EN BANC

[G.R. No. 115576. August 4, 1994.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.

CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO, COMM.
PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF
PRISONS, Respondent.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?

These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military commissions during the period of martial law. Both
were originally condemned to die by jusketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution to reclusion
perpetua.

Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case of Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 1 where we
held that the military tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were functioning. cha nro bles.c om:cra law:red

Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, 2 this Court directed the Department of Justice to file the corresponding
informations in the civil courts against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision.

No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.

On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) complaining that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3

In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their communication as admissible and requested the Republic of
the Philippines to submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the date of transmittal. 4

The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human Rights with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the
Commission, through its Chairman Sedfrey A. Ordonez, wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release of
the complainants unless criminal charges had already been filed against them. 5

On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released on September 29,
1992, and that Paquinto and Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the intimation that it
would not object to a petition for habeas corpus that the Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay. 6
This assurance was latter confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31, 1994. 7

The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on June 13, 1994. The writ was immediately issued,
returnable on or before June 22, 1994, on which date a hearing was also scheduled. chanrobles v irt ual lawl ibra ry

At the hearing, Chairman Ordonez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their immediate release in view of the failure of
the Department of Justice to file charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He stressed that their
continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of their human rights.

For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling
in Tan v. Barrios, 8 the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military tribunals that have
already become final or to persons who were already serving their sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the
only recourse of the prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.

It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions of Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military
commissions was promulgated. It has been six years since our decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of Justice to
file the appropriate informations against the civilians still detained under convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The
prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their convictions as the records of their cases
have allegedly been burned.

The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its failure to file the corresponding charges against the
two detainees before the civil courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot
now be found. It anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is
illogical and even absurd to suggest that because the government cannot prosecute them, the prisoners’ detention must
continue.chanrob les law l ibra ry : red

The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General contended
that the prisoners had themselves opted to serve their sentences rather than undergo another trial. Their ultimate objective,
so it was maintained, was to secure their release by applying for executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a
letter from one Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo B. Paquinto "chooses to
complete the service of his sentence so that the Board of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case." 9 No mention
was made of Jesus Cabangunay.

Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their
counsel and said they had never seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to write the
letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be released on the strength of the Olaguer decision.

The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a reexamination of the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile 10 in relation to the
case of Tan v. Barrios, 11 is necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the Department of
Justice to file the informations against the prisoners; the decision of the UNHRC declaring admissible the communication No.
503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus suggesting the violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that it would have no
objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the Commission on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.

The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26, 1991, it declared, citing the Tan case, that "those
civilians who were convicted by military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentences of
imprisonment for the past many years." . . "may be given the option either to complete the service of their sentence, or be
tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their sentence for the full period of
their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they should be set free." chanro bles. com : virt ual law l ibra ry

Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with the directive in the ‘Cruz Cases’ for the filing of
the necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, without prejudice to
said petitioners’ exercise of the option granted to them by this Court’s ruling in G.R. Nos. 85481-82, William Tan, Et. Al. v.
Hernani, T. Barrios, etc., Et Al., supra." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary

The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its second motion for extension was denied, in view of
the necessity to decide this petition without further delay. 12 The memorandum was admitted just the same, but we find it
adds nothing to the respondent’s original arguments.

There is absolutely no question that the prisoners’ plea should be heeded. The government has failed to show that their
continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause
whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who
should be made to suffer. In the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime
for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free.

Liberty is not a gift of the government but the rights of the governed. Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the
law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived
from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does
not grant it. Liberty is right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a person is deprived of
this right, all of us diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible. chan roble s.com.p h : virt ual law li bra ry

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute
longer. They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.]

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.

Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.

 SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL OFFENSES
COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. — The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their
company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages.
That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex
delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment;
and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article
2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family
Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise
parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules
shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic illustration is
provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a bitter episode for those whose
lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic
legal verbiage, this disposition should at least terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting
from the unfortunate occurrence.

In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties, petitioners are
now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No.
69060 with the following decretal portion: jgc:c hanrobles. com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint is hereby reversed; and instead, judgment is
hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts: chan roble s.com : virtual law lib rary

1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3. Attorney’s fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees’ counterclaims is affirmed." 1

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann
Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an
18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same
event on the same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978
when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the
latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed
in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from
January 7 to 13, 1978.

On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith
and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime
inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who
are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of circumstantial
evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her
with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners,
puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an unknown third
party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby
avoid identification. cha nrob les.com: cralaw: red

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence. Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit." 2

On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was
set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal
by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case: chanro b1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for
vicarious liability. 3

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his findings and
opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own
suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the
wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be
taken into account in the determination of whether it was suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive discharge in the
entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed
at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he
died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor
before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test
on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was
hastily buried. c ralawnad

More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8) hours after the
incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death; that when he arrived at the
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis;
and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4 However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-
hour interval, he never saw the body nor did he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the
head which he examined because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier
admitted that as far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no burning or
singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general characteristics of contact or
near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these clarification: jgc:chan robles. com.ph

"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or tattooing that could
result from these guns because they are what we call clean?

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ: chanrob1es v irt ual 1aw l ibra ry

Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said may not rule out the
possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?

A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc., from the
trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the gun could have been
fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of entry a little above the right ear and
point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?

A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far as the angle
or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of which were the bullets
that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-Legal Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance located at the right temple of
Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

x x x

"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges inverted,
oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above right external auditory
meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the
temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal
bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound, irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms.
behind and 12.9 cms. above left external auditory meatus. chanroble s vi rtualawl ib rary c hanro bles. com:chan rob les.com. ph

x x x

"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder tatooing (sic),
smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance, or separation of the skin from
the underlying tissue, are absent." 10

On cross-examination, Dr. Cerna demonstrated his theory which was made of record, thus: jgc:chanroble s.com. ph

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and
the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the Honorable Court how would it have
been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the 24 inches?

WITNESS: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arm’s length.

ATTY. SENINING: chanrob1es vi rtua l 1aw li bra ry

I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight towards his
head." 11

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses Lydia Ang
and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from the Gotiongs and the second, a
resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the
Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.

On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station; that it is the
second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that there is a firewall between
her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she
called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that
she saw a man leap from the gate towards his rooftop. 13

However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied having talked
with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden in front of it; that his house
is next to Felipe Gotiong’s house; and he further gave the following answers to these questions: chan roble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary

"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q What is the height of the wall of the Gotiong’s in relation to your house?

WITNESS: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

A It is about 8 feet.

ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)

Q And where were you looking from?

WITNESS: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)

Q From Your living room window, is that correct?

WITNESS: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry

A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as to the
reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of both were obstructed by high walls in
their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso,
testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong
when they heard her scream; that when Manolo climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he
heard the first shot; and, not more than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the
fence and drove to the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolo’s direct and candid testimony establishes and explains
the fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the Gotiong
house.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot Wendell and
Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the crime nor did they file any
case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his
own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial, documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point
to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a
reconciliation. cha nro bles. com:cra law:red

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not be civilly
liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record either.

Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a
safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety deposit box and
Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking
or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We,
accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to
the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key
was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the
instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents in not diligently supervising
the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death
that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box.
Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither
was a plausible explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back
thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that firearm.

In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start of this opinion,
respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had this to say: jgc:chanroble s.com.p h

". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell,
and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides: c hanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry

‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their minor
children who live in their company.’

"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly kept in a
safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the criminal act of said minor
who was living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367),
which held that: chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary

‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code
covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’

‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is
determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, because to hold
that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses,
would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).

". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to the drawer
where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had been missing from that
safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly displayed said gun and dedicated this
picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in
keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ." chanro bles law lib rary : red nad

x x x

"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not correct in dismissing
herein plaintiffs-appellants’ complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence, defendants-appellees utterly failed to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of
the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said
gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been
committed." (Emphases ours.) 19

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability based on what
appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this opportunity, however, to digress and
discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, Et. Al. 20
which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses," followed by an
extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted
passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder. chanrobles law lib rary

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as
being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the
matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil
liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other
hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and
substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of
joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his
death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence
the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages." cralaw virt ua1aw libra ry

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise primary, not
subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides: jgc:chan roble s.com. ph

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. —

x x x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon
those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part." (Emphasis supplied.) 21

Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of the parents
for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family.

That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the corresponding
provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the
absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code
states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own
property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an
equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: jgc:chanrob les.co m.ph
"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be
insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with civil law."
cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the
subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v. Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen,
Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al., 25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the
aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9
but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations
are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen
and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to
quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents
would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate
variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court’s determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases
involving either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.

In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a separate civil
action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for failure of the latter to prove
the diligence of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and, therefore, primary liability was imposed in a
separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on
the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi-delict.

However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his son, who was
over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In
the present case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which
purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-
year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages
arising from his conviction for homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered
by Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack
of intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be solidary liability
for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was only held subsidiarily liable.

It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons causing damages
under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27 innkeepers, tavernkeepers and
proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals,
accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of their co-accused in the other classes. 30

Also, coming back to respondent court’s reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly accurate to
say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows that what respondent court
quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the
law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability. However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the
text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in
said cases of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its
decision in this wise: jgc:cha nrob les.c om.ph

"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by both parties,
independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176 upon which the present action
was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from fault or negligence under the Penal Code
(Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minor’s criminal
responsibility is of no moment." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held primarily liable for the
civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who
live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to
damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or
over but under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same shall devolve
upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the
guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32
However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the
parents and those who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts
committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by
Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the
preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained,
we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such
damages.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, Jr., JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Davide, Jr., J., took no part. I used to be counsel of one of the parties.

Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

GR No. 125925 January 28, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
VENTURA VINUYA Y DELA CRUZ, appellant.

MARTINEZ, J .:

Venture Vinuya reaching only fifth grade elementary school 1 was raped by rape on April 24, 1995 at 10-year-old boy
Bonavi Reyes. 2 When Ventura was presented to the Lower Court for trial he denied the rape star, so the lawsuit
against him was begun to be heard. 3

At the end of the trial the Prosecution announced its evidence against Ventura. As the hearing went on, Ventura,
with two lawyers designated by the Low Court for him, indicated that he wanted to replace his refusal to accept the
confession filed. 4 Although Prosecutors have not concluded their evidence, they have no objection to Ventura's
admission to the rape star. However, it may be that the seriousness of the filing has been directed by the Low Court
and provided Ventura's defenders with sufficient opportunity to thoroughly explain why he might have been guilty of
the offense and that he would also likewise take action . 5

The following days of the hearing were announced by Ventura's lawyers that despite their explanation of what might
have happened, he was still ready (Ventura) to admit the star. So when the Judge asked again, Ventura admitted
her allegations. To be sure Ventura's willingness to admit her confession and to the extent provided by the Rules of
the Court is subject to questioning. The Court made it clear from her question to 21-year-old Ventura that she had
enough body and mind, that she understood her confession in the living room, that through her admission there was
no need to show any evidence of the Prosecutor or the plaintiff,6
The Low Court of Appeals issued that Ventura was raped by the child, raped by a reclusion perpetua and paid a fine
of thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) to the child. 7 From that decision, Ventura filed a claim to the Supreme Court,
so the Low Court ordered that the litigation papers be filed, so only to the Court of Appeals. 8

In this Court asked Ventura's lawyer to reinstatement in the Lower Court the question of what they had requested in
the last Judge mentioned (a) Ventura to abolish his verbal adjudication response; (b) revoke the decision of the
Lower Court; and (k) re-set pre-trial and plea bargaining . 9

According to the Rules of the Court, any person charged with an offense with a death sentence, and pleases him to
commit a crime can not be judged promptly. 10 The Principles also stipulate that the Court shall order the Prosecutor
or complain to prove that there is no absolute claim to the offense committed against him. 11 It is not enough just to
say the Court that the defendant voluntarily admits her. It is necessary to ask the Low Court questions that it
recognizes the defendant's attitude toward his confession. It is necessary to have the Higher Court adequate
guidance to determine whether the defendant actually understands and understands the meaning, significance and
consequences of his admission. 12

But the above-mentioned procedures are only applicable if the infringement of the information "or" complaint "can be
considered a" capital offense "or a death penalty. 13 Based on the liability of the offense filed against Ventura it is not
considered to be "capital offense" but only "non-capital offense". Due to the filing of "non-capital offense", the
repatriation of a defendant in his or her acceptance response, after the Court has made a decision, is permitted by
the Rules of Court. Thus the procedure to be followed is provided by Grade 4 of the Code Number 116 14indicating
that a defendant who responded to the confession filed a filing, permits the Court to receive proofs - not to prove
that he has already committed the offense because he has admitted it - but to ascertain what is the appropriate
penalty that should be imposed on him according to the circumstances and proof of the matter. But the wishes of
receiving the evidence dependent on the proper and proper judgment of the Court. In addition, the Rules also state
that at any time before the Court's decision to finalize a "final", it may allow or allow the defendant to withdraw his or
her response to the star and exchange for non-admission. Again, if the defendant is allowed to withdraw his reply
depends on the Court's wise will. 15And the response response decision is not usually changed by the Higher Court
when the Low Court finds no serious mistakes or abuses. In this regard there is no such mistake or abuse that the
Low Court has made, so it should be the discretion it does not allow Ventura to withdraw and re-change its
response.

Nevertheless, despite the foregoing, there have been instances where strict enforcement of the Rules of Judgment
should be abolished not only for quick, if not more than just for a fair decision on the matter. 16 This issue,
encouraged to redress the procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.

The Constitution that exists in our society is strictly prohibited. 17 As much as defending the honor and dignity of a
10-year-old boy who has never even knocked on the door of a girl's life is the life, the future and the name of a
strangler who made a dull trick on dignity and innocence of innocent children, because he is considered innocent
until proven guilty.

The courageous former member of this Court of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco once said that "the decapitation of an
adolescent who is indiscriminate in the world is made of a monster that ought only to be punished by the
corresponding penalties of the courts our society. " 18 But despite this, the belief that the Constitution provides for our
innocence to be considered as guilty until proved guilty without any provisions of our courts. 19Among those present
shall be the transfer of justice through the appropriate procedure provided by the Constitution. Purpose Principles
are not the norm to enforce it ruthlessly. However, the procedures to be followed are laid out as a guide to the
investigation into the realization of real-life forces that are kept in the veil of lies. To make sense of justice must be
aware of the pure and simple facts through proofs obtained only in the manner prescribed and permitted by law.

It should have been examined by the Low Court and asked Ventura's defenders - and not just Ventura - to make
sure the defendant clearly explained the consequences of his admission. 20 But this procedure is not in the Rules, a
Judge should not decide according to what the law says but what it deserves. This is not made by the Low Court. It
is quite sensational to say that the victim is a victim, but the defendant, regardless of which person, has human
rights, such as the corresponding hearing, to be respected as provided by the Constitution. 21

It is therefore permissible to return the matter to the Lower Court, not to reinstate the case, but to continue the
cessation of the Investigator's stating statements before Ventura exchange her response to admit the star. It is also
based on the right to speedy trial of the matter provided not only by the Constitution 22 but also by the "Speedy Trial
Act of 1998" under Republic Act No. 8493 and Supreme Court Circular 38-98. " 23

BECAUSE OF THE APPOINTMENTS, the Court has ordered that this matter be restored to the Lower Court to
proceed with the persecution of the Prosecutor's Office or to prosecute their proofs and to continue the hearing on
the matter as provided by the Rules of Judgment.

CONDUCT. 1âw phi1.nêt

Davide, Jr., CJ, Melo, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., Concur.