Land Conflict Lacandon

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Land, conflict, and political process:

the case of the Lacandon Community,
Chiapas, Mexico (1972–2012)
a
Héctor Calleros-Rodríguez
a
El Colegio de Tlaxcala, A.C., Mexico
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of the Lacandon Community, Chiapas, Mexico (1972–2012), The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41:1,
127-155, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2013.873891
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The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2014
Vol. 41, No. 1, 127–155, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.873891
Land, conflict, and political process: the case of the Lacandon

Community, Chiapas, Mexico (1972–2012)
Héctor Calleros-Rodríguez
This contribution analyses how indigenous land disputes have taken place within a
political process and the political responses to land tenure disputes. It does so by
analysing the case of the Comunidad Zona Lacandona (Lacandon Community;
Chiapas, Mexico) and the land tenure disputes in which it has been involved during the
period 1972–2012. The paper argues that the Lacandon Community (LC) has a micro-
corporatist relationship with the state and that its creation has brought its beneficiaries
(comuneros) into an ongoing dynamic of conflict and cooperation with the state, fellow
landed communities, social and non-governmental organisations and guerrillas. By
analysing its relationship with the state and the 40-year long conflict, the paper presents
the way in which the LC has defended its land rights within institutional channels as
well as by means of contentious action. The essay also shows how conflict has been
dealt with within a political process and contributes to the theoretical understanding of
the categories of micro-corporatism and political process as they are employed in those
cases where indigenous peoples enter into conflict over land. Data for this paper comes
from interviews, agrarian archives, public information requests, newspaper articles and
ethnographies on the case study and the region.
Keywords: land conflict; political process; micro-corporatism; Comunidad Zona
Lacandona; Lacandon Community
1. Introduction, the Lacandon Community

This paper focuses on the political processes involved in and actors’ responses to conflict
over land tenure. It analyses how land disputes and the demarcation and titling of traditional
common lands have been dealt with in the framework of a political process. It analyses the
case of an indigenous community that has defended its access to and rights over land during
the period 1972–2012. The Comunidad Zona Lacandona (Lacandon Community), located
in Lacandonia1 (Chiapas, Mexico),2 has defended its access to and rights over land during
The author wishes to thank Mexico’s Conacyt for funding this research, and two anonymous
reviewers and Dr. Ramiro Flores Xolocotzi for their valuable comments.
1
The Lacandon rain forest is located in the eastern part of Chiapas, in the Usumacinta river basin, con-
tiguous with Guatemala’s El Petén region and the Yucatán peninsula (O’Brien 1998, 4).
2
This paper makes an empirical contribution to the understanding of the Lacandon Indians, the LC and
Lacandonia as it is based on extensive fieldwork in the archive of the ministry of land reform in Chiapas
and Mexico City, the agrarian national registry (RAN) and its Chiapas office (RAN Txt), as well as the
general agrarian archive (AGA). Further evidence was obtained from semi-structured interviews with
comuneros, Public Information Requests (PIRs) and newspaper articles.
© 2014 Taylor & Francis

128 Héctor Calleros-Rodríguez
the period 1972–2012. In analysing the Lacandon Community’s (LC) responses to this con-
flict over land tenure spanning the period 1972–2012, some scholars have characterised it as
an ‘institutional conservationist community’ (Trench 2008, 621), a ‘subsidised and pro-
tected community’ (García de León 2002) and part of an oppressive political system that
has prompted an indigenous rebellion (Boremanse 1998, Legorreta 1998). Its land rights
have been questioned on the grounds of a lack of ‘ethnic authenticity’ (De Vos 1980, 2002).
This paper argues that in a conflict that hinges on the incomplete demarcation of the
LC’s communal lands and that involves various disputes with several parties, it is important
to analyse the Community’s relationship with the state, as well as the ways in which the
conflict has developed and been dealt with. The paper also argues that the relationship
between the Community and the state is better explained using the theory of corporatism
(Schmitter 1974, Cawson 1986, Williamson 1989)3 and its workings at the micro-level
(Cawson 1986, 106).4 Moreover, in this contribution, the political process (Oberschall
1973, Tarrow 1998, McAdam 1999) is understood as the way in which political action
and conflicts that emerge out of routinized institutional channels is put back into those chan-
nels. The assumption here is that when existing channels to address socio-political demands
fail to deliver, political actors may then mobilise ‘to advance collective interests through
noninstituionalised means’ (McAdam 1999, 37). The solution to social conflict entails a
political process (Coser 1967); the establishment of a political process to deal with political
action and conflict rests on a minimum condition: recognition (Oberschall 1973, 243).
Recognising actors and entering into negotiations with them are key elements when begin-
ning to resolve their differences; these two elements lead to the institutionalisation of a con-
flict into a political process, which is made up of land programmes and a series of
negotiations. Moreover, while the use of categories such as micro-corporatism and political
process are useful when conceptualising the LC as a political actor that shifts its forms of
political action locating itself inside and outside the polity, the category of ‘public arena’ is
useful when explaining how political actors engage in institutional forms of action (Lowi
1964, Hilgartner and Bosk 1988, 55, Smith 2009, 13). An arena refers to the institutional
settings in which the parties of a dispute negotiate their grievances.
The Lacandons’ experiences of land claims, recognition and the demarcation of their
communal territories are similar to those of Nicaragua’s Bosawas, Awas Tingnis and Ala-
mikangbans (Finley-Brook and Offen 2009), Peru’s Uros in Lake Titicaca (Kent 2008),
3
Schmitter (1974, 93) defined corporatism as a system of interest representation in which its constitu-
ent units are organised in a limited number of unique categories that are compulsory, non-competitive,
functionally differentiated, hierarchically organised, and recognised and sometimes created by the
state. Constituent units are given representational monopoly within their respective categories in
exchange for observing control in the election of leaders and in articulating demands and support.
4
Recent theorists of corporatism have developed a framework that allows for the analysis of the oper-
ation of corporatism at different levels: macro-, meso- and micro-. The common feature of corporat-
ism at its different levels is precisely the ‘fusion’ of the processes of interest-representation in policy
formation, and the participation in policy implementation (Cawson 1986, 106, Williamson 1989). In
micro-corporatism, public policy is agreed through direct negotiation with the individual actor and is
implemented through actors agreeing to undertake certain tasks in exchange for grants or other incen-
tives (Cawson 1986). This bipartite arrangement refers to situations where authorities negotiate policy
directly with those ‘groups that have something to offer to the state’ (Hayward 1979, 37, in Cawson
1986, 5). In micro-corporatism there is no intermediary layer between the actor and the state. State
interventions can only be achieved directly, and their enforcement is only possible if there is a
degree of government control over the actor’s interests (Cawson 1986).
The Journal of Peasant Studies 129
Chile’s Mapuches (Skjaevestad 2008), Brazil’s Kayapos (Schwartzman and Zimmerman

2005) and New Zealand’s Maoris (Stevenson 2008).
Finally, this paper does not provide an analysis of resource governance (Ostrom 2011),
the sustainable governance of natural resources (Hanna 1997), or the institutional arrange-
ments for the use, management and governance of ecological systems (Agrawal and
Ostrom 2001, 80). Consequently, it does not analyse this case study in terms of the extraction
or conservation of natural resources or the policies that were implemented for achieving those
ends. In addition to this, it does not conduct an analysis of protected natural areas and the land
tenure conflicts associated with them (Messina et al. 2006), although the case study does
provide evidence that is relevant to academic and public policy debates in all these areas.
2. Conflict over land tenure and the demarcation of communal lands

The LC is an agrarian community that was established by land reform in 1972 through an
agrarian procedure called ‘recognition and titling of communal lands’ (DOF 1972). This pro-
cedure provided 66 Lacandon Indians with 621,324 hectares (over 64 square kilometers) of
tropical rainforest in southern Mexico (Figure 1). Negotiations during the period 1976–
1979 also led to this agrarian community5 incorporating Tseltal, Chol and Tsotsil-speaking
members (DOF 1979). This land restitution and the negotiated incorporation of non-Lacandon
comuneros resulted in what is today the Comunidad Zona Lacandona (LC), which currently
has a population of 16,879 inhabitants (INEGI 2012). As a political actor, the LC has the fol-
lowing features: it has a land-sharing arrangement with 1450 land-right holders or comuneros
(Ascencio 2008, 129), who are mostly speakers of four different languages who live in five
different settlements: Lacanjá Chansayab, Najá, Metzabok, Nueva Palestina, and Frontera
Corozal –plus Ojo de Agua Chankin (Figure 2). This multi-ethnic community has a three-
tier governance structure (the overall community, the sub-community and the ward) where
the Lacandons hold the ruling power as the communal leaders (Chambor Chenabor 2009).
This Community has been pushing agrarian authorities for the demarcation of its tract of
land throughout the period 1972–2012 (Sub-communal leader. Interview 53). Different
groups of land claimants (ejidatarios, small owners and landless groups) have disputed
the ownership of the land by legal means and through social mobilisation, insisting on
the validity and legality of their land tenure rights and opposing the completion of the
LC’s boundary demarcation (Figure 3). This agrarian conflict is the outcome of several
factors including the uneven distribution of land, unfinished land applications that have
left landless people with no option but to occupy ‘vacant’ lands, and claimants falling
prey to local leaders who have organised invasions of already occupied land. In some
cases, land occupiers without legal rights have received compensation for vacating their
plots, but have reoccupied this land after receiving payments for it, or else have been
replaced by other groups. In other cases, land programmes have created as much conflict
as they have solved (Warman 2001, Villafuerte et al. 2002, Bobrow-Strain 2004).
By creating the LC, agrarian authorities left several land claimants without land although
many of them were presented with the option of becoming part of it as comuneros. A refusal
5
Mexico’s 1917 Constitution established different principles of land tenure: ejido allotment, ejido
allotment extension, new centres of population (NCPE) and ‘recognition and titling of communal
lands’. The latter, established in 1927, was a procedure that returned land to its ‘original’ communal
owners under the assumption that they were dispossessed or subject to disentailment (Kouri 2002,
Ferry 2003).
Figure 1. Chiapas, Lacandonia and the Lacandon Community.

Source: Conap-Semarnat 2008 in Trench (2008, 613).
to accept the agrarian authorities’ alternatives together with LC’s vigorous and effective
defence of its land rights has led to inter-communal conflict. Indeed, agrarian archives
contain evidence of 18 episodes of conflict and violence characterised by evictions and evic-
tion threats, invasions and invasion threats, relocations, violent clashes, and incarcerations of
ejidatarios and government officials. There have been at least seven cases of violent evic-
tions of groups of settlers, with most disputes taking place in San Quintín Valley (Las
Cañadas) and the valley of Santo Domingo. Throughout the period 1977–1989, some
ejidos6 were effective in stopping the surveying and demarcation of the LC’s tract. In
1982 and 1983, comuneros evicted smallholders (from the settlements of La Confidencia,
Camino de Tsendales and Nuevo Chihuahua) and imprisoned others (San Javier) on the
grounds that they were working in their lands. Again, in March 1984, there were evictions
of settlers from San Javier – with the help of the army – and from El Desempeño. These
6
The land reform programme (1915–1992) granted ejidos to heads of households (ejidatarios) who
‘hold usufruct of land rights, either as individuals or collectively’ (O’Brien 1998, 185).
Figure 2. The Lacandon Community and its sub-communities.

Source: Author based on map of Semarnat-Conanp (2007, 7).
evictions occurred in parallel with the agrarian authorities attempts to demarcate the LC’s
tract during the period 1982–1988 (Table 1 and Figure 4). These cases illustrate how the
LC has clashed with ejidos and smallholders in disputed areas in the proximity to its settle-
ments of Najá, Metzabok and Nueva Palestina. The most recent case of inter-communal vio-
lence took place in 2006 between the LC (Nueva Palestina) and the Viejo Velasco
settlement,7 in the Santo Domingo Valley (RAN Txt [441/CAJ74/2006], CDHFBC-
CCOCVV 2007, SRE 2009, CDHFBC 2010).
3. Political actors in conflict over land tenure in Lacandonia

Agrarian conflict in Lacandonia has been part of the broader post-revolutionary agrarian
conflict in twentieth-century Mexico. The LC has engaged in both conflict and
7
In April 1984, a census, conducted after comuneros burnt the settlement, reported eight individuals
eligible for ejido land allotment.
Figure 3. Original tenure problem of the Lacandon Community (614,321 hectares).

Source: Author based on Semarnat-Conanp (2007, 12) and Diaz Gordillo (2009, 10).
cooperation with the state as well as with a variety of land-claimants, organised mainly
around ejidos. The variety of ejidos and private smallholders that the Community has
clashed with provides evidence of the plurality of actors and complexities of their
relationships within this region (Table 2). These include land claimants represented by
corporatist peasant organisations that are the ‘historical allies’ of Mexico’s post-revolu-
tionary state (Rubio 1987, Paré 1990, Warman 2001, Mackinlay and Otero 2004). In
Lacandonia, corporatist organisations such as the Confederación Central Campesina
(CNC) have had little presence in the region although they have been active in the
San Quintín valley (Le Bot 1997, Legorreta 1998, Estrada Saavedra 2007). This type
of corporatist organisation has not supported the LC; on the contrary, there is evidence
of confrontations taking place in the 1980s between comuneros and the corporatist organ-
isations representing the interests of ejidatarios and smallholders in the Sinai and San
Javier regions (AGA Comunidad Zona Lacandona (File 276.1/1515); AGA Chan
Sayab (File 23/32381); AGA Nuevo Mariscal (File 23/10081)).
The LC has also clashed with organisations of the ‘independent peasant movement’
(Chol leader. Interview 23). During the 1970s, peasant organisations began to break away
from corporatist ones due to their limitations and failure to represent their demands. Since
the 1970s, the comuneros have been reluctant to join forces with groups led by indepen-
dent peasant organisations and civil society actors, whose repertoires of political action
entail resistance, sustained mobilisation, the politicisation of grievances and demands,
or armed resistance against the state. These actors have engaged in marches, demon-
strations, seizures of government premises, the detainment of government officials and
Table 1. Instances of conflict in Lacandonia (1974–2012).
Action Actors Year Event
Eviction Army 1975– The army evicted five settlements, and burnt three of them.1
1976
Eviction LC (Lacandon 1977 Settlement Balun Canaan, by Frontera Corozal.2
Community)
Violent ARIC UU 1977 July. Violent confrontation in ejido La Nueva Providencia over a
confrontation (Asociación tract. Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel (QTL) supported La Nueva
Rural de Interés Providencia against a cacique supported by agrarian authorities.3
Colectivo;
Unión de
Uniones)
Eviction ARIC UU 1982 August 1982. Eviction carried out by Nueva Palestina. It burned down
139 houses in the settlements Nuevo Progreso, Flor de Cacao,4
Cintalapa and San Antonio Escobar – members of the QTL, and
geographically close to Nueva Palestina. One elder and one child
were reported dead. Fifty-eight people were kidnapped and families
were evicted (Legorreta 1998, 150). In 2006, the LC decided not to

regularise their land, so Flor de Cacao faced eviction.
Eviction Sinaí 1983 June/July 1983. Eviction of Sinai smallholders (settlements: La
Confidencia, Camino de Tsendales and Nuevo Chihuahua).
Forty-nine out of 50 smallholders had been working since 1974
on national lands. In March 1986, the case was represented by
Alianza Revolucionaria Campesina (ARC).
Incarcerations San Javier 1983 June 1983. Fourteen individuals were incarcerated when working
within the LC’s tract. The group received 1685 hectares for 23
families that established ‘Sociedad de Producción Rural San
Javier’ affiliated to Central Campesina Independiente (CCI).
Eviction Santo Domingo 1984 Violent eviction, with police cooperation, in the Santo Domingo
gorge5 – members of Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel/Unión de Uniones
(QTL/UU).
Eviction El Desempeño 1984 Guadalupe, San Pedro, El Paraíso, Navalán, La Laguna, Bejucal,
Santa Rosa, Nueva Sonora, La Gloria, Palmar, La Delicia, El
Triunfo, Nuevo Jerusalén, Niños Héroes, Nuevo Chamizal, San
Jacinto Lacanjá, Flor de Cacao, Viejo Velasco, Nuevo Tumbalá,
and San Antonio Escobar.6
Eviction San Javier 1984 March. Eviction of smallholders: San Javier, El Silencio and La
Confidencia.
Eviction Santa Clara 1987 August. Santa Clara smallholders.
Eviction threats 1989 10 March. The LC’s general assembly votes to evict people from 10
settlements and 18 ranches.
Invasion LC 1990 February. A group of people attacked 27 families of Nueva Palestina
over excess land occupied by ejido Cintalapa. On 15 February
1990, LC sued ejido Cintalapa for invading its land.7 These ejidos
were members of the QTL/UU.
Invasions Invasion LC/ Metzabok 1994 February. Invasion threats on Metzabok made by El Tumbo, Nueva
threats Esperanza, Piedrón and San Jose Patihuitz.
Invasion threats LC/ Najá 1994 Neighbouring ejidos.
Incarceration LC 2005 LC members and SRA personnel incarcerated in Santo Domingo.
Eviction threats El Desempeño 2006 Settlements Flor de Cacao, San Jacinto Lacanjá, Ojo de Agua, El
Progreso and Viejo Velasco had been located here since an
agreement was signed with LC in 1984.
Violence LC-Xi’Nich 2006 Viejo Velasco (Xi’Nich) Vs. LC’s sub-community of Nueva
Palestina.
(Continued)
Table 1. Continued.
Action Actors Year Event
Threats of Rio Negro 2003– Conanp resisting regularisation of settlements San Gregorio,
relocation 2012 Salvador Allende and Ranchería Corozal, located within MABR
and the LC.
Sources: RAN Txt, Ascencio (2008), CDHFB (2006), Tejeda Cruz (2002), Legorreta (1998) and Lobato (1979).
Notes: 1Huts burning in the rain forest received media attention in Mexico City (Lobato 1979, 145).
2
Tejeda (2002, 156, 183).
3
Legorreta (1998, 90).
4
CDHFB (2006).
5
RAN Txt Minute 6 April 1984. Acta levantada en Cintalapa para atender desalojos en cañada de Santo Domingo:
Cintalapa2, Lacanjá Tseltal, Limonar, San Antonio Escobar, Chamizal, San Jacinto, Nuevo Tila, Nuevo Jerusalén
and Nuevo Progreso.
6
RAN Txt 93-92/171.
7
RAN Txt 123/205.
road blockades (Rubio 1987, Grindle 1990, Inclán 2009), as well as invasion threats,
eviction threats, invasions, evictions and harassment. The LC has engaged in conflicts
with several organisations of the independent peasant movement (Table 2): Coordinadora
Nacional Plan de Ayala, Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel (QTL)8 and Xi’Nich (Villafuerte et al.
2002).
Moreover, this Community has also had issues with the guerrillas of the Zapatista Army
of National Liberation (EZLN). The Zapatistas were not the first armed group to have oper-
ated in Lacandonia (De Vos 2002, Muñoz Ramirez 2003, FEMOSPP 2006); Metzabok’s
comuneros have witnessed operations against guerrillas in the nearby ejidos Taniperlas,
El Censo and Damasco (Lacandon comunero. Interview 42rt). Throughout the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s, Najá and Metzabok faced problems over land with several neighbouring
ejidos.9 For instance, Najá has had several land-related problems with the ejidos Villa Las
Rosas, El Jardin, Ignacio Zaragoza and Lacandon. Similarly, Metzabok has had problems
8
Since 1974, Liberation theologians from San Cristóbal’s Catholic diocese with the advice of Maoist
activists built up coalitions of indigenous (Choles, Tseltales, Tojolabales, Tsotsiles) ejidos. Following
a strategy of socio-political growth along the lines prescribed by the agrarian legislation, in 1975,
ejidos united in uniones (Unión de Ejidos Quiptic Ta Lecubtsel). In 1980, this organisation and
five others united to create the Unión de Uniones Ejidales y Grupos Campesinos Solidarios de
Chiapas (UU) –representing 140 ejidos in 13 municipalities of Chiapas – which joined nation-
wide peasant organisations (De Vos 2002, 281). Later, in 1988, UU adopted the form of ARIC
Union de Uniones Ejidales y Sociedades Campesinas de Produccion Rural de Chiapas (ARIC
UU), representing 95 ejidos and 26 ranches (Legorreta 1998, 200). In 1994, with the Zapatista upris-
ing, the organisation had to choose between rebelling against the state and continuing to negotiate; this
dilemma led to its fracturing into ARIC Independiente y Democratica and ARIC ‘Oficial’ (Harvey
1998, Legorreta 1998, Orive and Torres 2010).
9
The LC’s first land invasion case refers to Najá’s complaint (1st May 1973) against the ejidos El
Jardin, El Sibal and Lacandon (RAN Txt 1/05/1973). In 1981, the Community requested the help
of the Governor of Chiapas in evicting groups of smallholders that purchased land in the region
and were threatening to expel the Lacandons with firearms (RAN Txt 111/160 1981). On 7 March
1985, communal authorities complained that ejidatarios of Lacanjá Tseltal were farming on LC’s
land. Later in the 1990s, it brought criminal charges of invasion against the ejido Cintalapa (RAN
Txt 15/02/1990). In that year, Metzabok requested the President’s intervention to stop the ejido
Damasco from invading its lands (RAN Txt 10/06/1990). It also filed a legal complaint against the
ejido El Tumbo because it claimed that members of the ejido were working on Metzabok’s lands
(RAN Txt 21/08/1990).
Figure 4. The demarcation of the Lacandon Community. Source: SRA (2007b, 6 ppt).
Note: The perimeter in black refers to the first survey and demarcation procedure (14 November
1982), the perimeter in the brightest colour marks the second bounding procedure (23 November
1982) and the grey perimeter indicates the third bounding procedure (3 March 1988).
with the ejidos Damasco, El Tumbo, Agua Dulce and Tehuacán. According to the comu-
neros, when the Zapatistas rose in arms in the mid-1990s, both, Najá and Metzabok
received threats that their lands would be invaded and their crops incinerated (Lacandon
leader. Interview 51). Once the EZLN gained full control in Las Cañadas, abuses of non-
Zapatista peoples in the region were committed (Legorreta 1998, 294); similar abuses
were suffered by the people of Najá (Lacandon leader. Interview 51 and Sub-communal
leader. Interview 53). The authorities of Metzabok asked the governor of Chiapas to call
upon neighbouring ejidos to leave it alone. Lacandon comuneros suspected that the
ejidos El Tumbo, Nueva Esperanza, San Jose Patihuitz and El Piedrón were preparing to
invade Metzabok’s land. The Lacandons also feared being attacked at night, and explained
Table 2. Political plurality of the Lacandonia region.
Type of
Organisation Actor1 Year Members
Alianza Revolucionaria Campesina CPM 1986–1987 Smallholdings Chihuahua and Sinaí
Confederacion Nacional Campesina CPM 1983 San Javier
Central Campesina Independiente IPM 1983 San Javier
Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala IPM 1983 Ixcán
Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel IPM 1974–1993 26 Ejidos
ARIC (Asociación Rural de Interés IPM 1998 Several2
Colectivo) Independiente y
Democratica
ARIC (Asociación Rural de Interés IPM 1996 San Jacinto Lacanjá and Ojo de Agua El
Colectivo; Unión de Uniones) Progreso and Nuevo Villaflores
Historica
Confederación Agrarista Mexicana CPM Lazaro Cardenas and Nuevo: Reforma,
Betel, Progreso, Tumbala, Jerusalén,
Tila, Pedregal and Mariscal

Alianza Nacional Campesina IPM 1996 Ramon F. Balboa, Santa Martha Corozal
Independiente Emiliano Zapata
10 de Abril /UCD/CNPA (Unión IPM 1994 Santa Clara/ El Desempeño
Campesina Democrática/Coordinadora
Nacional Plan de Ayala)
Movimiento Campesino Regional IPM 1994 Santa Clara
Independiente
Unión de Ejidos Fronteriza Sur CPM 1994 Santa Clara
Unión de Ejidos Mayor Julio Sabines CPM 1994 Santa Clara
Confederación Nacional de Pueblos CPM 1996–1998 Several3
Indígenas (CNPI)
Solidaridad Campesina Magisterial IPM 1999 Sol Paraíso and Santa Cruz
Unión Campesina Indígena de la Selva de IPM 2006 El Desempeño: Flor de Cacao, Ojo de
Chiapas Xi’Nich Agua el Progreso, San Jacinto
Lacanjá and Viejo Velasco
Unión Campesina Indígena de la Selva de IPM 2004 Reforma, Lázaro Cárdenas and Nuevo:
Chiapas, Xi’Nich, CEOIC4 (Consejo Betel, Progreso, Tumbalá, Jerusalén,
Estatal de Organizaciones Indígenas y Tila, Pedregal and Mariscal
Campesinas)
Augusto D’Argence Velez/Xi’Nich IPM 1993 Santa Clara,5 Viejo Velasco et al.6
Unión Campesina Indígena de la Selva de IPM 1994–1996 El Desempeño
Chiapas, Xi’Nich, CEOIC.
Organización para la Defensa de los CPM 2007 Several
Derechos Indígenas y Campesinos7
Source: CIDSCZL (1998); CDHFBC files 2010–2000; AGA Comunidad Zona Lacandona [29 July 1994/014].
Notes: 1CPM: Corporatist Peasant Movement Organisation; IPM: Independent Peasant Movement Organisation.
2
CIDSCZL 1998; Villa Las Rosas, El Jardín, El Suspiro, Guadalupe Tepeyac, San Gregorio, San Antonio Miramar,
Salvador Allende, El Zapotal, Agua Azul, Candelaria and Viejo Velasco. Buen Samaritano, and Nuevo Israel.
3
From 1995–1998, relocation offers outside the territory of the LC were made to Cintalapa, Lacanjá Tseltal, Santo
Domingo and Francisco Villa La Laguna but not accepted (CIDSCZL 1998; CIDSCZL 1996).
4
These Chol settlements refused relocation to Frontera Corozal (1976–1977), choosing to remain where they were,
but they were evicted twice by the police and Nueva Palestina’s comuneros. An agreement signed on 24 October
1984 allowed them to stay in El Desempeño, but they were again threatened with relocation (March 2004). They
legitimately possess land in that region (CDHFBC 2/15/3 Marzo 2004).
5
AGA archive has documents of Santa Clara smallholdings. On August 1982, Santa Clarás owners dissolved their
association so each individual could have full ownership of a tract (AGA CZL [29 July 1994/014]). Agrarian
authorities failed to recognise the transaction and some plots of Santa Clara were reportedly sold twice. In 1993,
President Salinas committed to solving this problem as smallholders wanted compensation over 983-00-00 hectares.
On 28 September 1993, an inspection in the region was scheduled with the agreement of Xi’Nich.
6
La Culebra, El Limonar, Busilja, Nuevo Tumbalá, San Antonio Escobar, Nuevo Tila, San Jacinto Lacanjá, Manuel
Velasco Suarez, Flor de Cacao, Nuevo Jerusalén, and Nuevo Lazaro Cardenas.
7
CDHFBC 2007 [Press release 18].
that El Tumbo tried to take possession of Metzabok’s lands in 1991 (RAN Txt 28/02/1994);
apparently, in 1996, the Zapatistas approached Nueva Palestina with the intention of attack-
ing, but changed their plans when they realised that the settlement was larger than they had
thought (Lacandon leader. Interview 32cc).
Furthermore, it is claimed that the Zapatistas tried to infiltrate the LC as a witness
recounts that, around 1996, someone from Nueva Palestina had links with the Zapatistas,
but was evicted by comuneros (Interview 64). Another testimony recalls that, also in
1996, the Community retaliated against 20 of its own members that sympathised with the
EZLN (Interview 114). Furthermore, there is also evidence suggesting that the Zapatistas
courted the comuneros of the LC; a Lacandon leader explains that the comuneros received
invitations to join the Zapatista movement (Lacandon leader. Interview C). These testimo-
nies report that letters (apparently two) asking comuneros to join the armed movement were
exchanged. Comuneros turned down those invitations, responding that they respected the
armed movement – and would like them to return this respect. The LC was of the opinion
that it had learned how to negotiate with the government (Lacandon leader. Interview C).
The Community’s reluctance to join the armed political project or ejido-based organisations
of the independent peasant movement reinforced criticisms concerning its political standing
and brought accusations that it has been instrumental in the state’s policies for the region. On
the contrary, for the comuneros, the problem seems to be the willingness to solve agrarian
matters. For instance, in March 2008, illustrating this opinion with his experience in nego-
tiating the LC’s land dispute with the 6 de Octubre settlement, a Tseltal senior comunero
expert on agrarian matters declared that whilst they were interested in a negotiated solution
to the land disputes:
[t]he Zapatistas don’t accept conciliatory dialogue with the LC … . That [case (settlement 6 de
Octubre)] is still pending but they don’t want to negotiate with the LC, what they want is to take
possession of the land without the interference of the government; that’s how it is with the
Zapatistas (Tseltal agrarian negotiator Interview 12).
In addition to this, the Zapatista uprising has made the Lacandonia the centre of regional,
national and global activism. The Community has found itself in confrontation with the Neo-
zapatismo (Leyva 2002, 74), a network of civil society organisations located not only in
Chiapas but also in cyberspace that operates in Lacandonia and anywhere in the world.
This network has provided support and legal advice to some ejidos in cases of land disputes
and evictions, and they have opposed, denounced and mobilised resources locally, nationally
and globally to draw attention to the way in which evictions have been carried out. Two
examples of this are Friends of the Earth’s call for international action regarding the El
Suspiro settlement (Figure 5) and Amnistia Internacional’s (2007) worldwide action on
behalf of the 2006 conflict between the LC and Viejo Velasco, a case that a human rights
group of Chiapas took to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (RAN Txt
[441/CAJ74/2006], CDHFBC-CCOCVV 2007, 2, SRE 2009, CDHFBC 2010).
Thus, the comuneros have disputed land with a variety of actors, but they have been con-
sistent throughout this process in their determination to not be dragged into political, ideologi-
cal and religious projects that they do not support or view as beneficial for advancing what
they perceive as legitimate agrarian demands. They have continually requested the demar-
cation of their territory and the removal of illegal settlements from their land. However,
when their negotiations with the state have failed to provide a satisfactory solution to these
demands, they have turned to contentious action to find a solution by mounting pressure
on agrarian and environmental authorities. In addressing these demands, the state has had
Figure 5. Friends of the Earth’s cyber-campaign against evictions in Lacandonia.

Source: Friends of the Earth 2010.
different approaches, with interventions in agrarian matters and disputes not necessarily being
made on the LC’s behalf, but also on behalf of its counterparts (see Section 5).
3.1 LC’s twofold relationship with the state

This section examines criticisms made of the LC regarding its relationship with the state, its
political standing, and its standing on natural resource policies (Nations 1979, Boremanse
1998, Legorreta 1998, De Vos 2002, García de León 2002, Trench 2008). This paper
argues that these relationships fall within the historical transformations of land tenure in
Lacandonia brought about by Mexico’s land reform (1915–1992); it also argues that a his-
torical alliance between the state and the LC, as an agrarian community, is grounded on four
state interventions that structured a corporatist relationship.
First of all, the transformation of landless Lacandons, Chols and Tseltals – and a small
group of Tsotsils – into comuneros has to be understood as their access to the land reform
programme and the subsequent adoption of the form of social organisation prescribed by
the land reform (according to Mexico’s Constitutional article 27 and the agrarian legis-
lation). The second intervention that structured a corporatist relationship was the acceptance
of state-sponsored settlement relocations. In the early 1970s, the acceptance or rejection of
relocation proposals put forward by land authorities came to define the political standing of
several landless indigenous groups. By accepting relocation, the comuneros made a politi-
cal statement: in exchange for the recognition of their land rights, they have agreed to
follow the authorities’ proposals and policies. This form of political exchange has come
to define the LC’s legitimacy to take part in different public arenas. It has also come to
define its multi-ethnic identity; the fact that the LC is the union of five different and
distant settlements is not a random historical outcome, but rather a product of negotiated
relocations (Villa Rojas 1967a, 1967b, 1968, Baer and Merrifield 1971, Nations 1979).
In 1976, a group of eight settlements (comprising 475 families) of Chol speakers were relo-
cated to the settlement of Frontera Corozal, which was created ad hoc, together with 15
settlements (comprising 822 families) of Tseltal speakers that were relocated to Nueva
Palestina (Lobato 1979, Dichtl 1987, 56, Paladino 2005). These 23 settlements that
accepted relocations became part of the LC as comuneros and entered into a political
relationship of cooperation with the state. In contrast, those landless groups – and ejidos
– that voluntarily rejected relocation and incorporation into the LC and resisted compulsory
relocation joined together to create a social organisation (QTL) in the 1970s, and some
became part of the EZLN.
The third state intervention relates to the Community’s political standing. It has a
twofold relationship with the state: it has a corporatist relationship with the state at
micro-level in which it deals directly with authorities at the national, state and municipal
levels, and even with international actors. Its members are in a position to deal directly
with the state because of their ownership of strategic biodiversity, through which they
seek to advance their own interests (albeit precariously). This relationship, however, has
failed to deliver their sought-after solutions to the demarcation of their lands and the
removal of groups that, they claim, are ‘illegally’ settled there. Consequently, the comu-
neros have engaged in episodes – rather than sustained campaigns – of contentious
action against the state. Through actual and threatened invasions and evictions, and
through means such as blocking roads and detaining government officials, it has
mounted pressure on agrarian and environmental authorities to address its problems.
They have recurrently used these forms of action in an attempt to make the state deliver
on the terms of negotiations, with confrontations frequently occurring towards the end of
federal administrations (1976, 1982, 1988, 1994 and 2006) (Figure 4). The complexity of
its twofold relationship with the state contradicts previous characterisations of the LC as ‘an
instrument’ used by the state for enforcing agrarian, environmental, counter-insurgent and
social programmes in the region.
Several episodes illustrate the extent of the tensions and conflict with the state. First of
all, road blocking has been used as a measure to mount pressure on authorities and open up
negotiations (Sub-communal leader. Interview 58 kp). In 2006, the tactic was used twice:
once for the release of funds (Ascencio 2008) and on another occasion in the aftermath of
the Viejo Velasco conflict over land invasion (Tseltal school teacher. Interview 123,
CDHFBC 2010). Road blocking was originally used in December 1976 and February
1977, during the establishment of Nueva Palestina and Frontera Corozal (Lobato 1979,
O’Brien 1998, Paladino 2005). Moreover, the detainment of government officials was
used on 2 September 2000, when comuneros from Frontera Corozal detained officials in
order to mount pressure on environmental authorities when promised public programmes
failed to be delivered (Tejeda Cruz 2002).
Furthermore, the Community has used legal means as a strategy for making its
demands, but it faces difficulties in securing external advice (Lacandon leader Interview
31; Lacandon leader. Interview 37; Ascencio 2008, 133; Gutiérrez 2008). For instance,
its members made a complaint to Mexico’s Human Rights ombudsman (CNDH) in 1992
(CNDH 1992), in which they claimed that the land authorities (Secretaría de la Reforma
Agraria or SRA) had violated their human rights by failing to solve the problems caused
by the incomplete demarcation of communal lands, land tenure, forest destruction and
damage to property (RAN Txt [17/08/1992]). They claimed that SRA was advising
groups of invaders to settle within their communal lands, and they requested the Ombuds-
man’s intervention to deal with this (CNDH 1992). In response to their complaint, the SRA
contended that settlements within their lands are neither new nor imputable to agrarian auth-
orities; it also indicated that there were several groups with land claims and roughly 100
settlements, ranches and ejidos of different legal status within the LC’s tract of land.10
The SRA also defended its actions on the grounds that it was conducting technical work
related to the decree of 1972, and was not encouraging invasions. Lacking adequate
legal advice, the complaint ended in an amicable agreement between the comuneros and
the SRA, with the Ombudsman suggesting that the limits of each ejido be defined
through negotiation in the future in order to avoid the reshuffling of new settlements in
the area. The parties agreed and the subject of the complaint was easily resolved with an
agreement that was signed by Lacanjá Chansayab and Nueva Palestina on 24 October
2000 (CNDH 1992 [25/08/1992], RAN Txt [22/02/1994]).
Another legal action took place in 1994 when the Community took its land claims to the
agrarian tribunals (25 January 1994) seeking federal judicial protection (RAN Txt [amparo
50/94]); the lack of a lawyer led to the failure of their attempt to secure such protection. Later,
in 2005, comuneros threatened to file for federal judicial protection, but the agrarian attorney
(Procuraduría Agraria or PA) and SRA reportedly mounted pressure on its members to with-
draw their case, insisting that the trial would be long and the outcome would be uncertain
(Ascencio 2008, 135). Choosing a lawsuit meant they would need legal advice, which
they would originally receive from the PA; however, some of them tried to hire private
lawyers. Agrarian authorities reacted to this plan with determined opposition and
10
Some acquired land rights before 1972, others after 1972; some have preliminary resolutions, whilst
others have partially overlapping plots, completely overlapping plots or private properties.
successfully blocked the comuneros from pursuing this strategy. The agrarian attorney took a
more active role in the provision of legal-agrarian advice and defence (Ascencio 2008, 135).
The fourth state intervention relates to a negotiated adaptation to resource-use policies.
In the 1960s, the expansion of lumbering pushed different groups of Lacandons deeper into
the forest until they were resettled in Naja, Metzabok and Lacanja Chansayab (Nations
1979). However, the land restitution of 1972 transformed these Lacandons from victims
of resource exploitation into partners of the state in parastatal lumbering. They fell in
with the authorities’ plan to develop state-led lumbering and signed timbering contracts
with the parastatal company Cofolasa (1974–1991)11 and Corfo (1980–1989).12 Contradic-
torily, the state made its first environmental conservation intervention in the region in 1978
with the creation of the Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve (MABR) (O’Brien 1998,13
Ascencio 2008, Prodesis 2008, 45, DOF 1978). Since 1992, the LC has been a meaningful
actor in the consolidation of environmental conservation policy as it hosts seven protected
natural areas14 (Figure 6) and five communal reserves.15 Consequently, the comuneros have
become the Lacandonia’s stewards, enjoying access to funds earmarked for conservation.
For example, between January 2011 and April 2012, it has received more than 15 payments
of REDD+ funds (Reducción de Emisiones por Deforestación y Degradación Evitada)
(Cuarto Poder 28 April 2012; 19 January 2012). O’Brien claims that they, together with
environmentalists and scientists, ‘have succeeded in countering some of the pressures’
that have degraded or destroyed many parts of the rainforest (1998, 152).
Although the comuneros have been reliable partners in conservation efforts and have
had access to conservation funds, environmental conservation policies have created pro-
blems for them: (1) restrictions on the use of natural resources have been imposed (Gov-
ernment Official (Environment). Interview 71, Interview 72, Interview 73, Interview 74;
CONANP Metzabok 2006, CONANP Najá 2006); (2) it has been claimed that the intro-
duction of environmental policies has reproduced some forms of political control on the
comuneros (Trench 2008, Legorreta 2009), and (3) these policies have altered power
structures in Lacandonia at both, inter- and intra-communal levels which, in turn, have
been the cause of rising social tensions and disputes (Trench 2008). Inter-communal
imbalances are created through environmental conservation policies as they reward
certain holders of land-rights who agree to partake in biodiversity conservation. For
instance, unlike many ejidos in Lacandonia, the LC is a stakeholder in larger projects with
international donors, a status that is sanctioned by the government. The outcome is that
some comuneros, especially Tseltal and Chol, are criticised for not being genuinely com-
mitted to biodiversity conservation since some of them resist conservation practices and
engage in the hidden exploitation of natural resources and cattle ranching (Legorreta
2009). At the intra-communal level, the introduction of conservation-friendly activities
has proved to be a successful economic development (Lacandon leader. Interview 37), but
ecotourism has also been a factor of economic differentiation and political conflict within
the LC’s sub-communities (Tejeda Cruz 2002, Hernández Cruz et al. 2005, 610) and
amongst comuneros.
11
Compañía Forestal de la Lacandona, SA, was created in 1974 and disolved in 1991 (O’Brien 1998,
76, De Vos 2002, 93–134).
12
Corporación de Fomento de Chiapas, S.A. de C.V.
13
She analyses conservation strategies in Lacandonia and the problems in the management of the
MABR.
14
MABR; Lacan-Tún, Chan-Kin, Yaxchilán, Bonampak, Najá and Metzabok.
15
Sierra Cojolita, El Cartón, Flor de Chismática, Las Cruces and El Taller (Semarnat/Conanp 2007).
Figure 6. Protected natural areas within the Lacandon Community’s tract.

Source: Author based on Semarnat-Conanp (2007, 7).
3.2 Environmental micro-corporatism

Comuneros’ political accommodation to environmental conservation policies has helped
reinforce their corporatist relationship with the state. This is a micro-corporatist relationship
because the authorities negotiate an intervention directly with those ‘groups that have some-
thing to offer to the state’ (Hayward 1979, 37, Cawson 1986, 5). For instance, in Lacando-
nia, environmental policy is enforced through direct negotiation with comuneros as they
have the last remains of the tropical forest in their possession. Since the enforcement of
an environmental policy in Lacandonia is only possible if there is a degree of government
control, comuneros may agree to undertake certain tasks if they have access to funds and
arenas to negotiate their central demands.
However, O’Brien (1998, 170) claims that they have been unwilling ‘to allow decisions
and control of their land to be usurped by environmentalists, and ha[ve] increasingly voiced
[their] opinion in the management’ of the rainforest. This claim is important because it
raises an analytical problem: whilst comuneros have frequently been regarded as being sub-
jects of state-based political manipulation (Legorreta 1998, De Vos 2002, García de León
2002, Trench 2008) the conflicting points of that relationship have received little attention.
There have been several episodes of confrontation with environmental officials. In 1989,
comuneros complained that the MABR was occupying almost all of their land, and that
they themselves only occupied a small area for farming, livestock and forestry; they
worried that more relocations of human settlements would further reduce the areas available
to them (RAN Txt 8/04/1989). Also in 1989, environmental officials (Secretaría de Desar-
rollo Urbano y Ecología, SEDUE)16 planned to modify the decree creating the reserve, and
informed the LC of the terms of the map it was developing. Comuneros discussed the issue
at an urgent general assembly (10 March 1989); they rejected the plan and informed
SEDUE that they were against the decree that created the biosphere in the first place, as
it would lead to a change in the use and tenure of the land. They argued that it was creating
buffer zones restricting and conditioning land use. Their anger stemmed from the fact that
the creation of buffer zones would virtually deprive them of the direct management of their
own natural assets. Therefore, they resisted and opposed the modification of the biosphere’s
decree. Moreover, the assembly warned environmental authorities that if they persisted with
their proposal, then the comuneros would be forced to try to reclaim the area that was given
to the regularised 26 ejidos in the Valley of San Quintín as a measure for compensating for
the loss of land (RAN Txt 6/04/1989).
Another confrontation with government officials took place in 1990 when the Commu-
nity protested to Mexico’s President. In a letter, comuneros informed him that environmental
authorities were unable to stop the destruction of the rainforest (RAN Txt 15/05/1990) and
that SRA failed to complete the demarcation of its tract, which they claim has led to
further invasions of their land (RAN Txt 28/08/1989). Similarly, other confrontations took
place regarding the creation of the reserve La Cojolita (1993), the management of the
World Bank’s conservation funds (1996) and the management plan for the MABR (1997)
(O’Brien 1998, 170). Moreover, on 2 September 2000, comuneros of Frontera Corozal con-
fronted Semarnap regarding the creation of a management programme for the Lacantún Bio-
sphere Reserve (Tejeda Cruz 2002, 220, Trench 2002). One of the last problems refers to the
Chajúl Tropical Biology Station and also reveals the tensions with Chiapas and environ-
mental officials as members have complained that it is not clear to them what is happening
at Chajul and how it is working (Interview 37; Cuarto Poder, 28 June 2011). In 2010,
when Chiapas and environmental authorities were interested in renewing the leasing contract
of the station17 (Calleros-Rodríguez 2010), an acting authority reported that:
They [Chiapas and federal environmental officials] are mounting pressure on us to renew
Chajul’s leasing contract. The LC has decided not to renew because we don’t see the benefits
… this station is for monitoring [wildlife] and research but some time ago we learned that
research is not conducted and that there is tourism but only by rich people … . On 10th February
16
With different emphasis, environmental policy has been the responsibility of: SEDUE (1982–1992),
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente, Recursos Naturales y Pesca (Semarnap 1994–2000), and Secretaria
de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Semarnat 2000–2012). In 1992, the Procuraduría Federal
de Protección al Ambiente (Profepa), Mexico’s environmental attorney, was created. In 2000, the
Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (Conanp) was established as the agency respon-
sible for the management of protected areas.
17
O’Brien (1998, 161–4) presents the history of the Chajúl Station and the roles of Mexico’s govern-
ment, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), Conservation International, the
Pulsar Corporation and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
2010 a ten-year contract by which the community allowed the installation of the station expired
… and now the Chiapas governor wants to intervene and wants to suspend several negotiations
on agrarian issues … . The leaders of the community ask themselves: ‘why is there so much inter-
est’? I think this is about the water and its future commercialisation … . (Lacandon leader. Inter-
view 37)
Although O’Brien (1998) claims that comuneros have increasingly voiced their opinion
over the management of the rainforest, they still have little bargaining power in the consul-
tation, formulation and implementation of environmental policy and its programmes. They
have not been able to foresee and control the effects that these resource-use policies have
had on them and their lands (Lacandon leader. Interview 31, Lacandon leader. Interview
32cc, Nations 1979). They have witnessed how their land has turned into an arena requiring
their adaptation to government priorities and how environmental policies have imposed con-
ditions on them regarding resource use within their own territory. Consequently, the last
resort for comuneros has been threatening environmental authorities with the clearing of pro-
tected areas for agriculture and cattle ranching if their agrarian demands (the demarcation of
their communal lands and the eviction of unauthorised settlers) are not met. Instead of ‘black-
mail’ (Trench 2008), this stand should be interpreted as their last option to exercise power
within the environmental political arena. In these arenas, the strategy comuneros have followed
to voice their opinion in the management of the rainforest has been linking the State’s environ-
mental agenda with communal demands and needs. Indeed, environmental authorities have
been forced ‘to consider their interests and opinions’ since protected areas are superimposed
on comuneros’ lands (O’Brien 1998, 169).18
In these continued struggles with environmental agencies to achieve direct access to the
budgets that are allocated for biodiversity conservation goals and to negotiate greater involve-
ment in the management of the protected areas (ELI 1998, 75, O’Brien 1998, Paladino 2005,
288), comuneros have ‘appealed to the international donors, particularly the World Bank, to
allow local communities to be direct managers of their socioeconomic development and the
conservation of their natural resources’ (O’Brien 1998, 182). They have also stood their
ground and have been active in finding ways to increase their bargaining power as well as rede-
fining their strategies and political alliances, and they have become more assertive in their
negotiations with the state. It could be expected that an increase in their power would not
only weaken the micro-corporatist bond, but also contribute to the establishment of a more
accountable and balanced relationship where resulting compromises could reflect the priorities
of the comuneros rather than those of the environmental authorities (O’Brien 1998, 182).
Thus, whilst scholars have argued that LC’s role in public policy, its political standing
and its relationship with the state give evidence of an indigenous community under the pol-
itical control of the state, this argument, however, has given little attention to the ways in
which the LC has pushed for its central agrarian demands within its micro-corporatist
relationship with the state as well as its use of contentious actions to force a state interven-
tion when the latter has failed to deliver on its demands.
4. Political arenas for struggles over land tenure

The agrarian conflict in Lacandonia has been addressed by land programmes and a series of
rounds of negotiations that together constitute a political process. Regarding the land
18
On comuneros’ and ejidatarios’ participation in conservation initiatives, see Mendoza and Dirzo
1999, Bray et al. 2003, Kosoy et al. 2008.
programmes, they constitute political arenas. Arenas are institutional settings in which the
parties of a dispute negotiate their grievances; their existence shows how political actors
engage in institutional forms of action. The establishment of these arenas has required
state intervention at inter- and cross-governmental levels (RAN Txt [26/09/1994 Minute
4], [28/11/1994 Minute 6]). State interventions in agrarian matters and disputes have not
necessarily been made only on the LC’s behalf, but also on behalf of its counterparts.
On several occasions, land authorities have established institutional channels (land pro-
grammes) for the negotiated settlement of land grievances of comuneros, ejidatarios, small-
holding owners and landless claimants, although in some cases, they simply led to more
conflict (Bobrow-Strain 2004). Often, these programmes marked the beginning of a politi-
cal process. For instance, in the period 1972–1979, agrarian authorities attempted to regu-
larise tenure by incorporating new comuneros into the LC. Under this approach,
negotiations led to the relocation of settlements in today’s Frontera Corozal and Nueva
Palestina (Lobato 1979, Tejeda Cruz 2002, Paladino 2005). Another experience of success-
ful recognition of land rights was achieved by the ejido-based independent social organis-
ation QTL. Despite the repression it suffered in the 1970s and 1980s (Harvey 1998,
Legorreta 1998, Torres 2010, Orive and Torres 2010), it successfully negotiated the recog-
nition of its land rights. The negotiations on biodiversity conservation, land regularisation
and economic development, which started in 1987, culminated in 1989 with the regularis-
ation and titling of 26 ejidos in the Valley of San Quintín (Legorreta 1998, Estrada Saavedra
2007). Like the LC, QTL’s experience also shows the extent to which ejido-based non-cor-
poratist organisations were able to compromise and fall into line with the state.
In the 1980s, the Agrarian Rehabilitation Programme (1984–1988) was used to address
the problem of land appropriations carried out by landless claimants organised in or rep-
resented by independent agrarian organisations (Harvey 1998, Reyes Ramos 2002, Villa-
fuerte et al. 2002). A recipient of this programme was El Desempeño, in the northeast
corner of Lacandonia. Settlers in this region were evicted in the 1970s19 by the comuneros
of Nueva Palestina (RAN Txt [24/09/1984]). In 1985, agrarian authorities facilitated the
signing of an agreement that allowed the settlers to stay in the location they were occupying.
In March 1989, the issue was again raised when the LC’s general assembly reiterated its
decision to oppose the regularisation of several settlements20 and ranches,21 requesting
their immediate eviction and warning agrarian authorities that it would not discuss this
issue again (RAN [10/03/1989]). In 1990, settlers in El Desempeño, fearing that they
would be relocated, demanded the authorities to fulfil the terms of the agreement (RAN
Txt [16/09/1990]). In 2004, the LC again refused to negotiate the regularisation of El
Desempeño so settlers could stay where they were (RAN Txt [30/04/ 2004], SRA 2004,
2004a, 2004b, 2004c).
The state’s response to the Zapatista uprising was coordinated by an inter-agency and
inter-governmental body integrated by the Chiapas and federal agrarian authorities in a
Mesa Interinstitucional Agraria which included the LC and social organisations
19
Settlements Nuevo Tila, Nuevo Flor de Cacao, Nuevo Jerusalén, San Jacinto Lacanjá, Nuevo Pro-
greso and Lázaro Cárdenas.
20
Nuevo Tumbalá, San Jacinto, Lacanjá Tseltal, Cintalapa (extension), Nuevo Tila (extension), Nueva
Flor de Cacao, Nuevo San Lázaro, Loma Bonita, Nuevo San Gregorio, Ojo de Agua or Nuevo
Progreso.
21
Sinaí, Campo Cedro, Puerto Rico, El Jordán, La Palma, Galilea, Africa, Asia, Rancho Cintalapa,
San Gabriel, San Sebastián, San Pedro la Aurora, Salvador Allende, Chumacerro, San Alegra, San
Gregorio, Chapultepec and Altamirano.
representing several ejidos of Lacandonia. Negotiations were successful in stopping land

invasions and led to the signing of the Agrarian Accords in 1996. The Accords had
several aims: stopping the wave of land invasions of private and ejido lands carried
out by social organisations between 1994 and 1998, peacefully clearing invaded
private and ejido lands, and reconstructing legality, the legitimacy of political institutions
and the capacity of political institutions to deal with conflict (Villafuerte et al. 2002,
Bobrow-Strain 2004).22 Through this programme, authorities gained consent from rel-
evant stakeholders and could conduct agrarian-technical works. For instance, inspections
were conducted in the area of Santa Clara (near the Santo Domingo Valley) with the
consent of the organisation Xi’Nich (AGA Comunidad Zona Lacandona file 276.1/
1515 28/09/1994). However, the programme fell prey to agrarian politics (Villafuerte
et al. 2002, Bobrow-Strain 2004).
A significant change in the attention to agrarian conflict occurred in the 1990s when
the government reinforced environmental policies on the protection of natural areas
(CIDSCZL 1996, 7), turning Lacandonia into an environmental arena from an agrarian
frontier. The creation of the Mesa Agrario-Ambiental (19 May 1999) as a round of nego-
tiations had the objective of providing an institutional instance where agrarian and
environmental concerns of the MABR were discussed (Ascencio 2008, 44). Its
members were the comuneros, federal and Chiapas environmental and agrarian auth-
orities, and other civil servants. By 1999, the Mesa reported 32 irregular settlements
within the reserve (Ascencio 2008, 46) and several ejidos and their organisations
joined the talks (i.e. ARIC Independiente y Democrática) (Ascencio 2008, 50). These
negotiations were preceded by assessments of the number and location of ‘invading’
groups within both protected areas and the LC, which were carried out in 1996 and
1998. In 1996, agrarian authorities were involved in negotiations with ejido-based organ-
isations over irregularly held land in the Santo Domingo valley with the Confederación
Nacional de Pueblos Indígenas (CNPI) and over Salvador Allende, Nuevo San Gregorio
and San Antonio Miramar with the ARIC Independiente. They were also involved in
negotiations with the ARIC UU and Xi’Nich (CIDSCZL 1996, 8). Similarly, in 1998,
agrarian authorities and the organisations mentioned above discussed again proposals
to address the relocation of groups claiming land within the LC. The new federal admin-
istration that began on 1 December 2000 continued with the discussions on land regular-
isation in which some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) became active.23 On 8
June 2001, federal and Chiapas authorities signed an agreement aiming at the conserva-
tion and sustainable management of natural resources (Ascencio 2008, 54). The Mesa
operated until June 2003 and, while it was in place, several forced evictions and reloca-
tions occurred (Ascencio 2008, 54–60).
22
Mexico, Brazil, South Africa and Colombia have adopted land policies that resemble the World
Bank’s market-assisted land reforms (MALR). It has been suggested that the Agrarian Accords inau-
gurated a new policy in Mexico towards agrarian conflict as trust funds were created to provide inter-
est-free loans to facilitate the purchase of property for landless claimants (Bobrow-Strain 2004);
however, there is evidence of government-backed land purchases throughout the 1970s and 1980s
(Calleros-Rodríguez 2010).
23
For instance, in April and May 2002, Conservation International (2003, 29) provided training for the
management of the communal reserve La Cojolita (O’Brien 1998); in 2003, lagoons and rivers were
monitored through Conservation International and the USAID presented in Mexico City as ‘Estrate-
gia Selva Lacandona Siglo XXI’ on 26 June 2003.
Then, during the period 2003–2006, a more comprehensive approach to land regularis-
ation was enforced through the Programa de Atención a Conflictos Sociales en el Medio
Rural (or Programa de Atención a Focos Rojos). This Programme of Attention to Social
Conflicts in Rural Areas operated across Mexico, aiming to address long-standing agrarian
conflicts in areas mostly populated by indigenous peoples (SRA et al. 2006), land regular-
isation and environmental conservation (SRA 2006, 2006a, 2006b, SRA 2007a; SRA
2007b; Ascencio 2008). Land regularisations were conducted through a combination of
agreed relocations (negotiated re-settlements), agreed land purchases (negotiated expropria-
tions) and the payment of compensations (SRA et al. 2006, 11; SRA 2007; SRA 2009). The
LC itself was the object of 30 concerted expropriations; for instance, it ceded 44,006 hec-
tares for a compensation of 264.6 million pesos. It also signed 31 agreements that were rati-
fied before the agrarian tribunals, by means of which it exchanged 58,259 hectares of land
for 109.07 million pesos (SRA et al. 2006, 32). Within this programme, some resettlements
were conducted between July 2004 and February 2005 (i.e. Santa Martha, Nuevo Magda-
lena and Nuevo Montes Azules) (SRA et al. 2006, 41). Progress in addressing agrarian con-
flict and guaranteeing security of tenure in the period 2003–2006 rested on negotiated
agreements amongst stakeholders (SRA et al. 2006, Ascencio 2008, Díaz Gordillo
2009). Finally, land regularisations continued over the period 1 December 2006–30
November 2012 (Programa de Atención a Conflictos Sociales en el Medio Rural or
Cosomer) (SRA 2011).
The solution to agrarian disputes has been addressed within a multi-agency body24 that
also counts on the presence of the LC and ARIC Unión de Uniones Independiente y Demo-
crática (ARIC UUIyD). Comuneros’ constant denunciation of illegal settlers located within
their land was addressed in a meeting on 2 March 2010. At that meeting, environmental
officials agreed to conduct an investigation into the locations known as El Ocotal y El
Suspiro (Figure 5) to determine if new groups have re-settled there after agrarian authorities
negotiated their removal (Conanp 2011). Similarly, comuneros demanded the conclusion of
the demarcation of their territory in a meeting of 4 May 2010, when it was agreed that SRA
would ask the authorities of Chiapas for logistic and political support necessary to continue
with the demarcation of the Western perimeter of their tract (Conanp 2011). Consequently,
as comuneros and SRA resumed the demarcation, the ejidos and irregular settlements in
Lacandonia’s region of Amador Hernández mobilised to defend their land as they feared
a violent eviction (Cuarto Poder 24 June 2010).
The land regularisations that started in 2003 offered different solutions to irregular set-
tlers: voluntarily removal, relocation25 and regularisation. From 196 agrarian cases in 2003,
by 2012, there were only six (Ascencio 2008, Cuarto Poder 13 December 2011, 31 August
2011). However, the settlements of Lacandonia’s Río Negro region (Ranchería Corozal,
Salvador Allende and San Gregorio) offer an interesting case. These settlements are
located within the lands of the LC and the MABR. On 26 July 2010, in a meeting of the
Comisión Intersecretarial, Conanp reiterated its opposition to the regularisation of any
settlements within the MABR, as has been its position since 2005. In that meeting,
ARIC UUIyD (representing the Río Negro settlements) insisted on the regularisation of
24
Comisión Intersecretarial para resolver los Asentamientos Irregulares en la Selva Lacandona y la
Reserva de la Biosfera Montes Azules en el estado de Chiapas.
25
In February 2005, settlers of Nuevo Centro de Población Montes Azules agreed before SRA to
vacate its lands in MABR and relocated to a new town near the city of Palenque; however, since
the 200 hectares they were promised were not titled and public services not in place, on 21 March
2011, settlers blocked a highway in protest (Cuarto Poder 22 March 2011).
their lands. Despite the fact that LC’s comuneros have accepted the regularisation of those
settlements since 2010 (La Jornada 2 March 2010, Conanp 2011), Conanp reiterated (28
February 2012), once again, its opposition to the regularization, insisting on a voluntarily
relocation, and offered a compensation payment ($350,000.00 MXN per family). Rio
Negro settlers, however, rejected the proposal (Cuarto Poder 25 April 2012) and, fearing
a forced eviction, organised a ‘Civil Mission of Observation and Solidarity’ led by 15
NGOs (Cuarto Poder 13 May 2012, 22 April 2012, SIPAZ 2012). Activists visited the
area from 29 April to 4 May 2012, with the aim of documenting possible human-rights vio-
lations against the settlers, to express their solidarity and to reject their relocation.
Thus, over the period 1972–2012, the state has frequently intervened through a political
process built upon negotiated agreements with the intermediation of land authorities. This
process has become a balancing act between agrarian demands, environmental concerns,
human rights, political negotiations and the enforcement of environmental and agrarian
legislation.
5. The political process

Thus, land programmes and rounds of negotiations are two constitutive elements of the pol-
itical process. While land programmes provide the arenas in which the parties of a conflict
negotiate their grievances, the rounds of negotiations aim at managing conflict by enabling
parties to discuss and negotiate their demands, claims and grievances. By addressing land
disputes through negotiations, not only negotiated tenure of the land is established, but also
the adequate foundations for political stability are too (Villafuerte et al. 2002, Bobrow-
Strain 2004, Wehrmann 2008). Over a 40-year period, the parties of land disputes in Lacan-
donia have, on several occasions, discussed, negotiated and signed agreements (convenios)
amongst themselves. These agreements are the outcomes of the rounds of negotiations, but
they are also the foundation of the agrarian authorities’ strategy for managing and resolving
landed conflict in the region. For instance, three rounds of negotiations took place in 2003
(Southern Lacandonia) and 2004 (Las Cañadas region and Mesa Limonar) (SRA 2004d).
During these negotiations, organisations such as ARIC Independiente and ARIC UU sat
down with the comuneros of the LC to discuss either the relocation or regularisation of
several settlements (SRA 2004, 2005).
The rounds of negotiations have had different outcomes. Over the years, the agreements
reached in negotiations have given authorities the chance to carry out their functions creat-
ing conditions for subsequent solutions (i.e. facilitating the demarcation of the LC’s tract,
conducting technical works prior to land regularisation, revising of boundaries under
dispute, carrying out land regularisation and relocations, intervening when tensions
increase or to defuse conflict). For instance, in 1983, in Las Cañadas region, agrarian auth-
orities, the comuneros, and several ejidos agreed on the continuation of the boundary
demarcation of the LC simultaneously with the demarcation of some ejidos (Legorreta
1998). The continuation of agrarian works has been an important outcome of agreed
cooperation between social organisations, comuneros and agrarian authorities in the regu-
larisation process of their lands. For instance, in 1996, agrarian authorities were involved in
discussions with the organisation CNPI (representing the ejidos Santo Domingo, Cintalapa,
Lacanjá Tseltal, and Francisco Villa La Laguna) and ARIC Independiente (representing the
settlements of Salvador Allende, Nuevo San Gregorio and San Antonio Miramar). These
settlements were holding land without legal tenure irregularly, but they let authorities
measure their plots so as to facilitate negotiations with the comuneros. Organisations
such as QTL and Xi’Nich took a similar approach (CIDSCZL 1996).
The rounds of negotiations have also created conditions for conflicting parties to agree
on the revision of boundaries of disputed land. As inspections have been conducted with the
actors, this form of concerted action has been used when the location of boundaries is not
clear (RAN Txt [6/08/1987]). For instance, in February, March and April 1987, the ejidos
El Limonar, Cintalapa and Lacanjá Tseltal and the LC agreed to revise the boundaries
(RAN Txt [6/08/1987]). In addition to this, other outcomes of the negotiations have been
the security of tenure of land held without titles. In some cases, the signing of agreements
has been the first step for groups with conflicting land claims with the LC to obtain legal
certainty of tenure over their lands (SRA 2003, RAN Txt [DOF 11 January 2005, DOF
2 June 2003]). Moreover, relocations have also been dealt with within rounds of nego-
tiations. Discussions on the relocation of groups within the LC took place in 1998
amongst agrarian authorities and social organisations (i.e. CNPI, ARIC Independiente,
ARIC Union de Uniones and Xi’Nich). The authorities’ position on the regularisation of
those ejidos that had been legally constituted before 1972 was that, as long as they did
not occupy land in excess, comuneros’ rights should be respected based on the agreements
signed on 24 October 198426 and 6 December 1985 (CIDSCZL 1998).27 In the case of irre-
gular settlements located within the MABR, the authorities argued that eight of them (occu-
pying 27,244 hectares) should be persuaded to accept their relocation as a measure to clear
the biosphere reserve (CIDSCZL 1998).
Furthermore, negotiations have also enabled the authorities to intervene when tensions
are rising. For instance, in 1984, an agreement signed on 10 January allowed land auth-
orities to conclude the survey and demarcation procedure in the valley of Santo
Domingo. Later, a census conducted during February–April identified several settlements28
within the LC’s land, and 12 settlements29 that had been evicted together with the small-
holders of three ranches.30 In May 1984, agrarian authorities held discussions with the
Community, Unión de Uniones (UU) and the corporatist CNC (RAN Comunidad Zona
Lacandona [17/05/1984]). Similarly, agreements reached in rounds of negotiations have
also enabled the authorities to intervene in the region in the aftermath of the Zapatista upris-
ing. For instance, between September and November 1994, in an attempt to gain consent
from parties involved in land conflict and to seek their approval to conduct technical
works, agrarian authorities held meetings with the LC and organisations including ARIC
UU, Xi’Nich and UCD-CNPA (AGA Comunidad Zona Lacandona [26/09/1994 Minute
4]). Furthermore, in 1994, the authorities conducted inspections with the consent of
social Xi’Nich in the area of Santa Clara (Santo Domingo Valley) (AGA Comunidad
Zona Lacandona [28/09/1994]). In addition to these outcomes, negotiated agreements
have been useful in defusing conflict or re-establishing the status quo when violence has
erupted. This occurred in 1981, after a confrontation between LC and the settlements
26
Nuevo Tila and El Desempeño.
27
Ojo de Agua, Nuevo Progreso, Alfredo V. Bonfil, Nuevo Tumbalá, Nuevo Jerusalén.
28
Ibarra, Ixcán, Santa Martha Corozal, Guadalupe Trinidad, Candelaria, Santa Lucía, Ojo de Agua
San Jacinto, La Sultana, Pichucalco, Guanal, Agua Azul, San Jerónimo, Las Tacitas, Amador Hernán-
dez, Perla de Acapulco, San Francisco, El Limonar, Perla Blanca, Laguna Santa Elena, Nuevo Cha-
mizal, San Antonio Escobar, Nuevo Tenejapa, El Zapotal, San José, El Calvario, Loma Bonita, 13 de
Septiembre, Nuevo Tila, Nuevo Jerusalén, Nuevo Tumbalá, Flor de Cacao, San Jacinto Lacanjá and
Ojo de Agua.
29
Nuevo Tumbalá, Viejo Velasco, San Jacinto Lacanjá, Chamizal, San Antonio Escobar, Cintalapa,
Limonar, Niños Héroes, Nuevo Tila, Nuevo Progreso, Nuevo Jerusalén and Flor de Cacao.
30
San Javier, El Silencio and La Confidencia.
Nuevo Mariscal and Chamizal, the latter being accused of deforestation and burning the
pastures of comuneros belonging to Nueva Palestina. The parties in conflict reached an
agreement with the intervention of land authorities (RAN Comunidad Zona Lacandona
[114/160/1981]).
Nevertheless, despite the usefulness of negotiations in recognising the claims of differ-
ent parties, enabling the authorities to construct the social and political conditions in which
conflicting claims have been discussed and negotiated, restoring authorities’ operational
capabilities and creating conditions for subsequent solution to disputes, they have failed
on occasion. Sometimes, negotiations have led to agreements amongst conflicting parties
which are subsequently vetoed by government authorities. An instance of this problem is
the case of the Rio Negro settlements (Ranchería Corozal, Salvador Allende and San Gre-
gorio) which are located within the LC’s land and the MABR. The conflicting parties (LC
and ARIC UUIyD) agreed on a solution that was not acceptable for environmental auth-
orities (Conanp). Since 2005, Conanp has rejected the regularisation of those settlements,
but this stand triggered mobilisations in April–May 2012. Additionally, sometimes, nego-
tiations break down, particularly when the relocation of settlers is at stake. Such was the
case in July 1983 when a small group of owners were evicted. The parties of the conflict
agreed (on 10 January 1984) that the settlers could return to their plots; however, the agree-
ment was not respected. Consequently, agrarian authorities (SRA) promoted the signing of
another agreement and considered the possibility of including the affected settlers in the
Agrarian Rehabilitation Programme (RAN Txt [24/03/1986]). Given that agreements can
be broken, one way to ensure their long-term viability and legality has been having them
sanctioned by the agrarian tribunals. This measure has been used in the land regularisations
of 2003–2006 (Ascencio 2008, Díaz Gordillo 2009).
Thus, the agrarian conflict in Lacandonia has been addressed by land programmes and a
series of rounds of negotiations which together constitute a political process. The political
process has enabled authorities to construct the social and political conditions in which con-
flicting land claims have been revised, discussed and negotiated. In this way, the solution to
land-based disputes is a process of collective definition and negotiation. In a political
process, the construction of solutions often takes place in arenas provided by the state;
agreed forms of tenure negotiated in these arenas provide an adequate foundation for pol-
itical stability.
6. Conclusion: land, conflict and political process

This paper contributes to advance our understanding of indigenous struggles over land. In
particular, it contributes to the understanding of corporatism and its workings at the
micro-level (Cawson 1986). It does so by conceptualising the relationships of the LC
with the state as micro-corporatist based on its ownership of a large tract of land and
rich biodiversity. This paper also contributes to the theoretical understanding of the pol-
itical process as it is employed for dealing with conflict over land. The political process
comprises several land programmes and rounds of negotiations; this process has had
different outcomes over the period 1972–2012. These two categories are central to the
understanding of the LC’s relationship with the state and its responses to competing
land claims that have come from corporatist and independent ejido-based organisations,
guerrillas and NGOs. Finally, this essay contributes to advance our empirical understand-
ing of the LC and the Lacandonia region by examining previous scholarship and by pre-
senting fresh and new evidence on the complexity of the comuneros’ struggles to
complete the demarcation of their territory and to remove what they regard as illegal
settlements from their land.
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Héctor Calleros-Rodríguez is a political scientist with research interest in indigenous peoples,

human rights and social conflict over natural resources. Address: El Colegio de Tlaxcala, A.C.,
Mexico. Email: hcalleros.coltlax@gmail.com

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Land, conflict, and political process:

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Land, conﬂict, and political process: the case of the Lacandon

1. Introduction, the Lacandon Community

© 2014 Taylor & Francis

Chile’s Mapuches (Skjaevestad 2008), Brazil’s Kayapos (Schwartzman and Zimmerman

2. Conﬂict over land tenure and the demarcation of communal lands

Figure 1. Chiapas, Lacandonia and the Lacandon Community.

Figure 2. The Lacandon Community and its sub-communities.

3. Political actors in conﬂict over land tenure in Lacandonia

Figure 3. Original tenure problem of the Lacandon Community (614,321 hectares).

Table 1. Instances of conﬂict in Lacandonia (1974–2012).

Action Actors Year Event

were evicted (Legorreta 1998, 150). In 2006, the LC decided not to

Table 2. Political plurality of the Lacandonia region.

Tila, Pedregal and Mariscal

Figure 5. Friends of the Earth’s cyber-campaign against evictions in Lacandonia.

3.1 LC’s twofold relationship with the state

Figure 6. Protected natural areas within the Lacandon Community’s tract.

3.2 Environmental micro-corporatism

4. Political arenas for struggles over land tenure

representing several ejidos of Lacandonia. Negotiations were successful in stopping land

5. The political process

6. Conclusion: land, conﬂict and political process

Agreement No. 523-G-00–00–00053–00. Final Performance Report October 1, 2000- September

comunales en el núcleo de población denominado ‘Zona Lacandona’, municipio de Ocosingo,

Lacandon leader. Interview 32cc. 26 April 2008.

14 January 2004. [PIR/Appeal IFAI 0001500003608 RR/1299/08].

Héctor Calleros-Rodríguez is a political scientist with research interest in indigenous peoples,

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