Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jngse

Failure probability assessment of gas transmission pipelines based on T

historical failure-related data and modification factors
Ke Shan, Jian Shuai∗, Kui Xu, Wei Zheng
College of Mechanical and Transportation Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Beijing, 102249, China

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Evaluation of failure probability is one of the core contents of quantitative risk assessment. An assessment model
Pipeline of gas transmission pipelines failure probability based on historical failure-related data and modification factors
Risk assessment is established, which combines a quantitative part to integrate available historical failure-related data, with a
Failure probability qualitative analysis to compensate for a potential lack of precise crisp statistical data. The main idea is to use the
Qualitative analysis
modification factors to modify the baseline failure frequency. The baseline failure frequency is estimated from
Statistical data
the statistical historical failure-related data. The modification factors are calculated from the segment attributes
of the target pipeline using algorithms developed from the analysis of statistical data and analytical models
supplemented by pipeline evaluation criteria and expert judgment. The constructed model is applied to a long-
distance gas transmission pipeline so that the effectiveness of the proposed model could be demonstrated. The
prospect is for more efficient risk management by acting both on historical failure-related data and modification
factors of gas transmission pipeline systems.

1. Introduction
Pipelines are regarded as one of the most practical and economical
ways for transporting dangerous and combustible substances, such as
oil and gas (Brito and Almeida, 2009). However, some inner or outer
factors such as corrosion, natural force damage, third party damage,
and incorrect operation can be causative events for incident in pipeline
systems with potentially adverse consequences on the society, the
economy and the environment including major supply chains (Girgin
and Krausmann, 2016). Although the failure of pipelines can never be
completely avoided, an appropriate risk assessment method can con-
tribute to providing effective risk management to reduce the overall
risk of pipeline systems (Guo et al., 2016).
As one of the most studied topics, the risk assessment of oil and gas
pipeline has gradually evolved from qualitative evaluation to quanti-
tative evaluation. Evaluation of failure probability is one of the core
contents of quantitative risk assessment. Several researches are con-
ducted to analyze risk or failure probability connected with oil and gas
pipelines. Muhlbauer (2004) presented a risk assessment method using
an index system to evaluate the risk of long-distance oil and gas
transmission pipelines. This method had been widely used around the
world and worked well. Koornneef et al. (2010) presented a systematic
evaluation based on an extensive literature review, of the influence of
uncertainties on the results of quantitative risk assessments for CO2
transmission pipelines. Shahriar et al. (2012) employed the fuzzy logic
based bow-tie analysis to derive fuzzy probabilities of basic events in
fault tree and to estimate fuzzy probabilities of output event con-
sequences. The study also explored how inter-dependencies among
different risk events might affect analysis results. Zhang et al. (2012)
provided a probabilistic evaluation method for the gas pipeline with
corrosion defects based on the assessment criteria, and the failure
probability of corroded pipelines due to various uncertainties was as-
sessed using Monte-Carlo simulation technique. Jamshidi et al. (2013)
integrated the relative risk score methodology with fuzzy logic based on
experts' knowledge to model the uncertainty involved in the pipeline
risk assessment. Lu et al. (2015) presented a comprehensive risk eva-
luation method by combining a risk matrix with a bow-tie model. A
fuzzy petri net (FPN) model combined with fuzzy reasoning algorithm
for the risk assessment of long distance oil and gas transportation pi-
pelines was proposed by Guo et al. (2016).
Often above-mentioned studies estimated the failure probability of
oil and gas pipelines using expert elicitation and fuzzy logic, while, the
use of historical failure-related data in pipeline risk assessment is
unusual due to the lack of precise crisp data, uncertainties in the
available data, and imprecision connected with fluctuations of the
parameters, changing environment or new components (Shi et al.,
2014). As a result, most researchers just used historical failure-related
data to validate their proposed methods.

∗
Corresponding author.
E-mail address: shuaij@cup.edu.cn (J. Shuai).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jngse.2018.01.049
Received 10 October 2017; Received in revised form 7 January 2018; Accepted 27 January 2018
Available online 07 February 2018
1875-5100/ © 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
K. Shan et al.
Pipeline failure statistics enable the understanding of how and why
pipelines fail, providing the means to enhance pipeline safety (Cunha,
2016). Since 1970, the Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Ad-
ministration (PHMSA) (PHMSA, 2016) of the United States Department
of Transportation (DOT) has collected information on incidents that
occurred on gas and liquid pipelines regulated by PHMSA and met es-
tablished reporting criteria. The National Energy Board (NEB) (NEB,
2016) of Canada is an independent federal regulator established in
1959, which has collected and analyzed failure data of pipelines to
promote safety and security. The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association
(CEPA) (CEPA, 2016) also shares with Canadians details on the trans-
mission pipeline industry's recent performance to keep pipelines safe
and communities protected. The European Gas Pipeline Incident Data
Group (EGIG) (EGIG, 2015) is the owner of an extensive database of
pipeline incident data collected in Europe since 1970. The United
Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators' Association (UKOPA) (UKOPA,
2016) collects incident data related to the UK's onshore pipelines.
The pipeline incident database (PID) provides valuable information
for researchers to identify potential threats and damage mechanisms to
the risk management of oil and gas pipeline systems, and develop ef-
fective risk mitigation strategies. Several studies carried out statistical
analyses of the PID (Kiefner et al., 1999; Evans et al., 2014; Wang and
Duncan, 2014a,b; Duncan and Wang, 2014; Girgin and Krausmann,
2016; Lam and Zhou, 2016; Cunha, 2016).
However, some of these studies focused only on analyzing the
causes of the incidents, and failed to assess the risk or failure prob-
ability of pipeline. Some studies only took into account some basic pi-
peline parameters in the process of risk assessment. The quantification
of risk of gas transmission pipeline failure is a difficult task. Gas
transmission pipeline systems comprise many kilometers of pipes of
different ages and various materials. Operational and environmental
conditions are highly variable both temporally and spatially (Shahriar
et al., 2012). There are so many factors that need to be considered in
the process of pipeline risk assessment. Some factors such as diameter,
wall thickness, and depth of cover, can be obtained by statistical data,
but some others such as public education and quality of worker are
difficult to quantify. The data available are insufficient to support the
quantitative risk assessment of pipeline system. The proposed approach
combines a quantitative part to integrate available historical failure-
related data, with a qualitative analysis to compensate for a potential
lack of precise crisp statistical data.
The rest of the paper is structured as following. In Section 2, an
assessment model of gas transmission pipelines failure probability
based on historical failure-related data and modification factors is es-
tablished. In Section 3, the failure probability modification factors
index system is divided into three groups: a quantitative index, a semi-
quantitative index and a qualitative index. The evaluation methods of
the modification factors and the corresponding weights are proposed. A
case study is illustrated in Section 4 so that the effectiveness of the
proposed model could be demonstrated. Finally, conclusions are given
in Section 5.
2. Failure probability estimation model
2.1. Estimation model
As for the estimation model, the primary failure causes for pipeline
incidents are divided into six main groups: corrosion, natural force
damage, third party damage, material/weld/equip failure, incorrect
operation, and other incident cause. The framework for failure prob-
ability assessment of gas transmission pipeline is shown in Fig. 1.
The failure probability of pipeline system can be calculated from the
following equation:
357
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366
l l
P= ∑ Pi = ∑ Ri Fi
i=1 i=1 (1)
where P is the failure probability of pipeline system, per km per year; Pi
is the failure probability for primary failure cause i, per km per year; Ri
is the baseline failure frequency for primary failure cause i, per km per
year; Fi is the first level modification factor which corresponds to pri-
mary failure cause i; and l is the number of the primary failure causes
and l = 6.
2.2. Baseline failure frequency
The failure frequency is defined as the annual number of pipeline
failure incidents per unit line length. The baseline failure frequency is
defined herein as the average failure frequency for a reference line
segment associated with a particular pipeline system or operating
company. It is intended to reflect average conditions relating to con-
struction, operation, and management level.
The baseline failure frequency for primary failure cause i is quan-
tified using the following generic equation:
m
αi Nk
Ri =
m
∑ Lk
k=1 (2)
where Nk is the number of incidents occurring on pipelines in the kth
year; Lk is the corresponding length of pipelines in the kth year, km; αi is
the percentage of incidents caused by primary failure cause i; and
m = the total number of years for which the incident and mileage data
are available.
For the target pipeline system these baseline failure frequency es-
timates are best obtained from operating company historical failure-
related data if the system exposure is sufficient to yield a statistically
significant number of failure incidents. In the absence of appropriate
company or system specific data, the estimate of the baseline failure
frequency can be obtained from historical pipeline incident data gath-
ered by the Pipeline Incident Databases (PIDs) such as PHMSA, NEB,
and EGIG.
2.3. Failure probability modification factors
The failure probability modification factors are calculated from the
segment attributes of the target pipeline, and they are used to modify
the baseline failure frequency. The effects of modification factors may
be positive, by causing a reduction of the failure intensity, or negative,
by causing a higher intensity (Brissaud et al., 2010).
The first level modification factors can be calculated from multi-
plying the second level modification factors by their corresponding
weights.
n
Fi = ∑ wij Fij
j=1 (3)
where Fij is the jth second level modification factor in the first level
modification factor index i; wij is the corresponding weight of the
modification factor Fij; and n is the number of the second level index in
the first level index i.
3. Evaluation method of modification factors
3.1. Modification factors index system
The failure probability modification factors index system is com-
prised of six first level modification factor indices, 34 s level mod-
ification factor indices, and their corresponding weights. The six first
level modification factor indices correspond to the six primary failure
causes of pipeline incidents such as corrosion, natural force damage,
third party damage, material/weld/equip failure, incorrect operation,
K. Shan et al.
Fig. 1. The framework of failure probability assessment method for gas transmission pipeline.
and other incident cause. Each primary failure cause can be further
divided into certain number of secondary risk factors which constitute
the second level modification factor indices. Each modification factor
corresponds to one risk factor and vice-versa. The weights describe the
significance of the corresponding modification factors. Fig. 2 shows the
framework of this index system.
3.2. Classification of modification factors
In order to reduce the subjectivity in the process of evaluation, the
modification factor indices are quantified as much as possible. In con-
sideration of the different degrees of difficulty in quantifying the
modification factors, the second level modification factors indices are
divided into three groups: a quantitative index, a semi-quantitative
index and a qualitative index. The terms quantitative and qualitative
are often used to distinguish the amount of historical failure-related
data analyzed in the model and the amount of mathematical calcula-
tions employed in arriving at a risk answer. A index that exclusively
uses historical frequency data is sometimes referred to as quantitative
whereas a index employing opinion data, even if later assigned num-
bers, is referred to as qualitative or semi-quantitative (Muhlbauer,
2004).
3.2.1. Quantitative index
For quantitative indices, require large amounts of statistical data to
provide relevant results. In this paper, the database of EGIG is used for
the constitution of the quantitative index system. This database in-
dicates that the failure frequencies of gas pipeline depend on the basic
358
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366
characteristic parameters of the pipelines, for instance, diameter, wall
thickness, and depth of cover (Han and Weng, 2011). Each quantitative
index corresponds to one basic characteristic parameter and vice-versa.
As is shown in Fig. 3, the failure frequencies for primary failure
causes are given by fitting functions which directly depend on some
pipeline parameters. Among the parameters that govern the corrosion
failure frequency, three important parameters for the corrosion fre-
quency of failure are the type of the coating, the pipe wall thickness and
the line pipe age, with thinner wall thickness and longer service time
presenting a higher likelihood of failure. The relations between the
failure frequencies for primary failure causes and the basic character-
istic parameters of pipelines are shown in Table 1. “f(x)” is the fitting
function, and “x” is the basic characteristic parameter, such as dia-
meter, wall thickness, and depth of cover. The fitting functions will
provide beneficial for calculating the modification factors and their
corresponding weights. Notably, it is not available to describe the re-
lation between corrosion failure frequency and coating type by the
method of fitting because that relation is discontinuous, and the same to
the relation between material/weld/equip failure frequency and ma-
terial grade.
Although the database of EGIG is limited to Europe, the general
relations between the failure frequencies and the basic pipeline para-
meters are applicable to the pipeline systems also in other parts of the
world where the statistical data are not detailed enough.
3.2.2. Semi-quantitative index
For semi-quantitative indices, it is difficult to find the relationships
between failure frequencies and risk factors by the method of fitting due
K. Shan et al.
Fig. 2. The framework of failure probability modification factors index system.
to lack of precise crisp data. In this paper, some pipeline assessment
criteria and data handbooks are applied to classify the semi-quantita-
tive indices.
For the semi-quantitative indices in this paper, a scale from “I” for
“very low failure probability” to “V” for “very high failure probability”
is proposed. The semi-quantitative modification factor indices and their
corresponding scale criteria are shown in Table 2.
3.2.3. Qualitative index
For the qualitative indices, in order to set the current modification
factors' states, the lack of statistical data is therefore compensated by a
qualitative analysis of the modification factors through the use of
359
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366
organized expert judgment.
For the qualitative indices, a scale from “I” for “very low failure
probability” to “V” for “very high failure probability” is also proposed
as for the qualitative indices. The qualitative modification factor indices
and their corresponding scale criteria are shown in Table 3.
3.3. The evaluation methods of the second level modification factors and the
corresponding weights
The values of the second level modification factors are defined ac-
cording to the states of the modification factors:
K. Shan et al. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

Fig. 3. Effect of the basic characteristic parameters on the pipeline failure frequency.

1) If the modification factor is supposed to be in a medium state ac-
cording to the failure frequency, the corresponding value of mod-
ification factor is equal to “1”, and the failure probability of pipeline
system is equal to the baseline failure frequency;
2) If the modification factor is supposed to be in a lower state (resp. a
higher state), the corresponding value of modification factor is
smaller than “1” (resp. greater than “1”).
represents the “medium state”. For the semi-quantitative index and
qualitative index, the level “III” of modification factor represents the
“medium state”.
3.3.1. Evaluation method of modification factor for the quantitative index
To evaluate the modification factors of quantitative indices, a
method that consists of 4 steps is proposed as shown below:

Using available statistical data, pipeline assessment criteria, data
handbooks and, if required, expert judgment, the medium state of each
modification factor index must be set according to the failure fre-
quency, as much as possible, it must fit the baseline failure frequency.
For the quantitative index, the mean failure frequency for each primary
failure cause associated with each basic characteristic parameter
➢ Step 1: Collect the basic characteristic parameters, such as pipeline
diameter, wall thickness, and depth of cover, which correspond to
the quantitative modification factor indices.
➢ Step 2: Calculate the failure frequency f(x) using the fitting func-
tions in Table 1.
➢ Step 3: Calculate the mean failure frequency.

Table 1
Quantitative indices.

First level Index (Fi) Second level Index (Fij) Fitting function Mean failure frequency (rij)

Corrosion factor (FC)
Natural force damage factor (FN)
Third party damage factor (FE)
Material/weld/equip failure factor
(FM)
Incorrect operation factor (FI)
3 2
Wall thickness factor f(x) = -0.00001527x + 0.00109x -0.02481x+0.1783 0.018
(FCW)
Line pipe age factor (FCA) f(x) = 0.0000002047x4-0.00001907x3+ 0.0006045x2-0.006608x+0.01931 0.029
Coating type factor (FCT) Discontinuous 0.060
Diameter factor (FND) f(x) = 0.00000000004882x3 -0.00000006429x2-3.069e-05x+0.04801 0.018
Wall thickness factor f(x) = 0.000003226x4-0.0002949x3+ 0.009806x2-0.1404x+0.7302 0.050
(FEW)
Diameter factor (FED) f(x) = −0.0000000007608x3+ 0.000002131x2-0.001944x+0.5833 0.087
Cover depth factor (FEC) f(x) = 2.068 × 1015x−8.213 0.041
Material grade factor Discontinuous 0.016
(FMM)
Line pipe age factor (FMA) f(x) = −0.00000009733x4+0.0000128x3 -0.0004953x2+0.006852x-0.02312 0.036
Diameter factor (FID) f(x) = −0.00000000006731x3+ 0.0000001963x2-0.0001849x+0.05601 0.001

360
K. Shan et al. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

➢ Step 4: Calculate the second level modification factor.

> -0.85 or < -1.2

No SCADA system
Weekly or less
In step 3, in order to set the “medium state” for the quantitative
index, the Mean Value Theorem for definite integrals is used to calcu-
< 1000

< 70%
< 70%
< 1.10
< 1.10
< 1.10
> 100
> 5.0

> 2.5
late the mean failure frequency. The mean value of f(x) on [a, b] is

<5
<2
Ⅴ

4
defined as:

Once every four days

b
∫a f (x ) dx
rij =
−0.9 ∼ −0.85

b−a (4)
1000–2000

70%–79%
70%–79%
1.10–1.20
1.10–1.25
1.10–1.25
where rij is the mean failure frequency of the jth second level mod-
80–100
2.5–5.0

0.5–2.5

ification factor in the first level modification factor index i; f(x) is the
5–20

50%
2–5

fitting function; The results of the mean failure frequencies are shown
Ⅳ

in Table 1.
Once every three days

In step 4, the second level modification factor Fij can be estimated by

the following equation:
−0.95 ∼ −0.9
2000–5000

f (x ij )
80%–89%
80%–89%
1.21–1.40
1.26–1.50
1.26–1.40

Fij =
1.0–2.5

0.1–0.5
50–80

20–50

rij (5)
80%
5–7
Ⅲ

where f(xij) is the pipeline failure frequency which relates to the basic
Once every two days

characteristic parameter of the pipeline.

−1.0 ∼ −0.95

1, Division 2
5000–10000

3.3.2. Evaluation method of modification factor for the semi-quantitative

90%–99%
90%–99%
1.41–1.60
1.51–1.75
1.41–1.60
0.02–0.1

index and qualitative index

Modification factor level

0.5–1.0
50–100
30–50

7–10

To evaluate the modification factors of semi-quantitative indices

95%
Ⅱ

and qualitative indices, a fuzzy method that consists of 5 steps is pro-

posed as shown below:
−1.2 ∼ −1.0

1, Division 1
> 10000

< 0.02

> 1.60
> 1.75
> 1.60

➢ Step 1: Collect the pipeline attributes, such as soil resistivity, patrol

> 100

99.9%
< 0.5

100%
100%
< 30

> 10

Daily

frequency, and public education, which correspond to the semi-

Ⅰ

quantitative and qualitative modification factor indices.

Actual wall thickness/Design wall thickness⑥

➢ Step 2: Find the corresponding modification factor level of each

DC–Surface potential gradient (mV/m)④

semi-quantitative and qualitative index according to Tables 2 and 3.

➢ Step 3: Convert the modification factor level to a fuzzy possibility
score.
Qualification rate of welding⑤
AC–current density (A∙m−2)③

➢ Step 4: Convert the fuzzy possibility score to a fuzzy probability.

SCADA system reliability⑨
Potential pipe to soil (V)②
Soil resistivity (ohm-cm)①

For other type of coating

➢ Step 5: Calculate the second level modification factor.

For polyethylene coating

Growth rate(mm/year)

Design pressure/MOP⑦
Test pressure/MAOP⑧

4)If the data of a semi-quantitative index is unknown, it should be regarded as the worst case (level “V”).
3)⑤ The qualification rate of welding is estimated from the results of Nondestructive Examination (NDE).

In step 3, the modification factor level is converted to fuzzy possi-

Patrol frequency
Sign intactness
Scale criterion

Location class

bility score using a numerical approximation system as shown in Fig. 4.

(Chen et al., 1992). “Ⅰ” corresponds to “0.1”, “Ⅱ” corresponds to “0.3”,
“Ⅲ” corresponds to “0.5”, “Ⅳ” corresponds to “0.7”, “Ⅴ” corresponds to
“0.9”.
In step 4, the fuzzy possibility scores can be converted to fuzzy
Coating insulation resistance factor (kΩ·m2)

probabilities by the empirical equation proposed by Onisawa (1988):

1
Non-Pipe components safety factor

⎧ 10k (FPS ≠ 0)
Stray current interference factor

FP =
⎨0
Right-of-way condition factor

⎩ (FPS = 0) (6)
Cathodic protection factor

Product corrosivity factor

where
Soil corrosivity factor

SCADA system factor

Activity level factor

Pressure test factor

Second level index

1
Pipe safety factor
Seam weld factor

1 − FPS ⎤3
k=⎡ ×K
⎣ FPS ⎦ (7)
Patrol factor

where FP is the fuzzy probability and FPS is the fuzzy possibility score.
K is a constant and can be calculated by:
1
Material/weld/equip failure factor

1)①⑥⑦⑧⑨ From (Muhlbauer, 2004).

K=
lg(1/ r ) (8)
2)②③④ From GB/T 19285, 2014.
Third party damage factor

where r is the average failure frequency. For gas transmission pipeline

Incorrect operation factor
Semi-quantitative indices.

system, the average failure frequency is 2.32 × 10−4 per km per year,
according to the statistical analysis of Pipeline Incident Databases
Corrosion factor
First level index

(PIDs). The numerical data can be found in Table 4. For the secondary
level modification factor of gas transmission pipeline system, in this
paper, 2.32 × 10−5 is considered as the average failure frequency, So,
Table 2

K = 4.63.
In step 5, for the semi-quantitative index and qualitative index, the

361
K. Shan et al. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

Table 3
Qualitative indices.

First level index Second level index Scale criterion Modification factor level

Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ

Corrosion factor Internal corrosion ①Internal monitoring All of them 3 of them 2 of them 1 of them None
preventions factor ②Inhibitor injection
③Internal coating
④Pigging
Natural force damage Earth movement factor Potential for landslide, earthquake, or Very low Low Medium High Very high
factor subsidence
Heavy weather factor Potential for heavy rain/flood, high wind, or Very low Low Medium High Very high
lightning
Third party damage Public education factor ①Mailouts All of them 3 of them 2 of them 1 of them None
factor ②Meeting with public officials
③Meeting with local contractors
④Door-to-door contact with
adjacent residents
Alarm call system factor ①Protection legislation All of them 3 of them 2 of them 1 of them None
②Successful warning case
③24 h a day available
④Contingency plan
Above ground facilities ①Distance above 6 m All of them or no 3 of them 2 of them 1 of them None
factor ②With wall above ground facilities
③With security systems
④Inspection in important areas
Incorrect operation Construction factor Quality of installation, joining, handing and Excellent Above Average Below Poor
factor backfill average average
Maintenance factor Quality of documentation, schedule, and Excellent Above Average Below Poor
procedures average average
Quality of worker factor Sense of responsibility, safety awareness, and Excellent Above Average Below Poor
professional knowledge average average
Other incident cause – – Very low Low Medium High Very high
factor

of the level “III”, and the results are shown in Table 5.

3.3.3. Evaluation method of the corresponding weights

In this paper, evaluation process consists of assigning a weight to
each modification factor in order to contrast their effects. The weight
for each modification factor is quantified using the following generic
equation, and the results are shown in Fig. 2.
rij
wij = n
∑ j = 1 rij (9)

4. Case study

To validate the feasibility and practicability of the proposed

Fig. 4. Fuzzy numbers represent modification factor level. method, a 200.2-km-long pipeline is presented for demonstration.
Because risks are rarely constant along a pipeline, it is advantageous to
partition the line into smaller segments as some conditions such as
Table 4
Pipeline failure frequency presented in different databases.
population density, soil corrosivity, and coating characteristics change
significantly along the pipe route. This brings the total to 39 segments
Country or Database Period Failure frequency (per year per 103 km) in the 200.2-km-long pipeline. A 10.7-km-long pipeline segment, which
region is one of the 39 segments, is used as an example to illustrate the eva-
Historic Last 5 years
luation procedure of the proposed method. The evaluation methods of
US PHMSA 2004–2015 0.155 0.149 the other 38 segments are the same as that of this segment.
Canada CEPA 2011–2015 0.225 0.225
Europe EGIG 1970–2013 0.33 0.16
4.1. Baseline failure frequency
UK UKOPA 1962–2014 0.219 0.078
Average 0.232 0.153
The baseline failure frequency estimates are obtained from the
statistical historical failure-related data. In this study, pipeline mileage,
level “III” of failure probability represents the “medium state”, the incident, and failure cause data during the period 2002–2015 are used
corresponding fuzzy possibility equals to the average failure frequency, to calculate the baseline failure frequency. Annual length and incident
and the corresponding value of modification factor is equal to “1.0”. number of gas transmission pipelines are shown in Fig. 5. The dis-
The value of modification factor for the other four levels can be cal- tribution of incidents due to six primary failure causes for gas trans-
culated by the ratios of the fuzzy probabilities to the fuzzy probability mission pipelines is shown in Fig. 6. The baseline failure frequency of
pipeline due to each primary failure cause is calculated by using

362
K. Shan et al. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

Table 5
The value of modification factor corresponds to each modification factor level.

Modification factor level Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ

Fuzzy possibility score (FPS) 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9

Fuzzy possibility (FP) 2.34 × 10−10 7.23 × 10−7 2.32 × 10−5 3.23 × 10−4 0.006
Modification factor 9.98 × 10−6 0.031 1.0 13.78 253.59

be calculated from the Equation (1).

4.3. Result and discussion

The results of the baseline failure frequency, the modification factor

and the failure probability for each primary failure cause of the pro-
posed 10.7-km-long pipeline segment are shown in Table 8. The failure
probability of the proposed pipeline segment is 4.87 × 10−4 per km per
year. The percentage of each primary failure cause for this pipeline
segment is shown in Fig. 7. In this case, the percentage of each primary
failure cause of this pipeline segment is different from the average re-
sults of statistics. As is shown in Fig. 6, the historical incident data
suggests that incidents were most often caused by material/weld/equip
Fig. 5. Annual length and incident number of gas transmission pipelines. failure (29.80%), corrosion (24.14%), and third party damage
(21.94%). The remaining incidents were caused by natural force da-
mage (11.68%), other incident cause (8.97%) and incorrect operation
(3.47%). Fig. 7 indicates that material/weld/equip failure (34.84%)
and natural force damage (29.56%) are the two leading incident causes
for the proposed 10.7-km-long pipeline segment, followed by corrosion
(17%) and third party damage (13.75%), incorrect operation is the least
problematic, which accounting for only 0.84% of incidents. Pipeline
operators and industry stakeholders should pay more attention to pre-
vent material/weld/equip failure and natural force damage.
The evaluation results of the proposed method in this paper are
compared to those of W. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method which is now
Fig. 6. Distribution of incidents due to each primary failure cause for gas transmission
well known and one of the most widely used risk assessment methods.
pipelines.
W. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method suggests that the higher the score,
the lower the failure probability of pipeline. In order to better contrast
Table 6 the evaluation results of these two methods, the “400-score” is used to
Baseline failure frequency of gas transmission pipeline for each primary failure cause (per
indicate the failure probability for W. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method.
km per year).
The evaluation results of these two methods for the whole 200.2-km-
Primary failure cause Percentage (αi) Baseline failure frequency (Ri) long pipeline are shown in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 respectively. It is observed
from Figs. 8 and 9 that the evaluation results of these two methods are
Corrosion 24.14% 5.25E-05 approximately consistent, and the deviations are acceptable. The deci-
Natural force damage 11.68% 2.54E-05
Third party damage 21.94% 4.77E-05
sion maker can get differentiated information about the pipeline failure
Material/weld/equip failure 29.80% 6.48E-05 likelihood distribution through both of these two methods and find out
Incorrect operation 3.47% 7.54E-06 the relatively high risk pipe segments where more attention is required
Other incident cause 8.97% 1.95E-05 for preventing pipeline failure. However, compared with W. Kent
All failure cause 100% 2.17E-04
Muhlbauer scoring method, the proposed approach, which based on
historical failure-related data and modification factors, could obtain
Equation (2), and the results are shown in Table 6. It is important to absolute risk scale expressed by failure probability per km per year
point out that the baseline failure frequencies of the 39 pipeline seg- instead of relative risk scale expressed by score. A model, such as W.
ments are the same. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method, employing relative scales, even if later
assigned numbers, is referred to as qualitative or semi-quantitative. As
for quantitative risk assessment, the outcomes are individual risk (IR)
4.2. Modification factor and social risk (SR) which are closely related to failure probability.
Therefore, the proposed approach can lay the foundation for quanti-
The modification factors are calculated from the attributes of the tative risk assessment of gas transmission pipelines. What's more, in
proposed 10.7-km-long pipeline segment. The attributes of this pipeline order to reduce the subjectivity in the process of evaluation, the mod-
segment are collected in Table 7. When multiple conditions exist within ification factors index system, in this paper, is divided into three
the same pipeline segment, it is recommended that the worst-case groups: a quantitative index, a semi-quantitative index and a qualitative
condition governs the point assignment (Muhlbauer, 2004). According index. The quantitative index exclusively adheres to historical failure-
to the evaluation methods of the second level modification factors and related data and has no opinion data. The qualitative index entirely
the corresponding weights introduced in Section 3.3, the results of all relies on expert opinion. We can find out that the subjectivity of eva-
the second level modification factors are shown in Table 7. The first luation result mainly comes from the evaluation of the semi-quantita-
level modification factors can be calculated from the Equation (3). The tive index and the qualitative index. And compared with the expert
failure probability of the proposed 10.7-km-long pipeline segment can judgment method, the proposed approach, which combines a

363
K. Shan et al. Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366

Table 7
The pipeline segment attributes and the results of the second level modification factors.

Primary failure cause Attribute Values or situation description Modification factor (Fij)

Corrosion Wall thickness (mm) 12.5 0.483

Line pipe age 15 0.069
Coating type Polyethylene 0.167
Soil resistivity (ohm-cm) 7600 0.031
Potential pipe to soil (V) −0.86 13.78
Stray current interference 46 A m−2 0.031
Coating insulation resistance (kΩ·m2) 34 1
Growth rate(mm/year) 0.21 1
Internal corrosion preventions Internal monitoring; Inhibitor injection; Pigging 0.031
Natural force damage Diameter (mm) 508 1.222
Earth movement High 13.78
Heavy weather Medium 1
Third party damage Wall thickness (mm) 12.5 0.2
Diameter (mm) 508 0.529
Minimum cover depth (mm) 160 0.049
Location class 3 13.78
Patrol frequency Once every two days 9.98E-06
Sign intactness 85% 1
Public education Meeting with public officials; Meeting with local contractors 1
Alarm call system With security systems; Inspection in important areas 1
Above ground facilities Distance above 6 m; With wall; With security systems; Inspection in 9.98E-06
important areas
Material/weld/equip failure Material grade X60 0.438
Line pipe age 15 0.194
Qualification rate of welding 98% 0.031
Actual wall thickness/Design wall 12.5/10 = 1.25 1
thickness
Design pressure/MOP 6/4 = 1.5 1
Test pressure/MAOP 7.5/6 = 1.25 13.78
Incorrect operation Diameter (mm) 508 4
SCADA system reliability 95% 0.031
Construction Average 1
Maintenance Average 1
Quality of worker Above average 0.031
Other incident cause Other incident cause Medium 1

Table 8
Results of the modification factors and failure probabilities for the primary failure causes.

Failure cause Baseline failure frequency (per km per Modification factor for each primary failure Failure probability for each primary failure cause (per
year) cause km per year)

Corrosion 5.25E-05 1.578 8.28E-05

Natural force damage 2.54E-05 5.669 1.44E-04
Third party damage 3.02E-05 1.404 6.70E-05
Material/weld/equip failure 6.48E-05 2.619 1.70E-04
Incorrect operation 7.54E-06 0.545 4.11E-06
Other incident cause 1.95E-05 1.000 1.95E-05
All failure cause 2.17E-04 – 4.87E-04

failure probability based on historical failure-related data and mod-

ification factors is proposed. A quantitative assessment aims at for-
mulating a final result according to the potential changes of the mod-
ification factors. The main idea is to use the modification factors to
modify the baseline failure frequency. The major finding of this study
can be summarized as following:

(1) The proposed approach is an effective quantitative risk assessment

Fig. 7. Percentage of each primary failure cause for the proposed pipeline segment.
quantitative part to integrate available EGIG data set, with a qualitative
analysis to compensate for a potential lack of precise crisp statistical
data, is more objective.
5. Conclusion
In this study, an assessment model of gas transmission pipelines
method to assess the failure probability of a gas transmission pi-
peline system. Compared with W. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method,
the proposed approach, which based on historical failure-related
data and modification factors, could obtain absolute risk scale ex-
pressed by failure probability per km per year instead of relative
risk scale expressed by score. Compared with the expert judgment
method, the proposed approach, which combines a quantitative
part to integrate available EGIG data set, with a qualitative analysis
to compensate for a potential lack of precise crisp statistical data, is
more objective.

364
K. Shan et al.
Fig. 8. Evaluation results of the proposed method for the 200.2-km-long pipeline.
Fig. 9. Evaluation results of W. Kent Muhlbauer scoring method for the 200.2-km-long pipeline.
(2) The proposed approach is capable of performing sensitivity and
importance analysis of risk factors, which can identify the critical
factors where more attention is required for preventing pipeline
failure. By taking the ranking from 1 (very low failure probability)
to 5 (very high failure probability) into consideration, the decision
maker may well get precious and differentiated information about
the pipeline failure probability distribution and make appropriate
safety-related actions to prevent the damage.
(3) The baseline failure frequency is best estimated from historical
failure-related data. In the absence of appropriate company or
system specific data, an estimate of the baseline failure frequency
can be obtained from historical pipeline incident and exposure data
gathered by the Pipeline Incident Databases (PIDs) such as PHMSA,
NEB, and EGIG. So the proposed approach is applicable to the pi-
peline systems also in any other operating companies where his-
torical failure-related data are incomplete.
(4) The failure probability modification factors index system is estab-
lished, which includes a quantitative index, a semi-quantitative
index and a qualitative index. Six first level modification factor
indices and 34 s level modification factor indices are taken into
account systematically. It has been especially developed for gas
transmission pipelines, but may be more generally applied to any
other type of pipeline system such as oil pipeline, because the
modification factor indices identified here are more or less common
to all pipeline systems.
Acknowledgments
This research is financially supported by the National Science &
Technology Support Program of China (Grant No. 2015BAK16B02) and
the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Grant
365
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366
NEB, 2016YFC0802105).
References
Brissaud, F., Charpentier, D., Fouladirad, M., Barros, A., Berenguer, C., 2010. Failure rate
evaluation with influencing factors. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 23, 187–193.
Brito, A.J., Almeida, A.T., 2009. Multi-attribute risk assessment for risk ranking of natural
gas pipelines. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 94, 187–198. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.
2008.02.014.
CEPA - Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, 2016. Taking Action on Our Commitment
to Canadians. 2016 Pipeline Industry Performance Report.
Chen, S.J., Hwang, C.L., Hwang, F.P., 1992. Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Decision Making:
Methods and Applications. Springer-Verlag, New York.
Cunha, S.B.D., 2016. A review of quantitative risk assessment of onshore pipelines. J. Loss
Prev. Process. Ind. 44, 282–298.
Duncan, I.J., Wang, H., 2014. Evaluating the likelihood of pipeline failures for future
offshore CO2 sequestration projects. International Journal of Greenhouse Gas Control
24, 124–138.
EGIG - European Gas Pipeline Incident Report Group, 2015. 9th Report of the European
Gas Pipeline Incident Group 1970-2013. Report 14.R.0403.
Evans, K.S., Hanson, A., Sunday, C., Leonard, N., Tumminello, M., 2014. Analysis of pi-
peline accidents in the United States from 1968 to 2009. International Journal of
Critical Infrastructure Protection 7, 257–269.
GB/T 19285, 2014. Inspection of Corrosion Protection for Buried Steel Pipelines.
Girgin, S., Krausmann, E., 2016. Historical analysis of U.S. onshore hazardous liquid pi-
peline accidents triggered by natural hazards. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 40, 578–590.
Guo, Y., Meng, X., Wang, D., Meng, T., Liu, S., He, R., 2016. Comprehensive risk eva-
luation of long-distance oil and gas transportation pipelines using a fuzzy Petri net
model. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 33, 18–29.
Han, Z.Y., Weng, W.G., 2011. Comparison study on qualitative and quantitative risk as-
sessment methods for urban natural gas pipeline network. J. Hazard Mater. 189,
509–518.
Jamshidi, A., Chamzini, A.J., Yakhchali, S.H., 2013. Developing a new fuzzy inference
system for pipeline risk assessment. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 26, 197–208.
Kiefner, J.K., Kiefner, B.A., Vieth, P.H., 1999. Analysis of DOT Reportable Incidents for
Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 1986 through 1996. American Petroleum Institute
Publication, pp. 1158.
Koornneef, J., Spruijt, M., Molag, M., Ramírez, A., Turkenburg, W., Faaij, 2010. A.
Quantitative risk assessment of CO2 transport by pipelines-A review of uncertainties
K. Shan et al.
and their impacts. J. Hazard Mater. 177, 12–27.
Lam, C., Zhou, W., 2016. Statistical analyses of incidents on onshore gas transmission
pipelines based on PHMSA database. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 145, 29–40.
Lu, L.L., Liang, W., Zhang, L.B., Zhang, H., Lu, Z., Shan, J.Z., 2015. A comprehensive risk
evaluation method for natural gas pipelines by combining a risk matrix with a bow-
tie model. J. Nat. Gas Sci. Eng. 25, 124–133.
Muhlbauer, W.K., 2004. Pipeline Risk Management Manual, third ed. Gulf Publishing
Company, Burlington ISBN 0-7506-7579-9.
NEB - National Energy Board of Canada, 2016. Canada's Pipeline Transportation System
2016.
Onisawa, T., 1988. An approach to human reliability in man–machine systems using error
possibility. Fuzzy Set Syst. 27, 87–103.
PHMSA, 2016. About data & statistics. http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/
data-stats/, Accessed date: 26 September 2016.
Shahriar, A., Sadiq, R., Tesfamariam, S., 2012. Risk analysis for oil & gas pipelines: a
366
Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering 52 (2018) 356–366
sustainability assessment approach using fuzzy based bow-tie analysis. J. Loss Prev.
Process. Ind. 25, 505–523.
Shi, L., Shuai, J., Xu, K., 2014. Fuzzy fault tree assessment based on improved AHP for fire
and explosion accidents for steel oil storage tanks. J. Hazard Mater. 278, 529–538.
UKOPA - United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators’ Association, 2016. 2015 Report
for the UKOPA Infringement Database.
Wang, H., Duncan, I.J., 2014a. Understanding the nature of risks associated with onshore
natural gas gathering pipelines. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 29, 49–55.
Wang, H., Duncan, I.J., 2014b. Likelihood, causes, and consequences of focused leakage
and rupture of U.S. natural gas transmission pipelines. J. Loss Prev. Process. Ind. 30,
177–187.
Zhang, G., Luo, J., Zhao, X., Zhang, H., Zhang, L., Zhang, Y., 2012. Research on prob-
abilistic assessment method based on the corroded pipeline assessment criteria. Int. J.
Pres. Ves. Pip. 95, 1–6.