Received 6/21/2019 1:28:22 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Filed 6/21/2019 1:28:00 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

146 MD 2019

CRAIG STEDMAN, IN HIS OFFICIAL : IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF

CAPACITY AS LANCASTER COUNTY : PENNSYLVANIA
DISTRICT ATTORNEY, :
: No. 146 MD 2019
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; JOSHUA PARSONS, IN :
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN :
OF THE LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD :
OF COMMISSIONERS; DENNIS :
STUCKEY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY :
AS VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE :
LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF :
COMMISSIONERS; CRAIG LEHMAN, IN :
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :
LANCASTER COUNTY COMMISSIONER, :
:
Respondents, :
:
JOSHUA SHAPIRO, IN HIS OFFICIAL :
CAPACITY AS PENNSYLVANIA :
ATTORNEY GENERAL; AND BRIAN :
HURTER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS :
LANCASTER COUNTY CONTROLLER, :
:
Nominal/Non-Adverse Respondents :
:

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF

RESPONDENTS, LANCASTER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,
PARSONS, STUCKEY AND LEHMAN, RAISING LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, PURSUANT TO
PA. R. APP. P. RULE 1516(B) AND PA. R. CIV P. RULES 1028(A)(1) AND 1028(A)(4)

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents a purely local, political feud among Lancaster County government

officials. This Court need not concern itself with such local infighting. The Court should

therefore dismiss Petitioner’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a

claim.

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 This action began because the Respondents, Lancaster County Commissioners, had the

temerity to publicly comment on the propriety of certain actions and decisions by District

Attorney Craig Stedman. When the Commissioners voiced their concerns about Stedman’s use

of drug forfeiture money to lease himself an SUV (and then claim mileage for its use), and

certain personnel actions which smacked of politics, they were indignantly informed that the

District Attorney would sue them for defamation should they continue to speak up. Worse, the

District Attorney arrogantly told the Commissioners that he would use public funds (or drug

forfeiture funds) to pay his lawyers to pursue his frivolous lawsuits against them. Thus, Stedman

filed this action as part of his attempt to silence the Commissioners. Now, however, in his

Amended Petition, Stedman attempts to paint himself as the victim of some sort of “campaign”

by the Commissioners against him. In other words, Stedman is now working hard to create an

impression that the Commissioners are somehow responsible for the lawsuit Stedman chose to

file.

In their original response to the action, the Commissioners noted by Preliminary

Objections that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The Commissioners

pointed out that, whatever the merits of this dispute may be, it does not even belong in this

Court. Rather than address this basic, preliminary issue, Stedman has instead filed an Amended

Petition, adding an additional complaint that the Commissioners have taken actions to impede his

attempts to squander public money on attorneys’ fees for this unnecessary fight—a fight that he

chose to instigate.

For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioners now reassert that this Court lacks

jurisdiction over this dispute, and therefore the action should be summarily dismissed without

any consideration of the supposed merits of the underlying dispute.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was commenced through the filing of a “long-form” Petition for Review on

March 13, 2019.1 The County Commissioners filed Preliminary Objections raising, inter alia,

lack of subject matter jurisdiction on March 28, 2019. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on

April 8, 2019. However, none of the jurisdictional allegations were substantively changed or

amplified by the Amended Petition. The only relevant difference is that what had been

paragraph 13 in the original Petition is now paragraph 14 in the Amended Petition. Additionally,

the words “nominal/non-adverse,” as applied to Attorney General Shapiro, were changed to

“indispensable/non-adverse.” The jurisdictional averments are otherwise identical, and remain

insufficient to establish this Court’s jurisdiction.

III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A. The Court Lacks Original Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over All Claims in the
Amended Petition

The Amended Petition should be dismissed because the Court entirely lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. As to Count I:

1. This Court’s original jurisdiction is restricted to actions against the “Commonwealth

government.” The County Respondents are a political subdivision and officers of
such subdivision, not the Commonwealth government; and

2. Petitioner’s addition of the Pennsylvania Attorney General as an “Indispensable

party” is nothing more than a transparent contrivance to manufacture the Court’s
original jurisdiction when none exists.

As to Counts II and III:

1. Because the Court has no jurisdiction over Count I, it has no ancillary jurisdiction
over Counts II or III; and

1
Stedman also filed an “Expedited Application for Summary Relief,” as well as an application to “Expedite” the
consideration of this “Expedited” Application.

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 2. In any event, Count II, involving personnel issues, and Count III, involving
Petitioner’s claims for access to funding for attorney’s fees, are not related in any way
to Count I’s drug forfeiture issues and do not qualify for ancillary jurisdiction.

B. The Amended Petition Fails to Plead a Justiciable Case or Controversy Suitable for
Review Under the Declaratory Judgments Act.

Additionally, the Amended Petition should be dismissed because it does not present a

justiciable case or controversy ripe for judicial review. This Court can only hear actions

involving an actual case or controversy in which the requested declaratory relief would resolve

the uncertainty underlying the claim. Because Petitioner has not pleaded any facts demonstrating

that the Commissioners have taken any action against him (because they have not), there is no

controversy here.

C. Alternatively, the Petitioner Has Failed to State a Legally Sufficient Claim.

Even accepting as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Amended Petition,

the Court should dismiss this case because Stedman has failed to state a claim on which relief

can be granted. As to Counts I and II: Petitioner requests a declaration that his use of drug

forfeiture funds and personnel decisions are not subject to any oversight by the Commissioners.

Yet, Petitioner has not alleged facts that the Commissioners have done anything more than

publicly discussed his use of Act 13 funds and made personnel recommendations in response to

employee complaints.

As to Count III:
1. Petitioner requests a declaration that the Commissioners must pay his legal expenses
without limit, but no formal request to pay his legal expenses was even submitted to
the Commissioners before the Petition was filed, (or since).

2. Moreover, Petitioner cannot avail himself of this Court’s limited exception to the
American rule regarding reimbursement of legal fees used solely in separation of
powers suits involving the Judicial Branch of the Commonwealth. Contrary to

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 Petitioner’s insinuation, a District Attorney is not a member of the judiciary nor is he
his own branch of Commonwealth government.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. The Amended Petition Itself Establishes That the Court Lacks Jurisdiction
Over All Counts.

Petitioner filed this action under this Court’s original jurisdiction. The Amended Petition

asserts that this Court has “original jurisdiction over the claims in Count I under

Section 761(a)(1) of the Judicial Code.” (Am. Pet. ¶ 7). It then contends that “this Court has

ancillary jurisdiction over the claims in Counts II and III because they are related to and closely

intertwined with the claims within the Court’s original jurisdiction set forth in Count I.” (Am.

Pet. ¶ 8). According to Stedman, the Court only has jurisdiction over Counts II and III to the

extent that it has jurisdiction over Count I; no independent basis is pleaded for jurisdiction over

Counts II and III. However, this Court lacks jurisdiction over all counts of the Amended Petition

because Section 761(a)(1), on its face, is plainly inapplicable to this action, for the reasons

developed below.

1. The Inclusion of the County Respondents Cannot Ground This Court’s Original
Jurisdiction.

Section 761(a)(1), confers original jurisdiction upon this Court in limited circumstances,

relating to actions “[a]gainst the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof.”

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1). The “Commonwealth government” is defined in Section 102 of the

Judicial Code as follows:

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 “Commonwealth government.” The government of the
Commonwealth, including the courts and other officers or agencies
of the unified judicial system, the General Assembly and its
officers and agencies, the Governor, and the departments, boards,
commissions, authorities and officers and agencies of the
Commonwealth, but the term does not include any political
subdivision, municipal or other local authority, or any officer or
agency of any such political subdivision or local authority.

Id. § 102 (emphasis added). “Political subdivision,” in turn, is defined in the Statutory

Construction Act as: “Any county, city, borough, incorporated town, township, school district,

vocational school district and county institution district.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1991 (emphasis added).

Thus, with regard to the definition of “Commonwealth government,” as noted in the authoritative

treatise West’s Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: “All three branches of state government are

encompassed in this definition and local governmental entities are excluded.” See 20 West’s Pa.

Prac., Appellate Practice § 40:304 (emphasis added).

The County Respondents are elected representatives of a political subdivision; as

Petitioner admits, Lancaster County is a county of the third class. (Am. Pet. ¶ 10). Thus, the

County Respondents are plainly not the “Commonwealth government” as that term is defined in

the Judicial Code. As such, this action against the Commissioners is not an action “against the

Commonwealth government” as required by § 761(a)(1).

2. Summarily Including the Attorney General as a Party Does Not Properly Invoke this
Court’s Original Jurisdiction.

Stedman’s inclusion of the Attorney General as an “Indispensable/Non-adverse”

respondent to Count I does not alter this conclusion. Stedman takes pains in his Amended

Petition (including the caption) to assert that the Attorney General has been named only as an

“Indispensable/Non-adverse” party. More specifically, the Amended Petition reads as follows:

Attorney General Shapiro is named as a Respondent only because

he is an indispensable party to Count I of this action in that the

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 declaration of rights sought by District Attorney Stedman in
Count I would impact his authority under Act 13.

(Am. Pet. ¶ 14).

Simply labeling the Attorney General as an indispensable party does not establish

jurisdiction. To begin with, Count I cannot be seen as being brought “against the

Commonwealth,” and the Attorney General cannot be “indispensable,” where Stedman

affirmatively pleads that the Attorney General is “non-adverse.” Being “against” a

“non-adverse” party is an obvious non sequitur.

Substantively, since Stedman does not seek relief directly against the Commonwealth,

“this Court’s jurisdiction depends upon whether or not the Commonwealth is an indispensable

party.” McDonough v. Com., 364 A.2d 965, 966 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). This Court has

defined an indispensable party as someone “whose interests are so connected with the litigant’s

claim that no relief can be granted without infringing upon that party’s rights. A Commonwealth

party may be declared an indispensable party when meaningful relief cannot conceivably be

afforded without the Commonwealth party’s direct involvement in the action.” Ballroom, LLC v.

Com., 984 A.2d 582, 588 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (citations omitted). Contrary to the Amended

Petition, this jurisdictional analysis centers not on whether any aspect of this case would

“impact” the authority of the Attorney General, but whether any relief sought could be granted

without the active participation of the Attorney General in the lawsuit. See id.; see also

McDonough, 364 A.2d at 966 (holding that the Commonwealth was not an indispensable party

because meaningful relief could be granted without the Commonwealth’s direct involvement.”).

Naming the Commonwealth as a party does not mean that the Commonwealth is an

indispensable party. See Pa. Sch. Boards Ass’n, Inc. v. Com. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, Teamsters

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Local 502, 696 A.2d 859, 867 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (“The mere naming, however, of the

Commonwealth or its officers in an action does not conclusively establish this court’s

jurisdiction, and the joinder of such parties when they are only tangentially involved is

improper.”). Rather, a petitioner must establish that the Commonwealth’s involvement in the

case is actually necessary. It is the Petitioner that “bears the burden of demonstrating that the

rights of the Commonwealth are ‘so connected with the claims of the litigants’ that the relief it

seeks . . . cannot be granted unless the Commonwealth is a party.” City of Lebanon v. Com.,

912 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).

Thus, the key inquiry here is whether the Commonwealth’s rights would be infringed if

the Court grants the requested relief, such that the Commonwealth is an indispensable party to

this action. Indeed, this question has arisen often in declaratory judgement actions like this one.

With only limited exceptions,2 the courts of this Commonwealth have consistently found that

merely naming a Commonwealth Agency or official is insufficient to ground the Commonwealth

Court’s original jurisdiction, where the Commonwealth Agency or official’s rights would not be

infringed if relief was granted.

Even in cases where the Commonwealth arguably had a financial interest in the outcome

in a case, this Court has still declined to exercise its original jurisdiction. See Pa. State Educ.

Ass’n v. Com., Dep’t of Educ., 516 A.2d 1308, 1310 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1986). In Pa. State Educ.

2
The Commonwealth has been held indispensable where it holds title to realty in dispute and an order would
adversely affect its interest in the real estate. See Scherbick v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cty., 387 A.2d 1301, 1303
(1978). Commonwealth Department of Transportation was declared an indispensable party to a declaratory
judgment action between an airplane manufacturer and an insurer, because the Department leased the airplane at
issue and would be contractually obligated to defend the manufacturer in the absence of insurance. See Piper
Aircraft Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 417 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980). Commonwealth Department of
Environmental Resources was held as indispensable to a declaratory judgment action between a township and its
insurer, because the township was seeking defense and indemnification for alleged environmental violations that the
Department filed against it. See Pleasant Twp., Warren Cty. v. Erie Ins. Exch., 348 A.2d 477, 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1975). However, these exceptions are inapplicable here, where Petitioner is not seeking to compel the
Commonwealth to act, but rather is seeking an order restraining the County from acting.

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Ass’n, this Court held that the Department of Education was not an indispensable party where its

involvement in a school district tuition agreement was minimal and neither the amount nor the

mode of state funding would change because of the agreement. Id. at 1311. Similarly, in an

action seeking accounting and a return of insurance premiums paid by the Commonwealth, the

Court determined that the Commonwealth was not indispensable, despite its potential financial

interests, because relief could be granted without the Commonwealth’s direct involvement. See

McDonough, 364 A.2d at 966. A review of additional relevant cases demonstrates just how

seldom a Commonwealth party has been held “indispensable” in actions that are truly between

other parties.3

Here, Stedman has baldly named the Attorney General as an “indispensable/non-adverse”

defendant for the sole purpose of invoking this Court’s original jurisdiction. The Amended

Petition does not request any relief against the Attorney General. In fact, the singular mention of

the Attorney General in the prayer for relief merely seeks a declaration that only the County

Controller and Attorney General “have the authority under Act 13 to audit or investigate” the use

of forfeiture funds. (Am. Pet. ¶ 98a). Rather, the Amended Petition seeks declaratory and

injunction relief against the Commissions barring them from reviewing the District Attorney’s

use of forfeiture funds, and deeming the funds free from County contracting procedures. (Am.

3
See, e.g., Centolanza v. Lehigh Valley Dairies, Inc., 658 A.2d 336, 339 (Pa. 1995), (holding that Department of
Environmental Resources was not an indispensable party to private citizens' suit because the Department’s interest
was not essential to the merits of the issue, and the relief requested did not involve action by the Department); City
of Lebanon, 912 A.2d at 341 (holding that Commonwealth was not an indispensable party to a declaratory
judgement action regarding the constitutionality of a statute affecting the power of a city to acquire authority assets);
Annenberg v. Com., 686 A.2d 1380, 1385 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (holding that neither Commonwealth nor
Attorney General was indispensable to declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a taxing
statute); Springdale Twp. v. Allegheny Cty. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review, 467 A.2d 74, 77 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that Commonwealth was not indispensable party to action township filed challenging
tax exempt status of a public utility’s property); Comerford v. Factoryville Borough Council, 328 A.2d 221, 222 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (holding that Commonwealth Department of Environment Resources was not indispensable to
declaratory judgment claim seeking to invalidate a borough contract).

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Pet. ¶¶ 98b, c). As the case law shows, Petitioner’s attempted, superficial joinder here is

insufficient to ground jurisdiction. Stedman’s designation of the Attorney General as an

“indispensable” party is incorrect as a matter of law, and his nominal joinder in this action is a

transparent ploy to establish this Court’s jurisdiction.

Moreover, the Amended Petition contends that the Commissioners’ intention to “audit”

Stedman’s use of drug forfeiture funds (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 37, 45-46) usurps the Attorney General’s

“audit authority over the use of such funds . . . .” (Am. Pet. ¶ 34; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 46).

Notwithstanding these legally deficient allegations (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 27, 34, 46), Act 13 does not

authorize, much less require, the Attorney General to “audit” a district attorney’s use of drug

forfeiture funds. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5803(j). Instead, the law requires Lancaster County itself,

“through the controller . . . and the district attorney” or any “other appropriate auditor” to

provide “an annual audit of all forfeited property and proceeds . . . .” Id. And it requires “the

county [to] report . . . the disposition of the property . . . to the Attorney General.” Id. Plainly,

the Attorney General is merely the recipient, and not an active auditor, of the “county’s” audit of

drug forfeiture funds. Thus, even if Respondents had asserted a right to audit Stedman’s use of

drug forfeiture funds, this would not “impact” the authority of the Attorney General to “audit”

because the Attorney General has no power to audit under this law.

Respondents acknowledge that the Attorney General has filed an Answer in this matter,

noting the Attorney General’s duties under § 5803. The Attorney General did not directly

address whether he is an indispensable party to this action, but did state that the outcome of this

case would “impact the statutory role of the Attorney General who should, therefore, have the

opportunity to be head.” (Atty. Gen. Answer p. 2). First, it is for the Court, not a party, to

decide whether a party is indispensable to litigation. Second, while the Attorney General’s

10

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answer says that this case will “impact” him, it does not address how. Nor does it indicate that

the Attorney General intends to argue one way or another on this issue between Stedman and the

Commissioners. Count I presents a simple matter of statutory interpretation, which “is a pure

question of law,” strictly for a court to decide. See St. Elizabeth's Child Care Ctr. v. Dep't of

Pub. Welfare, 963 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Pa. 2009). Although the Attorney General requests to be

heard on this issue, his involvement in the Court’s statutory interpretation is not necessary;

therefore, he is not an indispensable party.

Petitioner’s claims as pleaded, even if true, present no challenge to the Attorney

General’s authority in any sense. To the contrary, the declaratory judgment Stedman seeks is in

no sense “adverse” to the interests of the Attorney General. The Attorney General’s

participation as a Respondent in this case is simply not necessary to the relief Stedman requests.

Therefore, Stedman has failed to meet his burden to establish that the Attorney General is an

indispensable party, such that this Court has original jurisdiction over this action. He has not

even seriously attempted to do so through the cursory allegations repeated in the Amended

Petition at ¶ 14. It bears repetition that the absence of this Court’s jurisdiction had already been

called to Stedman’s attention through the County Respondents’ Preliminary Objections prior to

the filing of the Amended Petition.4

3. The Court Also Lacks Ancillary Jurisdiction Over Counts II or III.

First, because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Count I, the Court must

also dismiss Counts II and III for lack of jurisdiction. The Court cannot exercise independent
4
As indicted, Commissioners raised the absence of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction in their initial
Preliminary Objections, filed March 13, 2019. Rather than address this glaring threshold issue, Stedman simply
filed an Amended Petition adding Count III on April 8. Nothing about the Amended Petition attempted to amplify
or clarify the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. Compare Amended Petition ¶¶ 6–8, 14 with original Petition ¶¶ 5–
7, 13. In other words, even after this glaring jurisdictional defect was identified and called out, Stedman chose to
ignore it.

11

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original jurisdiction over these counts as they are only against the County Respondents. See

supra Section IV A 1. Nor can the Court exercise ancillary jurisdiction over these counts.

Under § 761(c), the Commonwealth Court can exercise “ancillary jurisdiction over any

claim or other matter which is related to a claim or other matter” within its original jurisdiction.

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(c). Thus, the Court cannot excise ancillary jurisdiction over a matter if it does

not first have independent original jurisdiction. It follows, then, that because the Court lacks

jurisdiction over Count I, the Court lacks ancillary jurisdiction over Counts II and III. See

Bowers v. T-Netix, 837 A.2d 608, 614 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (“[G]iven that we have dismissed

all of [plaintiff’s] claims against the [Commonwealth], we no longer have a basis for exercising

ancillary jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] claims against [non-Commonwealth party].”); see also

Pittsburgh Fire Fighters, Local No. 1 ex rel. King v. Yablonsky, 867 A.2d 666, 673 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2005) (dismissing ancillary jurisdiction claims against city after original

jurisdiction claims against the Commonwealth were dismissed). Consequently, in the absence of

jurisdiction over Count I, this Court necessarily also lacks jurisdiction over Counts II and III and

should dismiss these Counts.

Second, even if the Court found that it had original jurisdiction over Count I, Counts II

and III are wholly unrelated to Count I. Count I stems from the Commissioners’ purported

“audit” of Stedman’s use of forfeiture funds, while Counts II and III stem respectively from

“employment disputes” and attorneys’ fees funding requests. Thus, even if the court concludes

that Count I is within its jurisdiction, Counts II and III undoubtedly belong before a different

tribunal.

Count II involves, by Petitioner’s own description, “[e]mployment disputes.” (Am. Pet.

¶¶ 55, 57, 59). These disputes have absolutely nothing to do with Petitioner’s complaints in

12

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Count I about drug forfeiture funds. Further, the Attorney General is not even included as a

party to Count II, so Petitioner certainly cannot claim jurisdiction based on the Attorney

General’s role. Petitioner’s allegations underscoring Count II describe a purely local, political

dispute within his office. (See Am. Pet. Ex. I).

Moreover, Petitioner barely attempts to demonstrate how Counts I and II are “related.”

Stedman brazenly alleges some “coordinated effort” and “overall related scheme” to interfere

with his rights and authority as the District Attorney. (Am. Pet. ¶¶ 8, 56). Absent these

conclusory statements, Petitioner has not alleged any facts supporting the existence of the

Commissioners’ supposed vendetta against him. Indeed, Petitioner does not show any logical

relation between the factual assertions underlying Count I (Commissioners’ public statements

about Act 13 funds) and those allegedly giving rise to Count II (the Office of Human Resources’

review of employee complaints). A bald conclusion that these matters are somehow related is

hardly enough to bring Count II within the Court’s ancillary jurisdiction.

These same deficiencies apply to Count III; it is in no way related to Count I. The

attorneys’ fees dispute is not “related to” drug forfeiture laws and does not involve the Attorney

General. This dispute between the District Attorney and the County Commissioners remains a

purely local issue. Petitioner makes no attempt to show how Counts I and III are “related,” apart

from the same, conclusory allegation of some “coordinated effort” to infringe his authority as the

District Attorney. He fails to establish any logical connection between these matters. As such,

Count III is unrelated to Count I and the Court should not exercise ancillary jurisdiction over it.

The arguments above establish that the Court does not even enjoy subject matter

jurisdiction to consider whether the Amended Petition states a claim. Consequently, the

arguments which follow are set forth in the alternative, and only in an excess of caution.

13

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 B. The Amended Petition Fails to Present a Justiciable Controversy

Petitioner requests this Court to issue declaratory relief as to three discrete questions,

none of which has yet to ripen into an actual controversy requiring judicial resolution. Because

none of the Counts raise actual, justiciable controversies, they are legally insufficient for

declaratory relief and should be dismissed. These issues reflect, at most, public discussion of

matters of public concern: the expenditure of public money and the conduct of public

employees.

To properly present a petition under the Declaratory Judgments Act, a party must plead

the existence of an actual, justiciable controversy that a court declaration could resolve. See,

e.g., Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v. Com., 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005). As this Court has

previously stated:

“To sustain a declaratory judgment action, the plaintiff ‘must

demonstrate an ‘actual controversy’ indicating imminent and
inevitable litigation, and a direct substantial and present interest.
Absent an ‘actual controversy,’ any opinion rendered would be
advisory, and we do not issue advisory opinions. Courts should
refuse to grant declaratory relief where it would not resolve the
uncertainty or controversy which spurred the request.”

Buehl v. Beard, 54 A.3d 412, 419 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012), aff’d, 91 A.3d 100 (Pa. 2014)

(internal citations omitted). A speculative harm or injury is not an actual controversy sufficient

to render a justiciable case. Put simply, “[a]n issue that ‘may’ arise in the future ‘is not

considered ‘ripe’ for judicial interpretation.’” DeNaples v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 150 A.3d

1034, 1040 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016) (citing Brown v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 673 A.2d 21, 23

(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996)). Further, declaratory relief is discretionary by nature, and a court may

decline to grant it, where, for example, doing so “would not terminate the uncertainty or

controversy giving rise to the proceeding . . . .” 42 Pa. C. S. § 7537.

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 Here, in Count I, Petitioner attempts to manufacture a controversy by accusing

Respondents of threatening to “audit” his use of Act 13 funds. This contention is not at all

supported by Petitioner’s factual averments. Similarly, Count II fails to establish an actual

controversy as evidenced by Exhibit H to the Amended Petition. Respondent’s Office of Human

Resources simply reviewed two District Attorney’s office employees’ complaints and made

recommendations about them.

Lastly, for Count III, Stedman again attempts to create a controversy by charging

Respondents with refusing to pay his legal fees for this very Petition. However, Stedman does

not allege that the Commissioners actually refused to pay a legal bill—because Stedman had not

submitted any bills for payment when the Petition was filed, and has not done so to date. Even

in light of the Commissioners’ letter to Controller Hurter, (Am. Pet. Ex. J), indicating that the

County would not pay Stedman’s legal expenses resulting from this matter, this dispute presents

exactly the type of speculative harm that this Court has routinely held not ripe for judicial

resolution. See, e.g., Silo v. Ridge, 728 A.2d 394, 398 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (dismissing

declaratory judgment claim that was based on “nothing more than conjecture and speculation”);

Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Hafer, 597 A.2d 754, 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (dismissing declaratory

judgment action filed “in anticipation of events which may never occur”).

1. The Allegations of Counts I and II Lack any Pleaded Factual Basis.

In Count I, Stedman baldly alleges that Respondents intend to “audit” his expenditures of

drug forfeiture money. (Am. Pet. ¶ 37). Not only is this allegation unsupported, it is actually

contradicted by the Lancaster County Solicitor’s correspondence to Stedman’s lawyers.

(Am. Pet. Ex. E). Exhibit E, a letter from the Lancaster County Solicitor, never mentions the

term “audit.” This letter responds to Petitioner’s lawyers’ previous threats to sue the

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Respondents for defamation and advises Stedman that the Commissioners intend to continue to

“speak out” on matters of public concern, including his use of drug forfeiture funds to lease a

vehicle for his exclusive use.

In addition, the term “audit” is defined by Act 13, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5803(j),5 and there are no

factual allegations that the Commissioners intend to “audit” Stedman’s office per this definition.

Stedman’s allegation that the Commissioners “so-called ‘investigation’ is nothing more than a

differently named ‘audit,’” is both legally and factually unsupportable. (Am. Pet. ¶ 45). The

Commissioners agree that they do not have the power to “audit” Stedman’s spending of Act 13

funds. Indeed, this is a function reserved solely for the County Controller through his obligation

to submit an annual audit to the Attorney General. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 5803(j).

Furthermore, Act 13 never mentions the term “investigate” as a function reserved solely

for the Controller or Attorney General, because Act 13 never mentions the word “investigate.”

See Id. § 5803. Thus, it is legally incorrect to claim that an “investigation” is the same as an

“audit” under Act 13. Other than Stedman’s broad conclusory allegation that the Commissioners

intend to investigate the vehicle he leased for his exclusive use, the Amended Petition presents

no facts supporting this conclusion. The County Solicitor’s letter belies this contention. (See

5
“Annual audit of forfeited property.--Every county in this Commonwealth shall provide, through the controller,
board of auditors or other appropriate auditor and the district attorney, an annual audit of all forfeited property and
proceeds obtained under this chapter. The audit shall not be made public but shall be submitted to the Office of
Attorney General. By September 30 of each year, the county shall report all forfeited property and proceeds obtained
under this chapter and the disposition of the property during the preceding year to the Attorney General. The
Attorney General and each district attorney shall maintain and create appropriate records to account for the property
forfeited in a fiscal year and the use made of the property forfeited. Each audit shall include:

(1) Date property was seized.

(2) The type of property seized.
(3) Where property was seized.
(4) The approximate value.
(5) The alleged criminal behavior with which the property is associated.
(6) The disposition or use of property forfeited.
(7) Whether the forfeiture was related to a criminal case and the outcome of the criminal case.
(8) Date of forfeiture decision”

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Am. Pet. Ex. E). The Commissioners intended to discuss this topic, and when Stedman’s threats

of defamation lawsuits did not intimidate them, he attempted to manufacture a controversy where

none exists.

Count I does not allege that the Commissioners have taken any action to interfere with

Stedman’s Act 13 expenditures, nor that they attempted to seize or restrict Stedman’s access to

the SUV at issue. Indeed, Commissioners have done nothing more than discuss the propriety of

using Act 13 funds to lease the SUV. As such, Count I does not present a justiciable case or

controversy adequate for judiciary review.

Relatedly, Count II of the Amended Petition alleges that the Commissioners have

somehow acted improperly by commenting upon personnel actions occurring within the District

Attorney’s office. Stedman accuses the Commissioners of making “policy and employment

recommendations” and “demands for information.”6 (Am. Pet. ¶ 66). Again, there is no

allegation that the Commissioners have taken any specific action, such as to mandate particular

personnel actions as to any employees. Exhibit H to the Amended Petition makes this clear. The

Commissioners have not attempted to hire, fire, or supervise any District Attorney’s office

employees. Nor have they “demanded” anything. The only facts offered in support of this claim

are the non-binding recommendations that the Office of Human Resources made in response to

employee complaints and the Commissioners’ public comments on personnel issues. Clearly,

these recommendations and public comments in no way represent an actual case or controversy

between the Commissioners and the District Attorney. Instead, Stedman apparently believes his

personal displeasure with the Commissioners’ public comments on personnel matters somehow

6
The Office of Human Resources summary never uses the word “demand.” Stedman apparently falsely equates
“demands for information,” to the following quote from the summary: “It is further recommended that all files held
in the District Attorney’s office relating to this matter be immediately turned over to Human Resources.” (Am. Pet.
Ex. I) (emphasis added).

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SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

represents a justiciable case. Nonetheless, this “dispute” represents nothing more than a matter

of public concern that Stedman wishes was kept private.

2. The Harm Alleged in Count III is Entirely Speculative and Not Ripe for Review.

For Count III, Stedman asks the Court to grant him a blank check for his attorneys’ fees

and legal expenses in this matter. The Amended Petition seeks, inter alia, declarations that

“Stedman is entitled to payment of his attorneys’ fees and legal costs incurred as a result of this

litigation[,]” and that this payment “do[es] not require the approval of the [Commissioners.]”

(Am. Pet. ¶¶ 115a, c). Yet, the Commissioners have not formally denied payment of any legal

fees or costs. In fact, Stedman has not formally submitted any invoices for attorneys’ fees or

legal costs. (And certainly had not done so when the petition was filed). Accordingly, as with

Counts I and II, this Court should dismiss Count III because it is entirely based on speculation

and does not present an actual case or controversy ripe for judicial review.

C. Even if the Court Looks to the Merits of the Amended Petition, Stedman has Failed
to State a Claim Upon Which Declaratory Relief Can be Granted.

If the Court somehow looks past the glaring jurisdiction and justiciability issues with

Stedman’s claims, the Court must still dismiss his Amended Petition because his claims are

legally insufficient to warrant relief. The Amended Petition does not aver facts that the

Respondents have done anything outside of their statutorily authorized authority as County

Commissioners or their free speech rights as citizens of the United States.

1. As the Ultimate Administrators of County Government, the Commissioners Must

Review, Discuss, and Make Recommendations on County Administration.

In Count I, the Amended Petition accuses Respondents of “insisting they have the power

to control [Petitioner’s] actions and the power to audit and review Act 13 expenditures . . . .”

(Am. Pet. ¶ 94). Similarly, in Count II, Stedman contends that Respondents are “insisting they

18

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

have the power to review [his employment decisions.]” (Am. Pet. ¶103). These allegations are

legally insufficient to present any possibility for declaratory relief.

First, as Stedman implicitly admits, the Commissioners have not done anything to

control, audit, or review his spending of forfeiture funds, or his employment decisions. On its

face, the Amended Petition only alleges that the Commissioners insist that they have the power

to do so. The Commissioners admittedly have commented about the use of Act 13 funds, but

they have not taken any affirmative action to interfere with Stedman’s discretionary use of the

funds. Further, the county Office of Human Resources has responded to employee complaints

regarding the District Attorney’s personnel decisions, but the office merely provided

recommendations to Stedman. (See Am. Pet. Ex. I). Petitioner does not aver any actual

interference with his forfeiture fund spending or his personnel decisions. Stedman’s apparent

displeasure at the Commissioners’ comments does not give rise to any right to declaratory relief.

Second, the Commissioners have a responsibility and obligation to oversee the

administration of the Lancaster County Government as a whole, especially its fiscal affairs. See

Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Com., 64 A.3d 611, 618, n.10 (Pa. 2013) (“A board of county

commissioners generally regulates the affairs of its county in every conceivable way.”); see also

16 P.S. § 203 (“The corporate power of each county shall be vested in a board of county

commissioners.”); Id. § 1701 (“The county commissioners shall be the responsible managers and

administrators of the fiscal affairs of their respective counties . . . .”). The District Attorney is a

county officer. See Pa. Const. Art. IX, § 4. Although District Attorneys “act on behalf of and in

the name of the Commonwealth in investigating and prosecuting crimes,” they are clearly

considered local officers in their administrative roles. Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d

339, 350 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Pennsylvania’s statutes also reflect the local status of the DA’s

19

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

Office.”); see also N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312, 318 (M.D. Pa.

2011) (holding that District Attorney was a county official when conducting “purely

administrative tasks unrelated to prosecutorial functions . . .”).

As such, the Commissioners have an obligation to ensure that County government is

prudently managing its fiscal affairs. Contrary to Petitioner’s claims that Respondents wish to

somehow “audit” or “investigate” his use of Act 13 funds, the Respondents have only discussed

and considered how the funds were being spend, in light of their overall administrative authority

of county government. Similarly, under this same authority, the Commissioners can certainly

comment and make recommendations regarding the District Attorney’s personnel decisions.

Further, the Office of Human Resources made personnel recommendations only after it received

complaints from two employees. In sum, the Commissioners’ comments and recommendations

were squarely within their purview as the administrative heads of county government.

Third, contrary to the Amended Petition, the Pennsylvania Constitution does not give District

Attorneys unrestricted, constitutional authority over personnel decisions. Stedman erroneously

declares that he has constitutional rights, beyond reproach, to hire, fire, and supervise employees

in his office, under 16 P.S. § 1620. However, this Court has expressly held that a District

Attorney’s hiring discretion is not constitutionally protected. Rebert v. York Cty. Detectives

Ass’n, 909 A.2d 906, 913 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (“Nothing in these cases suggests that Section

1620 rights are constitutionally protected, nor does our constitution itself accord row officers any

particular management rights”).

Petitioner tries to conflate the constitutional personnel rights of the judiciary with that of

a District Attorney. See Lehigh Cty. v. Com., Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 489 A.2d 1325, 1327 (Pa.

1985) (citations omitted) (“The power to appoint necessary personnel is inherent in the judicial

20

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

power. The authority to supervise and to discharge court-appointed employees is not only a

necessary corollary to this appointment power but also is essential to the maintenance of an

independent judiciary.”). However, District Attorneys are not part of the judicial branch, but

rather “related staff.” Miller v. Cty. of Centre, 173 A.3d 1162, 1169 (Pa. 2017). The policy that

county commissioners should not interfere with judiciary personnel decisions is predicated upon

maintaining an independent judiciary; thus, this policy concern has no bearing on a District

Attorney’s personnel decisions. Further, in a case by a probation officer alleging that a county

was his employer and discriminatorily fired him, this Court held that the county’s hiring

recommendations did not infringe the judiciary’s constitutional personnel management rights.

See Bowser v. Clarion Cty., 206 A.3d 68, 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2019) (holding that judiciary, not

county, was probation officer’s employer despite county’s hiring recommendations). If a

county’s hiring recommendation did not infringe the judiciary’s constitutional personnel powers,

surely the Office of Human Resource’s personnel recommendations cannot have impeded

Stedman’s hiring authority, which lacks constitutional protection.

2. The District Attorney is Not Entitled to Have His Legal Fees Paid by the County, to
the Extent They Exceed the $5,000 Budgeted for District Attorney Legal Fees.

Petitioner asserts a right to have his attorneys’ fees and legal expenses paid for by the

County. He entirely relies on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Com., ex rel.

Jiuliante v. Cty. of Erie, 657 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 1995), to argue that the Commissioners must give

him a blank check to pay his attorneys’ fees and legal expenses. However, the narrow exception

to the American Rule (that parties are not entitled to attorney’s fees, absent a contractual or

statutory right) carved out in Jiuliante applies only to cases involving the Judicial Branch

defending its independence, and is inapplicable here.

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SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

 In Jiuliante, the Supreme Court stated that:

We are persuaded that the constitutional scheme of separation of

powers, which preserves the independence of the judiciary,
warrants recognition of a limited exception to the general rule and
therefore hold that attorney’s fees may be awarded in a successful
action challenging conduct which genuinely threatens or interferes
with the inherent authority of the judiciary.

Id. at 1252. Two prerequisites to this exception are thus apparent: (1) a party must succeed in

the action, and (2) the action must have challenged conduct that threatened the independence of

the judiciary. Post-Jiuliante, the unique need to uphold the judicial branch’s independence has

been further explained by Pennsylvania courts. See Driscoll v. Corbett, 69 A.3d 197, 215 (Pa.

2013) (Eakin, J., concurring) (citing Jiuliante, 657 A.2d at 1247) (“The Pennsylvania

Constitution is designed to assure the judiciary a measure of independence not given to the other

branches of government in order to insulate it from political pressure.”); Yurgosky v. Com.,

Admin. Office of Pa. Courts, 722 A.2d 631, 637, n.16 (Pa. 1998) (citing Jiuliante, 657 A.2d at

1252) (“We held that the preservation of the independence of the judiciary through the separation

of powers warranted the engrafting of an exception to the general rule that a litigant cannot

recover counsel fees from an adverse party. We concluded that ‘attorney’s fees may be awarded

in a successful action challenging conduct which genuinely threatens or interferes with the

inherent authority of the judiciary.’”).

Stedman attempts to extrapolate the Supreme Court’s holding in Jiuliante to require the

Respondents here to pay for his legal fees incurred in a suit he initiated, in which he simply

attempts to silence the Commissioners. Again, this Court has held that district attorneys are not

members of the judicial system. See Miller, 173 A.3d at 1169–1170. Therefore, the special

22

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

concerns about the independence of the judiciary and the administration of justice that

underscored the Supreme Court’s holding in Jiuiliante are clearly not present here.

This case is more analogous to Medico v. Makowski, 793 A.2d 167 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

2002), where this Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a county prothonotary’s mandamus

and injunctive relief action seeking to require county commissioners to increase her office’s

funding. Id. at 171. There, while once again explaining how Jiuliante uniquely applies to

funding the judiciary, this Court held that the prothonotary’s request for additional funding must

be analyzed the same way as another other county official’s funding request. Id. This inquiry

focuses on “whether the requested funding . . . [was] reasonably necessary to the prothonotary’s

office’s ability to adequately carry out its statutory duties such that the Commissioners violated a

mandatory duty to provide necessary office furniture, equipment, and/or supplies.” Id. A

District Attorney is a county officer, just like a prothonotary. The Medico case makes clear that

funding requests from county officers are not analyzed the same way as judiciary funding. As

such, the attorneys’ fees exception that the Supreme Court carved out in Jiuliante, based on the

unique independence of the judiciary, does not apply to attorneys’ fees requests from county

officers or other Commonwealth government entities.

The Amended Petition effectively demands that the Commissioners immediately give

Stedman a blank check to pay his legal expenses, regardless of whether he prevails in this case.

(See Am. Comp. ¶¶ 4, 115a–e). Petitioner may be entitled to use some county funds to pay

attorneys’ fees and legal expenses, but only based on his budget allocations from the County’s

2018-2019 budget. See Yost v. McKnight, 865 A.2d 979, 986 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). In Yost,

this Court held that a District Attorney had the authority to enter into contracts for “services for

which he has funds in his budget. Otherwise, he must request that the Commissioners

23

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

appropriate such funds for his use.” Id. Respondents acknowledge that the District Attorney’s

office was budgeted $5,000 in the county’s 2018-2019 budget for “legal expesnes”.7 If Stedman

wishes to use this $5,000 to pay his outside counsel in this matter, he must first submit invoices

to the Controller’s office, who then may allocate the $5,000 for legal fees. However, Stedman

did not request any additional funding to pay for legal fees prior to hiring outside counsel and

initiating this action. Accordingly, upon submitting invoices, Stedman may be able to use

county funds to pay up to $5,000 for attorneys’ fees or legal expenses; but any amount in excess

of $5,000 need not be paid by the County.

V. CONCLUSION

The Amended Petition invites the Court to participate in District Attorney Stedman’s

attempts to harass and intimidate the Lancaster County Commissioners for having the audacity to

raise their concerns about his recent activities. In light of the absence of subject matter

jurisdiction, a justiciable controversy, or any legally sufficient basis for declaratory relief, this is

an invitation the Court should decline. For the aforementioned reasons, any further

consideration of this action would only exacerbate the waste of resources this action involves and

elevate this purely local dispute to an unwarranted level.

7
See Lancaster County General Fund 2019/2018 Budgeted Revenues, p. 25, available at
https://co.lancaster.pa.us/DocumentCenter/View/10059/2019-General-Fund-Take-Away-Reports, (last visited June
17, 2019).

24

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

 For all the foregoing reasons, the Commissioners request that their Preliminary

Objections be sustained, and the Amended Petition for Review be dismissed, in its entirety,

without need for further proceedings.

STEVENS & LEE

Dated: June 21, 2019 By: s/Mark D. Bradshaw

Daniel B. Huyett
Attorney I.D. No. 21385
111 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 679
Reading, PA 19603
(610) 478-2219
dbh@stevenslee.com

Mark D. Bradshaw
Attorney I.D. No. 61975
17 North Second Street
16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
(717) 234-1090
mdb@stevenslee.com
Attorneys for Respondent Lancaster County Board
of Commissioners

25

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy of the

Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts that

require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential

information and documents.

STEVENS & LEE

Dated: June 21, 2019 By: s/Mark D. Bradshaw

Daniel B. Huyett
Attorney I.D. No. 21385
111 North Sixth Street
P.O. Box 679
Reading, PA 19603
(610) 478-2219
dbh@stevenslee.com

Mark D. Bradshaw
Attorney I.D. No. 61975
17 North Second Street
16th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
(717) 234-1090
mdb@stevenslee.com
Attorneys for Respondent Lancaster County Board
of Commissioners

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, MARK D. BRADSHAW, ESQUIRE, certify that on this date, I served a certified true

and correct copy of the foregoing Preliminary Objections of Respondents, Lancaster County

Board of Commissioners, Raising Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a

Claim, Pursuant to Pa. R. App. P. Rule 1516(b) and Pa. R. Civ. P. Rules 1028(a)(1) and

1028(a)(4).upon the following counsel of record, by depositing the same in the United States

mail, postage prepaid, addressed as follows:

Mark E. Seiberling, Esquire

Kleinbard, LLC
3 Logan Square
1717 Arch Street, 5th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103
mseiberling@kleinbard.com

Attorney General Joshua Shapiro

Nicole Borland, Esquire
Office of Attorney General
15th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
nboland@attorneygeneral.gov

George D. Alspach, Esquire

Alspach & Ryder, LLC
232 N. Duke Street
Lancaster, PA 17602
galspach232@aol.com

Dated: June 21, 2019 s/Mark D. Bradshaw

Mark D. Bradshaw

SL1 1578324v3 104982.00038

 Received 6/21/2019 1:28:22 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Filed 6/21/2019 1:28:00 PM Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

146 MD 2019

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Craig Stedman, in his Official Capacity : 146 MD 2019

as Lancaster County District Attorney, :
Petitioner :
v.
Lancaster County Board of Commissioners;
Joshua Parsons, in his Official Capacity as
Chairman of the Lancaster Board of
Commissions; Dennis Stuckey, in his
Official Capacity as Vice-Chairman of the
Lancaster County Board of Commissioners;
Craig Lehman, in his Official Capacity as
Lancaster County Commissioner,
Respondents

Joshua Shapiro, in his Official Capacity

as Pennsylvania Attorney General; and
Brian Hurter, in his Official Capacity as
Lancaster County Controller,
Non-adverse Respondents

PROOF OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this 21st day of June, 2019, I have served the attached document(s) to the persons on the date(s)

and in the manner(s) stated below, which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121:

PACFile 1001 Page 1 of 3 Print Date: 6/21/2019 1:29 pm

 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PROOF OF SERVICE
(Continued)

Service

Served: George D. Alspach

Service Method: eService
Email: galspach232@aol.com
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: 232 N Duke St
Lancaster, PA 17602
Phone: 717--39-3-3939
Representing: Respondent Brian Hurter

Served: Joshua D. Shapiro

Service Method: eService
Email: lsnyder@attorneygeneral.gov
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: 1600 Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Phone: 717--78-7-3391
Representing: Respondent Joshua Shapiro

Served: Joshua John Voss

Service Method: eService
Email: jvoss@kleinbard.com
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: Three Logan Sqaure, 5th Floor
1717 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Phone: 267--44-3-4114
Representing: Petitioner Craig Stedman

Served: Keli Marie Neary

Service Method: eService
Email: kneary@attorneygeneral.gov
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: Strawberry Square, 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Phone: 717-787-1180
Representing: Respondent Joshua Shapiro

PACFile 1001 Page 2 of 3 Print Date: 6/21/2019 1:29 pm

 IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PROOF OF SERVICE
(Continued)

Served: Mark Edward Seiberling

Service Method: eService
Email: mseiberling@kleinbard.com
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: Three Logan Square, 5th Floor
1717 Arch Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Phone: 610-212-8918
Representing: Petitioner Craig Stedman

Served: Nicole Jeanne Boland

Service Method: eService
Email: nboland@attorneygeneral.gov
Service Date: 6/21/2019
Address: Office of Attorney General
15th Fl., Strawberry Sq.
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Phone: 717--78-3-3146
Representing: Respondent Joshua Shapiro

/s/ Mark David Bradshaw

(Signature of Person Serving)

Person Serving: Bradshaw, Mark David

Attorney Registration No: 061975
Law Firm: Stevens & Lee, PC
Address: Stevens & Lee Pc
17 N 2ND St 16th Fl
Harrisburg, PA 171011647
Representing: Respondent Lancaster County Board of Commissioners
Respondent Lehman, Craig
Respondent Parsons, Joshua
Respondent Stuckey, Dennis

PACFile 1001 Page 3 of 3 Print Date: 6/21/2019 1:29 pm