40.

G.R. No. 197174 September 10, 2014

FRANCLER P. ONDE, Petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition2 for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the R TC and
named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pifias City as sole respondent alleging
that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth
certificate stated that his parents were married. His birth certificate also stated that his mother's first
name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that the following entries on his birth
certificate be corrected as follows:

Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his parents December 23, 1983 - Bicol Not Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

The RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form and
substance. It ruled that the proceedings must be adversarial since the first correction is substantial in
nature and would affect petitioner’s status as a legitimate child. It was further held that the correction
in the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General
to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in
the Civil Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ISSUES: (1) whether the RTC erred in ruling that the correction on the first name of petitioner and his
mother can be done by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048;

(2) whether the RTC erred in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his
parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings;

HELD: On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother as
appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. Indeed,
under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be
corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of
a judicial order.

On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioner’s birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to "not married" is a substantial
correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is substantial as it will affect his
legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an illegitimate one. In Republic v. Uy, 8 we held
that corrections of entries in the civil register including those on citizenship, legitimacyof paternity or
 filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
themselves of the appropriate adversaryproceedings.9

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY

39.
UY G.R. No. 198010 August 12, 2013
FACTS:

Respondent alleged that:

 She was born on February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay.

 Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known
to her family and friends as "Norma S. Lugsanay."

 Her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Board of Medicine Certificate, and
passport bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay."

 She is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the
surname of her mother.

 She is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all
Filipinos.

The RTC set the case for hearing. The order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.
The (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office was furnished with the copy of the petition and court order
for their information and guidance.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent. OSG assailed the decision for
failure to implead indispensable parties.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s compliance to publication and notice requirement under S4R108 cured
the defect of failure to implead indispensable parties?

RULING:
No. RTC/CA Decisions nullified.

If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent
in the petition.
 The respondent seeks the correction of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded
and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice
thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. A reading of
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to
different potential oppositors: (1) The persons named in the petition; and (2) other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with
the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
his interest if he so chooses.

There may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured:

1. by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court
all possible interested parties;
2. where the interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
3. when there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or
4. When a party is inadvertently left out.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial
and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court is
mandated.

38. REPUBLIC vs COSETENG-MAGPAYO Case Digest

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO
(A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG)
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011

FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
(respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who,
as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed a Petition to change
his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating
that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent
also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the
surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname.
In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s
3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-
20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial
court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte
By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil
Registrar ofMakati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES"
[in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]…
(emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to
the Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should
be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings.
2. Whether or not the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it directed the deletion of
the name of respondent’s father from his birth certificate.
HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)

1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when
the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name
to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
*** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood
in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held
that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion
was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to
his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ."

******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108, Sec 1, 3 and 4 applies.
2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil
registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case,
and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made
parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate
was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent
before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct.

Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry
should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby."
Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that
given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given
to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or
affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted
Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods
(for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or
from the last date of publication).

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment
on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded
under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out

37. Siegfred Mison vs Gallegos GR Nos. 210759, 211403 & 211590

Doctrine:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special
concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs
and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantial allegations.

Facts:

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfried Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigation (BI) for the immediate arrest and deportation of respondent Ja
Hoon Ku (Ku) to Korea for being an undesirable alien. Pursuant to Summary Deportation Order, Ku was
arrested and detained at the BI detention center.

Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos
granted the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted.

Ruling:

No.

The Supreme Court ruled in negative. Section 1 of the Rule in the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The Amparo rule was intended to address the intractable problem of the “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

As to what constitutes enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the
elements constituting enforced disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of the RA
9851, to wit:

(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political
organization;

(c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information
on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d)That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.

In probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA 9851.

Guided by the parameters of RA 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s circumstance does not come under
the statutory definition of an enforced disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but
there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give
information to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. More importantly, there
was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and
the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as
evidenced by the Return of Warrant of Deportation.
The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts
were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause
the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved
party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege
of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

Wherefore, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to deny the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.

35. Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3
minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her
petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their
biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no
longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal
grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad
and gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that
Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to
prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological
mother.

Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child,
if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner
failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and
support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such
abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have
existed at the time of adoption.