CRUZ V.

CATAPANG
ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common "in equal
Facts: With the of Norma Maligaya, Teofila shares."

Catapang built a house intruding on a

portion of a property co-owned by Leonor Facts:  In 1986, John Abing and Juliet
Cruz and Norma Maligaya. Leonor filed a Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife
complaint for forcible entry against without the benefit of marriage. Together,
Catapang?
they bought a 2-storey residential house.
Consequent to the purchase, the tax
Issue: Will the action prosper?
declaration of the 2-storey house was
transferred in the name of Juliet. 

Held: Yes. The construction of a house on

the co-owned property is an act of dominion. In 1995, they decided to partition their
Such requires consent from all co-owners. properties as their relationship soured. They
There being no consent from all co-owners, executed a Memorandum of
Catapang had no right to construct her Agreement. Unfortunately, the document was
house on the co-owned property.
left unsigned by the parties although signed
by the witnesses thereto. Under their
unsigned agreement, John shall leave the
PALASBAS AND MALAZARTE V. CA
couples' dwelling with Juliet paying him the
amount of P428,870.00 representing John's
Facts: Plasabas, one of the co-owners of the share in all their properties. Juliet paid John
subject property, filed a complaint for the sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial
recovery of title to property with damages payment of his share, with the balance of
against respondents, Lumen and Aunzo. The P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in twelve
respondents moved to dismiss the case for monthly installment. 

Petitioner’s failure to implead other co-

owners of the property.
Juliet, however, failed to make good the
b a l a n c e . O n a c c o u n t t h e re o f , J o h n
Issue: May a co-owner file reivindicatory demanded of her to vacate the annex
action without impleading their co-owners?
structure housing the sari-sari store. Juliet
refused, prompting John to file an ejectment
Held: Yes. Any one of the co-owners may suit against her.  In his complaint, John
bring an action for ejectment. This covers all alleged that he alone spent for the
kinds of actions for the recovery of construction of the annex structure with his
possession, including an accion publiciana own funds and thru money he borrowed from
and a revindicatory action.
his relatives. In fact, he added that the tax
declaration for the structure was under his
Impleading other co-owners is not name. 

mandatory because suit is deemed to be

instituted for the benefit of all. The only Issue: Whether or not the property subject of
exception is when the plaintiff claims to be the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership
the sole owner of the subject property.
of John.

Held: No.  Other than John's bare allegation

ABING V. WAEYAN
that he alone, thru his own funds and money
Case Doctrine: In the absence of proofs to
the contrary, any property acquired by
common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned
by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-
he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence
is wanting to support such naked claim. For
sure, John even failed to reveal how much he
spent therefor. Neither did he divulge the
names of the alleged relatives from whom he
made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Arambulo and Iraida Arambulo Nolasco
In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by other party
of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the
household.
owned in common, the courts may afford
The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of
proofs to the contrary, any property acquired
by common-law spouses during their period
of cohabitation is presumed to have been
obtained thru their joint efforts and is owned
by them in equal shares. Their property
relationship is governed by the rules on co-
ownership. And under this regime, they
owned their properties in common "in equal
shares." Being herself a co-owner of the
structure in question, Juliet, as correctly
ruled by the CA, may not be ejected
therefrom.
the RTC.
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil
Code, a co-owner may bring an action for
ejectment against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
ownership of a common property. It bears
stressing, however, that in this case,
evidence is totally wanting to establish
John's or Juliet's exclusive ownership of the
property in question. As borne by the record,
Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure and the sari-sari store thereat by
virtue of her being a co-owner thereof. As
such, she is as much entitled to enjoy its
possession and ownership as John.
them in the division upon the termination of
ARAMBO V. NOLASCO
Facts:
1) Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita
A. Dela Cruz, along with their mother
Rosita vda. De Arambulo, and siblings
Primo V. Arambulo, Ma. Lorenza A.
L o p e z , A n a M a r i a V. A r a m b u l o ,
Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V.
are co-owners of a 233 sq.m. Land in
Tondo, Manila.
2) When their mother died, she was
succeeded by her husband, Genero
Nolasco and their children.
3) On January 8, 1999, petitioners filed for
relief alleging that all co-owners, except
for Nolasco, have authorized to sell their
respective shares to the properties,
saying that in the Civil Code, if one or
more co-owners shall withhold their
consent to the alterations in the thing
adequate relief.
4) Respondents sought the dismissal of the
petition for being premature.
Respondents averred that they were not
aware of the intention of the petitioners
to sell the properties they co-owned
because they were not called to
participate in any negotiations regarding
the disposition of the property.
5) RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and
ordered respondents to give their
consent to sale. Respondents filed a
notice of appeal to the CA. CA reversed
Issue: WON respondents, as co-owners, can
be compelled by the court to give their
consent to the sale of their shares in the co-
owned properties
Held: Art. 493 dictates that each one of the
parties herein as co-owners with full
ownership of their parts can sell their fully
owned part. The sale by the petitioners of
their parts shall not affect the full ownership
by the respondents of the part that belongs
to them. Their part which petitioners will sell
shall be that which may be apportioned to
the co-ownership. With the full ownership of
the respondents remaining unaffected by
petitioners’ sale of their parts, the nature of
the property, as co-owned, likewise stays.
Contract of lease in favor of Yap Kui Chin.
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-
seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer the co-owner of the property. To be a
co-owner of a property does not mean that
one is deprived of every recognition of the
disposal of the thing, of the free use of his
right within the circumstantial conditions of
such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for
the use and enjoyment, or the right of free
disposal, that the previous consent of all the
interested parties be obtained.
1920 - heirs of Julian Melencio made an
Petitioners who project themselves as
prejudiced co-owners may bring a suit for
partition, which is one of the modes of
extinguishing co-ownership. Art. 494 of the
Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common
insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary
to this rule, Art. 498 of the Civil Code states
that whenever the thing is essentially
indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree
that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed. This is
resorted to (a) when the right to partition the
property is invoked by any of the co-owners
but because of the nature of the property, it
cannot be subdivided or its subdivision
would prejudice the interests of the co-
owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon
proper reimbursement of the co-owners. This
is the result obviously aimed at by petitioners
at the outset. As already shown, this cannot
be done while the co-ownership exists.
no power to lease the property for a period
MELENCIO V. DY TIAO LAY
lease was for 20 years amounted to an act of
Parcel of land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija
was originally owned by one Julian Melencio
who died before the 1905, leaving his widow
Ruperta Garcia and 5 children. Ruperta held
nothing but a widow’s usufruct in the land.
Te r m o f L e a s e : 2 0 y e a r s , f o r t h e
establishment of a rice mill with necessary
buildings for warehouses and quarters for
employees. Document evidencing lease
acknowledged but never recorded with the
Register of Deeds. Lessee took possession
of the land and erected the mill and other
necessary buildings. Lease was transferred
to Uy Eng Jui who transferred it to Uy Eng
Jui & Co. (unregistered partnership); until the
lease finally came to Dy Tiao Lay. Land was
registered under the Torrens system in 1913
but the lease was not mentioned in the title,
though it was mentioned that one house and
3 warehouses were owned by Yap Kui Chin.
extrajudicial partition of parts of the
inheritance. After Mrs. Macapagal, wife of
one of the heirs of Julian, Ramon, demanded
an increase of the lease from P20 per mo. to
P300/mo., she was informed by Dy Tiao Lay
that a written lease existed and that
according to its terms, Dy Tiao was entitled
to an extension of the lease at the original
rental. Plaintiffs insisted they had no
knowledge of it and in such case the lease
was executed without their consent and was
thus void.
The power of majority (of co-owners of an
indivisible property) would be confied to
deceisions touching the management and
enjoyment of the common property and
would not include acts of ownership, such as
a lease of 12 years w/c gives rise to a real
right, which must recorded and which can be
performed only by owners of the property
leased. Where the contract of lease may give
rise to a real right in favor of the lessee
(constituting a sundering of the ownership
which transcends mere management) then
the part owners representing the greater
portion of the property held in common have
longer than 6 years without the consent of all
co-owners. In this case, the fact that the
rigorous alienation and NOT a mere act of
management, thus necessitation the consent
of ALL co-owners.

EDC V. SAMSON-BICO

Facts: Apolonio Ballesteros and Maria

Membrebe