1.

PUBLIC INSTRUMENT IS NOT ACTUAL DELIVERY

TEN FORTY VS CRUZ
[G.R. No. 151212. September 10, 2003]
TEN FORTY REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., Represented by its President, VERONICA G. LORENZANA,
petitioner, vs. MARINA CRUZ, respondent.
FACTS: complaint for ejectment was filed by Petitioner against Respondent
-petitioner alleged that petitioner is the true and absolute owner of a parcel of lot and residential house
-petitioner acquired the same from Barbara Galino by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
-sale was acknowledged by said Barbara Galino through a 'Katunayan';
-payment of the capital gains tax for the transfer of the property was evidenced by a Certification Authorizing
Registration issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
-petitioner came to know that Barbara Galino sold the same property to Cruz, who immediately occupied the property
and which occupation was merely tolerated by petitioner
-complaint for ejectment was filed with the Barangay East Bajac-Bajac but for failure to arrive at an amicable
settlement
-demand letter was sent to [respondent] to vacate and pay reasonable amount for the use and occupation of the same
-it was was ignored by the respondent
-respondents Answer with Counterclaim
- it was alleged that: petitioner is not qualified to own the residential lot in dispute, being a public land;
-according to Barbara Galino, she did not sell her house and lot to petitioner but merely obtained a loan from
Veronica Lorenzana
-payment of the capital gains tax does not necessarily show that the Deed of Absolute Sale was at that time already
in existence
-there is no allegation that petitioner had been in prior possession of the premises and the same was lost thru force,
stealth or violence;
-evidence will show that it was Barbara Galino who was in possession at the time of the sale and vacated the property
in favor of respondent
-in April 1998, she caused the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of Barbara Galino and a new one issued
in respondents name; petitioner obtained its tax declaration over the same property on November 3, 1998, seven (7)
months [after] the respondent
- at the time the house and lot [were] bought by respondent, the house was not habitable, the power and water
connections were disconnected;
-being a public land, respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office in Olongapo City
-Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) ordered respondent to vacate the property and surrender to petitioner
possession thereof.
-Regional Trial Court[7] (RTC) reversed the MTCC
-RTC ruled as follows: 1) respondents entry into the property was not by mere tolerance of petitioner, but by virtue
of a Waiver and Transfer of Possessory Rights and Deed of Sale in her favor; 2) the execution of the Deed of Sale
without actual transfer of the physical possession did not have the effect of making petitioner the owner of the
property, because there was no delivery of the object of the sale as provided for in Article 1428 of the Civil Code;
and 3) being a corporation, petitioner was disqualified from acquiring the property, which was public land.
-Sustaining the RTC, the CA held that petitioner had failed to make a case for unlawful detainer, because no contract
-- express or implied -- had been entered into by the parties with regard to possession of the property. It ruled that
the action should have been for forcible entry, in which prior physical possession was indispensable -- a circumstance
petitioner had not shown either.
-appellate court also held that petitioner had challenged the RTCs ruling on the question of ownership for the
purpose of compensating for the latters failure to counter such ruling. The RTC had held that, as a corporation,
petitioner had no right to acquire the property which was alienable public land.v
ISSUES: 1. Whether [r]espondents possession or occupation of the said property is in the nature of an exercise of
ownership which should put the herein [p]etitioner on guard
2. Whether the ejectment case should have been a forcible entry case where prior physical possession is
indispensable
3. Whether occupation or possession of the property in question was merely through the tolerance or permission of
the herein [p]etitioner
HELD: Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIONALE: 1. ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. Nowhere in the Civil Code is
it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of
real estate
- Court has held that the execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery.
Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected because of a legal impediment.
-constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to
take actual possession of the land sold.
-petitioner did not gain control and possession of the property, because Galino had continued to exercise ownership
rights over the realty. That is, she had remained in possession, continued to declare it as her property for tax
purposes and sold it to respondent in 1998.
-Petitioner should have likewise been put on guard by respondents declaration of the property for tax purposes on
April 23, 1998, as annotated in the tax certificate filed seven months later. Verily, the tax declaration represented
an adverse claim over the unregistered property and was inimical to the right of petitioner.
- How could it have been so tolerant despite its knowledge that the property had been sold to her, and that it was by
virtue of that sale that she had undertaken major repairs and improvements on it
2. Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court: Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs.
-In its Complaint, petitioner alleged that, having acquired the subject property from Barbara Galino it was the true
and absolute owner on December 5, 1996, that Galino had sold the property to Respondent Cruz on April 24, 1998
-allegations appeared to show the elements of unlawful detainer. They also conferred initiatory jurisdiction on the
MTCC, because the case was filed a month after the last demand to vacate -- hence, within the one-year prescriptive
period.
-However, what was actually proven by petitioner was that possession by respondent had been illegal from the
beginning. While the Complaint was crafted to be an unlawful detainer suit, petitioners real cause of action was for
forcible entry, which had already prescribed. Consequently, the MTCC had no more jurisdiction over the action.
-appellate court, therefore, did not err when it ruled that petitioners Complaint for unlawful detainer was a mere
subterfuge or a disguised substitute action for forcible entry, which had already prescribed.
3. As a general rule, this kind of reassessment cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only questions of law.
-On the basis of the facts found by the CA and the RTC, we find that petitioner failed to substantiate its case for
unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed between the parties. Not shown either was the
corporations alleged tolerance of respondents possession.
- To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of
the possession. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an
improper remedy.
-In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the
claim of petitioner that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.
-Complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after its sale
to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance
-allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioners theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer.
First, these arguments advance the view that respondents occupation of the property was unlawful at its inception.
Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioners supposed act of
sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered
-bare allegation of petitioners tolerance of respondents occupation of the premises has not been proven, the
possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should
have been for forcible entry -- an action that had already prescribed

2. PETITIONER OWN LAND BY LATCHES

[ HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ VS CA]
HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ, FILOMENO and GREGORIO, both surnamed MADRID, respondents.
FACT: petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages against private respondents involving a parcel of
land
-petitioners assert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the private respondents,
Madrid brothers in a deed of sale executed
-since then they have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property.
-However, much to their dismay and surprise, private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Title over the said
land.
-Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale of petitioner and assuming that said document exists, the
same is fictitious and falsified.
-while they admit petitioners possession of the land, they assert that this possession is in defiance of their repeated
demands that the former relinquish the same
-Pacifico Marquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property having bought the same from
the Madrid brothers
-During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of sale since it was lost.
-a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction was
presented
- there was no proof that the copy sent to the court as required by the notarial law is unavailable.
- Court believes that the xerox copy of a certified true copy of the original issued by the notary public cannot be
admitted in evidence to prove the conveyance of the land in question.
-trial court dismissed petitioners complaint
-Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision,
-Court of Appeals rendered its judgment which ruled that Exhibit A was admissible in evidence for failure of the
private respondents to object when it was offered during the trial but concluded that the same had no probative
value to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold to them
-Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate against them because their title to the property is
registered under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable. The principles raised, while admittedly correct,
are not without exception.
-Madrids explanation that they did not demand the petitioners to vacate the land due to the unexplained killings
within the area.
-Petitioners maintain that even if Exhibit A were a mere photo copy of the original carbon copy, they had presented
other substantial evidence during the trial to prove the existence of the sale.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the TCT secured by the Madrids operate to vest upon them the ownership
2. Whether the evidence presented by the petitioner is admissible thus would vest them ownership
HELD: decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1994 in CA - G.R. No. 25339 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Instead, petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. No costs.
RATIONALE: 1. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT did not operate to vest upon them ownership of
the property.
-Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership,
especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in October
1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the land.
-records show that the disputed property has been in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since
been introducing several improvements on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the
Madrids. Furthermore, during all this time, the land was enclosed, thus signifying petitioners exclusive claim of
ownership.
-The construction of various infrastructure on the land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other
buildings - was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. Oddly, not one of them
protested.
-Even if we were to rule that the Certificates of Title to the private respondents would ripen into ownership of the
land, and therefore, the defense of prescription would be unavailing, still, the petitioners would have acquired title to
it by virtue of the equitable principle of laches. The Madrids long inaction or passivity in asserting their rights over
disputed property will preclude them from recovering the same.
-If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their ownership, they should have filed a judicial action for
recovery of possession and not merely to have the land registered under their respective names. For as earlier
mentioned, Certificates of Title do not establish ownership.
2. cursory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was
executed. Worse, when Atty. Tabangay typed Exhibit A, the contents were based on an alleged carbon original which
petitioners predecessor-in-interest presented to him, without bothering to check his own files to verify the
correctness of the contents of the document he was copying. In other words, Atty. Tabangays failure to determine
the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable.
-It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be presented, all duplicates and/or counterparts
must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as
established until all its parts are unavailable.
-Atty. Sevillano Tabangay, the notary public who notarized the deed of sale, testified that the document has about
five (5) copies.
-Notwithstanding this procedural lapse, when Exhibit A was presented private respondents failed, not only to object,
but even to cross-examine the notary public, Atty. Tabangay, regarding its execution.
-Forthwith, upon private respondents failure to object to Exhibit A when it was presented, the same becomes
primary evidence
-To be sure, even if Exhibit A is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value
must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined. Its tendency to convince and persuade
must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.

3. TAX DECLARATIONS STRONG EVIDENCE

[HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC VS HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC
[G.R. No. 149679. May 30, 2003]
HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIOZA,
SOLEDAD E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE
ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO;
BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO
ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO
BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO,* respondents.
FACTS: In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property
situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac.
- Upon the latters death, the said Lot 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and
Balbina.
- Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered.
- Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente, herein petitioner.
- Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his fathers brother
and sister, nor his cousins.
- Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to
the time of his death.
-some of the respondents bought their title from descendants of the ermacs
- heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them.
- filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the [respondents] ownership over their respective parcels
of land, prompting them to file this action for quieting of title.
- It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the original
claimant of dominion over Lot
- During his lifetime, Clemente Ermac was in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an
owner of the entire Lot No. 666. With the help of his children, he cultivated the said lot, and planted corn, peanuts,
cassava and fruit products.
- Upon Clementes death, [petitioners] inherited Lot No. 666, and they constructed their residential houses thereon.
[Petitioners] claim that [respondents] recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only tolerated by
Clemente Ermac and the [petitioners]
- lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision, finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio Ermac,
All the heirs of Claudio Ermac, therefore, should share in the ownership over Lot No. 666, by right of succession.
- CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[7] should not be disturbed on appeal.
-CA found that Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children
-- Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that
they -- as well as their predecessors-in-interests -- had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owners.
- Petitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment
proceedings they had filed earlier.
- Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of
title issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of
one year from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challenged.
- Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well
as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio
Ermac.
-Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took
the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the
property in the names of petitioners predecessors-in-interest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco
2, Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and] Anunciacion Suyco is
indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[
3. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666
HELD:
RATIONALE: 1. Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they
may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.
-Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time, there is legal basis
for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.
- credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and
resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in
appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of fact, which the CA affirmed,
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.
2. While it is true that Section 32[ of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible
after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy[ in law. The acceptability of the Torrens
System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners
- ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not
create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an
evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the
certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.
3. When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is
created in favor of the defrauded party.
- Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in
the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since
respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and
thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe
- Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used
to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice. Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a
property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.
4. DONATION PROPER NUPTIAS NOT IDENTIFIED
[LALUAN VS MALPAYA]
G.R. No. L-21231 July 30, 1975
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners, vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO JASMIN, et al., respondents.
FACTS: Laluans, the Laguits and the Sorianos, petitioners herein, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin, herein respondents, for
recovery of ownership and possession of two parcels of land.
-petitioners seek a declaration that they are the owners pro indiviso of: a) A PARCEL OF RICELAND b) A PARCEL OF
RICELAND AND CORNLAND
-base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent
Malpaya's wife) who died intestate and without any children.
-first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan.
-They claim that the respondent Malpaya, taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the
respondent Tambot, as evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property"
-second parcel of land they allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and Laluan, and charge that the
respondent Malpaya, with right to sell only one-half thereof as evidenced by the "Absolute Deed of Sale"
-respondents claimed that the parcels of land belonged to the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The
respondents Tambot and Jasmin further aver that the respondent Malpaya had the "perfect legal right" to dispose
of the said parcels of land and that they bought the properties in good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of their
vendor.
-neither the respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due and proper notice served on them. Nor did
they file any motion for postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave to continue with the presentation of
their evidence. This the court a quo granted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their evidence before the clerk of
court.
-court a quo rendered judgment declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" as well
the "Absolute Deed of Sale", except as regards the one-half portion of the land described in the latter document
which belonged to the respondent Malpaya.
-Court of Appeals rendered judgment setting aside the appealed decision and entered another remanding the
case to the court a quo for further proceedings.
-CA voided the procedure whereby, at the continuation of the hearing of the case on August 1, 1957, the court a quo,
in the absence of the respondents and their counsel, allowed the petitioners to present their evidence before the
clerk of court.
- petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of the respondent Court as well its resolution denying their motion
for reconsideration, and ask that judgment be rendered affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo
-petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the party
present when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the petitioners continue, the clerk of court
merely performs a ministerial task.
-respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a quo arrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied it,
to designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the property in question was indeed a donation proper nuptias
2. whether or not the reception by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence of the respondents
and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial error that vitiated the proceedings.
HELD: (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1963 and its resolution dated March 30, 1963 are
set aside; (2) the judgment of the court a quo dated September 23, 1957, insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute
Deed of Sale," is hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the court a quo of the same date, insofar as it relates to
the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," is set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is hereby remanded to the
court a quo for a new trial, to the end that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be specifically
established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary to retake evidence already taken, but the parties shall be
afforded opportunity to present such evidence as they may deem relevant to the particular question raised herein.
No costs.
RATIONALE: 1. A. invariable applicable rule is to the effect that in order to maintain an action to recover
ownership, the person who claims that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his ownership of the
property claimed but also the identity thereof. The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land he
claims. 13 And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the
question by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to extrinsic evidence, oral or written.
-record shows that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any evidence indicating that the land sold
by the respondent Malpaya to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of the three parcels described in the
deed of donation. The petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the three parcels — its location, area, and
contiguous owners — subject of the deed of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property."
-court a quo relied mainly on the documents — the deed of donation propter nuptias and the translation thereof in
English — presented by the petitioners before the clerk of court. However, the respondents contend — and this the
respondent court took significant note of in its resolution that the land described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property" is not any of those set forth in the deed of donation.
B. court a quo committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs
to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan and Malpaya acquired the
said parcel of land from Eustaquio Marquez "sometime in 1912" or, specifically, during the marriage. Following the rule
then that proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the statutory
presumption operative, 15 it seems clear enough that the parcel covered by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" pertains to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
-court a quo committed no error in declaring the "Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as to the one-half portion of
the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse of the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners
the owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said "Absolute Deed of Sale;"
2. No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the
evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of court constitutes but a ministerial
task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if
any, adduced by the party present.
-This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court, the exercise of judicial discretion
usually called for when the other party who is present objects to questions propounded and to the admission of the
documentary evidence proffered.8 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still
rests with the judge who is obliged to personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported.
-The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the reference by a court
of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report thereon. These provisions explicitly
spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after
the reference proceedings.
-Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders a reference of the
case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no application to the case at bar where
the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the witnesses6 presented and to
mark the documentary evidence7 proffered on a date previously set for hearing.

2. by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

[GERMAN MANAGEMENT VS CA]
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the
owners of a parcel of land
-land was originally registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, pursuant to a Homestead Patent
granted by the President of the Philippines
-spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop
their property into a residential subdivision.
-petitioner obtained Development Permit from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development.
-petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
- petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions occupied and
cultivated by private respondents.
-respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
- alleging that they are mountainside farmers and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association
-they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No.
27
-petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay
Road at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot
to be affected
-petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by:
(1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice;
(2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence
and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and
(3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from their respective
farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028.
-Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for forcible entry.
-CA reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court.
-Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the property at the time they were
forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless
of the legality or illegality of possession
-Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing
and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429
of the New Civil Code.
ISSUES: whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner.
HELD: Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
RATIONALE: In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose were ever in possession
of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact
that they even planted rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
destroying their crops.
-Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it presented, such
evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be
stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession
shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror.
-Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles
him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
-Such justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states,
"(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the
aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."

3. ROAD LOT ONLY CAN CONSTRUCT WALLS

G.R. No. 165952 July 28, 2008
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Present: Petitioner - versus - LANDEX DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
FACTS: Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in Quezon City
-FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39) lots
-It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen (17) lots to respondent Landex.
-dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its lots.
-To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction
- Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable
for two million pesos in damages.
-Landex alleged that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall.
-Landex claimed that Aneco has its own entrance to its property: Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco
del Monte Street.
-Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when Aneco constructed a building on said street.
- Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in
the deed of sale that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
-RTC rendered a Decision granting the complaint for injunction
-RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco.
-White Plains Association vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765, wherein the issue involved was the ownership of a road lot, in an
existing, fully developed and authorized subdivision, which after a second look, is apparently inapplicable to the
instant case at bar, simply because the property in question never did exist as a subdivision. Since, the property in
question never did exist as a subdivision
- CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC order
-A held that Aneco knew at the time of the sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based on the
express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI, the seller, was no longer interested in pursuing its subdivision
project
ISSUES: whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a concrete wall on its own property.
HELD: petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
RATIONALE: Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or tenement by
means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. As owner
of the land, Landex may fence his property subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a
clear legal and enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute of
ownership.
-Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it knew at the time of the sale
that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI
and Aneco where FHDI manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
-If Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own provision for road lots. It
certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new
owner Landex. The RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.
-SC agree with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for injunction against Landex should be dismissed for lack of
merit. What is involved here is an undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall
on his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a landowner, respondent
Landex, from fencing his own land.
-Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when affirmed by the CA are
accorded great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings and
conclusion of law of the trial court and the appellate court. We have meticulously reviewed the records and agree
that Aneco failed to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own property.

4. duty of director of lands ministerial

[JACINTO VS DIRECTOR OF LANDS]
G.R. No. L-26374 December 31, 1926
NICANOR JACINTO, Petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondent.
FACTS: during the period from 1911 to 1913, sales certificates were issued by the Bureau of Lands to Frank W.
Carpenter for more than 100 lots of the Tala and Piedad Friar Lands Estates
- total area of the land covered by the sales certificates being over 1,490 hectares and the purchase price amounting
to about P56,600. of which amount Carpenter up to the year 1923, had paid in installments the sum of P16,272
-judgment rendered against Carpenter in civil CASE execution was levied upon all of his right, title and interest in the
lots purchase together with the improvements thereon
-sheriff of Rizal sold the property to the petitioner herein, Nicanor Jacinto.
-sheriff's sale was registered in the Bureau of Lands, assignments of the Bureau of Lands' sales certificates were
duly recorded, and certificates of assignment were issued and delivered to petitioner
-Metropolitan Water District instituted proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the condemnation of
certain parcels of land for the construction of an earth am and a first-class highway three kilometers long, in
connection with the so-called Angat Water Works Project
- Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order authorizing the Metropolitan Water District to take possession of
said parcels of land upon deposit with the provincial treasurer of the sum
-By virtue of this order, the Metropolitan Water District entered into occupation of the land and began the
construction of permanent improvements thereon. Lots
-lots of this decision were included in the land sought to be expropriated and the herein petitioner, Nicanor Jacinto,
was made a party defendant in the proceedings.
-He admitted the existence of the right of condemnation and the necessity for the expropriation, but demanded the
sum of P64,839.33 as indemnity for the expropriation.
-the actual purchase price to be paid by the purchaser from the Government only amounts P13,725, including interest,
the Metropolitan Water District considered the petitioner's demand excessive and declined to pay the claim.
-applicant tendered payment to the Director of Lands of the sum of P4,650 to cover the remaining balance of the
sales price of the lots in question and demanded a corresponding deed of conveyance for said lots.
-Director of Lands, upon the advice of the Attorney-General, rejected the tender and refused to execute and deliver
the instrument of conveyance demanded from him
-present action was thereupon brought, the petitioner insisting that, under Act No. 1120 as amended, he is entitled to
a conveyance of the land upon payment of the purchase price to the Government, and that, upon such payment, the
execution of the document of conveyance becomes a ministerial act which the Director of Lands is bound to perform,
and, in regard to which, he has no discretion.
-respondent's contention seems to be that before the petitioner's tender of final payment was made, the land in
question had already to all intents and purposes been expropriated and the Metropolitan Water District, the plaintiff
in expropriation proceedings, placed in possession
-the petitioner had admitted the necessity and the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the lands and that the only
thing lacking to complete the condemnation was the appraisal of the value of the petitioner's interest in the land and
the payment to him of the amount of such value
-therefore, the execution of a deed of conveyance for the land to the petitioner is not only useless, but also
improper.
ISSUES: Whether the duty of Director of Land is ministerial in nature
HELD: respondent is, therefore, hereby ordered to receive the balance of the purchase money for any or all of the
by the petitioner. The petition is denied as to the execution of deeds of conveyance. Without costs. So ordered
RATIONALE: The land in question is private or patrimonial property of the Philippine Government and we can find no
law specially enjoining upon the Director of Lands the duty to execute deeds of conveyance to purchasers of such
lands; on the contrary, that duty, under section 567 of the Administrative Code, appears to devolve upon the
Governor-General.
-section 14 of Act No. 1120 the Director of Lands is, however, charged with the duty of receiving the purchase
money payable under that Act and may therefore be compelled by mandamus to receive, as a purely ministerial act,
such purchase money when tendered.
-writ cannot issue in this case unless it appears that the respondent "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." (Section 222, Code of Civil
Procedure.)
-proprietary rights, except the right of occupation, are not affected by the condemnation proceedings until the title
has passed to the plaintiff and that does not occur until the award of compensation or damages has been satisfied.
-there are other reason why the petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a conveyance must be denied. In the first
place, mandamus is not the proper remedy to enforce purely contract rights such as that here sought to be enforced
5. SQUATTER NOT ALLOWED
[CITY OF MANILA VS GARCIA]
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA
PARAYNO — NARCISO PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO
BARRIOS — LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS,1 ELENA RAMOS,
ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO
— SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ —
(MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO,
defendants-appellants
FACTS: Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land
-Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge
and consent.
-They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city.
- presence of defendants having previously been discovered, were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits
— each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth.
-For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
-Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this
school's expansion
-plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of
defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
-This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, for the payment of the amount due by reason
of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.
-Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.
-judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts
ISSUES: 1. Whether defendants have acquired the legal status of tenants.
2. Whether houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder and impair the use of that
property for school purposes.
HELD: Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-appellants. So
ordered.
RATIONALE: 1. A. Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will elevate
it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to our concept of
proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It
does not promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain.
-Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly
form of government.
B. Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city charter
enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila.
-Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is our considered view that
the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple expedient of giving
permits, or, for that matter, executing leases.
C. These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the
effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two
decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent
premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
-To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the detriment of public
interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this environment that we
look into the validity of the permits granted defendants herein.
-The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from
recovering possession by peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of course, that
intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of
lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning.
-They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the
city. Their homes were erected without city permits.
2 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained
obligation to establish and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at
least free public primary instruction"
- courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades has been and
still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good.
The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount.
-In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this,
for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the
prejudice of the education of the youth of the land.
- Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance could well have been summarily
abated by the city authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts.