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MOSQUEDA vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS, G.R.

189185

Facts
Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007

 Enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City.


 To impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.

Subtopic

 Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Assosciation, Inc. (PBGEA), herein respondents challenged the ordinance by
questioning its constitutionality before the Regional Trial Court.
 PBGEA alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of Police Power, Violated the equal protection
clause, violated due process of law.

RTC RULING

 Ordinance is valid.

CA RULING

 Reversed Judgment of RTC


 Unreasonable and Oppressive
 3-month transition period impractical
 No reasonable distinction (Equal Protection Violation)
 30-meter buffer zone constitutes taking of property w/o due process.

Issue
Subtopic 2

 W/N Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007 is violative of the 1987 constitution.

Petitioner reasons out the following:

 LGC Sec. 458 (Interest of General Welfare)


 LGC Sec. 16
 No violation of Equal Protection since distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious
than other methods.
 No need for substantial distinction on the level of concentration since fungicide in the air is already pollution pursuant to
Section 5 of RA 8749.

 That the 30-meter buffer zone is zone is a valid exercise of police power. That the maintenance of the buffer zone does
not require respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings and that such buffer zones does not deprive its owners of
its beneficial use and such is consistent with the Consitution as the land is made available for a social function.

Issues
Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and
oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5;
and
(c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.

SC Rationale
Decision
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu
that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume considerable time and financial
resources given the topography and geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed
within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the ordinance violates due process for
being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their
property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application.
Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and
alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that
the ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the classification
does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically
underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the
intended purpose of the l

Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City


of Davao (Environmental Law)
Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc. v City of Davao
January 9, 2009
CA Mindanao Station, Lantion

NOTE: still pending in the SC

FACTS:

Sangguniang Panglungsod of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07, Series of 2007: “An Ordinance Banning Aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all agricultural entities in Davao City”
RTC: rendered ordinance valid and unconstitutional

ISSUES:

WON the ordinance banning aerial spraying is unconstitutional Constitutional right to health and to a healthful and
balanced ecology.

RULING:
(Still pending SC decision)

CA: UNCONSTITUTIONAL & INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER


It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance since it is a measure that has an
ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of public health and the environment against the alleged harmful effects of
aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides.

However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the three months period shift from aerial
spraying to ground spraying unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.

City of Davao lacked:


- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering works required for the efficient operation of banana
plantations, indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and enhance their investments.
- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other spraying practices
would preclude the banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations… Such an apparent eventuality
would prejudice the operation of the plantations and the economic repercussions thereof would just be akin to
shutting down the venture.

• Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is unconstitutional.


• No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of Davao did not prove that the aerial
spraying of substances is the proximate cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly suffered.
• EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – it does NOT classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially
even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid
substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment
• Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives plantation owners of the lawful and
beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation (with regards to buffer zones required by the
ordinance)

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA ET AL vs PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAV AO
FRUITS CORPORATION, and LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and
CITY GOVERNMENT OFDAVAO vs COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION

After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City.
Aerial Spraying - refers to application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form which
dispenses the substances in the air.
Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by agricultural entities in relation to their
agricultural activities;
Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but not limited to, land preparation, seeding,
planting, cultivatlo.n, harvesting and bagging;
Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in agricultural activities
RTC
The ordinance was challenged by Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association Incorporated after
it took effect on March 23, 2007 – more than a month after it was approved by then Mayor Rodrigo
Duterte challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs
through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged:
1. alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power;
2. violated the equal protection clause;
3. amounted to• the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication
pursuant to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

RTC DECISION:
1. The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;
2. That the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause;
3. That aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it
exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift; and that the ordinance
enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it
had violated the Constitution.
4. However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition
period.
RTC granted the prayer for a preliminary injunction, but later on declared the ordinance as valid and
constitutional.
CA
Petitioners Davao City, and Wilfredo Mosqueda et al, who intervened and argued in favor of the
ordinance, appealed to the CA and sought injunctive relief. The CA issued a temporary restraining order.
CA DECISION:
The CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.
1. It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive in
view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial spraying to truck-mounted
boom spraying;
2. Ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance which
defined the term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and
beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides
or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and could
enhance agricultural production.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL & INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER


It is within the mandate and authority of the City of Davao to enact Ordinance since it is a measure that
has an ostensible LAWFUL SUBJECT: protection of public health and the environment against the alleged
harmful effects of aerial spraying of pesticides or fungicides.
However, UNLAWFUL MEANS since unduly oppressive to individuals and the three months period shift
from aerial spraying to ground spraying unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.
City of Davao lacked:
- Technical understanding on the intricacies of the engineering works required for the efficient
operation of banana plantations, indifference to corporeal rights of banana planters to protect and
enhance their investments.
- To abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt other
spraying practices would preclude the banana planters from being able to fertilize their plantations…
Such an apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations and the economic
repercussions thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.
• Also, since SEPARABILITY CLAUSE IS NON-EXISTING, the whole ordinance is unconstitutional.
• No scientific basis for banning aerial spraying. Testimonies in favor of City of Davao did not prove that
the aerial spraying of substances is the proximate cause of the various ailments the victims allegedly
suffered.

• EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – it does NOT classify which substances are prohibited from being applied
aerially even as reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial
effects of liquid substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment
• Ordinance is confiscation of property without due process of law, it deprives plantation owners of the
lawful and beneficial use of such areas to be ceded, without just compensation (with regards to buffer
zones required by the ordinance)

The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motions on August 7, 2009

SC
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts
1. like the primacy of human rights over property rights and the presumption of validity in favor of
the ordinance;
2. that the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents PBGEA, et al. to the
residents' right to life, health and ecology, thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the
ordinance;
3. that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set aside the wisdom behind the
enactment of the ordinance;
4. that the CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the State was allowed to take
positive actions to prevent harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific
certainty;
5. that the CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the ordinance violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that affected
fundamental rights;
6. that there was nothing wrong with prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the
aerial spraying of water produced drift that could affect unwilling neighbors whose constitutional right
to a clean and healthy environment might be impinged;
7. that as far as the three month period was concerned, the CA should have considered that
manual spraying could be conducted while the PBGEA, et al. laid down the preparations for the conduct
of boorri spraying;
8. that 'reasonableness" could be more appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the
parties against the protection of basic rights, like the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and
healthful ecology;
9. that PBGEA, et al. did not substantiate their claim of potential profit losses that would result
from the shift;
10. that business profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their fundamental rights as
residents of Davao City, which were the rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect;
11. that PBGEA, et al. did not explore other modes of pesticide treatment either as a stop-gap or as
a temporary measure while shifting to truck mounted boom spraying;29 that the imposition of the 30-
meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of police power that necessarily flowed from the protection
afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted effects of ground spraying; that the imposition of the
buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking under police power

In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds, namely:
I. The court of appeals ignored fundamental precepts and concepts of law which, properly considered,
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the davao ordinance is constitutional and valid
II. The davao ordinance is consistent with the equal protection clause
III. The means employed by the davao ordinance is more than reasonably related to the purpose it seeks
to achieve
IV. The davao ordinance is valid, being demonstrably reasonable and fair
V The requirement relating to the 30-meter buffer zone are consistent with due process of law, being av
alid exercise of police power

In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to be considered and
resolved, to wit:
I. Whether or not the honorable court. Of appeals erred in holding that section 5 of ordinance no. 0309-
07, series of 2007 is oppressive and an unreasonable exercise of delegated police power
II. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that ordinance no. 0309-07 is
violative of the equal protection clause of the constitution;
III. Whether or not the honorable court of appeals erred in holding that ordinance no. 0309-07
constitutes taking of property without compensation, thus, violative of the due process clause of the
constitution
IV. Whether or not aerial spraying of fungicides is safe to the people and the environment

CITY OF DAVAO I
A. The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance because it
would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and business in the interest of the
general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local Government Code;
B. that the ordinance was enacted to carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under
the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code);
C. that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the distinction lies in
aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other modes; that aerial spraying
produces more drift that causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and obnoxious experience on
the part of the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even with the use by the respondents of
highly advanced apparatus,
D. that because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied by the
respondents), there is no need to provide for a substantial distinction based on the level of
concentration;
E. that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air pollutants pursuant to
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and the activity thus falls under
the authority of the local government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect
and promote human health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.

CITY OF DAVAO II
A. The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not thereby oblige
the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only choose boom spraying
to justify the alleged impracticability of the transition period by erroneously adding the months required
for each of the stages without considering other steps that may be simultaneously undertaken;
B. that the Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., by which the six-
month period for the folding-up of business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of police
power;
C. that the respondents did not present any documentary evidence on the feasibility of adopting
other methods;
D. that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of plantations owned and operated by PBGEA's
members use aerial spraying, hence, the perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on aerial
spray to the banana industry is entirely misleading;
E. that the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-month transition period;
F. that the complaints of the community residents - ranging from skin itchiness, contraction and/or
tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in breathing after exposure to spray mist -
only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm to the residents;
G. that considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a pharmacologist and
toxicologist, established that fungicides could cause debilitating effects on the human body once inhaled
or digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no correlation between aerial application and the
complaints of the residents;
H. that given that aerial spray produces more drift and is uncontrollable compared to the other
methods of applying fungicides, the • ordinance becomes reasonable;
I. that the medical-related complaints of the residents need not be proven by medical records
considering that these were based on personal knowledge.

CITY OF DAVAO III


The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a valid exercise of police
power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable;
- that the maintenance of the buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a portion of
their landholdings; that the planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate the
residents from spray drift;
- that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their
property;
- that the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property owners that the
use of property bears a social function.

MAIN ISSUE
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power:
(a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5;
(b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under
Section 5;
(c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural
lands in Davao City.

HELD: Petitioners then brought the issue to the SC, but the High Court unanimously denied the
consolidated petitions on certiorari for lack of merit.
The SC made 3 points on the question of "whether a prohibition against aerial spraying is a lawfully
permissible method that the city government can adopt to prevent the effects of the so-called aerial
drift":
1. The ordinance violates the due process clause - The High Court said Davao City "must not act
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically regardless of the ordinance's salutary purpose."
- On Section 5, the SC said 3 months would be inadequate time for the city to shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively depriving the city an efficient means to combat disease.
- But the High Court disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer zone required by the ordinance is in
violation of due process since the purpose is to minimize the effects of aerial spraying.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause - The SC said equal protection was violated since
the ordinance made no substantial distinctions when it prohibited aerial spraying per se regardless of
the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it imposed the 30-
meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the size of landholdings.

3. The ordinance is an ultra vires act - According to the SC, the city disregarded regulations implemented
by the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA), including its identification and classification of safe
pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
Regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, the SC said, is a function lodged
with the FPA and not with local government units.
Thus, when Davao City enacted the ordinance "without inherent and explicit authority to do so" the SC
said the local government performed an ultra vires act.

In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14 of R.A. 9167 which earmarks the
income on amusement taxes imposed by LGUs in favor of FDCP and the producers of graded films, the
income from the amusement taxes levied by the covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance
accrue to them, not even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor. Congress therefore,
clearly overstepped its plenary legislative power, the amendment being violative of the fundamental
law’s guarantee on local autonomy as echoed in Sec. 130(d) of the LGC which provide that revenue
collected pursuant to the said code shall inure to the benefit of the local government. (FILM
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COLON HERITAGE REALTY CORPORATION, OPERATOR
OF ORIENTE, OPERATOR OF ORIENTE GROUP THEATERS, REPRESENTED BY ISIDRO A. CANIZARES/FILM
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CITY OF CEBU AND SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., G.R.
NO. 203754/G.R. NO. 204418, JUNE 16, 2015)

Film Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage Realty Corporation
758 SCRA 537
2015
Facts:
The City of Cebu passed Ordinance No. 69 whereby Sections 42 and 43 thereof require
proprietors, lessees or operators of theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts of
admission fees to the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu City. Thereafter, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9167, Sections 13 and 14 thereof states that producers of graded A and B films shall be entitled to
incentives equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected on such graded films. The Film
Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP), in implementing the statute, argued that the Congress
restricted the delegated power of the City of Cebu in imposing amusement taxes, when it enacted Secs. 13
and 14 of R.A. No. 9167. The lower court ruled, however, that said provisions are contrary to the basic
policy in local autonomy that all taxes, fees, and charges imposed by the LGUs shall accrue exclusively to
them, as articulated in Article X, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not Secs. 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 violates fiscal autonomy
Ruling:
Yes, Secs. 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 violates fiscal autonomy.
The basic rationale for the current rule on local fiscal autonomy is the strengthening of LGUs and
the safeguarding of their viability and self-sufficiency through a direct grant of general and broad tax
powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional.
The legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple
and unreasonable impositions; (b) each LGU will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the
resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair,
uniform, and just.
It is beyond cavil that the City of Cebu had the authority to issue its City Ordinance No. LXIX
and impose an amusement tax on cinemas pursuant to Sec. 140 in relation to Sec. 151 of the LGC. Sec.
140 states, among other things, that a “province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from admission
fees.” By operation of said Sec. 151, extending to them the authority of provinces and municipalities to
levy certain taxes, fees, and charges, cities, such as respondent city government, may therefore validly
levy amusement taxes subject to the parameters set forth under the law.
For RA 9167, however, the covered LGUs were deprived of the income which they will
otherwise be collecting should they impose amusement taxes, or, in petitioner’s own words, “Section 14
of [RA 9167] can be viewed as an express and real intention on the part of Congress to remove from the
LGU’s delegated taxing power, all revenues from the amusement taxes on graded films which would
otherwise accrue to [them] pursuant to Section 140 of the [LGC].”
Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that what Congress did in this
instance was not to exclude the authority to levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered
LGUs, but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received by the LGU from the
taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP, instead of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in
clear contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by LGUs shall accrue exclusively to
said LGU and is repugnant to the power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.

Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on
RA 6770)
Posted on August 31, 2016
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
– The Ombudsman’s argument against the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for
its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. – No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.

– The Ombudsman’s maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional
injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase “[n]o writ of injunction
shall be issued by any court,” the Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts
their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court’s
constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this
Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial
power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to
carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive
relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against “decision or findings” of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45
appeal and thus – similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional
and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman’s posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman
Act provisions are in part materia in that they “cover the same specific or particular subject matter,” that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA’s subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the
Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the jurisdiction of
the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The
Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has
a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.

OMBUDSMAN Carpio-Morales v. CA and Jejomar


Binay G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
Doctrine of Condonation Abandoned
APRIL 1, 2019

FACTS:

A complaint/affidavit was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and
employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019,
otherwise known as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,” in connection with the five phases of the
procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman issued the order placing Binay, Jr., et
al. under preventive suspension for not more than six months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.

The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, and that their
continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.

Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order,
and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.

Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending
any of the five phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he
was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election
as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court,
assailing the CA’s Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.’s prayer for TRO.

The Ombudsman claims that the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of condonation should apply in Binay’s case.

RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious.

This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. It was a doctrine
adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from – and now rendered obsolete by
– the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor
Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed,
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

The condonation doctrine was first enunciated in Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, There is no truth
in Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their right to elect their officers if
condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a particular
constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office.

In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation.
Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of
condonation. If condonation of an elective official’s administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at
the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or
statutory provision, exists.

Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been abdicated.

SC Case Digest: Carpio Morales v. CA and


Binay, Jr. (G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 Nov
2015)
ABOGADOS·SUNDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2015

By Foggy
Greetings, Abogados!
This is a commentary (not really a digest) on the landmark case recently issued by the Supreme Court En
Banc, entitled Carpio Morales v. CA and Binay, Jr., G.R. No. 217126-27, 10 November 2015.
You must be familiar with this case. The media covered it really well in view of the personalities involved (but
we won’t dwell with those people here – the most you’ll get would be the title of the case). More importantly,
this case finally got rid of the pesky old condonation doctrine, albeit in a scholarly fashion. The case tells us
how the condonation doctrine came about, unraveling the mystery behind it, and why it was subsequently
upheld in several SC decisions. Let me try to point out why you should read this case, even for leisure, to wit:
(1) it has a TON of citations on a wide range of legal topics; (2) it makes reference to foreign laws and
doctrines; (3) there is a clinical dissection of the case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106
Phil. 466 (1959) (hereinafter referred to as “Pascual”) on the condonation doctrine; and (4) in true SC fashion,
the case is Solomonic innature.
Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:
1. Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition;

3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.;

4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing said TRO and WPI; and

5. Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt
was improper or illegal.
Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Photo credit: inquirer.net)
In dispensing the First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsman’s petition falls under the exceptions that a
prior motion for reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, 5 June
2013, which held as follows: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and
the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved. (Emphasis supplied on the grounds relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no motion for
reconsideration was needed.)
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 0.)
As to the Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd Paragraph states:
“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal orapplication for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.”
Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC
relied on its ruling in the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998), which, in turn, held that
the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is void, as it had the effect of increasing theappellate jurisdiction of the
SC without its advice and concurrence, inviolation of Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. This tells us
that lawyers should always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has affected itso much – maybe it’s
time to update it.

Senate President Salonga (Photo credit: senate.gov.ph)


Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770.
It quoted the exchanges between Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo Angara, Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and
Neptali Gonzales, which merely led the SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators were talking about Sec.
14, RA 6670, or some other provision. In other words, while the throwback was appreciatedby the SC, the
discussions were not really useful in this case.
Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy of Binay, Jr. – the filing of petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, to assail the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order – was valid, citing the cases
of Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong, G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and Dagan v.Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013. It’s just sad that the sorry end of Second Paragraph of
Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking up this issue on its own
motion, or ex mero motu, which it canrightfully do, since it is, after all, the SC.
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 1. Bonus point goes to Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution)
The Third Issue is where it starts to become more interesting.Here, the Ombudsman’s history was discussed,
citing heavily from the case of Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January
2014 (hereinafter referred to as “Gonzales”). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from ear to ear while
reading this portion, but this form of flattery should lead one to be suspicious.
What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of the Ombudsman’s independence covers
thefollowing: (1) it is the creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy; and (3) it is insulated from
executive supervision and control. Onthis basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected
frompolitical harassment and pressure, to free it from the “insidious tentacles of politics.” (Oh, what imagery
does this give.) Since the SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted toshield the Ombudsman
from the judicial review power of the courts. After all, there is no politics in the judiciary, right?
After the Ombudsman, it is now the SC’s turn to give an exhaustive recap of its own history. Starting from the
definition of Judicial Power, the SC went on the discuss its expanded scope ofjudicial review enunciated in
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, then the evolution of itsrule-making authority in
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999). The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA
6770, has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
rules allowing the issuance of an injunction form part of the court’s inherent power, which (now, citing foreign
case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish itsconstitutionally mandated functions.
The SC ruled that Congress’ passing of the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance
of an injunction, is an encroachment of the SC’s rule-making authority. An injunction, after all, is merely a
provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not consented to
this as it has not issued rules of procedure through an administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation, the
SC declared the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective, “until it is adopted as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.” Abangan ang susunod na kabanata.
Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up: The Second Paragraph was declared
unconstitutional, and the First Paragraph was now deemed ineffective. As such,the CA was held to have
correctly issued the injunctive relief in enjoining thepreventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 2.)
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up. To go right at it, the SC abandoned the
condonation doctrine, but ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the WPI, as it did so
based on good case law, considering that the abandonment is prospective in nature.
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that this was a jurisprudential creation that
originated in the 1959 Pascual case, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is notable that there
was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated
what appears the sole basis forthe condonation doctrine in Pascual, to wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.

Much has happened since the 1935 Constitution. (Photo credit: en.wikipedia.org)
As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given for the condonation doctrine, except that “it
seems to incline” towards American authorities. On this regard, the SC made its own investigation, and found
that there was really no established weight ofauthorities in the United States (“US”). In fact, 17 States in the
US have already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to
adopt the findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat that said cases are merely “guides
of interpretation.”
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is that it was able to convince the SC not to adhere
to stare decisis, thereby enriching Philippine jurisprudence on this matter. This is important, as its effects are
far-reaching, since we now have additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective case laws. For
this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly from the case, viz:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual,and carried over in
numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this
Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there
are powerful countervailing considerations against its application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only
when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after
all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, ‘[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide.'
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically
shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including, of
course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-examination.”
The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to enumerate the notable cases that applied Pascual,
which included cases issued under the 1987 Constitution. Pascual was tested under existing laws, to see if
there exists legislation to support Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative Code, Code of
Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all
times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s
administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a
second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense,and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising
from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx …"

Office of the Ombudsman (Photo credit: philstar.com)


The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC
would remove this defense oft-times used by elected officials, of which the SC was aware of, as it made
mention of the databrought forward by the Ombudsman, to wit:
“To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that ‘for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85
cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on condonation. Thus, in just
one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct – were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial
powers.’ Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.”

(Score: Ombudsman– 2; Binay, Jr. - 2. Bonus point goes to the research team of the Ombudsman, who painstakingly went
through American jurisprudence to support their position.)
The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment directed to the Ombudsman was illegal, was
refused to be resolved on the ground there are no contempt proceedings yet. It is the claim of the Ombudsman
that since she was an impeachable officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due course has
been given to the contempt action, thus, the Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
(Score: Ombudsman – 2; Binay,Jr. -2. No points in this round.)

Justice Perlas-Bernabe (Photo credit: sc.judiciary.gov.ph)


So there you have it! The case was Solomonic, in my opinion, as both parties walk away with something. This
review also does not do justice on how well this case was penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-
Bernabe. So please go read the case on the SC website, or just click here.
Some final thoughts:
 Expect this case to be taken up in Constitutional law classes on judicial review, SC’s rule-making
power, and the Ombudsman as a constitutional body.
 It is interesting to wait for the SC’s future rules with regard the matter on the issuance of injunction
under Section 14, RA6770. We hope that this actually comes into fruition.

 This case may be cited by practitioners who intend to file a petition at the SC without prior motion
for reconsiderationbefore the CA.

 Lawyers with politician clients should really take note of this case, as it removes a vital defense in
administrative cases filed against them. Good thing that this is prospective in nature.

 Bar candidates must watch out for this, as it may come out in next year’s Bar Exam in the subject of
Political Law.

 Please read, as well, the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, who
concurred on the SC’s ruling on the ineffectiveness and unconstitutionality of the First Paragraph
and Second Paragraph, respectively, of Sec. 14, RA 6770, but dissented on the revisitation on the
condonation doctrine. Justice Bersamin postulates that condonation must apply only after the
conduct of anadministrative investigation, not while such officer is undergoing investigation. As
such, the CA, according to Justice Bersamin, wrongly applied the condonation doctrine, as such, said
doctrine should not have warranted a re-examination by the SC.

Cheers, Abogados!

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08


Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose
Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested
Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June
30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year... and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the mayoralty seat
Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification... to run,... predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule.
On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding for Abundo,... accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-
elect of Viga... private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto... action... to unseat Abundo
on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
Issues:
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one
year and one month of the second... term as a result of an election protest.
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the
duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the... application
of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
Ruling:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was
effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably... disallowed
to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful
choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and
statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres,
was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from the
ambit of the three-term... limit rule.
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor,... Abundo
assumed the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over one year... and one month... it cannot be said that Mayor
Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor...
serve the functions of the said elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed
winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For... another, not having been
declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title
which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo was not entitled to the elective
office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his service,
until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term.

ABUNDO vs. COMELEC


January 8, 2013
Velasco, Jr., J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
This case contains the summary of jurisprudence on the three-term limit rule. Hence, the length.
SUMMARY: Abundo vied for the position of mayor of Viga, Catanduanes for 4 consecutive elections ( 2001,
2004, 2007, 2010). In both 2001 and 2007, he was proclaimed the winner and served his terms. However, in
the 2004 elections, Torres was proclaimed as the winner in the election. Abundo unseated Tores after a
successful election protest. Abundo served the remaining 1 year and 1 month of the term. In the 2010
elections, Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. Torres filed a petition to disqualify Abundo based on
the three-term limit rule. Meanwhile, Vega filed a quo warranto proceeding against Abundo before the RTC
which ruled that Abundo was ineligible to serve as Mayor. On appeal, Comelec Second Division and en banc
affirmed RTC ruling. SC reversed and ruled that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the
ambit of the three-term limit rule.
DOCTRINE:
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on the three-term limit, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has
been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.

The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption
are the following:
Re: Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under
the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of
any term limit (Borja, Jr.vs Comelec, 1998). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior
to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and
is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon vs Comelec, 2008).
Re: Recall election
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in
the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd
term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo vs Comelec, 2002 and Socrates vs Comelec,
2002).
Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by
itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasavs Comelec,2003).
Re: Period of Preventive Suspension
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.vs Comelec, 2009)
Re: Election Protest
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida vs Comelec, 1999 and Dizon vs Comelec 2009). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any
length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official
had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong vs Alegre, 2006 and Rivera III vs Comelec,
2007).
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Ablardo Abundo, Sr. vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner
one Jose Torres who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a
period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. Torres filed a
petition to disqualify Abundo predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding for Abundo, who in the meantime
bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres
initiated against Abundo, Ernesto R. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC to unseat
Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, and found
Abundo to have already served 3 consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit,2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010,
and, hence, disqualified for another,i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo had been declared winner in the
aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga
mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact.To the RTC,
the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC
COMELEC Second Division affirmed the RTC ruling.
COMELEC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration. There was no involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is
considered never to have losttitle to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and, what the
Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three
consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.
Hence, the petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, the Comelec issued a resolution declaring its decision in the disqualification case as final and
executor. Upon a motion by Vega, a writ of execution was also issued. The SC issued a TRO but on the same
day it was received, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga,
Catanduanes took their oaths of office as mayor and vice-mayor respectively and assumed their posts the
following day.
ISSUE: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being
declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for
purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials?

RULING: NO. The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term
limit rule
RATIO:
**Procedural issue: SC ruled that Comelec en banc was correct in ruling that the arguments in the MR were
mere reiterations of what was brought up in Abundo’s appeal brief before the Comelec division.

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship
was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an
office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the
electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective officialconcerned was
elected.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional
and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he has fully served
three consecutive terms.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, voluntary
renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in
determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated
the observation that the law “does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual
interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term
limit rule.”
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers only
consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. There has, in fine, to
be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. Of course, the
basic law is unequivocal that a “voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be
considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.” This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the
three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption
are the following:
Re: Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the
position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under
the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of
any term limit (Borja, Jr.vs Comelec, 1998). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior
to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and
is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon vs Comelec, 2008).
Re: Recall election
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective
position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in
the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd
term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo vs Comelec, 2002 and Socrates vs Comelec,
2002).
Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by
itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasavs Comelec,2003).
Re: Period of Preventive Suspension
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and
entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.vs Comelec, 2009)
Re: Election Protest
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is
interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida vs Comelec, 1999 and Dizon vs Comelec 2009). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any
length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official
had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the
defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his
proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong vs Alegre, 2006 and Rivera III vs Comelec,
2007).

Aldovino, Jr is not applicable as that involves a preventive suspension which, as ruled, did not interrupt the
continuity of service of a term.
The Case of Abundo presents a different factual backdrop than those cases whose doctrines are cited above.
Unlike in other protest cases, , Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the
rightful holder of the mayoralty post. Also, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political
power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position” but also to “enhance
the people’s freedom of choice.” In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, “while people should be protected
from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is
not unduly curtailed.”
The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as
an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
The first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied. However, there was an issue on whether such terms were served by Abundo.
Subsumed to this issue is the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption
during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term.
A “term,” as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, “a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.” It also means the “time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents
shall succeed one another.” It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can
serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected
officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006,
Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of
right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is
simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions
thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the
office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest,
as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be
said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served
less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor is
and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes
of counting the three-term threshold.
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of service
and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or
suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak
of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected
official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective
office. On the other hand, the word “renunciation” connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known
right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective
local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the
term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
The COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the term is
immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor. SC did not agree
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official
the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for
the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections,
was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004— the start of the
term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a
private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared
later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the
fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had
no legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s resolution against
Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court ruled that temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of
an elective does not involve loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office
holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.
Such pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous
to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective post.
For one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term,
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not
having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot
plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if
the belated declaration in the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the
term, Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of his
service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. Abundo became or
was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor.
If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent
defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared
interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office
and serve only for a little more than a year after winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the “law contemplates a rest period
during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.” Applying the said principle in
the present case, there is no question that during the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from
exercising power or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes. Consequently, the period during
which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service
because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres,
who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
WHEREFORE, RTC ruling is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for
the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is
accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.

SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA, Petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGARDO A. TALLADO, Respondent
G.R. No. 226792
June 6, 2017

FACTS:

In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for
the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Typoco was proclaimed as the winner.
Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a petition for correction of a manifest error. The Petition
was decided in respondent's favor on March 5, 2010 and the latter assumed the position of Governor of Camarines Norte from
March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010, the end of the 2007-2010 term.

Respondent ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he won and served as Governor of Camarines
Norte, respectively. On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Camarines Norte in the May
9, 2016 National and Local elections. On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena, Camarines
Norte, filed a petition for respondent's disqualification from running as Governor based on Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No.
9523 on two grounds: (1) he violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC); and (2) respondent's suspension froni office for one year without pay, together with its accessory
penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in the Ombudsman's Order9 dated October 2, 2015.

Respondent argued that since the petition was primarily based on his alleged violation of the three-term limit rule, the same should
have been filed as a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Rule 23 of COMELEC Resolution 9523,
in relation to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the ground cited affected a candidate's eligibility; that based on Section
23, the petition should had been filed on November 10, 2015, but the petition was filed only on November 13, 2015, hence, the
same had already prescribed and must be dismissed. His suspension from office is also not a ground for a petition for
disqualification. On the substantive issues, he denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully serve three consecutive
terms since he only served as Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010.

On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being filed out of time. It ruled that a violation of the
three-term limit rule and suspension from office as a result of an administrative case are not grounds for disqualification of a
candidate under the law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which dismissed the same in a Resolution dated August
24, 2016. The COMELEC En Banc echoed the Division's findings that the grounds relied upon by petitioner are not proper for a
petition for disqualification but one for denial of due course to or cancellation of respondent's COC, which was filed out of time. It
then continued to rule on the merits finding that respondent did not serve the full 2007-2010 term as Governor of Camarines Norte,
thus, cannot be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Edgardo A. Tallado violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING:

No, the respondent Edgardo A. Tallado did not violate the three term limit rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991 .The Court noted the grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under Sections 12
and 68 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as well as
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, which respectively provide: SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty. x x x x SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance
his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;

x x x x SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same
right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

A reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not include the two
grounds relied upon by petitioner. Hence, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2016 of the Commission on
Elections En Banc is AFFIRMED.

BATANGAS, Philippines – Batangas Governor Hermilando Mandanas urged the national government to
recast the 2019 national budget that Malacañang endorsed to Congress to implement the
recent Supreme Court ruling on the computation of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for local
government units (LGUs).

As lead petitioner in the case and chairman of all Regional Development Councils in Luzon, Mandanas on
Wednesday, July 11, proposed the passage of a resolution requesting the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to urgently implement the SC decision.

The Supreme Court announced on July 4 its decision that the “just share” of LGUs must be computed
and sourced from all national taxes and not just from the national internal revenue taxes.

–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
“Implementing the ruling of the Supreme Court will enable the LGUs to efficiently and expediently serve
the Filipino people and hasten the delivery of much needed and long delayed basic services,” Mandanas
said.

With this, the 2019 proposed budget of P640.6 billion allotment to LGUs will increase by about 50% due
to the inclusion of the Bureau of Customs collection of national taxes, including tariffs and custom duties.

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“This is the real meaning of bottom-up budgeting and inclusive development. With increased funds, the
real needs of the community will be attended by the community. Shifting money from the national
government to the local government will mean devolved services can now be really funded, and this will
also reduce underspending and corruption,” Mandanas added.

Among the basic services and facilities that the LGUs can now provide without being at the mercy of the
national government are repairs of barangay roads, building of health centers and hospitals, provision of
CCTVs for crime prevention, tourism facilities, and their own ambulances.

Aside from the estimated P300 billion increase in the 2019 budget, LGUs have yet to receive P1.5 trillion
representing IRA backpay from 1992, he said.

Mandanas recognized that the national government will not be able to pay this amount in full unless they
borrow, but said “that (borrowing) need not be done if they recast the existing budget. If they take out the
amount from the general budget and give it as IRA, there will be no increase in the total budget and no
borrowing involved,”

In 2012, Mandanas, who was representative of the 2nd district of Batangas, went to the High Court to
question the government’s wrong computation and misappropriation of IRA funds for LGUs.
In his 23-page petition, Mandanas argued that Section 284 on Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes of
Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code) clearly defines “just share” regarding the IRA while Section
21 of RA 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code) enumerates the sources of revenue as income taxes,
estate and donor’s taxes, value-added tax, other percentage taxes, excise taxes, documentary stamp
taxes, and such other taxes imposed and collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

Advertisement
During the time of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Mandanas had won a petition and was able to
have some P60 billion in IRA to local governments released. – Rappler.com

SC Holds Palawan as Not Entitled to Share in the Proceeds of the Camago-


Malampaya Project
January 23, 2019

The Supreme Court has declared that the Province of Palawan is not entitled to share in the proceeds
of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project. Palawan premised its claim on the ground that it has
territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya reservoir.

The Camago-Malampaya natural gas project is covered by Service Contract No. 38 between the
Republic or national government and the contractor which was subsequently composed of a
consortium of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated (SPEX/OXY).

In a 94-page consolidated decision penned by Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam, the Court En Banc granted
the petition of the Republic in GR No. 170867 to reverse and set aside the December 16, 2005
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95 in Civil Case No. 3779 declaring that
Palawan “is entitled to the 40% share” of the government’s earnings derived from the Camago-
Malampaya natural gas project since October 16, 2001. The Court also denied the Petition for Review
filed by Bishop Arigo Pedro Dulay, et al. in GR No. 185941, which questioned the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 683 of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo authorizing the release of funds for
development projects in Palawan pursuant to the Provisional Implementation Agreement between
Palawan and the national government for being violative of the Constitution and the Local Government
Code (LGC), which is the basic issue in GR NO. 170867.

The Court held that there is no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir
belongs to the State, noting that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on
a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the
LGC, that allows local government units (LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the utilization of national
wealth provided they are found within their respective areas.

The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya reservoir within
the area or territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed that “As defined in its organic
law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-
Malamapaya reservoir is loated, was clearly not included in its territory.

The Court also held that Presidential Decree No. 1596, which constituted Kalayaan as a separate
municipality of the Province of Palawan, cannot be the basis for holding that the Camago-Malampaya
reservoir forms part of Palawan’s territory. It declared that the delineation of territory in PD 1596
refers to Kalayaan alone and that the inclusion of the seabed, subsoil, and continental margin in
Kalayaan’s territory cannot by simple analogy be applied to Palawan. Likewise, it held that the
definition of “Palawan” under Republic Act No. 7611 should not be taken as a statement of territorial
limits for purposes of Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, but in the context of RA 7611
which is aimed at environmental monitoring, research, and education.

The Court also did not subscribe to Palawan’s argument posited by the Province of Palawan that the
national wealth, the proceeds from which the State is mandated to share with the LGUs, shall be
wherever the local government exercises any degree of jurisdiction. “An LGU’s territorial jurisdiction is
not necessarily co-extensive with its exercise or assertion of powers. To hold otherwise may result in
condoning acts that are clearly ultra vires. It may lead to, the words of the Republic, LGUs ‘rush(ing)
to exercise its powers and functions in areas rich in natural resources even if outside its boundaries)
with the intention of seeking a share in the proceeds of its exploration’ – a situation that ‘would sow
conflict not only among the local government units and the national government but worse, between
and among local government units.’”

The Court pointed out also that Palawan never alleged in which of its municipalities or component
cities and barangays the Camago-Malampay reservoir is located, militating against its claim that the
area form part of its territory.
The Court further held that 1) estoppel does not lie against the Republic as previous acknowledgments
of Palawan’s share were based on the mistaken assumption that it it is entitled to the said allocation,
2) Section1, Article X of the 1987 Constitution did not apportion the entire Philippine territory among
the LGUs such that at any one time, a body of water or a piece of land should belong to some province
or city, 3) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) did not confer on LGUs
their own continental shelf as this pertains to the coastal state.

(GR No. 170867, Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan; GR No. 185941, Bishop Dulay v.
Ermita, December 4, 2018)

The Supreme Court ruled that Palawan was not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project
despite it has territorial jurisdiction over the Camago-Malampaya reservoir.

The Camago-Malampaya natural gas project is covered by Service Contract No. 38 between the Republic or national government
and the contractor which was subsequently composed of a consortium of Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental
Philippines, Incorporated (SPEX/OXY).

In a 94-page, the SC granted the petition of the government in GR No. 170867 to reverse and set aside the December 16, 2005
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95 in Civil Case No. 3779 declaring that Palawan “is entitled to the 40%
share” of the government’s earnings derived from the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project since October 16, 2001.

The Court also denied the petition for review filed by Bishop Arigo Pedro Dulay, et al. in GR No. 185941, which questioned the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 683 of former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo authorizing the release of funds for
development projects in Palawan pursuant to the Provisional Implementation Agreement between Palawan and the national
government for being violative of the Constitution and the Local Government Code (LGC), which is the basic issue in GR NO.
170867.

The SC held that there was no debate that the natural resource in the Camago-Malampaya reservoir belongs to the State, noting
that Palawan’s claim is anchored not on ownership of the reservoir but on a revenue-sharing scheme, under Section 7, Article X of
the 1986 Constitution and Section 290 of the LGC, that allows local government units (LGUs) to share in the proceeds of the
utilization of national wealth provided they are found within their respective areas.
The Court, however, found that existing laws do not include the Camago-Malampaya reservoir within the area or territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Palawan. It stressed that “As defined in its organic law, the province of Palawan comprises merely of
islands. The continental shelf, where the Camago-Malamapaya reservoir is loated, was clearly not included in its territory.

The SC also held that Presidential Decree No. 1596, which constituted Kalayaan as a separate municipality of the Province of
Palawan, cannot be the basis for holding that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan’s territory.

It declared that the delineation of territory in PD 1596 refers to Kalayaan alone and that the inclusion of the seabed, subsoil, and
continental margin in Kalayaan’s territory cannot by simple analogy be applied to Palawan.

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