Republic of the Philippines with modification that of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner

SUPREME COURT
liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
Manila

The Facts
THIRD DIVISION

On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2

G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Division, Central Police District
Command, received a dispatch order2 from the
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, desk officer.3 The order directed him and three
(3) other policemen to serve a warrant of
vs. arrest4 issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador against
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for
kidnapping with ransom.5

DECISION
After a briefing, the team conducted the
necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking
his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.6
REYES, R.T., J.:
Eventually, the team proceeded to the
Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station
at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex
petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.7
prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a
SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached
prospective, not retroactive, effect.1 However,
petitioner.8 They put him under arrest,
penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not
informed him of his constitutional rights, and
a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive
bodily searched him.9 Found tucked in his
effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and
waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial
exception to the exception on effectivity of
Number 5231511 with five (5) live
laws.
ammunition.12

Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa

Petitioner was then brought to the police
nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng bagong
station for questioning.13
batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong
nagkasala na hindi pusakal na kriminal.

A verification of the subject firearm at the

Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame
We apply the exception rather than the rule in
revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but
this petition for review on certiorari of the
to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming
Sampaloc, Manila.14 Epifanio Deriquito, the
records verifier, presented a certification15 to
that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief
records officer of the Firearms and Explosive
Division.16
Petitioner was then charged with illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17 as
amended. The Information read:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
without any authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his/her possession and under his/her custody
and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing
Serial No. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary
license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
Assistant City Prosecutor18
With the assistance of his counsel de parte,
Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19
Trial on the merits ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the
prosecution in the manner stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was
supplied by the combined testimonies of
petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3
Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he
was fast asleep in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City.20 He was roused from
his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in
civilian clothes bolted the room.21 They trained
their guns at him22 and pulled him out of the
room. They then tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet.23 The raiding team went back
inside and searched and ransacked the room.24
SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.25
Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong
baril sa loob!"26
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we
are authorized to shoot you because there’s a
shoot to kill order against you, so if you are
planning do so something, do it right now."27
He was also told that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest.28 However, he was not
shown any proof when he asked for it.29
Neither was the raiding group armed with a
valid search warrant.30
According to petitioner, the search done in the
boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from
him was duly licensed and covered by necessary
permits. He was, however, unable to present
the documentation relative to the firearm
because it was confiscated by the police.
Petitioner further lamented that when he was
incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the
services of a counsel. Neither was he allowed to
see or talk to his family.31
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe
to grind against him. While still with the
Narcotics Command, he turned down a request
of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-
related investigation involving friends of the
said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise
subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on
appointed as the head of the unit that
conducted the search in his boarding house.32
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command
testified that he issued to petitioner a
Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 199333
covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition. This was upon the verbal
instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3
Timbol identified his signature34 on the said
receipt.35
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent
to where petitioner was arrested, testified that
on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly
entered his room as he was preparing for
school.36 They grabbed his shoulder and led
him out.37 During all those times, a gun was
poked at him.38 He was asked where petitioner
was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to
petitioner’s room.39
Four (4) policemen then entered the room.40
He witnessed how they pointed a gun at
petitioner, who was clad only in his
underwear.41 He also witnessed how they
forcibly brought petitioner out of his room.42
While a policeman remained near the faucet to
guard petitioner, three (3) others went back
inside the room.43 They began searching the
whole place. They forcibly opened his locker,44
which yielded the subject firearm.45
RTC and CA Dispositions
On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner
guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period or
from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum
to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in
the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).
The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government. Let the
same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of
the PNP.
SO ORDERED.46
Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his
motion was denied on August 27, 1998.48 He
appealed to the CA.
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed
with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo
of the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court
upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4
years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years
as maximum.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION
as to the penalty, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.49
His motion for reconsideration50 having been
denied through a Resolution dated August 3,
2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present
petition under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our
consideration:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND
LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE
SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM
DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT
THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS
TREE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY
SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF
THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).52 (Underscoring
supplied)
Our Ruling
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
the prosecution has the burden of proving the
twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject
firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same
does not have the corresponding license for
it.53
The prosecution was able to discharge its
burden.
The existence of the subject firearm and its
ammunition was established through the
testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.54 Defense witness
Yuson also identified the firearm.55 Its
existence was likewise admitted by no less than
petitioner himself.56
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess
the firearm, Deriquito testified that a
verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38
bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and
Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed
that the seized pistol was not issued to
petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc,
Manila.57 As proof, Deriquito presented a
certification signed by Roque, the chief records
officer of the same office.58
The Court on several occasions ruled that either
the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms.59 The prosecution more than
complied when it presented both.
The certification is outside the scope of the
hearsay rule.
The general rule is that a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived
from his own perception.60 Otherwise, the
testimony is objectionable for being hearsay.61
On this score, the certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception
to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130,
Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in
official records made in the performance of his
official duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said
certification are only prima facie evidence of
the facts stated there. However, the failure of
petitioner to present controverting evidence
makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the
presumption stands.
Petitioner, however, raises several points which
he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies
with the trial court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the
subject firearm was invalid. The search was
conducted after his arrest and after he was
taken out of the room he was occupying.62
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of
his arrest goes into the factual findings made by
the trial court and its calibration of the
credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put
by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v.
Rivera:63
x x x the manner of assigning values to
declarations of witnesses on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity
to observe the witnesses and assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but
not reflected on record. The demeanor of the
person on the stand can draw the line between
fact and fancy or evince if the witness is telling
the truth or lying through his teeth. We have
consistently ruled that when the question arises
as to which of the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief,
the assessment of the trial courts are generally
viewed as correct and entitled to great weight.
Furthermore, in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of the accused depends
on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial
court are given the highest degree of respect if
not finality.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court found the prosecution version
worthy of credence and belief. We find no
compelling reason not to accept its observation
on this score.
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a
ranking police officer who not only claims to be
highly decorated,65 but have effected a number
of successful arrests66 as well. Common sense
would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with
the Office of the Solicitor General that framing
up petitioner would have been a very risky
proposition. Had the arresting officers really
intended to cause the damnation of petitioner
by framing him up, they could have easily
"planted" a more incriminating evidence rather
than a gun. That would have made their
nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there
indeed was one.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is
not legally authorized to possess the subject
firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally
authorized to possess the subject firearm and
its ammunition on the basis of the
Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNP
Narcotics Command.67
Although petitioner is correct in his submission
that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official duties,68 it is only a presumption;
it may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the
presumption when it proved that the issuance
to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was
anything but regular.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the
Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on
the verbal instruction of his immediate superior,
Col. Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol’s
testimony on cross-examination70 would reveal
that there was an unusual facility by which said
receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance
utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner
under questionable circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as
evidence is not fatal provided there is
competent testimony as to its existence.
Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm
and ammunition should have been excluded as
evidence because they were not formally
offered by the prosecution71 in violation of
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.72
We note that petitioner contradicted himself
when he argued for the validity of the
Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time,
for the exclusion in evidence of the subject
firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner’s act
may result to an absurd situation where the
Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while
the subject firearm and its ammunition which
are supposedly covered by the Memorandum
Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would
have made the Memorandum Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg
to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject
firearm73 and its five (5) live ammunition74
were offered in evidence by the prosecution.75
Even assuming arguendo that they were not
offered, petitioner’s stance must still fail. The
existence of an unlicensed firearm may be
established by testimony, even without its
presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,76
the non-presentation of the pistol did not
prevent the conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of
People v. Malinao.77
As previously stated, the existence of the
subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition
were established through the testimony of
SPO2 Disuanco.78 Yuson also identified said
firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted its
existence.80
We hasten to add that there may also be
conviction where an unlicensed firearm is
presented during trial but through
inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event
(for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in
evidence, as long as there is competent
testimony as to its existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under
the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or
possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of any firearm or ammunition."
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing
law at the time petitioner committed the
offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No.
8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,81
during the pendency of the case with the trial
court. The present law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period and
a fine of not less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person
who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in,
acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32
and other firearm of similar firepower, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or
instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed.
(Underscoring supplied)
As a general rule, penal laws should not have
retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.82 An
exception to this rule, however, is when the law shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
is advantageous to the accused. According to government.
Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right"
of the offender, "but founded on the very
principles on which the right of the State to WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
punish and the commination of the penalty are Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.
based, and regards it not as an exception based
on political considerations, but as a rule
founded on principles of strict justice."83 SO ORDERED.

Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is RUBEN T. REYES

imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that Associate Justice
the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period84 from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Associate Justice
prision correccional maximum which ranges
from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) Chairperson
day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term Associate Justice
shall be one degree lower, which is prision
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
correccional in its medium period (two [2]
years, four [4] months and one [1] day to four Associate Justice
[4] years and two [2] months).86 Hence, the
penalty imposed by the CA is correct. The ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of Associate Justice
prision correccional medium, as minimum term,
to six (6) years of prision correccional
maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance
with the Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. Court of
Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88 ATTESTATION

As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live
ammunition, their proper disposition should be
made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code89 which provides, among others, that the
proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO 3 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.

Associate Justice 4 Exhibit "B."

Chairperson 5 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.

6 Id. at 11.

7 Id. at 3. INP is now Philippine National Police

(PNP).
CERTIFICATION
8 Id. at 4.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s 9 Id. at 5-6.
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to 10 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN,
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. December 11, 1996, p. 10.

REYNATO S. PUNO 11 Exhibit "E."

Chief Justice 12 Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."

13 TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6.

14 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.

Footnotes 15 Exhibit "C."

PNPFED 12 Jul[y] 1996

1 New Civil Code, Art. 4. CERTIFICATION

1-a Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time
of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same.
This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter
Arms, Cal. 38 with serial number 52315 is
registered to RAUL PALENCIA SALVATIERA of
Sampaloc, Manila, acquired thru transfer f[ro]m
Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card d[a]t[e]d
10 December 1990.

2 Exhibit "D." This certification is issued for whatever legal

purpose it may serve.
 29 Id. at 12.

FOR THE CHIEF, FED: 30 Id. at 14.

31 Id. at 21-22.

EDWIN C[.] ROQUE (Sgd.) 32 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26.

P/Sr. Inspector 33 Exhibit "1."

Chief, Records Br[.] 34 Exhibit "1-A."

35 TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.

16 TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20. 36 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.

37 Id. at 8.

17 Entitled "An Act Codifying the Laws on 38 Id.

Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture,
39 Id. at 8-9.
Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of
Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or 40 Id. at 9.
Instruments Used in the Manufacture of
Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and 41 Id. at 10.
Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations 42 Id.
Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes." This law
was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 43 Id. at 11.
June 29, 1983. See Zuño, Sr. v. Dizon, A.M. No. 44 Id. at 12.
RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223 SCRA 584, 598.
45 Id.

46 Rollo, p. 44.
18 Rollo, p. 35.
47 Exhibit "E."
19 Id. at 38.
48 Exhibit "F."
20 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21.
49 Rollo, p. 31.
21 Id. at 21.
50 Exhibit "I."
22 Id.
51 Exhibit "B."
23 Id. at 22.
52 Rollo, p. 125.
24 Id. at 3, 6.

25 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5.

53 Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917,
26 Id. at 4. March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402; Mallari v. Court
27 Id. at 10. of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19,
1996, 265 SCRA 456; People v. Damaso, G.R. No.
28 Id. at 11. 93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547.

54 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
55 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
56 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
57 TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
58 Id. at 19-20.
59 People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30,
2006, 506 SCRA 219; Ungsod v. People, G.R. No.
158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 282;
People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 112090, October 26,
1999, 317 SCRA 435, citing Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269
SCRA 402; Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
106229-30, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 123;
People v. Orehuela, G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April
29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82. See also Mallari v. Court
of Appeals, supra note 53; People v. Solayao,
G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA
255.
60 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
61 The United States Federal Rule of Evidence
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." Cleary, E.W.,
McCormick on Evidence (1984), 3rd ed., p. 729,
citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c).
Accordingly, hearsay evidence is objected to
due to the following reasons:
Oath. Among the earliest of the criticisms of
hearsay, and one often repeated in judicial
opinions down to the present, is the objection
that the out-of-court declarant who made the
hearsay statement commonly speaks or writes
without the solemnity of the oath administered
to witnesses in a court of law. The oath may be
important in two aspects. As a ceremonial and
religious symbol it may induce in the witness a
feeling of special obligation to speak the truth,
and also it may impress upon the witness the
danger of criminal punishment for perjury, to
which the judicial oath or an equivalent solemn
affirmation would be a prerequisite condition. x
xx
Personal presence at trial. Another objection
early asserted and repeated of late is the want
of opportunity, in respect to the out-of-court
declarant, for observation of his demeanor,
with the light that this may shed on his
credibility, that would be afforded if he were a
witness on the stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of
public disgrace can scarcely fail to impress the
witness, and falsehood no doubt becomes more
difficult if the person against whom directed is
present.
Moreover, personal presence eliminates the
danger that in the oral reporting of an out-of-
court statement that the witness reporting the
statement may do so inaccurately. It seems
probable that the reporting of words spoken is
subject to special dangers of inaccuracy beyond
the fallibility common to all reproduction from
memory of matters of observation, and this
seems a substantial danger in the admission of
hearsay. x x x

Cross-examination. It would be generally agreed
today that noncompliance with the third
condition is the main justification for the
exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack of any
opportunity for the adversary to cross examine
the absent declarant whose out-of-court
statement is reported by the witness. x x x In
perhaps his most famous remark, Wigmore
described cross-examination as "beyond any
doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented
for the discovery of truth." (Underscoring
supplied) (Id. at 727-728.)
62 Rollo, pp. 8, 136.
63 433 Phil. 343 (2002), citing People v.
Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25,
1999, 302 SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Phil.
543 (2000); People v. Deleverio, G.R. Nos.
118937-38, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547;
People v. Zaballero, G.R. No. 100935, June 30,
1997, 274 SCRA 627.
64 People v. Rivera, id. at 352.
65 Rollo, p. 61.
66 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25.
67 Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138.
68 Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818
(2000), citing People v. William, G.R. No. 93712,
June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA 808; People v.
Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200
SCRA 194. See also Rules of Court, Rule 131,
Sec. 3(m).
69 TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.
70 Id. at 7-11.
FISCAL: I am asking you why your office likewise
issued [a] Memo Receipt if he [i.e., Colonel
Angelito Moreno] normally issue (sic) a firearm
for [an] officer of the PNP?
A. Because our office has also authorized us
to issue.
Q: And who authorized your office?
A: It is our Commanding Officer, Sir.
Q: And who authorized the Commanding
Officer?
INTERPRETER:
Witness cannot answer.
Q: Where does the Commanding Officer
derive his authority?
A: What I know is that the Commanding
Officer is authorized to [issue] firearm that will
be issued to a PNP Officer but I do not know
who gave the authority to our officer.
xxxx
Q: As such, do you keep inventory of such
supplies?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you have the inventory of this
particular gun, the original?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you have that inventory with you, that
inventory of such gun, the Memo Receipt?
71 Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.
A: That firearm was not in my custody.

72 Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. – The court shall

Q: But you said a while ago it is with you, consider no evidence which has not been
which is which, do you have or do you not have formally offered. The purpose for which the
the listing of such inventory? evidence is offered must be specified.

A: None, Sir.

73 Exhibit "E."

xxxx

74 Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."

FISCAL: Mr. Witness, other than this case, were

there any instances where you issued Memo
75 TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.
Receipt as verbally directed by your alleged
Commanding Officer Moreno?

76 G.R. Nos. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232

SCRA 82, 95-96.
A: Yes, Sir, I’m only a RSO since November
1993.

As Mr. Justice Feliciano held for the Court:

Q: Precisely, 1991 to 1993, for a period
wherein you claimed you hold an office of RSO,
has (sic) this the only time you issued?
A: Many time[s], Sir.
COURT: Let’s clarify this. The Court understands
to (sic) your previous answer that this is the first
time that you have done this procedure of
issuing guns to an officer. Are you changing that
this is the first time and not many times?
A: That is the only first (sic) time, as
instructed by the Commanding Officer, Your
Honor. (Underscoring supplied)
x x x Upon the other hand, we note also that the
allegedly unlicensed murder weapon was not
presented in evidence by the prosecution. What
the prosecution did present to show absence of
a license or permit to possess the firearm used
to kill Teoberto, was a certification issued by the
Bohol Regional Headquarters of the Integrated
National Police, dated 20 December 1989, x x x:
xxxx
We consider that the certification was adequate
to show that the firearm used by Modesta
Orehuela in killing Teoberto Cañizares was a
firearm which Orehuela was not licensed to
possess and to carry outside his residence on
the night that Teoberto Cañizares was shot to
death. That that firearm was a .38 caliber pistol
was shown by the testimony and report of NBI
Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When the above
circumstances are taken together with the
testimony of the eye-witness that Modesto
Orehuela was in fact in possession of a firearm
and used the same to kill Teoberto Cañizares,
we believe that accused Orehuela was properly
found guilty of aggravated or qualified illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
(Underscoring supplied)
77 G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423
SCRA 34. See also People v. Taan, supra note 59;
People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366 (2000).
78 TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
79 TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
80 TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
81 People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.
82 Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. Nos. L-56741-42,
April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457, 472. An ex post
facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
83 People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923),
citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de
las Leyes.
84 Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II,
2001 ed., p. 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN
ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD. – 4 years, 2 months and
1 day to 6 years
Minimum : 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 4
years, 9 months and 10 days
Medium : 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 5
years, 4 months and 20 days
Maximum : 5 years, 4 months and 21 days to 6
years
85 Id. at 1026. RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS
MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. –
17 years, 4 months and 1 day to reclusion
perpetua
Minimum : 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18
years and 8 months
third person not liable for the offense, but
those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed. (Underscoring
supplied)

Medium : 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20

years

Maximum : Reclusion perpetua

86 Id. at 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS

MEDIUM PERIOD. – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months

Minimum : 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 2

years, 11 months and 10 days

Medium : 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 3

years, 6 months and 20 days

Maximum : 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years

and 2 months.

87 343 Phil. 297 (1997).

88 G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007.

89 Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the

proceeds or instruments of the crime. – Every
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony
shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds
of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be

confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a