Crimpro Digest

[G.R. No. 149357.
March 04, 2005]

MOBILIA PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 149403. March 04, 2005]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ and HAJIME UMEZAWA, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions: a petition for review on certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines, docketed as
G.R. No. 149403 of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440 which reversed its decision and granted the
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by respondent Hajime Umezawa; and the petition for review on certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 149357 filed by petitioner Mobilia Products, Inc. (MPI), the intervenor in the CA, assailing the same Resolution of the appellate
court.
The Antecedents
The antecedents were amply summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the petition at bar, to wit:
Mobilia Products, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of quality furniture which caters only to the purchase orders
booked and placed through Mobilia Products Japan, the mother company which does all the marketing and booking. After orders from
customers are booked at the mother company in Japan, the same are coursed through Mobilia Philippines for implementation and
production, after which, the ordered items are shipped to Japan through the mother company.
Mobilia Products Japan sent Hajime Umezawa to the Philippines in order to head Mobilia Products, Inc. as President and General Manager.
To qualify him as such and as a Board Director, he was entrusted with one nominal share of stock.
Sometime in the last week of January 1995, Umezawa, then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., organized
another company with his wife Kimiko, and his sister, Mitsuyo Yaguchi, to be known as Astem Philippines Corporation, without the
knowledge of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Susumo Kodaira and the other members of the Board of Directors of
Mobilia.
The said company would be engaged in the same business as Mobilia. Spouses Umezawa recruited Justin Legaspi, former Production
Manager of Mobilia, to act as Manager and one Yoshikazu Hayano of Phoenix Marble Corporation to serve as investors [sic].
Pending formal organization, Spouses Umezawa, Justin Legaspi and Yoshikazu Hayano wanted to accelerate the market potentials of
Astem by participating in the International Furniture Fair 1995 held at the Word Trade Centre of Singapore on March 6 to 10, 1995.
One of the requirements of such Fair was that the furniture exhibits must arrive and be received at Singapore not later than February 23,
1995. Pressed for time, with less than one month to prepare and while Astem had yet no equipment and machinery, no staff and no ready
personnel, Umezawa, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed on him as President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., and
in conspiracy with his wife, his sister Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Justin Legaspi, all with intent to gain for themselves and for
their company Astem Philippines Corporation, stole prototype furniture from petitioner Mobilia so that the said pieces of furniture would be
presented and exhibited as belonging to Astem in the International Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore.
In order to avoid detection, Umezawa contacted Henry Chua, the owner of Dew Foam, one of the suppliers of Mobilia, for that the latter to
load several pieces of prototype furniture into a Dew Foam truck and store them at the Dew Foam warehouse. The first batch of furniture
was stolen on February 8, 1995, when Mr. Henry Chua, upon the request of respondent Umezawa, caused to be loaded into his Dew Foam
truck two prototype sofa models worth P500,000.00, after which, the same were spirited from the Mobilia compound, then transported and
stored in Henry Chuas warehouse.
Again, on February 18, 1995, Umezawa, with grave abuse of confidence and taking advantage of his position as President and General
Manager, unlawfully stole expensive furniture from Mobilias factory worth P2,964,875.00. In order to avoid detection, the said furniture were
loaded in the truck belonging to Dew Foam, with respondent Umezawa personally supervising the loading, the carting and spiriting away of
the said furniture. Thus, taking advantage of his position as General Manager, he managed to have the said furniture taken out of the
company premises and passed the company guard without any problem and difficulty.
Further, on February 19, 1995, around 1 oclock in the afternoon, respondent Umezawa again loaded into his motor vehicle, and took away
from company premises under the same irregular and unlawful circumstances, an expensive three-seater sofa worth P255,000.00.
The taking out of the said furniture was effected in violation of the standard procedures established by petitioner corporation which requires
that every shipment or taking out of the furniture be checked and reviewed by Mobilias Production, Planning, Inventory Costing and Control
(PPICC) Division. All the foregoing furniture were transported to and stored at Henry Chuas warehouse. After sometime, the foregoing
furniture were photographed for slide photos at Photo Folio at the Reclamation Area, Cebu City and then finally catalogued for use in the
Singapore Fair for the use of Astem and its supposed owners, namely: spouses Umezawa, Hayano and Legaspi. The foregoing furniture
models were finally shipped for exhibition at the International Furniture Fair 95 in Singapore as furniture belonging to Astem Philippines
Corporation.
Sometime in March 1995, based on orders booked for Astem, Umezawa, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed on him as
the President and General Manager of petitioner Mobilia, ordered and caused the manufacture of eighty-nine (89) pieces of furniture with a
total value of P17,108,500.00. The said pieces of furniture were made with Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as well as with
Mobilia time and personnel, all of which were under the administration and control of Umezawa as President and General Manager. The
said materials and supplies, the time and labor, were supposed to be used for the manufacture and production of quality furniture for the
EXCLUSIVE USE of Mobilia. However, Umezawa, in violation of his duty to apply the same for the use of Mobilia and the duty to account
for the same, converted their use for the benefit of Astem or for the use and benefit of Umezawa, his wife and sister, Yoshikazu Hayano and
Legaspi, much to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products.
The same furniture could also have been taken out of the company premises by Umezawa and cohorts for shipment and delivery to Astem
customers had it not been for the timely discovery of the previous theft. [2]
The Board of Directors of MPI, consisting of its Chairman Susumo Kodaira and members Yasushi Kato and Rolando Nonato,
approved a Resolution on May 2, 1995 authorizing the filing of a complaint against Umezawa for two counts of qualified theft allegedly
committed on February 18 and 19, 1995. Attached to the complaint was the Joint Affidavit of Danilo Lallaban, George del Rio and Yasushi
Kato. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-275.
On May 15, 1995, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft against Umezawa with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lapu-Lapu City. The accusatory portion of the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013231-L, reads:
That during or about the period comprised between the 18th and 19th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, while being then the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a
corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of furniture, holding office and doing business in the Mactan Export Processing Zone,
Lapu-Lapu City, with grave abuse of the confidence reposed upon him by his employer, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the corporations factory in Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City,
expensive pieces of furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 3, 2-seater
German leather sofa, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 208,125.00
8) 1 piece, Model Table No. 2,
Italian marble table, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
10) 2 pieces, Model Pedestal
No. 6, Italian marble pedestal, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 150,000.00
11) 1 piece, Model Column
Standard No. 11, Italian marble worth - - - - - - - - - - - - P 93,750.00
13) 1 piece, Model High Table
No. 10, Italian marble, worth - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 187,500.00
15) 1 piece, Model Table No. 7
16) 1 piece, Model Table No. 5
18) 3-seater sofa, worth- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - P 255,000.00
with an aggregate value of P3,219,875.00, Philippine currency, without the consent of his employer, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia
Products, Inc., in the said amount of P3,219,875.00.
Contrary to law.[3]
On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment covering the properties of Umezawa.
Umezawa then filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the information filed against him, the discharge of the writ of attachment issued by
the trial court, and to set the case for preliminary investigation. MPI, the private complainant therein, opposed the motion.
In the meantime on July 21, 1995, MPI filed another criminal complaint for qualified theft against Umezawa, his wife Kimiko Umezawa,
Mitsuyo Yaguchi, Justin Legaspi, Yoshikazu Hayano and Henry Chua allegedly committed in March 1995, with the Office of the City
Prosecutor. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 95-442.
On July 25, 1995, the trial court issued an Order in Criminal Case No. 013231-L denying the omnibus motion. On joint motion of
Umezawa and the public prosecutor, the trial court ordered a reinvestigation of the case. Conformably, the public prosecutor conducted a
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 013231-L jointly with I.S. No. 95-442.
On September 25, 1995, Umezawa filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), docketed as SEC Case No.
002919, for the nullification of the Resolution issued by the three alleged members of MPI Board of Directors, authorizing the filing of
criminal complaints against him in behalf of the corporation.
On January 3, 1996, the public prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for qualified theft and one count of estafa
against Umezawa, and dismissing the case against the other accused. The Prosecutor maintained his finding of probable cause against
Umezawa in Criminal Case No. 013231-L.
On February 20, 1996, the public prosecutor filed an Information for qualified theft with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City against Umezawa,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 013423-L. The accusatory portion reads:
That on the 8th day of February 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while being the President and General Manager of Mobilia Products, Inc., a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
quality furniture, whose principal place of business is at the Mactan Export Processing Zone, Lapu-Lapu City, with intent to gain, without the
consent of his employer, and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away from the corporations factory the following expensive pieces of furniture, to wit:
1) 1 set, Model No. 2, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 225,000.00
2) 1 set, Model No. 1, 2-seater German
leather sofa, all valued at . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 275,000.00
with an aggregate value of P500,000.00 Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Another Information for estafa was thereafter filed against the same accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 013424-L. The
accusatory portion reads:
That sometime in March 1995, in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence reposed upon him as the President and General Manager of Mobilia
Products, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
amount of Seventeen Million One Hundred Eight Thousand Five Hundred (P17,108,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, which was the total
value of the furnitures ordered and manufactured by the accused or at his instance using Mobilia supplies, materials and machineries, as
well as time and personnel which were supposed to be for the exclusive use of Mobilia Products, Inc. but were converted for the use and
benefit of the accused and Astem Philippines Corporation, a company or firm engaged in the same business as that of Mobilia Products,
Inc., which is, [in] the manufacture and production of quality furniture for export, owned by the accused, to the damage and prejudice of
Mobilia Products, Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
On April 25, 1996, Umezawa filed a motion for the suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency of his petition with
the SEC in Case No. 002919. The trial court, however, issued an Order on May 21, 1996, denying the said motion. It held that the filing and
the pendency of a petition before the SEC did not warrant a suspension of the criminal cases.
On September 25, 1998, Umezawa was arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On September 30, 1998, Umezawa filed anew a Joint Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 013231-L and
013423-L, on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the felony of qualified theft. Umezawa claimed that based on the
Joint Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution submitted during the preliminary investigation, Yasushi Kato and George del Rio, MPI
Vice-President and the head of the Upholstery Department, respectively, the appropriate charge should be estafa and not qualified theft.
Umezawa further claimed that for their failure to object to and resist his alleged delictual acts, the said witnesses were as guilty as he was
and should have been included in the Information. He also asserted that there was, likewise, no allegation in the Informations as to who
was the owner of the articles stolen; hence, there was no offended party. He noted that the Informations merely alleged that MPI was his
employer. He further posited that there was no valid charge against him because the resolution authorizing the filing of the cases against
him was approved by a mere minority of the members of the MPI Board of Directors.[6]
Umezawa, likewise, filed a Motion to Quash[7] the Information in Criminal Case No. 013424-L on the ground that the facts alleged in
the Information did not constitute the felony of estafa. He posited that the Information did not contain any allegation that any demand was
made for him to return the goods. Furthermore, the owner of the said articles was not specified. He noted that as gleaned from the Joint
Affidavit of the witnesses for the prosecution, there was no lawful private complainant. He reiterated that the MPI board resolution
authorizing the filing of the charge against him was not approved by the majority of the members of its board of directors. Umezawa also
alleged that the charge for estafa with abuse of confidence was already included in the charge for qualified theft, where it was alleged that
he committed theft with abuse of confidence; hence, the charge for estafa should be quashed, otherwise, he would be placed in double
jeopardy. The motion was duly opposed by the prosecution.
On January 29, 1999, the trial court issued a Joint Order[8] dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction. It held that the dispute between
the private complainant and the accused over the ownership of the properties subject of the charges is intra-corporate in nature, and was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. It ruled that Umezawa, as a member of the board of directors and president of MPI, was also a
stockholder thereof. While Umezawa claimed to be the bona fide owner of the properties subject of the Informations which he appropriated
for himself, the private complainant disputes the same; hence, according to the trial court, the conflicting claims of the parties should be
resolved by the SEC. The private and public prosecutors received their respective copies of the Joint Order on February 2, 1999.
The MPI, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the court and for the reinstatement of
the cases on February 15, 1999. The MPI relied on the following grounds:
a. The Honorable Court has jurisdiction and must exercise it over these cases;
b. The above-entitled case is not an intra-corporate controversy;
and
c. The accused could not claim ownership nor co-ownership of the properties of private complainant corporation.[9]
The MPI maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction over the cases and cited Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A,
which provides the rules on cases over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. A copy of the motion was served on the public
prosecutor for his approval. However, the public prosecutor did not affix his conformity to the motion, and instead opted to appear before
the trial court during the hearing of the same. During the hearing, both the public and private prosecutors appeared. In support of his
motion, the private prosecutor argued that the trial of the case must be done in the presence of and under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.[10]
The trial court denied the motion in an Order dated April 19, 1999. It held that the SEC, not the trial court, had jurisdiction over intra-
corporate controversies. It also ruled that the motion of the private complainant was pro forma, it appearing that the public prosecutor had
not approved the same.
The public prosecutor received a copy of the Order on April 20, 1999. On April 26, 1999, the People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the CA against Presiding Judge Rumuldo R. Fernandez and Umezawa, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 52440. The CA allowed the MPI to intervene as petitioner, and admitted its petition- in-intervention.
The People of the Philippines, as the petitioner therein, raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE LEGAL AND MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE AND
JURISDICTION OF THESE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
RESPONDENT HAJIME UMEZAWA;
III
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CASES AND DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.[11]
The People asserted that the controversy involving the criminal cases was not between Umezawa and the other stockholders of MPI,
but one between him as the accused therein and the People of the Philippines. It averred that under Section 20(b) of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129, the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the cases against Umezawa. It also alleged that in dismissing the criminal cases
against Umezawa on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the crimes charged, the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
On September 2, 1999, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition and nullifying the assailed Orders of the RTC. It ruled that the
issue of ownership of the properties subject of the Informations was not an intra-corporate dispute. It held that Umezawa, although
president and general manager of the MPI and a stockholder thereof, was not a joint owner or co-owner of the personal properties subject
of the charges. It also held that the dispute between a private corporation and any of its stockholders relative to the ownership of properties
does not ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the RTC over the criminal cases under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It also declared that the
material averments of the Informations sufficiently charged qualified theft and estafa.
Umezawa filed a motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the CA. In a complete volte face, the appellate court issued a
Resolution on August 8, 2001, granting the motion and reversing its decision. It affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the dispute between
Umezawa and the other stockholders and officers over the implementation of the MPIs standard procedure is intra-corporate in nature;
hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Citing Section 5(a)(b) of P.D. No. 902-A, and the ruling of this Court in Alleje v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the appellate court ruled that based on the material allegations of the Solicitor General in the petition before the CA, the SEC
had exclusive jurisdiction over the conflicting claims of the parties. It likewise affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the absence of any
allegation in the Information that the MPI was the owner of the properties subject of the Information is fatal.
The petitioner MPI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST
UMEZAWA.
II
WHETHER OR NOT ALL THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES OF QUALIFIED THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE SUFFICIENTLY
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.
III
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE THE CORRECT RULING IS NOT
TO DISMISS THE CASE BUT TO ORDER AMENDMENT.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL.

V
WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.[13]

The People of the Philippines filed a separate petition for review on certiorari, contending that:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT
THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND INJUNCTION WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THAT PETITIONER HAS LOST ITS
RIGHT TO APPEAL;
2. THE COURT OF APEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN RULING THAT NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF QUALIFIED
THEFT AND ESTAFA ARE PRESENT;
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED BLATANT AND SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN FINDING THAT THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO THE PRO-FORMA MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA.[14]
The two petitions were consolidated in the Second Division of the Court.
The threshold issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the petition for certiorari of the People of the Philippines in the
CA assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court was time-barred; (b) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the crimes
charged in the said Informations; (c) whether the Informations sufficiently charge the felonies of qualified theft and estafa; and (d) if in the
affirmative, whether all the elements of qualified theft and estafa are alleged in the Informations.
On the first issue, the CA held that the Public Prosecutor failed to file a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts January 29,
1999 Joint Order dismissing the cases, that is, within fifteen days from receipt of a copy of the said order on February 2, 1999; neither did
the People appeal the said Order within the period therefor. Thus, according to the CA, the People filed its petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus assailing the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court only on April 26, 1999, well beyond the 60-day period therefor.
The appellate court, likewise, held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration of the said Joint Order by the private prosecutor without
the conformity of the Public Prosecutor did not toll the period for the People to file its motion for reconsideration thereof, or to appeal
therefrom, or to file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. It ruled that, having lost its right to appeal in due course, the People
was proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. The CA declared that the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner MPI of the Joint Order of the RTC is pro forma, the public prosecutor not having signified his written conformity thereto.
On the other hand, the petitioner People of the Philippines insists that while the public prosecutor did not expressly conform to the
motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1999 Joint Order of the trial court filed by the private prosecutor, through the public
prosecutors presence during the hearing of the said motion, his supervision and control over the private prosecutor during the said hearing,
he in effect adopted and conformed to the said motion for reconsideration.
In his comment on the petitions, respondent Umezawa maintains that the motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court
filed by the private prosecutor did not interrupt the period within which the People could appeal, citing the ruling of this Court in Cabral v.
Puno.[15] The respondent posits that the finding of the trial court, which was affirmed by the CA, that the public prosecutor did not conform to
the motion for reconsideration of the private prosecutor, is binding on this Court. The respondent also avers that the petitioner has no
personality to file the petition. Moreover, he insists that whether the public prosecutor conformed to the private prosecutors motion for
reconsideration is a question of fact which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Courts Ruling

The contention of the petitioner People of the Philippines is not correct. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[16] When the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution
of the offense.[17] In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[18] we held that under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will then act as private prosecutor for the protection of his
interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to
be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must
be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding,
with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.[19]
The intervention of the private offended party, through counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the
prosecution of criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination, for under the law, he assumes full responsibility
for his failure or success since he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination.[20] The prosecution of offenses is a
public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for
the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. [21] Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his
appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.[22]
The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any
time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final
termination of the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under his supervision and control.[23]
In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the offended party is limited to the
civil liability arising therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order
of dismissal or acquittal may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is concerned and may be
made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended
party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case.[24] However, the offended party or
private complainant may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal therefrom but only insofar as the civil
aspect thereof is concerned.[25] In so doing, the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the public
prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right of
appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public and private prosecutors are not precluded, whenever feasible, from filing a joint motion for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of the case or the acquittal of the accused, on the criminal and civil aspects of the cases.
In the present case, only petitioner MPI, through counsel, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the trial courts Joint Order dated
January 29, 1999, praying for the reinstatement of the cases insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. The public prosecutor did not
approve nor conform to the said motion. Although petitioner MPI provided ample space for the said conformity of the public prosecutor, the
latter did not do so; he merely appeared during the hearing of the said motion with the private prosecutor when the latter presented his oral
arguments in support of the said motion.
The fact that the public prosecutor did not conform to the said motion, however, does not mean that the same is pro forma. It must be
stressed that the propriety and efficacy of the motion, insofar as the civil aspect of the cases is concerned, is not dependent upon the
conformity of the public prosecutor. Hence, the filing of the joint motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the running of the period
for petitioner MPI to assail the joint order in the CA via an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari or mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
However, since the public prosecutor did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the joint order nor conform to the motion of
petitioner MPI, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases is concerned, the period for the State to assail the said joint order was not
suspended. Only the motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor of the joint order of dismissal of the cases could have tolled
the period within which the State could appeal, insofar as the criminal aspect of the cases was concerned. The bare fact that the public
prosecutor appeared for the State during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI does not amount to or constitute his
adoption of the said motion as that of the State. As ruled by this Court in Cabral v. Puno:[26]
While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal. He did not have the legal personality to appeal
or file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private prosecutor is under the direction
and control of the Fiscal, and only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period for
appeal.[27]
We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner People of the Philippines with the CA on April
26, 1999 was filed beyond the 60-day period as provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,[28] it appearing that the public
prosecutor received a copy of the joint order of the trial court on February 2, 1999, and, thus, had only until April 3, 1999 within which to file
the said petition.
Even then, the Court still holds that the CA erred in dismissing the petition of the People of the Philippines simply because the public
prosecutor erred in not himself filing a motion for reconsideration of the joint order of the trial court, on his perception that by being present
during the hearing of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner MPI, he thereby adopted the said motion as that of the States. The settled
rule is that the State is not estopped by the mistakes of its officers and employees. Indeed, in Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court
declared:
Estoppel does not lie against the government because of the supposedly mistaken acts or omissions of its agents. As we declared in
People v. Castaeda, there is the long familiar rule that erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block
subsequent correct application of the statute and that the government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents.
The Court also held in Chua v. Court of Appeals:[30]
While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are (a) when public welfare
and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and
void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. [31]
On the second issue, the petitioners assert that the CA erred in holding that the dispute between it and the respondent is intra-
corporate in nature; hence, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. As gleaned from the material allegations of the Informations, the
RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes charged. Petitioner MPI further avers that even if there is no allegation in the Informations
identifying it as the owner of the personal properties described in the Informations, its ownership of the properties can be inferred from the
other allegations. The petitioners maintain that even if the Informations are deficient, the remedy is the amendment of the Informations and
not the dismissal of the cases.
For his part, the respondent avers that the assailed Resolution of the CA is correct, and that it is the appellate courts decision which is
erroneous.
We agree with the petitioners.
According to Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129
SEC. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Section 32 thereof was later amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7691, as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction;
and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
Case law has it that in order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint or Information must be examined
for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the prescribed period provided for by law are within the
jurisdiction of the court, and where the said Information or complaint is filed. It is settled that the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or Information and not by the findings based on the evidence of the court after
trial.[32] Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by the law in force at the time of the filing of the Information or complaint. Once
jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation. Indeed, in People v. Purisima,[33] this Court held that:
In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial or
even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the
misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by law are
sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction.
In Criminal Case No. 013231-L, the value of the properties subject of qualified theft is P3,219,875.00, while in Criminal Case No.
013423-L, the value of the property was pegged at P255,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for theft when
the value of the stolen property exceeds P22,000.00 is as follows:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 20,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph and one year of each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code further provides for the penalty for qualified theft:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified
in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 013424-L for estafa, the amount of the fraud involved is P500,000.00, and under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for such crime is
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Patently, then, based on the material allegations of the Informations in the three cases, the court a quo had exclusive jurisdiction over
the crimes charged.
The bare fact that the respondent was the president and general manager of the petitioner corporation when the crimes charged were
allegedly committed and was then a stockholder thereof does not in itself deprive the court a quo of its exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. The property of the corporation is not the property of the stockholders or members or of its officers who are stockholders. [34] As
the Court held in an avuncular case:[35]
... Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate and distinct from its members. While shares of
stock constitute personal property, they do not represent property of the corporation. The corporation has property of its own which consists
chiefly of real estate (Nelson v. Owen, 113 Ala., 372, 21 So. 75; Morrow v. Gould, 145 Iowa, 1, 123 N.W. 743). A share of stock only typifies
an aliquot part of the corporations property, or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed according to law and equity
(Hall & Faley v. Alabama Terminal, 173 Ala., 398, 56 So. 235), but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the corporation
(Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St., 28). Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets (Gottfried v. Miller,
104 U.S., 521; Jones v. Davis, 35 Ohio St., 474). The stockholder is not a co-owner or tenant in common of the corporate property (Harton
v. Johnston, 166 Ala., 317, 51 So., 992) [36]
As early as the case of Fisher v. Trinidad,[37] the Court already declared that [t]he distinction between the title of a corporation, and the
interest of its members or stockholders in the property of the corporation, is familiar and well-settled. The ownership of that property is in the
corporation, and not in the holders of shares of its stock. The interest of each stockholder consists in the right to a proportionate part of the
profits whenever dividends are declared by the corporation, during its existence, under its charter, and to a like proportion of the property
remaining, upon the termination or dissolution of the corporation, after payment of its debts.[38]
We also agree with the ruling of the CA in its decision that the SEC (now the Regional Trial Court) had no jurisdiction over the cases
filed in the court a quo. The appellate courts reliance in the assailed Resolution issued by the Board of Directors of the petitioner
corporation, on Section 5(b) of P.D. No. 902, has no factual and legal basis.
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A provides that the SEC[39] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
the following:
(a) devices or schemes employed by, or any acts of, the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners, amounting to fraud
and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of association or
organizations registered with the Commission, and
(b) controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively.
In Fabia v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court explained that Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A should be taken in conjunction with Section 6 of
the law. It then proceeded to explain:
In synthesis, Sec. 5 of PD 902-A mandates that cases involving fraudulent actions and devices which are detrimental to the interest of
stockholders, members or associates and directors of the corporation are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC. Taken in
conjunction with Sec. 6 of the same law, it will be gathered that the fraudulent acts/schemes which the SEC shall exclusively investigate
and prosecute are those in violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission alone. This
investigative and prosecutorial powers of the SEC are further without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of The Revised
Penal Code.
From the foregoing, it can thus be concluded that the filing of the civil/intra-corporate case before the SEC does not preclude the
simultaneous and concomitant filing of a criminal action before the regular courts; such that, a fraudulent act may give rise to liability for
violation of the rules and regulations of the SEC cognizable by the SEC itself, as well as criminal liability for violation of the Revised Penal
Code cognizable by the regular courts, both charges to be filed and proceeded independently, and may be simultaneously with the other.[41]
Thus, the filing of a petition in the SEC for the nullification of the Resolution of May 2, 1995 issued by the Chairman and two members
of the Board of Directors of petitioner MPI, which authorized the filing of criminal cases against respondent Umezawa, was not a bar to his
prosecution for estafa and qualified theft for his alleged fraudulent and delictual acts. The relationship of the party-litigants with each other
or the position held by petitioner as a corporate officer in respondent MPI during the time he committed the crime becomes merely
incidental and holds no bearing on jurisdiction. What is essential is that the fraudulent acts are likewise of a criminal nature and hence
cognizable by the regular courts.[42] Thus, notwithstanding the fact that respondent Umezawa was the president and general manager of
petitioner MPI and a stockholder thereof, the latter may still be prosecuted for the crimes charged. The alleged fraudulent acts of
respondent Umezawa in this case constitute the element of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code on estafa.[43]
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the CA in its decision, to wit:
A dispute involving the corporation and its stockholders is not necessarily an intra-corporate dispute cognizable only by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Nor does it ipso facto negate the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the subject cases. The Supreme Court
citing the case of Viray v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 92481, 191 SCRA 308 [1990]) in Torio v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107293, March
2, 1994, 230 SCRA 626) held:
It should be obvious that not every conflict between a corporation and its stockholders involves corporate matters that only the SEC can
resolve in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
As the Supreme Court further ruled in the Torio case that a contrary interpretation would distort the meaning and intent of P.D. 902-A, the
law re-organizing the Securities and Exchange Commission. The better policy in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case would
be to consider not only the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the questions raised in the subject of the controversy.[44]
On the last issue, we find and so hold that the Informations state all the essential elements of estafa and qualified theft. It was
adequately alleged that respondent Umezawa, being the President and General Manager of petitioner MPI, stole and misappropriated the
properties of his employer, more specifically, petitioner MPI. As expostulated by the CA in its decision:
In any event, the allegations in the informations, if hypothetically admitted, are sufficient to bind Umezawa to the charges of qualified theft
and estafa. As aptly ruled by the court a quo in its Order of July 25, 1995, all the elements of the offense of qualified theft are present. There
is no basis for claiming otherwise. Furthermore, the private offended party, as well as the subject matter of the felonious taking and the
ownership thereof, have been adequately indicated or identified leaving no room for any doubt on these matters. Considering that the
motions to quash of September 30, 1998 are fundamentally rehash of the motion to quash filed on May 29, 1995 and the culpable acts
subject of the new informations are virtually the same as the first information filed against Umezawa, there is no conceivable reason why
the court a quo abandoned its previous stand and controverted itself in regard the sufficiency of the informations.
In our considered view, and as the court a quo had correctly held in its Order of May 26, 1996, even a SEC ruling voiding the resolution
authorizing the filing of criminal charges versus the accused Hajime Umezawa can have no bearing on the validity of the informations filed
in these three criminal cases as pointed out by private complainant, the public offenses of qualified theft and estafa can [be] prosecuted de
officio. The resolution of the office of the prosecutor on the preliminary investigation as well as the re-investigation conducted on the letter-
complaint filed by private complainant company sufficiently established prima facie case against the accused and the legality or illegality of
the constitution of the board which authorized the filing of the complaint does not materially affect either the informations filed against
Umezawa or the pending criminal proceedings. As petitioners contend, the action is now between the People of the Philippines and herein
private respondent.[45]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52440
dated August 8, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 2, 1999 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135554-56. June 21, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO DELA CRUZ y CARIZZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated August 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and 15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2) counts of rape
and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in the RTC of Baguio City. The informations
alleged:
Criminal Case No. 15163-R -
That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA
CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

Criminal Case No. 15164-R -
That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of
his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 7610
(The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter,
JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R.
Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three cases. When arraigned, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of
the National Bureau of Investigation-Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother of complainant and spouse
of accused-appellant; and SPO2 Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police.
The prosecution established that accused-appellant married Jean dela Cruz in civil rites on 14 April 1977 and again in Catholic rites on
27 December 1978. They begot four children, namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace, Daniel Jay and Gerard Nio.[4]
Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. He transferred to the Don
Bosco Elementary School in Baguio City sometime in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he worked at the Saint Louis
Center in Baguio City until his dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-appellant again taught at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac
from 1993 until his arrest in August 1997.[5] While working there, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac on weekdays and went
home every 15 days or every payday. They would go home to Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on Friday evening and
return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.[6]
Jeannie Ann dela Cruz (Jeannie Ann) testified that she was born to accused-appellant and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April 18, 1979 in
Tarlac, Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her family transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio
City. Her family lived in an extension of her grandmothers house which had a basement, a second floor and an attic. The second floor had
four rooms and a stairs leading to the attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie Anns parents and her two brothers, Daniel and Nio,
stayed in the basement while she and her sister, Divine stayed in the second floor.[7]
Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting her when she was seven years old. While he helped do her homework
at night, accused-appellant would on occasion make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also instances when he would put
his penis inside her mouth and withdraw the same when a white liquid came out.[8] Accused-appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell her
mother what he was doing to her and told her that it was a normal thing between father and daughter. He further warned Jeannie Ann that
her mother might kill them should she learn about the things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant and did not tell anyone
about the sexual acts he performed on her. As she was growing up, accused-appellant continued to engage in the aforementioned sexual
activities with her, and continuously threatened to hurt her, her siblings or her mother if she did not give in to his desires. Jeannie Ann still
refrained from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-appellant that the sexual activities which he performed on her were
proper.[9] She recounted before the trial court three particular occasions when accused-appellant molested her.
Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was sexually abused by accused-appellant in their house in No. 37 Leonard
Wood Road, Baguio City. She was only 11 years old then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said house when her
grandmothers house in Sumulong St. was destroyed in the July 16, 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio City.[10] They occupied the basement of
the house in Leonard Wood Road. The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room and a living room. Nobody stayed in the second floor
thereof but during the day they stayed in the main house.[11] Sometime that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old brother Nio and
accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and her sister Divine went to market. She was in the living room with Nio when
her father undressed her. Her father removed his pants and she was made to lie down on a cushion. Her father played with her genitalia
and rubbed his penis against her private part until a white liquid came out of his penis. Jeannie Ann said that after said incident, she felt
pain in her vagina whenever she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not resist because she thought that what her father was doing to her was
a normal act.[12]
Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old. She was watching
television with her siblings in the living room. At that time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-appellant called her
three times but she refused to respond to his call as she was watching television. Exasperated, accused-appellant pulled her inside one of
the bedrooms and asked her to lie down on the bed saying, "This is only for a while." Accused-appellant then undressed her, removed his
pants and underwear, inserted his finger inside her vagina, mashed her breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant proceeded to rub
his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his penis therein and kept it there until his semen started to come out. Accused-
appellant placed his penis on Jeannie Anns stomach where he made his semen flow. While all this was happening, Jeannie Ann could only
cry, as she was afraid of accused-appellant, because he threatened her that he would kill her or her mother and siblings.[13]
The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their house in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City on August 2, 1997. She
was then 18 years old. When she came home at around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis University, she saw accused-
appellant at the door. He told her to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored him and went directly to her room and started cleaning the
same. While she was cleaning the outer portion of her room, she saw accused-appellant go up the attic. While he was there, he repeatedly
called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie Ann remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean the attic, she went
up when she was done cleaning her room.[14]
Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann swept the floor. When she was done, accused-appellant asked her to
join him on the bed. He went near her and again asked her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call. Accused-appellant
whispered to her that he was running out of time. He talked in whispers so that the other people in the house at that time would not be able
to hear what he said. Sensing that accused-appellant would again molest her, Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to cry. He told her
to stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do would only take a while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Anns t-shirt and
brassier, mashed her breasts with his left hand and inserted his right hand inside her pants. Jeannie Ann resisted, but accused-appellant
proceeded to insert a finger of his right hand inside her vagina. While he performed the aforementioned acts on his daughter, accused-
appellant told her, I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only one who will do this to you.[15]
Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He
immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved away from her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down and to keep
quiet about the incident. When accused-appellant noticed that Aileen had left because Jeannie Ann did not respond to her, accused-
appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and said: "Please cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you my life. Promise that I will be the only
one who will touch you." Accused-appellant began touching her again. He inserted his fingers inside her vagina. As he touched her, he said,
Please cooperate with me and trust me. This is for your own good and for the good of our family. If you will not follow me, you might regret
it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish, I can already die and you will no longer have any problem.[16] Although Aileen,
Divine, Nio and Rogel, another boarder in their house were also there at the time of the incident, Jeannie Ann did not have the courage to
call for help because she was very much afraid of accused-appellant, and she saw anger in his eyes.[17]
When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann insisted on going down. She cried as she returned to her room to fix
herself. Thereafter, she went out of the house to deal with what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward the bridge, she saw
a white L-300 van belonging to the police. She flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2 Bravo
and SPO2 Ong, what accused-appellant had just done to her. The policemen accompanied her back to their house where they met
accused-appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who had raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the policemen to
the Baguio City Police Station.[18]
When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie Ann narrated her experience to the police officer stationed at the
Womens Desk. In her statement, Jeannie Ann described what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997.[19]
Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellants claim that she had sexual relations with her boyfriend Charles, and that she accused her
father of rape to get back at him for causing her breakup with Charles.[20]
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who conducted a physical examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8,
1997, testified that he found two old healed lacerations at 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Anns hymen. He said that the
lacerations could have been inflicted more than three months prior to the date of the examination and considering the proximity of their
location, could have been inflicted at the same time. A hard rigid instrument like an erect male organ, a rigid wood or a finger could have
caused these lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of the lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the victim had
sexual intercourse less than three months prior to his examination of her, since intercourse would not create further lacerations when done
in the same position. He likewise noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the vaginal rugosities were slightly flattened and smoothed. The
victim's hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill said it was possible that penetration happened several
times. He further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a diameter of more than an inch, could cause the
lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal walls.[21]
Jean dela Cruz (Mrs. dela Cruz), Jeannie Anns mother and wife of accused-appellant, testified that she learned that accused-
appellant had sexually abused their daughter Jeannie Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her marketing chores. She
was told by her daughter Divine that accused-appellant was picked up by the police. Mrs. dela Cruz followed accused-appellant to the
police station and found Jeanie Ann crying while the latter was reporting what had happened to her at the Women's Desk. Upon seeing her
daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together.[22]
Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that accused-appellant
had been performing oral sex on their daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as it was the first time that she learned
about it. In her anger, she rushed to the other room where the accused-appellant was being questioned and slapped him, kicked him and
scratched his face. She said accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him. When accused-appellant was already incarcerated,
Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters[23] from him asking for forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann.[24] She also informed the trial
court that after accused-appellants incarceration, she went to Tarlac to get her husband's things since he usually stayed there on weekdays
while he taught at Don Bosco.[25] She discovered several love letters by a certain Emily addressed to accused-appellant,[26] Emilys
photograph[27] and accused-appellants draft love letters to Emily, dated March 21, 1995,[28] September 4, 1995,[29] and March 7,
1996.[30] Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter from a certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a chance of winning her
heart,[31] and a photograph of Maureen.[32] She said that the tenor of the letters indicated that accused-appellant was having relations with
other women.[33] Mrs. dela Cruz also denied accused-appellants claims that she had a paramour and that she helped Jeannie Ann file the
complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to get back at him for being unfaithful to her.[34]
SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio City Mobile Group, also testified that on August 2, 1997, between 11:30
a.m. and 12:00 noon, while he and his companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were passing along Sumulong St., Baguio
City, they saw Jeannie Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them and tearfully reported to them that her father had just sexually
molested her. They accompanied Jeannie Ann to her house and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant as the person who mashed
her breasts and inserted his finger inside her vagina. SPO2 Ong and his companion approached accused-appellant, introduced themselves
as policemen and invited him to the police station. He said that accused-appellant readily agreed to go with them to the police station.[35]
The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant, Camilo Estepa, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio
City, Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco in
Trancoville, Baguio City.
Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In 1987,
he transferred to Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught also in Saint Louis
School Center. In 1994, he went back to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught there until his incarceration in
August 1997.[36] On weekdays, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they would go home to their family in Baguio
City every 15th and 30th of each month to give his salary to his wife. When these dates fell on a weekday, they would go home to Baguio
City the following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.[37]
He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his daughter Jeannie Ann.[38] According to him, he tried to provide for the needs of
his family, especially his wife whom he loved very much. He maintained that even when he was already in jail, he asked his mother and his
sister to support his daughter's education.
He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the evening of August 1, 1997, which he recalled was a Friday. That night, his wife
asked him to clean the attic the following day as there was a dead rat therein.[39]
The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed the decomposing body of the rat from the attic as requested by his
wife. He called his daughter Jeannie Ann who was cleaning her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic and help him. It
took a while before Jeannie Ann heeded his call. When she finally went up, she merely swept one third of the floor area of the attic, away
from where the dead rat was. When she was done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant asked her to come near him, as he wanted to
apologize for having scolded her earlier and to remind her that she should not have ignored him when he commanded her to go up the attic,
or to at least tell him that she could not obey his command immediately. While he was talking to her, they heard someone calling her
name. Jeannie Ann told accused-appellant that that person was her classmate. She then went down while accused-appellant stayed on to
fix the things in the attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him that they had some visitors downstairs. On his way down
from the attic, he looked out of the window and saw Jeannie Ann walking beyond the bridge.[40]
Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were looking for Rogel, one of their boarders. After leading these visitors to
Rogel, two policemen arrived in their house with Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo
and SPO2 Melchor Ong. The former asked for accused-appellants name and thereafter invited him to the police station. He freely went with
them, without asking the purpose of the invitation.[41]
At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accused-appellant. The interview was reduced to writing and he was asked to
sign the same. He did not read the document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first, accused-appellant refused to
sign the document without the presence of his counsel. SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to sign the document
may be interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part. Accused-appellant thereafter decided to sign the document.[42]
Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac because he was dismissed from
the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City. He acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student named Freda Miguel filed a
case[43] against him because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that he
signed an amicable settlement of the complaint. However, he denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing thereof
was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis Center.[44]
He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but insisted that they were only his friends, and
that Emilys reference to him as her boyfriend in one of her letters[45] was only a joke.
Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases against him because they had resentments
against him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His wife, on the other hand,
wanted him out of her life because she had a paramour. According to him, his wife admitted to him that she had an illicit relationship with a
man named Alfredo dela Cruz, a namesake of his brother. His wife had a second relationship with a person named Alfredo Aquino against
whom he filed a case before the barangay.[46]
Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, told the trial court that sometime in 1993, accused-appellant
filed a case for malicious mischief against a certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of Mrs. Aqui, the mother of Mrs. dela
Cruz. Accused-appellant alleged that Aquino was courting his wife. However, the case was settled amicably when Aquino agreed to leave
the boarding house of Mrs. Aqui.[47]
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to 1998, testified that he had known accused-
appellant since 1994 and was not aware of any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that accused-appellant and his son Daniel
would go home to his family in Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac either on Sunday evening or Monday morning. He would
come to school on time and attended the flag ceremony regularly. Fr. Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever complained about
accused-appellant.[48]
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville, Baguio City, testified that accused-appellant was
a very competent teacher in Science and had a very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he regretted that accused-appellant
left his teaching job at the Don Bosco Elementary School after only one year.[49]
On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of Rape (committed in September 1990) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under paragraph No. 3
of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (Statutory Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua; to indemnify the offended party, Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
offense of incest rape (committed in July 1995) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under Section 11 of
Republic Act 7659 (Heinous Crime Law) which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to
suffer the supreme penalty of Death to be implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann
dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
offense of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code instead of violation of
RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him, applying the indeterminate sentence
law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two
(2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann
dela Cruz the sum of P5,000 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law.
SO ORDERED.[50]
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jeannie Ann and in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Anns testimony was fabricated
and inconsistent.[51]
Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her harrowing
experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where he worked on weekdays,
and Jeannie Ann was with her mother in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose the sexual abuses which accused-appellant
allegedly committed against her.[52] Moreover, he claims that considering Jeannie Anns tender age at the time he allegedly raped her, she
must have suffered great pain and should have complained about it to her mother or told the latter what accused-appellant had been doing
to her. Accused-appellant argues that the delay in the reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his daughter is not normal and is
indicative of the untruthfulness of complainants charges.[53]
The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter
Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime of Rape prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997), and which is the applicable law for the rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:
When and how rape is committed. --Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

xxx
In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following guidelines it had previously formulated for the review of rape cases: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to disprove; (2) in view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[54]
In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility of the victims testimony. The trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
the victims statements is accorded great weight because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses testify and observing their
deportment and manner of testifying. The trial court judge is indisputably in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the
complainants testimony. Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.[55]
The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under oath that she has been raped meets the test
of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.[56]
In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Anns testimony to be "natural, coherent and touching as she recounted her harrowing
experience in the hands of her father,"[57] as follows:
xxx
q Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, Madame Witness, do you remember if there was anything unusual which took place
again in your house at Sumulong St., Baguio City?
a There was, sir.
q What was that incident?
[a] On that night I was watching TV with my brothers and sisters. While I was watching TV my father was calling me but I did not
heed his call because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he called me and I know that he was already angry. Then
he went near me and pulled me into the other room. And in that other room, he did bad things that I cannot imagine.
q Now, you said that you and your brothers and sisters were watching TV on that night of July, 1995. Where was your mother at
that time?
a She was not in the house at that time because she attended a meeting in our church.
COURT: (to witness)
q That is why we already excluded the public. Dont let the Court speculate. Will you tell us straight. What did your father actually
do which you said (sic) he did things which you cannot imagine?
a When we were in the room he let me sit on the bed. And he asked me to lie down. And he said, This is only for a
while. And after that he put down my pants and my underwear. Then he undressed, lowered his pants and removed his
brief. Then he started touching my vabina (sic).
COURT:
Continue from there. Make it of record that at this point the witness is crying.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now after your father had removed your pants and your underwear as you said, and he also removed his pants and his brief
and started holding your vagina, what else happened?
a He fingered my vagina and also mashed mybreasts (sic). And with his tongue he licked my vagina. After that he used his penis
and rubbed it into my vagina. And he played with my vagina.
q What did you do when your father was doing that to you?
a I was just crying, sir.
q Did you not fight back?
a No sir, because I was afraid of my father.
q Why are you afraid of your father?
a Because when I was still young, one time he told me that either I will be killed or our family will be killed.
q On what occasion was that when your father old (sic) you that it is either you or the family that will be killed?
a I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I was still young.
q Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your vagina, what else did your father do?
a When he was rubbing his penis against my vagina there was a white liquid that came out. And when that white liquid came out
he placed his penis on my stomach where the white liquid was placed.
COURT: (to witness)
q Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing his penis to your vagina? What was being done actually?
a I felt that half of the head of his penis was inside my vagina. That is what I felt. (At this point the witness again broke into tears)
COURT:
Continue.
PROS. CENTENO:
q Now, when you felt that as you said half of the penis of your father was inside your vagina, what did you do?
a None, sir.
q Why did you not do anything?
a Because I didnt know what to do, sir.
q Did you not try to fight your father?
a No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father. Because when he gets mad at my mother, my brothers and sisters would be
involved.
q Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness, particularly in September of 1990, several months after the earthquake of July 16,
1990, will you tell us where you were residing?
a We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, sir.
q How old were you?
a I was 11 years old.
xxx
q When you were staying at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City, together with your father, your mother, your sister and your
brothers in September of 1990, do you remember if there was any unusual incident which happened to you?
a Yes, sir.
q What was that incident?
a I was with my father and brother Nio at the sala. And at the sala he undressed me and did the same. He removed his
pants. Then he took a cushion from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he played with my vagina. Then he
rubbed his penis against my vagina. Nio was still a baby at that time.
q Where was your mother at that time?
a My mother was not in the house at that time. What I know is that she went to the market.
q How about you sister Divine?
a She was with my mother, sir.
COURT: (to witness)
q Again, in this incident will you describe actually to us the motions that took place with the rubbing of his penis into your vagina?
a It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina (witness showing her left hand, palms up) and this is his penis (witness
demonstrating with her right forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on my vagina.
PROS. CENTENO:
q What did you feel while your father was doing that to you which you term as rubbing his penis into your vagina?
a I felt pain, sir.
PROS. CENTENO:
May we put the word mahapdi which was the term used by the witness, in the record.
(to witness)
q How long did your father rub his penis into your vagina?
a It was for quite a long time until a white liquid came out.
q Did you not fight back when your father did that to you?
a No, sir.
q Why did you not fight back?
a Because I thought that what he was doing to me was a normal act.
xxx[58]
The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the shame and the embarrassment as she broke down
and cried several times in the course of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her father."[59]
Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of her private parts and endure the humiliation of
a public trial where she would be forced to recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been raped. This is
especially true in cases of incestuous rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann accused her own father of abusing her, since reverence
and respect for ones parents and other elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children.[60]
The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim where the delay can be attributed to the
pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy over the victim. It
is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue because of the rapists threat on her life, or on the life of
the other members of her family. [61]
In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that accused-appellant threatened to hurt her, her mother or her siblings if she
did not give in to his desires.[62] Her fear of what accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if she revealed his evil deeds
was what compelled her to suffer in silence for a long time. In People v. Nicolas,[63] the Court stated:
The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all
cases that have reached this Court. It is through this fear that the perpetrator hopes to create a climax of extreme psychological terror which
would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. The relationship of the
victim and the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the
victim.[64]
On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to be evasive in his narration of his story. All that he offered in his defense
were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. [65]
Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the charges against him to get back at him for causing her breakup with her
boyfriend Charles is likewise unbelievable. It is not likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story of defloration against her
own father and put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well, unless it was the plain truth and her motive was purely to obtain
justice.[66] Neither does the Court believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife urged their daughter to file rape charges against him
because she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the way of her extra-marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as
an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma.[67] No mother would have the courage to expose
an ignominious act of her husband that could lead to a breakup of the family unless she was prompted by a desire to obtain justice for her
daughter.[68]
The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape he committed in
September 1990, since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law).[69]
However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him for the rape committed in July
1995. R.A. No. 7659, which was already in force at that time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender must concur for the death penalty to be imposable. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 provides:
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxx
The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of minority and relationship are considered as special qualifying
circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty. These circumstances
must be alleged in the information and established during trial for the court to be able to impose the death penalty.[70] It was, therefore,
incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily prove both circumstances of minority and relationship.
In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the information and proven in the course of the
trial. However, Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was offered to
establish her age was her bare testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to present her birth certificate, or in
lieu thereof, other documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate, school records which would have aided the court in verifying her
claim that she was a minor when she was raped by accused-appellant in July 1995.
In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the penalty imposable for the offense in Criminal Case No. 15164-
R is reclusion perpetua.[71]
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the information in Criminal
Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness.[72]
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which
among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.[73] Moreover, it does not state the
acts and omissions constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of
criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter
[Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.[74] The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is
therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[75]
Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this Court regarding the defects of the information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui vs.
People,[76] because the information is a patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and of the basic principles of due process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for
review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed decision, whether these errors are
assigned or not.
It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by the trial court. The lower court in its decision ordered accused-appellant
to indemnify the complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases, representing moral
damages. It failed to award the prescribed amounts for civil indemnity, the award of which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
rape.[77] This civil liability ex delicto is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.[78] It is not to be confused with moral
damages, which is awarded upon a showing that the victim endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.[79]
Under prevailing jurisprudence, when the penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) should be awarded as civil indemnity to the rape victim.[80]Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each count of rape is proper.
In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in rape cases without need of proof for it is
assumed that the private complainant has sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering.[81] The Court affirms the award by the trial
court of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, since said amounts are in
accord with its current rulings.[82]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R is
hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay
the victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the
amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages.
3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared null and void for being violative of the accused-appellant's
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official business.
Quisumbing, J., no part in deliberations.
G.R. No. 188217, July 03, 2013
FERNANDO M. ESPINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated 24 February 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106,
which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. 02-01226 to 31 convicting the accused of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a); and the CA Resolution3 dated 25 May 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused in the same
case.
The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN
Inc.).4 His duties included the delivery of its commissions to the import coordinators.5
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal�s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6) counts of estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
for allegedly rediscounting checks that were meant to be paid to the company�s import coordinators.6
During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the endorsements of the payee on six checks were
forged,7 and that the checks were rediscounted by the accused�s aunt-in-law.8 She later testified to her participation in the rediscounting
and encashment of the checks.9
The accused testified for himself, claiming that what precipitated the charges was his employer�s discontent after he had allegedly lost an
account for the company.10 He was eventually forced to resign and asked to settle some special arrangements with
complainant.11 Alongside being made to submit the resignation, he was also asked to sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers written
on it.12 He complied with these demands under duress, as pressure was exerted upon him by complainants.13 Later on, he filed a case for
illegal dismissal,14 in which he denied having forged the signature of Mr. Banaag at the dorsal portion of the checks.15
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of the aunt-in-law of the accused, to prove that the accused had called her to ask if she
could rediscount some checks, and that she agreed to do so upon his assurance that he knew the owner of those checks.16
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a).17 In response, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,18 arguing that the trial court committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was different
from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also alleged that there was no evidence to support his
conviction.19 Thus, he contended that his right to due process of law was thereby violated.20
In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined by the
facts alleged in the information, and not by a reference to any particular section of the law.21 Subsequently, the RTC denied the Motion.22
The accused then elevated the case to the CA23 on the same grounds that he cited in his Motion, but it denied his appeal,24 stating that the
alleged facts sufficiently comprise the elements of estafa as enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a).25 His subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
The accused thus filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process.26 Specifically, he claims that he was denied due process when he was
convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged with estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1(b).27 He argues that the elements constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that this difference should be
reflected in the Information.28 According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b) would not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a).29 Thus,
he emphasizes the alleged failure to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.30
The issue that must be determined is whether a conviction for estafa under a different paragraph from the one charged is legally
permissible.
Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be �informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him� in order to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be
absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. As explained by the Court in People v.
Manalili:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that �what determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law.� x x x. (Emphasis supplied) 31
This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the
charge and conviction for estafa.
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling words of the Information are found in its body.
Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation
of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, the Court has clarified in
several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic]
is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information.
The Court�s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that the
characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts
stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be
tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. (Emphases supplied)32
Clearly, the fiscal�s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC,33 did not
bind the trial court insofar as the characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement never limited the RTC�s
discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. The Court further explains the rationale behind this discretion in this
manner:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he
stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to enable the accused to vex
the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of
the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which
his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question
is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption
of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of
the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of
the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights... If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to
say what the crime is or what it is named x x x. (Emphases supplied)34
Any doubt regarding the matter should end with the Court�s conclusion:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that
petitioners committed estafa under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners committed estafa under
Article 318) and the absence of the words �fraud� or �deceit� in the Information,the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the
RTC that the factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege
the elements of estafa in general committed through the offense of falsification of public document. As the Sandiganbayan correctly
held:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information by making reference to the definition and
the essentials of the specific crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for him to suitably
prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary,
however, that the imputations be in the language of the statute. What is important is that the crime is described in intelligible and
reasonable certainty. (Emphasis supplied)35
Moreover, the Court declared that in an information for estafa, the use of certain technical and legal words such as �fraud� or
�deceit,� is not necessary to make a proper allegation thereof.36
Thus, the only important question left to be answered is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which the
accused was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting him of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) instead of
paragraph 1(b)? The answer to this question, however, requires further reflection.
The crime charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Its elements are as follows: (1) that money,
goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.37
However, the crime the accused was convicted of was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a). The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) that there is a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means is made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relies on the false pretense, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means, that is, he is induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and (4) that as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.38
The six Informations are all similar in content except in the amounts and the check numbers. One of them reads as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
That on or about the 17th day of July, 2000, in the City of Paranaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein represented by Honesto
Raquipiso, tasked with liasoning with the import coordinators of the complainant�s various clients including the delivery of their
commissions, said accused received in trust from the complainant Metrobank check no. 1640443816 in the amount of P12,675.00 payable
to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay, with the obligation to deliver the same but said accused failed to deliver said check
in the amount of P12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the same, forged the signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check
rediscounted and far from complying with his obligation, despite demands to account and/or remit the same, with unfaithfulness and/or
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds thereof to his
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of P12,675.00.39
Are the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a) present in the above-quoted Information? Arguably so, because the accused represented
to the injured party that he would be delivering the commission to Mr. Banaag; and because of this representation, KN Inc. turned over
checks payable to Mr. Banaag to the accused. In turn, the accused rediscounted the checks for money, to the detriment of both Mr.
Banaag and KN Inc. However, this set of facts seems to miss the precision required of a criminal conviction. Estafa under paragraph 2(a) is
swindling by means of false pretense, and the words of the law bear this out:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Article 315.
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. x x x.
In this case, there was no use of a fictitious name, or a false pretense of power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or
business. At the most, the situation could be likened to an imaginary transaction, although the accused was already trusted with the
authority to deliver commissions to Mr. Banaag. The pretense was in representing to the injured party that there was a deliverable
commission to Mr. Banaag, when in fact there was none.
Instead of unduly stretching this point, the Court deems it wiser to give the offense its true, formal name � that of estafa through abuse of
confidence under paragraph 1(b).
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property. This at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Informations.
First, personal property in the form of the checks was received by the offender in trust or on commission, with the duty to deliver it to Mr.
Banaag. Even though the accused misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was obliged by KN Inc., the
injured party, to deliver the check and account for it. Second, the accused rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this
rediscounting resulted in the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not the payee and therefore not lawfully authorized
to do so. Finally, this wrongful encashment prejudiced KN Inc., which lost the proceeds of the check. When accounting was demanded from
the accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse.
His series of acts precisely constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).
Nevertheless, this Court need not make such a detailed and narrow analysis. In Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, it stated that estafa can be
committed by means of both modes of commission in the following way:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
x x x[E]stafa can be committed with the attendance of both modes of commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed
against the same victim and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the landowner the real
position of the prospective buyer of the land in order to induce said owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land
for the higher amount which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then clandestinely misappropriated the excess, the
crime of estafa was committed under both modes and he could be charged under either. (Emphases supplied)40
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be interpreted as charging the accused
with both estafa under paragraph 1(b) and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law that one act
can give rise to two offenses,41 all the more when a single offense has multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot
withstand the tests for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the circumstances attending the conviction
for estafa could have been more precise, there is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts
agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their
appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 24 February 2009 and Resolution
dated 25 May 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004]

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the
ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated
June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in December 1973
and started its actual operations in 1976. Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to
establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act
No. 340.[1] Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and
compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings
of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.[2] AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)
under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002. It is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP
through a Board of Trustees and Management Group.[3] Its funds are in the nature of public funds.[4]
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of the
Province of South Cotabato, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[5] with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real
estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the
government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner, Retired
Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-RSBS,[6]together with twenty-seven (27) other persons[7] for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.[8]
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24)
separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly
approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133.[9] All were similarly
worded, except for the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the offense, and the property involved. Representative
of the said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the inculpatory portion of which reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a
low ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their official duties, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring together and confederating with NILO
FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally execute and/or cause the
execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the
purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00
per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00
per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS,
and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of the subject
lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other taxes
should have been P524,475.00 and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing undue injury to the government through
evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN and
50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents, defined and
penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145.[11] Save
with respect to the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies, and the property involved in each case, the
Informations were, likewise, similarly worded, representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The accusatory portion reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO
PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring and confederating with each other and
with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent, did, there
and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify a public document by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-
sq. m. property particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and stating therein a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per
square meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth and in
fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest,
alleging want of jurisdiction.[13] He, likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings[14] on February 16, 1999,
because of the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed
the said motions.[15]
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a Notice of Appearance [16] as
private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)[17] on March 9, 1999.
The notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig.
Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof.
In a Resolution[18] dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was issued.[19] He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty.[20]
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending
that the charges brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil
liability had arisen.[21] He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may be allowed to intervene
through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged.[22] He maintained that
if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and
contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members-contributors, they have been disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful
investments and residual interest at the AFP-RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not
having waived the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any
event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[23]
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal cases involved. He
posited that AGFOI was neither a member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly by the
national government and individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a single centavo to the funds of the
AFP-RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual members who
compose it.[24] Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation[25] with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his arraignment
deferred pending the resolution of the reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr.
and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the prosecution to evaluate its evidence and take such
appropriate action as regards accused Ramiscals subject motion shall also include the case regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.[26]
In the meantime, in a Resolution[27] dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioners opposition and denied
his plea for the denial of the appearance of the law firm.[28] In justifying its resolution, the Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be
affected by the action of the Court resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal presumption that their
appearance should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.[29]
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration[30] of the Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was opposed[31] by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[32] denying the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and
October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court, and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN
FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO
INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.[33]
In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
was improper since the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not final; hence, the remedy of the
petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also argues that the petition is
premature because the reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition, he posits that the AGFOI is a
member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the
private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his recourse
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was proper.
The Ruling of the Court

The Assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are
Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or
matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an interlocutory one
in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] as follows:
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an
adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of
the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and
liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which, among
others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause
the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.[35]
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is
interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a
pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in this case.[36]
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the
appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single
appeal.[37]
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan
may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.[38]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private
prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI, represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who were, likewise,
investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the offended party whose rights may be affected by the prosecution of the criminal and civil
aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their merits, more specifically, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner
or the civil liabilities attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the Ombudsman would maintain the finding of
probable cause against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and, thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of
probable cause against the petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to proceed to trial, receive the
evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis thereof. The petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to
trial, and, if convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their
merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure, not override
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest of
justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil action on certiorari.[39] As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[40] a petition
which should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application
of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.[41]
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner made the following averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to
be the offended party despite the plain language of the Informations and the nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court blatantly
violated basic procedural rules, thereby eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. He, likewise, averred that the
Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the entry of a party, through a private prosecutor, which has no right to the civil liabilities of the
accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil liabilities at all based on the nature of said crimes. The
petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition thereto, in gross violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As
we held in People v. Court of Appeals:[42]
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction
where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave
abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment
as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[43]
Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties, like the private respondents herein, may, likewise, enter
their appearance as offended parties and participate in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of
the Law Firm Albano
& Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of Commodore Aparri
and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano

Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have been disadvantaged or deprived of
our lawful investments and residual interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged plunder of the Systems
Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)

(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)[44]
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank officers claiming to have
residual interests in or to be investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover,
there is no showing in the records that the Board of Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the respondent law
firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above cases. Neither is there any resolution on record issued by the Board of Directors of
the AGFOI authorizing Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the
private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law firm is the counsel of Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor
of any private party. He asserts that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e)
of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government because based on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as
vendee, it was deprived of capital gains and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any allegation
that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused by the said falsifications. The petitioner further argues that absent any
civil liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be considered the offended party entitled to participate in
the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would
not sustain a direct and material damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates
to any person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the
cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right to intervene, considering that such intervention would
enable the members of AGFOI to assert their rights to information and access to the official records, documents, and papers, a right
granted by no less than paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed with public
character because the government provided for its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary contributions of the incumbent
AFP soldiers and officers.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the
offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[45] of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury
to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted[46] and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution
of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.[47] The prosecution of offenses is
a public function.[48] Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action
personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.[49] With the implied institution of the
civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil.
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party
for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.[50] Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal
Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his
appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.[51]
The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local governments or government-owned or controlled
corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 [52] of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under
Article 213[53] of the Revised Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as amended, to mention a
few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019,[54] any party, including the government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of
the accused. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the
accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose
person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,[55] or that
corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is
sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest
must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire
to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.[56]
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have
a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members to have
access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS
are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely
inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its
members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the
offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The
AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it
entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of
public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of
public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes
immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.[57]
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal
the correct amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the government, the offenders
thereby commit two crimes (a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b)
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government as the offended party
for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner and his co-
accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be
considered the offended party entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate Counsel.[58]
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-46656 June 26, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE MAGPALE, defendant-appellant.
Constancio Padilla and Zoilo P. Perlas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor-General Concepcion and Acting Assistant Attorney Roxas for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, charging
him with a violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That, on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, feloniously, knowingly and without lawful purpose,
have in his possession, custody and control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to wit:. . . ., with the
intent of using it for falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit:
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace was marked by the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by
the waiver of the defense to present any evidence in rebuttal. Convinced, from the evidence before him, that there was reasonable ground
to believe that the defendant committed the crime complained of, the justice of the peace remanded the records of the case to the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceedings. In the latter court, the defendant was informed against by the provincial fiscal as
follows:
That on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I., and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the above-named defendant, Felipe Magpale, did then and there voluntarily, maliciously, illegal and
criminally make an iron brand purported to be of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, with the intention of using it knowingly
in the falsification of certificates of ownership of large cattle, said manufactured brand having been found in the possession of said
accused. All contrary to law.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision the dispositive part which reads:
Wherefore, the court finds the defendant Felipe Magpale guilty of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences to an indeterminate penalty ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one
day of prison correccional, to pay a fine of P100 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the accessories of the law
and to pay the costs.
The case is before this court on appeal by the defendant and appellant, who makes the following assignment of errors:
1. The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer interposed by the defendant that the said court has no jurisdiction over the case
on the ground that the accused is deprived of the right to preliminary investigation on the information charged.
2. The lower court erred in finding the acts imputed to the defendant punishable, as coming within the purview of article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged in the information, and in not acquitting him of the same.
In varying phraseology, but conveying the same central thought, this court has set out the purposes of a preliminary investigation as follows:
"The object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from unless and expensive prosecutions." (U. S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.) "Preliminary investigations are intended to secure the right to every person charged which crime to be free from the
inconvenience, expenses and burden of defending himself in the course of a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has been
passed upon in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose; and that they are intended
further to guard the state from the burden of unnecessary expense involved in holding trials based on false, frivolous or groundless
charges." (U.S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil., 666.) "A preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part thereof and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof." (U.S. vs. Yu
Tuico, 34 Phil., 209.) In the case at bar, it will be noted that the officer charged in the complaint and that alleged in the information are
defined and penalized by the same article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, and are so related that an inquiry into one would have elicited
substantially if not precisely the same facts that an inquiry into the other would have brought into light. It will further be noted, that in the
notices sent out by the justice of the peace in connection with the preliminary investigation of the complaint, he did not specially refer to only
one of said offenses but to both, as he invariably spoke of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, thus giving the appellant a
chance, and putting him on his guard, to defend himself not only against the charge of illegal possession of the iron brand but also against
that of making or ordering the making thereof. But the appellant has seen fit to waive his right to present any evidence at said investigation,
and we cannot now entertain his last-minute defense that he should have been investigated anew for the crime alleged in the information.
To grant him such a belated remedy would not be in obedience to, but in disregarded of, the prime purposes for which preliminary
investigations are ordained by law and sanctioned of the decisions.
Granting, however, that he was entitled to a second preliminary investigation, still his right thereto was invoked after he pleaded not guilty
when arraigned. In People vs. Solon, (47 Phil., 443, 448), it was intimidated that "Whether said motion was made or after the arraignment,
is of some importance for the reason that if it was not made before the arraignment or before the plea of the defendants was entered, it
would indicated that they have waived their right to a preliminary examination, and for that reason the court a quo would have been justified
in denying the said motion." After his motion contesting the jurisdiction of the trial Court was denied, the appellant should have brought the
appropriate proceedings to compel the trial court to grant him another preliminary investigation, this right being a substantial one. Instead,
the appellant folded his arms and went forward with the trial, at which the prosecution presented who brought in testimony, without any
objection on the part of the appellant, establishing the fact that the appellant was the one who ordered the making of the iron brand in
question.
As to the last two assigned errors, article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make or
introduce into the Philippine Islands any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implemented intended to be used in the
commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.
Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is criminally liable for the making thereof.
(Article 17, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality of San
Jose, Nueva Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to its inhabitants.
The offense committed by the appellant under the aforecited article of the Revised Penal Code is penalized withprision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, and a fine to exceed P10,000, imposable in its medium period (three years, six months, and twenty-one
days to four years, nine months, and ten days) because unattended by any modifying circumstances. The judgment is thus modified and
the defendant sentenced, under Act No. 4103, to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is four months and one day of arresto
mayor, and the maximum three years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional. As thus modified, the appealed judgment is
affirmed, with costs to the defendant and appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU, G.R. No. 169718

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,* and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. December 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159, which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Manila,
Branch 38 dated August 28, 2000 in Criminal Case No. 95-144230 that found petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The full text of the Information filed against petitioner reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Prosecutor upon sworn complaint of Rolando Registrado, complainant herein, in
representation of his daughter, Jerica Registrado, whose statement is hereto attached as Annex A, accuses DANTE
DATU Y HERNANDEZ of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness punishable under RA 7610 otherwise known as the Special
Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:
That on or about February 24, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon JERICA REGISTRADO, 5 years of
age, by then and there inserting his finger in the latters genitals, against her will and consent.[3]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty; thus, trial ensued.
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution shows that in the morning of February 24, 1995, at about 7:00 a.m., Jerica,
aged 5, was playing with her friends Khamil and Neeca near the house of their neighbor Boyet Rama (or Boyet) situated
at the corner of a street in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila; that suddenly, [petitioner] grabbed Jerica and inserted his middle finger
in her vagina, after which, he warned her not to tell it to anyone; that immediately, Jerica ran to her house; that while her
mother was giving Jerica a bath, she found bloodstain in her (Jerica) panty and blood in her vagina; that upon being
informed of her mothers discovery, Rolando, Jericas father, looked at her vagina and found it swollen; and that asked by
her father who did it, Jerica disclosed that it was appellant.
On the same date, February 24, 1995, Jerica was brought to the NBI where she was examined by Dr. Villena,
whose findings are as follows:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, coaptated (sic). Fourchette, tense. Vestibular mucosa,
congested. Contusion, purplish, peri-urethral area. Hymen, thin, short, intact. Hymenal orifice measures
0.5 cm. in diameter. Vaginal walls and rugosities, cannot be reached by the examining finger.
CONCLUSION:
Physical Virginity Preserved.
Professing innocence, appellant claimed that commission of the alleged sexual molestation is highly improbable
as it supposedly took place in a busy street; that the charge was concocted upon inducement of David Escalo (or Escalo),
a friend of Jericas parents, as admitted by Escalo to Zaragosa during one of their drinking sprees; and that a case for oral
defamation was filed by him against Jericas parents for their false accusation.[4]
In the end, the trial court convicted petitioner of the crime charged in a Decision dated August 28, 2000, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness penalized under Section 5, Article III of Republic Act 7610 and sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal together with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify private complainant in
the sum of P50,000.00 as and by way of moral damages and to pay the costs.[5]
Taking issue with the said judgment, petitioner appealed the same to the Court of Appeals but the appellate court merely affirmed the
assailed lower court ruling in a Decision dated March 31, 2005.
Undaunted, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court[6] assailing the aforesaid
Court of Appeals Decision. This Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. However, in petitioners Memorandum, his counsel indicated that petitioner died on August 3, 2006.[7] As proof of petitioners
death, a certified photocopy of his Death Certificate with Registry No. 2006-859[8] was attached as Annex 1 of the said pleading.
In light of this supervening event which occurred while petitioners appeal of the judgment of his conviction was pending resolution before
this Court, we are constrained by both law and jurisprudence to dismiss the present case for the appeal has been rendered moot.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code instructs us that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the offender, to wit:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
In the seminal case of People v. Bayotas,[9] we formulated the following principles which guide this Court as regards to the
application of the foregoing penal provision, to wit:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
xxxx
d) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.[10]
It is therefore evident from the foregoing discussion that venturing into the merits of petitioners appeal given the circumstance of
his untimely demise has become superfluous because, even assuming this Court would proceed to affirm the lower courts judgment of
conviction, such a ruling would be of no force and effect as the resultant criminal liability is totally extinguished by his death. Consequently,
his civil liability arising from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, is likewise extinguished by his death. Since his appeal was still pending
before this Court, there was no final judgment of conviction upon which an award of civil indemnity could be based.
Accordingly, this Court holds that the death of petitioner extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., acts of lasciviousness. Thus, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated March 31, 2005, affirming petitioners
conviction by the trial court, had become ineffectual.[11] As a result thereof, the instant petition is hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of petitioner Dante Hernandez Datu, the Decision dated March 31, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26159 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. 95-144230 before the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
ssociate Justice Associate Justice
OSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ssociate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Senador vs people 692 scra 669 3/6/2013

Navaja vs de castro 759 scra 487 6/22/2015
Abs cbn vs ombudsman 569 scra 59 10.15/08
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 201620 : March 6, 2013
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME,Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the May 17, 2011 Decision1 and March 30, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952.
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal
Code,3 viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, having obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount
of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same on consignment basis with express obligation to account for and remit the entire
proceeds of the sale if sold or to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated demands therefor, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit proceeds of the sale of said items or to return any of the items that may have been
unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to
his/her own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned amount of P705,685.00.4 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were
engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime in the first week of September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in Guadalupe
Heights, Cebu City, expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that the latter was selling. On September 10, 2000, Rita's daughter-
in-law and business partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth seven hundred five thousand six hundred eighty
five pesos (PhP 705,685).5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on
commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the
delivery.6 However, as events turned out, Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the given
period.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the unsold jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds
from the sale of jewelry entrusted to her. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint against
Senador.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No. 0003603 dated March 31, 2001 for the amount of
PhP 705,685,9 as settlement of her obligations. Nonetheless, the check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a closed
account.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the prosecution, and instead, she relied on the defense
that the facts alleged in the Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In particular, Senador asserted that the
person named as the offended party in the Information is not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to
Senador, the private complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private complainant turned
out to be "Rita Jaime." Further, Cynthia Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al.11 (Uba) and United
States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),12 Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador guilty as charged and sentenced as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315
of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA
JAIME, the following: 1) Actual Damages in the amount of P695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the Information until
fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and 3) the amount of P50,000 as Attorney's fees.
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the appellate court rendered a Decision upholding the
finding of the RTC that the prosecution satisfactorily established the guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The CA opined that the
prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the pieces of jewelry
in trust under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted the pieces of jewelry to her benefit but to the
prejudice of business partners, Rita and Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return the pieces of jewelry despite demand made by Rita.
Further, the CA finding that Uba13 is not applicable since Senador is charged with estafa, a crime against property and not oral defamation,
as in Uba ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 16010, finding
accused appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 30, 2012. Hence, the present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation in the Information of the offended party violates, as
petitioner argues, the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, thus, entitling her
to an acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution
does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal,14 more so if the variance relates to the designation of the offended party, a mere formal
defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador's reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a
crime against honor, wherein the identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime
against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the information.16 Thus, in case of an error in the designation
of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its
dismissal:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom or
against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is
no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to
properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or
ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended party would
depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is generic or one which is not described with
such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is material and would
result in the violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error,
Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an offense shall have been described with sufficient
certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of the opinion that this
provision can have no application to a case where the name of the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar;
and at any rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in this case would not be sufficiently identified.
A complaint stating, as does the one now before us, that the defendants "took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain and
against the will of the owner thereof the sum of P100" could scarcely be sustained in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the
act of robbery or of the subject of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money has no earmarks; and generally speaking the only
way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual
who was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been so identified in the complaint, the proof must
correspond upon this point with the allegation, or there can be no conviction.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100. Since money is generic and has no earmarks that
could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could be described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended
party or the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the identity of the offended party is material and necessary for the
proper identification of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of the offended party would also be material, as the
subject matter of the offense could no longer be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner,18 Sayson v. People,19 and Ricarze v. Court of Appeals20 support the doctrine that if the subject
matter of the offense is specific or one described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous
designation of the offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the person injured by a criminal act is not material for the
prosecution of the offense because the subject matter of the offense, a warrant, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to
properly identify the particular offense charged. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the proceeds of the warrant was to the prejudice of Aun Tan may be
disregarded by virtue of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, which declares that when an offense shall have been described in the
complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. In any
event the defect, if defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant on the merits, and
can not, therefore, under the provisions of section 10 of the same order, affect the present proceeding.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there was an erroneous allegation as to the person
injured because the subject matter of the offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently identified. We held, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient
certainty as to identify the act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal
defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual
backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant
which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of
the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the
ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the
check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended
party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information." 22(Emphasis
supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person injured is not material because the subject matter
of the offense, a check, was sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged.23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic
and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal
and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a
warrant, as in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic property. Instead, the information
specified the subject of the offense as "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00." The charge was thereafter
sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement24 signed by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates
these "various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685," viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Quality Description
1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams
1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams
1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams
1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams

1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams
1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams
1 #2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams
1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams
1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams
1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams
1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams
1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams
1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams
1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams
1 #1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams
1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams
1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams
Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the present case, not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy.
The error in the designation of the offended party in the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay obligations through Keppel Check No. 0003603, which was dishonored because it was drawn
against an already closed account. The offer indicates her receipt of the pieces of jewelry thus described and an implied admission that she
misappropriated the jewelries themselves or the proceeds of the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In criminal cases. except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised. an offer of
compromise by the accused may he received in evidence as implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together, the C A did not err in affirming petitioner's conviction for the crime of estafa.
In light of current jurisprudence,25 the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary damages excessive. Art. 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nevertheless, "exemplary damages
are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions."26 On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 100,000 is reduced to PhP 30,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C A-G.R. CJ.C No.
00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages he reduced to PhP 30,000.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, v. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, OR THE ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF MCTC JAGNA-
GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, DKT PHILS., INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated August 28, 2007 and the
Resolution2 dated May 7, 2008 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02353, which affirmed the Order dated
September 21, 2006 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50, in SP Civil Action No. 0356.
The factual antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje,
against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it
appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00, instead of the actual amount of P810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna,
Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904. The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said receipt
No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and thereafter
accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused as a result
of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be
proved during trial. Acts committed contrary to the provision of Article 172, No. 2, in relation to Article 171, No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4

On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the ground that none of the essential elements of the crime
of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to
improper venue.
In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case for arraignment, the decretal portion of the
Order reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the motion is DENIED, but considering however that accused has already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court by filing cash bond for their respective temporary liberty, set this case for ARRAIGNMENT on November 22, 2005, at 10:00 o'clock in
the morning at the Session Hall, 10th MCTC, Jagna, Bohol.
The previous Court Order setting these cases for arraignment on November 09, 2005, is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.6
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration of the November 2, 2005 Order, but the MCTC denied it in a Resolution7 dated January 24, 2006.
Navaja filed a petition for certiorari8 before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of legal basis or merit.9 On Navaja's contention
that the case for falsification of private document against her was filed with the MCTC which has no jurisdiction due to wrong venue, hence,
the RTC ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The contention of the petitioner is untenable. As correctly pointed out by the MCTC, the improper venue was already resolved squarely by
the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that �there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna�.
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after
she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional
State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement �describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was
prepared by the cashier herself.�
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna
when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol,
would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would
necessarily result in a �neither here no there� situation.10
Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA.
In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.
Navaja filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied it in the Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, she filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF JAGNA, BOHOL[,] DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.
i. Not one of the essential elements of the alleged crime of falsification of a private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
ii. Venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and cannot be presumed or established from the alleged acts of the petitioner on a totally
different and unrelated time and occasion.
iii. The strict rules on venue in criminal cases were established for the protection of the rights of the accused and to prevent undue
harassment and oppression.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
II. HEREIN PETITIONER PROPERLY AVAILED OF THE REMEDY OF FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN QUESTIONING
IMPROPER VENUE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III. SETTLED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE CLEARLY PERMITS THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE
DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH.11
The petition lacks merit.
On the substantive issue of whether the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has jurisdiction over her case for falsification of a private document, Navaja
argues that not one of the three (3) essential elements12 of such crime was shown to have been committed in Jagna, Bohol. She insists that
there is no showing in the Information, or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification of a private
document was committed or consummated in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the allegation in the complaint-affidavit that the subject receipt
was issued by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol, cannot determine the venue because the place of issuance of the receipt is not an element of
the said crime. It was also impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, because the alleged request for reimbursement
under the Weekly Travel Expense Report for September 29 to October 4, 2003, was prepared and submitted on October 6, 2003 in Cebu
City, while the subject receipt was issued on October 2, 2003 by Garden Cafe in Jagna, Bohol. She further insists that at the time of the
issuance of the subject receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, hence, there is no crime of falsification of private
document to speak of. She explains that any damage that private respondent could have suffered would only occur when it pays the
request for reimbursement in the Travel Expense Report submitted on October 6, 2003, but not before that date, much less at time of the
issuance of the said receipt.
Navaja's arguments are misplaced.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.13 This principle was explained by the Court in Foz, Jr. v.
People,14 thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where
the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly
take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.15
In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Place of commission of the offense. � The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its
identification.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People,16 the Court said that both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal
cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some of
its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or with the
intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for which it was
intended.17chanrobleslaw
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential elements
of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the complaint-affidavit make
out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol. In particular, the Information clearly alleged that she committed such
crime thereat, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the 2nd day of October 2003, in the municipality of Jagna, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice a juridical person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial receipt No. 6729 of Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, by making an alteration or intercalation in the said
receipt No. 6729 from EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P810.00) to ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P1,810.00) and
thereafter accused used the said receipt to claim reimbursement with DKT Philippines, Inc. represented by Atty. Edgar Borje and accused
as a result of which received the amount of P1,810.00 to her own benefit; to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in the amount
to be proved during trial. xxx18
Likewise, the Complaint-Affidavit dated February 18, 2004 alleged that the she committed the said crime in Jagna,
Bohol, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
�4. Among the expenses she reimbursed from DKT is the amount of Php1,810.00 she supposedly incurred at Garden's Cafe,
Jagna branch. Photocopy of the receipt dated 02 October 2003 she sent to the DKT office in Metro Manila is hereto attached as Annex
�C�.
5. However, upon recent field investigation of Navaja's expenses in Bohol, it was found that the actual amount she incurred at Garden's
(sic) Cafe is only Php810.00 Photocopy of the duplicate original official receipt (pink copy) certified true and correct by the cashier of
Garden's Cafe, Jagna is hereto attached as Annex �D�.
6. Evidently, Navaja falsified the receipt in Bohol upon receiving it with the intent of causing damage to DKT.�19
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the
result of proof20, the Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial jurisdiction of the MCTC of
Jagna, Bohol.
Meanwhile, Navaja's defense that it was impossible for her to have committed the crime in Jagna, Bohol, cannot be sustained at this point
where the prosecution has yet to present evidence to prove the material allegations of the charge against her, which include the place
where the subject receipt was falsified. However, given that the defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper venue may be raised at any
stage of the proceeding, the Court stresses that if the evidence adduced during the trial would show that the crime was indeed committed
outside its territorial jurisdiction, the MCTC should dismiss the case based on such ground.
On Navaja's claim that there is no crime of falsification of private document to speak of because at the time of the issuance of the subject
receipt on October 2, 2003, the element of damage was absent, the Court sustains the RTC ruling that such damage need not be present,
as Article 172 (2)21 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that mere intent to cause such damage is sufficient.22chanrobleslaw
Navaja further contends that the CA's reliance on the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor as to the sworn statement of a certain
Cheryl Labarro23 for purposes of determining venue was misplaced, as her sworn statement pertains to an incident in Miravilla Resort in
Tagbilaran City, which was entirely separate and distinct from the facts material to the case. She adds that the CA's reliance on the said
statement in upholding the venue of the case clearly runs afoul with the provisions of Section 34, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.24 She
submits that nowhere in the Rules of Court is it allowed that the actions of the accused on a different occasion maybe used to confer venue
in another case, since venue must be determined solely and exclusively on the facts obtaining in the instant case and cannot be inferred or
presumed from other collateral allegations.
The Court finds no merit in Navaja's foregoing contentions which boil down to the factual issue of whether the crime of falsification of private
document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People, et al.,25 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable. A
question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt centers
on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The
issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence,
the question posed is one of fact.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether the crime of falsification of private document was committed in Jagna, Bohol or in Cebu City, is a question of fact. Indeed, in the
exercise of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the parties during trial.26 In certain exceptional cases, however, the Court may be urged to probe
and resolve factual issues, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA�s findings are contrary to those by the trial court;
(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner�s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.27
Navaja failed to show that any of these circumstances is present.
It also bears emphasis that the factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.28 In this case, the CA, the RTC and the MCTC all agree that the issue of
improper venue was already resolved by the Regional State Prosecutor when he held that �there are sufficient evidences (sic) indicating
that the falsification took place in Jagna.�29 The Court perceives no compelling reason to disturb such factual finding.
Anent Navaja's claim that the MCTC simply made reference to the findings of the Regional State Prosecutor without specifying the factual
and legal bases of its resolution, the Court finds that the RTC had squarely addressed such issue as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This court notes that in that particular resolution, reference was made to the sworn statement of Ms. Cherly Lavaro who narrated that after
she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and in her presence wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional
State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's statement �describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after
issuance. The borrowing of the cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was
prepared by the cashier herself.�
In the same affidavit, Ms. Lavaro corroborated the affidavit of another witness, which categorically states that Ms. Navaja was in Jagna
when the questioned receipt was issued.
If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol,
would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was done in Cebu City. In other words, the said contention would
necessarily result in a �neither here no there� situation.30
On Navaja's argument that the CA's reliance on Labarro's31 aforesaid statement in upholding the venue of the case violates Section 34,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,32 the Court holds that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was
committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires the existence of probable cause. In Fenequito v. Vergara,
Jr.,33 the Court expounded on the concept of probable cause in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects.
It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.34
Also, Navaja insists that the rule on venue should have been construed liberally in favor her favor as the accused, and strictly against
private respondent, given its purpose of preventing harassment and inconvenience by compelling the accused to appear in a different court
from that of the province where the crime was committed. Yet, private respondent willfully chose to prosecute separately the other cases for
falsification of private document against her in different jurisdictions, namely, Cebu City, Bacolod City, Iloilo City and Tagbilaran, Bohol, to
harass and drain her financial resources, when all these criminal cases, involving minimal amounts of actual damages,35 should have been
filed in one (1) criminal jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity of actions.
The Court overrules Navaja's assertions, and upholds the RTC's sound ruling thereon:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The petitioner's insistence that all the criminal complaints filed against her should be filed in one jurisdiction would be a blatant violation of
the law on jurisdiction as one cannot file a criminal case other than where the offense was allegedly committed.
In short, if it so happens that several offenses are alleged to have been committed in different venues, then it is just unfortunate that
whatever complaints have to be filed, will have to filed in those different venues. To do otherwise would be procedurally fatal.36
To stress, in criminal proceedings, improper venue is lack of jurisdiction because venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.37 Unlike in a civil case where venue may be waived, this could not be done in a criminal case because it is an element of
jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot be held to answer for any crime committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Be that
as it may, Section 5 (4), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Court has the power to order a change of venue or place of
trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Consequently, where there are serious and weighty reasons present, which would prevent the court of
original jurisdiction from conducting a fair and impartial trial, the Court has been mandated to order a change of venue so as to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.38 That private respondent filed several criminal cases for falsification in different jurisdictions, which unduly forced
Navaja to spend scarce resources to defend herself in faraway places can hardly be considered as compelling reason which would prevent
the MCTC from conducting a fair and impartial trial.
Besides, it is erroneous for Navaja to argue that the separate filing of the falsification cases she allegedly committed in different jurisdictions
would result in multiplicity of actions. Such separate filing of cases is only consistent with the principles that there are as many acts of
falsification as there are documents falsified39 and that the venue of such cases is where the document was actually falsified40.
The Court now resolves the second and third procedural issues.
On the second issue, Navaja states that she did not commit a grave procedural error in filing a petition for certiorari from the denial of her
motion to quash. She posits that venue is an element of the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a criminal proceeding, and
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be interposed at any stage of the proceeding. Thus, even if a party fails to file a motion
to quash, the accused may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on, and such objection may be raised or considered motu
propio by the court at any stage of the proceeding or on appeal.
On the third issue, Navaja asserts that the Supreme Court has allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the denial of a motion
to quash in cases where grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or when the lower court acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. She claims that not only did the lower court commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash, but there is
likewise the issue of improper venue that need to be settled with finality and dispatch. In support of her assertion, she cites a ruling41 that
when the court has no jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the complaint, the court should dismiss the case, instead of ordering its transfer.
Apropos to the second and third procedural issues is Querijero v. Palmes-Limitar42 where the Court reiterated the fundamental principle that
an order denying a motion to quash is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that �a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to
resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an
appeal in the manner authorized by law.�
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order in
the following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.43
As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed to prove that any of the said special
circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in
affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.
Finally, the remaining factual issues raised by the parties need not be discussed further, as they are properly resolved in due course of the
proceedings in the instant case before the MCTC and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 28, 2007 and the Resolution dated May 7,
2008 in CA G.R. SP No. 02353 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
THIRD DIVISION
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO G.R. No. 133347

LOPEZ, JR., AUGUSTO ALMEDA-LOPEZ, and OSCAR M.
LOPEZ,
Present:
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. CHICO-NAZARIO,

BENEDICTO,*EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, MIGUEL V.
GONZALES, and SALVADOR (BUDDY) TAN,* NACHURA, and
Respondents. REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 15, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Joint Resolution[1] dated May 2, 1997 of then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto in OMB-0-94-1109, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners against private respondents, and the
Order[2] denying their motion for reconsideration.
This case stems from an all too familiar chapter in Philippine history, i.e., the declaration of martial law by then President Ferdinand Marcos
and the simultaneous sequestration of not a few private corporations, including one of the petitioners herein, ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation (ABS-CBN).
On April 18 and 26, 1994, petitioners Eugenio, Jr., Oscar and Augusto Almeda, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN,
executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private respondents Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia, Miguel V. Gonzalez, and
Salvador (Buddy) Tan with the following crimes penalized under the Revised Penal Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by
Means of Violence or Intimidation; (b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 - Theft; (d) Article 302 - Robbery; (e)
Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other Deceits.
Individual petitioners complaint-affidavits[3] uniformly narrated the following facts:
1. The day after the declaration of martial law, or on September 22, 1972, just before midnight, military troops arrived at the ABS-CBN
Broadcast Center in Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, and informed the officers and personnel thereat of the seizure and closure of the premises
by virtue of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1 issued by President Marcos ordering the closure of all radio and television stations in the
country.
2. LOI No. 1 authorized the Secretary of National Defense to take over or control, or cause the taking over and control of all x x x
newspapers, magazines, radio and television facilities and all other media of communications throughout the country. Consequently, a total
of seven (7) television stations owned and operated by ABS-CBN were closed down by the government.[4]
3. When it became apparent that petitioners would not be granted a permit to re-open, ABS-CBN on October 31, 1972, terminated the
services of all its employees, giving each employee his/her retirement benefits. Corollary thereto, sometime in November 1972, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., then president of ABS-CBN, wrote then Secretary of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile,[5] of their desire to sell ABS-CBN to
the government. In that same month, however, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. was arrested by the military, and detained at Fort Bonifacio for almost
five (5) years until his escape therefrom on September 30, 1977.
4. Subsequently, after the proposal to sell ABS-CBN to the Marcos government did not materialize, ABS-CBN started negotiations with then
Governor of Leyte, Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez, who expressed his desire and intention to acquire the former. However, the negotiations
with Kokoy Romualdez in 1973 likewise did not result in the sale and re-opening of ABS-CBN.
5. On June 6, 1973, the television and radio stations of Kanlaon Broadcasting System (KBS) on Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City were
consumed by fire. KBS was the umbrella corporation of the Benedicto Group of broadcasting companies, including Radio Philippines
Network (RPN),[6] which operated TV Channel 9, the only television station allowed to continue operating during the early years of the
martial law regime. Respondent Benedicto, then Philippine Ambassador to Japan, managed, controlled, and was one of the principal
stockholders of RPN.
6. On even date, both Benedicto and Alfredo Montelibano, who at that time was Chairperson of the Board of Directors (BOD) of ABS-CBN,
were in Bacolod. Benedicto constituted Montelibano as his emissary to the Lopezes, relaying his plan to temporarily use ABS-CBNs
broadcast studios in Quezon City, from which to operate TV Channel 9, for such period of time as may be necessary to rebuild KBS burned
studios.
7. On June 8, 1973, Montelibano met with other officers and executives of ABS-CBN, including herein petitioners Oscar and Augusto
Lopez, informing them of Benedictos request. Oscar and Augusto, and the rest of the ABS-CBN management team, strongly opposed the
request. Eventually, however, when Montelibano mentioned that Malacaang and Romualdez had cleared said request, the possibility of a
government-ordered confiscation of ABS-CBN, and not least of all, the possible release of Eugenio Lopez, Jr., petitioners Oscar and
Augusto, as with the rest of ABS-CBNs executives, acquiesced to Benedictos request.
8. Thus, at noontime on the same day, representatives of KBS headed by Jose Montalvo arrived at the Meralco Building to finalize the
proposed arrangement with ABS-CBN. The transaction between ABS-CBN and KBS is evidenced by a letter-agreement dated June 8,
1973, which reads in relevant part:
This is to confirm the agreement arrived at between RPN and ABS-CBN to the following effect:
1. Commencing on the date hereof, ABS-CBN hereby conveys to RPN by way of lease its TV and radio equipment
(excluding TV channels and radio frequencies) and its premises at the ABS-CBN Broadcast Center, Bohol Avenue,
Quezon City (collectively called the leased facilities) listed in the schedule attached hereto and marked as Annex A.
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the leased facilities. The amount
of the rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.
3. The term of this lease shall commence on the date hereof and continue for such reasonable time as may be normally
necessary for the rehabilitation of RPNs facilities unless an earlier period may be fixed by RPN and ABS-CBN after
discussion with Ambassador Benedicto.
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all
losses and damages to such facilities.
xxxx
6. Upon termination of this lease, RPN shall return the possession of the leased facilities to ABS-CBN and vacate the
same without the need of notice or demand.
7. ABS-CBN, through its Chairman, Mr. Alfredo Montelibano, shall have the right to select and designate the personnel
(not to exceed 20 at any one time) to maintain and operate all specialized TV and radio equipment.
xxxx
10. ABS-CBN shall have the right to enter the Broadcast Center at any reasonable time during the term of this lease for
the purpose of determining compliance by RPN of the terms hereof.
xxxx
12. RPN shall not, without the prior written consent of ABS-CBN, sub-lease the leased facilities or any part thereof nor
shall any part be removed from the premises except the equipment, which are intended for operation
the Broadcast Center in due course of operations.
9. Meanwhile, it appears that the parties were hard pressed to negotiate and fix the monthly rental rate. Several attempts by Oscar to set up
a meeting with Benedicto for the fixing of the monthly rentals proved unsuccessful.
10. After more than four months of trying, a meeting between Oscar and Benedicto finally materialized on October 31, 1973. At that
meeting, the discussion not only covered fixing of reasonable rentals for the lease of the ABS-CBN studios, but likewise included the
possibility of an outright sale.
11. Thereafter, the discussions and negotiations stopped as none of the petitioners were able to meet anew with Benedicto who had
supposedly referred the matter to people above and the man on top.
12. Frustrated, then Senator Lorenzo Taada, as counsel for ABS-CBN, in May 1976, wrote Benedicto demanding vacation of the ABS-
CBN Broadcast Center and payment of back rentals for the use of the ABS-CBN studios and facilities.
13. In response, Senator Estanislao Fernandez, on behalf of Benedicto, met with Senator Taada in June 1976. Another meeting took place
between the parties respective counsels which included respondent Gonzales, another counsel for Benedicto. Despite these meetings, no
agreement was reached between Benedicto and ABS-CBN. On the whole, from June 8, 1973, the time KBS occupied the ABS-CBN studios
in Quezon City, no rental was paid by the former to the latter.
14. In the years following until the Marcos government was toppled in 1986, the ABS-CBN stations were transferred to the National Media
Production Center (NMPC) headed by Gregorio Cendaa of the Ministry of Information. Starting in January 1980, KBS, on a staggered basis,
transferred possession, control and management of ABS-CBNs provincial television stations to NMPC. Some of the radio stations of ABS-
CBN were turned over to the governments Bureau of Broadcast, while some were retained by KBS thru the Banahaw Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) and Radio Philippines Network (RPN).
15. Parenthetically, during a military inventory in 1979-1980, and a visit by ABS-CBN executives at ABS-CBNs radio transmitting stations in
Meycauayan, Bulacan, headed by petitioner Augusto, on August 13, 1984, ABS-CBN properties and massive equipment were found to be
missing. In addition, the musical records and radio dramas accumulated by ABS-CBN in a span of twenty-five (25) years and stored in its
library were now gone.
16. In June 1986, President Corazon Aquino, acting on the request of ABS-CBN through Senator Taada, returned to ABS-CBN these radio
and TV stations on a gradual and scheduled basis.
As required by the Ombudsman, the respondents, except for Garcia, filed their respective counter-affidavits,[7] with Benedicto adopting that
of Gonzales, denying petitioners charges, and averring that:
1. The execution of the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement was a free and voluntary act of ABS-CBN which agreed thereto fully expecting
remuneration in the form of rentals, thus:
2. RPN shall pay ABS-CBN monthly rental as is reasonable compensation for the use of the lease facilities. The amount
of the rental shall be determined after a discussion with Ambassador Roberto Benedicto.
2. In that regard, respondent Gonzales, counsel for KBS, RPN and Benedicto, participated in the negotiations and was present at three (3)
meetings for the fixing of rentals. Also in attendance were former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, specially engaged to represent RPN and
Benedicto, and Senator Taada and petitioner Augusto for ABS-CBN.
3. Initially, the discussions centered on the possible formulas for the fixing of rentals. Later on, however, before an agreement on the rental
rate could be reached, the discussions shifted to the possibility of an outright sale. The discussions on the sale were expanded as various
creditors of ABS-CBN had made and presented claims before respondent Garcia, then Comptroller of KBS-RPN.
4. However, the discussions were discontinued when then Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile reminded KBS of the
sequestered status of ABS-CBN facilities such that arrangements undertaken for the use and lease thereof should be taken up with the
government.[8]
5. Meanwhile, in July 1974, Secretary Ponce Enrile authorized KBS, acting on behalf of BBC, to make use of the ABS-CBN provincial
stations which were not covered by the June 8, 1973 letter-agreement. The authorization was granted in connection with the increased
undertakings assigned by the Department of National Defense (DND) to KBS, specifically, for the governments mass-media developmental
peace and order nationwide campaign.
7. Thereafter, in October 1977, RPN vacated the ABS-CBN studios and turned over the properties to George Viduya, the general manager
of the government station GTV-4. Viduya continued operations of GTV-4 at the ABS-CBN properties, after which, the properties were all
delivered in 1979 to the NMPC headed by Cendaa. The provincial stations were delivered and turned over on a staggered basis, with the
DZRI station in Dagupan handed over in 1979. The successive transfer of all ABS-CBN studios and stations, in Quezon City and the
provinces, were covered by receipts which were collated by the law firm of respondent Gonzales retained by KBS for that purpose.
8. The use of the ABS-CBN studios involved only three (3) juridical entities, RPN, ABS-CBN and the government. The charges leveled by
petitioners in their complaint-affidavits merely point to civil liability as specified in the letter-agreement itself:
4. RPN hereby assumes full and complete responsibility for the leased facilities and shall be answerable for any and all
losses and damages to such facilities.
On the whole, the allegations of petitioners do not support the elements of the crimes charged.
9. Lastly, respondents invoke the grant of absolute immunity to Benedicto as part of the Compromise Agreement in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 34 which states:
The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and employees of the corporations above
mentioned, who are included in past, present and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such that
there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said persons for acts, omissions committed prior to
February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any penal law, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019,
in relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.
Expectedly, the petitioners in their joint reply-affidavit refuted respondents counter-affidavits. Contrary to respondents allegations,
petitioners reiterated Benedictos over-all ploy, in conspiracy with the other respondents who were officers of KBS and/or RPN, to use and
occupy ABS-CBN properties without paying compensation therefor. Petitioners maintain that respondents grand scheme was to take-over
ABS-CBN, albeit ostensibly covered by the letter-lease agreement, giving the take over a semblance of legality.
Thereafter, with the issues having been joined, the Ombudsman issued the herein assailed Joint Resolution dismissing petitioners
complaints. To the Ombudsman, the following circumstances did not give rise to probable cause necessary to indict respondents for the
various felonies charged:
1. The Letter-Agreement of June 8, 1973 belie any illegal take-over of the ABS-CBN complex.
While the Lopezes are now complaining that the letter-agreement was virtually forced unto them thru intimidation, hence,
the vitiated consent of Mr. Montelibano, there is nothing however which the complainants adduced to prove this allegation
except their threadbare allegations of threats. On the contrary, it appears that the Lopezes blessed the letter-agreement
hoping that their financial difficulties with respect to the affairs of the ABS-CBN and their problem concerning the
continued detention of Eugenio Lopez, Jr. by the military, would at least be mitigated. x x x
It is thus clear that the ABS-CBN complex was freely leased by Montelibano upon consultation with the Lopezes who
entertained some ulterior motives of their own which they expect would result from the agreement, either directly or
indirectly. Of course, the Lopezes may not have realized some of these expectations (i.e., the rentals, the release of
Eugenio, Jr. from detention) but this does not change the fact that the parties consent to the contract appears to have
been freely given. Perforce, the complaint under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines must fail.
2. Other TV and radio stations were taken over pursuant to LOI 1-A, hence no violations of Art. 312, 302 and 308 of RPC.
To the alleged violation of Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the respondents contended that their use of ABS-CBNs
facilities other than those included in the lease-agreement, was in fact with the authority of the then Department of
National Defense (DND). There is no denying that all of the ABS-CBN properties including the provincial ones are under
sequestration pursuant to Presidential Letter of Instruction No. 1-A, issued on September 28, 1972. It was under the
strength of this Presidential Letter of Instruction that KBS-RPN was authorized to enter, occupy and operate the facilities
of ABS-CBN. This was also confirmed by DND Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile in his letter to RPN dated June 26, 1976.
Unmistakably, KBS-RPNs possession of the ABS-CBNs property other than those in the ABS-CBN complex is primarily
anchored on the authority pursuant to LOI 1-A. With this apparent authority, this investigation can not see in any which
way how the respondents could have illegally taken over the properties of the [petitioners], particularly those in the
province; there is therefore no convincing proof to support a charge under Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. It may
come to mind that occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property under Article 312 requires as one of
its elements the presence of violence against or intimidation of persons as a means in securing real property or rights
belonging to another. Plainly, this element is not shown. The complainants may have felt intimidated by the sequestration
order, but it is in the nature of such Order to be coercive. It was an act flowing from the martial law powers of then
President Marcos.
3. No unlawful taking as to justify charges for Robbery or Theft.
Robbery and Theft under Articles 302 and 308 of the Revised Penal Code were also attributed by the [petitioners] against
the respondents. From the records, it is clear that KBS-RPN has juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties subject
of this complaint; a right which can be validly set-up even against ABS-CBN itself. It can be recalled that KBS-RPN was
authorized to enter, occupy and operate ABS-CBN facilities by virtue of the authority granted by the President, pursuant
to LOI No. 1-A. Aside, the Broadcast Center itself was covered by the lease-agreement. Under these situations, there is
obviously no basis to charge the respondents for robbery and theft; for these penal offense require as an element the act
of unlawful taking or asportation. Asportation is simply poles apart from the juridical possession which KBS-RPN enjoyed
over the properties.
4. No deceit was employed to gain possession of the Broadcast Center and the provincial TV and radio stations.
In the prosecution for estafa under [Articles 315, paragraphs 2(a), 3(a) and 318] of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement of fraudulent representation of the accused, be
made prior to, or, at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainants, it being essential that such
false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the complainants
to part with the thing. If there be no such prior or simultaneous false statement or fraudulent representation, any
subsequent act of the respondent, however fraudulent or suspicious it may appear, can not serve as basis for the
prosecution of these crimes.
[From petitioners complaint-affidavits], it is very clear that the late Alfredo Montelibano was the one who talked with
Roberto Benedicto, preparatory to the signing of the lease-agreement. As the complainants did not identify exactly which
constitute the deceitful act (or the intimidation) which could have induced the Lopezes into accepting the lease
agreement, in most probability, the occurrences which vitiated their consent happened during this preliminary discussion.
Noticeably however, it is not Alfredo Montelibano, the one who supposedly talked with Benedicto, who is testifying on the
alleged veiled threat or deceits, if there are. Precisely, because he is already dead.
x x x [I]t is submitted that the Lopezes can not now testify on something which are not derived from their own personal
perception. The bottomline is that what they are now trying to adduce, pertaining to the alleged deceits [or intimidation]
attending the negotiation of the lease agreement are purely hearsay. This is a matter which only Alfredo Montelibano
could testify competently.[9]
The Ombudsman saw no need to discuss the defenses of prescription and immunity from suit raised by the respondents given his dismissal
of the complaint-affidavits on the merits. However, in a subsequent Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Joint
Resolution, the Ombudsman lifted the Office of the Chief Legal Counsels ratiocination for dismissing the complaint-affidavits, thus:
Incidentally, RPN has been identified as among the corporation in which respondent Benedicto has substantial interests.
In fact, it was one of the subject matters of the Compromise Agreement reached by the government and respondent
Benedicto in Sandiganbayan Civil Case no. 34.
In that Compromise Agreement, for and in consideration of respondent Benedictos cession of equities, and assignment of
his rights and interest in corporations therein listed, among them RPN, the government extended absolute immunity to
Benedicto, including officers of his corporations as therein mentioned, such that there shall be no criminal investigation or
prosecution against said persons for acts or omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have
violated any penal law, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any asset
treated or included in this Agreement.
In effect, the People of the Philippines as the offended party in criminal cases has waived its right to proceed criminally
against Benedicto, et. al., for whatever crime they may have committed relative to, among others, the alleged plunder of
ABS-CBN properties. Again, whatever liability that remains thereabout on respondents part is perforce only civil in
nature.[10]
Hence, this recourse by the petitioners alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution and Order.
Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999 and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in
compliance with Section 16,[11] Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the Court of their clients demise. Benedictos counsel
filed a Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal)[12] moving that Benedicto be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the reason
that the pending criminal cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the party accused.
Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v. Court of Appeals[13] which held that civil liability of the
accused survives his death; because death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations.
Our ruling on this issue need not be arduous. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with
his criminal liability, has long been clarified and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:[14]
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure[15] as amended. The separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBNs insistence that the case at bench survives because the civil liability of the respondents subsists is
stripped of merit.
To begin with, there is no criminal case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute
respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted along with the criminal action unless
the offended party: (a) waives the civil action, (b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action,[16] is not applicable.
In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,[17] the death of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against
him, regardless of the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death of the accused must hinge on other
sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on other
sources of obligation must be prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal action is
extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the same criminal action.
Significantly, this Court in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals,[18] taking cognizance of respondent Benedictos death on May 15, 2000,
has ordered that the latter be dropped as a party, and declared extinguished any criminal as well as civil liability ex delicto that might be
attributable to him in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-101969 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Lastly, we note that petitioners appear to have already followed our ruling in People v. Bayotas[19] by filing a separate civil action to
enforce a claim against the estate of respondent Benedicto.[20] The claim against the estate of Benedicto is based on contractthe June 8,
1973 letter- agreementin consonance with Section 5,[21] Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. Plainly, the dropping of respondents Benedicto and
Tan as parties herein is in order.
We now come to the core issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners
complaint against the respondents. We rule in the negative and, accordingly, dismiss the petition.
We cannot overemphasize the fact that the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.[22] The raison d etre for its creation and endowment of broad investigative authority is to insulate it
from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges and fiscals offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the execution of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and
misfeasances committed by public officers.[23]
In Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto,[24] we dwelt on the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman, to wit:
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the Office of the Ombudsman. It bears
emphasis that the Office has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers under the Constitution
and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989). This discretion is all but free from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention to ensure that the Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence.
Indeed, the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. The Ombudsman may thus conduct an investigation if the complaint filed is found to be in the
proper form and substance. Conversely, the Ombudsman may also dismiss the complaint should it be found insufficient in
form or substance.
Unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Ombudsmans powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The pragmatic basis for the general rule was explained in Ocampo v. Ombudsman:
The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of
the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in
much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be compelled to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file
an information in court or dismiss a complaint by private complainants.[25]
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that we do not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
vested by the Constitution. In short, we do not review the Ombudsmans exercise of discretion in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint
except when the exercise thereof is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[26] In this regard, petitioners utterly failed to demonstrate the Ombudsmans abuse, much less grave abuse, of discretion.
Apart from a blanket and general charge that remaining respondents herein, Gonzales and Garcia, are officers of KBS/RPN and/or alter
egos of Benedicto, petitioners complaint-affidavits are bereft of sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that crimes have been
committed and the respondents, namely, Gonzales and Garcia, are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[27] Certainly, the
Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners complaint-affidavits.
From the entirety of the records, it is beyond cavil that petitioners seek to attach criminal liability to an unequivocally civil undertaking gone
awry. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, although the petitioners may not have realized their expectations in entering into the June 8,
1973 letter-agreement, such does not render their consent thereto defective.
The execution and validity of this letter-agreement is connected with respondents culpability for the felonies charged as these include the
element of whether they had juridical possession of the ABS-CBN properties. Essentially, petitioners claim they did not freely give their
consent to the letter-agreement. However, on more than one occasion, petitioners have invoked the letter-agreements provisions, and
made claims thereunder.
First, petitioners met and discussed with respondents the fixing of the rental rate for the ABS-CBN studios in Quezon City as provided in
paragraph 2 of the letter-lease agreement. Next, petitioners counsel wrote a demand letter to respondents for the payment of rentals for the
latters occupation and use of ABS-CBN properties pursuant to the letter-agreement. Last and most importantly, petitioners have made a
claim against the estate of Benedicto based on the same June 8, 1973 letter-agreement.
This action of petitioners clearly evinces their ratification of the letter-agreement. As previously discussed, the civil liability of respondents
Benedicto and Tan hinging on the charged criminal acts herein was extinguished upon their death. But other civil liabilities founded on other
sources of obligations under Article 1157 of the Civil Code may still be prosecuted either against the estate of the deceased if based on
contract,[28] or against the executors and administrators of the deceaseds estate if based on quasi-delict.[29]
As petitioners have ratified the letter-agreement, even after the lifting of martial law and the toppling of the Marcos government,
and advanced the validity of the letter-agreement in their claim against the estate of Benedicto, they cannot, in the same breath, aver that
respondents actuations in the execution of the letter-agreement were criminal in nature, or that the letter-agreement was more ostensible
than real and to insist on the prosecution of respondents for felonies supposedly committed in connection with this ubiquitous letter-
agreement.[30]
In fine, the Ombudsman did not abuse his discretion in determining that the allegations of petitioners against respondents are civil
in nature, bereft of criminal character. Perforce, he was correct in dismissing petitioners complaint-affidavits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Roberto S. Benedicto and Salvador Tan are dropped as
private respondents without prejudice to the filing of separate civil actions against their respective estates. The assailed Joint Resolution
and Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-94-1109 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Deceased.
[1] Rollo, pp. 36-54.
[2] Id. at 55-61.
[3] Id. at 62-99.

[4] Television Stations
Channel Location
1. TV Channel 2 Metro Manila
2. TV Channel 4 Metro Manila
3. Batangas Channel 3 Batangas City
4. DZBC TV Channel 3 Baguio City
5. DYCB TV Channel 3 Cebu City
6. DYXL TV Channel 4 Bacolod City
7. DXAW TV Channel 4 Davao City
Radio Stations
Frequency/Call Sign Location
1. DZXL (AM) 620 Khz Metro Manila
2. DZAQ (AM) 960 Khz Metro Manila
3. DZYK (FM) 101.1 Khz Metro Manila
4. DZMM (AM) 1000 Khz Metro Manila
5. DZWL (AM) 830 Khz Metro Manila
6. DZMY (AM) 1160 Khz Metro Manila
7. DZYL (AM) 1340 Khz Metro Manila
8. DZBC (AM) 690 Khz Baguio
9. DZRI (AM) 1040 Khz Dagupan
10. DZXI (AM) 660 Khz Laoag
11. DZQM (AM) 1020 Khz Lucena
12. DZRB (AM) 750 Khz Naga
13. DZBL (AM) 690 Khz Legaspi
14. DYPL (AM) 670 Khz Iloilo
15. DYXL (AM) 870 Khz Bacolod
16. DYCB (AM) 570 Khz Cebu
17. DXJW (AM) 1010 Khz Zamboanga
18. DXCL (AM) 700 Khz Cagayan de Oro
19. DXAW (AM) 640 Khz Davao
20. DXLI (AM) 910 Khz Iligan
21. DXLC (AM) 660 Khz Cotabato
[5] Now a senator of the Republic of the Philippines.
[6] As alleged in petitioners complaintaffidavits, KBS and RPN are treated as one and the same entity, unless otherwise separately
identified.
[7] Rollo, pp. 106-119.
[8] Letter dated June 28, 1976, id. at 151.
[9] Id. at 40-44, 47.
[10] Id. at 59-60.
[11] SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall
be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of
his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, of if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the
estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.
[12] Rollo, pp. 395-399.
[13] G.R. No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.
[14] G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 239, 255-256.
[15] Now the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[16] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1(a).
[17] Supra note 14.
[18] 416 Phil. 722 (2001).
[19] Supra note 14.
[20] Rollo, pp. 475-491.
[21] SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions.All claims from money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the
last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise
they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator commences an
action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has
against the decedent, instead of presenting them independent to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not
yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
[22] 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XI, Sec. 13(1).
[23] Republic v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135123, January 22, 2007, 512 SCRA 57.
[24] G.R. No. 139675, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112.
[25] Id. at 121-122.
[26] See Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 207, 216.
[27] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 1.
[28] See RULES OF COURT, Rule 86, Sec. 5.

[29] RULES OF COURT, Rule 87, Sec, 1.
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of
money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
[30] See Articles 1390 (2), 1391, 1392, 1393 and 1396 of the Civil Code.
Art. 1390. x x x
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
This period shall begin: In cases of intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the guardianship ceases.
Art. 1392. Ratification extinguishes the action to annul a voidable contract.
Art. 1393. Ratification may be effected expressly or tacitly. It is understood that there is a tacit ratification if, with knowledge of the reason
which renders the contract voidable and such reason having ceased, the person who has a right to invoke it should execute an act which
necessarily implies an intention to waive his right.
Art. 1396. Ratification cleanses the contract from all its defects from the moment it was constituted.

Crimpro Digest

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Crimpro Digest

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

[G.R. No. 149357.

March 04, 2005]

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HS LOST ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL.

WHETHER OR NOT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UMEZAWA IS PRO FORMA.[13]

The Courts Ruling

[G.R. Nos. 135554-56. June 21, 2002]

CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 188217, July 03, 2013

FERNANDO M. ESPINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. Nos. 140576-99. December 13, 2004]

The Ruling of the Court

Atty. Antonio Albano

Dear Atty. Albano:

Thank you very much.

(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)

G.R. No. L-46656 June 26, 1940

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

DANTE HERNANDEZ DATU, G.R. No. 169718

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty; thus, trial ensued.

The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

OSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Senador vs people 692 scra 669 3/6/2013

G.R. NO. 201620 : March 6, 2013

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CYNTHIA JAIME,Respondents.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The petition is without merit.

1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams

1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams

1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams

1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams

1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams

1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams

1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams

1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams

1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams

1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams

1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams

1 #1851 1 pc. lady's ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams

1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams

1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams

G.R. No. 182926, June 22, 2015

The factual antecedents are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Tagbilaran City, (for Jagna, Bohol) February 10, 2005.4

Navaja's arguments are misplaced.

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;

(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and

ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, EUGENIO G.R. No. 133347

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ROBERTO S. CHICO-NAZARIO,

Respondents. REYES, JJ.