LAW 154- LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

I. DECLARATION OF POLICY The autonomy of the LGUs as thereby ensured does not contemplate the
fragmentation of the Philippines into a collection of mini-states, or the
creation of imperium in imperio. The constitutional mandate to ensure local
LGC, SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – autonomy refers to decentralization.”
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political (Mandanas v Ochoa, Jr.)
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local
autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant DECENTRALIZATION
communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more Decentralization of Decentralization of Power
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a Administration
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given Occurs when the central Abdication of political power in favor of
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of government delegates LGUs declared to be autonomous
decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local administrative powers to regions, making the latter no longer
government units. political subdivisions in order to accountable to the national
make it more responsive government, but to its constituency
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local (Limbona v Mangelin) (Ganzon v CA)
government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative and referendum.
Four categories of decentralization in the Philippines (from National
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and Government to LGUs)
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government (1) Political decentralization or devolution- occurs when there is a
units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources from the central
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in government to the LGUs for the performance of certain functions.
their respective jurisdictions. (2) Administrative decentralization or deconcentration- involves the
transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the
AUTONOMY national office to the regional and local offices.
(3) Fiscal decentralization- means that the LGUs have the power to
LGC, SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. – create their own sources of revenue in addition to their just share in the
(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and national taxes released by the National Government.
political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful - It includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as own priorities.
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the - This is limited by Congress in subjecting the LGUs' power to tax to the
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for guidelines set in Section 130 of the LGC and to the limitations stated in
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted Section 133 of the LGC.
through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall (4) Policy or decision-making decentralization- exists if at least one
be given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The subnational tier of government has exclusive authority to make decisions on
process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to at least one policy issue.
the local government units. (Mandanas v Ochoa, Jr.)

“One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards DECONCENTRATION & DEVOLUTION
decentralization of government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two
facets, the administrative and the fiscal. Deconcentration
Deconcentration is
administrative in nature; it
Devolution
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes
political decentralization, or the transfer of
involves the transfer of
functions or the delegation of
authority and responsibility
from the national office to the
regional and local offices.
This mode of decentralization
is also referred to as
CASE
LIMBONA v MANGELIN
GANZON V CA
powers, responsibilities, and resources for
the performance of certain functions from
the central government to local
government units. This is a more liberal
form of decentralization since there is an
actual transfer of powers and
responsibilities. It aims to grant greater
FACTS
Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang
Pampook, and elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of
Central Mindanao. Petitioner sent a telegram to
Acting Secretary of the Assembly that there shall
be no session in November. The Assembly held
session in defiance of petitioner’s advice.
Various city official filed ten administrative
complaints against Iloilo City Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon for various charges, including abuse of
authority, grave misconduct, and arbitrary
detention. Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument is
that the 1987 no longer allows the President to
exercise the power of suspension and/or removal
over local officials. In particular, the basis of his
argument is the deletion of the phrase “as may be
administrative autonomy to local government units in
decentralization. cognizance of their right to self-
government, to make them self-reliant,
and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities.
(Disomangcop v Datumanong)
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The autonomous regions of Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction
of the national courts. An examination of the very Presidential Decree
creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in decentralization of power.
They are under the supervision of the national government acting through
the President, and under the Court’s Jurisdiction.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power.
Decentralization of administration – the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments
“more responsive and accountable,” and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress.”
It relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
Decentralization of power – an abdication of political power in the favor
of local governments units declared to be autonomous.
Decentralization of power amounts to “self­immolation,” since in that
event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.
The Court held that the local autonomy under the Constitution
involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in
which local officials remain accountable to the central government.
Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the
latter may impose disciplinary action against local officials.
 provided by law” in Art. X, Sec. 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
PIMENTEL, JR. V President Ramos issued AO 372, making it
AGUIRRE imperative that all government agencies adopt
cash management measures to match the
expenditures with the available resources.
Petitioners filed a Petition seeking (1) to annul
Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372,
insofar as it requires local government units to
reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from
implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
PROVINCE OF NORTH Formal peace talks were held between the
COTABATO v GRP Government and MILF, which resulted in the
PEACE PANEL ON GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN Agreement 2001). Negotiations led to the
finalization of the Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which grants
the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro
to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). With
regard to governance. a shared responsibility and
authority between the Central Government and
BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as associative. With the formulation of
the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation
and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No.
3, and right to information. They further contend
that it violates the Constitution and laws.
The Court ruled that Sec. 1 is valid as it is merely advisory in nature
and does not interfere with local autonomy but Sec. 4 is not valid
because any retention by the national government of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units is a violation of the LGC and
Constitution which mandates the automatic release of revenue shares.
Philippine concept of local autonomy: Only administrative powers over
local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions but these must still be in
line with the policies set for the entire country by the President and
Congress.
Fiscal Autonomy: local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities.
Local Fiscal Autonomy does not, however, rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs are consistent with national goals.
The President, according to the Constitution, is the head of the economic
and planning agency of the government and is primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social
and economic policies, plans and program for the entire country.
The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently
worded
The Concept of Association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
Associative relationship defined as a middle ground between integration
and independence. One state— the associate—delegates responsibilities
to the principal state, while maintaining its status as a state.
The aforementioned are inconsistent with the Constitution.
The only jurisdiction recognized is the Philippine State
ARMMs at the most, still conform to the framework of this Constitution.
The President may exercise her powers as delegated to the GRP Peace
Panel, to conduct Peace Negotiations, as reflected in the SUSPENSIVE
clause of the MOA-AD (the clause where amendments are guaranteed).
But NOT the power to guarantee Constitutional Amendments; only to
propose them to Congress as ways to effect the agreements mentioned.
DEMAALA v COA Narra, a town in Palawan, enacted an ordinance
that collected an additional 0.5% real property tax
which was to be used in a special education fund.
The ordinance was done in pursuant of LGC Sec
235 which gave the LGU’s an option to impose
said tax for said purpose. The difference however
lies in that the rate stated in the LGC was 1%
rather than the ordinance’s 1%. The COA
considered the 0.5% collected as a deficiency and
held Mayor Demaala and several other LGU
officials personally liable for the deficiency.
MANGUNE v ERMITA This is a Petition for Review from an RTC Manila
decision which declared EO 567 as constitutional.
The assailed EO, issued by Pres. Arroyo,
devolved the administration and supervision of the
Taguig-Pateros District Hospital from the DOH to
the City of Taguig.
MANDANAS v OCHOA, There are two cases consolidated, both assailing
JR. the computation in the General Appropriations Act
for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), which in
turn is constitutionally and regularly released to
LGUs as their just share. Collections of national
internal revenue taxes by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) — excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs)
SC reiterates that given the language of LGC Sec 235, said tax is optional
and it is within the LGU’s power to collect said tax and impose a specific
rate, and that if there is any doubt with regards to the taxing power of the
LGU, said doubt must be resolved in favor of fiscal autonomy of the LGU
as a declared preference by the constitution.
The Court denied the petition, ruling that in its Declaration of Policy, the
LGC espouses a system of decentralization through the devolution to
LGUs of the delivery of basic services.
Regarding petitioners’ invocation of Sec. 17(e), LGC:
Sec. 17(e), LGC. (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall
devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision
of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six
(6) months after the effectivity of this Code.
As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which
the national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.
which limits the devolution of services to LGUs only 6 months from the
effectivity of the LGC, the Court states that the law “must be interpreted
not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.”
One form of decentralization is devolution, which involves the transfer of
powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain
functions from the central government to the LGUs. Devolution is
indispensable to decentralization.
The 6-month period in the LGC was intended to prompt the national
government to speedily devolve existing services to LGUs. However,
there is nothing that expressly prohibits devolution after this period.
The phrase “internal revenue” which modified “national taxes” as the base
amount for IRA allocation in Section 284 of the LGC was found
unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution on “national taxes” alone.
The provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, Constitutional
Commisions, Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human Rights share
 and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) — have not
been included in the base amounts for the
computation of the IRA.
ACCOUNTABILITY
LGC, SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. –
(b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local
government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative and referendum.
CONSULTATION
LGC, SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. –
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government
units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned
sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in
their respective jurisdictions.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
1987 CONST. ARTICLE X LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
two aspects: The first relates to the grant of fiscal autonomy, and the
second concerns the automatic release of funds.
The common denominator of the provisions is that the automatic release
of the appropriated amounts is predicated on the approval of the annual
appropriations of the offices or agencies concerned. Directly contrasting
with the foregoing provisions is Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution which only mentions automatic release, and appropriation is
not a condition for the automatic release of the just share.
Four categories of decentralization in the Philippines (from National
Government to LGUs (supra)
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan
political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no
such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective
provincial officials.
LGC, SECTION 3. Operative Principles of Decentralization. - The
formulation and implementation of policies and measures on local
autonomy shall be guided by the following operative principles:
(a) There shall be an effective allocation among the different local
government units of their respective powers, functions,
responsibilities, and resources;
(b) There shall be established in every local government unit an
accountable, efficient, and dynamic organizational structure and
operating mechanism that will meet the priority needs and service
requirements of its communities;
(c) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, local officials
and employees paid wholly or mainly from local funds shall be
appointed or removed, according to merit and fitness, by the
appropriate appointing authority;
(d) The vesting of duty, responsibility, and accountability in local
government units shall be accompanied with provision for
 reasonably adequate resources to discharge their powers and
effectively carry out their functions; hence, they shall have the
power to create and broaden their own sources of revenue and
the right to a just share in national taxes and an equitable share in
the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
wealth within their respective areas;
(e) Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities,
and cities and municipalities with respect to component
Barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are
within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions:
(f) Local government units may group themselves, consolidate or
coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes
commonly beneficial to them;
(g) The capabilities of local government units ,especially the
municipalities and Barangays, shall been enhanced by providing
them with opportunities to participate actively in the
implementation of national programs and projects;
(h) There shall be a continuing mechanism to enhance local
autonomy not only by legislative enabling acts but also by
administrative and organizational reforms;
(i) Local government units shall share with the national government
the responsibility in the management and maintenance of
ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction, subject to the
provisions of this Code and national policies;
(j) Effective mechanisms for ensuring the accountability of local
government units to their respective constituents shall be
strengthened in order to upgrade continually the quality of local
leadership;
(k) The realization of local autonomy shall be facilitated through
improved coordination of national government policies and
programs and extension of adequate technical and material
assistance to less developed and deserving local government
units;
(l) The participation of the private sector in local governance,
particularly in the delivery of basic services, shall be encouraged
to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy
for sustainable development; and
(m) The national government shall ensure that decentralization
tributes to the continuing improvement of the performance of local
government units and the quality of community life.
CASE FACTS
TANO v SOCRATES Petitioners assail certain ordinances by the LGU
of Palawan for being unconstitutional.
(Ordinances: banning shipment of all live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princesa; requiring persons
engaged in any trade/profession or having in his
possession articles for which a permit is required
to first obtain a Mayor’s Permit; prohibiting
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
shipping of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms as listed for 5 years.)
They claim that the prohibition catch, gather,
possess, buy, sell, or ship certain aquatic
organisms deprives them of their livelihood and
lawful occupation and trade.
RULES OF INTERPRETATION
LGC, SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local
government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the
power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
(b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be
construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and
liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief
granted by any local government unit pursuant to the provisions of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The SC held that the issuances are not unconstitutional. The centerpiece
of LGC is the system of decentralization. Indispensable to decentralization
is devolution. LGUs have the power, within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology.
Some of the devolved powers of LGUs are
1) the enforcement of fishery laws within the municipal waters,
2) the establishment of a closed season to allow aquatic animals to
recover, and,
3) as under the general welfare clause, the protection of marine life in
Palawan.
These are the contents/purpose of the assailed ordinances. They are a
valid exercise of the powers of the LGU.
[Sir Raquedan says: This is an example of the application of LGC Sec 3 (i)]
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in accelerating
economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in
the community;
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code
and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation involving a
local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were
vested; and
(e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no
legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs
and traditions in the place where the controversies take place.
Basically: In favor of the LGU
 CASE FACTS
CITY OF OZAMIS v Petitioners assail certain ordinances by the LGU
LUMAPAS of Palawan for being unconstitutional.
(Ordinances: banning shipment of all live fish and
lobster outside Puerto Princesa; requiring persons
engaged in any trade/profession or having in his
possession articles for which a permit is required
to first obtain a Mayor’s Permit; prohibiting
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling,
shipping of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms as listed for 5 years.)
They claim that the prohibition catch, gather,
possess, buy, sell, or ship certain aquatic
organisms deprives them of their livelihood and
lawful occupation and trade.
EFFECTIVITY
LGC, SECTION 5 (d)
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this
Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original
terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the
time such rights were vested; and
CASE FACTS
EVERDONE v COMELEC Apelado, et al. filed a petition for the recall of
Mayor Evardone with the Office of Local Election
Registrar. COMELEC approved the
recommendation of the Election Registrar to hold
a signing of the petition for recall. Evardone filed
a TRO which was granted 2 days beforethe
holding of the signing. Although notice was
received by the principal COMELEC office on the
day itself, such notice was only received by the
COMELEC field agent a day after the recall was
signed. COMELEC nullified the signing for being
violative of the TRO. Evardone seeks to annul the
COMELEC resolution approving the petition for
recall on the theory that the 1987 Constitution
repealed BP 337 (Local Government Code) in
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The SC held that the issuances are not unconstitutional. The centerpiece
of LGC is the system of decentralization. Indispensable to decentralization
is devolution. LGUs have the power, within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology.
Some of the devolved powers of LGUs are
1) the enforcement of fishery laws within the municipal waters,
2) the establishment of a closed season to allow aquatic animals to
recover, and,
3) as under the general welfare clause, the protection of marine life in
Palawan.
These are the contents/purpose of the assailed ordinances. They are a
valid exercise of the powers of the LGU.
[Sir Raquedan says: This is an example of the application of LGC Sec 3 (i)]
Section 536. Effectivity Clause. - This Code shall take effect on January
first, nineteen hundred ninety-two, unless otherwise provided herein, after
its complete publication in at least one (1) newspaper of general
circulation.
Basically: Law governing at the time of the filing of a case/charge is the one
that governs.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
This case discusses a situation in the interim between the effectivity of the
old and new LGC and concludes that during the period where there was
still no new LGC the old LGC was still in force so long as it was not
inconsistent with the 1987 constitution.
 favor of a new code yet to be created by the
legislature.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH Private respondent Sibbaluca was charged for SC ruled against her petition. SC said that the case is outside the ambit of
v CA grave misconduct and dishonesty before the DOH the provisions of the LGC of 1991, as this law only became effective in
in 1991. 1992, not in 1991.

SOH ruled against her, and as a result, she was

suspended from office. Sibbaluca instituted an
action against the SOH arguing that it was the
Provincial Governor, not the SOH, who has
disciplinary powers over her, as per the new LGC
of 1991.

II. GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES OF LGUS

municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive

1987 Constitution Article X historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There Philippines.
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. SECTION 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
SECTION 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable share in
the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth SECTION 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall,
within their respective areas, in the manner provided by law, including within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass
sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits. the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.

SECTION 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan

political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10
CREATION AND CONVERSION
hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic
autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will hereby Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
 territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements
prescribed in this Code.
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the creation of
a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to
provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and
special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as
expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. - It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government
unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a local government unit
LGUs are POLITICAL and CORPORATE units. [Bagabuyo v COMELEC]
o As a political subdivision, an LGU is an instrumentality of the state in
carrying out the functions of government.
o As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality
from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its
constituents. It acts as an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs and the mediums through which the
people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns.
FOR CREATION, DIVISION, MERGER, ABOLOTION OR SUBSTANTIAL
ALTERATION OF BOUNDARIES (as per Art. 10 Sec X)
General Requisites:
1) By law (province, city, municipality or any other policial
subdivision) OR by ordinance (barangay)
2) In accordance with LGC criteria:
a. For creation, conversion (LGC, Sec. 7)
i. Income- sufficient
ii. Population- total number of inhabitants
iii. Land Area- contiguous, properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions,
sufficient to provide basic services and facilites
iv. Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall
be attested to by the Department of Finance
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the
Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
Section 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence. - When a new local
government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon
the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the
members of its sanggunian, unless some other time is fixed therefor by the
law or ordinance creating it.
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
b. For division and merger (LGC, Sec. 8)
i. (same but) division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the LGU concerned
to less than the minimum requirements
ii. The income classification of the original LGU
shall not fall below its current classification prior
to such division.
c. For abolition (LGC, Sec. 9)
i. Its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum
standards prescribed for its creation
3) Approval by majority votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit/ units directly affected.
Re: Legislative Reapportionment vis a vis Creation:
Legislative reapportionment does not include the division or creation of an
LGU. Article VI Sec. 5 governs the rules on reapportionment. The creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units,
i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by Art. X,
Sec. 10. Legislative districts are representation, while LGUs are the political
subdivisions of the state (plebiscite, and compliance with the requirements of
the LGC). A plebiscite is required for the creation of LGUs, while it is not for
legislative districts. 
 [Bagabuyo v COMELEC]
 CASE FACTS DOCTRINE
PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL Vice Pres. Emmanuel Pelaez assails Pres. The Court held that the said Sec. 68 constituted an
Diosdado Macapagal’s issuance of Executive invalid delegation of legislative power, and had
Orders Nos. 93-121, 124, and 126-129, which been repealed not by R.A. No. 2370, but by the
created thirty-three municipalities. According to Constitution.
Pelaez, the said executive orders are null and void
as Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
pursuant to which the executive orders were
supposedly issued, has been impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 2370.

TORRALBA V MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

CHIONGBAN V ORBOS

HERRERA V COMELEC

CAWALING V COMELEC

LATASA V COMELEC

SULTAN V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SEMA V COMELEC

BAGABUYO V COMELEC

NAVARRO V ERMITA

CAGAS V COMELEC

2) Attempt in good faith to organize the corp

REQUIREMENTS (LGC, Sec. 7, supra) 3) Colorable compliance with the law
4) Assumption of corporate powers
DE JURE v DE FACTO
[Sir Raquedan says: This is purely academic now. Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC
converted de facto corps to de jure:
De Facto Corporations- Formed when there is defect in the creation of a
“Municipal districts which were organized pursuant to presidential issuances
municipal corporation but its legal existence has been recognized and
or executive orders which have their respective set of elective municipal
acquiesced publicy and officially.
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the LGC are considered
as regular municiplaiites”]
Requisites [Municipality of Malabang v Benito]
1) Apparently valid law under which the corporation may be formed
CASE FACTS DOCTRINE
 PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL
CITY OF MALABANG v BENITO
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO V MENDEZ
CANDIJAY V CA
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ V BAZ

INCOME Resource persons during hearings meet the documentary requirements

Income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds transfers,
and non-recurring income (LGC, Sec. 442, 450, 451) is in cluded in “average
annual income”
The internal revenue allotment (IRA) of municipalities form part of
their annual income [Alvarez v Guingona]
provided under Section 7. [Samason v Aguirre]
Conversion criteria cannot solely be based on the new income requirement.
Capability and viability to become component cities should also be
considered. [League of Cities v COMELEC]

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

ALVAREZ V GUINGONA, JR
SAMSON V AGUIRRE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES

POPULATION
City whose population has increased to 250k is entitled to have a leg district
only in the immediately following election after attainment of the 250k
population. [Aldaba v COMELEC]
Population requirement is required only for cities. Even in the LGC, 250k is
not an indispensable requirement but merely an alternative [Aquino III v
COMELEC]
Note: Each city with a population of 250k shall have at least 1
representative—but this is a requirement for apportionment of
legislative districts.

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

ALDABA V COMELEC
AQUINO III V COMELEC

LAND AREA Requirement of contiguous land area is not needed if an LGU is comprised of
islands. [Navarro v Ermita]

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

MARIANO V COMELEC
NAVARRO V ERMITA

DIVISION AND MERGER
Section 8. Division and Merger. – Division and merger of existing local
government units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed
for their creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the
income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code:
Provided, further, That the income classification of the original local
government unit or units shall not fall below its current classification prior to
such division.
The income classification of local government units shall be updated within
six (6) months from the effectivity of this Code to reflect the changes in their
financial position resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein
 CASE FACTS DOCTRINE
BAGABUYO V COMELEC

ABOLITION
Section 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. - A local government unit
may be abolished when its income, population, or land area has been
irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its
creation under Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies
mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the sangguniang concerned,
as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the
province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit
sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged.
The fact that nobody resides in an LGU does not result in its automatic
cessation. The Congress or the sanggunian must pass a law or an ordinance
for the abolition of such LGU, subject to the mandatory requirement of a
plebiscite. [Sultan Usman Sarangani v COMELEC]

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

SARANGANI V COMELEC
SALVA MAKALINTAL

PLEBISCITE Plebiscite is required for creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial

Plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date (LGC, Sec. 10)
BUT Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be
held. Power to fix is legislative in nature. Determination of the feasibility of
holding a plebiscite on a given date is within the discretion of the COMELEC.
[Cagas v COMELEC]
alteration of boundaries. This includes conversion [Tobias v Abalos] and
downgrading [Miranda v Aguirre]. Plebiscite is not required for creation or
dissolution of legislative districts [Bagabuyo v COMELEC] and administrative
regions.
Boundary dispute … presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may
be held [City of Pasig v COMELEC]

The term “in the political units directly affected”

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

CARAM V COMELEC
TOBIAS V ABALOS
MIRANDA V AGUIRRE
CITY OF PASIG V COMELEC
CAGAS V COMELEC

SELECTION AND TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENT OFFICES AND
NAMING RULES
SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site,
Offices and Facilities.
(a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local government units shall
specify the seat of government from where governmental and corporate
services shall be delivered. In selecting said site, factors relating to
geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of transportation and
communication facilities, drainage and sanitation, development and
economic progress, and other relevant considerations shall be taken into
account.
(b) When conditions and developments in the local government unit
concerned have significantly changed subsequent to the establishment of
the seat of government, its Sanggunian may, after public hearing and by a
vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members, transfer the same to a site better
suited to its needs. Provided, however, That no such transfer shall be
made outside the territorial boundaries of the local government unit
concerned.
The old site, together with the improvements thereon, may be disposed of
by sale or lease or converted to such other use as the Sanggunian
concerned may deem beneficial to the local government unit concerned
and its inhabitants.
(c) Local government offices and facilities shall not be transferred,
relocated, or converted to other uses unless public hearings are first
conducted for the purpose and the concurrence of the majority of all the
members of the Sanggunian concerned is obtained.
SECTION 12. Government Centers. - Provinces, cities, and
municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government center where
offices, agencies, or branches of the national government, local
government units, or government-owned or -controlled corporations may,
as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local
government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of
national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the
government center as contemplated under this Section. The national
government , local government unit or government-owned or -controlled
corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its
buildings and facilities in the government center.
SECTION 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places,
Streets and Structures.
(a) The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine
Historical Commission (PHC), change the name of the following within its
territorial jurisdiction:
(1) Component cities and municipalities, upon the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned;
(2) Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thorough-fares, and
bridges;
(3) Public vocational or technical schools and other post-
secondary and tertiary schools;
(4) Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities;
and
(5) Any other public place or building owned by the provincial
government.
(b) The Sanggunian of highly urbanized cities and of component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials, hereinafter referred to in this Code as independent component
cities, may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission,
change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:
(1) City Barangays, upon the recommendation of the
Sangguniang Barangay concerned;
(2) City roads, avenues, boulevards, thorough fares, and bridges;
(3) Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical
schools, community colleges and non-chartered colleges; (4) City
hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and
(5) Any other public place or building owned by the city
government.
(c) The Sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in
consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name
of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:
(6) city and municipal Barangays, upon recommendation of the
Sangguniang Barangay concerned;
(7) city, municipal and Barangay roads, avenues, boulevards,
thorough fares, and bridges;
(8) city and municipal public elementary, secondary and
vocational or technical schools, post-secondary and other tertiary
schools;
(9) city and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health
facilities; and (5)Any other public place or building owned by the
municipal government.
(d) None of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or
buildings shall be named after a living person, nor may a change of name
be made unless for a justifiable reason and, in any case, not oftener than
once every ten (10) years. The name of a local government unit or a public
place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic significance shall
not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the Sanggunian
concerned and in consultation with the PHC.
(e) A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the
recommendation of the local school board concerned.
(f) A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health
facilities shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local health
board concerned.
(g) The change of name of any local government unit shall be effective
only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the
political unit directly affected. In any change of name, the Office of the
President, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the
Bureau of Posts shall be notified.

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

SAMSON V AGUIRRE

POLITICAL AND CORPORATE NATURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
SECTION 11, supra
SECTION 22 Corporate Powers.
(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the
following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this
Code and other laws.
(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or
change their existing corporate seals: Provided, That newly
established local government units or those without corporate
seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be
registered with the Department of the Interior and Local
Government: Provided, further, That any change of corporate seal
shall also be registered as provided herein.
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, contract may be
entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the local
government unit without prior authorization by the Sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
Barangay hall.
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the
exercise of their proprietary functions and in the management of
their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in
this Code and other applicable laws.

CORPORATE POWERS

CASE FACTS DOCTRINE

VILLAS v CITY OF MANILA
PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v CITY
OF ZAMBOANGA
TORIO V FONTANILLA
CITY OF MANILA V IAC
MACASIANO V DIOKNO
REPUBLIC V CITY OF DAVAO
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF BATAAN V
GARCIA

BASIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES

CASE FACTS
LLDA V CA
ALBON V FERNANDO
FILINVEST LAND INC V FLOOD AFFECTED
HOMEOWNERS OF MERITVILLE ALLIANCE
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
V DENR
PIMENTEL, JR. V OCHOA
MANGUNE V ERMITA
AUTHORITY TO NEGOTATIE AND SECURE GRANTS
SECTION 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. - Local chief
executives may, upon authority of the Sanggunian, negotiate and secure
financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services or
facilities enumerated under Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign
assistance agencies without necessity of securing clearance or approval
therefor from any department, agency, or office of the national government
or from any higher local government unit: Provided, That projects financed
by such grants or assistance with national security implications shall be
approved by the national agency concerned: Provided, further, That when
such national agency fails to act on the request for approval within thirty
(30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved.
The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon signing of such
grant agreement or deed of donation, report the nature, amount, and terms
of such assistance to both Houses of Congress and the President.
LOCAL PREQUALIFICATION, BIDS AND AWARDS COMMITTEE
SECTION 37. Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee
(Local PBAC).
(a) There is hereby created a local prequalification, bids and awards
committee in every province, city, and municipality, which shall be
primarily responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors,
bidding, evaluation of bids, and the recommendation of awards concerning
local infrastructure projects. The governor or the city or municipal Mayor
shall act as the chairman with the following as members:
(1) The chairman of the appropriations committee of the
Sanggunian concerned;
(2) A representative of the minority party in the Sanggunian
DOCTRINE
concerned, if any, or if there be none, one (1) chosen by said
Sanggunian from among its members;
(3) The local treasurer;
(4) Two (2) representatives of nongovernmental organizations
that are represented in the local development council concerned,
to be chosen by the organizations themselves; and (11) Any
practicing certified public accountant from the private sector, to be
designated by the local chapter of the Philippine Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, if any.
Representatives of the Commission on Audit shall observe the
proceedings of such committee and shall certify that the rules and
procedures for prequalification, bids and awards have been complied with.
(b) The agenda and other information relevant to the meetings of such
committee shall be deliberated upon by the committee at least one (1)
week before the holding of such meetings.
(c) All meetings of the committee shall be held in the provincial capitol or
the city or municipal hall. The minutes of such meetings of the committee
and any decision made therein shall be duly recorded, posted at a
prominent place in the provincial capitol or the city or municipal hall, and
delivered by the most expedient means to elective local officials
concerned.
LOCAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE
SECTION 38. Local Technical Committee. -
(a) There is hereby created a local technical committee in every province,
city and municipality to provide technical assistance to the local
prequalification, bids and awards committees. It shall be composed of the
provincial, city or municipal engineer, the local planning and development
 coordinator, and such other officials designated by the local
prequalification, bids and awards committee.
(b) The chairman of the local technical committee shall be designated by
the local prequalification, bids and awards committee and shall attend its
meeting in order to present the reports and recommendations of the local
technical committee.
GENERAL WALFARE CLAUSE
SECTION 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall
exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied there
from, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

(Constitutional?  or )
PEOPLE V GABRIEL 
SAMSON V MAYOR OF
BACOLOD CITY 
CITY GOVERNMENT OF
QUEZON CITY V ERICTA 
BALACUIT V CFI OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE AND BUTUAN
CITY, BR. II 
MMFA V BEL-AIR 
BATANGAS CATV, INC. V CA 
TABAYAN Y CALIPLIP V
PEOPLE 
WHITE LIGHT CORP V CITY
OF MANILA 

ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE
LGC, SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -
(a) The Sangguniang Bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to section
16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
municipality as provided for under section 22 of this Code, and shall …
(5) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and
structures within the municipality in order to promote the general welfare
and for said purpose shall:
(i) Declare, prevent or abate any nuisance.
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a)
The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under section 22 of this Code, and shall …
(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures
within the city in order to promote the general welfare and for said purpose
shall:
(i) Declare, prevent or abate any nuisance;
NCC, Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or
endangers the health or safety of others; or although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or foregoing definition.

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects
a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons,
Article 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or (2) A
civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
RA 9165, Sec. 52, 53

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

ESTATE OF FRANCISCO
V CA
PARAYNO V
JOVELLANOS
ASILO JR. V PEOPLE
PEREZ V SPS. MADRONA
KINGHTS OF RIZAL V
DMCI HOMES, INC.

EMINENT DOMAIN finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
LGC, SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public ROC, RULE 67, Expropriation
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the RA 7279, Sec. 9 and 10
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
Requisites (in general):
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be 1. Necessity
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously 2. Private property
made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: 3. Taking
Provided, further, That the local government unit may 4. Public Use
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of 5. Just compensation
the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with
Requisites for the Exercise of Eminent Domain by an LGU
the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing
market value of the property based on the current tax the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
 exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation Resolution
proceedings over a particular private property;
2. The power is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the Mere declaration of the opinion of the
benefit of the poor and the landless; Considered as law
lawmaking body
3. There is payment of just compensation based on the fair market
On matters applying to persons or
value of the property at the time of taking; and On a specific matter
things in general
4. A valid and definite offer was previously made to the owner of the
property, but the offer was not accepted Intended to permanently direct and Temporary in nature
[Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong] control
A third reading is not necessary unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the
A third reading is necessary
Eminent Domain may only be excercised via ORDINANCE. sanggunian members
ORDINANCE v RESOLUTION (BOC Reviewer 2018)
Ordinance [Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 111230 (1994)]

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

PROVINCE OF
CAMARINES SUR V CA
FILSTREAM
INTERNATIONAL
INCORPORATED V CA
MUNICIPALITY OF
PARANAQUE V VM
REALTY CORP
SUGUITAN V CITY OF
MANDALUYONG
CITY OF CEBU V
SPOUSES DEDAMO
JESUS IS LORD
CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
FOUNDATION INC V
MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
MASIKIP V CITY OF
PASIG
BELUSO V MUNICIPALITY
OF PANAY (CAPIZ)

RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands.
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed by the
Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for
the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases:
(1) when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound
for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater
economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes,
as determined by the Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the
 total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the
ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component
cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five
percent(5%): Provided, further, That agricultural lands
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A.
No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands into
other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority, authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
excess of the limits set in the next preceding paragraph.
CASE FACTS
PATALINGHUG v CA Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted an ordinance
on zoning of the city. A building permit was issued
to the petitioner to construct a funeral parlo at
Cabaguio Avenue. Respondents complained that
the said funeral parlor was within 50 m radius of
INC Chapel and resident structures. The Court
held that petitioner did not violate the ordinance.
The Court found that the nearest structure is a
commercial building. Even though the Tepoot
building was declared as residential for tax
purposes, it was reclassified as commercial by the
local government and that determination for
zoning purposes must prevail.
FORTRICH v CORONA The case involves a 114-hectare land in Bukidnon
owned by NQSRMDC. The Sangguniang Bayan
of Bukidnon enacted an Ordinance converting the
property from agricultural to industrial/institutional
to attract investors since under Section 20 of the
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing
laws, continue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use
plans enacted through zoning ordinances which shall be the
primary and dominant bases for the future use of land resources:
Provided, That the requirements for food production, human
settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into
consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Failure to act on a proper and complete application for
reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the same
shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No.
6657.
AO 363 (1997)
[Sir Raquedan says: Power to reclassify is with DAR; not conversion etc etc.
DON’T FORGET JUNE 15, 1988!! Before this date, there was no need for
DAR approval for reclassification.]
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Court held that the declaration of the area as a commercial zone thru
a municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality. The state, in order
to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations.
SC held that the Win-Win Resolution is void because when the OP issued
the Order declaring the March 1996 Decision final and executory, as no
one had seasonably filed an MR, OP lost its jurisdiction to re-open the
case, more so modify its Decision.
 LGC 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize
the classification of 5% of their agricultural land
area and provide for the manner of utilisation.
However, DAR Sec. Garilao placed the property
under the compulsory coverage of CARP and
directed the distribution to all qualified
beneficiaries. The OP, however, reversed the
DAR Sec.'s decision because converting the land
would open great opportunities for employment
and bring about great development in economic
growth of the municipality. The OP's decision was
declared final and executory. Some alleged
farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in
front of the DAR compound in QC, which led to
the issuance of the Win/Win Resolution penned
by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.
Corona, stating that only 44 ha of the property
would be converted. Petitioners aver the OP was
only prompted to issue it, modifying the order of
the OP which had already become final and
executory.
ROS v DAR Petitioners are the owners/developers of several Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of
parcels of land located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on
By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial,
these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification
the Provincial Board of Cebu approved of agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to
Balamban’s land use plan and adopted en toto change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to
Balambans Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial agricultural land for other purposes.
Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively.

DE GUZMAN v CA Petitioners were tenants of a piece of land that
was expropriated by the municipality for the
purpose of building a market. The construction did
not push through even after many years so the
petitioners sought the classification of the land
into one that was viable for the land transfer
program. The petition was approved, but
subsequently reversed. Hence, this petition.
The zoning ordinance passed by the municipality sometime in 1980
reclassifying the subject land as commercial and future site of a
market complex operated to take away the "agricultural" status of the
subject property. Subsequent events cited by petitioners such as their
continuous tillage of the land and the non- commencement of the
construction of the market complex did not strip the land of its classification
as commercial.

UNITED BF Municipal Council of Paranaque enacted The Court held that the LGC and E.O. 72 which implements the LGC
HOMEOWNERS ASSOC v Municipal Ordinance 97-08 reclassifying parcels provisions on land use plans empowers cities and municipalities to enact
of land along El Grande and Aguirre Ave. in BF zoning regulations and ordinances in promotion of the public welfare. In
THE CITY MAYOR OF Homes Paranaque from residential to commercial.
PARANAQUE Union BF Homeowners’ Associations, Inc.
(UBFHAI), other associations and residents
questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance,
arguing that it amounts to the impairment of
contracts between the developers and the lot
buyers. The municipality, on the other hand,
argues that the ordinance was a valid police
power measure.
CHAMBER OF REAL CREBA seeks to nullify and prohibit the
ESTATE AND BUILDERS enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended
ASSOC v SEC OF by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum
AGRARIAN REFORM No. 88, for having been issued by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as
some provisions of the aforesaid administrative
issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
According to CREBA, by reason of the said AO
and Memorandum, there is an actual slow down
of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the
housing shortage, unemployment and illegal
squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not
only of the petitioner and its members but more so
of the whole nation.
this case, the ordinance was enacted as a valid police power measure,
the LGUs being empowered under the law to issue the same and the
ordinance being neither discriminatory nor oppressive. Since it is a police
power measure, it defeats the non-impairment of the contract as the rights
of property in a contract must yield to a valid exercise of police power.
The Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body
of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. While the non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has
to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power. There is no
reason why public welfare should not be made to prevail through the state’s
exercise of its police power.
The SC dismissed the petition. On procedure alone, the petition must
necessarily fail because the SC does not have original jurisdiction over a
Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Moreover, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction and gravely abuse his discretion because EO No. 129-A
vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the CARP. DAR
has also been given the authority to approve land conversion.
Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the
definition of agricultural lands “lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non­agricultural uses before 15 June 1988”
for purposes of land use conversion. DAR AO No. 01-02 also does not
violate the local autonomy of local government units, nor does it violate
the equal protection and due process clause of the Constitution. Lastly,
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the
public
Having recognized the DAR’s conversion authority over lands reclassified
after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued that the SAR was wrongfully
given the authority and power to include “lands not reclassified as
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988” in the definition of agricultural lands. Such inclusion does not
unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it
made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DAR’s conversion
authority, thus, serving the very purpose of the land use conversion
provisions of RA No. 6657.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is
the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures

DAVAO NEW TOWN
DEVELOPMENT CORP v
SPS SALINGA
CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS
LGC, SECTION 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.
(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley,
park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however,
That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the
public facility that is subject to closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently
closed without making provisions for the maintenance of public
safety therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public
use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no freedom
park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer
or relocation to a new site.
CASE FACTS
SANGALANG v IAC To decongest traffic and for public convenience,
the Mayor of Makati opened Jupiter Street to the
public. The Bel-Air Village Association argued that
Jupiter Street is for the exclusive use of Bel-Air
residents.
for land use conversion. A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does
not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo
the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land
for other purposes.
The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The
authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by
RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said
Sec. 20 of RA No. 7160
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be
temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an
undertaking of public works and highways, telecommunications,
and waterworks projects, the duration of which shall be specified
by the local chief executive concerned in a written order: Provided,
however, That no national or local road, alley, park, or square
shall set temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities
not officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or Barangay may, by a duly enacted
close and regulate the use of any local ordinance, temporarily
street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place where
shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or shopping areas
may be established and where goods, merchandise, foodstuffs,
commodities, or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed
to the general public.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Mayor’s act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to
open a city street for public use.
Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, above this is the duty of a
local executive to take care of the needs of the majority despite the
expense of the minority.
CABRERA v CA
DACANAY v ASISTIO, JR. Petitioner files a Mandamus petition to compel
respondents to demolish and clear the market
stalls on V. Gozon, Gonzales and Heroes ’96
Streets.
SPS PILAPIL v CA A camino vecinal, owned by the Colomidas,
traversed the property of the Pilapils. The
Colomidas filed for injunction and damages when
the petitioners threatened to hurt them if they did
not stop improvements on the camino vecinal and
the court ruled in their favor.
FIGURACION v SPS LIBI Figuracion’s land was expropriated by Cebu City
to extend N. Escario Street. Not all of the land
was used; thus, the remainder, was reconveyed to
Figuracion. However, the Libis were occupying
the remainder and refused to vacate so they
opposed the reversion of the lot.
As long as a property owner has reasonable access to the general system
of streets, he has no right to compensation for the closure of a public street.
The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner the
public maintenance of the most convenient route to his door.
Respondent must clear the roads “
The right of the public use to city streets may not be bargained away
through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the
good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace,
safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials
are under legal obligation to protect”
The EO issued by then Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of the
streets are contrary to general law and cannot infringe upon the vested
right of the public to use City streets for the purpose they were
intended to serve: i.e. as arteries of travel for vehicles and
pedestrians.
However, the SC ruled that a camino vecinal is a munical road. he
Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and
adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may
consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed,
maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road. No
private party can interfere with such a right. There is unrebutted evidence
that the Municipality of Liloan, through its Sangguniang Bayan, had
approved a zoning plan which indicates the relative location of the camino
vecinal. Under the zoning map approved by the Sangguniang Bayan, the
camino vecinal passes the side of the land of the Pilapils.
The Libis suits must be dismissed as they have no legal standing to
question the reconveyance.
Property that is no longer being used for a public purpose may be
reconveyed for any legal purpose. Reversion is a proceeding by which the
State seeks the return of lands of the public domain or the improvements
thereon through the cancellation of private title erroneously or fraudulently
issued over it.
The LGC conveys to LGUs the power of reversion of public roads. The
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides that property withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose such as reconveying
it to the precious owner. Therefore, the City of Cebu has every right to
reconvey the remaining lot to Figuracion. The City through the issuance of
two resolutions recognized Figuracion’s right to repurchase the land
previously owned by his family.
ALOLINO v FLORES Spouses Flores built a house and a store on a
barrio road, alleging that on March 1, 2004,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig reclassified the
property as a residential lot from its prior
classification as a barrio/municipal road.
Court ruled that this is without merit, as pursuant to the LGC, it is only
through an ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
Sanggunian members, can an LGU permanently close a road.

LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
LGC, SECTION 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and
their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or
damage to property.
CIVIL CODE, Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of
danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for
damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any
criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to
support such action.
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision.

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

MENDOZA v DE LEON
CITY OF MANILA v
TEOTICO
PILAR v SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF DASOL,
PANGASINAN
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
FERNANDO, LA UNION v
FIRME
An owner of an exclusive ferry privilege brought an
action against municipal council members after
they revoked his lease and forcibly ejected him to
grant the ferry to a different person. Plaintiff
Mendoza won in the lower court. The Court
reviewed jurisprudence on whether or not a
municipality and/or its councilors may be held liable
for an action for damages.
: Teotico fell into a manhole in the City of Manila
and sued the city for damages. The CA ruled that
the city was liable for damages due to the injuries
sustained by Teotico. The City asserts that under
its charter, it is not liable for damages or injuries
due to the fault of the Mayor, Municipal Board, or
any other city officer. The
Petitioner is the vice-mayor of dasol. A resolution
increasing the salary of the mayor and the
treasurer was enacted without corresponding
increase to the vice-mayor’s. SB
enacted a appropriation ordinance to oay for his
salary differentials but the same was vetoed by the
mayor. VM filed a petition for mandamus and
damages. damages.
A collision occurred involving a
passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned
by the Estate of Nievera, a truck driven
by Manandeg and owned by Velasquez and a
dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando,
The Court ruled that municipalities may be held liable for negligent
performance of its corporate or proprietary functions, while municipal
councilors may be held liable if the actions committed are so far opposed
to the interest of the municipality itself. Petitioners should be held liable as
there was no valid reason for revoking Mendoza’s privilege and exposing
the municipality to liability.
SC ruled that it is actually Art. 2189 of the Civil Code that applies in this
case, which provides that cities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of
road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
While the mandamus petition became moot and academic, the court
nevertheless ruled that VM is entitled to actual moral, exemplary damages
and litigation costs to be paid personally by the mayor because it was the
latter’s act that caused the VM damage.
Topicà Damages
SC modified the CFI decision absolving the petitioner municipality of any
liability. The Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions.
 La Union and driven by Bislig. The driver of the
dump truck of the municipality insists that “he was
on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s
municipal streets.” Several jeepney passengers
died and others suffered injuries so a complaint
for damages was filed against the driver and the
owner of the jeepney. CFI ruled for plaintiffs and
held defendants Municipality of San Fernando
and Bislig jointly and severally liable.
QUEZON CITY OF Fulgencio Jr. rammed into a pile of diggings in
The award of exemplary damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially
GOVERNMENT v QC. He sustained injuries so his father filed a
DACARA case for damages against QC. TC and CA ruled deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress
that QC’s negligence was the proximate cause of wanton acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments
the accident and awarded damages
to Fulgencio. It was not proven that QC exercised and their employees should be responsible not only for the maintenance
due care in repairing the road by placing of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus, they must
precautionary signs around the diggings esp since
the area was dimly lit. SC affirmed based on Art secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures. Not
2189 CC. only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest; their very
existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local governments
have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public
foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note
that the present petitioners are the very parties responsible for
endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.

OSEMNA v COA
The City of Cebu contracted with construction
contractors WTCI and DCDC to construct and
renovate the Cebu City Sports Complex. Mayor
Osmena was authorized by the Sanggunian
Panglungsod to execute the contracts. Osmena
issued a total of 20 Change/Extra Work Orders
with WTCI and DCDC. The Sanggunian refused
to authorize Osmena to enter into the
Change/Extra Work Orders. WTCI and DCDC
sued the City of Cebu for payment of the
additional work. The RTC ruled for the
contractors. To pay for the judgment debts,
The public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of
government funds was made in violation of law.
Salva v. Carague: transactions under audit are to be judged on the basis
of not only the standards of legality but also those of regularity, necessity,
reasonableness and moderation.
[Implied by the decision] Where the circumstances show that the [LGU
Official] issued the change and extra work orders for the City’s successful
hosting of [a government project or activity] and not for any other
nefarious endeavor, said official cannot be held personally liable.
 the Sanggunian passed the required appropriation
ordinances. However, during post-audit, the COA
disallowed payment of the litigation expenses,
damages, and attorneys fees to WTCI and
DCDC. COA claims that the same
were unnecessary expenses for which the public
officers should be held liable in their personal
capacities pursuant to law (Section 103 of PD
1445). On MR, the COA held that only Osmena
was personally liable since it was he ordered
the change or extra work orders without the
supplemental agreement required by law, or the
prior authorization from the Sanggunian. Osmena
appealed to the SC. The Court looked into the
circumstances of the case, and held that Osmena
was not personally liable. The Court cited case
law and several circumstances that justified not
making Osmena personally liable. (see
enumeration in the ratio).

III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
EXECUTIVE SUPERVISION
CONST, Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of the component units
are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
ARTICLE XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
LGC, SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government
Units. -
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall
exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that
their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces,
highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities; through the
province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and through
the city and municipality with respect to Barangays.
(b) National agencies and offices with project implementation functions
shall coordinate with one another and with the local government units
concerned in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the
participation of local government units both in the planning and
implementation of said national projects.

(c) The President may, upon request of the local government unit
concerned, direct the appropriate national agency to provide financial,
technical, or other forms of assistance to the local government unit. Such
assistance shall be extended at no extra cost to the local government unit
concerned.
CASE FACTS
PLANAS v GIL This is an original action of prohibition instituted
in this court by which the petitioner seeks to enjoin
the respondents Commissioner of Civil Service
from conducting the investigation ordered by
authority of the President of the Philippines.
LACSON v ROQUE Mayor Lacson made a radio broadcast in which
he criticized the court’s decision stating that “if
[he] had the power to fire Judge Montesa (trial
judge who acquitted Deputy Chief of Police Juan
in a criminal prosecution for malversation), [he]
would fire him for being
incompetent”. Judge Montesa filed his projected
complaint for "libel and contempt" with the City
Fiscal. The President suspended
Mayor Lacson from office. The issue is WON the
President can suspend Lacson.
HEBRON v REYES Petitioner and respondent were elected mayor
and vice-mayor respectively of the Municipality of
Carmona in the province of Cavite in the general
elections of 1951. On May 1954, petitioner was
preventively suspended by the Office of the
President due to certain administrative charges
lodged against him. During that period,
respondent was directed to assume the office of
Acting Mayor. Since petitioner remained
suspended for more than a year and 7 months
and there was no action on the administrative
case, an action for quo warranto was instituted on
the ground that respondent was illegally holding
and has unlawfully refused to surrender the
office.
GANZON v CA Various city official filed ten administrative
complaints against Iloilo City Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon for various charges, including abuse of
authority, grave misconduct, and arbitrary
detention. Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument is
(d) National agencies and offices including government-owned or -
controlled corporations with field units or branches in a province, city, or
municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for his
information and guidance, monthly reports including duly certified
budgetary allocations and expenditures.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Court rules, however, that the constitution grants to the President the
powers of control and supervision. The power to exercise general
supervision over all local governments and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed authorizes him to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of the petitioner herein.
Court held NO. Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code in
conferring on the Chief Executive power to remove specifically enjoins
that the said power should be exercised conformably to law. Removals
must be accomplished only for any of the causes and in the fashion
prescribed by law and the procedure.
The Court held that the petitioner mayor may not be removed or
suspended directly by the President as the President has no inherent
power to remove or suspend elective officials. The executive department
of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over
local governments, may conduct investigations with a view to determining
whether municipal officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the
administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means only to
ascertain whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should
take such action.
.The Court disagreed, holding that the President, through the Secretary,
still had the power to suspend or remove local officials. However, the
Court also held that the Secretary gravely abused his power to do so.
 that the 1987 no longer allows the President to
exercise the power of suspension and/or removal
over local officials. In particular, the basis of his
argument is the deletion of the phrase “as may be
provided by law” in Art. X, Sec. 4 of the 1987
Constitution
VILLAFUERTE, JR. v Following a report from the COA that LGUs have
ROBREDO not been spending the 20% development fund of
the IRA for proper projects, the DILG issued
several issuances to remind the LGUs on how
such funds must be utilized. Such issuances were
assailed for being violative of the constitutional
provision that ensures the local autonomy of
LGUs.
CONSULTATIONS
[Sir Raquedan says: 2 steps in consultation:
1. Consultation
2. Approval
Also, Section 27 must always be read with Section 26!]
LGC, SEC 2 (c), supra
SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project
or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-
renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government
CASE FACTS
LINA, JR. v PANO Respondent was given license by the PCSO to
operate lotto. He asked petitioner for mayor’s
permit to open a lotto outlet in Laguna but this was
denied pursuant to Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, which
prohibits gambling.
The Court held that the issuances in question are not violative as the
same are merely advisory.
units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize
the adverse effects thereof.
SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required.- No project or program
shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior
approval of the Sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That
occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
RA 8975 Sec. 2, 8
RA 8975 Sec. 7
RA 8975
RA 10752
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Court held that the Kapasiyahan is valid, but this cannot prohibit the
operation of lotto outlets in Laguna. First, the Kapasiyahan is a mere policy
statement on the part of the local council, and therefore is not self-
executing. Second, lotto is duly authorized by the government through RA
1169. The power of LGUs to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions
is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. Hence, ordinances
should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.
BANGUS FRY Petitioner fisherfolks seek to nullify the ECC
FISHERFOLK v granted to NAPOCOR by immediately filing the
LANZANAS petition for cancellation and application for writ of
injunction directly with RTC Manila. Such ECC
was for NAPOCOR’s construction of a mooring
facility to provide electricity for Oriental Mindoro.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL v At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro
EXEC SEC Manila, parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation were set aside by the President,
through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a
sanitary landfill. This site, extending to more or
less 18 hectares, had already been in operation
since 19 February 1990 or the solid wastes of
Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong,
Pateros, Pasig, and Taguig. Petitioners Province
of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and
various concerned citizens expressed their
disapproval, detailing the adverse environmental
effectsof the dumpsite in their areas. DENR and
MMDA refused to suspend operations on the
dumpsite, asserting that the stated area is the
most suitable area for a dumpsite. Petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari with TRO. CA
denied. Petitioners filed this petition for review
on certiorari, assailing the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 635.
ALVAREZ v PICOP PICOP filed petition for mandamus to compel
RESOURCES DENR to convert their TLA to an IFMA. The Court
held that DENR does not have a ministerial duty
to do such, as it required an exercise of discretion
and there was no law mandating them to do so.
The 1969 agreement relied upon by PICOP is a
mere assurance that the boundaries under TLA
43 will not be altered.
BORACAY FOUNDATION Due to the increasing number of tourist arrivals at
v PROVINCE OF AKLAN Boracay, the Province of Aklan filed an application
with the DENR for a foreshore lease of areas
along the shorelines of Barangay Caticlan in order
to expand the port facilities therein. The
Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan issued
SC upheld the RTC decision which dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction. SC held that Secs 26 and 27, LGC are
inapplicable to the case because as petitioners admit, the mooring
facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does not
belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. As an
environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation
of the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned
sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the
construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power
barge.
SC declared it unconstitutional. The circumstances under
which proclamation was passed violates the LGC (particularly, the
requirements on consultation). Also, “water is life.”
Under the LGC, therefore, 2 requisites must be met before a national
project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected
local communities, and prior approval of the project by the
appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements,
the projects implementation is illegal.
As to the compliance with the administrative and statutory requirements
for the issuance of an IFMA, PICOP failed to comply. As for the
consultation requirement, PICOP only consulted with Surigao del Sur. The
TLA traverses the length and breadth of Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Sur,
Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental, hence, PICOP should have
consulted and acquired the approval of ALL SUCH LGUs.
The Court held that the information dissemination campaign did not
comply with the requirement of prior public consultation provided by the
Local Government Code.
 Resolution No. 13 manifesting its strong
opposition to said application because the
Province did not conduct any consultations with
the Sangguniang Barangay. Despite the issuance
of said Resolution, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Province entered into a MOA with the
Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA), which
also increased the area of the reclamation project
to 40 hectares. It was only at this point that the
Province conducted a series of “information-
education campaigns” with the public.

RELATIONS WITH THE PNP
LGC, SECTION 28. - Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units
of the Philippine National Police. - The extent of operational supervision
and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection
unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective
jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise
known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of
1990", and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
RA 8975
RA 10752

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

CARPIO v EXEC SEC Carpio questions the constitutionality of RA 6975 The SC states that upon examination of the provisions, it would show that
alleging that it emasculates the NAPOLCOM and NAPOLCOM still retains control over the PNP and there is no
abdicates the presidential role as commander-in- encroachment on presidential powers.
chief.

ANDAYA v RTC CEBU Regional Director Andaya of Regional Police
CITY Command No. 7 submitted to the mayor of Cebu
City a list of five (5) eligibles from among whom
the mayor shall choose one to be appointed as
the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not
choose anyone from the list because the name of
his protege, P/Chief Inspector Sarmiento, was not
included therein. The City of Cebu then filed a
petition for declaratory relief against Andaya and
NAPOLCOM Regional Director Inciong, which the
RTC granted.
The SC held that the RTC's ruling is void because as a mere deputy of the
NAPOLCOM in his territorial jurisdiction, the mayor has very limited
authority in the selection of chief of police in his city. In reality, he has no
power of appointment; he has only the limited power of selecting one from
among the list of five eligibles screened by the Senior Officers Promotion
and Selection Board in Camp Crame to be named the chief of police. For
verily, the power to appoint Directors of Provincial/City Police Commands
is vested in the PNP Regional Director.
The mayor has no power to require the Regional Director of the Regional
Police Command to include the name of any officer, no matter how
qualified, in the list of five eligibles to be submitted to the mayor. The
purpose of such prohibition is to enhance police professionalism and to
isolate the police service from political domination.

CANONIZADO v AGUIRRE Respondents seek a reconsideration of the The Court upheld its earlier decision.
Court’s decision declaring Sec. 8 of RA 8551
unconstitutional for violating the petitioners’ right
 to security of tenure. Respondents contend
that Canonizado should be deemed to have
abandoned his claim for reinstatement as
Commissioner of the PNP, having accepted, and
qualifying for the position of Inspector General of
the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP.
. appointment, promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the
PEOPLE v VELARDE y
Crispin Velarde was found guilty beyond
BANDOJO
reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide. [Prosecution] During his investigation,
appellant, after being informed of his constitutional
rights in the presence of Atty. Danilo
Domingo (Mayor of Malolos) whom he agreed to
act as his counsel, voluntarily admitted having
raped and killed the victim Brenda
Candelaria. [Defense] He denied having raped
and killed Brenda Candelaria. The RTC convicted
applellant on the basis of circumstantial
evidence as well as his written extrajudicial
confession, which was admitted in evidence.
RODRIGUEZ v CA Rodriguez was arrested in an entrapment
operation against extorting cops. An
administrative case decision had him summarily
dismissed whilst several other cases were
pending – another admin case for grave
misconduct, and a criminal case for robbery. He
appeals claiming that he was denied due process.
It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts
another incompatible with the first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his
title is thereby terminated without any other act or proceeding. The positions
of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector General of the IAS are
incompatible with each other. RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS
from sitting in a committee charged with the task of deliberating on the
NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP. But,
this rule on incompatibility of duties will not apply to the case at bar because
at no point did Canonizado discharge the functions of the two offices
simultaneously. He was forced out of his first office by the enactment of RA
8551. When he was appointed as Inspector General, he had ceased to
discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOM Commissioner
SC acquitted him on reasonable doubt. SC held that the extrajudicial
confession is not admissible in evidence because appellant was not
assisted by independent counsel, as mandated by Article III Section 12 (1)
of the Constitution. Atty. Domingo cannot be considered as
an independent counsel. He was the mayor of Malolos at the time. As
such, he exercised “operational supervision and control” over the PNP unit
in that municipality. His powers included the utilization of the elements
thereof for the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes,
the arrest of criminal offenders and the bringing of offenders to justice.
A municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by
the Constitution. As legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out
the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenance of
peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into
conflict of interests.
SC held that Rodriguez cannot claim a denial of due process as he had
several avenues of recourse as the PNP is civilian in character and part of
the Civil Service. He could’ve appealed to the DILG and then to the CSC
but chose instead to go to the CA on appeal and subsequently to the SC.
Furthermore, the decision of the NAPOLCOM showed that administrative
due process was observed as he had been afforded the opportunity to be
heard.
INTER-LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
LGC, SECTION 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and
Municipalities. - The province, through the governor, shall ensure that
every component city and municipality within its territorial jurisdiction acts
within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the
province.
SECTION 30. Review of Executive Orders. –
(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special
statutes, the governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
component city or municipal Mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or
municipal Mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
Punong Barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be
forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal Mayor, as the case may
be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review, the
local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders
are within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city,
or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal Mayor fails to act on said
executive orders within thirty (30) days after their submission, the same
shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.
CASE FACTS
NEW SUN VALLEY Petitioner NSVHAI filed this case against
HOMEOWNERS respondent Sangguniang Barangay over a
ASSOCIATION v resolution issued by the latter opening 2 streets
SANGGUNIANG within its village to vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
BARANGAY, BRGY. It argued that respondent needed to pass an
SUNVALLEY, PARANQUE ordinance, not a mere resolution, for the opening
CITY of the said roads.
RELATIONS WITH NGOS
LGC, SECTION 34. Role of People's and Nongovernmental
Organizations. - Local government units shall promote the establishment
SECTION 31. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial
Legal Officer or Prosecutor. - In the absence of a municipal legal officer,
the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal
officer, and in the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on
any legal question affecting the municipality.
SECTION. 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective
Barangays. - The city or municipality, through the city or municipal Mayor
concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component Barangays
to ensure that said Barangays act within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.
SECTION 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local Government
Units. - Local government units may, through appropriate ordinances,
group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services, and
resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such
undertakings, the local government units involved may, upon approval by
the Sanggunian concerned after a public hearing conducted for the
purpose, contribute funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of
property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions
as may be agreed upon by the participating local units through
Memoranda of Agreement.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The SC ruled in favor of respondent SB, stating that since Brgy. Sun
Valley already owned the roads which were opened; thus, there was no
need for an ordinance. It also ruled that NSVHAI failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by going straight to the RTC when it should have
filed an appeal with the city mayor.
and operation of people's and nongovernmental organizations to become
active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy.
IV. ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
QUALIFICATIONS
SECTION 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the Barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or Sanggunian bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read
and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice- governor or member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, or Mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
CASE FACTS
LABO, JR. v COMELEC Ortega filed for the disqualification of Labo as a
candidate for Mayor of Baguio on the ground
that Labo made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy when he declared himself
as a Filipino citizen, when in fact he was
not. Labo won. Ortega alleges that
since Labo was disqualified, he as the candidate
with the next highest vote should be declared the
Mayor. On the other hand, Labo claims that he is
a Filipino citizen, and that he should be declared
as mayor.
FRIVALDO v COMELEC Frivaldo ran for the 3rd time as governor
of Sorsogon and won, also for the 3rd time (he
was declared as not a Filipino citizen in the
previous 2 elections). Lee, the candidate who got
the 2nd highest number of votes is
questioning Frivaldo’s citizenship, arguing that the
latter is not a Filipino citizen, hence, disqualified to
run for public office. Frivaldo was granted
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, municipalities must be at least twenty-
one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of
age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of Punong Barangay or member of the
Sangguniang Barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on
election day.
(f) Candidates for the Sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
SC held that they are both wrong, and resolved to declare the Vice Mayor-
elect as the Mayor.
Sec 39, LGC: an elective local official must be:
- a citizen of the Philippines
- a registered voter in the place where he intends to be elected
- a resident therein for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and
- able to read and write Filipino of any other local language or dialect
Filipino citizenship is a fundamental qualification and is an
indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. Disqualification on its basis cannot be simply cured election
by the majority.
Ratio: If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
The SC consolidated the petitions filed by Lee and Frivaldo. It then ruled
that Frivaldo is qualified to assume the position of governor of Sorsogon.
According to SC, the citizenship requirement in the LGC is to be
possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is
proclaimed andat the start of the term of office to which he has been
elected. In this case, Frivaldo’s repatriation was given a retroactive effect
as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he
was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in
 repatriation under PD 725 and was able to take
his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen
before he assumed office. However, on the same
day that he took his oath, SC had already
directed Comelec, and the latter had already
proclaimed Lee as the newly elected governor
of Sorsogon.
SALCEDO II v COMELEC
Victorino Salcedo II sought to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ermelita Cacao
Salcedo, on the ground that by stating that her
surname was “Salcedo” therein, she committed a
material misrepresentation, since she had no right
to use that surname because she was not legally
married with Neptali Salcedo. The
COMELEC Second Division initially granted the
petition. It then reversed itself in an En Banc
decision. The SC affirmed the reversal.
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino
citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should
have been proclaimed instead of Lee.
DOCTRINE: Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof.
The law intended citizenship to be a qualification distinct from being a
voter, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to
reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification
(aside from citizenship), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to
require that the official be registered as a voter in the area or territory he
seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: “a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province where he intends to be elected.” It should be
emphasized that the LGC requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration—not the
actual voting—is the core of this “qualification.” In other words, the law’s
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective
official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern—and not
anywhere else.
Section 39 the LGC speaks of “qualifications” of “elective officials,” not of
candidates. Literally, such qualifications—unless otherwise expressly
conditioned, as in the case of age and residence—should thus be
possessed when the elective or elected official begins to govern, i.e., at
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term.
The Court held that there was no material representation as to Ermelita’s
use of the surname “Salcedo.”
The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code
refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that the consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having
made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are grave to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the
intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive
political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous
 mistake. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive
the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office.

TORAYNO SR. v Emano was the governor of Misamis Oriental. His The Comelecupheld Emano’s subsequent election as Mayor. The SC
COMELEC 1995 COC showed his residence to be affirmed, and mainly looked at the factual circumstances in determining
in Misamis Oriental. While in his third consecutive whether Emano satisfied the residency requirement, as they had done in a
term, he filed his COC for mayor of Cagayan de previous and similar SC case.
Oro City, stating that his residence for the
preceding 2 years and 5 months was in Cagayan
de Oro City. Petitioners, as voters,
challenged Emano’s eligibility to run for City
Mayor as he failed to satisfy the residency
requirements, not being a resident of Cagayan de
Oro City for at least one year preceding the
elections.

COQUILLA v COMELEC Petitioner was PH natural-born citizen who had to SC affirmed the COMELEC’s ruling.
leave the country to join the US Navy. He was
naturalized as a US Citizen and remained a US
Citizen from 1965 until 2000, when he was
naturalized as a PH Citizen. Petitioner had
attempted to run as a Mayor of his hometown in
Oras, Eastern Samar on February 27, 2001. His
certificate of candidacy indicated that he had been
a resident of the PH for the past 2 years.
Respondent Alvarez brought a complaint against
the same alleging he had committed material
misrepresentation. COMELEC failed to act on the
matter so Coquilla won the elections. However,
COMELEC later ruled that he had failed to satisfy
the residency requirement as he cannot reckon
his residency from the time he visited the PH as
a balikbayan.
BAUTISTA v COMELEC Petitioner Bautista filed his COC for the Punong SC held that the COMELEC resolutions were void, because the
Barangay position in Lumbangan, but his COMELEC en banc cannot deal with quasi-judicial matters. It also
application was rejected by Election Officer Jareo deprived Bautista of due process. However, SC ruled that Bautista was,
because he was not a registered voted in the said indeed, not a registered voter of Lumbangan. It also declared Alcoreza as
barangay. Case elevated to the COMELEC which the Punong Barangay of Lumbangan by virtue of the succession rules in
upheld Jareo’s decision, but was not confirmed by LGC.
COMELEC en banc in time before the July 2002
 barangay elections. Jareo won as Punong
Barangay. After his assumption of office,
COMELEC en banc released resolutions
declaring him disqualification as a candidate and
declaring Alcoreza, the second-highest winning
candidate, as the duly-elected Punong Barangay
of Lumbangan.
ALTAREJOS v COMELEC Ciceron Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in The Court noted that Sec 39, LGC does not specify any particular date
San Jacinto, Masbate. Private respondents filed a when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
petition to disqualify Altarejos on the ground that (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately preceding
he is not a Filipino citizen and he made false the day of election) and age (at least 23 years of age on election
representation in his certificate of candidacy that day). And according to the case of Frivaldo v COMELEC, the citizenship
he was not a permanent resident or immigrant of qualification of a candidate for an elective office will only apply at the time
a foreign country. Altarejos argues that he his of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term and
Filipino citizenship was restored when he was that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of the application for
given a Certificate of Repatriation; hence, he is repatriation.
qualified to run as mayor. COMELEC first division
and en banc ruled that Altarejos failed to comply The citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office will only
with the requirements of Sec 2 of RA 8171, which apply at the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
provides that repatriation shall be effected by his term. If the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
taking the necessary oath of allegiance and people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons
registration in the proper civil registry and in the owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
Bureau of Immigration. COMELEC ruled that the thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification
records show that the registration in the civil as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the
registrar was done only on February 18, start of his term.
2004 and with the Bureau of Immigration on
March 1, 2004
MATUGAS v COMELEC obert Barbers filed a certificate of candidacy for SC affirmed. Barbers is a Filipino citizen. Petitioner did not overcome the
the position of Governor of Surigao del Norte for burden of poof. The documentary evidence he submitted fails to establish
the May 2001 elections. Ernesto Matugas, also a that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition to
Disqualify Barbers on the ground that he is not a Sec 39 of the LGC requires that an elective local official be a citizen of the
Filipino citizenbecause he was naturalized as an Philippines.
American citizen in 1991 and there was no
repatriation granted in his favor. Barbers won the
election and was proclaimed as the duly elected
governor. COMELEC dismissed the petition to
disqualify for lack of merit. COMELEC en banc
affirmed.
DUMPIT-MICHELENA v Tess Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the SC affirmed and ruled that Tess did not meet the one-year residence
BOADO position of mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La requirement.
Union. Boado, et al filed a petition for the
disqualification and the denial or cancellation of For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile.
her certificate of candidacy on the ground of
material misrepresentation. It was alleged that she Property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be voted for an
was not a resident of Agoo one year prior to the office.
 upcoming May 10, 2004 election as required by
the LGC because she only transferred
to Agoo from Naguilian in October 2003. Dumpit-
Michelena countered that she already acquired a
new domicile in San Julian West when she
purchased a residential lot on April 19, 2003.
Comelec Second division cancelled her COC.
Comelec en bac denied her MR.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose. To effect change, there
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The intent
to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual

JAPZON v COMELEC Japzon and Ty were candidates for the Office of
Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar. Japzon filed a petition to
disqualify Ty on the ground of material
misrepresentation alleging, among others, that Ty
failed to meet the one year residency prior to the
elections.
The Court ruled that for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained
his Philippine citizenship under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225, to
run for public office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.The
Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

MARUHOM v COMELEC Maruhom and Abinal were rival mayoralty Section 39(a) of the LGC: an elective local official must be, among other
candidates in Marantao, Lanao Del Sur in the things, a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province
2007 elections. Abinal filed a Sec. 78 Petition where he intends to be elected.
against Maruhom before the COMELEC, alleging
that Maruhom was disqualified from running as
she was a double registrant – she
wasregistered as a voter in Marawi City and
in Marantao, with her two registrations only three
days apart. There being double
registration, Maruhom’s subsequent registration
in Marantao was null and void ab initio and, not
being a registered voter
in Marantao, Maruhom was disqualified from
running for municipal mayor of said
municipality. The COMELEC ordered the
cancellation of the COC and the Court upheld this
decision, ruling that Maruhom was not a qualified
candidate as she was not a registered voter
in Marantao.
JALOSJOS v COMELEC Jalosjos was born in the Philippines, migrated to
Australia, then came back to the Philippins at 35
years old to live with his brother. He then ran for
governor in Zamboanga Sibugay. Erasmo says
Jalosjos has failed to establish his domicile, which
is one of the requirements for a gubernatorial
seat. Erasmo argues, and Comelec agrees, that
Jalosjos is merely visiting his brother.
SOBEJANA v COMELEC Sobejana-Condon ran for Vice Mayor and won.
Some voters filed a petition for
quo warranto questioning her eligibility to run
because she is a dual citizen (Filipino and
Australian), and she failed to renunciate her
foreign citizenship. WON she is eligible - NO
JALOSJOS, JR. v Cardino filed for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC
COMELEC on the ground of material misrepresentation. He
alleged that Jalosjos misrepresented in his COC
that he was eligible to run for mayor when in fact
he was not because he was previously convicted
with robbery. Under the RPC, robbery has an
accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification which makes a person perpetually
disqualified from running for a public office
JALOSJOS v COMELEC SC finds petitioner ineligible to run for office since
she has not proven her residency in the
Municipality of Baliangao for more than 1 year
prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
MAQUILING v COMELEC Arnado, pursuant to RA 9225, reacquired his
Filipino citizenship and renounced his American
citizenship in order to run for the position of Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. His qualification
Court rules that Jalosjos has fulfilled the requirements for domicile, in that
he had actual presence in the locality, and his actions indubitably show his
intention to establish his domicile. This actions being his registration as a
voter, his purchase of property, correspondence with leaders, and
his renunciation of Australia
. R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-
acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an
authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.Rule applies to all those who have re-acquired Filipino
citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are still dual
citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for exercise of right to run for
public office. It is an additional qualification for elective office specific only
to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public
office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the
exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18,
2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective
office. Unless she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian
citizenship, she is ineligible to run for and hold any elective office in the
Philippines.
The Court ruled in favor of Cardino and further enunciated that Cardino,
having the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed as
Mayor.
Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A
person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
Court rules: to be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must
have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and
regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not
make it one’s residence.
The Court ruled that such use of the foreign passport operates to revest in
Arnado his American citizenship and has the effect of disqualifying him
from the candidacy.
 for the position was attacked by the other
candidates, alleging that he was not qualified as
he was shown to have used his US passport.
The privilege afforded to citizens who reacquire their Filipino citizenship
does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing
his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Such requires the
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country.

AUGSTIN v COMELEC Petitioner Agustin was a dual citizen of both the The Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation of the COC, but on a
Philippines and the US, having been naturalized different ground – the COC was valid at the time of filing, as Agustin had
as an American citizen in 1997. He renounced his already renounced his American citizenship at that time. However, he was
American citizenship on October 2, 2012. subsequently rendered disqualified by his act of using his US passport to
On October 5, 2012, he filed his CoC for the travel to Hawaii on October 6, 2012: this operated as a repudiation of his
position of Mayor of the Municipality of renunciation of his American citizenship, which resulted in his reversion to
Marcos, Ilocos Norte. Rival candidate Pillos filed a his previous status of a dual citizen disqualified under the LGC.
Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancen the COC,
alleging that Agustin made a material
representation therein: he stated that he had been
a resident of the municipality for 25 years, despite
the fact that he registered as a voter there only in
May 2012.
The COMLEC En Banc cancelled the COC, but
on the ground that the same was invalid for
Agustin’s failure to prove his compliance with RA
9225 and not on the grounds alleged in the
petition.
CARDINO v COMELEC Cardino filed a petition for quo warranto against SC upheld the validity of such Affidavit, finding no reason to disturb the
Jalosjos for the seat of Mayor of Dapitan, factual findings of COMELEC/
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground that Jalosjos’
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
was falsified. COMELEC 2nd Division and en
banc gave credence to Jalosjos’ evidence that the
date in the Affidavit was a mere clerical error.
TAN v CRISOLOGO Tan was a natural-born Filipino who became a The Court ruled that Tan could not be considered a Philippine citizen at
naturalized US citizen in 1993. She applied to be the time she registered as a voter and that she lost her Philippine
a registered voter in 2009 and took an oath of citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.
allegiance to the RP in later that year; she then
filed her CoC to run for a seat in
Congress. Crisologo sought the exclusion of Tan
from the voter’s list alleging that Tan was not a
Filipino when she registered as a voter

DISQUALIFICATIONS (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving

moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
LGC, SECTION 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
 (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of
allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or
abroad;
CASE FACTS
MARQUEZ, JR. v Marquez was proclaimed SK Chairman
COMELEC of Brgy. Putatan, Muntinlupa City. After the
election, his opponent Santos, filed an election
protest before the MeTC alleging that Marquez
should be disqualified as he didn’t satisfy the age
requirement. The MeTC issued a TRO. Marquez
filed a MTD saying that the election protest was in
reality a quo warranto proceeding over
which MeTC didn’t have jurisdiction, because
under Sec. 6, CRN2824, the trial court’s
jurisdiction is confined only to anomalies in the
conduct of the SK elections. The determination
of elgibility, on the other hand, is vested with the
election officer. MeTC ruled that Sec. 6, CRN
2824 only applies to cases filed before the SK
elections; it is Sec. 254 of the OEC which should
apply in this case.
DELA TORRE v A case for disqualification was filed
COMELEC against Rolando Dela Torre before the
COMELEC, which issued two resolutions
declaring him disqualified from running for Mayor
of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections.
The COMELEC held that Dela Torre was found
guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law, which crime constitutes an offense involving
moral turpitude under Sec. 40(a) of the LGC. Dela
Torre sought to nullify the resolutions.
RODRIGUEZ v COMELEC Rodriguez was arrested in an entrapment
operation against extorting cops. An
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have
acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the
same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Re: Crime: Must be of moral turpitude OR punishable by 1 year or more of
imprisonment but both conditions must be within 2 years after service
sentence.
[Sir Raquedan says: In the Dela Torre case, the SC stopped at moral
turpitude, but that was wrong!]
[Note for exam: Escape from jail the day before; in relation to fugitive from
justice? May kaso daw to?]
RULING/ DOCTRINE
SC affirmed and ruled that MeTC had jurisdiction over the
quo warranto proceeding.
Any contest relating to the election of members of the SK (including the
chairman) whether pertaining to their eligibility or the manner of their
election is cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs, and MeTCs. Sec. 6 CRN 2824
only applies to proceedings before the election. This is evident from the
use of the word ‘candidates’ in Section 6 and the phrase ‘winning
candidates’ in Section 49. The distinction is based on the principle that it is
the proclamation which marks off the jurisdiction of the courts from the
jurisdiction of election officials. Before proclamation, cases concerning
eligibility of SK officers and members are cognizable by the Election
Officer under Section 6. But after the election and proclamation, the same
cases become quo warranto cases cognizable by MTCs, MCTCs,
and MeTCs.
Court found that the element of actual knowledge that the thing was stolen
in the crime of fencing makes it an offense involving moral turpitude
Rodriguez was arrested in an entrapment operation against extorting cops.
An administrative case decision had him summarily dismissed whilst
 administrative case decision had him summarily
dismissed whilst several other cases were
pending – another admin case for grave
misconduct, and a criminal case for robbery. He
appeals claiming that he was denied due process.
MAGNO v COMELEC Carlos Montes filed a case for disqualification
against Nestor Magno (mayoralty candidate who
was convicted of 4 counts direct bribery in 1995
and applied for probation). COMELEC disqualified
him citing Section 12 of Omnibus Election Code.
Magno argued that COMELEC should have
applied Section 40 of LGC which only provided for
two-year disqualification instead of 5 years as
stated in the Omibus Election Code.
MERCADO v COMELEC Petitioner Mercado and respondent Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the 1998 elections. Respondent was
then declared the winning candidate; however its
proclamation was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain
Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was
not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United
States.
LINGATING v COMELEC Petitioner filed with the Provincial Election
Supervisor in Pagadian City a petition for the
disqualification of respondent Cesar Sulong.
According to petitioner, during Sulong’s first term
as mayor of Lapuyan, he was administratively
charged with various offenses, and that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur
found him guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this
decision had become final and executory. Sulong
denied that the decision had become final and
executory. The COMELEC First
Divisiondisqualified Sulong but
COMELEC en banc reversed.
several other cases were pending – another admin case for grave
misconduct, and a criminal case for robbery. He appeals claiming that he
was denied due process. SC held that Rodriguez cannot claim a denial of
due process as he had several avenues of recourse as the PNP is civilian
in character and part of the Civil Service. He could’ve appealed to the DILG
and then to the CSC but chose instead to go to the CA on appeal and
subsequently to the SC. Furthermore, the decision of the NAPOLCOM
showed that administrative due process was observed as he had been
afforded the opportunity to be heard.
SC ruled that (1) the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude but (2)
the COMELEC should have applied Section 40 of LGC because (a) it is a
law enacted after the Omnibus Election Code and (b) it is a special law.
Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to Article 40
of the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
Court ruled that by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a
Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another
country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines
and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
The SC agreed with the COMELEC en banc that Sulong is not
disqualified. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the
alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed
before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter reelected for another term. The decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification
and malversation of public funds, has not until now become
final. Considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve
respondent’s motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have
voted for respondent Sulong that after all, he is disqualified.
The rule that an elective local officer, who is removed before the
expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being
a candidate for a local elective position does not apply where the decision
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finding a local mayor guilty of
dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds has not become
final.
KARE v COMELEC Ceriola, the second placer in the mayoralty
elections in Malinao, Albay, sought to disqualify
Moll, the winner of the election, on the ground that
Moll had been sentenced by a final judgment of a
crime which has a punishment of more than a
year of imprisonment. COMELEC en banc
disqualified Moll and proclaimed Ceriola as the
mayor-elect. Moll appealed to the Court and
argued that his conviction has not yet become
final because he filed an appeal within the
reglementary period. Kare, the Vice-Mayor-elect,
on the other hand, also appealed as to the
proclamation of Ceriola as mayor.
MORENO v COMELEC Respondent Mejes filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay because he had been convicted by final
judgment of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno argues
that since he was already granted probation, he is
now qualified to run for public office again. The
SC ruled in his favor and reversed the
COMELEC en banc.
SJS v DANGEROUS hese are three consolidated cases challenging the
DRUGS BOARD constitutionality of Section 36 of RA 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002),
The SC dismissed Moll’s petition and granted Kare’s.
As to Moll’s disqualification, the Court held that Moll’s appeal was not
seasonably filed (according to the Rules on Criminal Procedure). The
period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for
reconsideration or a motion for a new trial. What Moll filed was a "Motion
to Quash the Information"; and when it was denied, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial. The period is interrupted only by the filing of
a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being
appealed. Neither Moll’s Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for
Reconsideration was directed at the judgment of conviction but attacked a
matter extraneous to the judgment. Therefore the judgment against him
has become final.
As to Kare’s appeal, the Court held that Ceriola, as the second placer,
cannot be declared as the mayor-elect and the rules on succession
provided for in the LGC must govern – it is Kare who shall succeed as
mayor.
Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides: "Disqualifications.
– The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence. Moll was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one
(1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly
disqualified him from running for any elective local position.
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended
as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine
imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted."
Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court's finding that he
has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed
terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
The disqualification under Sec. 40(a), LGC covers offenses punishable by
1 year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also covers probationable
offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office.
The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the LGC.
The Court ruled that the senatorial requirement is unconstitutional as the
qualifications for candidates is already limited in the Constitution, and that
the drug testing for accused individuals is also unconstitutional as the
 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses.
RISOS-VIDAL v COMELEC Estrada was convicted of plunder (an offense
involving moral turpitude, which effectively
disqualified him from any public elective office).
Arroyo granted him pardon restoring him to his
civil and political rights. He ran for Mayor of
Manila and won. The case is a petition to
disqualify him, saying that the pardon did not
restore him to his right to be voted for as it was
not absolute or plenary.
AGUSTIN v COMELEC supra
LABAO, JR. v COMELEC
MATURAN v COMELEC Maturan contends a COMELEC Resolution
perpetually disqualifying him to run for public
testing is not random or suspicionless. Mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for students is constitutional given the
students waive their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and
voluntarily submit themselves to the parental authority of school authorities;
while in the case of private and public employees, the drug testing is
allowed due to the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
The Court ruled in favor of Estrada’s qualification.
LGC, Sec 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
xxx
Omnibus Election Code, Sec 12. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
In the grant of pardon, a general statement restoring Estrada to his
political and civil rights is enough to remit the penalty of absolute
perpetual disqualification for office.
The Supreme Court affirmed the cancellation of the COC, but on a different
ground – the COC was valid at the time of filing, as Agustin had already
renounced his American citizenship at that time. However, he was
subsequently rendered disqualified by his act of using his US passport to
travel to Hawaii on October 6, 2012: this operated as a repudiation of his
renunciation of his American citizenship, which resulted in his reversion to
his previous status of a dual citizen disqualified under the LGC.
The term ‘“fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. It is the intent to evade that is the
compelling factor and there can only be an intent to evade prosecution
or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
The Court dismissed his petition and cited the ruling in Pilar.
 offense pursuant to the penalty imposed by Sec.
14, RA No. 7166 for repeated failure to file his
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
(SOCE) for the 2010 and 2013 elections.
Petitioner interposes the defense of good faith,
alleging that he was not required to file his SOCE
for 2013 because he withdrew his candidacy a
day before the elections. Furthermore, he alleges
that the penalty is cruel, degrading, and inhuman
punishment.
ALBANIA v COMELEC Respondent Tallado ran for the third time as
governor of Camarines Sur. His first term was
only from March 22 to June 30, 2010 because he
only served the unexpired term of his opponent.
Petitioner assails his candidacy by filing a petition
for disqualification alleging a violation of the three-
term limit rule..
MANNER OF ELECTION AND DATE OF ELECTION
SECTION 41. Manner of Election. - (a) The governor, vice-governor, city
Mayor, city vice-mayor, municipal Mayor, municipal vice-mayor, and
Punong Barangay shall be elected at large in their respective units by the
qualified voters therein. However, the Sangguniang kabataan chairman for
each Barangay shall be elected by the registered voters of the katipunan
ng kabataan, as provided in this Code.
(b) The regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang bayan shall be
elected by district, as may be provided for by law. Sangguniang
Barangay members shall be elected at large. The presidents of
the leagues of Sanggunian members of component cities and
municipalities shall serve as ex officio members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned. The presidents of the liga
ng mga Barangay and the pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
kabataan elected by their respective chapters, as provided in this
Code, shall serve as ex officio members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang
bayan.
(c) In addition thereto, there shall be one (1) sectoral
representative from the women, one (1) from the workers, and one
(1) from any of the following sectors: the urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector as
In the case at bench, as the law does not make any distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew
the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to
a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his
candidacy.
The COMELEC, en banc and SC all ruled in favor of respondent Tallado.
Petitioner’s petition was defective and filed out of time since violation of the
three-term limit rule is not found as one of the grounds for a petition for
disqualification. Moreover, respondent did not violate the three-term limit
rule since he did not serve the fully time of his first term
may be determined by the Sanggunian concerned within ninety
(90) days prior to the holding of the next local elections, as may be
provided for by law. The Comelec shall promulgate the rules and
regulations to effectively provide for the election of such sectoral
representatives.
SECTION 42. Date of Election. - Unless otherwise provided by law, the
elections for local officials shall be held every three (3) years on the
second Monday of May.
TERM OF OFFICE
SECTION 43. Term of Office. - (a) The term of office of all local elective
officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years,
starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided for
by law, except that of elective Barangay officials: Provided, That all local
officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
2. (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
 3. (c) The term of office of Barangay officials and members of the
Sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall
begin after the regular election of Barangay officials on the second
Monday of May 1994.
CONST, Art. X, Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.
RA 9164 (2002), Sec. 2
CASE FACTS
(Eligible to run?  or )
DAVID v COMELEC Petitioners were contesting that the applicable
governing law over barangay elections and
barangay officials was RA 6679, and not the
current LGC of 1991, such that their term as
barangay officials should be for five, and not three
years, and that punong barangay should have
been selected from among the winning kagawads.
BORJA v COMELEC  Vice mayor Capco became mayor after the
incumbent died. He finished the unexpired term of
the former mayor, and ran and got re-elected
twice. When he ran again, Borja jr. opposed his
candidacy because of the three-term limit for
Mayors, arguing that his succession to the former
mayor’s office should be considered as one term
within the three-term limit.
LONZANIDA v COMELEC Lonzanida was elected and served as mayor for
 two consecutive terms. He ran for a third time,
and was proclaimed winner and assumed office.
However, his opponent Alvez filed a petition to
disqualify him as mayor. RTC granted the petition
and declared the office vacant. Lonzanida ran for
a fourth time and was proclaimed winner.
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying
Lonzanida from office because he had
already served three consecutive terms.
ADORMEO v COMELEC Petitioner and private respondent were the only
 candidate for mayor of LucenaCity in the 2001
elections. Talaga Jr. served 2 terms 1992-1998,
Section 2. Term of Office. –The term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be three
(3) years.
RA 10923
Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (Borja v
COMELEC)
a. That the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and
b. That he has fully served three consecutive terms.
Preventive suspension is not a valid interruption. Valid substitution requires a
valid COC [Talaga v COMELEC]
RULING/ DOCTRINE
SC ruled that the provision under the LGC of 1991 is valid and
constitutional, i.e. the term of barangay officials is for three years only, and
that the barangay chairman should be directly elected by the electorate.
[Sir Raquedan says: LGC is inconsistent with previous law re: term limit.
But not unconstitutional because under 7160, they were elected by the
people!]
The Court disagreed with petitioner, and held that the three-term limit
applies to being ‘elected’ three consecutive terms, and not only ‘serving’
three consecutive terms.
He was not elected during the first term, he merely succeeded by
operation of law.
SC ruled that Lonzanida was not disqualified.
In this case, Lonzanida could not have been considered to have been
elected three consecutive times because of the RTC decision declaring a
failure of elections. He could not also have been considered to have
served three consecutive terms, because he did not voluntarily renounce
his position, thus suchinvoluntary severance from office is an interruption
of continuity of service, and he cannot be considered to have served the
entire term.
The court held that Talaga is eligible to run for mayor
Private respondent was not elected for three consecutive terms for he was
a private citizen for nearly two years. The continuity of his mayorship was
 lost in the 1998 election but won and served
another term after the recall election in 2000
which lasted June 30, 2001.Petitioner sought the
disqualification of private respondent on the
ground of the three-term limit rule under the
constitution and the local government code.
LATASA v COMELEC  Latasa was elected as mayor of Municipality
of Digos for three terms. On his third term,
Municipality of Digos was declared a component
City – City of Digos. His opponent Sunga filed a
petition with the COMELEC
for Latasa’s disqualification and/or cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy. Latasa ran for mayor
again and garnered the highest number of votes.
COMELEC v CRUZ Congress passed RA 9164, providing for a three-
year term limit on barangay officials. Barangay
officials contested the proviso, claiming it was
unconstitutional for retroactively applying such
limit.
MONREAL v COMELEC Monreal and Foronda assail the COMELEC
resolutions cancelling their certificates of
candidacy for barangay elective postitions,
despite their having won the elections. The
Comelec’s ruling was based on the enactment of
RA 9164 which puts a term limit of three-
terms (nine years) to barangay elective officials.
Both petitioners wanted to annul these COMELEC
resolutions based on the RTC Ruling finding Sec
2 of RA 9164 to be unconstitutional.
ARATEA v COMELEC Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for
mayor. Lonzanida won. Aratea won as Vice
Mayor. As to WON Lonzanida was disqualified
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code,
or made a false material representation under
Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his
certificate of candidacy being void, court
held YES, he is disqualified.
TALAGA v COMELEC  This is a consolidated case
concerning disqualification of a substitute who
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Private respondent is
qualified to be a candidate for the 2001 elections.
Not eligible to run for maoyor. No new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not
mean that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision,
the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of the city mayor.
The Court discussed a the history of election laws, and held that such
provision had always been in the law, and the latest iteration is merely a
restatement of a term limit that had always been present. Additionally, the
Court noted that retroactivity of laws is not even a constitutional issue.
The court rules, however, that the RTC ruling has not yet attained finality
and is not yet executory, thus the law remains in force. The law is also in
line with Section 43 of the Local Government Code, in that the primary
intention was to broaden the choices for candidates, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena.
He became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public
office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final.
The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and
became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy on 1 December 2009. As to WON the second placer or the
Vice-Mayor elect should succeed the mayor, Second placer Antipolo
should be proclaimed mayor. Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All
votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Mayor.
SC held that the declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his COC
invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted by

ABUNDO v COMELEC 
VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice- Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or Mayor, the vice-governor or vice-
was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty Barbara. As to Castillo’s assertion, SC held that the Labo doctrine on the
election, and the ascertainment of who should rejection of the second placer applies to him such that being the
assume the office following the substitute’s candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested
disqualification. Ramon Talaga and Phillip Castillo office, he could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the
both filed a COC for the position of Mayor first placer because the he was “not the choice of the sovereign
of Lucena City to be scheduled in the 2010 will. Therefore, SC held that it is the elected Vice Mayor (Alcala, intervenor
national and local elections. Castillo filed in this case) who must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to
with Comelec a petition seeking the denial of due a permanent vacancy in the office.
course or cancellation of COC of Ramon for
having already served 3 consecutive terms as
City Mayorof Lucena On election day, the name of
Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the
votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of
Barbara as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara being ultimately credited with 44,099
votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. Castillo
filed a petition for annulment of proclamation with
the Comelecand contends that with Ramon being
a disqualified candidate and Barbara having filed
her COC beyond the allowed period, he should be
considered as the one who got the highest
number of votes in the elections.
Petitioner ran for the position of municipal mayor Elected 3 times but during the protest, there was an interruption so
in four successive regular elections. On the first second requisite was not met.
two, he won and was proclaimed mayor, and
accordingly served the full three-year terms. On
the third, however, his opponent was initially
proclaimed winner and served about two years of
the three-year term. Petitioner filed an electoral
protest against his opponent’s declaration, which
was successful. Petitioner was thus declared the
real winning candidate; but he only got to serve
the remaining one year and one month of the
term. He ran once more after this last term. His
opponent then files a disqualification case,
contending that petitioner’s candidacy if given due
course would violate the three-year term limit
imposed in the Constitution and the LGC.
mayor concerned shall become the governor or Mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, Mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall
become the governor, vice-governor, Mayor or vice-mayor, as the case
may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the Punong Barangay,
the highest ranking Sanggunian Barangay member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall
become the Punong Barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking Sanggunian members
shall be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms
of their predecessors. For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
CASE FACTS
LABO, JR. v COMELEC Labo was the candidate with the highest number
of votes for the position of mayor of Baguio City.
His qualification, specifically with regard to his
citizenship, to the position was assailed.
VICTORIA v COMELEC The position of Vice-Gov. in the Province of Albay
was left vacant. According to the law, the one who
should fill the vacancy shall be the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
FARINAS v BARBA A vacancy in the member of Sangunniang Bayan
by a member who does not belong to a political
party occurred. Palafox was recommended by
both Mayor Barba and Sangguniang Bayan.
However, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election.
To determine rank:
Number of votes you got/ total registered voters
Question is: Is there a valid COC?
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Court held that he was not qualified for the position of Mayor. With
regard the contention that the second placer should be proclaimed the
winner, the Court held that such is not the case. The Court reverses the
decision in Santos. The vice-mayor is ordered to assume the office of the
mayor.
To proclaim as the winner of an election that who has not acquired the
majority or plurality of votes is repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage.
The fact that the winning candidate is later disqualified does not
necessarily entitle the second placer to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a disqualified candidate may not be
effective as to put him in office, but if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray,
void, or meaningless.
Pursuant to LGC, Sec. 44, which states that ranking in the Sanggunian
shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained
by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in
each district in the immediately preceding local election, respondent
should succeed the vacant position of Vice-Gov.
The SC ruled that the appointing power is granted to Governor upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Vacancies in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Panlunsod, Bayan and
Barangay shall be filled by appointment by the local chief executive, as
 recommended Nacino and the Governor
appointed Nacino. Despite this, Mayor Barba still
appointed Palafox. The RTC upheld Palafox’s
apointment.
the case may be (President, through the Executive Secretary, Governor or
Mayor) upon recommendation of (a) the political party to which the
member causing the vacancy belongs, or (2) the Sanggunian concerned
in cases where the member concerned does not belong to a political
party.

Not Nacino because Sangguniang Panlalawigan is the one who

recommended him (wrong)
Not Palafox either because Mayor was the one who recommended (also
wrong)

RECABO v COMELEC
DAMASEN v TUMAMAO
Recabo filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor under LAKAS NUCD-UMDP as a substitute
for his mother. Reyes sought the cancellation
of Recabo’s certificate of candidacy; the
COMELEC cancelled his CoC on the ground that
it was not a valid substitution.
Atty. Damasen filed a petition quo warranto
against Tumamao. They are fighting over who has
the right to a seat in the Sangguniang Bayan. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tumamao.
The Court upheld the COMELEC decision. Reyes, prayed that he be
proclaimed the winner in light of Recabo’s disqualification. The Court ruled
that the disqualification or non-qualification of the winner in a vice
mayoralty race does not justify the proclamation of the defeated candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes.
Rules on succession in cases of permanent vacancies in the SB is
provided under Sec. 45 (b) of RA 7160:
1. The appointee shall come from the same political party as that of
the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy
2. And have “a nomination and a certificate of membership…from
the highest official of the political party concerned…”
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a
replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to
maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

LGC, SECTION 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian.
(a) Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian where automatic successions
provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
component cities and the Sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal Mayor, in the case of Sangguniang Barangay,
upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned.
party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and
shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment
herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of membership of the
appointee from the highest official of the political party concerned are
conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination
and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefor.
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian member
who does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall,
upon recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified
person to fill the vacancy.

(b) Except for the Sangguniang Barangay, only the nominee of the
political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned had been
elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the
last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner
hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the
Barangay in the Sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by
the official next in rank of the organization concerned

TEMPORARY
SECTION 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief
Executive. - (a) When the governor, city or municipal Mayor, or Punong
Barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or
legal reasons such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad,
and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-
mayor, or the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of
the local chief executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend,
or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of
temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working days.
(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the
appropriate Sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief
executive concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where
the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes, the local
chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents
showing that said legal causes no longer exist.
CASE FACTS
MENZON v PETILLA Leyte Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was
designated as Acting Governor by Secretary of
Local Government Luis Santos, who also
designated Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as Acting Vice-
Governor. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan later
issued a resolution declaring invalid Menzon’s
appointment, after the Undersecretary of Local
Government issued an opinion stating that
since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to
succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in
case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of
Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not
necessary. Despite the Undersecretary later
clarifying himself, Petilla and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan refused to correct its resolution and
pay Menzon the emoluments attached to the
Office of Vice-Governor.
BUNYE v ESCAREAL Petitioners are municipal mayor, vice-mayor and
incumbent councilors or members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila. They filed a petition seeking to annul the
resolution promulgated by the Second Division of
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspending them
(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country
but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3)
consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the
said office. Such authorization shall specify the powers and functions that
the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the local chief
executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or
refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal
vice-mayor, or the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, as the
case may be, shall have the right to assume the powers, duties, and
functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said
local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c)
hereof.
(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case
authorize any local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of
the office, other than the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice- Mayor,
or the highest ranking Sangguniang Barangay member, as the case may
be.
RULING/ DOCTRINE
The Court ruled that there was a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-
Governor, and applying Section 49 of the Local Government Code to
temporary vacancies, held that the Secretary of Local Government may
appoint Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor.
SC held that Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, unequivocally
provides that the accused public officials “shall be suspended from office”
while the criminal prosecution is pending in court and that such is
mandatory.
 from office pending their trial for violation of Sec.
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
under an information arguing that their suspension
is unnecessary because they have repeatedly
admitted that they had committed the acts
constituting the offense charged against them,
there is no cause for apprehension that they might
tamper with the records in the offices under their
control, or intimidate prospective witnesses
against them.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE

SECTION 47. Approval of Leaves of Absence. - (a) Leaves of absence of local elective officials shall be approved as follows:

(1) Leaves of absence of the governor and the Mayor of a highly urbanized city or an independent component city shall be approved by the President
or his duly authorized representative;

(2) Leaves of absence of a vice-governor or a city or municipal vice-mayor shall be approved by the local chief executive concerned: Provided, That the
leaves of absence of the members of the Sanggunian and its employees shall be approved by the vice-governor or city or municipal vice- mayor
concerned;

(3) Leaves of absence of the component city or municipal Mayor shall be approved by the governor; and

(4) Leaves of absence of a Punong Barangay shall be approved by the city or municipal mayor: Provided, That leaves of absence of Sangguniang
Barangay members shall be approved by the Punong Barangay.

(b) Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove specified is not acted upon within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the application for
leave of absence shall be deemed approved.

V. LOCAL LEGISLATION

LEGISLATIVE POWER

SECTION 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the province; the Sangguniang
Panlungsod for the city; the Sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and the Sangguniang Barangay for the Barangay.

Sangguniang Panlalawigan- Province

Sangguniang Panlungsod- City
Sanggguniang Bayan- Municipality
Sangguniang Barangay- Barangay

Principles of a valid ordinance:

● must not contravene the Consti or any statute,
 ● must not be unfair or oppressive,
● must not be partial or discriminatory,
● must not prohibit but may regulate trade,
● must be general and consistent with public policy,
● must not be unreasonable.
[Tatel v Virac]

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

TATEL V VIRAC
MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V JAC
LINER
LEGASPI V CEBU CITY

MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIAN (MANNER OF ELECTIONS, DATE OF ELECTION, TERM OF OFFICE)

SECTION 41
RA 8553
RA 10156

VACANCIES IN THE SANGGUNIAN

SECTION 45

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

FARIÑAS V BARBA
NAVARRO V CA

RULES AND PROCEDURE

PRESIDING OFFICER
SECTION 49

INTERNAL RULES
SECTION 50

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
SECTION 51

SESSIONS
SECTION 52
SECTION 186
SECTION 187
QUORUM
SECTION 53

APPROVAL, VETO, AND REVIEW

SECTION 54- 59

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

(UV?  or )
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF LEMERY V
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF BATANGAS 
TATEL V VIRAC 
MODAY V CA 
CITY OF MANILA V LAGUIO JR. 
MOSQUEDA V PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS &
EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION INC 
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG
KABATAAN V QUEZON CITY
 (Manila, Navotas)
 (QC)

POSTING AND PUBLICATION

SECTION 188
SECTION 511

LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

SECTION 120-127

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

GARCIA V COMELEC
SBMA V COMELEC
LAMBINO V COMELEC

VI. DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS

SECTION 60-68
RA 6770

GROUNDS

SECTION 60
CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE
PABLICO V VILLAPANDO

FORM, FILING, AND NOTICE AND HEARING

SECTION 61-62

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

JOSON V TORRES
GARCIA V MIRO
DON V LACSA

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

SECTION 63-65

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

GANZON V CA
ESPIRITU V MELGAR
BOLASTIG V SANDIGANBAYAN
SALALIMA V GUINGONA
RIOS V SANDIGANBAYAN
MIRANDA V SANDIGANBAYAN
CARPIO-MORALES V CA

DECISION

SECTION 66

APPEALS

SECTION 67

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

LLORENTE V SANDIGANBAYAN
PABLICO V VILLAPANDO
MENDOZA V LAXINA, SR.
CALINGIN V CA
BERCES, SR. V GUINGONA JR.

JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN

RA 6770
CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE
HAGAD V GOZO-DADOLE
CASTILLO-CO V BARBERS
GARCIA V MOJICA
EQUIVEL V OMBUDSMAN
COA V HINAMPAS
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V RODRIGUEZ
ALEJANDRO V OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS (SANDIGANBAYAN)

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

INDING V SANDIGANBAYAN
RODRIGUEZ V SANDIGANBAYAN
BARRIGA V SANDIGANBAYAN

CONDONATION DOCTRINE

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

AGUINALDO V SANTOS
CARPIO-MORALES V CA
GIRON V OCHOA, JR.
DIMAPILIS V COMELEC
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V VERGARA
DATOR V CARPIO-MORALES

RECALL

SECTION 69-75
RA 9244 (2004)

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

GARCIA V COMELEC
PARAS V COMELEC
ANGOBUNG V COMELEC
JARIOL V COMELEC
CLAUDIO V COMELEC
AFIADO V COMELEC
SOCRATES V COMELEC
MENDOZA V COMELEC
GOH V BAYRON
MARMETO V COMELEC
 VII. HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANIZATION

SECTION 76-81, 91-93, 94-97

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

FLORES V DRILON
DEBULGADO V CSC
MATHAY JR. V CSC
MATHAY JR. V CA
CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI V CSC
PASTOR V CITY OF PASIG
CSC V TINAYA
MENDOZA V COMELEC
GOH V BAYRON
MARMETO V COMELEC

RESIGNATION

SECTION 82 Resignation of Elective Local Officials. –

(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice- governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of component cities;
(3) The Sanggunian concerned, in the case of Sanggunian members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of Barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken by the aforesaid authorities, shall be furnished the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within fifteen (15) working days from receipt thereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by Sangguniang members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session of the Sanggunian concerned and
duly entered in its records: Provided, however, That this subsection does not apply to Sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases
where existing laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such resignations

Must be acted upon by the Mayor, if not—No resignation.

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA

GRIEVANCE AND DISCIPLINE

SECTION 83. Grievance Procedure. - In every local government unit, the local chief executive shall establish a procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or
settle complaints and grievances presented by local government employees.
 SECTION 84. Administrative Discipline. - Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees as well
as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws. The results of such administrative
investigations shall be reported to the Civil Service Commission

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION/ INVESTIGATION (APPOINTIVE)

SECTION 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees. - (a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period
not exceeding sixty (60) days any subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the
charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

(b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee shall be automatically reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the administrative proceedings against him until its termination. If the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to the fault, neglect or request
of the respondent, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

SECTION 86. Administrative Investigation. - In any local government unit, administrative investigation may be conducted by a person or a committee duly
authorized by the local chief executive. Said person or committee shall conduct hearings on the cases brought against appointive local officials and employees
and submit their findings and recommendations to the local chief executive concerned within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the hearings. The
administrative cases herein mentioned shall be decided within ninety (90) days from the time the respondent is formally notified of the charges.

SECTION 87. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - Except as otherwise provided by law, the local chief executive may impose the penalty of removal from service,
demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one (1) year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months' salary, or reprimand and otherwise
discipline subordinate officials and employees under his jurisdiction. If the penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than thirty (30) days, his
decision shall be final. If the penalty imposed is heavier than suspension of thirty (30) days, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission,
which shall decide the appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof.

SECTION 88. Execution Pending Appeal. - An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a decision of removal or suspension of a respondent- appellant. In
case the respondent-appellant is exonerated, he shall be reinstated to his position with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto from the time he had
been deprived thereof.

Local chief executive- Preventive Suspension for 60 days for dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect; or if guilty of charges which would warrant
removal from service.
If elective- Only the Courts

PROHIBITED BUSINESS

SECTION 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. - (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:

(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit in which he is an official or employee or over which he has the power of supervision, or
with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents, or attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred,
directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the local government unit to such person or firm;

2. (2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
 3. (3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of such local government unit for unpaid taxes or assessment,
or by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the said local government unit.
4. (4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the local government unit for which a surety is required; and
5. (5) Possess or use any public property of the local government unit for private purposes.

(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to prohibited business and pecuniary interest so
provided for under Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven thirteen (R. A. No. 6713) otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" and other laws shall also be applicable to local government officials and
employees.

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

TEVES V SANDIGANBAYAN
DOMINGO V SANDIGANBAYAN
CABALLERO V SANDIGANBAYAN

RESIGNATION

SECTION 82

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA

RESIGNATION

SECTION 82

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA

RESIGNATION

SECTION 82

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA

RESIGNATION

SECTION 82

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA
RESIGNATION

SECTION 82

CASE FACTS RULING/ DOCTRINE

SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES V CA