Fernandez v. Torres || J. Feliciano GR No.

102940

215 SCRA 489

Doctrine:

Mere speculation/apprehension does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest.

Facts:

There was a public agitation for a total ban on deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad due to the
growing number of complaints from entertainers and relatives about the exploitative working
conditions, harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female
performing artists and entertainers abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection
of Overseas Entertainers, attended by representatives from the government and the labor sectors, was
held on November 18, 1991. The outcome of such was the DOLE Circular No. 01-91 (dated November
20, 1991) entitled “Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment
of Performing Artists”. Petitioners Fernandez, et.al. wish to prohibit and restrain the DOLE and POEA
from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular, citing it to be arbitrary,
oppressive and discriminatory against performing artists ages 18-22, who would otherwise be qualified
for overseas employment, hence it violates the equal protection clause and due process clause of the
Constitution.

*For reference, Item No. 1 of the aforementioned circular states: "1. No Filipino entertainer shall be
deployed outside the Philippines except for legitimate performing artists consisting of musicians, singers
and members of dance troupes. In all cases, the performing artists must have a track record of
legitimate and reputable performance in the Philippines for at least one year. In no case shall the
performing artist be below 23 years old. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable
reasons, exempt performing artists from coverage hereof.”

Issue:

Whether or not the petition at bar presents a justiciable controversy

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petition does not present a justiciable controversy.
Petitioners have failed to show the first requisite of judicial inquiry (i.e. the existence of actual case or
controversy) hence the Court is resolved to DISMISS the petition.

Ratio:
  Requisites for judicial review/judicial inquiry: In actions involving constitutional issues, the
firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts
unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:

[1] the existence of an actual case or controversy;

[2] the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial interest in the
resolution thereof;

[3] the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and

[4] that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be indispensable for the final determination of
the controversy

 the DOLE circular does not establish an absolute and comprehensive prohibition of the
deployment abroad of entertainers below 23 years of age. Item No.1 provides that the Sec. of
Labor & employment may exempt someone from the coverage of this law for justifiable reasons.
Grounds for such exemption are provided for in a set of Administrative Guidelines Implementing
Dept. Circular No. 01-91
 The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and
all applications for exemption for coverage of DOLE circular No. 01-91. It is presumed that
administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the presumption of constitutionality and,
that official duty has been or will be regularly performed.
 "Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit
of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.” (Phil. Association of Colleges
and Universities v. Secretary of Education)
 Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein,
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is especially true where the issues reach
constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion.' (Rice vs. Sioux City)
TATAD VS. GARCIA 243 SCRA 436

Facts:

Petitioners Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmeña and Rodolfo G. Biazon are members of the Philippine
Senate and are suing in their capacities as Senators and as taxpayers. Respondent Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. is
the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), while
private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is a private corporation organized under the laws of
Hongkong.

In 1989, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) planned to build a railway transit
line along EDSA which shall traverse the cities of Pasay, Quezon, Mandaluyong and Makati. Certain
corporations were then invited to prequalify but no bidding was made. EDSA LRT Consortium was the
only one to qualify and hence, an agreement was made between the former and DOTC. Said agreement
was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided for by law (RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718.
Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e. railways, and shall supply the
train cabs. It was also agreed that every phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and
the latter shall pay rent for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the
government shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium and thereafter, it shall sell teh facilities to the
government for $1.00.

However, petitioners opposed the implementation of the agreement as they argued that EDSA LRT
Consortium is a foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot
own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the nationalized areas of
activities.

Issue:

Whether or not an owner and lessor of the facilities used by a public utility constitute a public utility.

Held:

No, it does not constitute public utility. EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. Is admittedly a foreign corporation
“duly incorporated and existing under the laws of Hong Kong”. However, there is no dispute that once
the EDSA LRT III is constructed, the private respondent, as lessor, will turn it over to DOTC as lessee, for
the latter to operate the system and pay rentals for the said use.

What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks, rail stations, terminals and the power
plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they
do not themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but
their use to serve the public.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public
utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public. In law, there is a clear distinction between
the “operation” of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and the equipment used to serve
the public.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HENRICO UVERO, ET AL.,
respondents.

G.R. No. 79732, November 8 1993

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines has sought the expropriation of certain portions of land owned by the
private respondents for the widening and concreting of the Nabua-Bato-Agos Section, Philippine-Japan
Highway Loan (PJHL) road. While the right of the Republic is not now disputed, the private respondents,
however, demand that the just compensation for the property should be based on fair market value and
not that set by Presidential Decree No. 76, as amended, which fixes payment on the basis of the
assessment by the assessor or the declared valuation by the owner, whichever is lower. The Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor to the private respondents and subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In Export Processing Zone Authority ("EPZA") vs. Dulay, etc. et al., this Court held the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain to be a judicial function and it thereby declared Presidential
Decree No. 76, as well as related decrees, including Presidential Decree No. 1533, to the contrary extent,
as unconstitutional and as an impermissible encroachment of judicial prerogatives. The ruling, now
conceded by the Republic was reiterated in subsequent cases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the law in question should have prospective, not retroactive,
application.

HELD:

The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal
intents and purposes, a total nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, we refer
to the law itself being per se repugnant to the Constitution. It is not always the case, however, that a law
is constitutionally faulty per se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import. but invalid in its
application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise valid law may be held
unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when
it vitiates contractually vested rights. To that extent, its retroactive application may be so declared
invalid as impairing the obligations of contracts.

A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and
consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration. Thus, in our decisions on the
moratorium laws, we have been constrained to recognize the interim effects of said laws prior to their
declaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been unable to simply ignore strong
considerations of equity and fair play. So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be
described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry, let alone to be unsettled by a
subsequent declaration of nullity of a governing statute.
Doctrine of Operative Fact - as an exception to the general rule (an unconstitutional law is void), only
applies as a matter of equity and fair play.