Moravcsik (1976) The Discernibility of Identicals

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
The Discernibility of Identicals

Author(s): J. M. E. Moravcsik
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 17, Seventy-Third Annual Meeting American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (Oct. 7, 1976), pp. 587-598
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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THE DISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS 587
"overdetermination of warrant." If S has two independent bodies

of evidence for Q, then in fact each warrants Q for him then.
Pastin's analysis, however, entails that neither warrants Q. since
neither is such that, without it, Q would no longer be warranted.
Pastin's analysis also yields incorrect results in cases in which a
person would not be warranted in believing his warranters if he
were not also warranted in believing what they warrant. This oc-
curs whenever the warranters are "epistemically sufficient" for what
they warrant. In these cases, Pastin's analysis entails the falsehood
that the warranters are warranted by what they warrant.
A third problem with Pastin's theory has to do with his concept
of basicness. It can be shown, I believe, that no contraction is basic.
For in order to ascribe any contraction to a person at a time, we
must assume that he or she has changed in many ways beyond those
"required on epistemic grounds" by the absence of a specified
proposition.
A final problem for Pastin's theory has to do with "essential
warrant." There may be a proposition P such that, if S is warranted
in believing anything at t, then S is warranted in believing P then.
If so, P is essentially warranted for S at t. So far as I can tell, Pastin
has no way of avoiding the consequence that, if P is essentially
warranted for S at t, then, for any proposition Q, if Q is warranted
for S at t, then P warrants Q for S at t.
FRED FELDMAN
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
THE DISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS *
H OW can identicals be discernible?Does not the assumption

underlying this question lead to the absurdity that the
same thing is distinguishable from itself? To be sure, one
may encounter things that seem different, only to discover later that
they are in fact identical. It might, for example, take some time to
discover that one's quiet neighbor is in fact the teller at the bank
whom one has watched for some time. But can one ascribe incom-
* To be presented in an APA symposium of the same title, December 30, 1976.
Gareth B. Matthews will comment; see this JOURNAL, this issue, 598/9.
This essay was written while the author held an ACLS Fellowship. I wish to
thank the members of my seminar in Gattingen, in the Spring of 1976, for many
useful suggestions. I am indebted in particular to Prof. G. Patzig and Dr. G.
Striker. None of these philosophers are responsible for the results.
588 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
patible characteristics to the same object? Let us consider:

(1) The plant I bought a month ago had no flowers.
(2) The plant that is on my desk has flowers.
(3) The plant that I bought a month ago is the same plant as the one
that is on my desk now.
The difference expressed by (1) and (2) cannot be ascribed to
mere difference in appearance. Still, one might say that there is no
mystery here. The two sentences referred to indicate a simple case
of change. Change shows that some identicals are discernible
through time. Certain types of individuals tend to lose and gain
attributes. Why should the obvious call for philosophic explana-
tion? This paper shows that, as in many other cases, in the case of
change too, what is intuitively obvious is not without the need for
conceptual clarification. In what follows, several versions of essen-
tialism will be reviewed as possible answers to the conceptual prob-
lems of change and persistence. In the course of reviewing some of
the difficulties of Kripke's version of essentialism, an attempt will
be made to contrast this and other recent versions of essentialism
with a type of essentialism that has its roots in some theses to be
found in Aristotle's writings. This will bring us to certain insights
concerning the relationship between language and reality.
I. THE PROBLEM AND DE DICTO SOLUTIONS
One of the conceptual problems posed by sentences (1) to (3) can
be phrased in the following way. Is it not puzzling that, in spite of
(1) and (2), (3) can be true? What is the range of sentence-pairs that
can be substituted for (1) and (2) without destroying the truth of
(3)? The pair (1) and (2) describes change, while (3) asserts per-
sistence. What kinds of change can a persistent entity endure? Why
is it illegitimate to infer the falsity of (3) from the conjunction of
(1) and (2)? Note that from the conjunction of (1), (2), and (3) we
can infer the falsity of
(4) The plant on my desk now is the same as it was before.
Apparently, the plant is not the same, but it is the same plant.
The difficulty, however, revolves not around the concepts of same-
ness and identity, but-as we have seen-around the notions of
change and persistence.'
According to Saul Kripke's writings,2 the border between change
I For further discussion see D. Gabbay and Moravcsik, "Sameness and Indi-
viduation," this JOURNAL, LXX, 16 (Sept. 20, 1973): 513-526.
2 "Naming and Necessity," in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of
Natural Language (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1972), p. 314.
and destruction is spelled out by our intuitions of possibility. Ask-

ing ourselves about conceivable changes is supposed to show the
breaking point of persistence. On this basis certain philosophers
distinguish between some essential properties of a thing, i.e., those
required for persistence, and accidental properties, i.e., those which
it can gain or lose without loss of survival. It has been argued
against this line of reasoning that our intuitions of possibility are
unreliable in some cases, and hazy at the edges in others.
One might want to consider also alternative foundations for es-
sentialism and theories of change. One such alternative can be
gleaned from certain Aristotelian passages.3 In order to appreciate
this line of reasoning, we need to bring out yet another aspect of
sentences (1) to (3). Under normal circumstances the change de-
scribed by (1) and (2) is a part of the natural development of cer-
tain types of plants. Young plants do not come equipped with
flowers. It takes nourishment and growth to enable a plant to reach
the stage of maturation at which it can start bearing flowers. All
normal plants of the appropriate type undergo this series of
changes, it is part of their nature, part of the natural process that
constitutes their life span. Thus, for the appropriate types, under-
going these changes is a part of what it is to be a plant. Accounting
for this type of change is a part of what it is to understand plants.
Developmental changes of the sort illustrated here are not only not
obstacles to survival; they are necessary conditions for survival. A
plant that fails to reach its stages of maturation fails to fulfill its
potential.
Facts of the sort illustrated here indicate the kind of data that
the essentialism under consideration is supposed to account for.
The foundation of this essentialism is that some changes are not
mere accidents; they constitute the life of an organism. As data for
essentialism, intuitions of possibility are replaced by facts about po-
tentiality and natural growth.
There is a tradition in philosophy, starting at least with the
Eleatics and Plato, according to which there is a conceptual rela-
tion between being and unchangeability. The slogan of this tradi-
tion seems to be: "If only things stayed put, then there would be
no need to complicate the conceptual framework! This tradition
still exerts a lot of influence on contemporary thought. In sharp
contrast, we have the Aristotelian insight according to which-for
3 For the importance of growth, development, etc., as constitutive of the lives
of certain types of entities see Of Generation and Destruction 1: 1, 2, and Physics
II: 8.
certain types of entities-change and being are inextricably inter-

woven. Change does not work against being; on the contrary, it
makes being for the appropriate types of entities possible. This fact
has not been given recognition in modern analytical metaphysical
discussions.
In order to account for growth and development it is not enough
to say that entities capable of undergoing such processes must have
essential properties. We need to distinguish different types of essen-
tial properties, and to mark off essential properties as a subclass of
necessary properties. Thus we need a conceptual anatomy of essen-
tialism. In rough outline, this requires the following skeleton of
distinctions.
A. Essential Properties. Since criteria of growth, maturation, and
persistence are relative to kinds, we need some properties that will
specify kinds, and others that will spell out the structures of at-
tributes governing growth, generation, and destruction for members
of the relevant species.
Al. Kind Attributes. These are generic and specific properties.
They have attached to them principles of individuation, thus pro-
viding the domain whose developmental structures and potentials
are to be specified.
A2. Attributes Specifying Conditions of Persistence. In the sim-
plest case this would be the property of having-through time-the
same parts. But in most cases-especially when involving organic
kinds-the criteria for persistence are much more complicated (e.g.,
those for a human body).
A3. Developmental Attributes. These will be the attributes, with
temporal sequential restrictions and links, which specify the changes
that the entity must undergo in order to reach maturation. Not
every spatiotemporal entity must have A3. But the restriction need
not be as narrow as the Aristotelian conception of a substance.
There is no reason why processes (political, art, education, etc.) or
institutions should not be specified partly in terms of sets of A3
attributes that they require. Aristotelian essentialism of the sort
sketched here need not be restricted within the confines of Aris-
totelian ontology.
A4. Principles of Change and Perishing. Relative to a kind K,
there will be conditions specifying which changes count as fulfilling
potential and which lead to or constitute destruction.
B. Other Necessary Attributes. Clearly there will be attributes
other than Al to A4 which a thing belonging to a kind K has nec-
essarily. Some of these will be attributes that everything must have;
others will be relative to certain sets of Ks. For example, being
TIE DISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS 59I
spatiotemporal is a necessary attribute of all animals, but it is not

covered by a description of their essential nature.
All these kinds of attributes need to be contrasted with the non-
necessary attributes (relative to K), some of which display regularity
and others of which occur randomly (a distinction not always clear
in the classical texts).
These reflections show that it is not enough for the anti-essen-
tialist to cast aspersions upon our alleged intuitions of possibility
and claim that the distinction between change and perishing is
purely a matter of arbitrary semantic conventions. He will have to
provide an alternative account that will deal adequately with the
phenomena analyzed by the essential structure outlined above and
with the link between our notions of an individual and the con-
cepts of growth and the completion of stages. The life of an organic
entity, and the lives of some other entities as well, is not captured
adequately by descriptions of a mere temporal sequence of attri-
butes. The facts demand that maturation, the normal state, and
decay be also represented in an adequate logical framework. The
challenge to the anti-essentialist is posed not merely by intuitions
but by the facts of nature.
One might try to construe the modal connections of the essen-
tialist theory in the de dicto mode. Such a theory will represent
essentialist structures as links between attributes. It will hold that,
whatever sound structures can be squeezed out of essentialism, they
are to be encased in a series of analytic propositions. For example,
kind attributes will be represented as attributes that a certain class
of things must have during their whole life span, if they have them
at all. But it is not clear how A2-type attributes will be distin-
guished from kind attributes. Intuitively, the difference is that the
kind attributes (but not the A2 attributes) are linked to principles
of individuation. The difficulty of representing this formally is
dwarfed, however, by the difficulty of representing in a formal
modal logic-with only de dicto modal scope allowed-the notions
of growth, development, potential, and decay. In terms of tense
logic, this is a problem not of representing temporal reference and
cross reference, but of representing aspect. Time points, temporal
intervals, and a succession of predicates will not represent what is
meant by someone completing a task, or a man growing old (in
contrast to his becoming old or turning into an old man over-
night). Modern logic has, at present, no adequate treatment of
these matters.4
4I am indebted to Dov Gabbay and Hans Kamp for stimulating discussions
on this topic.
Ascription of potentiality and normal development cannot be

reduced to statements about attributes, for they require reference
to existing individuals. "Beavers build dams" says nothing about
all beavers or the statistical majority of beavers; it ascribes a certain
potential to existing normal specimens.
This view is implicit in Aristotle's treatment of development.5
There is nothing "iffy" about Aristotelian ascriptions of potential-
ity or development. The ascriptions are direct and not conditional.
Thus not "if this is a plant, then . . ." but "this plant is . ." or
''a plant is . .6
In view of the fact that the de dicto approach cannot account for
developmental concepts and does not make essential reference to
existing individuals, we must look for other solutions.
II. DE RE SOLUTIONS, ARISTOTELIAN ESSENTIALISM, AND
NATURAL LANGUAGE
We can see from the foregoing that, for the expression of essential
facts, we need to refer to individuals, either in some way under any
description or with the use of a privileged description.
Why should 'this plant' be a privileged referring phrase? What is
wrong with "x is a plant" expressing a genuine statement of subject-
predicate form, with either x = this, or x = what is in front of me
on my desk? Why could not x fix reference, and the question of
whether it be a plant or not, left to further investigation?
A referring expression that is not linked to criteria of individua-
tion and persistence cannot pick out an individual in such a way
as to secure a subject through time whose features, growth, short-
comings, etc. we wish to establish and describe. By this criterion
we can distinguish 'this plant' sharply from the two candidates for
IV in the formula above. For neither of these have the required
criteria attached to them, whereas 'this plant' does.
If there are laws of growth and development, these should be
incorporated into the sciences. But, as Aristotle saw, there can be
no science without the postulation of a well-defined domain of
individuals over which the established laws will range.7 The math-
ematician, according to Aristotle, will posit a domain of units, the
geometer a domain of points, and the biologist-botanist perhaps the
domain of organic entities. The entities within these domains are
unities of different sorts, with different criteria of individuation
5 For example and discussion, see Physics II: 3.
6 For detailed documentation and discussions, see my "Aristotle on Adequate
Explanations" Synthese, xxviii, 1 (September 1974): 3-17, and "Aitia as Genera-
tive Factor in Aristotle's Philosophy" Dialogue, xiv, 4 (December 1975): 622-638.
7 Posterior Analytics II: 8.
and persistence and with different structural descriptions, revealing
how the units are constructed out of their parts.8 The domains are
marked by "entitative terms." Such a term has to have principles of
individuation and persistence linked with it, in order to mark off
various domains of discourse for the different sciences as well as
common sense. These entitative terms have to be more specific than
the term 'being'; for there is no principle of individuation and
persistence associated with the concept of being as such. (This is
the cash value of the Aristotelian dictum that being is not a genus9).
The laws of nature do not range over a mysterious realm called
"everything." 10 They range over domains carved out by the prin-
ciples of individuation and persistence linked to entitative terms.
Quantifiers in such a system have only derivative significance. If
one says: "some . . ." or "every . . . ," then the Aristotelian will
ask immediately "some . . . what?" and "every . . . what?"-fur-
thermore, he will not countenance "thing" as an answer.
In these respects the Aristotelian view about some parts of lan-
guage seems to mirror natural language better than modern sym-
bolic logic. In the formal languages of modern logic quantifiers
reign supreme. The universe of discourse is whatever they range
over. This magic trick is-quite properly-accomplished by the dis-
tinction between uninterpreted and interpreted systems. In giving
an interpretation, we assign a domain of individuals, so that dif-
ferent predicates will range over (partly) different sections of such
a domain. What the quantifiers will range over, and what the pred-
icates are assigned to, will be determined by those who construct
the language. They may wish to talk about space-time points, or
sets, or numbers, etc. This is what makes what we call a "formal
language" an artifact; not that it has symbols in it, but that it is
given an interpretation by someone and is assigned a domain of
individuals. Natural language cannot avail itself of such magic. It
has to present, in some way, its own interpretation. Thus the do-
mains of discourses are indicated by a set of privileged terms. These
are the terms that carry principles of individuation, and in some
cases principles of persistence. There are various syntactic devices
for this: indefinite noun phrases, nominalizations, etc. In this man-
ner, a natural language lifts itself up by its own denotational
bootstraps.
8Metaphysics Z: 6, 17.
9Metaphysics 998b21-26.
10 For further discussion, and link to the law of noncontradiction, see M.
Matthen "Essentialism and Non-contradiction," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford, 1975.
Thus the basic referring expressions in a natural language assign

the referent to some category, with principles of individuation and
persistence. Other referring expressions, e.g., 'what is on my table
now', are derivative; their use requires that they be backed up by
some basic referring expression: if not, then some key questions
concerning the definiteness of the reference cannot be settled.
There may be mistaken identifications. For example, we might
refer to something as "this plant" when in fact there is no plant in
the region singled out contextually. In those cases reference simply
fails; thus no assertion is being made, and we are not confronted
with a case of successful reference and false predication.
This account does not rule out the case of someone referring to
an entity having completely misunderstood its nature. For the
account specifies rules for the use of expressions, and not epistemic
requirements for speakers.
III. ARISTOTLE,CHOMSKY, KRIPKE, AND THE STUDY OF NATURE
The foregoing shows the discernibility of identicals not to be merely
a matter of arbitrary semantic convention, nor merely a matter of
intuitions, but a matter of working out the best theory for facts
concerning development, growth, and potentiality. This shows also
a limitation on this kind of essentialism; it deals with natural
kinds, and not with kind-terms or predicates in general. Given that
this type of essentialism is concerned irreducibly with individuals,
we should return once more to the question of how one should
characterize the relationship between individual and essential na-
ture. How is the individual singled out, and what tie does it have
to the specification of its nature?
According to Kripke (op. cit.), the relevant individuals are singled
out by names functioning as rigid designators, picking out individ-
uals across all those possible worlds in which they exist, without
the mediation of what Frege called senses. According to this view,
names have no unique descriptive content.
The relationship of an individual and its nature confronts us
with a dilemma. On the one hand, the relationship can be con-
strued as holding between a bare substratum and attributes; Russell
once called this the "coat-hanger theory of predication." On the
other hand, one might construe-as Russell once did-the individ-
ual as a "mere bundle of qualities." One might call this the "onion
theory of predication"; you peel away all the leaves (qualities) and
there is nothing left. Essentialism poses problems for both theories.
On the one hand, what ties the coat-hanger ("bare particular") to
its essential nature? On the other hand, why should some onion
leaves be "more equal" than others?
Parallel problems surface on the linguistic plane. Kripke's theory

is the analogue of the coat-hanger theory. Unless names place their
bearers within some category, how can they be subjects of essential
attributions? On the other hand, Frege's theory (with the refine-
ment of individual concepts) is the analogue of the onion theory.
If the name stands for "leaves," essential attribution depends on the
description under which the individual is considered.
As Noam Chomsky pointed out recently,'1 neither namables nor
names come in splendid isolation. In his critique of Kripke,
Chomsky is not maintaining that names have unique descriptive
content. He points out, however, that common-sense understanding,
as well as cultural factors, places conditions on what will be named
in a natural language, and that names-whether newly introduced
or traditional parts of a language-come in systems such as names
for persons, countries, rivers, etc. Thus names in a natural language
cannot be merely isolated rigid designators; they place individuals
within our categorial scheme. (In terms of this paper, they place
their bearers within some category that provides persistence and
individuation criteria.)
According to Aristotle, individuals are neither "coat-hangers" nor
bundles of qualities. They derive their being from belonging to a
genus. Thus the individual is fundamental for Aristotle,'2 but, e.g.,
Socrates derives his essence from being a man.
For Aristotle the link between language and reality is provided
by the system of entitative terms that provides for domains (genera)
of individuals and thus for discourse. (Since they provide criteria
of individuation and persistence, one could strengthen possible-
worlds semantics by relativizing it to such domains.) Such systems
are not infallible; postulated species can turn out to be illusory.
The bridge between language and reality will hold even if some
of the planks have to be repaired or replaced from time to time.
For Kripke too, essentialism is tied up with the problem of the
bridge between language and reality. Like many other prominent
philosophers of this century, he finds the key link in the referring
function of some singular terms. Russell's logically proper names,
Wittgenstein's atomic sentences, and Kripke's rigid designators are
members of the same family, spawned by the same concern for find-
ing an exit from the maze of words. This conception is to be con-
trasted with Aristotle's, and with Chomsky's remark that "There is
no simple point of entry into the system of language" (op. cit., 52).
The Aristotelian conception provides for essential attributions to
11 Reflections on Language (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 44-46.
1-2 E.g., Posterior Analytics II:
19.
individuals under privileged descriptions. The range of these priv-

ileged descriptions depends both on our conceptual framework and
on whatever properties things have independently of human con-
ceptual categories. An extreme version of essentialism would repre-
sent essential attributions as independent of conceptual categories.
Chomsky's recent criticisms of essentialism (46 ff) seem to be di-
rected against such versions. But the weakening of such claims can
still leave us with forms of essentialism, i.e., frameworks within
which reference to individuals in modal contexts is not eliminable
in favor of reference to attributes.
Chomsky himself, in spite of the critical remarks, is committed
to a brand of essentialism-in fact to a version that resembles what
was called here Aristotelian essentialism. For he believes-as one
can see, e.g., in the book cited-that the task of the branches of
knowledge dealing with aspects of human activity and constitution
is to discover via empirical work what is unique and constitutive
of the human species. Aristotle holds essentially the same view
about the sciences; their task is to uncover through empirical work,
what is constitutive of different domains and species.13
Interestingly enough, this turns out to be a point on which Aris-
totle, Chomsky, and Kripke converge. For though he does not dis-
cuss the aspects of the human condition, Kripke's views of natural
kinds (op. cit. 314-327) involve construing important statements of
identity, such as 'Water = H20', as empirical but necessary.
The problem arises: how can one fix the denotation of the term
singling out the relevant species and then have subsequent work
reveal the essential structure? Aristotle's notions of nominal and
real definition were supposed to solve this problem (ibid. 92b25ff).
On this view, experts and laymen do not attach different meanings
to terms like 'water', 'tiger', etc. They attach the same nominal
definition, and then the expert fills in the real definition.
In this respect Aristotle and Kripke represent the same view.
Both depart from the sort of view according to which experts and
laymen use the relevant terms with different meanings. Both can be
represented as driving a wedge between what it is to know the
meaning of 'F' and knowing what F really is. But what Aristotle
wants to accomplish with different kinds of definitions Kripke
wants to achieve by assimilating natural-kind terms to proper
names. He construes natural-kind terms too as rigid designators,
thus keeping the species fixed while empirical research uncovers
the essence.
13 This comes out again in Posterior Analytics II: 19.
There are two serious problems with Kripke's view. According

to him the following two statements of identity must hold:
(5) Water = H20.
(6) Water = what we drink out of the faucet in big cities.
The latter is the sort of identification that enables us to tag the
proper kind whose nature we are trying to determine. The problem
is, however, that from (5) and (6) it would follow that
(7) 1120 = what we drink out of the faucet, etc.
But, as we all know, (7) is not even close to being true. By now
we do not have the faintest idea of what it is that comes out of the
faucet, and is as of now not quite so bad as to poison us. Similar
examples could be given from other areas-one of the most fright-
ening being 'air'. Apparently, there are two rigid designators: the
one the scientist uses when he studies H20, and the one we use
when we talk about cleaning up the environment. Where Carnap
had difficulty establishing the link between two meanings, Kripke
faces the difficulty of establishing a link between two rigid des-
ignators.
The other difficulty is that the rigid-designator doctrine is in-
voked here to handle a case in which there is a difference between
knowing the meaning of 'F' and knowing what F is. But what
would happen if we invoked the same doctrine to cover all such
cases? We find the same division of linguistic labor in the case of
words like 'voluntary', 'speak', 'breathe', etc.-in each of these cases
we all know how to use the word, but only the expert (if anyone)
knows the nature of the item denoted. A semantics for natural lan-
guages in which all these words function as rigid designators defies
the imagination. One could say that Kripke did not claim that in
all cases of the division of linguistic labor we invoke the rigid-
designator doctrine. But how do you draw the line? And if for some
cases there is another remedy, what prevents us from applying it
to cases like 'water', 'man', etc.?
There may be alternatives to the traditional analytic view other
than the one Kripke offers.14 It seems to be important that we
should maintain the insight on which Aristotle, Chomsky, and
Kripke converge and that we should attempt to construct the satis-
factory metaphysical and logical framework. For this insight helps
us in coming to see the humanities as well as the social sciences as-
14 For an interesting alternative, see B. Linsky "Natural Kinds and Natural
Kind Terms," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford 1975.
ideally-designed to do the same work: to discover empirically what

are the unique species-invariant features of humans. (Alternatively,
to prove that there is no set of unique species-distinguishing marks.)
The study of natural language, of other cognitive competences, as
well as the study of man's need for beauty, friendship, and health,
could be placed in this framework. In this manner the tools of
analytic metaphysics can help to build the foundations of a human-
istic and nondogmatic essentialism.
J. M. E. MORAVCSIK
Stanford University
MORAVCSIK ON INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR ESSENCES *

IN the last section of his paper, "The Discernibility of Identi-
cals," Julius Moravcsik returns, as he says, "to the question of
how one should characterize the relationship between [an] in-
dividual and [its] essential nature." He asks, "How is the individual
singled out, and what ties does it have to the specification of its
nature?"
Moravcsik shows himself interested in both language and meta-
physics. As for language, he wants to know what account of naming
and what account of predication might enable us to understand
best the relation between an individual and its essence. As for meta-
physics, he wants to know what the relation actually is between an
individual and its essence.
Moravcsik reminds us of the following hoary dilemma: either an
individual is like a coat-hanger on which hang its attributes (the
coats) or else an individual is like an onion, the skins of which are
the individual's attributes. The coat-hanger view makes the indi-
vidual an uncharacterizable "something" distinct from, and addi-
tional to, all its attributes. The onion view makes the individual
the sum of its attributes and renders incoherent the idea that the
individual might have had attributes it lacks or lack attributes
it has.
Moravcsik says that these views flounder on the relationship be-
tween a thing and its essence. In fact neither view makes any allow-
ance for such a relationship (unless, perversely, one takes the es-
sence of a thing to be simply the sum of all its attributes). To allow
for essences (more narrowly conceived than simply the sum of a
* Abstract of a paper to be presented in an APA symposium on The Discerni-
bility of Identicals, December 30, 1976, commenting on J. M. E. Moravcsik's
paper, this JOURNAL, this issue, 587-598.

Moravcsik (1976) The Discernibility of Identicals

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Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

The Discernibility of Identicals

"overdetermination of warrant." If S has two independent bodies

THE DISCERNIBILITY OF IDENTICALS *

H OW can identicals be discernible?Does not the assumption

patible characteristics to the same object? Let us consider:

and destruction is spelled out by our intuitions of possibility. Ask-

certain types of entities-change and being are inextricably inter-

spatiotemporal is a necessary attribute of all animals, but it is not

Ascription of potentiality and normal development cannot be

Thus the basic referring expressions in a natural language assign

Parallel problems surface on the linguistic plane. Kripke's theory

individuals under privileged descriptions. The range of these priv-

There are two serious problems with Kripke's view. According

ideally-designed to do the same work: to discover empirically what

MORAVCSIK ON INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR ESSENCES *

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