts a much stronger emphasis on the intellectual virtues— wisdom, nous,
prudence. H e barely alludes to justice and moderation, and he merely men-
tions unmanliness, n ot manliness itself. T o this I would repíy as follows:
Pausanias presents morality o r moralism as modified by a certain kind o f
eroticism— the love o f a mature man for a youth who is afraid o f impropri-
cty. Pausanias’s position is based on a clear idiosyncrasy. But what he says
$6
I' A Ü $ A N r A s ( 2 )
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C H A P T K R M V E
trine o f eros. (Gap in the tape.] I am noc sure whether Plato did n ot mean
to bring out very massively the contradictor y character o f the attempt to
rcconcílc, to subject eros to moral virtue. Pausanias makes the remark
“Every action can be noble o r base.” This is also a principal question o f
morality as morality. You have to take the two things together. H e who pre-
sents the standpoint o f moral virtue brings out two principies: (a ) every ac
ción may be moral and (b ) thcre ís a thralldom superior in dignity to the
fteedom belonging to morality. We must keep this in mind. We must keep
in mind how this clement in the context o f the Platonic analysis o f eros
comes o u t . . . .
In the next speech you will see an attempt to subject eros to art. In the
last three specches no attempt is made to subject eros to anything cxternal.
In Sócrates’ speech there is something higher than eros, but that is not ex
terna!.
U sten er: I t seems to me that the stress you put on definíng Pausanias’s
speech as essentially defending pederásty . . .
M r Strauss: There is no question about that, that he makes very dear.
We must face that. I think this is part o f the argument. Whereas there is still
a certain ambiguity in Phaedrus’s posidon, Pausanias, Eryximachus, and
Ariscophanes are defenders o f pederasry. In the last two speechcs this
changes again. This implies that a careful study o f these three speechcs will
reveal to us why Plato regarded pederasry as wrong. I think in the case o f
Pausanias it bccomes feirly clear: the very comical presentation o f uniting
for the purpose o f virtue and doing something which has no relation with
it. . . . In a much more sophisdcated way this com es out in the next speech.
I f we sdck to what Pausanias’s speech does, its unique character among
the six speeches— the emphasis on the Athenian law, and the fact that con-
trary to the original daim merely to reinterpret the Athenian law he sug-
gests a change in it— I believe it is necessary to conclude that it is a
deliberative speech. A deliberative speech is o f course n ot a detachcd, ratio*
nal analysis. That it is a scductive speech, líke Agathon’s for examplc, may
very well be, but it is more than that. While it may be truc that every speaker
has in mind an individual, with the exception o f Aristophanes— and I be
lieve that Sócrates had particularly Phaedrus in mind— it still means more
than that. The engine used by individuáis must be understood in its own
terms, precise ly if we want to understand the effect on certain individuáis. I
am sure there is a connecdon, but nevertheless we must also understand—
in spite o f the rhecorical elements which every speech contains— we must
also consider it as it presents itself, a speech praising eros, presenting eros as
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P A U S A N ] AS ( 2 >
the speaker sees it. In the case o f seduction it is clear. Agathon later on pre-
sents eros as sheer beauty endowed with all virtues.
I will draw a picture here o f the six speakers:
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CHAP T E R FJVE
erotic contact, in his general rebu ff against Agathon in the beginning when
Agachón says, “I f you touch me I will gec wisdom.”
Mr, Strauss: Yes, this is o f course o f almost Aristophanean indecency. I
didn’t want co develop this because I know chat you have read the literature
on that one.
[In answer to a question:] The question is, W hat makes it possible that
mind and body are united? I f you answer moral virtue, that is n ot unrea-
sonable. Thercfore Plato makes the suggestion in the R epu blic, to which wc
might rcturn, that what unítes the highest and the lowcst is philosophy.
This, to o , is enigmade but indicates the problem. The SympoHum is silent
about that. But, as I said befóte, we ñnd in Sócrates* speech a doctrine o f
threc eróte s, none o f which is base, only high and low. The low is n o t base.
All are natural, and we must see whether we find there moral virtue as an
object o f a natural desire. In scholasdc language we can say, although this
will displease many who think o f these matters in more poctic terms, the
Platonic doctrine o f eros is idéntica] with his doctrine o f the natural inclina*
dons. I think Pausanias’s speech brings this problem more into the open
than any other speech. In a general way, all six speakers are decent men, that
goes without saying.
[In answer to a question about the polis and caiculation:] That is the
way in which he presents it in the R epu blic. Eros is radically different from
calculadon. Eros is a kind o f possession, therefore he uses the term madness
in the P haedrus. The R epu blic, howevcr, is silent about eros in the second
book when he speaks about the foundation; he presents the case as some-
thing which can be put together and should be put together entirely on the
basis o f calculadon. The one who comes nearest to this in the Sytnposium is
Phaedrus. The word which Sócrates uses for virtue, which can be translated
as prudence or practical wisdom, contains the elem ent o f calculadon, and
Sócrates is by no means completely adverse to it. T h e true virtue is the one
in which calculadon and possession coincide. Throughout the Platonic di
alogues we find that one and only one phenomenon will solve the problem
he has stated in a particular dialogue, and that is philosophy. W hether he
takes justice, and he shows u$ the just city— uldmately we do n ot find jus-
tice in any city, however virtuous; the only perfect form o f justice is phi-
iosophy. O r, he takes freedom. The only onc who is genuinely free is the
philosopher. The same regarding eros. Only in philosophy does eros come
fuliy into its own. T h at is not meant to be something superimposed, as Pau-
sanias tries to superimpose. Contrary to all enthusiasts Sócrates says love is
not directed coward the beautiful. The elem ent o f splendor is absolutely
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P A Ü S A N I A S < 2 )
91
6 ERYXIM ACHUS
92
E R Y X I M A C H U S
93
C H A P T E R ÜI X
poínt, the ordinary poiitician, which includes all those we cali S t a t e smen,
has eros fbr the demos. This also throws light on the fact that the R ep u blic
is silent on eros, ultimately because the most interesting case o f eros,
namely eros o f the ruler for the ruicd, ls not admitted on the highcst level.
The philosopher in the R ep u blic rules n ot out o f eros but o u t o f compul
sión, as is dearly stated in the sixth and seventh books.
T o recapitúlate In a few words the comparison between Pausanias’s
erotic association and the polis to which I referrcd: You wilt recall that Pau-
sanias explicitly says the perfect erotic assodation is onc in which mature,
decent males edúcate potentially decent males. This, however, is exactly
what the polis claims to do. Mature gendemen edúcate potential gentie-
mcn— the next generation. B u t, o f course, we sec the absurd combinadon
o f educado n for virtue and pederasty. Pausanias demands a nonexistent
com binadon o f the law on philosophy and the law on pederasty. The se laws
exist in Athens but they are not combined. In demanding the combinadon
o f these two disdnct laws, he refers to two independent principies: intelli-
gence— nous— and body. In his speech he refers to three principies alto-
gether: intelligence, freedom, and moral virtue. He refers to them in ordcr
to justify pederasty. We have seen that intelligence, as he understands it,
does n ot justify pederasty. I t rather jusdfies love o f oíd men like Sócrates. As
for política! freedom, according to the argument it does justify pederasty
but n ot the dístinction between the noble and base eros. The third princi
pie— moral virtue— is sufficient in Pausanias's own opinión. I think reflec-
don shows that moral virtue itself is a unión, a com binadon o f these two
different things— intelligence and freedom. Freedom is specifícally polid-
cal, what we ordinarily cali consent. The polidcal, in its tu m , is primarily in
the Service o f the body, in modcrn ianguage o f self-preservation. We have,
then, cwo principies ultimately: intelligence and the body. Thcir unión,
which is complicated and difficult to understand, explains moral virtue.
The basis is this: the requirements o f intelligence and the requirements o f
the body, and therewith ofsociety, m eet. It is strange that they should meet
because intelligence and the body are entirely different. Their m eeting can
be shown very simply: both in order to live with others and in order to
think, you musí have a certain amount o f temperance. Ify o u are constandy
drunk you cannot be a Citizen, ñor can you be a thinker. Also courage: you
cannot be a good soldicr if you are absolutely cowardly, ñor can you be a
good thinker if you are absolutely cowardly. You would be constandy in
fcar and not have a free mind. O ne can say, then, strange as it sounds, that
the requirements o f the mind and the requirements o f living together meet
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E R Y X I M A C H U S
somehow; they are for practical purposes almost the same. B u t they are rad-
icaily difierent in principie o r in spirit. The purposes in each case are radi-
cally different. Moral virtuc, which is for the sake o f understanding, o f
theoria, and for the sake o f soeiety, presents itself as the end— the simple,
clear, and homogeneous end o f human Ufe. We can cali this position moral-
ist. Although Aristotle prese nted this view to some extent, it was fully
developed only by Kant. This will suffice as a summary o fth e points we dis-
cussed last time. Though this is an occasion for further discussion we must
make some headway.
L et us turn to the beginning, 1 85c4. After Pausanias had paused which
is, first o f all, an ailuslon to the length o f Pausanias’s speech.
W ho makes this pun— Pausanias and pause? Could it not have been made
by Aristodemus in his report and stuck in Apollodorus’s mind? They are
very different men but they have something in com m on: they are young
lovers o f Sócrates. I think this ambiguity, that we don’t know who made
this joke, is n ot unintended.
, . . but hiccups had just come over him, cithcr by saticty or by something
else, and he was unable to speak. But he did say— the physician Eryxi-
machus was lying in the couch below his— “Eryximachus, it is just that
you either stop my hiccups or speak on my bchalf, until I have stoppcd.”
And he said Eryximachus said, “Well, 111 do thcm both. I shall speak in
your turn, and you, when you stop, will speak in mine, and while I am
speaking, see whecher the hiccup is willing to stop ifyou hold your breath
for a long time; ifn o t, gargle with water. But if it is very severe, pick up the
sort o f thing by which you might irricate your nose, and sneeze. And ifyou
do this once or cwice, even if it is very severe, it will stop.” “You couldn’t
speak too soon,” Aristophanes said, “and I shall do this.” (1 8 5 c 6 -e 5 )
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CHAPTF. R $ IX
eludes the first half o f the speeches and Sócrates the second half. By virtue
o f this change we get Sócrates and the poets in the second half. Incidentally,
also only strong drinkers; the weak drinkers are in the first h a lf Still, could
Plato not have arranged it in the first place so that we would have the order
Phaedrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus in the first h a lf and in the second Aris-
tophanes, Agathon, Sócrates? We must see the dramatic meaning o f this
change. This sensible order is brought about by accident. Why is this better
than if it had been planned? T o put these three m ost outstanding m en to-
gether would have been impolite. There is a disproportion between wis-
dom , which requires that they go together, and politeness, o r the polis and
society. This is a consideradon in cvery Platonic dialogue. In this way Ar-
istophanes’ speech becomes the ccnter o fth e whole. Aristophancs acquires
this ccnter position by a defect o f his body. The body asserts itself after Pau-
sanias's somewhat disingenuous attempt to put the body entirely in the sec
ond place: bodily gratifications are only in the Service o f moral education.
You see also that Eryximachus shows that he is a physician, very clear and
precise, but also very pedantic, As you can also see, he is eager to speak*
There is a certain contrast between him and Sócrates, as we shall see. Now
let us turn to Eryximachus’s spcech.
This is important for the understanding o f the whole. There was no such
connection between Pausanias’s and Phaedrus’s speeches. Eryximachus’s is
a continuation or, as he claims, the consummation o f Pausanias’s spcech.
But he carefiiily says, “I must try,” and we will see later on that he does not
condude it. The man who condudes the series which began with Pausanias
is Aristophanes. These three speeches form an important subtheme.
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KR V X I M AC H U S
97
C H A P T B R SI X
Pausanias had said it is noble to grant fávors to the good lovers, it is base to
grant favors to the dissolute lovers. In medicine it is noble to satisfy love felt
for what is healthy in che body, and it is base to satisfy the love felt for what
is sick in thc body. In other words, medicine identifies the good with thc
hcalthy and the dissolute with the sick. However, he brings in another co n
sideración: the healthy body lovcs X , and thc sick body loves Y. H e says sim
ilar things love similar things. T h e word sim ilarm W be crucial in the sequel,
thereforc I mention it here. The physician does n ot feel love for that which
he satisfies o r for that which he does not satisfy. T h e loveless art rcgulates
love. This is a certain difficulty which onc must keep in mind. Just as virtuc
was n ot love in Pausanias and Phaedrus but either produced love or regu-
lated it.
Up to this point Eryximachus has explained who o r what is the lover.
The lover is thc body, but what does thc body love? So far we d o n 't know.
L isten cr: Isn’t there nobility in the action o f the physician in his permit*
ting and helping to satisfy desi re?
Mr. Strauss: This is an important question. The healthy body is good,
and thc sickly body as such is a bad body. W hat the physician does is either
noble o r base. This is very interesting bccause what is loving— the body—
is caUed good o r bad, whercas the loveless art is now called noble o r base.
Pausanias had distinguished betwcen noble and base eros. Eryximachus
here, at any ratc, seems to distinguish between good and bad eros and a
noble o r base cxercise o f the art. H ow much this means wc shaU see.
L isten er: He agrecs with what Pausanias had said that it is right to grat
iíy good men and base to gratify dissolute men. Pausanias ended with a
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E R Y X I M A C H U S
“Medicine is, to speak summarily, the Science o f the crocic things o f the
body in regard to replction and cvacuation, and he who discerns in them
the noble and base eros, he is the most skillcd in medicine; and he who
makes chem alter, so as to acquire che onc cros instead o f the other, and in
which things cros is not but should come to be in them, if he knows how
to implant ic, and if it is there to remo ve it, he would be a good crafts*
man.” (I8 6 c 5 -d 5 )
The question here is: We know who o r what is the lover— the body either
healthy or sick— but who is the beloved? Repietion or cvacuation. The
body has love for either the right kind, and then it is noble, or for the wrong
kind, and then it is base. The Greek verb from which repledon is derived is
used as well for the pregnaney o f females. So you see the connection with
the erotic phenomenon. Medicine distinguishes between two kinds. I t en-
courages and even allows o r causes the right kind and takes away the wrong
kind. We also see a distinedon within medicine as knowledgc. The one who
recognizes, diagnoses, eros, and the other who is concem ed with doing
things— he is called a good craftsman. Thus the theoredeal and practical as-
peets are distinguished and we shall see later that this is very important. In
the case o f bodies the beloved is repietion and evacuation. T h e quesdon is,
could this have any applicability to the soul? In other words, does the soul
love repietion and evacuation? Perhaps we could connect repietion with
knowiedge, and evacuation might be the evacuation o f ignorance o r per
haps also the bad evacuation, namely forgetting o f knowiedge.
“He must be able to makc the most hatcful things in the body friends and
love one another. The most contrary things are the most hatefiil, coid to
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CHAPTE K SIX
Kot, bi etc r to swcct, dry to liq uid, c vcrythin g o f thc kind. Ou r anccstor As-
clcpius kncw how co instill eros and unanimity in these things, as thc poces
here say and I am persuaded, and so he put together our art.’1 ( 186d 5-c3)
H e drops thc subject o f repletion and evacuation, as we have seen, and, per-
haps, replaces it by something more general— opposites. Clearly repletion
and evacuation are opposites, but he looks at ít now from a different poínt
o f view, opposites in the body, n ot opposites which the body seeks. The
body contains opposite elements. This is the basis fbr the very need for re
pletion and evacuation. Medicine must establish harmony between these
opposite elements, i.e., love o f the most hostile. The lover is the beloved
and the beloved is the lover. The lover and beloved are no longer distin-
guished in the subject, eros, as they were in the speeches o f Phaedrus and
Pausanias. Eryximachus drops now all one-sided love. A one-sided love
would be, for example, the love o f the body for food. H e is only concerned
with things capable o f mutual love, namcly, the elements o f the body.
Ifo n e were to appty this simply to human beings, a rather fantastic rcsult
would seem to com e about— the best man must love the most dissolute
man, and the art regarding the soul would exist in establishing an equi-
librium o f mediocrity between thc best and the worst. Surely in Eryxi*
machus’s own case, because he and Phaedrus are similar people, chere
would be base love, since true love seems to be only among opposites.
What strikes us immediately is the siJcnce about male and female. In his
whole speech this is the most relevant opposite, if you talk about love.
There was this famous list o f opposites drawn up by the Pyth agoré ans, and
male and female naturally figured in an important place. Eryximachus goes
so far as to be silent even about m en— males. O ur physician is silent about
the normal unión o f opposites in living beings. Why? Noble love is usually
love o f opposites, and this is the work n ot o f nature but o f art. This, o f
course, constitutes the highest praise o f art. I f the noble love is never
brought about by nature, but only by thc medical art, he also implies some
thing else. I f by nature opposites hate each other, it means that similar
things by nature love each other. Simply and crudcly expressed— pederasty.
Pederasty is natural, and this is, o f course, what he is trying to prove. Eryx
imachus’s cosmic doctrine o f eros is nullified n ot only by his concern with
medicine but by his kind o f eroticism as well. His cosmic doctrine o f eros
pro ves to be an expression o f these two concem s: art and pederasty. The
difficulty you see at this time is this; His art is opposed to his eroticism bc-
causc his art is supposed to establish harmony between opposites. It is
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E R Y X 1 M A C H U S
thereforc a grcat problcm for him to praise eros and his art in the same
breath.
‘‘The entirecy o f medicine, as I say, is govemed through chis god, and like-
wise gymnastics and farming as wcll." (1 8 6 c 4 - 187a 1)
These three arts— medicine, gymnastics, and farming— are mentioned to-
gether also in the tenth book o f the L aw s (8 8 9 b - e ) in the context o f a
represe ntation o fth e doctrine o f the subve rsive people: Art is lower than na-
ture, and the most respectable arts are, therefore, medicine, farming, gym
nastics, because these are the arts which most cooperare with nature. In the
política! art there is nothing natural, it de ais only with human artifaets,
laws, etc. This is derivadve from the view that to be means to be body. At
this point Eryximachus has finished his discussion o f medicine and we keep
only one thing in mind: Medicine consists in bringing about love o f op-
posites which are by nature hostile, which implies that by nature similars
attract each other— love each other, Applied to human thíngs this would
mean that pederasty is natural and heterosexual love is to be brought about
artificially by medicine, which is a very funny suggcstion.
In the sequel he speaks o f eros in music. M usic, to o , establishes har-
mony between opposites, i.e., the eros o f opposites fbr one another.
“It is plain to anyone who pays attention with even a licde nous that music
too is along the same lines as them, just as perhaps Heraclitus too wants co
say, since if one just takes him litcrally he does not speak beautifully. He
says o f the one that in differing with itsclf it agrccs with itself, ‘just as is the
harmony o f bow and oflyre.’ It is overwhelmingly irrational to assert that
a harmony difTcrs or is out o f things that are still differing. Buc perhaps he
wanted to say this, that o f the prior differenccs o f high and low a subsc*
quent agreement has come about by the musical art. It is surcly not the
case that a harmony would be out o f high and low while they were still dif-
fering. Harmony is consonance, and consonancc a kind o f agreement, but
it is ímpossi ble that there be a harmony out o f differing things as long as
they are differing, just as rhythm too has come to be out o f swift and slow,
which have prevíously differed but subscqucntly carne to an agreement.”
(1 8 7 a l-c 2 )
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C H A P T E R S1X
“In this case music instills harmony in all these things, just as ín the oeher
case medicine did, by the insertion o f cros and unanimity among one an-
other. Music too is in turn a Science o f erotic things, in regard to harmony
and rhythm. And in the system itself o f harmony and rhythm, it is not at all
difficuk to discern the erotic things, and the twofold eros is noevet diere.”
(187c2-c8)
102
E R Y X I M A C H U S
“Buc whenever one has to employ rhythm and harmony in relation to hu
man beings, either by making— it is what they cali lyric poetry— or by us-
ing correctíy the songs and meters ihat have been made— it is what has
got the ñame educación— then it is here that it is difficuit and there is need
o fa good craftsman.” (I8 7 c 8 -d 4 )
“The same argument has come back, that one must gratify the orderly
among human beings and scc how the not yet orderly might become
more orderly, and one must guard the eros o f these— and chis is the beau-
tiful eros, che uranian, the Eros o f the uranian muse. But the eros o f the
pandemian Polyhymnia, that one must cautiously apply co whacever one
applies ic, in order that they may rcap the pleasure o fit, and not inscrt any
licendousness, just as in our art it is a great task to use the dcsires o f the art
o f cookery bcautifuUy, so as to reap the pleasure without discasc. So in
music, in medicine, and in all other things, both the human and the di
vine, one must guard each Eros, co the extenc it is allowcd, for the pair is
in them.” (1 8 7 d 4 -1 8 8 a l)
The art o f cooking must be supervised by the medical art. T h e art o f cook-
ing is an art which supplies pleasure; the art o f medicine does n ot, as wc all
know. H e de ais here with croticism as a subdivisión o f music. H e de votes
only a small part to human love. A very smal1 part o f his speech is devoted
to what was the solé subject o f Pausanias and Phacdrus. The lesson den ved
ffom medicine and music is that noble love is love for harmony, which con-
sists o f opposites. Therefore, it is noble to grant favors to the well-behaved
human beings and to the not yet well-behaved with a view to the ir becom-
103
CHAF T E K $ IX
104
E R Y X I M A C H U S
nature, bccausc there is aíso a base eros. The supremacy o f the noble eros i$
the product o f art, it is n ot by nature. The unnatural character o f pederasty
permits Eryximachus to praise tn one breath pederasty and art. L et me ex-
ptain. At first glance you would say this: Those which are by nature oppo-
sites, the male and the female, tend by nature to lo ve one another. This
unión is according to nature and is healthy. Those which are by nature sim
ilar— males— tend away from one another. Their unión is against nature; it
is sick. T h e art must bring about their separation if it should n ot act against
nature. M edicine, in other words, would be for the cure o f pederasty and
n ot for heterosexual íove which ¡s natural. Buc this ¡s, o f course, unaccept-
able for Eryximachus. The principie o f pederasty can be stated as follows:
Things which are by nature similar tend by nature toward one another.
T h en, o f course, it follows that those which are by nature opposite— males
and females— tend away ffom one another and we need an art in order to
make these opposites— males and females— lovc one another. Males and
females must be brought together by art for the prese rvation o f the human
species. This would mean that the prese rvation o f the human species de-
pends entirely on the art o f medicine, which is a gross exaggeration. B u t, on
the other hand, this art has nothing to do with Eryximachus’s kind ofcroti-
cism. H e must praise both his art and his eroticism and must conceive o f
both as akin to each other. Otherwise he cannot be satisfied. I f the principie
stated— that things opposite tend away from one another and art is needed
ín order to make them love one another— if these principies are to be pre-
served and if his art is to be ¡n harmony with his kind o f eroticism, there
must be some oppositeness which his art alone, o r art alone, can overeóme.
This is the opposition n ot o f male and female but o f virtue and pleasure. He
must seek for harmony between opposites, the artificial harmony between
the opposites o f males and females won’t do. He finds what he seeks in the
opposition o f good behavior and pleasure. B u t then, o f course, it is music
rather than medicine which overcomes this opposition. I f virtue and plea
sure are opposites, then the noble and the pleasant are opposites, and the
pleasant is the base, I t is a tall order that the solution o f the human problem
should consist in establishing a working harmony between the noble and
the base. This much, I think, appears up to this point.
Eryximachus told us o f one sphere in which only one o f the two forms
o f eros exists, what I cali theoretical music and which reminds us somehow
o f mathematics. This is forgotten, o r perhaps n ot forgotten. H e implies
that it does n ot belong co the human things, ñor to the divine things. The
divine things are practically idéntica! fbr him with the natural things. There
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C H A P T E R S1X
was a doctrine which held that mathcmatical things are not natural, and, o f
course, they are not human things, in the sense that in themselves they have
anything to do with human well-being. I want to repcat one point. Origi-
nally he had said that the base eros must be taken away, meaning the lo ve o f
the sick body for things which increase its sickness. Now he says the base
eros must he preser ved but subordinated to an integra ted end, the noble
eros, and that means pleasure. H e wants to praise in one breath pederasty
and his art, What would help? By nature man is heterosexual; his art brings
about homosexuality. But for any sensible Greek to say something is against
nature is a degradación. He cannot praise both. I f he would say pederasty is
according to nature, then his art, in bringjng about the artificial unión o f
male and female, has nothing in com m on with pederasty. A rt and pederasty
are mutually exclusive and this has something to do with the truc nature o f
man as an animal and a thinking being. B u t these two different functions
are m ore o r less in a certain harmony which exeludes this fanciful and ad
verse attempt o f Eryximachus. In the rest o f che speech he deais with the
eros in divine things. H itherto he had spoken o f eros in human things and
made a subdivisión— eros in medicine, eros in music. The erotic doctrine
proper was only a subdivisión o f the doctrine o f eros in music. Now he
ttirns to t h e eros i ti divine things. By th e divine things he means th e natural,
the cosmic things, as we wül see.
One could say Eryximachus has tour subjeets: medicine, which deais
with the visible body; music, which deais with invisible sounds; astronomy,
which deais with the visible bodies far away; and divination, which deais
with the invisible gods. This is an ascent from the most obviously visible
bodies nearby to the least accessible invisible gods. H e implies that as a
physician he deais with visible bodies nearby; his art ¡s the most solid o f all
the arts mentioned. This was seen by Krüger in his book, to which I ha ve
referred on another occasion. B u t one must n ot overlook the other side,
namcly the following proportion: the nearby visible is to the nearby audible
as the far away visible is to the far away audible. The connection between
the first parts is clear. W hat about the audible? Where in the case o f the gods
does the element o f audibility com e ¡n? The gods are known by sounds, by
hearing, by tradition. Hearsay is a basis o f knowledge o f the gods. Yet we
must also see the distinction between the human and the divine. Medicine
and music dea! with human things, astronomy and divination with divine
things. T h e relationship between astronomy and divination wilí n ot prove
to be like the relación between medicine and music. I t is rather like the re
lación o f theoretical medicine and music to practica! medicine and music.
106
E R Y X I M A C H U S
wSincc cvcn thc system o f the scasons o f che year is ful! o f both o f these,
and whenever those things ofwhich I was just speaking— thc hot and coid
things and che dry and liquid— obtain che ordcrly eros in rclation to onc
another, and get a harmony and modérate blcndíng, thcy bring in their
coming a good season for human beings, al) che other animáis, and planes,
and theycommit no injustice; but whenever thc Eros that gocs along with
hubris is more in power in regard to the seasons ofthe year, they do a grcat
deal o f damage and commic injustice. Plagues are wont to arisc from
things o f this sort, and many other varictics o f discase for beasts and
plants. Frosts, for examplc, hailstorms, and rusts come about from the
greediness and disorderliness o f erotic things o f this sort in relación to onc
another, the Science o f which, conce rning the movemenes o f the stars and
seasons o f theyears, is called astronomy.” (1 8 8 a l-b 6 )
107
CHAP T B R SJX
have been preserved. There is a funny thing: Empedoclcs add ressed that
poem to a young man whose ñame was Pausanias, ju$t as Eryximachus, in a
way, addresses his speech to Pausanias. L et us see what these funny things
mean: Empedocles said there are four eícm ents and everything that hap-
pens is either unión o r disunion, either iovc or destruction. But this has a
subdety: war is only another form o f Iovc, namely the love o f the similars. I f
the different elemcncs com e togethcr, the cosmos disintegrates. The love o f
similars leads to chaos; the love ofopposltes leads to the cosmos. The joke
consists in linking this up with the issue o f pederasty and heterosexuality.
From Empedocles’ point o f view, both forms o f eros are effective in the
whole and are, as such, divine. The fact that the one is harmful to men and
beasts, leading to chaos, and the other helpful to men and beasts, the love
o f opposites, was o f no ultímate concern to Empedocles as a thcorctician.
Both are equally necessary, equally divine; there must be disintegration and
there must be integración. The spirit in which Empedocles said it is illus-
tratcd by the fbllowing remark o f an earlier philosopher, Heraclitus: “For
the god everything is noble, good, and just. But men have made the sup-
position that some things are unjust and others are just.” From a divine
point o f víew the destruction o f the cosmos is as noble, just, and good as its
contrary, but men from their narrow perspcctivc say the one is noble and
the other base.
In other words, this Em pedodean doctrine is a purely theorerical doc
trine. It looks at the whole with perfect dctachment from human needs; it
is not sufficient for practical purposes. Eryximachus tries to link this up: he
must cali one o f these noble love and the other base. Homosexuals or het-
erosexuals are consistent if they love the opposites, namely, when they say
yes to the conditions o f human life, the cosmos. They are inconsistent if
they love similars, be cause in chis way they contri bute to the restoration o f
chaos, and thcrcwith the destruction ofreason and art itself. Reason and art
can only be if the opposites are united. Eryximachus takes the well-known
physiological, scientific doctrine and puts it to use ín his understanding o f
eros. And don’t believe that this Em pedodean doctrine, in making use o f
the four elements and discord and love, is scientifically inferior to more re-
cent suggestions. We cannot accept it in these terms; it leaves many ques-
tions open. The correction which comes out in Eryximachus’s doctrine is
this: What is according to nature is love o f the opposite, which alone makes
possi ble the cosmos; love o f pederasty means saying yes to the chaos, the
destruction o f nature. Eryximachus, however, is n ot aware o f this. N ow let
us condude his speech.
108
E R Y X I M A C H U S
KA11 che sacrifices, more over, and those chings over which the art oí'div-
ination presides— these are thc community o f gods and human beings
with one another— are concemed with nothing else than the guarding
and cure o f Eros. For cvery impiccy is wonc to arísc if someone docs not
gratify the orderly Eros and honor and dignify him in cvcry deed, both in
regard to parents living and dead and in regard to gods. In these matters it
has been assigned to the art o f divination to examine the loves and cure
them, and divination is in turn thc craftsman o f friendship o f gods and hu
man beings, by its scientific knowledge o f the erotic chings o f human be
ings, as manyas pertain to sacred right and piccy.” (1 8 8 b 6 -d 3 )
Astronomy, as we have seen, cannot aftect these divine laws— namely, these
opposite elements— cannot predict them , but divination can. Why? Be-
cause if you assume that behind the things going on in he aven there are
gods, and the gods can be influenced n ot by astronomy but by divination in
the widest sense, including sacrifices, etc., it becomes possi ble to estabüsh
love between gods and men. Astronomy culminates in divination, just as
medicine culminated in musíc. The latter is easy to understand, for no mat-
ter what a physician may tell you, if your conduct is n ot températe, the pre
scripción s o f the physician are o f no use. Similarly, astronomy is incomplete
if it is n ot completed by divination, by the art which allows you to control
these potcntially hostiic torces. Divination produces eros between m en and
gods. We can say divination ¡s a kind o f cosmic medicine, a human art es-
tablishing a cosmic order tavorable to men and beasts by cstablishing fricnd-
ship between gods and men.
I t seems there is either war between gods and men o r love. But this is
n ot strictly true on the basis o f the Empedoclean doctrine, where we have
seen war as a fbrm o f love. Even if we take the final formulation o f Eryxi-
machus we have to say there is always love between gods and m en, either
orderly or disorderly. The art o f divination brings about orderly love be-
cween gods and men. I f either o f thc cwo partners loves the other dis-
solutely, impiety follows on the parts o f gods o r men. The two must learn to
follow the noble eros, which ís done by influencing the gods through sacri*
fices. You improve the gods by appeasing them.
O ne more word about the central thesis o f Eryximachus: aii love is mu
tual, therefbre love between gods and men must be mutual. The only ques-
tion is whether it is sober or dissolute. Think o f the love stories about Zeus
and humans. An art is necessary to sober up the gods; this is part o f the art
o f divination. While Eryximachus surcly means this with tongue in cheek,
he does n ot quite see the trony beyond the irony, namely, why he is com-
109
C H A P T E R SI X
110
E R Y X I M A C H U S
111
CH A PTBR SIX
the Greck word tcchne because there is no strict equivalen t in modern lan-
guage. Art today exeludes the shoemaker and the carpentcr, whereas in
Greek they would be cxamples o f an art. Tcchne has much to do with what
¡s called today science, namely, a subphilosophic pursuit o f high exaetness.
T h e connection between pederasty and the other matters is this; Ped-
erasty is un natural love. The expectation from art increases as the expec-
tations from nature decrease and bccom e insufficient. Ify o u prefer the un*
natural, consciously or unconsciously, you demand thereby an art that
supports this unnacural thing.
Love is universal; it is mutual. B oth pareners are inspired by the same
motive. This is different in Phaedrus and Pausanias, where the motive o f
the lover and the beloved were clearly distinct. Love is universal; everything
that is loves. Attraction and repulsión are only different forms o f love, love
o f the similar or love o f the opposite as the case may be. Now, if you look
at this scheme— love o f the same, chaos, pederasty; love o f the opposite,
cosmos, heterosexuality— what is the function o f art here? I f love o f the
similar is against nature, as we here presuppose, then heterosexual love is
according to nature. The medical art, then, has the function to cure ped
erasty. O n the other hand, love o f similars is according to nature. Nature
abhors love o f opposite s. Then art alone can bring about procreation. I f all
men were by nature homosexual, there would still be a need for the procre
ation o f the human race. Art alone can bring about procreation. Eryxi-
machus’s attempt to establish a harmony between his art and his eroticism
failed. Therefbre he turns to an alternad ve, He says the proble m o f art is to
bring together opposltes which by nature abhor one another. T o rcconcile
this with pederasty is his problem. H e does this in the foliowing wayr the
oppositcs which have to be rcconciled are noc the two sexes but virtuc and
pie asure. T h e highest art, the musical art, brings about this harmony o f
virtue and pleasure and thus makes pederasty possible as a noble love. But
in this understanding, virtue and pleasure are conccived as opposites. That
means, o f course, that pleasure is base, n ot jusc morally neutral. N ot the ex
tirpación o f the base, o f the ugly, which he originally demanded, but its rec-
onciliation with the noble o r beautiful is the task o f the highest human art.
Yet, as he indicatcd in his criticism o f Hcraclitus, does the base n ot cease to
be base when the harmony between pleasure and virtue is achievcd? What
becomes, then, o f the distinction between noble and base eros? Is the base
eros more than an inchoate eros, i.e., n ot truly eros? Thus, he prepares the
way for Aristophanes’ tacit rejection o f the distinedon between a noble and
a base eros striedy speaking.
112
E R Y X I M A C H U S
Eryximachus’s the me is mutual lo ve, and chis is connected with his si-
lence on hierarchy. H e does not have the possi bility o f distinguishing ranks
o f eros corresponding to ranks o f human beings. You may rcm em ber that
Phaedrus alluded to this hierarchy by speaking o f those who are by narure
best; but in his understanding these people had as such nothing to do with
eros. Pausanias had dropped that. His distinction between noble and base
eros had nothing to do with the natural distinction. The silence here on hi
erarchy and, the refere, the stress on simple mutuality Icad to the conclusión
that the love o f similars is n ot superior to the love o f opposites. There is no
distinction; both are equal, which means, o f course, that chaos and cosmos
are equal. This we understand immcdiately today, because ffom our Science
we learn that the State in which it was six billion years ago is just a different
State o f the world; there is no objective superiority o f one State to the othcr.
We humans prefer the latter, but this is only a subjective and external dis
tinction, not one inherent in the subject matter. We can put it this way per-
haps: the highest praise o f eros in the whole work occurs here. Eros rules
cverything. Evcrything loves. Therefore the distinction between lover and
beloved ultímately makes no sense. AJI love is mutual. There is nothing
which rules by nature. The complete silence in Eryximachus’s speech about
maje and female— for Plato and Aristode the most simple example for the
natural difference between ruiing and ruled— indicates this. N o natural hi
erarchy. Therefore art rules, because we must makc distinctions between
the better and the worse. I f it is n ot in nature it must be brought in by man,
inteliigendy and reasonably— it must be done by art. Pan-eroticism implies
the rule o f art. This I wanted to say in conclusión to our discussion o f Eryx
imachus’s spcech last time, and before we turn to the seque 11 would like to
see whether you have any difficulties which we may o r may n ot be able to
solve.
U sten er: In 18 6 b he says that the healthy State and the sick State o f the
body are dissimilar. Directiy after that he says dissi milars love dissimilars.
Would that imply that the healthy State loves the sick State and vice versa?
M r Strauss: I discussed this last time. This is an inicial statement. which
he retracts later on. I will try to re trace it. He starts from the distinction be-
rween two ero tes— the noble and the base. As a physician he identifies the
one with the healthy, and the base with the sick. Then he says the healthy
body loves healthy things, the sick body loves sick things. T h en , since there
is this fundamental distinction, he says dissimilar things love dissimilar
things. W hat does the body love? Repletion and evacuation. T h e healthy
body loves the right kind o f food and the sick body the wrong kind o f food.
113
C H A P T E R S I X
T h en, for some reason, which is n ot given, he docs n ot like that. The rea-
son, I believe, is that the food does n ot lovc the body. I f you thínk o f a little
lamb, potencial food, it does not like to be eaten. In the case o f rcpletion
and evacuation, it is a nonmutual love and he ¡s driving toward a concep
ción o f lovc which would be mutual. H e is n ot satisfied and so he turns to
the lovc o f opposites, which has to be brought about by art. You see, not
every statement is o f equal weight and that applies to us too. In the begin-
ning o f an argument we might make a statement which \vc would n ot re -
peat a half hour later, be cause in the mean time it might have been proved
insufficient. Still, it is important as a stage in the dcvelopment o f the argu-
ment.
[In answcr to a quesdon:] The fundamental difficulty was taken carc o f
by Empedocles. He called it also a State o f love, but the love o f similars. H e
also called it strife. What is behind this notion: love o f similars leading to the
collection o f similars and love o f dissimilars which leads to the emergencc o f
composite beings— plants, brutes, men? What is the difference between
thcm? T o which I think, Empedocles’ answer ¡s that from the point o f view
o f god they are equally good; but we humans— and the same would apply
to brutes and plants if they could speak— we say this is cosmos and that is
chaos. Once you accept that, you have the jusdficadon for medicine, that
which enables the body to grow and fulfill its function properly. This is o f
course the standard for medicine. It is the funedon o f art to bring opposites
together, and even on the highest Icvcl— even in astronomy, which dcals
with the visible bodies tar away— there exists, Eryximachus says, a noble
cros and a base cros. T h e noble eros leads to health, the scasons, e tc.; the
base eros leads to plagues and similar phenomena. In the case o f the conflict
between the two erotes in the visible bodies nearby, medicine can be efifec-
tive; there medicine is ineffectual.
But we can’t leave it at that: we have to find an art which Controls the
heavenly bodies, and that is the art o f divinadon. Hís whole speech ends
with his praise o f the art o f divinadon. Through the art o f divinadon the
noble eros o f these things holds the balance. Why? Because the gods do
that. B u t who moves che gods? The human arrisan— the problem o fth e £ « -
thyphro. W hat we find in the cosmos, according to Eryximachus, is the fight
between the two erotes, the noble and the base, the cosmic and the chaotic.
H e asserts an ultímate rule o f cechne, n ot o f medicine. The grand bodies
with which astronomy deals are indirectly controlled, vía the gods, by the
mande art. All arts are concerned with the human good, subordinately or
architectonically. From the theoredeal point o f view, from the point o f view
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KR VX I M A C H ü S
o f god, the human good i$ o f no interese. But from man’s point o f view it is
predominan!. Therc is a necessary connection bctween pan-croticism and
thc rule o f tcchne. I f pan-croticism means that everything that is loves and
there are n o beings which are lovcd o r beloved, then therc is no hierarchy,
and che disdnetion betwccn good and bad must com e from a subjecdvc
point o f view. The elassie statement, in the Fragments o f Heraclitus, 102:
“F or god everything is just, noble, and good; but men have made the sup-
position that somc things are just, others n o t.* That is exaedy what Sóc
rates, Plato, and Aristode deny. They assert that the distinction between
good and bad, noble and base, just and unjust, are n ot merely human, al-
though m ost o f the use wc make o f these distinedons is merely human.
I have to add a few points regarding the Eryximachus speech which I ei-
ther forgot o r which were brought to my attendon. First, Plato tries to
show in Eryximachus the typical physician, just as in Theodorus in the T h ea-
etetu s he shows the typical mathemaucian. There is a certain pedanticism
about Eryximachus but also a ccrtain lewdness, i f I may use this strong
word. In a certain contemporary medical treatm ent o fe ros I always was re-
minded o f a statement o f Burkc regarding certain doctrines o f the eigh-
teenth century: he uses the expression wan unfashioned, indelicate, sour,
gloomy, ferocious medley o f pedanticism and lewdness. * I think this has
some contemporary application.
T h e next point: I mentioned that the background o f Eryximachus’s
speech is the philosophy o f Empedocles, who addressed his philosophic
poem to someone called Pausanias. Eryximachus addresses his speech to
this Pausanias. Empedocles is the natural target here behind Eryximachus
because Empedocles’ philosophy is truly a pan-erodc philosophy. Love, ei-
ther for the similar o r for the opposite, rules everything. Therc is anocher
strange thing about Empedocles. I read to you Fragment 111 in Kathleen
Freeman’s transladon: “You shall learn al1 the drugs that exist as a defense
against illness and oíd age. For you alone will I accomplish all this. You shall
check the forcé o f the unvarying winds which rush upon the earth with
their blasts and lay waste the cultivated fields. And again, if you wish, you
shall conduct the breezes back again. You shall créate a seasonable dryness
atter the dark rain for mankind, and again you shall créate after summer
drought the water that nourishes the trees and which will flow in the sky.
And you shall bring out o f Hades a dead man restored to strength.” In
other words, Empedocles also teaches a universal power o f tcchne, o f art.
As far as my recoUection goes this is the only docum cnt in a philosophic text
prior to Plato wherc the notion o f Science for the sakc o f power, the famous
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C H A P T fe R S I X
116
B R V X I M A C H Ü S
you must see thc connection between thc doctrines and the human types o f
the speakers, n ot understood as mere individuáis. This implies also that
therc must be a completeness in the selection o f types presented. I f the ty-
pology is n ot com plete, which might be the case, then one cannot simply
say Plato forgot about that; one must raise the question W hy did Plato om it
that type? Perhaps because he did n ot wish to present it, either because it is
uninteresting, irrelevant, or for some other re ason.
L et us consider the question o f completeness. As I indicated by my
schema we have here eros subject to something extraneous or sovereign
eros. T h e first is subdivided into three— eros subject to gain, eros subject to
moral virtue o r law, and eros subject to art. We have to raise the question Is
this a complete description? Is the re an al tem ad ve to gain, virtue, tcchne,
something to which eros could be thought to be subject, and for which we
have to find a speech? I be lleve that on rcflection we find that it is complete.
Have we n ot at this point, at any rate, laid bare the principie governing the
whole work? The dass agreed with me by silence— the re is no alternadve.
B u t, later o n , a friend o f mine who does n ot wish to be mentioned said,
“W hy n ot procrearon?” In a way, this is indeed truc. Procreation, we can
say, comes in as the theme in the next three speeches in different ways. But
I must add one point: gain, virtue, techne are striedy extraneous to eros;
procreation is not. Therefbre, your silence and my assertion wcre justified.
This creates a prejudice in favor o f the view that we will find at the end o f
the dialogue a complete discussion o f eros. But once this is setded, and I do
n ot claim that this remark o f mine settles it, we have to raise this question:
Is there a proper correiation between the se types— gain, moral virtue, and
art— and the human beings who present them? For instance, moral virtue:
Could we n ot say that the best representad ve o f the moral supervisión o f
eros would have been a stern moralist, say, a puritan? In other words, by not
taking a stern moralist, did not Plato tbrget something important? Should
n ot the moralist be the speaker about the conflict between eros and moral -
ity? It is absolutely necessary to consider the altcrnatives for oneself in order
to understand what Plato is doing. Plato made a decisión— this book. The
grounds o f the decisión he did n ot teü us, wc have to find out ourselves. To
understand a Platonic dialogue is not mercly to take cognizance o f the de
cisión, but to understand the grounds o f the decisión. W hy did Plato not
present a severe puritan to present the moral point o f view?
U sten cr: It is possible that the severe puritan escapes the realm o f love.
Mr. Strauss: I am not speaking o f Calvin o f course, but there have been
other puritans who have been bothered by eros. That is n ot an impossibil-
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C H A P T B K S I X
ity; Calvin may have been unaware o f the problem, but n ot evcry puntan
was. What ís thc truc reason? He supprcsscs thc problem. The supremacy o f
moralicy is so certain and evident that a conflict cannot rcally arise. The pu
ntan would have been unable to praise eros, and that is an clementary con-
dition for every speech here. StUl, one could say it is a bit narrow o f Plato
n ot to give us this spectaclc o f puntan versus eros. T o which the answer is
cxtrcmely simple; he did that in the R epu bltc. O ne could say he wrote a
whole book to show us this conflict. T h e R ep u bltc begins with thc story
where a poct— and what a poet, Sophocles— complains in thc strongest
terms about eros as a terrible tyrant which he has fom m ately escaped now,
being an oíd man. I f this is n ot a rejection o f eros cven by a poet, I don’t
know what it is. Plato did not forget that problem, but it was n ot proper in
the Sym posium . But why Pausanias? There are perhaps alternad ves. I t is not
only necessary that the man know the problem from his own expcrience; he
must also have a special concern. In other words, it is necessary to raise in
cach case this question: Does n ot the speaker have a selfish interest in his
doctrine? D oes he n ot speak pro domo? And I think we would have to make
a distinction ac thc end berween those speakers who do n ot simply speak
pro domo and those who do. Pausanias surcly does: an oldish lover who has
not sufficicnt crotic rccommcndation and whose best rccommcndation is
his respectability. H e is naturally, in this context, the best speaker about this
aspect o f eros. I do noc say that this sufficcs— very far from it. I only wanted
to say that it is necessary, and a full understanding o f any work o f this kind
would requere a full demonstration.
T o turn to Eryximachus. He represents the point o f view o f art in regard
to eros. H e is a physician. That is n ot difficult to understand. W ho are the
spccialists regarding eros today? T h e psychoanalysts, they are physicians.
Medicine is the art concerncd with eros and its conscqucnces— think o fo b -
stetrics and gynccology, which are surely medical disciplines. B u t, it is o f
coursc also true, medicine deais with sick bodies, not as gymnastics with
healthy bodies. The whole problem o f sickness and health is thc the me o f
medicine; therefore the distinction bctween sick and healthy eros foUows,
from the medical point o f view, the two crotes, just as it had for Pausanias,
from his moral point o f view.
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7 ARISTOPHANES
119
C H A P T E R S E V F N
“It [the hiccup] did indeed stop; not, however, before the sneezc was ap-
plicd to it, so 1 am wondering whecher the orderlincss o f the body desires
these kinds o f noises and ticklings, such as the sneczc is, for it stopped at
once when I applied the sneeze to it.” (189a 1 - 6 )
The word orderly is a derivative from the word cosmos. What do we learn
from it? T h e orderly, the decent, the well-behaved needs, apparendy, the
ugly— sncezing and such things— in the case o f the body. Perhaps it is also
true in the case o f the soul. I f this is true, then the praise o f eros would re-
quire the praise o f the base or ugly. We see also that Aristophanes’ hiccup
was quite severe.
And Eryximachus said, “My good Aristophanes, see what you are doing.
Being about to speak you make a joke, and you compel me to be a
guardián ofyour own speech, if you say anything laughable, though it was
possiblc for you to speak in peace.” (1 8 9 a 7 -b 2 )
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A R I 5 T O P H A S B S
“You think you can hit and run, Aristophanes,” he said. aBut pay atten-
tion and speak on the condi don that you will give an account [logos]. Per-
haps, however, if I decide to, 1TI let you go.” ( 1 8 9 b 8 - c l)
Eryximachus says, you think you can g ct away with jokes; but be respon-
sible to m e, complete my logos, and d o n ot make jokes. N ot Dionysus will
be the judge, but medicine. The radical difference between Eryximachus’s
and Aristophanes’ speeches comes out in this short exchange, and yet they
are exchangeable as I said. T h e com ic poet, and only the comic poet, can
bring out the fuíl truth o f this o r any other physiology.
L tsten er: Is there any reference here to laughter as a funny noise itsclf?
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C H A P T E S S E V E N
You see herc that he refers only to Eryximachus and Pausanias. Only thelr
speeches are relevant to his subject. W hat does he say> M en act as if they
had never experienced the power o f eros, for otherwise they would worship
him more than any other god. They do n ot worship him propcrly now.
What Aristophanes suggests is what wc would cali now a religious revolu-
tion, n ot merely the mild change o f the law suggestcd by Pausanias. Aris
tophanes introduces in a way new divinities. In a way he com m its the crime
o f which Sócrates was accused. Eros deserves the greatest worship be cause
he is the most philanthropic o f all gods. N ot becausc he is the oldest, the
most powerful, or the most just god. Phaedrus had praised eros as most
useful to the beloved— to him. Aristophanes says eros is m ost useful to
mankind, a much broader conslderation. We have, o f course, to raise the
question ofw hat will be the rightful status o f the worship o f the other gods
after Eros will have come into his own. M ust there n ot be a certain derü*
gration o f the others?
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A R I S T O P H A N E S
Eros is the physician, n ot the medical art. Eros, including pederasty, as will
appear from the sequel, is n ot a sickness but a cure. The cure brings about
the greatest happiness. T h e sickness is unhappiness. In other words, eros
cures n ot only this o r that deficiency, it cures the essen dais o f human life, as
will appear later. N o such praise o f eros has appeared hitherto.
“I shall try to explain to you his powet\ and you will be the tcachcrs o f
everyone else.” (1 8 9 d 3 -4 )
wOur nature long ago was not that which it is now, but o f a difíerent sort.
First, there wcre three genera o f human beings, not just as now, male and
female, but there was a third besides, common to boch o f them, the ñame
for which remains but ic icself has disappeared. There was one then that
was androgynous, common in looks (eidos) and ñame from both, male
and fe male, but now it is noc, except for the ñame, which occurs as a re-
proach.* (1 8 9 d 6 -e 5 )
Aristophanes begins with the extínct sex o f man. Naturally, because it is the
most striking; also, now, the most in disrepute. That there were such men
was taught by Empedocles, the originator o f this scheme, who was Eryxi-
machus’s authority. Whereas today there is merely a shadow, a ñame, origi-
nally there was the thing itself and a rcspectable ñame. Now this has a
general application. W hat if acccpted opinión is not authoritative for Aris
tophanes, but the respected, the accepted, is an important form o f the no
ble o r fair. Aristophanes makes it clear from the beginning: precise ly the
disreputable will be brought out by him, the com ic poet living in the ele-
ment o f the despicable and base.
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C H A P T E R S fe V K N
“Sccond, the looks ofcach human being was as a whole round, with back
and sides in a arde, and he had four arms and hands, legs and fect cqual to
the arms and hands, and cwo faces on a circular ncck, similar in all respeets.
Thcrc was single hcad for the two faces lying opposite, and four ears,
two genitals, and everything else as one mighc conjecture from these.”
(189e5-190a4)
Every being was a whole. This means it was round. All parts o f the body
were doubled, except the head and the neck. A fantastic being, very ugly,
but we must see what he does with ¡t.
Now these round beings were also capable o f fast circular motion. They
could ha ve rolled even without stretching their legs, as indicated here in
190a6. Why this is so we shall see in thc sequcl.
“The re ason why thc genera were thrcc and o f this kind was this: thc male
was at the start the offspring o f the sun, the female o f the earth, and that
which partakes o f both o f the moon, becausc che moon too parcook of
both. They were spherical, both they thcmsclvcs and their movement, on
accounc o f their being similar to their parents." (190a8-b5)
Now we know why man was originally a circular thing, moving in circular
motion. He gives che re ason explicidy. We see, then, that Aristophancs
transce nds already here thc merely human and enters into the sphere o f
cosmology. The very word stroggulos, which he uses in 189 c 6 , occurs, for
example, in Plato’s P h a cd o( 9 7 e l ), where the question is discussed whether
the earth is flat or round. Sun, m oon, and earth are gods. T o quote from an
Aristophanean comedy, P eacc 4 0 6 - 1 1 , the sun and the m oon are the gods
to whom the barbarians sacrificc, where as the Grccks sacrifice only to thc
Olympian gods. In Herodotus, book 1.131, the Persians worship sun,
m oon, earth, firc, water, etc., and they do not believe like the Greeks that
the gods have human shapes. Aristophanes here refers us to a barbarie no-
don. Originally men had the shape o f the cosmic gods, because they were
the deseendants o f thc cosmic gods. In that shape, as will becom e clcar in
the sequel, they did not yet have eros, because the androgynous did not
have eros. Each kind o f man had the single shape o f sun, m oon, o r earth.
But where do the gods o f human shape com e in? They are decisive for the
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A R |S T O P H A N R S
“They were awesome in their strength and vigor and had greac and proud
thoughts, and they made an attcmpt on the gods. And what Homcr says
about Ephialtes and Otus, that they tried to mount up to the sky, is said
about them, with their intent to assault the gods. Then Zeus and the other
gods were deliberadng as to whac they should do and were perplexed.
They did not know how they could kili them and, as they had blasted the
giants with lightning, wipe out the race— the honors and the sacrifices
they had from human beings would be wiped out— any more than they
could allow them to wax wancon .” (19 0b5 - có )
125
C H A P T E R S E V E N
what they want. You scc Zeus thinking and finally he got a bright idea.
Thcn he says, “I seem to myself.” Does anything strikc you? Wcll, that’s the
very beginning o f the dialogue. The Symposiutn begins with the same two
words. I regard it as possible that Plato dirccts our attention in advancc to
this speech o f Zeus and that Aristophanes* spccch is the central speech o f
the whole work. Zeus is introduced as a speaker by Protagoras in Plato’s di
alogue F rotad oras and by Sócrates in the G orgias. In the dialogue C rin a s,
where Cridas is the ch ief speaker, the dialogue ends, “thcn Zeus said”— but
the speech doesn’t come. According to the accepted opinions the C rin a s
has not been completed. I believe that Plato did not want Cridas to make
such a speech. Aristophanes at any rate gives he re a speech by Zeus.
“Thcn Zeus with difficulty conce ived o f a plan and says, ‘I secm to mysdf,’
he said, ‘to have a devíce, how human beings may [still] be and by becom-
ing weaker stop their licenciousness. I shall now cut each ofthcm in two,
and they will simultancously be weaker and more use ful to us on account
o f their having become more in number. And they will walk upright on
two legs. And if they are still thoughc to wax wancon and are not willing to
remain quiet, then I shall,’ he said, ‘cuc chem again in two, so they will go
around hopping on one leg.’” ( 1 9 0 c6 -d 6 )
126
A R I S T O P H A N E S
127
CHAI* f R R S EV E N
128
A R l S T O t K A N E S
is the conncction between thcse dialogues, and it shows the crucial impor*
tance o f the theological problem for Plato.
“With this remark he proceeded to cut human bcings in two, just as chose
who cut sorb-apples whcn they are going to pickle them, or just as those
who cuteggs with hairs.” (I9 0 d 7 -e 2 )
This, ofcou rse, recalls Aristophanic examples in his comedies. You see also
the contrast betwcen the gods in their solemnity and thesc very humdrum
things.
“And whomcvcr he cut, he told Apollo to turn the face and half o f the
neck around toward che cuc, ¿n order Chat che human being might, on see-
ing his slicing, become more orderly, and he ordered him to cure thc rest.
And he turned the face around, and drawing together the skin at what is
now callcd thc bclly, by making a single mouth, just as in string bags, he
bound it up at the middle o f the belly. Ic is what wc caU che navel. And he
smoothed out all the other many wrinkles and straightened out thc chcst,
with the sorc o f too! shoemakers use in smoothing out che wrinkles
around the last; but he left a fcw around thc nave) itsclf and thc bclly, to be
a rem inderofthe ancicntcxpchenee.” (1 9 0 c2 -1 9 1 a 5 )
Natural men are transformed by the art o f the gods so as to becom e orderly.
Apollo is a kind o f physician but also a shoemaker. You see thc example o f
domesdeated apples, ifw e can use the expression, and domesticated eggs.
They are no longcr capa ble o f bearing fruir. Man’s civilización is a kind o f
castration. Apollo, as you may have observed, did n ot turn around the neck
as Zeus had told him. Did Zeus, in Apollo’s opinión, lack anatómica!
knowledge? There is a strange parallel to this story ín Plato’s dialogue P ro-
tagora$> which I would like to read to you:
As often as men banded together they did wrong to one anochcr, through
the lack o f civic are, and so they began co be scattered again and to perish.
Zeus, then, fearing chat our race was in danger o f ucter destruction sent
Hermes to bring shamc and right among men, to che end that there
should be regulation o f cides and friendty des to draw them together.
(3 2 2 b 6 -c 3 )
Thcn Hermes askcd Zeus in what manner was he to give men right and
sense o f shame. “Am I to deal them out as thc arts have becn dealt? The
dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing the medical art is
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C H A P T E R . S E V K N
ablc to treac many ordinary mcn, and so with thc other crafts. Am I to
place among men right and respect in this way also or deal them out to
all?” “T o all,” rcplicd Zeus. (3 2 2 c 3 -d 2)
Now the implicación is chat Hermes has to tell Zeus how the arts are <li-
vided. I raise this question, though I am by no means sure that I am right,
but it’s the bese I can do. Zeus cut them to pieces; then Apollo sewed up
the side on which they were cut. We see the re was much skin. There were
wrinkles and he had to use a shoemaker’s instrument to sm ooth them out.
W here did Apollo get the additional skin required so that there were even
additional wrinkles which had to be smoothed out? H e acts as if the skin o f
the whole man were now available for the half man, which o f course was a
mistake. Did he in cach case discard one half; leaving it skinless and letting
it perish? Did Apollo, in other words, behave like that Epimetheus o f whom
Protagoras speaks in the same story? I can read you that p a r t:44Epimetheus
being not so wise as he might be heedlessly squandered his stock o f proper-
ties on the brutes. H e still had left unequipped the race o f man and was at a
ioss what to do with it” (3 2 1 b ó -c 3 ). Man was left nakcd and only the theft
o f firc from Hephaestus on the part o f Prometheus could save the human
race. Are we n ot confronted here with a similar situation by the blundering
activity o f a god? In that situation a savior, Prometheus, was needed; there
is no reference to such a savior here. Why? Because the place o f Prometheus
as a founder o f civilization is in Aristophanes’ speech taken by eros. Aris-
tophanes gives no account o f the origin o f the arts in his speech. H e disre-
gards art altogcther. However this may be, the sequel surely shows that the
gods lacked foresight. This cutting and sewing together did n ot solve the
problcm at all. Apollo left man a sign to remember thc original act, but this
was also superfluous, as we shall see immediately.
“When the nature was cut in two, cach half in longing for his own carne
together, and throwing cheir arms around one anochcr and intertwining,
in their desire to grow together, were being killcd offb y hunger and the
resc o f their idleness on account o f their unwillingness to do anything
apart from one another. And whenever onc o f thc halves died, and one
was left, the one that was left went scarching for another and intertwined
itself with either half o f a whole woman ic encountered— it is what we cali
woman— or o f a man, and so they kepton perishing.” (1 9 1 a 5 -b 5 )
You see the problem is not yet solved for the gods. The nature was cut in
two, man’s nature was ímpaired, namcly, by nomos. I t is for this reason that
the universal expression “the nature,” not merely human nature, is used. It
130
A R I S T O P H A N E $
is not uninteresting that “to cut” also means to cástrate. O ut o f this sitúa-
don eros aróse. Eros is surely n ot the oldest god. You see Phaedrus’s thesis,
which was hitherto uncontested, is Kerc ímpiieidy conte sted. Agathon will
question it explicidy. Eros is in no way connectcd with the Olympian gods
and, therefore, in particular n ot with Aphrodite. Aristophancs makes true
what Pausanias had only implied. As Profcssor von Blanckenhagen pointed
out to us, eros is possi ble without Aphrodite. As desire for the restitution o f
the cosmic, globular shape, eros belongs to the cosmic gods. Eros, we can
say already now, is a moveraent o f nature, o f impaired nature, against law.
T h e direction o f eros is inverse to the direction o f the action o f the
Olympian gods. T o overstate it in order to makc it perfectly clear, eros is
radically impious. 1 think this is n ot a wholly unintelligible thought, though
it may n ot be theologically wholly correct. I f you look at all innate actions
o f which man is capable, all his acdons can in their performance be directed
to the glory o f god. The only acdon o f which this is n ot possi ble in the per
formance is the sexual act. There was always a tensión between the biblical
religión and eros. Think only o f the second chaptcr o f Génesis, where the
disobedience o f Adam has some connection with the loss o f sexual inno-
cence.
You see at the end o f the passage that we read, Aristophanes om its an-
drogyncs from the enumeration because there are no longer androgynes.
Now there are only males and fcmales. In the immediate sequel he says that
Zeus becamc pitiful, merciful. O n the basis o f what we have heard before,
this ¡s a euphemism. Zeus’s pity for man is prompted by his self-interest, as
we have seen before.
wIn pity Zeus provides another dcvice: he changes the place o f their geni-
tais to the front— for up to this time ehey also had them on the oucside,
and chey used to generate and give birth not into one another butinto the
earth, just as cicadas do— so he changcs them to the front and through
this made gencration in one another, through the mate in the female, for
these reasons: if a man should encounter a woman, they might generate in
the embrace and the race continué, and ifa male should encounter a maJe,
repletion o f intercourse [being togetherj ac any race might occur in the
embrace, and they might stop and turn to deeds and takc carc o fth e rese
o f their life [liveühood].* ( 1 9 lb 5 - c 8 )
Now Zeus does the whole thing. He was dissatisfied with Apollo's blunder.
Original man already possessed sexual organs and used them. In this re*
spect, and in this rcspect only, they were originally similar to the Olympian
gods as distinguished from the cosmic gods, sun, m oon, and earth. What
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C H A P T f, R S E V B N
docs this mean? This is, o f course, a very malicious suggestion. According
to Aristop Kanes, the specific differencc o f men is sexuality as distinguished
from radonalíty. This needs a long com m ent because the brutes are also ca*
pable o f sexuality. The point on which men agree in origin with the Olym
pian gods was n ot their ereetness but sexuality. This connects man with the
Olympian gods and separates him from the cosmic gods. Perhaps this fact
was the reason why men were from the outset subject to the Olympian
gods. Their dissoluteness in the use o f their sexual organs catled fbr subjec-
tion, if only to beings which were themselves n ot immune to dissoluteness.
But this sexuality has as little to do with eros proper as any dissoluteness o f
the gods. That’s the crucial thesis— sexuality is n ot eros. B u t how did orig
inal men use their sexual organs? They begot into the earth, namely the
males, and they gave birth into the earth, namely the females. I can under-
stand this only in this form; the males fertilized eggs left by the females ¡n
the earth. Originally ai! men carne from the earth, like the oíd Athenians,
and it was claimed for the Athenians alone. T h e changc which Zeus ef-
fected was to change man into his own image as regards sexual relations
to o , but with this difference, what is mere pleasure in the case o f the
Olympian gods is for men a dire necessity. The survival o f the human race
and its sadsfaction, so that men are frcc to work, depend on the change ef-
fected by Zeus. These two things, the survival o f the human race and the
sadsfaction o f the individual, uldmately serve one function: man can serve
the Olympian gods. Therefore, Aristophanes’ speech is bound to end with
a praisc o f piety.
In the case o f the meeting o f male and female you see procrcation, not
sadsfaction. In the case o f the meeting o f male and male— satisfacción, but
n ot procrcation. H e is silent here about the meeting o f female and female,
a subject which he wili take up later. You see the pcdcrastic element in
Aristophanes’ speech, which will com e out more fully, and which is a
particularly malicious suggestion because pederasts are presented in the
Aristophanean plays, at least in the first lines, as something ridiculous.
Through the Olympian gods men acquired orderliness. Eryximachus had
said that both orderliness and its opposites are o f cosmic origin. Loves o f
similars— chaos; love o f opposites— cosmos. B oth are cosmic forces. For
Aristophanes orderliness does not stem from the cosmic gods. This, we can
say, is his cosmology. This is important in connection with Aristophanes’
tacit de nial o f the significance o f mind, o r nous, and therefore his silence
about the arts as well.
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A M S T O P H A N E S
I havc to procced stcp by step, leaving loose cnds while I go. At the cnd
o f the discussion I shall try to pulí it together. Through the Olympian gods
men acquired ordcrliness, erect stature, and the possibLUty o f embrace.
Originally, sexual rclations were reí ate d to the earth. Erect stature and the
possibility o f embrace línk men to the Olympian gods. In the case o f the
Olympian gods there is no con ñeco on between orderliness, on the onc
hand, and an erect stature and em brace, on the other. B u t in the case o f
man there is. Why? M en and the Olympian gods, we may say, and I use a
crude expression which in the case o f Aristophanes 1 don’t think is com
plete ly improper, are the only sexy beings. H ere we answer the question re-
garding the brutes. In the case o f the brutes, the sex life is limited by nature
to the seasons. This is surely not true o f man and surely n ot o f the
Olympian gods. I f we may cali this for convenience’s sake scxiness, thcn
this is what leads men to the Olympian gods— they are n ot limited to mat-
ing seasons. But there is one obvious difference between men and the
Olympian gods in this rcspect. There is a limitación without which man is
noc thinkable, and which is absent in the case o f the Olympian gods: the
prohibición against incest. In the case o f men, incest, always a great theme
in the Aristophanean comedies, comes Ln. Man has a natural latitude re-
garding sex. I remind you o f the farnous passage in the beginning o f Aris-
totle’s P olin es 1253a39:
By nature there is in all men the impulse toward polirical association, and
he who first establishcd it is responsible for che greacest good. For, just as
man, when perfected, is the bese o f the animáis, so he is when divorccd
from law and right the worst o f all. For injusticc is harshest if it has
weapons. But man is bom having che possession o f wcapons such as pru-
dcncc and virtue which he can use to the highest degree foropposite ends
Thcrcfore man is most impious and mostsavage without virtue, and worst
with regard to sexual things and food.
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C II A P T t R S E V h M
divine law, eros cannot be understood exccpt in relation to the gods, o r law.
A mere physiological understandingof eros is absolutely impossible.
alt is, then, from ancient times that eros for one another is inbom in hu
man beings, a bringer-together o f the ancient nature in trying to malee
onc out o f cwo and cure human nature.'* ( 1 9 Ic 7 -d 3 )
Sexual satisfaction should enable man to survive for the purposc o f wor-
shiping the gods. From the gods’ point o f view the end o f sexual satisfac
tion is piety. From man’s point o f view the end is sexual gratification. These
are two cntirely different ends. We had a similar problem in Pausanias’s
speech, where the two partners, the lovcr and the beloved, are united in the
perfect erotic association but inspired by different motives. Eros is the nat
ural desi re o f human beings, n ot o f brutes, for restorarion o f the ancient
nature, the healer o f human nature. T o repeat: in Aristophanes’ under-
standing eros is peculiar to man. Eros is a natural conscqucnce o f the artifi
cial división o f the ancient nature. Eros is n ot a gift o f the Olympian gods,
Aristophanes’ doctrine o f eros is the counterpart o f Plato’s doctrine o f
recollection, a return to the ancient nature in the case o f Aristophanes, a
recollection o f the originally perfect knowledge in the case o f Plato. You see
also the difFerence: For Plato the guiding consideration is the mind, the in-
tellect, nous; for Aristophanes it is something else, and it can provisionally
be described as the negad ve reladon to nomos. This negative relation to
nomos is more meaningful to Aristophanes than mere procreation and
mere gratification.
Eros is striving for something unattainable, and this is also impiied in
procreation. This unity can never be achieved. I t is esscntially unsatisfac-
tor y. I t is, therefore, man’s present nature— man as wc know him— to be
unhappy, to be sick. I t is n ot that some men are sick and others healthy, as
Eryximachus had said, but that all men are sick. This misery o f man is traced
to hubris. It reminds strangely ofbiblical doctrines. Although Plato started
from cntirely different things he carne up with notions similar to the bibli
cal notions. Furtherm ore, what eros longs for is this unión, this original
unit, something which we would cali, not being tutored by Aristophanes,
something ugly. T h e beauty o f the body is completcly denied in favor o f
these strange round beings. All concern with the beautiful tends beyond
the beautiful to something else. The striving forcé o f the beautiful in erotic
feelings leads cventually to the defeat o f the beautiful. Eros is tragic, cer-
tainly in the sense in which we understand the word. It is interesting that
this is imputed to the cómic poet.
134
A R 1 S T 0 P H A S E S
“Each o f us is a tokcn o f a human being, beca use each has been sliced, jusc
as flat fish, two out o f one. So each is aiways seeking his own tokcn."
( !9 1 d 3 - 5 )
The seeking is aiways, there is no folfillment. For each human being seeks
n o t simply some other human being, but that individual human being
which is by nature its other half. T o show the impossibility o f this situation
we must remind ourselves o f the possibility that through Apollo’s blunder
the other h alf might have been left skinless and m ight, therefore, have per-
ished. M en will, therefore, never find the other half. Al1 love is unhappy, vis-
ibly o r invisibly— comically unhappy or tragically unhappy. This is a strange
problem for a comic poet. B u t Aristophanes is not an ordinary comic poet.
“Now aii men who are a slicc o f the common— it was then called androg-
ynous— are lovcrs o f women, and many o f the adukcrers have come co be
from this genus, and all the women in turn who are lovers o f men and
aduiteresses come to be from this genus. But all women who are a slice o f
woman, these hardly pay any attention to men, but rather they are turned
toward women, and the lesbians come to be from this genus. But all who
are a slice o f male, they pursue the males, and as long as they are children,
because they are cuts o f the male, they love men and rejoice in lying down
cogether wíth the men and embracing them, and these are the best o f the
children and youchs, because they are most manly by nature." (1 9 1 d 6 -
192a2 )
H e re we find the question o f the natural hierarchy brought up for the first
time. T h e large majority o f m en are heterosexual, for they descend from
original androgynes. This new doctrine o f eros legitimares adultery as a
m atter o f course, i.c., it legitimates what is forbidden, it legitimates the ig-
noble, the disgraceful, the base, and the ugly. Aristophanes is silent o n jus-
tice, here as elsewhere. Eros, we could paradoxically say, ¡usdy overrides
justice. In 1 9 2 d 8 , as you will have seen, he does n ot say all adulterers, only
most o f them. Why n ot all? There are adulterers, as Aristotle in his wisdom
tells us, who are prompted by love o f gain, therefore they would n ot be
prompted by eros. By the use o f different tenses, he indicates that in former
times adulterers werc mostly prompted by love for the female sex. N ot so
now. Why are the women loving women in the center? There are only three
cases. H e started from the most com m on case, heterosexual love, and he
wants to end with the highest case, the male homosexuals. T h e second case
is n ot com m on but below the highest. That means that what is most dis
graceful, the least high, i$ in the center. Why? Because the most disgraceful,
135
C H A P T P . R S E V B N
uSome say indeed thac thcy are shameless. They lie. Ic is noc by shameless*
ness that thcy do this but by confidence, manJiness, and a manly look, cm-
bracing what is like themselves. The evidence is great: on becoming
complete [perfect] only men o f this sorc go into politics.” ( 1 9 2 a 2 -7 )
T h e best males, the homosexual males, turn to politics when they become
oíd, and this pro ves n ot only that they are the best men but that they are
free from shamelessness. Is it not a strange thing to say that politicians are
characterized by absen ce o f shamelessness? What does he mean? T o prove
that the homosexuals are not shameless he refers to che fact that they alone
go ¡nto politics. Politics would seem to be the médium o f bashful behavior.
Let me return. I say first that Aristophanes succeeds where Pausanias and
Eryximachus failed, namely in proving the supremacy ofpederasty, because
he links it up with the natural hierarchy. Pederasty is the preserve o f those
who are most male by nature. I d o n ot deny that thc re is a certain joke in
that— courageous, manly, and male. Maiüincss is the criterion. Why? The
puré males, the males interested only in males, are deseendants o f the sun,
as distinguished from the earth and the m oon, from whlch the others are
descendant. They are as little shameless as the sun, which sees everything,
and no one would cali the sun shameless.
Apparently he legitimates pederasty by referente to the polis, and then,
o f course, the argument would run as fbllows: T h e polis, according to a
preposterous etymology, stems from war (poletnos). War is that in which at
first glance the polis shows itself in aü its splcndor and forcé, and manliness
is, o f course, the virtue ofw ar. In Pausanias’s speech we have seen that po-
litical freedom jusdfics unlimitcd pederasty. In opposidon to Pausanias,
howcvcr, Aristophancs abolishes the distinction bctween noble and base
pederasty. There is only a hierarchy o f eros, none o f which is base, for each
is according to nature. Also here, in contradisdncdon to Pausanias, the
boys are lovers o f the adult men and vice versa. Mutual love ¡s present here,
just as it was in Eryximachus. Yet, to return to the m a n point: I t seems that
thc polis is used for establishing the hierarchy o f nature. W hat is most con-
ducive to poli tica! life in its greatest splendor is the highest. B u t must not
the hierarchy o f eros be established on the basis o f eros itself and n ot on the
136
A f U S l ' O P H A N t S
basis o f som cthing extemal to eros, such as thc polis? W hat has thc polis to
do with the essence o f cros, with man’s desire to return to his original na-
turc? D ocs n ot the polis belong togcthcr with nomos, and henee with thc
Olympian gods, o r is there an eros for thc polis? L et us see thc sequel.
“Whenever they bccomc full-grown men, they are pederasts and naturally
do not pay anention to marriages and acts o f procreador», but they are
compelled by the law; but it suffices for them to live with each other un-
married. Nowhe who is o f this kind proves to be in any case a pederast and
fond o f lovers [philerastes], always embracing that which is akin.” ( 1 9 2 a 7 -
I9 2 b 5 )
These he-men have no cros for the polis; they regard nomos mercly as com
pulsión. They lo ve only what is akin to them , and the ir fellow citizens are
n ot akin to them . T h e political point o f view has no legitimate place in
Aristophanes’ argument. For example, he does not refer to the obvious link
between polis and eros which will come out in Agathon’s speech, namely
eros as love for honor, which tum s naturally into thc political. This is not
even alluded to by Aristophanes. Precisely because he has expericnced the
power o f cros o r because he does n ot subordínate eros to any extraneous
consideration, he cannot refer to the polis in order to legitimate eros. Does
he basely bow to the taste o f the public in the theater? N o. Eros is a desire
for the ancient nature, for the State in which man had the loftiest thoughts,
in which he thought o f conquering heaven, o r rather Olympus. Eros is re
be Ilion against nomos. Through eros men cease to be cowed and acquire
again the loftiest thoughts. I f this is the essence o f eros, the community o f
those which are most manly by nature is most highly ero tic to the deepest
degree in regard to what eros is ultimately after— the State o f completeness
in which men could challenge the gods. Therefore Aristophanes succeeds
where Pausanias and Eryximachus iailed. Because he frees eros from sub-
jection to anything n ot inherent in e r o s . . . [Tape ch a n g e .]. . . therefore it
can be understood only in terms o f the extremes.
“ N o w w h e n e v e r t h c p e d e r a s t a n d c v c r y o n c c ls c m e e ts u p w ith th a c v ery
own half o f his, then they are wondrously thundcrstruck by fricndship,
kinship, and eros, unwilling to be separated from one another for virtually
even a short time. And these are the ones who continué with one another
throughout life, but who could not even say what they want for them-
selves from one another. No one wouJd think that it was the intercourse
[being together] o f sex, that for its sake onc, after all, would enjoy being
with the other with such great seriousness; but it is evident that the soul o f
137
C H A P T E R SHVEN
cach o f thc rwo wants something else, which it is not abJe to say, but it di*
vincs and hints at what ir wants in riddles.” (1 9 2 b 5 -d 2)
“And ifwhilc they were lying down in the same place, Hcphacstus should
stand over them with his tools and ask, 'What is ít, human beings, that you
want to get from one another?’ And if he should again ask when they were
at a loss tor an answcr, 'D o you actuaily dcsire this, to bccome, in the best
possiblc case, in thc same place with onc another, so as not co be apare
from one another day or night? I f ic is this Chat you dcsire, I am wiiling to
melt you together and fuse you into the same, so as co bccomc onc, being
two, and as long as you live, both, as if being one, to live in common, and
when you dic, there in turn in Hades, with the pair o f you dead, instead o f
two, to be onc in common. Well, see whether you love this and it is
enough for you if you obtain chis.* We know that not cvcn one, if he heard
this, wouid re fuse, and it would be evident that he wants nothing else. He
would simply believc he had heard that which for some time he had been,
138
A R I S T O r H A N h S
after all, desi ring, to come together and mclt together into the one being
loved and become one out o f two. The cause is this: ihac was our ancient
nature, and we were wholes. So the ñame for the desi re and pursuit o f the
wholc is eros.” (1 9 2 d 2 -1 9 3 a l)
The god who speaks to the lovers is Hephaestus, the blacksmith. Does
this remind you o f something you may know from other readings? H e
phaestus comes up in a similar situation in the Odyssey, in the eighth book,
where the story o f Ares and Aphrodite is told. Aphrodite was the wife o f
Hephaestus and had an adultcrous affair with Ares. Som ehow Hephaestus
carches them in the act. I read to you a few words from the prose transla-
tion. Hephaestus naturally makes a fuss and aJI the gods assemble. H e com-
plains bitterly to Zreus.
His mouthing gathered the gods to the housc o fth e brazen floor. Posei-
don the Harth-girdlcr, bcncficcnt Hcrmcs, and royal Apollo the far-
darting carne: but the Lady Goddesses remained at home, all o f them,
quite out ofcountenance. In Hephaestus’ forccourt collected the Givers
o f Weal and unquenchable was the laughter that aróse from the blesscd
Gods as they studied the tricky devicc ofHcphacstus. One would cacch his
neighbor’s eye and gibe: “Bad deeds breed no merit. The slow outrun the
speedy. See how poor crawling Hephaestus, despite that limp, has now
overtaken Ares (much the mosc swift o f all divine dwellers upon Olympus)
and cleverly caught him. Ares will owc him the adultéreos fine.” Words
likc this one whispered to the other: but o f Hcrmes did Zeus’ royal son
Apollo loudly ask, “Hcrmes, son o f Zeus, messenger and giver ofgood
things: would you not choose even the bondage o f chese cough chains, if
so you might slccp in the one bed by golden Aphrodite?” And to him che
Gods’ messenger, Argus-bane replied: “Ifonly this might be, kingly, far*
darting Apollo! I f there werc chains withouc end, thrice as many as are
he re, and all you Gods with all che Goddesses to look on, yet would I be
happy beside the Golden O ne.” (Odyssey ü.3 2 1 - 4 3 )
This story is now transfcrred from the immortals to the mortals. The un
quenchable laughter about the two immortals caught in the act ofadultery
and the frank expression by Hermes about his desire to üe publidy with
Aphrodite, while fettered to her literally, is the comcdy in eros. H e contra
dices propriety. W hat he says is improper but it is natural. W hen these two
things clash laughter arises. N ot in every case, naturally, but in the case o f
certain clashes we laugh. For example, at the story o f a murder we don’t
laugh, but at a confidence man we do. N ot all successful crimes are laugh-
able.
139
C H A P T E K . SE V E N
140
A R I > T O 1’ H A N E $
T h e motive o f piety, it appears here, is fear, fear o f superior power like the
power o f the Spartans. This fear demands n ot orderiiness regarding eros,
but orderiiness regarding the gods. T h e example he gives here is recorded
by Xenophon in his G reek History> book 5, chapter 2 . 1 will tcll you the gist
o f the story: There were people üving in the Peloponnesus who had been
the allies o f the Spartans and then carne over to the Athenian side, i.e., they
became democratic. The Spartans vanquished them and estabiished an aris-
tocracy and destroyed the democracy. They restored the original way o f Üfe
o f the Mantineans, which was to Uve in villages. Xenophon uses the phrase
“as they Uved in the olden tim es.” This is difficult to understand. From a
Platonic point o f view the Spartans deserve rcspect and not merely fear be-
cause they estabiished aristocracy, which from Plato’s point o f view is supe
rior to democracy, o r because they restored the ancient. The gods can de-
mand only fear because they do n ot estabUsh the ancient, they prevent the
establishment o f the ancient. Yet, on the other hand, the Spartans, by com-
peUing the Arcadians to Uve in villages and n ot ¡n the city, may be said to
141
CH A P T E R SE V E N
havc dccivilized the Mantineans, and the gods are somehow the cause o f
civiiizadon. Even according to Aristophanes’ doctrine, or prccisely becausc
o f Aristophanes’ doctrine, it would seem that the gods deserve respect and
n ot merely fear. W hat I am driving at is thísr the story told by Xenophon i$
absolutely ambiguous in connection with this passage. I t can be under-
stood to mean that the gods deserve only fear, o r they may also de serve re
spect.
“ But for these reasons everyone must exhort every man to be pious about
gods, in order that wc may escape one [fatc] and obtain the other, as Eros
is our guide and general." ( 1 9 3 a 7 -b 2 )
Aristophanes says he re that one must admonish every man, male man. He
is n ot concerned with the picty o f women. Piety is required so that the
other gods d o n ot prevent us from getting what the god Eros leads us to.
T h e Service o fth e other gods has merely a negad ve function, likc evil ghosts
as it were. T h e positive good comes from the god Eros alone. Yet Eros is the
leader o f an army and, as you know, an army consísts o f males. Eros is the
leader o f an army o f males which strives for original unity, for the rccovery
o f lofty thoughts, which implies the thought o f rebellion against the gods.
T h e fundamental antagonísm betwcen the Olympian gods and eros re-
mains preserved. Piety in this sense is merely a dire necessity and conces-
sion. We will complete our discussion o f Aristophanes’ speech next time.
142
8 AGATHQN
143
i ' HA P T í R E I ü HT
is this so? Mu cuati ty, hori2ontality> as disringuished from verdcaüty, eros di-
rected toward the highcr— this is connected with the p roble m o f the mind
as folio ws: The object o f the mind is higher than the mind itself, since the
mind folio ws its object and not the other way around. Eryximachus had
also made the distinction between noble and base eros. The distinction, as
he presented it, is not a natural distinction but is established by art with a
view to what is useful to man. Remember particularly what he said about
the seasons. The healthy seasons and the unhealthy seasons are equally nat
ural. T h e prevalence o f one or the other is achieved by art. Therefore he
ends with the assertion o f the supremacy o f art. I f the distinction between
noble and base eros, then, is n ot by nature, it ought to be dropped. And this
is exactly what Aristophanes does. Aristophanes does ha ve recourse to a
natural hierarchy among men. Yet that hicrarchy is determined n ot by nous
buc oniy by maniiness. Eros, according to him, is rebellion and militar y ac-
tion; eros is the leader o f an army.
A few words about Aristophanes’ story. M an, the desee ndant o f the cos-
mic gods, therefore round, was to be subject to the Olympian gods. But
since he had lofty thoughts he refused to submit. Why was man subject
from the beginning to the Olympian gods? M an, in contradistinction to
his p r o g e n ito r the cosmic gods, is in need o f procreation. And, in contra
distinction to the brutes, he is not limited to mating seasons. In the latter
respect, and only in that respect, he is likc the Olympian gods. The rela-
tionship between man and the Olympian gods is based on the sexual lat-
itude o f both. The specific difference o f man among the animáis is this
sexual latitude.
Through the punid ve acción o f the Olympian gods men becom e wcll
be haved, kosm ios in Greck, which recalls “cosm os.” This orderliness does
n ot com e from the cosmic gods but from the Olympian gods. M en ac-
quired erect stature, the shape o f the Olympian gods. The Olympian gods
molded men in the ir image, you could say, to use the biblical parallel. M en
be carne human through the action o f Zeus, for man becom e s human
through law, nomos. And the cause o f the nomos, which makes man hu
man, must be manlike. T h e Olympian gods are manlike. O n the basis o f the
comedies o f Aristophanes one could say, since man’s sex Ufe is n ot Umited
by nature to seasons it must be limited by law. T h e most massive limitation
o f man’s sex life by law is the prohibí don against incest. The Olympian gods
are n ot Umited by seasons or by prohibítions against incest. Man is n ot lim
ited by seasons but is Umited by the prohibidon against incest; n ot by na
ture but by convention. T h e brutes are Umited by nature and n ot by con-
144
A Ü A T H O N
“Let no onc act contrary to him— and he acts contrary whoever incurs the
enmity o f the gods— for ifw e become friends and reconciled to the god
we shall find and meet up with our very own bclovcd, which few nowadays
do.” (1 9 3 b 2 -6 )
One must follow Eros, who is a leader o f an army, the refere a male. This in-
cludes avoiding becom ing hateful to the gods. As for Eros, one must be-
com e a friend o f Eros and becom e reconciled to him. Aristophanes does
not speak o f friendship between men and the Olympian gods, whereas
Eryximachus had ended his speech with the demand for friendship. There
is need for reconciliation with Eros. Why? So that we can disco ver and en-
counter our young beloved, which Aristophanes ordinarily refers to as a
145
C H A P T R R B I C H I
male be lo ved by males. At prese nt this happcns only to a fcw. Why? At pres
ent there ¡s no proper worship o f E ros, i.e., there is to o great a worship o f
the other gods. Eros is angry with us for this ncglect. I f he were properly
worshiped he would help us find our natural alter ego. Surely the Olympían
gods are o f no positive help as regards the crotic pursuit.
“And picase let not Eryximachus supposc, in making my logos inco a com-
edy, chat I mean Pausanias and Agathon— for perhaps they in fact do ob-
cain this, and both are males, in thcír naturc manly.” { 1 9 3 b 6 -c 2 )
H e speaks he re explicitly o f men and women but by the use o f this word
beloveds (p a id ib a )3 which means predominandy male favorites, a prepon-
derance o f the pederastic thought remains. The return to the original na
ture pro ves now to be a utopia. I t is the best in itself but at present is not
available. Only the closest approximadon to it is the best possible as matters
stand. And what is that best possible? T o find n ot one’s natural male alter
146
C H A P T B R El üH' l
148
A ti A ! '! ( O N
149
C H APT B R E I G H 1
150
A C A r H o N
Then Sócrates said, “The reason is, Eryximachus, that you yourself have
competed bcautifully; but ifyou should be where I am now or rather, per-
haps, where I shaU be when Agathon too speaks well, then you would be
very afraid and at total risk, as 1 am now.* (1 9 4 a l-4 )
“You want to bewicch me, Sócrates,” Agathon said, “in order that I be
thrown into confusión on account o f my bclicf that the audiencc [the-
atron] has great expectations that 1 will speak wcll.” ( 194a5 -7 )
153
C H A P T R R E 1 G H I
form with thc actors, and wich a gjancc straight out at so large an audience
whcn you were about co make an exhibición o f your own specchcs, and
you were not at ali baffled— I should believe that now you will be in con
fusión on account o f a few human beings likc us.' ” ( 1 9 4 a 8 -b 5 )
In other words, You, Agathon, who had the courage to appear o n the stage
in your own play, will n ot be afraid to address us few fellows.
Phaedrus thinks that Sócrates and Agathon will have their dialogue imme-
diately after their speeches, and Agathon thinks that he and Sócrates will
have their dialogue frequendy here after. W ho is the better diviner o f the
two? The main point, however, is the fourfold reference to conversation.
Now, what is the meaning o f this interlude? As you know, it is n ot the first
interludc. The first interlude carne prior to Eryximachus’s speech and was
due to Aristophanes’ incapacitaron. In the course o f the evening, with the
Progressive exhaustíon o f the subject, che general incapacitaron mercases,
n ot only the particular one o f Aristophanes. There is a general incapacity
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A G A T H O N
fór long speeches. W hen people are to o tired to make long speeches, they
are n ot to o tired to make conversation, engagc in dialogue. The dialogues
com e in as a mere substitute for long speeches. This, however, is changed
with Sócrates’ speech, which is, as it were, nothing but a dialogue, although
it claims to be a speech. The first interludes were the dialogues betwcen
Eryximachus and Aristophanes. They dealt with Aristophanes1 ridiculous
bodily handicap, o f which Aristophanes himself was in no way ashamed.
The present interlude is chiefly a dialogue between Sócrates and Aga-
thon— Aristophanes is completely silent— and it deais with fear o f disgrace,
as distinguished from hiccups. Agathon and Sócrates claim to have fear o f
disgrace, and this is a natural introduction to the subject o f the beauty o f
eros. But Sócrates and Agathon only claim to have such fear; in fact they
don’t fear it. Yet only Agathon is found out, as you have seen. Agathon
walks into the trap which Sócrates had set. There was no rcason for Aga
thon to speak at this point in the presence o f Sócrates. Agathon becomes
ridiculous; hi$ beauty, his grace, his charm, is somewhat spurious. H e is a
beautiful young man, as wc have seen, and, as we will see later, with a not so
beautiful inside, contrasted with the ugly, oldish Sócrates with a beautiful
inside. Perhaps this applies to the ir speeches too. We must also consider
this, and this is a good introduction to Agathon’$ speech; nowhere in the
dialogue do we find perfect beauty. It is always tainted, if only by a snub
nose. Now we turn to Agathon’s speech.
“I wanc first to speak o f how I must speak, and then speak. AIl chose who
have spoken befbre seem to me not to be praising che god but blessing hu
man beings for the goods for which the god is responsible; but as to what
sort he himself is in bestowing chese gifts, no one has spoken. There is one
correet manner o f every praise for everything, to go through in speech,
whomever the speech is about, and say in being o f what sort he is in fact
the cause o f what sort o f things. So too in the case o f Eros, it is just for us
to praise him first as to what sort he is, and the n his gifts. * (1 9 4 e 4 - 19 5a5)
As it appears in the Greek, Agathon is the only one who begins with an em-
phatic I— ego. Naturally, he is beautiful and successful and he knows it. H e
makes the distinction between how one ought to speak and when one
speaks. T o speak o f how one ought to speak Ls n ot truly to speak. Is this in-
telligiblc? For example, ifyou have a methodology o f the social Sciences, do
you say anything about social phenomena? In a way you are silent. There is
a formality about it which ¡s empty. I t would be different in one case: i f the
art o f how to speak were the other side o f psychofogy, knowledge o f the
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C H A P T E K F. U i n
soul; then the sciencc o f how to speak would be fiiil o f content. This is, o f
coursc, Plato’s notion o f rhetoric: it is only the doctrine o f the soul viewed
fforn thc point o f view o f how to influcnce o r persuade other pcople.
Aristophanes had blamed all earlier human beings for not having wor-
shiped Eros; Agathon blames only all earlier speakers tonight. From this
poínt o f view he is much more modest. H e certainly is no revolutionary, as
Aristophanes was, an iconoclast. Iconoclasm is incompatible with beauty. I
cannot always repeat that the latitude o f the Greek word k a lo n — which is
beautiful, fair, respectabíc— ineludes everything resplcndent for the eyes or
thc mind. In Agathon’s spcech for the first time the god him sclf becomes
the the me, not as something existing merely in the soul o f man, but as self-
subsistent, and the question is raised, O f what quality is the god? Aristoph
anes aimost touched on that. H e spokc o f the power o f eros and the nature
o f man. He did not speak o f the nature o f eros; he did n ot even speak o f that
quality o f eros which Agathon refers to. We have to raise this question: Will
Agathon discuss the nature o f eros o r only his quality? You see also in the
way Agathon speaks that it is a very orderly spcech, with an orderly begin-
ning. A universal statement on every kind o f praise, regarding every possi-
ble thing. Then the appücation: this and this is the right way to praise
anything. But now wc are supposed to praise eros, and this is thc right way
for praising eros in particular. The gifts o f eros— that means that o f which
eros is thc cause— is a metaphoric expression.
“ I asscrt that though all thc gods are happy, Eros, if sacred right permits it
and it is not offensive to say so, is the happiest o f them, being thc most
beautiful and the best.” (1 9 5 a 5 -7 )
This gives the plan o fh is spcech. First, Eros’s qualities: (a ) the most beau
tiful; (b ) the best. Second, Eros as cause o f things outside o f himsclf. The
whole speech o f Agathon is characterized by an unusuaíly clear order. This
has very much to do with beauty, because clear order is an elem ent o f
beauty. But he does not raise the primary question, namely, What is eros?
What is its essence, its nature? This will be done only in Sócrates’ speech.
His praise o f Eros is nccessarily a critique o f the other gods. His very excuse,
“i f . . . it is not offensive to say so,” indicatcs that there is some prima fecic
re ason for offense; othcrwise he would never say that. The other gods are
all less chan pcrfect regarding both beauty and goodness; otherwise Eros
could n ot be the m ost beautiful and the best.
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Aü A T H O N
by fiight oíd age, though ít is plainly swift, for it approachcs us ac any race
faster than it should. It is that which Eros has a nature co hate and not to
come cven within.hailing distancc o f ” ( 1 9 5 a 7 -b 4 )
“He is always with thc young and is himselfyoung, for the oíd logos holds
good: like always draws near to like." ( 1 9 5 M - 5 )
“Though I agree with Phaedrus on many points I don’t agree with him on
this, that Eros is older than Cronus and Iapetus; but I assert that he is the
youngest o f gods and ever young, and the ancient business about gods,
which Hcsiod and Parmcnides speak of, happencd, if they wcre celling thc
truth, by Ncccssity and not by Eros. Otherwise, there would not have
been castrations, any more than bindings o f one another and many other
violent things, if Eros wcre among thcm, but there would have been
fnendship and peace, just as there now is, since the tíme that Eros has been
king ofthe gods.” (1 9 S b 6 -c 6 )
H e refere to Phaedrus and says that he agrees with him in many things.
W hat things, he doesn’t tell us. D oes he grant, for example, that eros is not
in the beloved? We must see. Agathon disagrees with Hesiod and Par-
menides, n ot with H om er, though H om er, too, speaks o f terrible fights
among the gods. H e does n ot wish to blame Hom er. There is a strange dif-
ficulty here since H om er is the oldest poet. Is there n ot a contrast betwccn
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A G A T H O N
soul he encounters with a rough character, he gocs away from it, and
whatever souJ he encounters with a soft character, he takes up rcsidencc
there. So if he is always touching with his feet and everywhere the softest
o f the softest, it is a necessity that he be most tender. So he is youngest and
tenderesc and, besides this, fluid in respect to his shape [ e i d o s ( 1 9 5 c 6 -
196a2)
You see the praise o f Homer. Yet H om er did n ot praise Eros, he praised
Ate, the goddess o f mischief, an avenging god. The oíd gods, as seen by the
oíd poets, are basically avenging gods. H om er did n ot praise a male god in
this way but a female god, and he didn’t praise in this way love but mischief.
H om er conceived o f eros as something much sterner than the soft, modern
Agathon does. W ith due euphemism, the elegant Agathon suggests that
the oldest o f all poets could n ot have done justice to the youngest o f all
gods. Only the youngest poet, who is in his way etemaily young, can do
this, probably by means o f cosmetics. In the thought o f the ancients, Ate,
the daughter o f Zeus, occupies the place which in the thought o f the mod-
erns is occupied by Eros. You know this phenom enon: the softening o f
manners. Agathon transforms Ate into E ros, something n ot beautiftil into
something beautiful. There is a parallel to that in Aristophanes’ speech. For
Aristophanes, the god who solves the ríddie o f the human soul is Hephaes-
tus, the limping god who, in addition, was deceived by his wife.
In Agathon the world o f beauty rules unimpaired. H om er places the
softness o f Ate only in her feet, n ot in her whole being. H ere, to o , Agathon
improves. H om er, in the nineteenth book o f the lita d , continúes, when
speaking o f Ate, ushe who damages or hurts human beings.” This is com -
pletely suppressed by our refined poet. Eros walks only on delicate, soft
things— on souls— and only on som e; he walks o n the softest o f the soft, on
the souls o f the soft. Souls are the softest o f beings; souls as souls are soft.
Characters which are somehow made out o f souJs may be hard o r soft, but
the souls as souls are soft. Eros does n ot dwell in the souls o f all, he does not
dwell in the souls o f harsh gods. W hich god is harsher and harder than Ares,
the god o f war? And Eros dweils in the soul o f Ares. Perhaps Agathon
would say Eros makes Ares soft, but that remains to be seen.
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AÜ AT H O S
“Aíter this one muse speak about the virtue o f Eros. The greatcst is that
Eros neicher commits injuscice against a god or human being ñor suífers
inj ustice at the hands o f a god or hum an being. ” (19 6 b 5 - 7)
Agathon is very far from denying what Aristophanes had said, that he was
the m ost philanthropic god. N ot justice is the greatest but the combinatíon
o f justice and immunity from injustice. I f you do n ot d o injusdee to others
and at the same time you cannot be hurt by others, this is the m ost desirabic
condition.
As we have seen, Eros rules over the gods, and the laws are the king o f the
city. Is there a connection between the se two ruler-ruled relationships?
The re is a difficulty, for Eros’s rule is gentle, the rule o f law not necessarily
gentle.
*
I trust you see the difficulty o f this argument: uncontrollablc dcsire is mod-
.eration and temperance.
*
“And further, in poinc o f manliness, ‘not even Ares resists’ Eros. For Ares
does not have Eros, but Eros has Ares— [eros] o f Aphrodite— as is the
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C H A P T E R E [ G H 1
story, and he who has is sironger [kreitton] than him who is had, and in
prevailing [k ra to n j over him who is more manly than anyone else, he
wouJd be thc most manJy o f ali. Now about ihe justice, moderation, and
manliness o f thc god it has been stated, but it is left [to speak about] wís-
dom .’” (1 9 6 c8 -d 5 )
You see che emphasis on thc ordcrly path all thc time. What about this ar-
gument about Eros’s courage o f manliness? This is as weak, I take it, as the
preceding argument: a very great coward o f thc gre atest pliancy could co n
trol the bravest very well without being thc bravest. W ith a view to the later
developmcnts o f thc speech, ¡t is important to observe that when he speaks
o f the love o f Ares he says, “E r o s . . . has Ares,” to which he adds, “the eros
o f Aphrodite, as is che story.” Eros is a self-subsisting being; but then the
eros o f Aphrodite is n ot a seif-subsisring being but something in Ares. In
the first case eros is something outside o f Ares and keeps him; in the other
case eros is something in Ares. This will be very important later on. The
word in Greek is sophia, and Agathon adds, “S o , as far as possrble, I must try
to om it nothing.” The account o f Eros’s wisdom will be as complete as
Agathon can makc it. T h e previous accounts were n ot so complete.
“So, as fer as possiblc, I must try to omit nothing. And first, in order that
I too, in turn, may honor our art, as Eryximachus did his own, the god is
so wise a poet as to make another a poet as well; everyone at any race be-
comes a poet, ‘cven if he is un*mu$ic before,’ whomever Eros touches. It
is fitting that wc use this as a witncss to thc cffcct that Eros is a good poet
in general in all poetry that involves music, for whatever one does not have
or does not know, he would neither give co another ñor teach another.”
( 196d 6-c6)
Agathon praises his art, techne, as Eryximachus did his. H e does n ot praise
his muse, as AristopKanes did, which was connected with the fact that in
Aristophanes’ spccch the intellectua! part o f man is played down. Thereforc
he spoke o f the Muse (1 8 9 b 7 ), something inspiring and not radonal as an
art is. Eros is wisc in the first place because he is a poet and one who makes
others poetic. You will see that Agathon does n ot say that eros is indispens
able for poetry. He does n ot say that all poets be come poets through eros.
O n the contrary: all m en, including all nonpoedc men, becom e poets un-
der the influence o f eros, n ot the other way around. This reminds us o f
Phacdrus’s speech in thc beginning, where Phaedrus made a distinctíon be-
tween those who are by nature best and who are imitated in a lesser way by
those who are inspired by eros. Those who are by nature best are brave.
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A G A C H O N
“And furthermore, who will object, in the case o f the makíng [ p o ie s iíjo f
al! animáis, and deny that chis is the wisdom o f Eros by which ah animáis
come to be and are bom?’ * (1 9 6 e ó -1 9 7 a 3 )
Again he uses the word potesis, which underlies the word poetry and which,
literally, means making, producing. The first form o f producing was poetry
in the ordinary sense; the second is the making o f ah living beings, all ani
máis. In the wide sense this ineludes man. Eros is effective in generation.
Agathon tacitly exeludes pederasty. There is no com ing in to being, no
emergence o f any living beings prior to eros. You remember, he had said
before there was a rule o f compulsión. There could n ot have been genera
ción then. In particular, the gods could n ot have com e into being by gener
ation through parents because eros is the youngest o f the gods. W hat about
the gods then? Were they always, o r if n ot, how did they come into being?
Agathon does not answer this question, for it is only with one god, with
Eros, that he is concerned. Eros was not always, for he is the youngest god.
H e was surely n ot generated by parents. This is n ot surprising because
Phaedrus had said in the beginning that nothing is known o f Eros’s par
ents, and no one had contested that. You will remember that Agathon said
he agrees with many things that Phaedrus had said but did n ot say with
which. O ne o f them is that eros has no parents.
Every generation by parents presupposes eros, but where does Eros
him selfcom e from? T h at’s the question. And this becomes the question for
the first time here again. It was for a moment the question in Phaedrus’s
speech, when he quoted the verse from Hesiod saying that eros emerged
first together with the earth, and that was superseded by the words o f Par-
menides, in which génesis, com ing into being, produced eros first. Coming
into being was given as the cause o f eros. T h e question comes up again now
o f the cause o f eros. L ct us continué now with the third and final sign o f
Eros's wisdom.
“And in the case o f the craftsmanship o f the ares, don’t we know that o f
whomever this god is the eeacher, he tums out notcworthy and bril-
liant, but whomever Eros does not touch, obscure? Apollo, moreover, dis-
covered archery, medicine, and divinaúon when desire and eros led the
way, so that he too would be a pupil o f Eros. And the Muses o f music, He*
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C H A I* T B R E I G H 1
phacstus o f forging, Athcna o f wcavíng, and Zeus ‘to pilot gods and hu
man beings.*” (1 9 7 a 3 -b 3 )
Eros is wise, chirdly, in being the ¡nspirer o f {literally by putting his hand
on) the arts. Fame in any art is due to one’s being touched by eros. F or ex-
ample, femé in poetry as distinguished from poetry itself. You see that po-
etry is mentioned twice in two different contexts. T h e emphasis now is on
femé. Agathon mentions only gods who be carne femous in the arts, not
men. These gods became femous in the arts because they were led by desire
and eros; desire and eros are used synonymously. Eros is desire, but no one
cvcr said desire is a god o r goddess. H e mentions five gods and seven arts;
the central art is the musical art. This is intelligible, so that we may better
see the contrast between what he says here about music arts, poetry in par
ticular, and what he said befbre regarding poetry Poetry, as distinguished
from femé for poetry, does n ot require eros. T h e central god o f the five
gods is Hephaestus. Love for whom makes Hephaestus femous in his art?
Love for his wife, Aphrodite? Hephaestus is also femous for his wife
Aphrodite’s love for Ares. Did Aphrodite and Ares becom e femous as in-
ventors by vircue o f their love? Did they becom e femous as inventors at ali?
There is something new com ing up here which has never occurred before
and that ¡s a new kind o f eros. Eros n ot as erotic desire strictly understood
but as love o f fem é, which will com e out in the immediate sequel. You see
also in passing that, contrary to Aristophanes, Agathon conceives o f eros as
a civilizing forcé; it was eros which inspired the invention o f the arts. Eros is
n ot directed toward that ancient nature, toward that aboriginal State ante-
dating all arts. Eros is in harmony with clvility or civilization.
The last god mentioned was Zeus. Through eros Zeus leamed to rule
gods and men. Zeus rules men too. B u t the cities are ruled by laws. W hat is
the relation between the rule o f Zeus, which in itself goes back to the rule
o f eros, on the one hand, and the rule o f laws, on the other? Zeus rules gods
and m en, but eros rules Zeus. But if Zeus ruled the gods, he rules also Eros.
Did Eros teach Zeus how to rule him, E ros, or is Eros not a god at all? This
would be another way to solve the difficulty.
“ It's from him also that the affeirs o f the gods were arranged when Eros
carne to be among thcm— clearly the eros o f beauty, for there is no eros
for ugliness. Previously, as I said at the beginning, many dreadful things
occurred among the gods, as it is said, on account o f the kingship o f Ne-
cessicy; but once this god was born, from the lovingof the beautiful things
all goods have come to be for gods and men.’” (1 9 7 b 3 -9 )
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A G A T H O N
Since eros taught Zeus to rule gods and m en, there aróse friendship and
peace among the gods. M ust the gods rule men so that there can be peace
among the gods. Are men absorbed into the gods o r vice versa? T h e most
important point here: eros is no longer an absolute, an absolute in the very
simple sense, like a tree. Eros is eros o f— o f beauty. You see also that
Agathon now explícitly grants the truth o f the scories told by H csiod and
Parmenides. But the m ost important point: peace and friendship aróse
among the gods n ot since eros ruled as a king, as was said before, but since
eros carne into being o r sprang fbrth; his kingly rule is coeval with his being.
Eros carne into being o r sprang fbrth— from what or through what? O u t o f
nothing and through nothing? Then he is nothing. And, in a way, this is
true: he is nothing as a self-subsisting being. We have seen some changes:
from Eros as a self-subsisting being, i.e., a god, to eros as an acovity o f the
soul, or as something directed toward— toward the beautiful. As a god
Eros is nothing. B u t he is m ost powerfiilly in the soul, henee he has no hu
man shape, for instance. As a self-subsisting being Eros is nothing. Yet we
speak o f him as a self-subsisting being. In a way he is a self-subsisting being.
In whích way? H e becom es a self-subsisting being through poetry, through
tragic poetry. For poetry as poetry precedes eros and eros rules Zeus. M ore
simply: the other gods prcsuppose eros, for they have parents. T h eir self-
subsistence breaks down with Eros’s self-subsistence.
Eros is eros o f beauty. M ore precisely— the verbal expression in 1 97b 8,
“from the loving o f the beautiful things*— it is not a being, it is an action.
The loving o f the beautiful— that is eros. Now we have seen that Agathon
uses beautiful, noble— k a lo n — originally only in the sense o f bodily beauty,
and he never applies this word to the virtues. From this it seems that the love
o f bodily beauty is the ground tbr everything good for gods and men. But
this expression, “the loving o f the beautiful things,* has a broader meaning.
I t may also mean the love o f honors. There is a particularly dear passage
regarding this usage in the beginning o f the third book o f Xenophon*s
M etnorabilttij where Xenophon says, “In this book I want to discuss how
Sócrates treated those who were longing for the beautiful things.” But this
means primarily the people who were ambitious, desirous o f honors. Love o f
honor— ambition— is not merely a by-product o f eros, as Phaedrus had said,
but a kind o f eros, the love o f femé. The gods who became femous as artisan
artists were indecd inspired by eros, not by eros for bodily beauty but by eros
for femé; and that is the difference betwcen Hcphaestus, on the one hand,
and Ares and Aphrodite, on the other. The latter loved only bodily beauty, so
that they did not becom e femous as inventors, whereas Hephacstus did.
165
A C A T H O N
fame and I suppose also by othcr eros. W hat is the connection? T h e líe im-
plied in the metaphoric description o f the true effects o f eros, naniely, that
it appeases passíons o f hatred and this kind o f thing, leads to a lie regarding
the effects o f eros. So that it is a kind o f parody o f what poetry does with
eros, i.e., ¡t goes over from the truth regarding eros— if a limited truth, be-
cause one could also question whether eros is simply a peace maker, though
it is this to some extent o f course. This is, 1 think, the meaning o f these two
verses. W hether or n ot they are good as verses is hcre n ot my concern, but
they are meaningful in this speech by the poet.
The thesis developed here is that eros is simply the good. N ot only desire
for the good, it is the good. B u t if this is so, eros— desire— is no desire. This
is another expression o f the absurdity in deifying eros. I f eros is deified he
becomes the good and he is no longer desire. And now the concluding re-
marks:
“Hcre you have it, Phaedrus," he said, “the speech from me: let it be ded-
icated to the god, partly partaking o f playfiilncss, partly o f a measured se-
riousness, to the extent that I am able." (1 9 7 e 6 -8 )
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C H A P T B R B I 6 H T
most, he says. Pausanias, for example, had only said, I did whac I could im
provise; and the remarks o f Eryximachus and even o f Aristophanes are aJI
much more rcstrained than this rcmark o f Agachón’s,
I would now like to give a summary o f Agathon’s spcech and thcn wc
may discuss it; T h e starcing point for understanding Agathon’s speech is
the fací that he is a tragic poet. Somehow he represents tragíc poetry, just as
Aristophanes represents comic poctry. But he is not as a tragic poet what
Aristophanes is as a com ic poet. His vanity, his ínsíncerity, his softness and
the to o obvious and to o external beauty o f his speech indícate the lower
level. The delicacy, n ot only o f eros as he describes him, but also o f his own
speech on eros has nothing harsh. T h e souls are the softest o f things. Eros
harmonizes everything. His speech is, as he says at the end, h alf playful, free
from all passion, because eros, as he presents it, does n ot constrain any suf-
fering, in contrast to eros as Aristophanes presented ¡t, where there ¡s pas
sion because there is suffering in eros.
Agathon’s art is lovclcss; it ¿s n ot inspired by eros and yet is enchanting.
The sound and the rhythm are beautiful. ShaU wc then say that he is a de
generare tragic poet, an cpigonic tragic poet? Perhaps. This would even be
historieally correct. O ne has only to read Aristotle’s Poetics to get this ¡m-
pression. But Agathon is doser to Sócrates than any other speaker. H e sits
closest to him and he aJone is awake at the end together with Sócrates,
when everyone else is drunk. This applies not only to the face that he can
drink so well but also to his doctrine. It is Agathon who teaches that eros is
eros o f beauty o r the beautiful things. H e does not say, as some o f the car-
lier speakers had said, that eros is lo ve o f beautitul human be íngs, o r lo ve o f
opposites, o r love o f the ancient naturc. H e is in agreement with Sócrates in
saying that eros is love o f the beautiful and he does not recognize anything
superior to eros which is alien to eros.
Secondly, ¡n this brief scntence, when he speaks o f eros’s wisdom, he
says eros i$ universal among the animáis. How sober! H e doesn’t go as far
as Eryximachus, who had said that eros rules everything— even the general
phenomena o f attraction and repulsión are erotic phenomena— ñor does
he limit eros, as Aristophanes had done, to human beings alone. You will
remember, eros as understood by Aristophanes is a mercly human phe-
nomenon.
Thirdly, and this is perhaps the most important point, Agathon is the
only one who raises the question regarding eros him self and n ot only his ef-
fe a s . H e does not say, W hat is eros?, but he comes very cióse to raising this
question. As an epigonic tragic poet he has undergonc the influence ofphi-
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A G A T H O N
losophy. He cannot take tragedy as seriously as the original tragic poets. But
even in his degeneracy tragedy seems to be superior to comedy. How is this
intelligible? Agathon praises the ares; he is n ot a re bel against the law, the
nom os, the intellect. Comedy, Aristophanean comedy, is such a rebellion.
Agathon is in harmony with civility and civilization, with cosmos. For cros
is also, and above all, love o f fame. Therefore, the positive presentation o f
the Olympian gods. T h e Olympian gods, as the originators o f civilizadon,
are praised, contrary to Aristophanes, where they also come up as origina
tors o f civilization, but eros is directed against them. Yet Agathon does not
believe in the Olympian gods. H e is the only one who makes the being o f
the god his the me. H e faces this problem, where as the others dismiss it.
Surely the others don’t believe in the Olympian gods, but they don’t face
the problem. His thesis is that Eros is the youngest god and yet has no par-
ents. H e makes the question o f his origins more clearly felt.
Eros, as presen ted by him, has no human shape, though he speaks o f his
bodily beauty more than anyone else. Eros is nothing sclf-subsisting: Eros
is era n ; Love is loving. He is the youngest god. T h e Olympian gods cannot
have been generated because they antedate eros. The Olympian gods carne
into being out o f nothing and through nothing, if they are taken as they
present themscIves. But they were made, they do have an origin. By whom?
Answer: by the makers, the poets, the tragic poets. They are the makers o f
the gods o f human shape. They deify what in itself is n ot divine. They cré
ate the gods. Why? Because they are inspired by love o f beauty. They ideal -
ize man, as wc say. They do this out o f love o f beauty— the human beauty
which they see does n ot satisfy them— and in doing so they raise the stature
o f man. They visualize something which looks likc man but which is dcath-
less and free ffom any other defect. They create the gods because they are
inspired by love o f beauty. They are the truc founders o f civility insofar as
they are solemn. The solemnity o f tragedy is higher than comedy, which is
a rebellion against the gods, an attempt to undo what the tragic poets did.
Tragedy is higher than comedy provided the tragic poet knows what he
is doing, provided he himself is free irom the spell which he ere ates, and
Agathon is obviously free trom that spell. The tragic poet establishes the
beauciful delusion, che salutary delusion, which the com ic poet destroys.
B u t this superiority o f tragedy is n ot simply true. At the end we shall find a
remark to this effect. Both tragedy and comedy are cqually necessary. I f
tragic poetry ene han ts, comic poetry disenchants. Wc don’t have to go
back to Aristophanes; think only o f D on Q uixote, the whole splendor o f
knight-errantry. Cervantes raises the low, practical, commonsensical ques-
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C II A P T E R B I G H 1
tion: did the knights not have olean shirts with them on their trips? This is
ncver mentioned in the books on knight-errantry. Disenchanting, but true.
This question must be raised.
Comedy is essentially commonsensical and prosaic, in spite o f the
verses. There is a fragment o f Heraditus o f which one cannot help thinking
in this connection. There is one thing and only one thing which is wisc,
which wishes and does n ot wish to be called Zeus, i.e., to be seen ¿n human
shape. Ic wishes to be seen, to be called Zeus— tragedy; it does n ot wish to
be called Zeus— comedy, which destroys that. Tragedy, then, is not simply
superior to comedy. This superiority in the Symposium is due to the partic
ular situation in the Symposium.
I will mention one or two points: The Symposium is, among other
things, Plato's reply to Aristophanes, as I have said before. Aristophanes
had attacked Sócrates and Euripides in the same breath, and Eurípides in
his turn was connected with Agathon. But why was there a sympathy be-
tween Sócrates and Euripides, i.e., tragedy, in the íirst place? In other
words, what is the principie behind the antagonism, the obvious and mani-
fest antagonism between Sócrates and Aristophanes which led Aristoph
anes to attack Sócrates? The philosopher is n ot a tragic figure from the
classical point o f view, but a cómica! figure necessarily, because he must ap*
pear comical to the nonphilosophers. From the very begínning, in the story
o f Thales, the first philosopher, he feU into a pit because he looked at the
stars; this is surely comical. Concerned with the highest he is Ibolish as no
ordinary human being would be. The philosopher is a comic and n ot a
tragic figure, and therefore he can be presented only in comedy. In the
comedy he is necessarily presented from the point o f view o f the common
opinions, i.e., as ridiculous. Comedy is able and compelled, i f it takes a suf-
ficiendy large view o f its fieíd, to attack philosophy. Comedy muse present
itself as antiphilosophic if it makes full use o f its possibilities. Tragedy can
never do that. Comedy has to do with the ridiculous in opposition to the
serious o r the solemn. In fact, tragedy and comedy present both, the ridicu
lous and the solemn, but in different ways. Comedy presents the serious be-
neath the ridiculous. W hat meets the eye is the ridiculous. Tragedy, on the
other hand, presents the ridiculous beneath the serious. The first impres-
sion is the solemn and serious, the dignified. Philosophy, however, must
present itself, because it is the most serious, as dignified, if it is to fulfill its
function and n ot destroy itself. This much for the speech o f Agathon and
the most obvious suggestions which it leads to.
Before we get co Sócrates’ speech, are there any questions?
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A G A T H O N
Listener: I am not sure what Agathon says. At one point he seems to say
eros is the good, at another point he says it is lo ve o f fame.
M r Strauss: One must always start from the mo$t massive and obvious.
First he says eros is the youngest. But even before that he says how eros
himself is, as distinguished from its eftects. Therefbre, whereas in the for-
mer speeches it could legitimately be doubted whether eros i$ a self-
subsisting being o r something which is only in other things, in Agathon’s
speech this can no longer be doubted. I t must be come the them e. H e de-
scribes first, at great length, eros as a self-subsisting being. T h en , precisely
for this reason, the reduction o f eros as love to the acts o f loving shows the
difficulty. The fact that he is the first to speak o f eros himself means that he
is the first to raise the question almost explicitly whether eros is a self-sub*
sisting being. This is, I think, the crucial point, and one must connect this
with the fact that he is a tragic poet. Aristophanes docsn’t even suggest that
eros is a self*$ub$isting being, H e conce ived o f eros as rebelÜon against the
Olympian gods. In Agathon there is a perfect harmony between eros and
the Olympian gods. T h e Olympian gods, inspired by eros, by love o f fame,
are the originators o f civilization. How can this be understood? I f tragedy,
by creating the gods o f human shape, lays the tbundation for civilization
and therefbre also limits human Ufe, comedy is the rebellion against this
and, therefbre, restores the original freedom. In the center o f che R epu blic,
more o r less, there occurs the simile o f the cave, in which human life is com-
pared to living in a cave, seeing only shadows o f things. O f what do men see
shadows in the cave? In the first place, one can show that the cave is also the
polis, and this is especiaJíy important in our connection. They see the shad
ows o f artifacts, imitating living beings which are carried around the cave.
These are the visible gods, created by artisans. This limits the polis, there -
fore it also makes possible the polis and yet, at the same time, keeps the
polis from seeing the truth. Therefbre, the men who le ave the cave, the
philosophers, never see these shadows. This is perhaps the most striking
parallel to what I suggested here, to which Agathon comes very cióse in his
own speech.
T o repeat: Tragedy and comedy are from Plato’s point o f view equally
necessary and equally problematic. He has indicated in the dearest possible
way how problematic they are in the R epubltc, in the famous criticism o f
poetry in the second and third book and, to some extent, also in the tenth
book. B u t this i$ really only the crudest polidcal expression o f what Plato
thinks about poetry. His serious views are, o f course, much more favorable
to poetry and, therefbre, also more particularly to tragedy and comedy.
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C H A P T t R E I G H 1
One could show this, perhaps, in the Law s, a political work, very clearly,
that, while it is true that poetry is in need o f política! supervisión, censor-
ship— Plato was n ot a liberal— he knew very well that from ano the r point
o f view the poet is the te ache r o f the legislators. The legislator has to learn
to understand men by studying the poet. Otherwisc he wtII be a very poor
legislator. In spite o f that, the legislator must judge on the basis o f his own
responsibility which poetry may or may n ot be publicly used. There is no
contradiction there. There is a tensión between the two things, but Plato
admits this tensión in this or that form throughout his work.
Ltstener: Why is it so easy to recognize what is comical in Aristophanes’
speech and so difficult to recognize what is tragic in Agathon’s speech?
Mr. Strauss: There is nothing tragic about it, I believe. O n the contrary,
I would say that Aristophanes’ speech shows both the comic and tragic ele-
ments in eros. That is the greatness o f Aristophanes. The com ic element is
obvious. I f you take part o f his argumein Üterally and think it through, you
arrive at the conclusión that all love is unhappy. This is, obviously, somc-
thing that is both comic and tragic.
Ltstener: Why didn’t he have a tragic poet trying to show both? Would
the pie ture have been the same even if he had been great enough to show
both?
Mr. Strauss: A great tragic poet might not have been willing to bring in
this great element o f playfulness o f which Agathon boasts. I f Plato found
the most fertile setting was a Sympostum after Agathon’s winning the con
test, he could not very well bring in Eurípides, tor example, instead o f
Agathon. These defectivc things, imposed on a man by chance, present also
very great opportunities. The overly swect in Agathon’s speech is very help-
ful in Sócrates’ speech later on.
[Tape change.] . . . and then the polis arises as somehow above these
things. That’s not the doing o f the philosopher, that is human nature. The
philosopher tries only to understand that, perhaps to impro ve it to the ex
tern to which it can be impro ved. That there be tragedy and comedy is a de-
mand o f the nature o f man. I f this were simply a Greek phenom enon, Plato
would simply show that the Greeks were in this respect a particularly lucky
peoplc. B u t you know that this is n ot simply true.
The fact that Aristophanes is a much more powerful individual and his
speech much deeper and richer than anyone else’s speech, I take for
granted. O n the other hand, from Sócrates’ point o f view it is the most
wrong, because it gocs in the felse direction most passionately. I use this
hesitant language partly because I d o n ot want to anucipate a very blg sur*
172
A G A T H O N
173
9 SOCRATES (1)
“ In the one case,'* Eryximachus said, wyou seem to me have spoken man-
tically, in saying, ‘Agathon will speak well’; but in the other, that you
would be ata loss, I don’t believe ic.w(1 9 8 a 8 -1 0 )
Eryximachus says, You did not prophesy that Agathon would speak mar-
ve lously; you said that he would speak well, and this was not difficult to
prophesy. As for your prophecy regarding yourself, I think you are mis-
taken. In other words, Sócrates, you are no good as a soothsayer. Sócrates’
attcm pt to save his honor as a soothsayer, if n ot as a speaker, has failed. Now
let us see how he goes on.
“ But just how, you blcsscd innoccnt,” Sócrates said, “am I not to be at a
loss, both mysclf and anyonc cJse whatsoever, if he is going co speak after
thc speaking o f so bcautiful and varied a spcech? Now aD thc rest was not
equally marvelous, but the things at the end— who would not be thun-
derscruck on hearing the beauty o f the words and phrases? As for mysclf,
on reflecting that I won’t mysclf be ablc to speak anything that is even
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S O C R A T E S il)
closc to it, I almost ran o ff and disappeared ouc o f shamc i f l knew o f any
place to go. The speech even reminded me o f Gorgias, so thac I simply ex-
pcricnced thc remark o f Homer. I was afraid that Agathon would finally in
his speech send in the head o f Gorgias— an uncanny speaker— against my
spccch, and makc me mysclf a stone in voicelessness.” (1 9 8 b l-c 5 )
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C H A P T E R N I N K
bcautiful things out o f che crue qualities o f the thing to be praised. In other
words, he admits that a praise cannot possi bly be true, thac ic demands si-
lence about the seamy síde o f the thing to be praised- I f you make a euiogy
you must say this man is a model o f virtue, though in reality he is a miser:
H e g o t up at four o 'd o c k in the morning, he cxposed himself to the most
terrible disgraces and bore them like a man, he lived on bread and water, he
was the m ost patient man— but you never say a word o f why he did that.
T h en you have said the truth. B u t you have sctected only the m ost beauti-
ful things. What Sócrates says is rcally m ost ironical, o f course, but we draw
one conclusión: Sócrates' praise o f eros will be selectively true; he will speak
only o f the most beautifuJ si de o f eros and n ot o f its seamy side. This fits
very well with something I mentioned before: every Platonic dialogue ab-
stracts from something, and the Sympostum will abstract from important
and essentiaJ elements o f eros. For example, he may abstract from certain
features o f eros which have been mentioned by earlier speakers. We have to
be watchful. Crude insolence in Plato's Sócrates is impossible. In Aristoph-
anes’ Sócrates it is a bit different. H ere he is always weil be haved. As I m en
tioned before when we discussed irony: irony noticed by the one who is
being ironized is insolence. T ry this expcriment and you will see that this is
true. Irony ¡s a very interesting phcnom enon because its primary inspira-
tion is humanity, o f course. N ot to hurt other people by showing one’s own
supcriority— this is the primary meaning o f irony in che higher sense o f the
word. B u t if this is noticed, if the superior man is indelicatc, stupid in his
irony, then he hurts someone. W e, who have so much time to read this at
leisure, can o f course find out what the people present at the m om ent could
not. They couldn’t rehear it, they couidn’c say, as a student I knew said, re-
peat that sentence you just said and repeat it again. Ordinarily in conversa*
tion one cannot do this. Xenophon aJways tries to suppress the unpleasant
things. W hen he comes to a deser ted town with his expedítion he never says
the town was de serte d; he wiil say it was a big town and will n ot add that it
was inhabitcd. H e will not say that someone is a coward, he will speak o f his
moderation and his skill and om it the rest.
Sócrates says, I know the truth regarding the praise o f things, and that
truth is knowlcdge o f the truth regarding the thing concerned; secondly,
selección o f the most beautiful parts o f it; and thirdly, prescnting them in
the most becom ing manner. This is a good rudimentary statemem ofw hat
a perfcct speaker is. Sócrates claims here, in his perfecc modesty, that he be-
lieves him self a pe rfect orator.
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C H A P T B R NI Nf c
I will n ot speak in your manner, he says, lest I de serve laughter. You see this
is much stronger. N ot because I cannot d o what you d o, but because this is
in itselfridiculous.
“See eo ie, then, Phaedrus, whether you at all necd a spccch o f this kind, to
hear the truth being said about Hros, with the nomenclature and arrangc*
mcnt o f phrascs to be o f wh atever sort it happens to be as it occurs.” He
said Phaedrus and all the rest urged him to speak in whatever way he him-
sd f believed he should speak. ttWcll, then, Phaedrus,” he said, waUow me
still to ask Agathon some smaJl things, in order that with the gain o f an
agreement from him I may then speak on thiscondition.”
“Well, I allow it,” Phaedrus said. “Go ahead and ask." So after this, he
said, Sócrates began from some poinc like chis. (199b2-c2)
Sócrates will n ot begin with a speech, he will begin with a dialogue, with
asking others. He picks Agathon because he is dosest to him, both ¡n space
and in kind. This Socratic rhetoric is essentially dialogic. This is only meant
to prepare the speech, the speech will com e later.
The difference betwccn Sócrates and all the other speakers is made clear
by this interlude. It is greater than the difference among any others o f
them. There is a radical difference regarding the meaning o f rhetoric.
Sócrates is, as you must have seen, a master o f the mi se -en-see nc, o f a cer-
tain theatrical art o f presenting himself. You only have to contrast these re-
marks o f his, these extremcly modest remarks o f his, with the comparatively
weak and conventional protestad ons in the beginning o f even Aristoph
anes’ speech, where he says, MI will speak in a different way.” How weak this
is compared to this challenge he re. Sócrates shows by deed that he is differ
ent from all other speakers. We must also see how Aristophanes, his great
antagonista introduced himself. H e introduced him self by his hiccuping.
That was Aristophanes’ apon a, his lack o f a way out. Sócrates’ embarrass-
m ent, on the other hand, was moral. H e had com m itted him self to some-
thing which he couldn’t achieve. But he doesn’t need a physician; he is his
own physician, being, in a way, Odysseus himself.
At this poínt the dialogue with Agathon stares. As a preparación for our
discussion o f Sócrates’ speech I would like to read to you a passage which is
absolutely crucial for the understanding o f Socratic rhetoric or dialccric,
but which is neglected coday because o f the contem pt for Xenophon which
has been so powerful since the last century. Xenophon carne to be regarded
as a rerired colonel, who was chiefly interes ted in dogs and horses and could
n ot possibly have had any understanding o f Sócrates. In the M em orabilta,
book 4 , chapter 6 , paragraphs 1 3 - 1 5 , we get the tbllowing account:
178
S O C R A T E S i 1 >
44And yet (b a i m en), my dear Agathon, 1 thought you led the way into
your speech bcautifuUy, in saying that you first had to show what sort Eros
is, and lacerhis deeds. I akogether admire this beginning.” (1 9 9 c 3 -6 )
T h e first two words o f Sócrates are the same as those with which Aristoph-
anes’ speech begins. These are the only speechcs beginning in this way, and
179
C H A P T E R N I N E
“So picase, sincc you went through everything etse bcautifully and mag-
nificcntly about what sort Eros is, tell me also this: Is Eros o f the sort as to
be eros o f something orofnothing? I am not asking whecher he is o f some
mother or father*^ che question whether Eros is eros o f a mother or a fa-
cher would be ridiculous— but just as would be che case wcre I asking
about this very thing ‘father’: ‘Is a father a father o f someone or not?’ You
would surely have cold me, if you wanced to answer bcautifully, kYes, the
father is father o f a son or daughter.’ Or is he not?”
“Yes, o f course,” Agathon said. (1 9 9 c ó -d 8 )
The question here is a fairly simple one: is eros n ot something like father or
m other, i.e., something which is essentially o f something. Is eros n ot essen-
tially rclative, ¡n this sense o f the word relative. For example, “tree.” Trec is
n ot essentially of. I t is accidental that it is thc trec o f Mr. Sm ith. The tree as
trec is a tree. But father is essentially related to a son o r a daughter. Is eros
n ot something o f this kind?
In passing, as a joke, he says, I d o n 't mean that eros is eros o f a father or
a mother, o r the eros o f a father for his daughter, o r a m other fbr her son.
This is not quite uninteresting bccause it has something to do with thc
problem o f inccst. W hat Sócrates implies here is that incestuous eros does
not exist. This is a grcat the me in Aristophanes, where thc problem o f incest
is brought up, also in connection with Sócrates’ teaching, in the CÁoudsy
where Sócrates is accused o f teaching his pupils to beat their fathers. This is
a simple proposition, which follows in strict logic from the principie that
the only tide co rule is wisdom. T hen, o f course, the wisc son is by nature
the ruler o f his unwise father. But ruling may inelude compulsión and this
may inelude beating. Thus, it follows that the son may beat his father, This
seems to be a perfcctly innoccnt thesis, but when thc pupil gocs on to say he
may also beat his m other; then the pupil’s father is shocked. The indication
in thc conte xt, which I cannot now develop, is the whole problem o f incest.
H ere, Sócrates seems to say that incestuous eros simply does n ot exist. In
thc immediate sequel he gives another example.
“Isn’t that also the case fbr the mother?” This too was agrccd. “Wcll,
then,” Sócrates said, “answer a little bit more, in order that you may un-
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C H A F T E R N I N E
“And ycc for all o f that, Agathon," he said, “you spoke bcautifully. But
speak stil! o f a small poine. D on’t you thínk that the good things are also
beautiful?"
“Yes, I d o ” (2 0 1 b 9 -c 3 )
In the contcxt good and noble are ¡nterchangeable. B u t they are n ot ínter-
changeable, as the very context shows.
“I f then Eros is in need o f the beautifii) things, and the good things are
beautiful, he would also be in need o f the good things."
“Sócrates," he said, “ I could not contradict you, but lee it be as you
say.”
“N o ," he said, “It is the truth, rather, my dcar Agathon, that you are
unable co contradict, since it is not at aJI difficult to contradict merely
Sócrates." (2 0 1 c 4 -9 )
182
SO C R A TE S 11)
regarding the gods, offer a perfect justification for Sócrates’ eros. Sócrates
is n ot Interested in incestuous eros, n ot in eros for his wife, n ot for his p o
lis, n ot for sexual gratification; that only human beings who are n ot beauti-
ful can have eros suits him excellently, and that one cannot distinguish
between noble and base eros. So much for the dialogue with Agathon.
A t this point begins the high point o f the Sytnposium, the conversation
between Sócrates and Diotima. For the better understanding, I would like
to make a prefatory remark which I hope I can prove when wc go on. The
whole speech o f Sócrates, which is, after all, that toward which we have
been building, consists o f the following parts: (1 ) the introduction, the dis-
cussion o f Sócrates’ rhetoric; (2 ) Sócrates and Agathon, the dialogue which
we have scen and which culminates in the assertion that eros is neither
beautiful ñor good, which ineludes, in this context, that the gods are nei
ther beautiful ñor good. Then we g ct (3 ) the dialogue with Diotima. This
dialogue is subdivided into three parts [later referred to as IIIA , IIIB , and
IIIC ]. The first part stops at 2 0 4 c 7 ; the second part stops at 2 0 7 a 4 ; and the
third part at the end o f it. T h e third part is again subdivided into three parts
[IIIC 1 e tc.]. The interesting point is this: ifyou count the parts which are
no longer divisible you get seven parts, i.e., as many parts as the whole dia
logue possesses. The real question would be whether there is somc real cor-
rcspondence between the seven parts o f Sócrates’ speech and the seven
speeches. The first part o f Sócrates’ speech deais with rhetoric; the first
speaker is Phaedrus, the interlocutor in the dialogue on rhetoric.
In my opinión Sócrates clearly abstracted from lovc o f one’s own. This
would make sense under one condition: A true speech o f praise must con
céntrate on the most noble and beautiful and disregard the less noble. Now,
¡ f love o f one’s own is less noble than love o f the beautiful, he would at least
have the merit o f consistency. The question is, is this a sensible proposition,
that love o f one’s own is lower than love o f the beautiful? Is it an intelligible
thesis? Love o f one’s own we see constandy around u$. A m other loving her
child, etc. Is it possible to see this love as inferior to love o f the beautiful? I
do not mean cutdng oneself o ff from the love o f one’s own, but simply to
State that it is subordínate to something higher which docs n ot have that re-
lation to one’s own. There is one thing one can say: if there is such a thing
as philosophy, o r love o f truth, it is more akin to the love o f the beautiful
than to the love o f one’s own. In the realm o f speech on general matters,
the love o f one’s own leads to ideology; the love o f the bcautifiií leads to the
truth. I f the fundamental fact is love o f one’s own, one absolutizes one’s
own and one sceks reasons for it. This is ideology, if one can use this abom
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C H A P T E R M I N E
“And I shall let you go for now; but the logos about Eros, which I once
hcard from Diotima, a Mancinean woman . . . “ (2 0 1 d l- 2 )
H erc the dialogue ends and Sócrates’s speech, the logos, begins. W hat was
said before? H e would give a speech after the dialogue. But we are in for a
great disappointmcnt. Sócrates’ speech does n ot begin, it is the speech o f
som eonc el se. This is strange. Sócrates reaíly breaks his promises, we must
say. As the ñame Diotim a indicates— from Dio~> genitive o f Zeus (D ios),
and tim a, honoring, and M antinea, the ñame o f a town, reminding o f
m antis, soothsayer— she is a prophetess. We have seen in our simple
schema o f the six speeches, Agathon and Sócrates are ¡nspired speakers. But
n o , Diotim a is the inspired speaker, Sócrates merely transmi ts what he has
heard from an inspired speaker. In addition, this tnspired speaker has the
strange quality o f being a woman. This contrasts with the all-male society.
You rcmember in the beginning there was a woman, the flute player, and
she was thrown out— and now she comes back. In addition, she is a fbreign
woman, which makes it worse. This contrasts with the fact the we have here
an all-Athenian society. There is a parallel to that in Plato elsewhere, in the
small dialogue called M enexenus. There, Sócrates reports a conversadon he
has had with a foreign woman, But this was n ot a prophetess from M ano-
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S O C R A T E S ( 1 )
nea but the famous Aspasia, che quasi m¡stress o f Pendes. The contcxt is
particularly comicaJ, because the question is a funeral speech which is to be
given, and Sócrates gíves the sketch o f a funeral speech for the Athenian
falten which had been sketched by the foreign woman Aspasia, with the im
plicación chac this funeral speech by a foreign woman was superior cven to
the famous funeral speech o f Pe rieles himself. Now, she comes (rom Manti-
nea, which is from the región o f Arcadia. The Arcadians were punished by
the Spartans, you may remember, and were reduced to village life, to a
primitive form o f life. What does he say? Diotima was wise in these things
and in many others.
“. . . who was wise in these things and many others, and once when the
Athenians cónsulted her on sacrificing, ten years before the plague, she
made adelayofthe disease." (2 0 1 d 2 -5 )
There is a parallel to that: there was a similar story about another prophetic
human being, Epimenides o f Crete, told in the first book o f Plato’s L a m .
Epimenides o f Crete was also a foreign soothsayer who had helped Athens
in a critical situation prior to the Persian war. The Cretans were famous, as
Plato indicates in the Laws, for pederasty, and Arcadia was a ncighbor o f
Elis, the country menrioned by Pausanias as particularly dissolute in this re-
spect. Diotim a was Sócrates’ teacher in erotic things. In other words, S ó c
rates was young when he had this conversatíon. I f the plague referred to is
that o f 4 3 0 , o f which Pendes was the most famous victim, the dialogue
muse have taken place in 4 4 0 , if n ot earlier, when Sócrates was reladvely
young, thirty o r younger.
44It was she who taught also me the erotic things. So I will try co recount
to you the speech she spoke, as far as I am able, on the basis o f what has
been agreed upon by Agathon and me. So, Agachón, one muse account
for Eros himself in just the manner you explained, first, who is he and o f
what sort, and then his deeds.” (2 0 1 d 5 -e 2 )
alt seems to be easiese, in fact, to give an account in just the way the
stranger [female ] once went through it in quizzing me. I too was saying to
her pretty ncarly the sores o f things that Agachón just now was eelling me.
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CH A P T E R N'IHE
Diotima was Sócrates’ teacher. This is an extremely rare case, that Sócrates
appears in the role o f a pupíl. There is orüy one other case, and that is the di
alogue P arm en ides, where Sócrates appears in the role o f a pupil o f Par-
menides. In the beginning o f this course I discusscd the fact that there are
only threc narrated dialogues which are not narrated by Sócrates: P a r -
m enides, P haedo, and the Symposium. The P arm en id es and the P haedo have
one thing in common: they tell us something about the young Sócrates. In
the P arm en ides this is obvious, and in the P h aed o Sócrates him self tells o f
his early youthful attcmpts at philosophy. Now we see that the Symposium,
to o , beiongs to this group, because he re we also have an account o f the
young Sócrates, the Sócrates who had not yet undergone the change to the
Sócrates we know from the Platonic dialogues. This is n ot merely a histori-
cal question, which, as such, would be o f no interest to us; it has great sub
stantive importance, as we may see. The young Sócrates held m ore o r less
the same view held now by Agathon. Eros ¡s a great god, and eros is lo ve fbr
the beautiful things. His view ¡s n ot identical with that o f Agathon; he did
n ot say that he is the most beautiful and best god, ñor did he say in particu
lar that eros is the youngest god. In other words, the young Sócrates had
not depreciated the other gods in favor o f eros as Agathon did. Ñ or had
Sócrates said, as Agathon did, that the other gods act from eros o f the beau-
tiAil. Diotima refutes Sócrates o n the basis o f his assertion that he was nei
ther beautiful ñor good. She does exactly what Sócrates did with Agathon,
all o n the premise granted by the other. In other words, Sócrates has no
originality whatsoever. O ne point I would like to mention: Originally,
Sócrates was a natural philosopher— we have had a specimen o f the pre-
Socratics in Empedocles— until he read a book by Anaxagoras, who said
the cause o f everything is nous. H enee, he expected Anaxagoras to show
that everything was reasonably and beautifully ordered. But Anaxagoras
did n ot make use o f his intellectual principie, and therefore Sócrates threw
it away. In the P arm en ides Sócrates is presented to us as a man who says
there are no ideas o f the ugly. This is still in ac cordan ce with the first step:
mind rules everything, therefore everything is well-ordered, beautifully o r
dered. And the view which he held o f eros fits beautifully: eros is only lo ve
o f the beautiful. From this point o f view the discovery which transformed
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S O C R A T E S l 1 >
the young Sócrates to the later Sócrates is che discovery o f the ugly, o f thc
recalcitrant.
“And I said, ‘How doyou mean, Diotima? Is Eros then agly and bad?' And
she said, ‘Don’t blaspheme! O rdoyou belicvc chacwhateveris not beauti-
ful is necessarily ugly?’ ‘Yes, o f course.' ‘And if it is not wise, it is ignorant?
O r have you not become aware that there is something between wisdom
and ignorance?’ ‘What is that?’ ‘Don’t you know,’ shc said, ‘that to opine
corrcctly withouc being ablc to give an account is neither to have precise
knowledge— for how wouJd precise knowledge be a matter without an ac*
count [irracional]?-—ñor is it ignorance— for how couid ignorance be the
hitting upon that which is?— but surcly corrcct opinión is o f this sort, be-
twcen understanding [phronesis]and ignorance.’” (2 0 1 e 8 -2 0 2 a 9 )
“ ‘Well, then, don’c compel what is noe beautiful to be ugly, any more than
what is not good to be bad. So too in thc case o f Eros, since you yourself
187
CHAP T E R NÍNI
agrce that he is noc good any more than he is beautiful, don't any che
more believe that he must be ugly and bad, but something,’ she said, ‘be
tween the v w o '” ( 2 0 2 b l- 5 )
She adds now that eros is not good. From the fact that he is n ot beautiful it
does n ot follow that he is n ot good. She assumes that Sócrates will take it
for granted that the beautiful ¡s identical with the good, so natural is it to
idendíy these cwo things, but it is also a question. The re is no universal
agreement. In some cases all m en make a distinction between the beautiful
and the good. Therefore, it is n ot truc opinión to say that they are identical.
“ ‘And yet,' l said, ‘it’s agreed upon by all that he is a grcat god.' ‘D o you
mean by all,' she said, ‘thosc who don’t know or also those who know?'
‘No, all inclusively.' And she said with a laugh, ‘And juse how,’ she said,
‘Sócrates, could it be agreed that he was a great god by those who deny
that he is even a god?1” (2 0 2 b 6 -c 2 )
Sócrates rcbels against the conclusión that eros, since he is neither good ñor
beautiful, cannot be a god. For there is universal agreement as to his being
a god. At this point Diotim a laughs, a very rare occurrence in this dialogue.
I t has happencd only in one case hitherto— Aristophanes laughed. She
lacks the solemnity which one wouJd expect from a prophetess. And now
she says something absol utely overwhelming: H e is n ot even a god— not
cven not a great god, but not a god at all. Diotim a said that, n ot Sócrates.
“ ‘Who are they?11 said. ‘You are one,’ she said, ‘and I am one.’ And I said,
‘How,’ I said, ‘do you mean this?' And she said, ‘Easily. Tcll me, don't you
asscrt that all gods are happy and beautiful? Or would you daré to deny
that any onc o f the gods is not beautiful and happy?' ‘No, by Zeus, not I,'
I said.” (2 0 2 c 3 -9 )
D o you sec what she does? D o you see what pressure she puts on Sócrates?
“Would you daré to deny . . . ?” That is the first oath occurring in the dia
logue itself. There was one in the beginning by Apollodorus.
“ ‘And don't you mean that those who possess the good things and the
beautiful things are happy? ' ‘Certainly. ’ ‘But you have agreed that Eros, on
account o f his lack o f good and beautiful things, desires those very things
o f which he is in nccd.' ‘I have agreed.’ ‘How then would he who has no
share in the beautiful and good things be a god?’ ‘In no way, it seems.' ‘Do
you sec then,’ she said, ‘You too hold Eros not to be a god?’ ‘WelJ, what
ehen,' I said, ‘would Eros be? Mortal?' ‘Noc Ln the least.’ ‘Well, what then?’
‘Just as before,' she said, ‘between mortal and immortal.’ ‘Whac's that. Di*
188
S O C R A T E S ()>
otima?’ ‘A great daim on, Sócrates. For the daim onion is in its entirery be
tween god and m o r t a l .( 2 0 2 c l 0 —e l )
Eros is n ot a god because he i$ neither good ñor beautiful. Then she says he
is neither a mortal ñor an ¡mmortal. As beforc, if there are things which are
neither beautiful ñor ugly, then there is something which is in between.
There can also be something between mortal and immortal. Is this pos-
sible, wc have to ask. We can easily see that something is neither beautiful
ñor ugly, but is it true in all cases that there must be something in between?
W hat about numbers? Neither odd ñor even. Can you say o f a number it is
between odd and even? I t wouldn’t work. I t seems that the case o f mortal
and immortal is like the case o f odd and even rather than o f beautiful and
ugly. In other words, Sócrates makes now the logical error opposite that
which he made in the beginning. In the begjnning he denied a mean where
a mean was possi ble. H ere he accepts a mean where a mean is impossible.
Eros is n ot a god but a dem on, he belongs to the demonic world. This is
very interesting with a view to the broad the me o f this dialogue. T h e Sytn-
posium is the only Platonic dialogue which deais with a god. Phaedrus had
said he is the oldest god, Aristophanes had said he is the m ost philanthrop-
¡cal, Agathon had said he is the youngest and the highest god. Diotim a says
that he is n ot a god at all. I f we assume that Sócrates accepted the lesson o f
Diotim a, as I think is dear at the end, we must say that Sócrates did n ot be-
lieve in any o f these gods, i.e., in the gods o f the city, and the refere he was
accused and conde mned, W hcn he was accused, the accuser said, “Sócrates
does n ot respect the gods o f the city, but introduces new d a im o n t a * And
then, in the argument with the accuser M eletus, Sócrates says, “W hat do
you mean to say, that I do n ot believe In the gods o f the city, but that I be-
lieve in other gods?” And thcy said, “N o , you are a simple atheist.” Sócrates
answered, “You say I believe in d a im o n ia , but what are d a im o n ia if n ot ci-
ther gods or children o f gods?* H enee, if he believed in demonic things as
the accuser admitted, he surely believed in the gods and even in the gods o f
the city. This passage is quite interesting, in the A poiojfy 2 6 c , where a cer-
tain notion o f d a im o n is devclopcd.
Still, there is a great difficulty: Diotima had said eros is between the
mortal and the immortal. T h e whole demonic realm is between god and
the mortal. And then Sócrates says, “W ith what power?* This is a very rich
and pregnant statement. T o begin with it is wholly unintelligible how there
could be a being which is neither mortal ñor immortal. I f such a being
should exist it must have a powcr. In Plato’s Sophist ( 2 4 7 D - E ) we find this
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C H A P T E R S I N b
declaration: This and this only truly is which has the powcr to act on some-
thing el se, o r to be actcd upon. O n what docs eros act and by what is eros
acted upon? This question is answered by Diotim a in th c seque!.
w<With what powcr?’ I said. ‘Interpreting and convcying thc things from
human beings to gods, and the things from gods to human beings, che re-
quests and sacri fices o f the latter, and o f the former the injunctions and ex-
changcs for the sacrifices, and being in the middle o f both it filis it up, so
as for the whole itselfco have been bound together by itself.'* (2 0 2 e3 -7 )
Everything demonic is between the mortal and the immortal. In a way, that
¡s truc, not bccausc ¡t itself is mortal o r immortal but because it is thc medi-
ator between the immortal— gods— and the m ortal— men. Therefore it is
the bond o f the whole. The implicadon is that the whole consists only o f
gods, m en, and demons, which can, o f course, n ot be the final truth. Both,
gods and men, need a bond. The demonic realm makes them complete.
N cither gods ñor men are self-sufficient; thc self-sufficiency is created by
the demons. Sincc the demonic afifeets gods and m en, it is. Because what-
cver acts, is. But how d o we know that there is any truth to this assertion
that there are such demonic things? Shc will say it in thc sequel.
**A II d iv in a tí o n m o v e s th r o u g h th is , as w c ll as t h c a r t o f t h c p ric s ts w h o
dea! with sacrifices, mitiacions, incancations, all o f divinadon, and magic.’“
(202c7-203al)
H e re is the cm pineal proof: there are arts o f divi ni ng and thc arts o f the
priests. Thcse are two difierent facets o f some importante.
aiGod does not mingle with human being, but through this there is the
entire associadon and conversación thae gods have wich human beings,
both aslccp and awakc.'” (203a 1 -4 )
God does n ot mingle with m en, and that ineludes also sexual relations.
There are no sexual relations between gods and m en— quite an assertion.
That means there are no heroes, generated by an immortal father and a
mortal m other o r vice versa, In this connection I ask you to look up the
A pology o f Sócrates ( 2 7 á ) where this question is discussed.
WiAnd he who is wise in things ofthis sort is a demonic man [daim m ios],
but he who is wise in anything clse, whether it be about arts or some hand-
¡crafts, is vulgar [banausos].}*( 203a4-6)
She speaks here only o f intercourse, o r dialogue, o f gods toward men. The
intercourse Icading from gods to men as distinguished from thc one lead-
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S O C R A T E S ( I )
ing from mcn to gods. This intercourse requires a demonic man, a man
possessing the mande faculty as distinguished from the art o f the priest. You
$ce aJso that she speaks o f a demonic man— malc. Ts there no place for de-
m onic women? Strange. She, who should know, seems to speak only o f de
m onic men.
MThe$e daimottesarc many and o f all sores, and Eros too is one o f them.'
‘And who is his father,' I said, ‘and who the mochcr?** (203a6-8)
Ero$ is a dem on, not a god. The distincuon between demon and god as two
distinct classes o f beings seems to be o f Platonic origin. As a dem on, Eros is
a mediator betwecn men and gods. There are said to be o f course many me-
diators, Eros being one o f them , yet it is n ot wrong to say that the mediator
is Eros. And Krüger, to whose book 1 have previously referred, makes the
remark that this is really the difference between Chrisdanity and Plato; the
mediator is not Christ, it is Eros.
As a dem on, Eros is not blessed o r happy. Eros is, but he was n ot always,
How do we know? That is n ot said. He is a living being, gods and demons
being living beings. Now, since he was n ot always, and is a living being, he
must have parents. This is Sócrates’ conclusión, Diotima did n ot say that.
H itherto, Phaedrus's contention that eros has no parents was never con-
tested. Now it is denied: Eros does have parents. O ne thing is dear on the
basis o f Diotima’s premise: Eros can not have one divine parent and one
human parent, since gods and mcn d o n ot mingle. Could Eros n ot have
sprung from one parent only? Pausanias spoke o f the noble Aphroditc, who
has only one parent, a male parent. Sócrates tacitly denies this. In this re-
spect he is rationalistic. I f he is a living being who has com e into being he
must have two parents. Diotim a says it would be to o long to nárrate, nev-
ertheiess I will tell you. She does n ot nárrate but only tell. The brief account
in the sequel is the only part o f the whole Sytnposium, with the possible ex-
ception o f Aristophanes’ speech, which one could cali a myth. There is an
infinite literature on the Platonic myth. They all suffer, as far as I know, and
I don’t know al1 o f them , from the fect that the scholar himseif decides what
is a myth, a m ost unscholarly procedure. One has to find out from Plato
what a myth is. In other words, I would regard only that as a myth o f which
Plato o r his characters say it is a myth. Howevcr this may be, in a loosc way
we can say that the génesis o f a dem on is in Plato a mythical statement. Pre-
cisely because this is so glaringly mythical, we see, when reading Diotim a’s
speech as a whole, how amazingly unmythical it is. I t is really a Socratic di
alogue, but with the strange inversión that Sócrates is on the recciving end.
191
C H A P T t R N 1 N I'
“ ‘It is rather long to narrare/ she said, ‘but I shall cell you. When
Aphrodite was born, both al1 thc othcr gods and Resourcc, the son o f
Meds, werc hoíding a fcast. When they had dincd, Poverry carne to beg—
it was a festival after all— and shc hung around the door/" ( 2 0 3 b l- 5 )
The translación is perhaps not quite clear that Reso urce, o r power simply, is,
o f coursc, a god. That is clearly stated in the Greek. One other thing: There
is only one Aphrodite. Wc had been told that there were two by Pausanias
and Eryximachus. Since there is only one Aphrodite, there is only one Eros.
That is strict logic. There is, however, Aphrodite without Eros, for on the
birthday o f Aphrodite Eros was generated. Aphrodite precedes Eros. This
i$ also a corrcction o f Pausanias. In other words, the dem otion o f Eros leads
to a promotion o f the other gods.
“ ‘Resourcc then got drunk on néctar— there was not yet wine—
(2 0 3 b 5 -6 )
Why does she say there was no wine yet? Although it was in the very olden
times, Eros is not so young as he might seem to be on the basis o f
Agathon’s speech.
. and heavy with it he went into the garden o f Zeus and siept/"
(2 0 3 b 6 -7 )
W hcther Eros is a descendent from Zeus is, to say the least, n ot clear. Poros,
his fother, was the son o f M etis, the first wife o f Zeus, buc o f course we
don’t know whether Zeus was the fether. Eros has some rclation to Zeus
since he was generated in Zeus’s garden. His relation to Zeus is obscure.
This is n ot unimportant; we shall see later what it means.
“ ‘Povcrty then, plotting to gct a child from Resource because o f her own
resorcclcssness, lay down beside him and conccivcd Eros/" ( 2 0 3 b 7 - c l)
“ ‘It's for chis reason that Eros has become the artendant and servant o f
Aphrodite, being born on her birthday and, at the same rime, being by na-
ture a lovcr conccrncd with thc beautiful, is a lovcr o f Aphrodite beca use
she is beautihil. Eros then, because he is thc son o f Resourcc and Povcrty,
has got settlcdin the same sort o f fortune as theirs/" (203c 1 - 4 )
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C HA n t R NI N t
becausc his m other is ignorant. This would be the only possi ble term o f
comparison. L ct us sce.
WiFor chis is the way it is. N ot one o f the gods phüosophizes, any more
than he de sires co bccome wisc— for he is— and whoever else is wíse, he
docs not philosophize either. And the ignorant in turn do noc philoso-
phize or desirc to becomc wise. For this is the very thing in which igno*
ranee is hard: not to be bcautiful and good and thoughrful but to sccm to
oncsclf to be sufficicnt. So he who believes he is not in need docs not de*
sirc thac which he believes he does noc need.’" ( 2 0 4 a l-7 )
194
S O C R A T E S ! I )
tophanes’ play ¡s the modcl for this passage herc. This wouJd be one o f thc
greater compíiments which Plato pays to Aristophanes in this pardcuJar
work. In that play, verses 5 5 0 - 5 5 4 , the view that povcrty is $clf-$ati$ficd
beggary ¡s thc view o f the vulgar. But the view that poverty ¡s love o f work,
to get out o f the misery, is the view o f that half-divine Poverty herself. Plato
herc imitates for his own reasons an ambiguity occurring in Aristophanes.
The issue is settled. We know the parents o f Eros by now and he turns to an-
other subject: W ho are these philosophers?
“ ‘Who then, Diotima,' I said, ‘are thosc who philosophize, íf thcy are nei-
ther the wise ñor the ignorant?’ ‘This,' shc said, ‘is by now clcar even to a
child: thosc who are bctwccn thcm both, o f whom Eros would be one.
For wisdom is o f the most beaucifiil things, and Eros is eros about the
bcautiful, and henee it is necessary that Eros be a philosopher, and being a
philosopher to be between wise and ignorant. His birth is the cause o f
this, for he is o f a wise and rcsourccful father, and a not wise and rcsourcc*
less mother.'” (2 0 4 a 7 -b 7 )
H e says his m other i$ not wise, he does n ot say she is ignorant, The philoso
pher, to o , is n ot wise by definí tion.
195
C H A PTER H IÑ E
“ 'But whom you bclkved to be Eros, it’s not a surprising experience that
you undcrwcnt. You believed, as it seems to me in makíng an ¡nfcrcnce
from what you say, that that which is loved is Eros, not that which loves.
It’s for this rcason that Eros appearcd to you to be altogethcr beautiful.
For ¡n face thc lovablc is that which is really beautiful, delicace, perfect, and
blessed; but that which is just loving is with thc different kind o f look
(id e a ] that I described.*” ( 2 0 4 c l - 6 )
According to Diotim a, thc basic error o f Sócrates was that he believed eros
to be che beloved but not the loving. The truth is that eros is not thc
beloved but the loving. This subject is n ot wholly alien to us. Phaedrus said
that the lover is inferior to the beloved— more divine than thc beloved, but
inferior to him. The beloved Achilles was more honored than Patroclus.
Diotim a says the lover is less divine that thc beloved and interior to him.
W hat is the beloved according to her? The beautiful. The beloved is the
truly beautiful, but the lover offers another sight, has another shape. You
see al so the words here “that which is loving* and “that which is loved* are
ncuters, n ot eros or the gods. T h e word which Plato uses here Ln thc end
[id e a ]) is the word from which id ea is derived. At 2 0 4 b 7 he had spoken o f
the nature o f eros. The nature o f eros and the ¡dea o f eros are the same. T o
indicate the paradox one could makc this remark: In a way eros is, for Plato,
nature in the sense in which we commonly mean the word— things come
into being and perish. Eros, we can say, is thc heart o f com ing into being
and perishing. Eros, wc can say, is the nature o f nature, the essence o f na
ture. This is at least part o f the Platonic argument.
A few words about IIIA . I f one were to insert here, in the argument
betwecn Sócrates and Diotima, Agathon’s thesis, one would arríve at the
conclusión that not only Eros, but all gods who are prompted by love o f
beauty, are not gods. But you see how difficult this is: it is divided bcrwcen
two difFerent pcople. Can you impute to Diotima o r Sócrates what Aga-
thon said? This implication is not brought up in thc conversación between
Sócrates and Diotima. The conclusión she draws is that Eros is n ot a god
but a dem on, a mediator betwecn gods and men, betwecn m or tais and im-
mortals. T o explain this she gives the genealogy o f Eros. Eros descended
from wealth and poverty. This means, Kowever, from a god— the tather—
and a dem on— the mother. Yet, as we have seen, Eros can be perfeedy un-
derstood from his m other'$ side. Eros can be perfeedy understood without
recourse not only to his father but to any o f the gods. All characteristics o f
Eros are tound in his mother. In granó ng that desi re, love, arises from lack,
from poverty ítself, do you n ot need another principie pointing toward full-
196
S O C R A T E S t i )
ness, indicating thc direction which desire, lack, takcs? And is n ot that to-
ward which dcsire movcs higher than the desire and thcrcforc divine? One
can say this: There must be someehing divine, something imraortal, some-
thing unchanging. This condición is sacisfied by the Platonic ideas, what-
ever they may mean. T h e beloved is higher than the loving, than eros, and
the beloved may very well be the ideas. We shall find some evidence for this.
We must keep in mind another difficulty. Poverty and Wealth are com*
pared to wisdom and ignorance. Eros is especiaUy in between wisdom and
ignorance* This State between wisdom and ignorance is described by D io-
tima in two entirely different terms: O n the one hand it is called right opin-
ion. Right opinión is in a way wisdom because it is truc opinión. On the
other hand, it is ignorance because it does n ot know why it is right. The
stage between ignorance and wisdom is also caíied philosophy. At first
glance philosophy and right opinión seem to be two entirely different
things.
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10 SOCRATES (2)
“And I said, ‘That’s all co the good, stranger, foryou are speaking beauti-
fully; but if Eros is o f ihis kind, whac use does he have for human beings?’”
(2 0 4 c 7 -8 )
utlt is this, Sócrates, that I shall try to tcach you next. Eros is o f this sort
and has come to be in this way, but he is o fth e beautiful things, as you say.
I f someone should ask us, “In what respecc is Eros o f the beautiful things,
Sócrates and Diotima?” It’s more plain in the foliowíng way: He who
loves the beautiful things lovcs. What docs he love?’ And I said, ‘For thcm
to become his.’” (2 0 4 d l- 7 )
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C H A P T E R I' f N
and abovc ail there is something connecting thc rwo rcalms. It follows from
the very distinction between ideas and nonideas, thac there are no ideas o f the
connecting link. Now, we have secn that eros connects the unchangeable, the
immortal, with the mortal; the refere thcre cannot be, ¡n thc simplest terms,
an idea o f love, love being essentially in between ideas and nonideas.
“ ‘But the answer,' she said, ‘still longs for thc following question: What
wíll he have whoever gets thc beautiful things?' I saíd 1 was hardly able any
longer to give a ready answer to thi$ question. ‘Well,' she said, ‘if one
should c han ge the question and ask using the good instead o f the beauti*
ful. Come, Sócrates, he who leves the good things loves, what does he
love?’ ‘To bccomc his,’ I said. ‘And what will he have whoever gets the
good things?' ‘I can answer this more rcadiiy,’ I said. ‘He will be happy.'"
(2 0 4 d 8 -e 7 )
T h e subject is changcd from the beautiful to thc good and then thc answer
becom es casy. This implies one crucial thing: that the good is not idéntica!
with thc beautiful.
“ ‘The reason is,’ she said, ‘that by the possession ofgood things the happy
are happy, and there is no longer any need to ask further “And what does
h e w h o w a n ts t o b e h a p p y w a n t ? ," b u t t h e a n s w e r s e e m s t o b e c o m p le te .*
‘You'rc speaking the truth,' I said.” ( 2 0 5 a l- 4 )
Seems to be, she says. Happiness seems to be an answer which does not
need any further question. It seems to be thc end o f man. Wc have herc an
examplc o f what right opinión is. It is right opinión; it is n ot knowledge, for
“it seems.” It is n ot knowledge because ¡t leaves únelear what happiness
consists in. M en divine that they seek happiness, and they have a general
understanding o f what it is and we can crudely say, Happiness is a State o f
contentedness, you want nothing further, and at the same time an enviable
State. Because a m oron, for ex ampie, might be perfcctly conté nt but we
would no longer say he is happy. This all men divine.
“ ‘Now this wanting and this eros, do you believe it is common to all hu
man beings and everyone wants the good things to be thcirs always, or
how do you say?' ‘In this way,' I said. ‘It is common to all.* ‘Why, then,
Sócrates,' she said, ‘do we deny that all (ove, if, that is, all love the same
things and always, but we say some love and some do not?' ‘I myself also
wonder,’ I said.” (2 0 5 a 5 -b 3 )
We have, then, at least a beginning for a possi ble interpretation. All men al
ways desire to be happy. This is eros. Eros is n ot desire for the beautiful, as
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C H A P T E R TEN*
from certain aspeas o f eros, from the seamy side o fe ros. Perhaps this is pre-
pared by com m on sense, which also calis certain forms o f the quest for hap-
piness eros.
- ‘So too in the case oferos. The cntirc dcsirc for the good things and for
being happy is, in general, “the greatest and dcceitful eros for cvcryonc."
But thosc who turn in many different dirccnons toward it, cithcr in terms
o f money making or lovc o f cxcrcisc or philosophy, they are not said to
love and are not callcd lovcrs; but thosc who go along a certain single
species o f it and are in earnest abouc it gec the ñame o f the whole: “eros,*1
“to love," and “lover$.m ‘You run che risk o f speaking che truth,* I said."
( 2 0 5 d l- 9 )
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S O C R A T E S ( 2 )
utAnd still a certain logos is spoken of,1 she said, ‘that says that those,
whocverseek their own half, love . . (2 0 5 d l0 -c l)
You see the interesting thing; this allegedly antedated Aristophanes’ speech
by decades. B u t we know better.
U4. . . but my logos denies that love is either o f a haJf or o f a whole, unless
no doubt, my comrade, ic is ín face good, sincc human beings are willing
to have their fcct and hands cut off, if it seems to them that the ir own are
no good. For each o f them severally does not chcrísh their own, unless
someone calis the good one’s own and o f oneself and the bad whatever is
alien, since ehere is nothing elsc that human beings love than the good. Or
do thcy seem so coyou>’" (2 0 5 e I - 2 06a 1)
All eros is love o f the good, and all desire for the good, however under-
stood, is eros. This is the cxact view. Eros is, therefore, not in particular love
o f one’s h alf o r the whole, because there is no reason to assume that the
other half or the whole as such should be good. Diotima flady contradicts
Aristophanes. There is a joke here. She said at first that the ñame eros is as-
cribed to a pare o f eros, let u$ say to a h alf o f eros. Now she tums from the
error which limits love to half o f love to the error which limits love to love
o f half. I t seems to be a mere joke, but it is more chan that. Love consists o f
two p a ra — o f two halves; one half o f love is love o f the good, the other half
is love o f the half. Namely, as Aristophanes understood it, love o f onc’s
own. Diotim a denies the existe nce o f the latter. B u t it is m ore precise to say
she abstraets. Explicitly she denies that it exists. Yct on what grounds? Men
don’t carc for their own, she says. L ook at the people who have their legs
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C H A P T B R t e n
amputated, their tceth extracted, etc.; they throw away their own if they are
bad. T o dig a little decper, why d o they do it? Because they love to live, be-
cause they love their own life, their own psyche, which means n ot only soul
but also Ufe. I refcr you to L aw s 8 7 3 c , if you think this is n ot a thought
which could have occurred in Plato. M en love themselves and they love the
good things for themselves. They want to appropriate them , to make them
their own. In the passage we have rcad, Diodma says, “unless no doubt, my
comrade, it is in fact good.” I d o n 't know whether the re is another instancc
in dassical Grcek literature where a woman calis a man comrade. I regard it
as possi ble that Sócrates he re, as it were, drops the mask and speaks to
Aristophanes.
“ ‘No, by Zeus, not to me,’ Isaid. ‘Isit rcally the case, chen,' shesaid, ‘that
one is to say so unqualifiedly that human bcings love the good?' ‘Yes,' I
said.” (2 0 6 a 3 -5 )
In the sequel we shall see that it is n ot so simple. The young Sócrates was
simple in believing that men love the good. Now we get an addition.
“ ‘What about this?’ she said. ‘Mustn’t one add also that they love the
good to be thcírs?' ‘One m ustaddit.’ ” (2 0 6 a 6 -8 )
You see “theirs”— 1 want the good for myself. I want to make it my own.
You see the thing is more subde. Sócrates moves away from this self.
wtAnd not only that it be cheirs but also be always theirs?’ ‘One muse add
chis too.’” (2 0 6 a 9 -1 0 )
The re are two addidons made, three points: All men love the good, all men
love the good for themselves, they love to have it always. The center one has
to d o with one’s appropriatíng it, making it one’s own. T h en she summa-
rizes.
“ ‘So eros, in summary,’ she said, kis o f the good being onc’s own fbrever?'
‘You speakmost tnify,’ I said.” ( 2 0 6 a l l - l 3 )
Now we know: eros is love for the sempitemal possession o f the good. That
is the strict and exact definidon o f eros. M ore precise: the sempitemal pos
session by oncsclf o f the good. These are the three Ítems and we must see
what will happen to them in the futurc.
w‘Since eros is always this,1 she said, ‘in what manner and in what action
would the zeal and ¿ntensicy o f those whopursuc it be called eros? What in
fact is this deed? Can you say?’” ( 2 0 6 b l- 4 )
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S O C R A T E S ( J i
‘“ WeU, in that case, Diotima,* I said, ‘I would noc be admiring you fbr
wisdom and be frequently coming to you in order to learn these very
things.' ‘Wcll, I shaJl td l you,' shc said. ‘This [deed] is birth in the beauti-
luí both in terms o f the body and in terms o f the soul.' ‘As to what you
mean,’ I said, ‘thcre is necd o f divination, and I don't understand.’ ‘Wcll,’
she said, ‘I shall speak more plainly. All human beings, Sócrates, are preg-
nant both in terms o f the body and in terms o f the soul, and whenever
they gct to be o fa certain age, our nature desires to give birth.’” (2 0 6 b 5 -
c4)
All human beings are in a sensc women, they all are pregnant. There is then
a nonhuman begetter. This is said by a woman. She will corrcct herself later,
but this ís the way in which she begins. T h e subje ct o f the pregnaney o f all
men will com e up later, perhaps you know from another Platonic dialogue,
about Sócrates being a midwifc, which impües that m en, to o , in a way can
be pregnant. This whole subject is here alluded to. Now we get the answer.
“It is incapablc o f giving birth in the ugly, but in the beautiful. For the in-
tercourse [being together] o f a man and a woman is birth. This matter is
divine and is the dcathlcss in the animal that is mortal, the pregnaney and
the generation. And that which is in the disharmonious cannoc come to
be; the ugly is in disharmony with everything divine, and che beautiful is
harmonious. Beaucy [Kallone] is Fate [Moira] and Eilythuia for genera-
don. It is on account o f this that whenever the pregnant thing draws near
the beautiful, it bccomes cheeríul and in its cheerfolness it dissotves [be-
comes relamed] and gives birth and generates; but whenever it draws near
the ugly, scowling and in pain it coils up and turns away and rolls up and
does not generate, but in Holding on to the embryo it bears it hard. It is
from this so urce that for the one who is pregnant and already swelling the
excitement about the beautiful bccomes ovcrwhclming, on account o f its
releasing the one who has it from great labor pains.’” < 2 0 6 c 4 -e l)
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C H A P T 6 R TEN
“ ‘For eros, Sócrates/ shc said, ‘is not o fth e beautiful, as you believe.’ ”
( 2 0 6 e l- 2 )
Now the break with Agathon occurs, if we fbrget for one m om ent that Di-
otima is said to be the speaker. In this section Sócrates rejeets the two no-
tions regarding eros: Eros is love o f onc’s own— Aristophanes’ assertíon;
eros is love o f the beautiful— Agathon'$ assertíon. Eros is not love for the
beautiful; the beautiful is only a transitional stage, a ruse o f nature you
could say.
“ ‘Well, what then?’ ‘O f the gene radon and birth in the beautiful.' ‘Al-
right/Isaid/’ (2 0 6 c 4 -6 )
T h at is the end o f this section which I cali IIIB . It i$ the central section o f
the Sócrates-Diotim a conversation, and we see why it deserves to be put in
the center. We have the two alternad ve interpretations regarding love—
íove as love o f one’s own and love as love o f the beautiful— both rejected.
The question which was raised is now answered. T o repeat: Love is love for
the sempiternal possession o f the good. But the only form o f love which we
206
S O C R A T E S { 2 i
209
C H A P T E K T E N
thc basis for these gods is dcstroyed and the question is what will be the
next stcp. Because love o f the beautiful and love o f one’s own will have to
be rcstored. They exi$t and they are the most importan t manifestations o f
love. But the question is what will be thc fate o f the gods in this restoration.
L isten er: Why are they guardians o f the beautiful rather than the good?
Mr. Strauss: What is the good now herc as distinguished from the beau
tiftil? What quaíity o f thc gods do you have in mind when you speak now o f
thc good?
L isten er: Perfection.
Mr. Strauss: Which perfection?
L isten er: Their immortality, happiness, beaucy.
Mr. Strauss: I think their most outstanding feature, at first glance, apart
from their beaucy, would be their concern wíth right. For example, Zeus is
thc king. W hat does that mean? As he is presented by Hom er, he is a very
superior king who is concerned with right. That H om er questions this is o f
course true; but d o n 't fbrget that it is a gross injustice, H clcn and París,
which underlies the Trojan War. I f you would say the wisdom o f the gods,
then the question is whcther this is truly achicved by the Olympian gods. I f
you take the notion o f gods as the most perfect beings, the question arises,
Can thc re be a pluraiity o f such beings? Thereforc the many monotheistic
remarks occurring in Plato. But, ifw e disregard this great difficulty for onc
m om ent, what is characteristic o f the gods? The mere fact that there is onc
goddess, Athena, singled out with a view to wisdom, Zeus more for his
royal wiliness, shows that this is n ot characteristic o f the gods. But what
stands out in each case is their immortal beauty, and even that is qualified in
the case o f Hephaestus with his limping, and shows that there are other el-
ements there too. These two heterogeneous elements— the sheer beaucy,
which in itsclf has no relación to guardianship o f right, and the other one,
thc concern with avenging, with concern for right, which can lead to an
aspee t o f the gods which is at least n ot emphatically beautiful— I beüevc
that is what he means.
L isten er: Eros understood as the sempiternal possession o f the good
does n ot exhaust eros because it still leaves the problem o f the individual.
D oes generación come under the heading o f the good?
M r Strauss: This is perfectly correct. That is what the good means herc.
We are told to find the answer to our question in the phenomenon o f hu-
man procreation. We have thc elem ent o f immortal ity in the fact o f sem
piternal procreation. Where do we find thc fact o f thc good? I t must be
implied in there. Mere being. That might be, but I must tell you that this
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S O C R A T E S ( 2 )
question w¡U be taken up by Diotima in che nexc part o f hcr specch. And in
this part, where the same phenomenon is discussed— procreation— the
good is dropped. Procreación supplics sempiternity. The good is o u t, be-
cause mere being in che narrow sense o f the word is hardiy good. L et us
wair for that.
L isten er: Procreation does n ot only mean the continuance o f a being or
o f the blood, but you could say the good comes in by carrying on a set o f
social valúes, a valué System which a person considere the good.
M r Strauss: May I take issue with the term ‘valué1 you used, this is not
translatable into Plato, and is a misleading term. You mean the good and
noble and just things. N o one every answered the question W hat is a valué?
Is an apple a valué, i f I desirc it? There ¡s really no clanty what a valué means,
whether it is an apple ifdesired o rth e principie why I desire it— say, because
it is healthy, o r pleasant. I think it is reaily a bad word. We can, o f course,
speak o f the valué o f an umbrella, which is an entirely legitímate use o f the
term. B u t to come back to your question and forget what some might cali
the se mande side o f the question, I would say this: The consideraron on
which you insist is absolutely reasonable and is, therefore, also considered
in the next part, in the central section o f the last part o f Diotima’s speech. I
will indica te in what way: Plato always insists that in order to understand
any human phenomenon you must look at the highest and most complete
manifestation o f it. Contrary to the tendeney o f social Science today which
looks mostiy at the poorest manifestauons o f it— it looks at the narrowest,
which can most easily be re produce d for quesdonnaire situations and
things like that. T o take up your question, Plato would say, let us look at
that. H e calis this, in a languagc which is some what metaphoric but at least
as intelligible as the valué terminology, the begetting, the generation in the
souls o f men. In other words, mere procreation will n ot produce the valúes
o f society, as you can easily see; when such a baby is transferred into an en
tirely difierent society, it will n ot be affected by the valúes o f the society in
which it was generated. The question is, then, the begetting o f notions
which are noble and just in the souls o f men. Very well, Plato says, if you
want to study that, let us look at it on the highest leve!. O n the highest level
¡t does n ot take place by the parents as parents. Parents as parents may not
be the best, though they might be. O n the highest level it is done by the
highest form o f educators. By educators you must n ot think o f Columbia
Teachers College. W hat Plato has in mind is che greatest poets. In other
words, he has in mind, to speak o f the Anglo-Saxon countries, the highest
form o f begetter— Shakespeare. There may be perfect concord among par-
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S 0 C R A 1 F. S { 2 )
for sexual unión, but since sexual unión ¡s by nature dirccted toward gener
ación it has chat.
L isten er: This passage which begins with the notion that all men are
pregnant, then shifts to the notíon o f procreación but with the earlier use o f
poctry— the ardst brínging fbrth a work o f art. Is this a kind o f begetting
and producing?
M r Strauss: Sócrates and Diotima have a certain malice against the po-
ets, and that will com e out. T o say briefly what wíl! happcn in the seque!: In
A there will be a restoration o f lo ve o f one’s own; in B again love o f onc’s
own, where the beautiful comes in as an indispensable means. This is where
he talks about the poets and he talks again about the mental parallel to bod-
ily begetting, where the purpose o f the whole thing is not beauty but im-
mortality, though it does go through beauty. H om er produces beautiful
children, the lit a d and the Odyssey>in order to becom e immortal. The pro-
duction o f beautiful things is n ot the end, which is a nasty accusation you
can say, but here we are. In the third part, the final part, where he speaks o f
what people would cali philosophy, the love o f the beautiful triumphs.
Sócrates’ whole speech is characterized by the following fact: It begins with
a refutation o fth e assertion that love is love o fth e beautiful and it ends with
an unbelievable re assertion that love is love o f the beautiful. This massive
contradiction is o f course n ot done because Plato had a loose mind, but be-
cause he wanted to do something. H e deliberately abstracted from the two
forms o f love— love o f one’s own and love o f the beautiful— to see what
com es out o f it, a perfectly com m on scíentific procedure, and then he re-
stores them. This has also the following meaning, that eros, which is the
subject, is subjected to a purification, to a catharsis. But what we calJ in the
moral sense purification is, intellectually, an analysis, dividing it into essen-
tial parts and seeing the difference.
L isten er: ln this section there seems to be sometí mes a false disjunction
between love o f the beautiful o r love o f the good versus love o f one’s own.
Perhaps there is a third, what Aristotic calis friendship. I think this has to be
taken into account.
M r. Strauss: Surely. B u t the question is only that what Aristotle under-
stands by friendship is n ot what one primarily means by eros. Aristotle also
mentions the remarkable fact that when people are truly friends they like to
be together. D on ’t underestimate that. This means n ot merely the writing
o f letters, but they themselves, i.e., the ir boches, together. This has nothing
to do with any indeccncies, but it is n ot unimportant that the so-called per
sonal prescnce is required for the highest fulfillment o f friendship. But
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C H A P T F. R TEN
truly, it is n ot the same as eras as u sed here in this emphatic sense. Can one
speak as easily as one can speak o f passionate eros o f passionate friendship?
I believe that friendship is cooler than eros.
L istcn cr: Supposc you put ¡t in the realm o f eros and speak of, say, what
pcriains between husband and wife, that somehow there seems to be a faJ-
sification o f this reality by reducing it to an eros for the preservation o f the
race.
M r Strauss: That this ¡s true is perfectly clear. This was the question
which has been raised before, n ot only the procreation but also the educa-
non o f the offspring.
L isten cr: It seems to me that there is an essential part o f this relationship
which can be legitimately abstracted from.
Mr. Strauss: That ¡s a very great question and, as all these questions, it
has been treated by the very great minds. In marriage two people o f differ-
cn t sex lead a noble Ufe together which they couid n ot possibly do in any
other way, and yet there is no reference to offspring. Kant, who was very far
removed form Plato and Aristotlc and who was very much concerned with
universally valid fbrmulations, tried to solve this question by his notorious
definition o f marriage— because he was thinking o f this fact o f childless
marriage— and therefore he said, and 1 can only say I am n ot responsible
fbr this definition: marriage is a Ufelong unión for the purpose o f mutual
use o f the genitals. This happens when you try to have a universally valid
formula for a complicated phenomenon which does n ot allow it. Plato and
Aristotlc were wiser. They said we can give a formula for the best, for the
perfect, and we thus imply the various forms o f deficiencics. Therefore I
would say that a childless marriage between the noblest human beings is yet
defective. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that a given marriage,
productivc o f offspring, say twenty-five children, is humanly impossible
compared with such a childless marriage. Yet the essential relation o f the
living together, in the highest sense, is the intention o f nature, the procre
ation and education o f children. This seems to me the only sensible view
unlcss we say, W ho cares for nature? D on ’t forget that the difference be
tween men and women is also a bodily difference.
[In answer to a question:] This noble man and this noble woman, where
there is no relation o f the body but only friendship— why should they
marry? Why should they Uve together? This friendship between a man and
a woman may be very high, but it is n ot marriage. Human things are com
plicated and according to the Platonic and Aristotelian view the only uni-
versality we can legitimately find in human things is on the level o f per-
214
S O C R A T E S ( a j
tt*So ali these things shc used to tcach me, whenever shc talked about
erotic things, and once she asked m e . . .,w (2 0 7 a 5 -6 )
215
11 SOCRATES (3)
216
S O CR AT E S (i )
“ ‘What, Sócrates, do you believe is the cause o f this eros and desire?”'
(2 0 7 a ó -7 )
Diotima here begins the investigation o f the cause o f this eros o r desíre.
Eros is here n o longer treated as a dem on, for if he werc treated as a demon
the question o f his cause would no longer arise; the question o f the cause o f
Eros with a capital E has been answered. The inquiry which begins here is
philosophic and in no way mythological; it is physiologic, i.e., concerned
with the nature o f this particular phenomenon. Furthcrm ore, shc asks tor
the cause o f this eros, namely, eros as desi re for procreation. This eros alone
will be discusscd here.
“ ‘O r arcn't you awarc how uncannily all be ases are disposed whenever
they desire, both the terrestrial and the winged, that all are sick and croti-
cally disposed, first in regard to mixing together, and second in regard to
the raising o f what is born, and they are ready to fight on their bchalf, the
217
C H A P T E R El . B V E K
weakest againsc che scrongest and co dic for them, whilc chcy chcmsclvcs
are rackcd by hunger, so as co bring thcm up, and there is nothing eUc
which they don't do; for in che case o f human beings,* she saíd, ‘one mighc
believe thac they do these things on che basis o f calculación; bue what is the
cause in the case o f beasts chat they are so crotically disposed? Can you
say?'” (207a7-cl)
218
I . H A P T B R E L E V E N
The cause o f eros is the subject. The mortal nature craves immortaiity. Pre-
viously she had said, in section IIIB , that he craves immortaiity togcther
with the good. Now she says eros is desire only for immortaiity; the good i$
tacidy dropped.
“ ‘And noc only in his body, but also in his soul, his ways, characters, opin-
ions, desires, pleasures, pains, fears— cach o f these never is prese nc in
him as the same, but some are coming to be, and some are perishing.’ ”
( 2 0 7 e l- 5 )
220
S O C R A T E S ( 3 }
What ¡s truc o f the body, that it doesn’t last, is true also o f what in modern
languagc would be called consciousness— thc Greeks say thc soul. But, in-
terestingly enough, now she speaks n ot only o f the loss talán g place in time*
but o f the recovery as well. I f living is dying, which, in a sense, is truc, it is
also reviving. There is a fundamental difference between the dying o f a ce 11
in m e, o r o f hair by being cut off, and my death simply, becausc 1 ccase to
be.
“‘And still far stranger chan this is thac the Sciences too, not only do some
o f them come to be and others perish for us, but also each one o f che S c i
ences undergoes the same thing. For what is called “to practice” is so on
the grounds that the Science is going out, for thc going out o f a Science is
forgetting and practice is the relnsertion again o f a new memory in place
o f that which is going away, and it preserves the Science, so as for it to be
thought to be thc same. In this manner everything mortal is preserved,
not by absolutely being always che same, as the divine is, but by thc fact
that that which is going away and getting oíd leaves behind anocher young
such as it itself was. By this device, Sócrates/ she said, ‘mortal partakes of
immortality, both body and everything else, but che immortal does it in
another way. So don’t wonder that everything by nature honors its own
of&pring, for chis kind o f zea! and eros attends on everything for the salce
o f immortality/” (207e5-208b6)
The key the me seems to be, eros is love o f immortality. T h e good as good
is n o longer the theme. L et us consider a few details: We chan ge constantly,
she says, and that means, o f course, we are. We remain alive. We could not
change if we were not. We constantly change so much that every part o f us
changes; for instance, every single piece o f knowledge we have changes. Let
us assume you have complete possession o f a mathcmatical theory— even
that changes. In what sense? It is the same piece o f knowledge which is re-
covered. In spite o f the change there is permanence, whereas in the case o f
blood and bones it is n ot the same that is recovered. I f a cell disintegratcs a
new cell is formed. But the Pythagorean theorem comes back as identically
the same theorem. There is, then, also permanence o f the same; but in thc
case o f every individual living being there is a finite permanence. T h e tran-
sition from a living being to its offspring is esscntially dififerent from the
transítion o f one stage in the life o f one living being to thc next stage. In
other words, the immortality o f the species is radically dififerent from the
immortality o f thc individual; but the immortality o f the individual is not
available to the brute, and tacidy to aii living beings. M ortal beings partake
221
C H A P T E R E L E V E N
222
S O C R A T E S { i i
“And 1, when I hcard che logos wondered and said, ‘Very w dl.’ I said,
4Wisest Diotima, is chis the way thcsc things cruly are? ’ And she, just as the
perfecc sophists,said. . . ” (2 0 8 b 7 -c l)
Sócrates again takes the initiative, the only other time he took it was at IIIB
(2 0 4 c 7 ), the central part o f the whole speech with Diotima; and now again
in IIIC , the central part o f the subdivisión. Sócrates had been told at 2 0 7 C
n ot to wonder, but after he heard Diotim a’s argument, he began to won
der, i.e., he is incredulous. Yet at the end he says, I have been persuaded by
Diotima. I f that is the case, it can only be by I1IC 2 and 3. While Sócrates
was still incredulous, he called Diotima “wisest.” W hen he delivers the
speech to the symposium, he calis her the perfect sophist. In the Sympo-
siu tn , sophist is a term o f praise; eros himself, fbr exampie, is called a sophist
and at the same dme a philosopher. As a philosopher he doesn’t possess wis-
dom , he only seeks it; when he is called a sophist, he is n ot a perfect sophist,
a complete possessor o f wisdom.
“‘Know well, Sócrates, since ifyou are willing to glancc at the love o f honor
in the case o f human beings, you would wonder at its irTationality íf you
don’t understand what I have said, when you rcflect on how uncannily they
are disposed by the eros o f becoming renowncd and “to lay down deathless
fame for ever.” O n its behalf they are prepared to run all risks to a still
greater degree than on behalf o f their childrcn, and to spend money and
toil at any kind o f toil whatsocvcr and to die fbr ic. (2 0 8 c l-d 2 )
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( HA PT E R ELEVEN
or for the beautifui, but for immortality. In the first case we have seen that
love for immortality through procreation, is, in fect, an extended love for
onc’s own. L et us see what love o f eterna! femé pro ves to be on closer in-
spection.
a 'Since do you believe,' she said, ‘that Alcestis would have died for Ad-
mctus, or Achilks dicd after Pacroclus, or your own Codrus die beforc on
bchalf o f the kingship o f his children, if they were not believing there
would be an immortal memory o f themselves about virtuc, which we now
have ofthem ?’” (2 0 8 d 2 -6 )
Ambición i$ concem ed with immortal farne for virtuc— thesc are the reaüy
important cases o f immortal femé. That means that ambition is not con
cerned with virtue as such. Virtue comes in only as an indispensable means
for getting immortal femé. Can you see he re an implication? I f ambition,
love o f immortality in the form o f immortal femé, is concem ed with the im
mortality o f femé and n ot with virtue, what kind o f eros is it then? Eros o f
onc’s own. In the children your bodily image is perpetuated; here a shadow,
your shadow, is perpetuated. The first two examples, as you may recall,
were used by Phaedrus, 1 7 9 b -1 8 0 b , as examples o f eros for other human
beings, lovers and beloved, which prove that such sacrificial deaths were
honored also by the gods. Diotim a uses these two examples as examples o f
eros for femé and speaks only o f their femé among men. Silcnce about the
gods here. Phaedrus’s central examplc was that o f thc singer Orpheus, who
cut a poor figure, who was n ot prepared to die for his beloved, ñor, it seems,
for immortal femé. Diotima replaces Orpheus with an Athenian example,
the oíd Athenian king Codrus. In Codrus’s case, as distinguished from that
o f Alcestis and Achilles, love o f offspring was combined with love o f femé,
and that throws light on the love o f fame. Love o f offspring and love o f
femé are akin to one another. B oth forms o f love are forms o f love o f one’s
own.
“ ‘That is fer from being the case,’ she said, ‘but I suspcct cvcryonc toils at
everything for the sake o f deathless virtue and a famous repucation o f this
kind, and to the extene that they are better, to that excent they do it more;
for they love the immortal.’ ” (2 0 8 d 6 -e l)
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C H A P T E R E L E V E N
also rcmember Agathon’s remark about the gods who were inventor crafts-
m en— Hcphacstus, etc.— prompted by lovc o f the beautiful. Now wc know
one thíng: gíving birth to prudencc.
“ 'B u t by far the greatest and mosc beaudful kind o f prudence is the order-
ing and arrangement o f cides and houscholds, the ñame for which is mod-
eradon and justice .*** (2 0 9 a 5 - 8 )
T h e sccond kind o f eros strives in the híghest case for giving birth to polit-
ical o r econom ic prudence. According to Plato there is no essential difFcr*
en t betwcen city and household, a thesis with which Aristodc takes issuc at
the beginning o f che P olitics. Political o r econom ic prudence is the highest,
and is identified here with moderation and justice. There is a passage in the
P haedo, 8 2 a -b , wherc it is said: “T h e vulgar and political virtue which men
cali moderation and jusdee and which aríses from habituation without phi-
losophy and intellect.” T h at is not the same as what he means here. There
is no reference to habituation here, for example. We must take this as a
much higher thing.
We must see n ot only what Plato mentions but also what he does not
mention. Three virtucs are mentioned here, but there are four. Diotima is
silent about courage. As appears from the sequel, the begetters o f this high-
est practical wisdom d o n ot die for the sake o f thcír offspring. T h e States-
men must die, but their begetters sit home. H ere the case o f Orpheus
comes in, a poet who díd not want to die and therefore becamc infámous in
a sense, though he was still famous as a poet.
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S O CR AT E S (Si
the eros directed toward procreation, does this makc the second kind o f
cros ambition ortovc o fth e beautiful? B oth are lovers ofim m ortaiity, each
o f his own immortality, o f his own.
You have here been given a brief description o f what scems to be the
highest form o f educator. Anywhere in Plato one must aiways think o f
Sócrates, even when he is not the speaker, as here. Is this n ot Sócrates who
begets the highest form o f practical wisdom by generating in the proper
souls ofyoung men, preferably beautiful in body but surely beautiful in soul?
H e refcrs to himself as a midwife. B u t what does this mean? According to the
explicit description, T heaetetus 1 4 9 b , he is n ot productive. I t ’s not Sócrates.
We shall sce laten In this passage, he says, uHe is well supplied with speeches
about virtue toward the human being, both about what sort the good man
ought to be and what he must practice ” There is a fine distinction here, the
virtue o f a man is n ot identical with how a man must be and what he must
pursue. Latcr on we shall see the solución to this problem.
L isten er: He is resourceful in discoursing about virtue, that is to say, in
something specifically human. Your earlier analysis o f the myth, the parent-
age o f Eros, may have been right in that context, but it seems to me as if Di-
otima is now allowing the father o f eros to have his say.
M r. Strauss: I would draw just the opposite conclusión, because in the
lover there is both wealth and poverty Is n ot the root o f both poverty? Pov-
erty knows itself to be poverty. I f you take poverty as mere destitution, that
is something else. But if Poverty implies the will to overeóme poverty, then
she does n ot need an outside incentive for seeking, she only needs, indeed,
something outside. T h e question is W hat is che poverty o f this rich man?
The cros consists n ot in his wealth but in his poverty. Qua rich he is not
an erotic man. Why does he need the poor young man? Immortality. In
Sócrates’ concluding remark, 2 1 2 b , he says that one could n ot easiiy take
hold o f a better helper for human na ture than eros. That means that there
might be an equally good helper or even a better helper, though he is not
easy to com e by, the natural gift. Eros is n ot a complete analysis o f man; an-
other very important point is what the Greeks cali a good nacure. Phaedrus
made it perfeedy clear that the men who are virtuous out o f cros are only
simulating the best natures. This rich man, as rich man, is the most gifted
man. We will ¡dentify him very soon. Now the question is what is the m o
tive o f the poet in his poetic production. 1$ this eros? W hat kind o f eros?
wtFor I suspcct in touching the beautiful and associating with it, he gives
birth to and generates the things with which he was long pregnant, both
when he is present and when he is absent, in remembering, and he raises
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S O C R A T E S ( 3 )
229
c H a P T F R E L E V E N
This seems no longer to belong to the love o f the soul, as the contempla-
don o f iaws o r pursuits did. T h e next step is love o f the Sciences. N o reason
is given here o r befbre why the latter form o f the beautiful is superior, i.e.,
more truly beautiful than the preccding one. But it is indicated. T h e pur-
suits are less beautiful than the Sciences becausc the pursuits are nccessary.
They are necessary, for example, for boxing or wrestÜng, for thc strength o f
the body, whereas che Sciences are beautiful in thcmselves. U p to this point
the beautiful was viewed as this o r that beautiful thing. Whenever every-
thing o f the kind is contemplated, for example, thc beauty o f all bodics,
there was already ímplied Science. L et us compare three passages which are
re levant. In 2 1 0 a Diotima said the lover o f one beautiful body generares
beautiful speeches. In 2 1 0 c she said the lover o f one beautiful soul gives
birth to such speeches as malte the young better. H ere she says the lover
o f the beautiful Sciences gives birth to many beautiful and magnificcnc
spccchcs and thoughis.
I f you take these three passages together, you see that the love o f the
beautiful Sciences is not in every respect superior to the love o fo n e beauti
ful soul. Only the love o f onc beautiful soul can generate speeches which
make the young better. O n the other hand, thc speeches produced by the
love o f one beautiful soul are not necessarily beautiful, which makes sense.
Is this not the case o f Sócrates? T h e lover o f one beautiful soul who gives
birth to such speeches that make the young better. Is this not the difference
becween Sócrates and thc poets? Is this n ot the reason why Sócrates did not
write poetry? H ere the transition from the love o f one beautiful body to
the love o f all beautiful bodies does n ot lead beyond gencrating beautiful
speeches. Love o f the beautiful Sciences is here presented as love o f beauty,
not as love o f truth. W hat does that mean? What are the beautiful Sciences
anyway? The mathematical Sciences. A puré music o f which Eryximachus
spokc in 187c. Why are they beautiful? Bccause their objeets are beautiful.
Because o f their ciarity and order. N ote that the beautiful Sciences are de-
scribed as objeets o f beholding, contem plation, n ot o f eros. I f eros is di-
rected toward the beautiful, that does n ot mean that all beautiful things are
objeets o f eros, there may be beautiful things which are n ot objeets o f pas-
sionate desire. In the first two stages, onc body and all bodies, we had love
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S O C R A T E S | 3 i
but no beholding. In che second rwo stages, pursuits and Sciences, we had
behoiding but n ot love. There wiil be a fifth and final stage. O ur expecta
ción would seem to be, and that would be very fortúnate for us, if on the
highest level love and beholding would come together. T h en we would
have the unity o f man on the highest plañe, where his loving life, his affec-
dónate life, his passionate life and his intellectual life would merge. Whether
this is the case o r not can be settled in one way: by reading what foliows. T o
my great regret I must say that this problem is n ot so easily solved. There is
again almost complete silence about love in the last part.
We are now at the third section o f the third part. This is again subdi-
vided. The third part deais with the highest form o f eros, love o f the beau
tiful and there are five stages: the first stage, love o f one body; second, love
o f all bodies; third, love o f beautifiil pursuits and íaws; fourth, love o f the
beautiful Sciences; and we now turn to the fifth.
Wi. . . until with strength and increase gathered there he catchcs sight o f
one Science ofthis kind, which is o fth e following kind o f beautiful. Try to
pay attention [apply your mind] to me,1 she said, ‘as best you can. Who-
ever up to this point has been guided to the crotic things, observing the
beautifiil things in order and corrcctly, in going chen to the end o f the
erotic things he will suddenly cacch a glimpse o f somethíng amazingly
beautiful in it$ nature— and this is it, Sócrates, for che sake o f which there
were also all the previous toils— (2 l0 d 6 - e 6 )
Toward the end o f the erotic inidadon he who has foílowed the way step by
step and correcdy sees some single sight o f a beautiful thing o f a certain de-
scription. What is beautiful is that with which the sight deais. H e will sud
denly see something strange. There is a kind o f break o f continuity here.
There is a radical differencc bctween this beautiful thing to be described in
the sequel and all beautiful things either mentioned or not. On the basis o f
the rcmark in 2 1 0 e l - 2 , one could perhaps say, try to apply your mind as
much as you can and try to follow the parallel in 210a 4 . This section is subdi-
vided into three parts: eros o f the body, eros o f the soul, and eros o f the mind.
W hat, then, is this one beautiful thing which appears at the end o f the way?
Uk. . . [somethíng beautiful] that in the first place always is and neither
comes into being ñor perishes, neither increases ñor diminishes, and in the
second place, is not in one rcspect beautiful and in another ugly, ñor
sometí mes is and sometimes is not, ñor in respect co one thing is beautiful
and in respcct to another ugly, ñor here beautiful and there ugly, as being
beautiful to some and ugly co some. ’ ” (2 1 0 e 6 - 2 11 a5)
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C H A P T E R E L E V E N
Now ihis is a description o f thc beautiful, that beautiful thing which comes
at thc end. This beautiful thing is in every respect, and that implies, o f course,
that it is always, because that which is not always is also not. That beautiful
thing is in every respect and is beautiful in every respect. Thcse two consider-
ations are inseparable, because for Plato, to be means to be something. There
is nothing which merely is and is not something. There is no such thing as
puré being. The whole Platonic notion o f being is implied in this.
This may com e as a surprise to us in modern times. W hen we speak o f
existence, d o we necessarily mean that existence must be something, mean-
ing something which is n ot implied in existence? This may n ot be so clear,
but for Plato it is a matter o f course. AJI other beautiful things, including all
laws, pursuits, Sciences, souls, etc., are n ot simply beautiful, they are also
ugly in certain respeets. How do wc know that this beautiful is, which will
pro ve to be the beautiful itself? I f thc meaning o f eros is understood, we see
that eros implics that there is such a thing, which is the beautiful itself. But
is this perhaps a delusion? Could eros in its deepest meaning, namely, as
tending toward thc beautiful itself, not be a delusion? Think o f Aristoph-
anes* myth, where we have a description o f the deepest meaning o f eros.
This deepest meaning o fero s proves to be a delusion: that unión is impos-
sible. O r is the desire o f the soul n ot necessarily the crown and c rite rio n o f
true thoughts, as a modern interpreter says? M eaning, if eros is the deepest
desire o f our soul directed toward something, this something must be.
Eros as desire for the simply beautiful, the unqualifiedly beautiful,
vouches for the being o f the eternally beautiful. But before we know that
the eternally beautiful and the unqualifiedly beautiful is, we do not know
whether eros is simply natural o r simply good. First we have to discover the
true na ture o f eros before wc can say that that which it divines is. I also draw
your attention to the fact that ¿n diese sections o f thc spccch eros is not
mentioned, Now, what is this beautiful itself? I t is the example in the Sym-
posiutn o f what is gene rally known as the idea in the Platonic sense. B u t it
is not called an idea here, and that is n ot negligible. Ideas seem to be seif-
subsisting and simply unchangeable, the only beings which are truly. The
usual view o f this notion is that Plato hypothesizes universals o r concepts.
Plato says the universals o r concepts are, and are more truly than any other
thing. The question is whether this is based on a proper understanding o f
Plato. I can only remind you o fa few things here: The word eid o smeans pri
maríly the shape o f a thing, the shapc which can be seen only with the
mind’s eye, the character o f a thing. Later on this was called the essence.
Yet, if onc says essence, one must consider this fact: essence as used later,
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S O C R A T E S < 3 i
H e re we have a summary. It is thanks to the correct love o f boys that the as-
cent takes place. That is the crucial point. Thls correct love o f boys ineludes
love o f the beautiful body. Contemplation o f the idea o f the beautiful is
from this point o f view only the last and highest stage o f the means for the
correct love o f boys. This should n ot be surprising, but in the R ep u bltc we
have a strict parallel to that. In the R epu bltc, philosophy is introduccd only
as means for the good polis. H ere philosophy is introduccd only as a means
for the correct love o f boys. But then, just as in the R epu bltc, what first
com es to sight as a means, pro ves to be the end. Philosophy n ot only as a
means for good politics but as the cnd; similarly here regarding pederasty.
You see also initiation is not indispensable. W hether one goes, o r whether
one is led by someone else, does n ot make a difference.
H ere we have a repetition o f the stages: one beautiful body, two beauti
ful bodies, all beautiful bodies, beautiful pursuíts, beautiful teachings, and
the teaching regarding the beautiful itself; six stages, i.e., as many as there
are speeches on eros in the dialogue. What does he omit? General rule;
there is never a repetition in Plato which is an idéntica! repetition; there is
always a change, though sometimes seemingly trivial. W hat is the change?
T h e change is in the second step, and that means much greater emphasis on
the body, accompanied by something else. When he makes the transítion in
the first statement from bodies to the other things, he speaks o f the souls.
There is no mention o f the souls here, and that has grave implicadons re
garding the meaning o f the work itself. In the presentation itself, as dístin-
guished from the summary, we have one body, all bodies, souls, pursuíts
and laws, Sciences, and the onc Science. O ne other subde thing; here he
goes from one to two and then to all beautiful bodies, and from that to
beautiful pursuits, to the beautiful pieces o f learning, to that piece o f learn*
ing, etc.; but whereas he repeats beautiful in the case o f the bodies, he does
237
S O C R A T E S (? )
“ 4Or don’t you realize,* shc said, ‘that hcrc alone it will be possible fot
him, on seeíng the beaudful by that by which it is visible, to give birth not
to phantom images o f virtue, beca use he is touching on that which is not
a phantom, but to true virtue, because he is touching on the truth; and
once he gives birth to true virtue and raises it, it is open to him to bccome
dear to the gods, and if it is open to any ochcr human being, fbr him too
to bccome immortal?’” (212a2 - 7 )
“Here you have, Phacdrus and everyone else, what Diotima said and I
have been persuaded of; and sincc I have bcen persuaded I try to persuade
everyone else as well that onc would not easÜy get anyone better than
Bros for helping human naturc gain this possession. Accordingly, I asserc
that cvery man should honor Eros, and I myself honor the erocic things
and praccice them to an cxccptional degree, and I urge everyone else to do
so, and now and always I celébrate the power and manJiness o f Eros to the
extent that 1 can. So regard this logos, Phaedrus, as an encomium to Eros
ifyou want, but if not, whatever and however you enjoy naming it, ñame
it chat.” (2 1 2 b l-c 3 )
239
S O C R A T E S í 3 )
241
C H APT ER ELEVES*
love o f the beautiful must be love o f the good. Diotima indicates how this
is possi ble. Eros o f the good is lo ve for my well-being, my own perfection,
virtue, the noble, and may even inelude fame. O n the highest level all threc
elements are presen*. I f a man loves what is most his own, namcly his soul,
he loves the truth, the good, and is attractcd by boys and youths who are his
kindred be cause they have the same potentialíty.
We may distinguish, I have said, one’s own, the beautiful, and the good;
buc this is n ot the tripartí tion made by Diotima. H er tripartí tío n is procre-
ation, glory, and, let us say, philosophy, or, perhaps, the beautiful instead o f
philosophy. What is the relation? Why does she replace the beautiful with
glory and the good with the beautiful? As for the first question: why does
she not speak o f the beautiful in the second stage but o f glory? This is iden-
tical with the dem otion o f poctry which she effeets. The poets, she says, do
not love the beautiful but their own. They are concerned with the beautiful
only as a means for their own. But what is that beautitiil? It is moral virtue
and, in the highest case, politieal prudencc, ultimately the p olis. But they
do not love these things for their own sake; they love them for their im-
mortality. Thcre is no eros for the polis and, henee, not for moral virtue and
politieal prudence. For moral virtue and política] prudence depend essen-
tially on the polis, and the polis is n ot natural. It is constituted by an arbi-
trary selection from the natural whole, the human species, toward which
eros is dircctcd— procreation. There is no natural inclination comparable
to procreation which is directed toward the polis as polis. There is no nat
ural inclination toward moral virtue and the polis, that is, indeed, the cru
cial implication.
T o understand that let us look at another tripartition which occurs
much later but is relaced to it. That is Thomas Aquinas’s distinction o f
man’s threcfold natural inclination, Su m m a, I I , 1, question 9 4 , article 2.
Self-preservation is the first, then preservation o f the species and raising o f
childrcn, then knowledge o f god plus social lifc, which is the equivalent o f
the polis. You see that he re, too, there is no natural inclination toward
moral virtue as moral virtue. Diotima is silent about se If-preservation.
Why? Because it can be said co be suberotic. We can n ot cali a man con-
cerned with preserving himself an ero tic man. She rcplaces, moreover, life
in socícty with immortal fáme, for the polis is noc natural.
Lee us also compare these distinction s with the three parts o f the soul in
the R ep u blic: desire, spirit, and re ason. Spiritedness is replaccd with love o f
glory, eros for immortal fame. Why? Spiritedness, which ineludes indigna-
tion, is relatcd to justice o r right, and the Symposiutn abstraets from right
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S O C R A T E S ( 3 'i
be cause thc right o r the just is not, as such, an object o f natural inclin adon.
Furtherm ore, spíritedness means, more gene rally, rcpelling thc hostile, the
alien. From this point o f view spíritedness is essentially related to love o f
one’s own. But love o f one’s own is lower than love o f the beautiful. The
Symposium transcends the love o f one’s own. Eros is homeless. T h e R ep u b’
IxCy as a political work, does not transcend the sphere o f one’s own. Perhaps
more precisely: the R ep u blic also suppresses Ln its way one’s own and that is,
indeed, the subdety o f the R epu blic. Proof: thc so-called communism o f
the R epu blic. O ne can say in thc R epu blic, to o , onc’s own is abandoned ln
favor o f the beautiful. W hen he speaks o f the education o f the guardians, in
the ccnter is education in music, and the tunction o f this education is to
make them love thc beautiful. Nevertheless, che R ep u blic does n ot tran
scend one’s own in the way the Symposium does, because one can say one’s
own ís transferred to the polis, which is also a limited part o f the human
race. In the R ep u blic you no longer love your natural brothers and sisters
but every fellow Citizen o f your age as an artificial brother and sister, and
every older man and woman as your artificial parents. O ne’s own, then, ís
radically modified in the R ep u blic, it is n ot transcended. Bccause the R e-
pu blic remains within the limitations o f the love o f one’s own, the emphasis
on spiritedness, repelling the foreign o r the alien, is crucial. The Sytnpo-
siutHj by transcending the sphere o f one’s own, is silent on spiritedness. We
may learn from this the general point that spiritedness is essentially the
companion o f the lower forms o f eros, and that is thc crudity, ifyou will, o f
the psychology o f the R epu blic. O n the higher stages o f eros therc is no
thumoSy no spiritedness, as a companion. The simple proof o f that is that
philosophy can justly be called a torm o f eros, but there is no ingredient o f
spiritedness in philosophy as philosophy. Indignation has n o place in phi
losophy proper. In its utteranees o r Ln its ccaching, this is another matter.
Listener: Isn’t there an immediate transcendence o f one’s own in the
R epublic?
Mr. Strauss: But it still remains one’s own city. As ordlnary human be-
ings we love our polis. But there can be a split. For example, a nice man in
Poland loves, in a way, the United States more than Poland. You can never
completely sepárate the matter— the Polish soil, the Polish people— and
the form , the government. Therefore, the faino us problcm ofloyalty. But,
on the highest level, you have undivided loyalcy because you live in the best
polis; it is precisely on the highest level also love o f one’s own polis as dis-
tinguished from the others. Never forget the complete silence in the R e -
p u blic about the relations o f the best polis to any other best city. Each city is
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247
CHAP T E R ELEVEN
part o f Diotim a’s speech. What about the presentation o f philosophy in che
last sección? We observe the complete sil ence about che ideas; only one such
thing is mentioned, the beautiful itself, but not as idea. The idea o f che
beautiful is introduced and has, in eftect, the function o f the idea o f the
good, which, according co Plato, has an absolutely unique position. This is
done withouc any preparation as well as certain other difficulties which I in-
dicated. I suggest that the last part has the function o f giving a poetic pre
sentación o f philosophy. What philosophy is does not in any reasonable way
appear from these two pages. It gives an image to the imagination o f the in-
credible superiority o f philosophy to any other beautiful thing. In the light
o f what I said, this poetic presentation o f philosophy is surely n ot tragic, ul-
timatcly it would perhaps appear to be highly comical. Unless we would say
that this poetic presentation is given by Diotima, not Sócrates, and Diotima
perhaps did n ot suffer from Sócrates’ limitation. Sócrates wins the contest
wich the poets by being able to give a phllosophic presentation o f poetry
and a poetic presentation o f philosophy. N o poet has cver succeeded in do-
ing that.
This poetic presentation o f philosophy leads us to see that eros is, strictly
speaking, only eros tbr human beings. Eros, then, is n ot the best helper for
human naturc. In other words, che dialogue ends with a depreciation o f
eros. This is, I think, the beginning o f the P haednts. T h ere, young Phae-
drus, in his opinions entirely uncrotic, prefcrring nonlovers to lovers, is
corrcctcd by Sócrates who gives there an unqualified praise o f eros. But
preciscly the P hacdrus i$ the only Platonic dialogue which ends with a
prayer, not to eros but, above all, to the god Pan, who has much to do with
fertility and, to that extern, with eros. Buc fcrtilicy in the wide sense: the
god o f natural wcalth. Even he re we are not permitted to forget the crucial
importancc o f the love o f gain, which is a humble represe ntative o f the love
for true gain, true wealth, the wealth o fth e soul, wisdom. S o much for this
section.
Listener: Are you suggesting that Sócrates lacked spiritedness whereas
Plato and Xcnophon did not?
M r Strauss: I am compclled to say that. Difierenriy stated and perhaps
more intelligibly, Sócrates was more unqualifiedly the philosophcr. I am
also n ot satisfied with this as an answer, because I am surc there is some-
thing hidden there, but I have not been able to crack that nut. You might
say Plato and Xenophon, to o , were not angry but played angry when ncc-
essary. Apparently Sócrates could n ot even d o that. There is only one scene
wherc Sócrates is almost angry, in Xenophon’s M em orabilia, in the first
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S O C R A T n f 3 >
book, chaptcr 3 , I believe. The o b ject o f his quasi anger is Xenophon. But I
admit, what I said is not perfectly clear and satisfactory.
Ltstener: I f eros is only eros fbr human beings, what would be th c status,
o r what would you cali the affinity, o f the sensitive person to the good?
Mr. Strauss: I f we take eros ín this strict and proper meaning, what
Aristophanes says could very well be true, that it contains more than the
lovers know. But if this implication is brought out, it would no longer be
eros proper. For example, the re is ¡mplied, as you may know from the liter-
ature, in every deep erotic relación a desire tor immortality o f that relación,
which cannoc in this form be fulfilled. The re is no such desire implied in the
desire for fbod o r drink. Would this implication o f eros n ot lead us beyond
eros? There are various other ways; for example, people are con cerned
whether their love is genuine o r not. Therefbre the question o f human sin-
cerity comes up. There are infinite ways which lead from the love o f human
beings in the strict sense beyond it. M ore gene rally stated: man cannot find
his completion, his fulfillment, in the erotic Ufe striedy understood. You
can, o f coursc, cali it eros, but thc question is whether this is n ot a meta-
phoric use o f che cerm. But ic is perhaps the best term we have.
L isten cr: I f in t h e h i g h e s t S t a t e m a n b e c o m e s purified o f e r o s , is t h i s his
h ig h e s t p e r fe c tio n ?
Mr. Strauss: Apparently this is the case. I f you see something beautifiil
without having looked for it, docsn’t it strike you and attract you without
any desire to possess it in any way? Whereas there is a lower kind o f love
which has necessarily a reflection to the self, health o r wealth. But there is a
love o f the beautiful which is really self-forgetcing and which is, in a way, o f
higher nobility than that love which i$ not selfrforgctting. The rcmarkable
fact is this: on the highest level self-forgetting is n ot possi ble. Love o f the
truth is higher than love o f beauty, and love o f the truth, if it is anything, is
something you want to possess. This can be absent in love o f the beautiful.
T h at is what Plato means. There is that strange kinship between the highest
and the lowest.
Ltstener: D oes love o f the good also presume that kinship with the low-
CSt?
Mr. Strauss: In one way: the concern with self, with thc health o f the
soul, is present on the highest level. Certain kinds o f love o f the beautiful do
n ot have that implication.
Listencr: Are you saying, then, that love o f the beautiful is higher in a
certain sense?
Mr. Strauss: That i$ probably n ot the only case in which a certain thing is
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12 ALCIBIADES
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ALCIR IADBS
the fe cc that Sócrates did n ot write would seem to indícate that he scorned
this kind o f immortality. I t indicates, we can also say, the problematic char-
acter o f Sócrates’ eros, o f hisdesire to be togethereithcr in his body proper
o r in this kind o f body— the book— with those he loved. Was Sócrates a
lover? This question is imposed on us by the very fect that he did not write.
The man who, at first glance, would secm to have known Sócrates best as a
lo ver was Alcibiades, and Alcibiades will give an answer to our question,
which is n ot sufficient but part o f our evidence. Sócrates was not a lo ver. I f
you remember the argumcnt I stated before, it means therefore he did not
write. B u t we must go deeper into the argument. I believe thc rime has now
com e, before we turn to the text, tor a consideration which I have post
poned many times.
The Symposium contains six speeches on eros, six different views o r the-
ories o f eros. B u t in a work such as this there must be some connection be-
tween the theory and the theoretician, between the speech and thc speaker.
The theories must somehow reflect typical human attitudes, as we would
say today. Now, what are these altitudes? I f the Symposium is n ot complete
in its consideration o f the possible human attitudcs, it is, o f course, incom
plete as a presentation o f eros. We must, therefore, get a survey o f the pos
sible attributes o f eros on the basis supplied by the Symposium. This can be
done by a simple mathematical operation. There are three considerations
which are obviously relevant: (1 ) the speaker may be a loveror be loved; (2 )
he m ay be oíd o r young, because it is n ot necessary that the lo ver be oíd and
the beloved young; (3 ) as indicated by the attitude toward wild drinking ¡n
the beginning, is he cautious o r not? T h e incautious are subdivided into
two fbrms: the incautious who is soft and the incautious who is manly. We
have, then, three different points o f view, two consisting o f two airernatives
and one o f three— twelve alternad ves altogether.
Now let us look at the combinations and see whether we can identify
them . Young, cautious, lover; young, cautious, beloved; oíd, cautious,
lover; oíd, cautious, beloved; young, soft, lover; young, soft, beloved; oíd,
soft, lover; oíd, soft, beloved; young, manly, lover; young, manly, beloved;
oíd, manly, lover; oíd, manly, beloved. I don’t claim that what I am going
to say now is the last word on the subject. I will make now one premise
which will not sound absurd, I believe, namely that oíd, manly, lover and
oíd, manly, beloved are one and the same in our dialogue— Sócrates. Oíd
does n ot mean seventy, but oíd relative to his beloved. That he is loved is
shown clearly by Aristodemus; that he is a lover is, at Icast, his claim; that he
is neither soft ñor cautious is evident. The total number o f characters would
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CH A P T E R I' VV É L V B
violcts, along with a great many fillcts on his head, and he said, “Men,
helio! Wil1 you weleome an extremely drunk man as a fellow drinker, or
are wc to go away once we have crowned Agathon? ít ’s why we carne. I,
you scc," he said, “could not come yesterday, buc now I have come with
fillets on my head, Ln order that from my head I may crown just likc this
the head o f the wisesc and most beautífuJ, if I may say so. Wiil you really
laugh at me because I am drunk? But even ifyou do laugh, all che same I
know that I am telíing the cruth. But telJ me, from wherc I am standing,
am I co enter on these conditions or not? Will you drink wich me or not?"
(2 1 2 d 5 -2 1 3 a 2 )
Since Alcibiades has not yet seen Sócrates he calis Agathon the wisest. H e is
sure that he telis the truth, as you see, in spite o r because o f his being drunk.
In vino peritas— there is something to that. But, on the other hand, we can
also say drunkenness docsn’t necessarily guarantee the truth. H ow true wili
it then be, what he is going to say about Sócrates later on in his speech? You
see ln the earlier part o f this passage the decisión is made by Alcibiades and
his atiendan ts, n ot by Agathon’s servants. Alcibiades crashes the party.
All then cried out loudly and urged him to enter and He down, and Aga
thon invited him. And he carne, being led by human bcíngs. (2 1 3 a 3 -5 )
And raking offthc fillcts as if to crown, he was holding thcm in front ofhis
eyes and did not catch sight o f Sócrates, but sat down beside Agathon, be*
tween Sócrates and him, for when Sócrates saw him he made room for
him. Then sitting down beside Agathon he grccted him and wascrowning
him. Then Agathon said, “Táke o ff Alcibiades’ shoes, boys, so that he may
lie down as the third." “Yes, o f coursc,” Alcibiades said, “but who is our
third fellow drinker?" And as he turned around he saw Sócrates, and on
secing him he jumped up and said, “Heracles!" (2 1 3 a S -b 8 )
You will scc that Alcibiades swears more than anyone else.
“What was this? Here’s Sócrates! Once more you wcrc lying down he re
waicing in ambush, just as you’re accustomed to pop up suddenly wher-
ever I was thinking you would léase be. And now why have you come? And
why in turn did you recline just here? It wasn’t by the side o f Aristophanes
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A L C I B I A D E i
or anyone clse who is ridiculous and wants to be, but you contrived to lie
down by the side o fth e mosc beautihil ofthosc within." (2 1 3 b 9 -c 5 )
And Sócrates said, “Agathon, scc to it that you protect me» since the eros
o f this human being has proved to be not a trivial matter for me. From the
time when I feli in love with him, it is no longcr possiblc for me eithcr to
glance at or converse with even a single beauty, or else he is jcalous o f me
and in his resentment does amazing things and reviles me and hardly
keeps his hands off. Sec to it that he docs not do something now, but rec-
oncile us» or ifhe tries to use forcé» defend me, since I am very much afraid
ofhis madness and love ofalover.” (2 1 3 c6 -d 6 )
Thus Alcibiades fulíills the prophecy. In the beginning Agachón had said to
Sócrates, “Dionysus shall be the judge between you and m e." Now Diony-
sus, represented by Alcibiades, is the judge and crowns Sócrates. While
Agathon to o is crowned, Sócrates is given the highest praisc: he wins al
ways, n ot only once in a while. Therefbre onc can say, with reference to an
earlier remark I made, the god, whose raw material is Alcibiades, would
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C H A P T B R T W B L V B
seem to be Dionysus. B u t that does n ot yet settle the issue. There may be
other gods, greater gods, who couJd be made o f Ale ibi ades by a great poet.
You see the agreement is kept. There is a strange mixture o f tyrannicai and
constitutional procedure. It is only for the purpose o f executing what has
been agreed upon. He is a typical tyrant, who would always $ay, *1 fulñil
what all o f you want,” but surely he eleccs himself
“Well, Agathon, let someonc bring me some big cup, if there is any. But
there is no need. Come, boy,” he said, when he saw it had a capacity o f
more than eight pints, “bring me thatcooler.” He then had it filled up and
drank o u to fit himself first, then he urged them to pour it out for Sócrates
and at the same time said, “Against Sócrates, men, this sophism o f mine is
nothing, for howcvcr much onc bids him drink, so much he drinks up and
will never get any more drunk.”
Sócrates drank as soon as thc boy had filled it; but Eryximachus said,
“How do we do this, Alcibiadcs? Is it in this way, without either saying or
singing anything in our cups, but shall wc drink simply like thc thirsty?”
(2 1 3c 1 0 —214 b 2 )
Then Alcibiadcs said, “Eryximachus, the best o f the best and most mod*
érate [sober] father, helio!” (2 1 4 b 3 -4 )
H e does n ot say most sober son, his father was most sober. This may mean
that Eryximachus did have a lítele and is n ot altogether sober.
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ALCI BIADES
tact that thc physician is n ot available is much worsc than if any hero were
n ot available because he can save many. Physicians are eminently useful in
war, and war is, o f course, as we shall see later, the most important business.
I f this is so, it follows strictly that one must listen to physicians in cvery af-
fair. I f one must listen to them in the most important things, one must
surely listen to them in less important things.
O ne more word about the situación in the eleventh book o f the Iliad: It
is a bad situation. H éctor is loose and slays many Greeks. The Greeks are in
greater danger than ever beíbre. Néstor, eloquence ¡ncarnate, gives an elo-
quent description o f the danger which Achilies’ aloofness irom the suffer-
ing o f the Greeks has brought about. Achilies is still sulking in his tcn t, and
the Greeks are in sore need o f Achilles. This situación exists again in 4 0 7 .
The Athenians, and in a way all Greeks, are in sore need. Alcibiadcs is aloof,
somehow aligned with the Persian king, and he is the only man who can
save Greece. By the way, this fits beautilully with Thucydides’ description o f
Alcibiades in this situation. Alcibiades divines the situation— he longs for
it— where he, a new and greater Achilies, will be the one ail Greece wants as
their savior. So this verse o f H om er is very revealing. O ne must always look
up quotations in their context if the context is preser ved. T o repeat; Is it
clear why Alcibiades obeys Eryximachus? That is surely a question. Why
should such a grand seigneur obey a physician, howcver famous, if the
physician was n ot, in a way, the most important man in war?
“ Listen then,” Eryximachus said. “We had dccidcd bcforc you carne in
that each o f us in turn, starting on thc left, ought to speak as beautiíul a
speech about Eros as he could and praise him. Now ail the rest o f us have
spoken, but you, sincc you have not spoken and have drunk, it is just for
you to speak and, once you have spoken, give any order you want to
Sócrates, and then he to the one on his right and so on for all thc rest.”
(2 1 4 b 9 -c 5 )
Alcibiades must speak on eros, o f course, likc cveryone clse, and then give a
commlssion to Sócrates, and then Sócrates to his neighbor on the right.
H erc wc have this difficuley: Is Sócrates n ot the last one on the right? And
here I am subject to correction by anyone who know$ better than I how the
seating arrangement was. B u t, as I understand it, Eryximachus must have
been mistaken, and if this is so, it would be addítionai proof that he is not
altogether sober.
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C H A P T E R r v v B L V E
the sobcr. And, you blessed innocent, docs Sócrates persuade you o f any-
thing o f thc things which he just now said? O r do you know that it is
wholly the opposiee o f what he was saying? For he, if I praise anyonc else
than him, while he is present, either a god or a human being, he will not
keep his handsoffm e.” “Be quiet!” Sócrates said. (2 1 4 c6 -d 5 )
Alcibiades says Sócrates wiil n ot tolérate it if I praise in his presence any god
o r man. Therefore he cannot praise ero$. For, contrary to what Sócrates
says, he is n ot a lover, n ot a worshiper o f eros.
“No, by Poseidont” Alcibiades said, “Say nothíng against it, since I would
praise no one else when you are presenC."
“Wcll, do it in this way,” Eryximachus said, “if you want. Praise
Sócrates. ”
“How do you mean?” Alcibiades said. “Is it thought that I should,
Eryximachus? Am I to attack the man and in your presence take my re
vengo on him?"
“You, ehere,” Sócrates said. “What do you have in mind? T o praise me
to make things funnier? Or what will you do?”
“I shall tell the truth. But see whetheryou allow it.”
“WciJ, in that case,” he said, “I allow and urge you to tell the truth.”
UI couldn’t begin too so o n ," Alcibiades said. “However, do as follows.
I f I say something untrue, check me in the middle, if you want, and say
that 1 am lying on that point; for as fer as my will goes I shall tic about
nothing. If, however, in rccollccting, I jump from one thing to another,
don’t wonder; for it is not at all easy for someone in the condition you see
me in to enumérate fluencly and in order your strangeness.” (2 1 4 d 6 -
2 I5 a 3 )
Alcibiades will praise Sócrates. This is settled. Sócrates couldn’t bear any-
thing else being praised in his presence, at least when Alcibiades is the
praiser. At the same time Alcibiades will take his revenge. Still, he will tell
only the truth about Sócrates. Sócrates certainly cannot forbid that. S ó c
rates does not refer to modesty for n ot wanting to be praised; he says that
he cannot prevent anyone from telling the truth no m atter what the subject
might be.
U stcn er: Sócrates spoke o f his d atm on ion as preventing him from doing
what is n ot proper, and this is cssentially what Alcibiades is asking Sócrates
to do for him.
Mr. Strauss: That is not a bad point. Very good as a m atter o f fact, be-
cause Alcibiades later on speaks o f Sócrates as a demonic being.
lÁ stentr: Where the English says, “in the condition you see me in,” docs
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A L O Bl A D E S
“I shall try to praise Sócrates, men, in this way— through images. Now he,
perhaps, will believe it is for making thtngs fonnier, but the image will be
for the sakc o fth e truth, not for the sake o fth e ridículous.” (2 1 5 a 4 -6 )
Alcibiades will praise Sócrates by use o f símiles and thus give a truthful de-
scription. That is important. I t is a new light on poetry which we have not
yet received. U p to now it seems that poetry does not tell the truth: poetry
magnifies, poetry adorns and thereforc distorts the truth. But poetry can be
truthful through símiles, and this means also that poetry does n ot limit it-
self to generadng political prudence. For example, the description o f S ó c
rates has no relation to that. At any rate, Alcibiades will give a poetic pre
sentation o f Sócrates, and this follows naturally the poetic presentation o f
philosophy in the last part o f Diotim a’s speech. B o th presentations o f phi-
losophy and o f Sócrates are inspired. D io tima is a prophetess and Alcibiades
is inspired by winc. The wine is that which makes possible the perfect frank-
ness o f his speech. This particular inspiration by wine is absent from the po
etic presentation o f philosophy by Sócrates or Diotima.
It would seem, then, that we are likely to get a franker presentation here
o f Sócrates than we have received o f philosophy. Only one question remains:
Is Alcibiades competent? That we don’t know yet. H e speaks through simil
itudes and the similitudes are, o f course, n ot litcrally true. The similitudes
refer to the whole Sócrates, n ot any individual action. All details are literally
true, that is Alcibiades’ claim. One could say what Alcibiades wants to give
is poetic history, where the whole is in símiles and all details are true. The
greatest example known to me at least o f such poetic history is Thucydides.
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virtuc, ciaims for him sclf the highest honors. The mere fact that Sócrates
says nothing to contradict Alcibiades would, on the fece o f it, mean that
Alcibiades has n ot said an untruth. We must al so n ot forget that, whatever
hubris may mean, this dialogue serves the purpose o f presenting Sócrates’
hubris, and thercfore it would be ardstícally impossible to destroy that.
W ithin the limits o f his understanding he makcs clear what Sócrates’
hubris ís.
wBut yoa differ from him by only this much, that without instrumcncs,
wich bare speeches, you have che same effect.” ( 2 1 5 c 6 - d l)
That is the only different between Sócrates and Marsyas. T h at is to say the re
¡s no difference between Sócrates and Marsyas regarding the defeat by
Apollo. How could Sócrates have been defcated by Apollo, on the basis o f
what we know? Where did Apollo enter into Sócrates’ life? The Delphic O r
acle. T h e oracle said Sócrates was the wisest man, and then Sócrates goes
around in Athens and examines every Athenian- Perhaps this was Sócrates’
defeat, that he had to walk around and examine every Athenian. You could,
o f course, say Alcibiades was drunk and every word would, therefore, not
have to be takcn seriously, but Plato wasn’t drunk.
wWe, at any ratc, whenever wc hear anyonc clsc speaking other speeches,
even o f a very good public speaker, vírtually no onc has any concern; but
whenever someo ne hears you speak or someone else speaks your speeches,
cvcn if the speaker is very poor, regardless ofwhether a man, a woman, or
a youth hears them, we are thunderstruckand possessed.* (2 1 5 d l-d 6 )
Sócrates is the only speaker whose speeches take possession o f the hearcr.
H e does n ot say now that his speeches, Üke Marsyas’s speeches, make mani-
fest those who are in need o f the gods. Every hearcr o f Sócrates’ speeches is
entranced, even if the speaker is a very low fellow, even women and young
men. Sócrates i$ a máster o f swaying the demos.
“I, at any race, men, if I were not going to be thoughc utterly drunk,
would have sworn to you exactly the sort o f things I myself have experi-
enccd by his speeches and how I still experience them even now. For
whenever I hear them, co a far greater extenc than Corybants, my heart
leaps and tcars pour out o f my eyes by the cffect o f his speeches; and I see
many many others experíencing the same things. In hearíng Pendes and
other good public speakers, though I was thinking they spoke well, I was
experíencing nothing like this, ñor was my soul in turmoi! and expcrícnc*
ing vexation at my slavjsh disposition, but this Marsyas put me in this State
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A L C I B I A D E S
quite o fren, so as to thínk that life was not worth living for me, being in
the State I am. And you won’t say, Sócrates, that these things too aro not
truc.” (2 1 S d 6 -2 1 6 a 2 )
You $ee the repetition: after all, Alcibiades should know best how Sócrates*
speeches affected him. How would you describe that effect o f Sócrates’
rhetoric, whích has no paral leí in present o r past according to Alcibiades?
Perhaps we should read on.
“And still even now 1 am conscious within mysclf that should I be willing
to (end my ears, I would not resist but I would experience the same things.
He compels me to agrcc that, in being need o f much mysclf, I still neglect
myself and handle the aftairs o f the Athenians. So forcibly stopping my
ears as if from the Sirens I ftee and am gonc, in order that I do not sit here
ídly beside him and grow oíd. I have cxperienced in relation to him alone
o f human beings what one would not suspect was in me, to experience
shamc before anyonc whatsoever. 1 feel ashamed only before him. I know
within myself that I cannot contradict him and say that I should not do
what he urges, but whenever I go away [I am conscious J that I have be en
defeated by the honor from the many. So I scurry away [like a runaway
slavc] and avoid him, and whenever 1 see him, I am ashamed about what
has been agreed upon. And often 1 would see him with pie asure no longer
among human beings, but ifthis should happen, I knowwell that 1 would
to a much greaeer exten t be grieved, and henee 1 don’t know what I am to
do with this human being.” (2 1 6 a 3 -c 3 )
This is the end o f the first part o f Alcibiades’ speech. H ow would you de
scribe the effect o f Sócrates’ speeches as described here by Alcibiades? I
think there i$ one modern word, which has no equivalent in Greek, which
could be used to describe this: religión. Alcibiades feels like a sinner— to
use a biblical expression— like one who knows that he sins but cannot help
going on sinning. That is perfectly true, provided we make one distinction
which is now very popular, I understand, between shame cultures and guilt
cultures. Indeed, Alcibiades speaks only o f shame, n ot o f guilt, I do not
want to identify myself with this theory, because guilt plays, o f course, a
great role among the Greeks as well, but certainly n ot in the case o f Alcibi
ades. Sócrates, we may say, successfully preaches repentance. In his effect he
appears almost like, what in an entircly different context would be, reli-
gious speakers. Sócrates is a successful p re ache r o f repentance, a religious
effect.
Alcibiades, howevcr, is defeated; he cannot live up to what he learos
from Sócrates. The thing that prevenís him from complying with Sócrates
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C H A P T B R T W E L V E
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C H A P T E R T W B L V E
S o that was the first artempt. At first Alcibiadcs was always in company
when he met Sócrates. Now he wants to find the secret. H e is alone with
him, but nothing happens. Yet one thing is dcar. Alcibiades expects o r di
vines that Sócrates’ secret knowlcdge is o f an erotic kind.
“After that I invítcd him to join me in exercising, and I joincd him in ex
ercising, as I intended that here I would gec somcwherc. So he exercised
with me and wrestled with me often when no one else was presen c. What
need is the re to speak any more about it? It did not do me any good. And
when I was getting nowhere in this way, I decided I should attack the man
at ñjU strength and not let up, inasmuch as I had now started on che at-
tempt, but I now had toknow what the business is.” (2 1 7 b 7 -c 6 )
T h e business o f Sócrates. That is the formula used in the Apology, the busi-
ness o f Sócrates. W hat is it? N o one knows. Alcibiades has the same embar*
rassment, but he has the particular nodon that this business has to do with
eros, and the refere he proceeds in an erotic fashion.
S o that is the last stage, and an account o f it will follow. Alcibiades is driven
to reverse roles and piay the lover. Sócrates daimed to be the lover o f Alci
biades, but that did not work. Alcibiades has to w oo Sócrates. Therc are six
stages. Alcibiades in the company o f attendants; Alcibiades alone; training,
i.e., stripping, together; thc invitación to dinner refosed; dinner without
conscquence; and six— I have to use the hard word— to sleep together.
That will com e now.
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Ale ibi ades makes it olear and pro ves it that he is altogether frank. W hether
Sócrates is altogether frank remains to be scen. Alcibiadcs makes Sócrates
what wc can only cali an improper advance, and his problem is the same as
that o f Pausanias, who was also worried about decency. But in contradis-
dnction to Pausanias, Alcibiades does not suggcst a chango in the law. Alci
biades has a tyrannical naturc, he disregards the law in favor o f the opinión
o f the sensible. T h e sensible will accept his conduct and that is sufficient;
the law is o f no interest.
aAnd he, when he heard me, very Lronically, and very charactcristically o f
him,saídin his usual way/Mydear Alcibiades, it's probable thatyou really
are not a bad sort, if it is in fact truc what you say about me and the re is
some power in me through which you would become becter. You must,
you know, be seeing some indescribable beauty in me and very far superior
to the beauty o f form in you. So ifin catchingsighc oficyou are trying to
have a share in ic and exchange beauty for beauty, íc’s not by a lítele
amount that you incend to gain an advantage over me, buc you are trying
to aequire the truch o f bcautiful things in place o f this opinión [sceming;
doxa]9 and you have in mind to exchange in rcality gold for bronze. But,
you blessed innocent, consider becter, lest I be, wichout your being aware
o f it, nothing. The sight o f thought, you know, begíns to look sharply
when the sight o f the eyes tries to fall o ff from its peak, and you are still far
from that.,w(2 l8 d ó -2 1 9 a 4 )
How does Sócrates get out o f this delicate situation? H e says, as it were,
you, Alcibiades, see in me an indescribable beauty, but precisely if you are
right you are trying to cheat me. You will get my true beauty and I would
get your spurious beauty, and that is n ot fair. I t is like the exchange o f Glau*
cus and Diomedes, exchanging gold for bronze weapons in the lita d . The
alternad ve is that you are mistaken as to my beauty. In that case I would
cheat you. Sócrates declines Alcibiades’ offer on grounds o f justice, perhaps
ultimately on the side o f law, seeing the connection between justice and
law.
Alcibiades is, o f course, unaware o f the ground o f this rejection, and
that is characteristic o f him because he has all kinds o f qualities but surely
no sense o f justice. Wc must also n ot ovcrlook the element o f sclfishness in
Sócrates. Sócrates, to o , does n ot wish to be cheated.
“And I, when 1 heard chis, said, ‘Nothing on my side has been stated in
any other way than how I think it; so on this condition you yourselfdelib
érate and decide whatever you believe is best for you and m e.' ‘Well,’ he
said, ‘that is a good point. In the ensuing time we shall on deliberation do
272
\ I. C 1 B U D E $
whatever appears to the two o f us thc bcst about thcsc things and every-
ching else.’ Now I, once I had spokcn and heard him say this, and with thc
discharge o f ai1 my wcapons as it wcrc, I bclicvcd he had been wounded,
and getting up, I did not ailow him to say anything anymore, but I
wrappcd my own himation around him— it was winter— and lying down
under that threadbare cloak o f his, I threw my arms around this truly de-
monic and wonderful being and lay down beside him the whole night.
And not even on chese potnts, Sócrates, will you say I am lying. And when
I had done this, he proved to be so far superior to my youthful bloom and
scorned and laughed at and insulted ic— and I was thinking I was some-
thing, in this regard at Icast. Oh, judges! You are judges o f che high and
mighty disdain o f Sócrates— know wel1, by che gods, by the goddesses, I
slcpt and goc up with Sócrates, and nothing more untoward occurrcd
than if I were slccping with my father or older brother.” (2 1 9 a 5 -d 2 )
273
C H A P T E R rvtfELVfi
The implica don is clear: the Pro tab oras is ¡n finiré ly less intímate than the
Symposium. The Symposiutn alone reveáis Sócrates’ hubris.
But the re remains an entire ly unsolved problem. Sócrates despises all
men, as Alcibiades says, even Alcibiades. Yet he somehow cares for all men,
and especially for the young. How is this possible? F or Alcibiades this is one
aspcct o f the riddle o f Sócrates, o f Sócrates’ strangcness. Sócrates is not a
lovcr, ñor is he filled with lo ve o f glory o r prestige. W hat prompts Sócrates
to care for men? A very simple, perhaps too simple, solution, though wor-
thy o f consideration: O ut o f justicc, though it is clear that Alcibiades would
not undcrstand that motivation. This may be the re ason why Alcibiades has
no access to Sócrates’ business. I do n ot go into the dramatic situation now,
al though that would, o f course, require attention. But you must always
watch where they are. Tt is the most embarrassing situation in which Alcibi
ades finds himself. You may have to transíate it into heterosexual relations
to rccognize it in modern literature.
wThcn what thought do you believe I had after this? While I believed 1 had
bcen dishonored, I solí admired his nature, moderation, and manliness,
havmg come across a human being o f this kind, such as I believed I would
never have encountercd in respect to prudence [phronesis] and cndurancc
[r c s is ta n c c J. H e n e e , ju s t as I d id n o t k n o w h o w I c o u ld g c t a n g r y a t h im
and be deprived o f the being-together with this man, so I was utterly at a
loss as to how I was to draw him over." ( 2 l9 d 3 - c l)
H e admired his nature as well as his moderation and manliness, and later on
he says, I didn’t ever believe I would encounter someone as outstanding in
prudence and in endurance. He apparently iden tifies moderation with pru
dence and manliness with endurance.
O ne virtue, however, is glaringly absent: justice, H e did not discover
any justice in Sócrates; one reason, which is sufficient reason, is that ¡t was
not in him, in Alcibiades. Justice, we could perhaps say, is replaced by en
durance. While Alcibiades has no sense for the just, he has a strong sense o f
the noble or beautiful. But o f what kind o f the beautiful? O f that kind o f
beautifiil which appeared at the peak o f Diotim a’s spccch on the poets—
prudence, politicaJ wisdom. Alcibiades had identified prudence with m od
eration and in the sequel he is going to speak o f Sócrates’ endurance. I
conclude, the moderation o f which Alcibiades spoke is identical with en
durance. T h e difference is trivial. M oderation has to d o with the right atti-
tude toward pleasures, and endurance with the right attitude toward pain.
This virtue swallows up everything, induding Sócrates’ manliness. Sócrates
274
A L C I B I A D E S
“For I wel1 knew that he was for more immime in ali respeets to money
than Ajax was to iron, and chat done by which I thought I would catch
him he had escaped me. I was going around at a loss, enslaved by that hu
man bei ng as no onc had bec n by anvonc else.'n (2 1 9c 1 - 5)
“AJI these chings had happened co me earlier. Aítcr this we wcrc on cam-
paign together against Potidaca, and we were messmates there. Now first
o f aU, he surpassed not only me in coils but everyone else as wcll; whenever
w'e were compellcd— cuc o ff somewhere, the sort o f thing to be expecced
on campaign— to go without food, everyone else was as nothing com-
pared to his endurance. And in curn, in festivities he alone was able to en-
joy boch everythingelse and drinking, and though unwilling, whenever he
was compeUcd, he used to beat everyone; and what is the most amazing
thing o f all, no human being ever saw Sócrates drunk. Now o f chis peine
there will soon be proof, 1 think." (2 1 9 e 5 -2 2 0 a 6 )
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C H A P T R H V W E I. V E
“And again in rcgard to his fcats o f endurante during winter— thc winters
are terrible there— everything etse he did was amazing. Once when there
was a most terrible frost—you can’t imagine— and everyone either did
not go out» or if they did go out wrapped themselves in amazing quand-
ties o f clothes and put on shoes and wrapped their feet in felt and sheep-
skins» he used to go out in those times with the sort o f himarion he used to
wcar even before, and without shoes he walked through thc ice more eas-
ily than everyone else who was shod, and the soldiers used to give him
sidclong glances as if he was despísing them. ” (220a6 -c 1)
“Now chis was the way it was; but it is worthwhile to hcar ‘thc sort o f
ching the enduring man did and endured there’ once on campaign.”
(220c 1 -3 )
“He conceivcd a thought there and stood from dawn considering it, and
when he couldn't makc any progress, he rciúscd to let up but kept on
standing considering. It was now already noon, and the soldiers bccamc
awarc o f it, and in amazement onc said to another, ‘Sócrates has been
standing there since dawn reflecting.’ Finally, some ofthe Ionians, when it
was evening, once they had dined— it was then summer— brought out
their bedding and slept in the coid while keeping watch on him, to see
whether he would stand aJso through the night. He stood till dawn and
che sun carne up; and then he went away after he had praycd to che $un.w
(2 2 0 c3 -d 5 )
The o b ject o f admiration here is not Sócrates’ contemplation but hls en-
durance. Here his endurance is shown in summer, as distinguished from his
276
A I C I R I A D K S
*And if you wam, in battles— for it is quite just to give him this— when
there was a battle after which the generáis gave me the prizc o f valor, no
other human being saved me except him: he refused to leave me when I
had been wounded, and he saved me along with my weapons. And I,
Sócrates, cvcn then urged the generáis to give you the prizc o f valor, and
in this at least you won’t find fault with me or say that I am lying; but when
the generáis looked at my rank and wanted to give me the prize o f valor,
you yourself proved to be more cagcr than the generáis fbr me to calce ic
rather than yourself.” (2 2 0 d 5 -c 7 )
Sócrates admitted that he should get the prize. D on ’t forget that. I t is truc
that it had something to d o with the fact that Alcibiades carne from one o f
the noblest families and Sócrates <Üd n ot, but stUJ it is something to come
from one o f the noblest families. T hus, Alcibiades began to get out o f his
State o f inferiority to Sócrates.
“Scill furcher, men, it was worehwhile to observe Sócrates when che army
was retreating in flight from Dclium, for I happened to be there on a
horse, and he was a hoplice. He and Laches were withdrawing together
when the soldicrs had alrcady seattered. I happened by, and as soon as I
saw thcm I urged the paír to be confidcnt, and I said I would not desert
them. He re, indeed, I observed Sócrates in a fincr way than I had in Poti-
daca— for I was less in fear beca use I was on horse back— first, how far he
surpassed Laches by his keeping cool [em phron], and then, it seemed to
me— Aristophancs, that line o f yours— even there he was walking as he
does here, ‘swaggering and casting his eyes sideways,’ calmly giving side-
long glances ac the friendly and the enemy, making it clear to everyone
even from a great distance chat if anyone actacks this man here he will de-
fcnd himsclfvcry vigorously. Accordingly, he went away in safety, he and
277
A I. ¡: I B 1 A D E S
applies both to him and to his speeches. In chis rcspcct he resembles no hu
man being but only the Silenuses and satyrs. And then he gjves some ex-
amples o f contem perar y equivalents to he roes: Brasldas is comparable to
Achilles, Brasidas the Spartan gentlcmen general; and Pendes is compara
ble as an orator to Néstor and Antenor. That Odysseus ¡s not mentioned I
noce in passing. Yon see here that Alcibiades inverts the times. H e treats
Achilles as a contemporary and Pendes as a mythical hero. In both cases it
amounts to the same thing. Just as he sees himself as an Achilles, o r perhaps
a super Achilles, he divines something o f Odysseus in Sócrates.
“I omitted this too in the first part, that his spcechcs are most similar to
the opened-up Silenuses. For should one be willing to hear the speeches
o f Sócrates, they would appear very ridiculous at first: they put around
themselves those kinds ofwords and phrases, on the outside— it’s the kind
o f hide o f a hubristic satyr. He speaks o f asses and pack-asses and black-
smiths and shoemakers and leather workers, and he appears to be always
speaking o f the same things chrough the same things, so that every inex-
perienccd and foolish human being would laugh at his spcechcs; but
should one see them opened up and get inside thcm, he will find that they
alone o f spcechcs had mind within and, sccondly, chai they werc most di
vine and had the greatesc number o f statues o f virtuc in thcmsclves and
pertaining o ver the greatest range, or rather over the endre range that it is
fitting for him who is going co beautiful and good to survey.” (2 2 1 d 7 -
222a6)
279
CHAl’ TER IW ELVE
basis o f what we have Icarned from Diotima? Frora beautiful bodies. But
Sócrates speaks o f such inconspicuous bodies as tanners, etc. The mature
Sócrates is n ot the young Sócrates trained by D io tima, let us not forget
that. Sócrates had learned to realize the importance o f the nonbeautiful,
the dreary, the insignificant. The outside o f Sócrates is hubris, according to
this repeated statement; the inside o f Sócrates is an imitation ofvirtu e, im-
ages o f virtue, n ot virtue itself.
In the first part o f his speech, Alcibiades had not spoken o f the hubris in
Sócrates’ speeches but only o f the religious or tragic effect o f these specches
on everyone. In the second part o f his speech Alcibiades did speak o f
Sócrates’ hubris, but as a hidden hubris. The exterior o f his specches was
eroticism and ignorance, by which I mean the claim that he is a lover and
the claim that he i$ ignorant. The inside was hubris, somehow ¡dentieal with
moderation. I remind you again that according to the meaning o f the
Greck terms, moderation and hubris are opposites. In classicaJ times, as I
said before, moderation meant moderation in sensual pleasures— food,
drink, sex. But in a deeper sense, moderation means much m ore, and then
its opposite is either hubris, insolence, rebellion, o r madness o r insanity. To
repcat: the inside o f the speeches prove to be hubris and its opposite—
moderation. Now Alcibiades says that the external o f Sócrates’ speeches is
comical, hubris, and that the moral effect o f Sócrates is limited to a very
few. I can n ot now, at this advanced stage o f the course, put together all the
threads; you have to do some figuríng out yourself. You see also a little
point in 2 2 1 e 5 - 6 : Sócrates does not in fact always say the same things
about the same subjeets, this is only the appearance. This is only another
way o f saying that Sócrates i$ ironical, be cause irony consists in not saying
the same thing to everyone. The word pack-asses is very strange. D oes he
ever talk o f pack-asses? I can only say the Platonic lexicón does n ot give any
other passage, and Xenophon’s Sócrates doesn’t use it either. The word oc-
curs once in Xenophon’s E d u cation ofC yru s> book 7 , chapter 5, and that is
an interesting point. Xcnophon uses this expression when he describes the
deeds o f the Persian king Cyrus in connection with the siege o f Babylon, in
a military context, and Cyrus is presented as the political, military man. Prc-
ciscly the military, political man must speak o f these matters which are so
ridiculous and comical, according to Alcibiades. That is the greatest irony.
Think o f modern war: must the general not be concerned with engineers
and transportad on? So what Alcibiades conveys very unknowingly is that
Sócrates is so comical, so ungentlemanly, so ridiculous, because he speaks
o f political and military matters. He ridiculcs himself without knowing it.
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C H A P T E R T W E L V E
do him any good, but makc surc thac no one will set me and you apart."
(2 2 2 c3 -d 6 )
282
A L C I B T A D B S
speech, as I daim? I will try to answer chis question in four different ways,
though they are probably not sufficíent. First, by this remark Sócrates
seems to confirm Alcibiades’ i nidal description o f Sócrates’ speeches, whcn
he described their tragic effect. O ne couid then say that Sócrates describes
the Symposium with a vicw to its possible effect on Alcibiades. Sócrates’ cf-
fect on Aid bi ades was like that o f a tragedy. Alcibiades, this political man
par excellence, can understand the effect o f Sócrates on him self oniy in
terms o f the effect o f tragedy. But the following answer I believe goes
somewhat deeper: the Symposiutn does n ot contain a single speech by
Sócrates. That is a pedantic remark but a necessary one. The re are only the
speeches o f the five others, and Sócrates’ speech, as you know, is the speech
o f Diotima. T h e Sytnposium as a whole is an enchandng work, and a certain
kind o f cnchantm ent is the function o f tragedy. The Symposiutn as a whole
is a praise o f eros as a god o r at least as a demon and, therefore, it belongs
together with tragedy. T h e third consideration: the Sócrates who speaks in
the Symposium, i f we assume him to be the same as Diorima, is the young
Sócrates, the Sócrates who had not yet understood the place o f the ugly or
the base in the economy o f the world. This Sócrates who had n ot yet un-
derstood the necessity o f the ugly or base had a tragic effect. The last sug-
gestión I would make is this: Is not the tragedy which is beyond the
competence o f Sócrates strictly speaking the punitive speech— the speech
referring to the punitive gods? But punishment presupposes law, nomos,
and therefore we can say tragedy in a more radical, in a more primary sensc,
is the producción o f nomos or, more worthily, o f true nomos. I read to you
a passage from the J jt m . The tragic poets com e and wish to be admitted to
the city. T h e legislator says:
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C I I A P T E R ( NVBL VB
fore, is in thc decpest scnsc o f the word tragic, where nomos means a bcau-
tiful, salutary, but spurious unit. Sócrates is a Icgislator regarding eros, but
only by virtue o f Diotima, n ot by his own power. The fact that he is n ot a
legislator is, o f coursc, aiso indicated by the fact that he is absent from
Plato’s Law s. B u t even i f Sócrates were ablc to give laws, he could n otp re-
sent properly the sanedons for violadons o f the law. Now let us go on.
Thcn Agathon said, “Well, Sócrates, you are probably speaking the truth.
I infer it also from the fact that he lay down in thc middle, becween me and
you, in order that he may kcep us apart, but ic won’t do him any good, for
I shaJI come to you and lie down beside you.” “Yes, o f course," Sócrates
said. “Come o ver here and lie down below me.” (2 2 2 d 7 -c5 )
“Zeus!” Alcibiades said, “Think o f what I once more suffer at his hands!
He believes he must be superior to me cverywhere. Well, if nothing else—
you are a marvcl!— allow Agathon to lie down between us.” (2 2 2 e ó -9 )
“But it’s impossible,” Sócrates said. “For you praised me, and I must
praise i n tu m the one on my right. So if Agathon lies below you, he surely
won't praise me again before, rather, he has been praised by me. Let it go.
Oh demonic one, and don't begrudge the youth to be praised by me, for
l very much dcsire to praise him.” (2 2 2 e l0 -2 2 3 a 2 )
“O h, joy! joy!” Agathon said, “Alcibiades, it’s impossible that I should re-
mam here, but as ccrtain as anything 1 shaU get up and move, in order that
I may be praised by Sócrates.” (2 2 3 a 3 -5 )
“That’s it!" Alcibiades said. “It's just the usual. Whcn Sócrates is present
it’s impossible for anyone else to have a sharc in thc beauties, and now
how resourcefúlly he found a persuasivo speech as well, so as for him
[Agathon] to lie down beside himself.” Now Agathon was getting up to
2S4
(' H A P T B X U V B L V E
through the production o f thc beauiiful gods, by this very ftc t is disen-
chanted and therefore also can disenchant. But che man who can disen-
chant, the comic poet, is n ot yet, for this reason, able to enchant, co
produce the gods in their awfol beauty. Therefore I think Sócrates could
have written comedies, he could n ot have written tragedies; and therefore
he did n ot write. This implies the assertion, the proof o f which is quite a
jo b , that properly understood the works o f Plato, and to some extent also
ofX enophon, are in the more subde sense o fth e word tragedies. Tragedies
which carry within themselves the comedy.
In this course and in this cffort we have reached the end, which means
only that we are in a good posición, after a pause, to begin again on a higher
level o f understanding, and that may go on for many readings. Because, ul-
timately, as I said in the beginning, onc cannot believe that one has under
stood hilly any Platonic dialogue ¡f one has n ot understood all the dia
logues. We have be come aware herc o f a number o f difficulties which we
could not cxplain o r which we could explain only in a complicated and un-
convincing manner. But apart from this obvious observation one can say
this a priori: there will be other dialogues— the P baedrus, Eutbydem us,
Laws} etc.— crucial points o f which one would have to considcr for under-
standing any other dialogue and therefore the Syfttposiutn in particular. In
this way, Plato’s dialogues are truly in imitation o f what we cali reality. The
enigma o f reality is limitcd by the Platonic dialogue. People used to speak
o f art as imitation, and that is a vcry profound word. I t means the imitation
o f the riddle o f reality, and this riddlc Plato imitates by writing many dia
logues, each giving some artículation o f a part. But even the greatest pos-
sible articulation o f any part cannot give more than partial truth, and that
means, o f course, partial truth about that part discussed in that dialogue,
and therefore one must go on.
Ltstener: What is it in Sócrates that Alcibiadcs admires and lo ves?
M r Strauss; I t is surely connected with the fact o f Sócrates’ amazlng ín-
telligence, that is clear. But that alone doesn’t do it, partly because Alcibi-
ades is not able and tough enough to follow Sócrates in his pursuit. There
fore it must be something else. Sócrates is a demonic man, to use the
Platonic word. What does this mean? Did you cver hear the expression wa
magnetic personal ity”? That is as reveaiing as any answer you could give on
that level. Sócrates must have had an indescribable fascination which led to
either intense attraction or equally intense repulsión. Gencrally speaking,
the more noble natures were attracted by Sócrates and the lower ones were
repelled. That Alcibiades is unable to give a clear account o f Sócrates is ob-
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C H A P T F . R i WE1.VE
and yet Sócrates had it. But we must n ot lose sight o f the fact, which Plato
conveys, that the man who is demonic, in the Greek sense o f the word, is
not divine; and Plato, I am almost certain, regarded himself as in this sense
divine. This is a very difficult question and our studies this quartcr are not
sufhcient to establish that.
L isten cr: Are you suggesting that the young Sócrates is also divine?
Mr. Strauss: I do n ot know. That Aristophanes intended that I could not
say. But the stacement o f Aristotle that nature is demonic and the nous di
vine is also o f some help, W hat Plato means is also that Sócrates’ nature, his
physis, was singularly phUosophic, must less dependent on training, habit*
uadon, than that o f other philosophers— his instinctive awareness o f the
questions. There are some humorous iilustranons at che beginning o f the
C rito: Sócrates is in prison, he dreams, and Grito comes in to effect a jail-
break so that Sócrates can get out to Thessaly, far away, lawless but safe for
a fugjtive from justice. T h cn Sócrates tells him his dream. A woman o f su-
perhuman stature had appeared to him and quoted a verse from the lita d :
on the third day from now you will be in Phthia, which is n ot very far from
Thessaly. In other words, Sócrates had in a tantas tic way divined the plan
hitherto wholly unknown to him. This divinatory quality Sócrates must
have possessed ¡n a way in which philosophers do n ot possess it. This div
inatory quality is, o f course, n ot essential to theorerieal perfection. B u t that
Sócrates had something in addition to that theorerieal quality which made
him as a human being both attractive and repulsive is part o f that mysteri-
ous point.
[In answer to a question:] Poet is to o general a term and among the
many objections you can raise to my prese ntation is that we have n ot gone
deeply enough into that problem. W hen we speak o f tragedy we cannot
help but begin understanding these terms as they are used now. W hen we
speak o f gods what do wc know o f the gods? Factual knowledge doesn’t
help us to know what is a god for a thinking Greek, o r for that matter also
for a nonthinking Greek. It is quite truc that what wc mean today by a poet
o r perhaps by an artist is some demonic quality. B u t is that the poetic qual
ity in the way Plato understood it? I think one must pay great attention to
the information deri ved from the G orjfias about the limitations o f Sócrates’
rhetoric and how they are connected with the fact that Sócrates cannot pro
duce very fine speeches.
I f there are no further questions I termínate this session and this course.
288
IN DEX
Achilles: as contemporary, 279; Diodma's of, 13; noblest lovcr in Symposium, 66;
intcrpretation of, 224; Phaedrus’s praise silence of, 152; in Xenophon, 21
of, 5 2 -5 3 Aristophanes. absence ofin Prosa¿ortu, 2 5 -
Adultcry: Aristophanes on, 13S 26; accuser o f Sócrates, 4 0 - 4 1 ; agrcc-
Agathon: argument ofwith Sócrates, 1 8 0 - me nt o f with Sócrates ,2 8 2 ; Alcíbiades'
82; belovcd o f Pauaanias, 61; character interruption of, 255; character of, 254;
of, 32; 254; difference from Aristoph* comedies of, 1 4 9 -5 0 ; diffcrencc from
anes, 147; on Homcr, 1 5 7 ,1 5 9 ; and “1" Agathon, 147; and Eryximachus, 1 4 8 -
(ego), 155; inside of, 155; and Phaedrus, 49; and Eurípides, 152; on gods, 142; on
1 5 7 - 5 8 ,1 6 2 -6 3 ; and Sócrates, 1 5 3 -5 4 ; hierarchy in Eros, 119; on inccst, 1 4 4 -
softncss of, 76; speech of, 156, summa- 4 5 , 180; laughter of, 121; next greatest
rized, 1 6 8 -6 9 ; thesis ofin relación to not highest, 151; nonpettiness of, 119;
Diodma’s, 1 9 6 ,206; verses o f on Eros, and order o f speakíng, 9 5 ; on philosophy,
166; victory of, 15 150; alone praises piety, 1 2 7 .1 3 2 ,142;
AJccstis: Diotima's interpretación of, 224; Ploutos<sfy 1 9 4 -9 5 : proponent o f reli-
praise of, 50-51 gious rcvolution, 122; and Sócrates, 140,
Alcibiadcs: accusation and dcfcnsc of 257; spcech o f summarized, 1 4 7 -4 8 ;
Sócrates, 268, 273; as Achillcs, 259; tragedy and comcdy o f Eros in, 172. See
in Athcns, 15; character of, 2 5 4 ,2 6 0 - atso Eryxímachus; Plato
6 1 ; humiliation of, 2 6 8 ,275; as raw Arístotlc, 226; on Empcdocles, 107. Etbics
material fbr a god ,2 5 6 - 5 7 ;“ religious" of, 85; on human narure, 151; on mag*
experíence of, 265; self-ridicuJe of, nanimity, 263; on mind and nature, 288;
2 7 9 -8 0 ; six stages ofin seducción of on moderation and endurance, 266; on
Sócrates, 2 7 0 -7 1 ; on Sócrates' specches, polis, 6 ; Polines of, 133; RbeUmc of, 77.
2 7 9 -8 0 ; superiority o f to Sócrates, 160; on Sócrates, 229; on time, 220
269 Art (rtcbne): abandonment o f by Aristoph-
A!-Farabi: achievement of, 2 4 6 -4 7 anes, 119, 132; as controller o f chance,
Ancestors: deificd, 217 110; and Eros. 9 7 .1 0 0 .1 1 1 -1 2 ; and
Ancestral: and thc good, 48. 158 law, 104; noble or base, 9 8 ; and pan-
Antigone: first words of, 241: praise o f Eros eroticism, 1 1 3 -1 4 ; theory and practice
in,46 o f.9 9 ,1 0 2
Aphrodite: in Díodma, 191; in Pausanias, Astronomy; and divinadon, 1 0 6 -7
6 2 -6 3 Ate: and Eros, 159
Apollo: in Aristophanes' speech, 1 2 9 -3 0 ; Athens: in Plato, 22; pederastv in, 6 7 ,7 7 -
defeat o f Sócrates by, 264 82
Apollodorus: character of, 1 4 ,2 0 ,2 2 ; as Attraction: and repulsión, 112
« 0 6 ,2 3 ,2 5 4
Apolojy o f Sócrates: as account o f Sócrates' Baibarism: cwo fbrms of, 68
magnanimity, 263; on business of Battle morality: in Athens, 29
Sócrates, 270; on gods and ¿sim onía, Beauty: o f actions, 6 5 ; o f body and soul,
189; on héroes, 190 231; o f Eros, 160; and good, 238; always
Aquinas: on beaury, 236; on justice, 86; on imperfect, i 55; refiection o f immortal in
natural inclinación, 242 mortal, 206; sdf-forgetting in lovc of,
Arisrodemus: image o f Eros, 29; importancc 249; and virtue, 161
289
I N n E X
290
I N D E X
291
I N I> b X
292
I N O V. X
293
I N D E X
294
Phiiosophy / Political Science