LOURDES L.

DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999

Facts:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977,
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of
Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children
of spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes
being not the wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void;
the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate.
Lourdes filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that she
is entitled to some compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although they were
not legally married to each other. This was denied by the trial
court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the
same within the extended period.

Issue:
Whether or not a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has
become final and executor still be given effect.

Held:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer
be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void.
Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is
invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own. In
this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of
Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final and executor.
The only instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable
to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
 Pascual COSO,
vs.
Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al.,
G.R. No. L- 16763, December 22, 1921

Facts:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with
Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many years.
They be got an illegitimate son. The testator's will gives the
tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimates on and also
provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros
to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses
incurred by her in taking care of the testator when he is
alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set
aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been
exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There
is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the
testator.

Issue:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a
character to vitiate the will.

Held:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is
not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the
influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes
undue influence has been variously stated, but the substance
of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a
will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so over
powers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy
his free agency and make him express the will of another
rather than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of
the testator in regard to the execution of the will in question,
either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near there
to as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will
in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making
of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not
otherwise have made. And while the same amount of
influence may be come undue when exercise by one
occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the
mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is
further shown that the influence destroys the testator's free
agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to
show that undue influence existed at the time of its execution.
While it is shown that the testator entertained strong
affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her
influence so over powered and subjugated his mind as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of
another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if
illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a
will. Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be
regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced,
even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and
unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have
contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such
disposition is voluntarily made.
 Rizalina Gabriel GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and Lutgarda SANTIAGO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979

Facts:
Lutgarda Santiago and Rizalina Gonzales are nieces of
the late Isabel Andres Gabriel. Lutgarda filed a petition for the
probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the
deceased and designated Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary
and executrix. There is no dispute that Isabel died as a widow
and without issue. The will submitted consists of five (5)
pages and includes the pages where on the attestation clause
and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written.
The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the
end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the
pages. The petition was opposed by Rizalina assailing that the
will is not genuine and was not executed and attested as
required by law.
The lower court disallowed the probate of said will and
as a consequence, Lutgarda appealed to Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision and allowed the probate
of the will. Rizalina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence this present action.

Issue:
Whether or not the will was executed and attested as
required by law.

Held:
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides for the
qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills while
Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness
to a will. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses
are not character witnesses for they merely attest the
execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities
attendant to said execution. And we agree with the
respondent that the rulings laid down in the cases cited by
petitioner concerning character witnesses in naturalization
proceedings are not applicable to instrumental witnesses to
wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and every one
of the three instrumental witnesses are competent and
credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence was found
by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this
Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover,
petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the
said witnesses.
 LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA
vs
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE,
G.R. No. 157451, December 16, 2005

Facts:
Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United
States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina Valmonte who
was then 28 years old. But in a little more than two years of
wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984. Before death
however, Placido executed a notarial last will and testament,
granting unto said Josefina certain properties, written in
English and consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15,
1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The
petitioner Leticia attacked the mental capacity of the testator,
declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial will
the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of
sound mind.
She knew whereof she spoke because in 1983 Placido
lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live
with him and they took care of him. During that time, the
testator’s physical and mental condition showed deterioration,
aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega for whom Placido took a fancy and
wanted to marry.

Issue:
Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary
capacity at the time he allegedly executed the subject will.

Held:
The court ruled that in determining the capacity of the
testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines: “Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential
that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution.
“Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that
the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties,
or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered
by disease, injury or other cause. “It shall be sufficient if the
testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act. “Article
800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind,
in the absence of proof to the contrary. “The burden of proof
that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making
his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of
the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator
made it during a lucid interval.” According to Article 799, the
three things that the testator must have the ability to know
to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature
of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the
testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary
act. Applying this test to the present case, we find that the
appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still
able to identify accurately the kinds of property he owned, the
extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As
regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that
he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have stated
earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in
its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
 Juliana Bagtas
vs.
Isidro Paguio, et.al
G.R. No. L-6801 March 14, 1912

Facts:
Testator’s body was paralyzed on the left side, his
hearing was impaired, he had lost his power of speech, his
head fell to one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. However,
he retained the use of his right hand and was able to write
fairly well. Through the medium of signs, he was able to
indicate his wishes to his wife and to other members of his
family.
At the time of the execution of the will there were
present the four testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio,
Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro Paguio, and attorney, Señor
Marco, and one Florentino Ramos. Anacleto Paguio and the
attorney have since died, and consequently their testimony
was not available upon the trial of the case in the lower court.
The other three testamentary witnesses and the witness
Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will
was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of
these witnesses the will was executed in the following
manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of
paper notes and items relating to the disposition of his
property, and these notes were in turn delivered to Señor
Marco, who transcribed them and put them in form. The
witnesses testify that the pieces of paper upon which the
notes were written are delivered to attorney by the testator;
that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they were
his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the
will as a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it
was read in a loud voice in the presence of the testator
and the witnesses; that Señor Marco gave the document
to the testator; that the latter, after looking over it, signed it
in the presence of the four subscribing witnesses; and that
they in turn signed it in the presence of the testator and
each other.

Issue:
Whether or not the testator was of sound mind.
Held:
Supreme Court held that the presumption of a sound
mind was not rebutted. Witnesses testified that the testator
wrote the disposition in pieces of paper; he was asked
whether they were indeed dispositions to which he nodded his
head in affirmation; and the will was read to him out loud.
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental
soundness ell established, and the testator in the case at bar
never having been adjudged insane by a court of competent
jurisdiction, this presumption continues, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the opponents to overcome this legal
presumption by proper evidence. They have failed to do.
There are many cases and authorities which we might
cite to show that the courts have repeatedly held that mere
weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do
not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does
not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment
and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such
exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and
legal, are universal in statement that the question of mental
capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations
from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated as
insanity and idiocy.
At the time of the execution of the will it does not appear
that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to
have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business
was in which he was engaged. The evidence show that the
writing and execution of the will occupied a period several
hours and that the testator was present during all this time,
taking an active part in all the proceedings. Again, the will in
the case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are
those of a rational person.
 ATANASIO ABQUILAN
vs.
FELICIANA ABQUILAN
G.R. No. L-24665 October 13, 1926

Facts:
On November 6, 1924, the date when the will purports
to have been executed, the supposed testatrix, Isidra
Abquilan, was not in a condition such as to enable her to have
participated in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering
from paralysis to cerebral haemorrhage in such degree as
completely to incapacitate her for intelligent participation in
the act of making a will. It appears that the deceased left no
forced heirs, and her only heirs, in case of intestacy, are her
brother, Atanasio Abquilan, the proponent of the will, and
Feliciana Abquilan.

Issue:
Whether or not the testator possesses testamentary
capacity to make the will valid.

Held:
No. On November 6, 1924, the date when the will
purports to have been executed, the supposed testatrix was
not in a condition such as to enable her to have participated
in the act, she being in fact at that time suffering from
paralysis to cerebral haemorrhage in such degree as
completely to incapacitate her for intelligent participation in
the act of making a will. A careful comparison of the name of
the testatrix as signed in two places to the Exhibit A, with
many of her authentic signatures leads to the conclusion that
the signatures to the supposed will were made by some other
person. Furthermore, the combined testimony of Juan Serato
and Alejandro Genito completely demonstrate in our opinion
that no will at all was made on November 6, the date
attributed to the questioned document, and that, instead an
attempt was made on the night of that day to fabricate
another will, which failed of completion because of the refusal
of Alejandro Genito to be party to the making of a will in which
the testatrix took no part.
The instrument before us was undoubtedly fabricated
later, probably on November 7, at a time when the condition
of the deceased was such as to make rational participation on
her part in the act of making a will impossible.
 CATALINA BUGNAO
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL
G.R. No. 4445 September 18, 1909

Facts:
The instrument was propounded by his widow, Catalina
Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was
contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of
the deceased, and who would be entitled to share in the
distribution of his estate, if probate were denied, as it appears
that the deceased left no heirs in the direct ascending or
descending line. Appellants contend that the evidence of
record is not sufficient to establish the execution of the
alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time
when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was
not of sound mind and memory, and was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will.

Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid

Held:
It is valid. While a number of a contradictions in the
testimony of alleged subscribing witnesses to will as to the
circumstances under which it was executed, or a single
contradiction as to a particular incident to which the attention
of such witnesses must have been directed, may in certain
cases justify the conclusion that the alleged witnesses
were not present, together, at the time when the alleged will
was executed, a mere lapse of memory on the part of
these witnesses as to the precise details of an
unimportant incident ,to which his attention was not directed,
does not necessarily put in doubt the truth and veracity of the
testimony in support of the execution of the will.
Testamentary capacity defined; proof of the existence of
all the elements in the following definition of testamentary
capacity, which was frequently been adopted in the U.S , held
sufficient to establish the existence of such capacity in the
absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances:
“Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the
nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged
at that time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and
the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims
upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.”
 Sancho
vs
Abella,
G.R. No. 39033 November 13, 1933

Facts:
The testatrix, Matea Abella, consulted Dr. Antonio
Querol of San Fernando La Union who diagnosed her to be
suffering from dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach. Thus, on
or about April 26, 1932, Matea Abella ordered a sexton of the
convent where she stayed to call Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso
to whom she expressed her desire to make a will. After the
will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of the testatrix,
Macario Calug read it to her and she approved it. When the
will had been copied clean, it was again read to the testatrix
and she expressed her approval thereof. The opponent claims
that, inasmuch as the testatrix was 88 years of age when she
made her will, she was already suffering from senile debility
and therefore her mental faculties were not functioning
normally anymore and that she was not fully aware of her
acts. As an indication of her senile debility, she attempted to
prove that the testatrix had very poor memory in connection
with her properties and interest; that she could not go
downstairs without assistance, and that she could not recall
her recent acts.

Issue:
Whether or not Matea Abella has testamentary capacity
at the time she allegedly executed the subject will.

Held:
As to the mental sanity of the testatrix at the time of the
execution of her will, the court ruled that it is an undisputed
fact the she left her home in Sinait, Ilocos Sur, on April 13,
1932, in order to go to San Fernando, La Union, to consult Dr.
Antonio Querol — of whose ability she had heard so
much — regarding her headaches and stomach trouble,
stopping at the convent of the parish church; the fact
of her having walked twice to the aforesaid doctor's clinic,
accompanied by her niece, Filomena Inay; the fact that she
had personally furnished the aforesaid doctor with all the
necessary data regarding the history of her illness the
fact of her having brought with her in her trunk the
deeds to her properties; the fact of her having called for
Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso; the fact of her having
personally furnished said attorney all the data she wished
to embody in her relative to her properties and the persons in
whose favor she wished to bequeath them; the fact of
her not wishing to sign her will on the night of April 28,
1932, but the following day, in order to be able to see it
better, and the fact of her having affixed her signature, in her
own handwriting, to the original as well as to the copies of
her will which consisted of nine pages.
All these data show that the testatrix was not so
physically weak, nor so blind, nor so deaf, nor so lacking in
intelligence that she could not, with full understanding
thereof, dispose of her properties and make a will. Neither
senile debility, nor blindness, nor deafness, nor poor memory,
is by itself sufficient to incapacitate a person for making his
will. Neither senile ability, nor deafness, nor blindness, nor
poor memory, is by itself sufficient to establish the
presumption that the person suffering therefrom is not in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient
evidence of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of
the will.
 THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ,
G.R. No. February 26, 1988

Facts:
This case arose from a petition filed by private
respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981
with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial
Court) seeking the probate of the holographic will of the late
Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. The
testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March
29, 1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of
her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named
executor in the will filed an urgent motion for appointment of
special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives
and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its
order of May 5, 1981 appointed private respondent as Special
Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.
On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner),
the only surviving sister of the deceased but who was not
named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will,
alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and
the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the
testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties
to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence
was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix
by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will
failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the
estate.

Issue:
Whether or not the holographic will in question was
wholly written, dated and signed by the late Herminia
Montinola.

Held:
In the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to
present competent proof that the will was actually executed
sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already
seriously ill and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only
on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion
Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which
upon careful examination did not prove such claim of
antedating. The factual findings of the probate court and the
Court of Appeals that the will in question was executed
according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on
the Supreme Court when supported by evidence.
We have examined the records of this case and find no error
in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the
contested will was duly executed in accordance with law.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has
no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to
succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her
only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Petitioner
still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the
testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication
of the unsoundness of her mind. We cannot subscribe to this
contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides — A will shall
be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an
heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate,
and even though the person so instituted should not accept
the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. In such
cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with
law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate
shall pass to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix
disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties does not
invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was
of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall
pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood
relatives, other than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for
while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the
testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs.
MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE
BUENO, heir,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ,
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926

Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable
of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care
of his cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7,
1924, or only four days after the will above-mentioned was
made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas
Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924, thereafter.
At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not
presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such
accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.
Margariat Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the
decedent. Margarita Lopez, claims said half by the intestate
succession as next of kin and nearest heir; while the appellee,
Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accreditation and in
the character of universal heir the will of the decedent.

Issue:
Whether or not Vicente F. Lopez guardian of the
decedent has capacity to inherit from the will.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Article 753
of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with certain
exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary
provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his
guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been
approved. The provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez
in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on
his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation
of guardian and ward existing between the parties.
In addition, Article 982 of the Civil Code provides that
accretion takes place in a testamentary succession, first when
the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or
the same portion thereof without special designation of
shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies
before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it. The will executed calls Vicente F.
Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same
inheritance without special designation of shares. One of the
persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this
person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he
had been alive at the time of the testator's death. Therefore,
its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not
only the undivided half which she would have received in
conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified
to take, but also the half which pertained to him. Luz Lopez
de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.
The Supreme Court made emphasis that between
articles 912 and 983, the former is the more general dealing
with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter
is more specific, defining the particular conditions under which
accretion takes place. In case of conflict, the provisions of the
former article must be considered limited by the latter. Under
paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs when
the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of
article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called
to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the
inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn
between incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take, and it
is contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such
as to bring the case under article 912 rather than 982.
However, the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was subject
was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental
incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes
a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.