Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin, G.R. Nos.

L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

Facts: Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
November 22, 1952

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of Charles Newton Hodges, her husband. She also stated in her
will that should Charles later die, the said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.

Charles died while domiciled here. The lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the probate court while
there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie so that a certain Avelina Magno may be appointed as
the administratrix of the estate. Magno was the most trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive and who had been employed for around thirty (30) years. It was manifested that Charles himself
left a will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. The judge approved the appointment of
Magno as administratrix.

Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will. Magno opposed the
said petition. The probate of Charles’ will was granted. The Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
was appointed the administrator. Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno arugued that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and
sister. Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death and that under Article 16
of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law. Under the Texas law, Linnie’s
will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes.

PCIB applied the renvoi doctrine – the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because
Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of her death.

Issues:
WON there is a testamentary substitution.

WON the Texas Law should apply

Ruling:

1. No. We overrule PCIB’s contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges’ will in favor of her
brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But neither are We
sustaining, on the other hand, Magno’s pose that it gave Hodges only a lifetime usufruct. We
hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted her brothers and sisters as
co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that the latter would have complete
rights of dominion over the whole estate during his lifetime and what would go to the former
would be only the remainder thereof at the time of Hodges’ death. In other words, whereas
they are not to inherit only in case of default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not
obliged to preserve anything for them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary
substitution are absent; the provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous
institution of heirs, whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition
the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of the
institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not prohibited by
law.

2. No. We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters
could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the proper
application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and the pertinent
laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno, and (2)
whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance
from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of
these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of
law, on any of these two issues, and We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings
and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate,
however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered
opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her
husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her
whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during
his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested
 administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the
time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been gratuitously disposed of
therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were assumed that, as
contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free
disposable portion, taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of
the Civil Code.

In re Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918

Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United
States, died in the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of
P231,800. The will was written in the testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This
will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section 618. On
February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
for the probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the
State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws
of that State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his father’s will

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petition

Ruling: No. Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week
publication of the notice in Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the
statute concerned which reads as “A will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of
another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which
he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own state or country,
may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not capitalized, does not mean that
United States is excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of
the US).

Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 887 (1924)

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s participation in the inheritance.
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s
estates.

Ruling:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.

The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as
to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Board of Commissioners (CID) vs. Dela Rosa, G.R. Nos. 95122-23, May 31, 1991

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural born mother,
Marciana Gatchalian.

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong
together with Gloria, Francisco and Johnson Gatchalian. They had with them Certificate of Registration
and Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature
of the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 5, 1961, admitting
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens and was issued Identification Certificates.
On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio
of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of
Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William and others.On July 6, 1962, the new Board of
Commissioners, reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and ordered the exclusion of,
among others, respondent Gatchalian.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1961 warrant of
exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportation case
against them was assigned.

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled
the warrant of arrest issued against him.

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of
Justice recommending that the respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the
warrant of exclusion be charged with violation against the Immigration Act of 1940.

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the
Commissioner of Immigration for investigation and immediate action.

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a
mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa. On September 4,
1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case alleging that respondent judge has no jurisdiction
over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.

On September 6, 1990, respondent’s wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela for injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. That petitioners acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. Respondent Capulong issued
the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the deportation
proceedings against William Gatchalian.

Issue:
Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:

The very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, which was dispatched to the
Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens.

In matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. A warrant of
arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for the purpose of investigation only, as in the case at
bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.

Philippine law, following lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where
celebrated is valid everywhere. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.
Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in
an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under
Section 1, Article IV of the Consititution.

Pakistan International Airlines vs. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, September 28, 1990

FACTS: On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, executed in Manila 2 separate contracts of
employment, one with private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. 1
The contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent portion as follows:

5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY

This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual consent of the parties.

xxx xxx xxx

6. TERMINATION

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate this
agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one month before the
intended termination or in lieu thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one month’s
salary.

xxx xxx xxx

10. APPLICABLE LAW:

This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of Pakistan, and only the Courts
of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under this
agreement.

Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants after undergoing training. Base station
was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. Roughly 1 year
and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares,
counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing them that they will be
terminated effective September 1, 1980.

Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company
benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).

PIA’s Contention: The PIA submitted its position paper, but no evidence, and there claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of bringing in from abroad
sizeable quantities of “personal effects”; and that PIA personnel at the Manila International Airport had
been discreetly warned by customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice.
PIA further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the
provisions of the employment contract.

Favorable decision for the respondents. The Order stated that private respondents had attained the
status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service; that the
stipulation limiting the period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual
employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out without the requisite clearance from the
MOLE, was illegal and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.

Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

Ruling: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly,
the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement
of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.

We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public interest and that the
otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing
upon some other law to govern their relationship.

the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign
corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to
the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative
agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.

Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to
oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in
any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the
matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the
same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.

Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, G.R. No. 18081, March 3, 1922

FACTS: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left
property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who
alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in
1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in
Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The
conflicting claims to Cheong Boo’s estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng
Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong
Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With
reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion
that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws
of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and
Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not
valid under the Philippine Island’s laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic
laws.

ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid Whether or not
the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid RULING: The Supreme Court
found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a
natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to
the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them
under the law.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new
relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as
to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative
provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts
intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public
policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will
most effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative
intention into effect.

Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that “all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be
valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To
establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before
the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to
prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years
of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband
through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, “save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to
produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment.” A marriage alleged to have been
contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the
Philippines.

People vs. Mura Dumpo, G.R. No. L-42581,October 2, 1935

Facts:

Moro Hassan and Mora Dumpo have been legally married according to the rites and practices of the
Mohammedan religion. Without the marriage being dissolved, it has been alleged that Dumpo
contracted another marriage with Moro Sabdapal after which they lived together as husband and wife.

Dumpo was prosecuted for bigamy in the CFI Zamboanga. Dumpo appealed.

It has been established by the defense, without the prosecution having presented objection or evidence
to the contrary, that the alleged second marriage was null and void according to Mohammedan rites on
the ground that her father (Moro Jalmani) had not given his consent.

Issue: Whether or not Dumpo was guilty of bigamy.

Ruling: No. Dumpo was acquitted.

The court formulated that there is no general statement regarding the requisites necessary for the
validity of a marriage between Moros according to Mohammedan rites. This is a fact which must be
subject to proof in every particular case.

In the case, the uncontradicted testimony of Tahari (Iman or Mohammedans priest authorized to
solemnize marriages between Mohammedans) was that the effect of the consent of the father's bride is
an indispensable requirement for the validity of such contracts.

It was easy for the prosecution to show that the marriage was void by refuting Tahari's testimony
because there were 2 other Imans among the State witnesses in the case, but it failed to do so.

Granting the absolute necessity of the father's consent, tacit compliance may be presumed because it
does not appear that Dumpo's father has signified his opposition to the 2nd marriage after he had been
informed of its celebration. But this presumption should not be established over the affirmation of
Dumpo's father saying that he did not give his consent to the 2nd marriage.

It is an essential element in bigamy that the 2nd marriage have all the essential requisites of a valid
marriage. It appearing that the 2nd marriage cannot be considered as such, there is no justification to
hold her guilty of bigamy.
Dissent:

There is no quotation from the Koran regarding the essentials of a marriage ceremony. Justice Hull
agrees that the evidence relied upon is not worthy of serious consideration. If consent were in fact
necessary, it can well be presumed from the subsequent actions of the girl.

Wong Woo Yu vs. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965

Facts:

The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married to
Perfecto Blas and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed
by the Board of Commissioners.

However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and ordered
petitioner to be excluded from the country.

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She then filed the
instant petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as certiorari) before the Manila
CFI.

After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written stipulation of facts, the
court a quo declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner
from the country. Respondents interposed the present appeal.

It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for
the first time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on
January 15, 1929; that their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set
of Board of Commissioners found that petitioner’s claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry
proceedings of Perfecto Blas had on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and
married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929;
that in an affidavit dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and
1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937,
then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he
first went to China when he was merely four years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it
must have been in 1912.
Issue:

W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be admitted as
non-quota immigrant in the country?

Ruling:

No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her alleged husband in
the investigations conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support of
petitioner’s claim that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial
proof of husband-wife relationship.

Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the status of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known that
in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either
by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of
the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412,
Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village
leader is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.

But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced in Section 19 of
Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the
Philippines which is valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to
the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence
of proof of the law of a foreign country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own.

Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers mentioned therein, and a
village leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be recognized
in this jurisdiction.
Decision appealed from reversed.

In Re May’s Estate, 185, N.Y.S. 284 (1920)

Facts

Sam May traveled with his niece by half-blood, Fannie May, from New York to Rhode Island, where the
Mays were married in a traditional Jewish ceremony. Later, Sam and Fannie had six children. After
Fannie’s death, Alice Greenberg (plaintiff), one of the children, filed a petition for the letters of
administration of Fannie’s estate in New York. Sam objected, arguing that as the surviving husband,
pursuant to state law, Sam had a superior right to administer Fannie’s estate. Greenberg, along with two
of her sisters, argued that Sam was not the surviving spouse of Fannie, because the Mays’ marriage,
although valid in Rhode Island, was contrary to the laws of New York. The trial court agreed and held in
favor of Greenberg. Sam appealed. The appellate court reversed and concluded that the marriage
between Sam and Fannie was valid in New York, because the degree of consanguinity of uncle and niece
was not repugnant to state statute. Greenberg and her sisters appealed.

Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid?

Ruling: Marriage between uncle and niece — Conflict of laws — Costs — (1) Uncle and niece, of Jewish
faith, were validly married by rabbi in Rhode Island under law of that State permitting marriages among
Jews within degrees of consanguinity allowed by their religion; marriage was therefore valid in New
York, and husband is entitled to letters of administration on her estate — (2) No positive law of this
State interdicts uncle-niece marriage, valid in foreign State — (3) Uncle-niece marriage approved by
parties” religion and by law of Rhode Island not offensive to natural law — (4) Court of Appeals will not
interfere with Appellate Division’s discretion in awarding costs against party personally (Surrogate’s Ct.
Act, § 283, subd. 2)

1. Decedent and her uncle, of whom she was a niece by the half blood, were both adherents of the
Jewish faith. A month after he had come to New York from Wisconsin, they had gone to Rhode Island,
where, in 1913, they were married by a Jewish rabbi. A certificate issued upon the marriage gave New
York as their residence. Two weeks after their marriage, they returned to New York and resided here for
thirty-two years thereafter until her death. During that time six children were born to them. A Rhode
Island statute, which forbids marriage between uncle and niece, expressly excepts therefrom and
declares valid “any marriage which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the degrees of affinity or
consanguinity allowed by their religion.” According to Biblical law and Jewish tradition, which were
made the subject of proof in this case, uncle and niece may marry. The marriage, being valid in Rhode
*487 Island, was valid in New York. Decedent’s husband is entitled to letters of administration on her
estate.

2. The legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is determined by the law of the place where the
marriage is solemnized. Our Legislature could have regulated within the State the marriages of its
domiciliaries solemnized in another State, or it could have declared that marriages contracted in
another State which would be void if contracted here should have no force here; but it did not do so,
and hence it cannot be said that there is any positive law in this State interdicting this marriage which
was valid in Rhode Island.

3. Nor can it be said that this marriage was inhibited by natural law. It was solemnized in accord with the
ritual of the parties” faith in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be “good
and valid in law”. It cannot be said that such a marriage was offensive to the public sense of morality to
a degree regarded generally with abhorrence.

4. The award of costs in the Appellate Division against a party personally was a matter of statutory
discretion (Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 283, subd. 2) with which the Court of Appeals will not interfere.

Matter of May, 280 App. Div. 647, affirmed.

APPEAL from a decree of the Ulster County Surrogate’s Court, entered December 1, 1952, upon an order
of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, which (1) reversed, on
the law, a decree of said Surrogate’s Court (STERLEY, S.), granting letters of administration to petitioner
Alice M. Greenberg, upon the estate of Fannie May, deceased, and (2) remitted the matter to the
Surrogate’s Court with directions to grant such letters of administration to respondent Sam May.

Helen M. Clark for appellants. I. Petitioner-appellant is entitled to letters of administration by virtue of

section 118 of the Surrogate’s Court Act. (Audley v. Audley, 196 App. Div. 103; Matter of Dobess Realty
Corp. v. Magid, 186 Misc. 225; People ex rel. Knott Management Corp. v. Graves, 286 N. Y. 377; “Smith”
v. “Smith”, 179 Misc. 19; Matter of Incuria v. Incuria, 155 Misc. 755; People ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors of
Rockland Co. v. Travis, 184 App. Div. 730; People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Van Voorhis v.
Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341; Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 193 Misc.
367.) II. It was an abuse of discretion for the Appellate Division to award costs to objectant as against
respondent personally. (Matter of Page, 107 N. Y. 266; Matter [*488] of Shapiro [Cohn], 147 Misc. 526;
Matter of Reimers, 261 N. Y. 337; Matter of Boyer, 54 Misc. 182; Matter of Ordway, 196 N. Y. 95; Texido
v. Merical, 132 Misc. 764; Perrin v. Harrington, 146 App. Div. 292; Day v. Town of New Lots, 107 N. Y.
148.)

Morton L. Kimmelman and Matthew H. Bowcock for respondents. I. A marriage valid where contracted
is valid in this jurisdiction. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602;
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341; Weisberg v. Weisberg, 112 App. Div. 231; Stevenson v. Gray,
56 Ky. 193; Fersterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131; Burnside v. Whitney, 21 N. Y. 148; Matter of Carnegie
Trust Co., 151 App. Div. 606, 206 N. Y. 390; People v. Bord, 243 N. Y. 595; Earle v. Earle, 141 App. Div.
611.) II. Sound public policy requires recognition of this marriage. (Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y.
341.)

OPINION BY: LEWIS, Ch. J.

In this proceeding, involving the administration of the estate of Fannie May, deceased, we are to
determine whether the marriage in 1913 between the respondent Sam May and the decedent, who was
his niece by the half blood — which marriage was celebrated in Rhode Island, where concededly such
marriage is valid — is to be given legal effect in New York where statute law declares incestuous and
void a marriage between uncle and niece. (Domestic Relations Law, § 5, subd. 3.)

The question thus presented arises from proof of the following facts: The petitioner Alice May
Greenberg, one of six children born of the Rhode Island marriage of Sam and Fannie May, petitioned in
1951 for letters of administration of the estate of her mother Fannie May, who had died in 1945.
Thereupon, the respondent Sam May, who asserts the validity of his marriage to the decedent, filed an
objection to the issuance to petitioner of such letters of administration upon the ground that he is the
surviving husband of the decedent and accordingly, under section 118 of the Surrogate’s Court Act, he
has the paramount right to administer her estate. Contemporaneously with, and in support of the
objection filed by Sam May, his daughter Sirel Lenrow and his sons Harry May and Morris B. May — who
are children of the challenged marriage — filed objections to the issuance of *489 letters of
administration to their sister, the petitioner, and by such objections consented that letters of
administration be issued to their father Sam May.

The petitioner, supported by her sisters Ruth Weisbrout and Evelyn May, contended throughout this
proceeding that her father is not the surviving spouse of her mother because, although their marriage
was valid in Rhode Island, the marriage never had validity in New York where they were then resident
and where they retained their residence until the decedent’s death.

The record shows that for a period of more than five years prior to his marriage to decedent the
respondent Sam May had resided in Portage, Wisconsin; that he came to New York in December, 1912,
and within a month thereafter he and the decedent — both of whom were adherents of the Jewish faith
— went to Providence, Rhode Island, where, on January 21, 1913, they entered into a ceremonial
marriage performed by and at the home of a Jewish rabbi. The certificate issued upon that marriage
gave the age of each party as twenty-six years and the residence of each as “New York, N. Y.”. Two
weeks after their marriage in Rhode Island the respondent May and the decedent returned to Ulster
County, New York, where they lived as man and wife for thirty-two years until the decedent’s death in
1945. Meantime the six children were born who are parties to this proceeding.
A further significant item of proof — to which more particular reference will be made — was the fact
that in Rhode Island on January 21, 1913, the date of the marriage here involved, there were effective
statutes which prohibited the marriage of an uncle and a niece, excluding, however, those instances —
of which the present case is one — where the marriage solemnized is between persons of the Jewish
faith within the degrees of affinity and consanguinity allowed by their religion.

In Surrogate’s Court, where letters of administration were granted to the petitioner, the Surrogate ruled
that although the marriage of Sam May and the decedent in Rhode Island in 1913 was valid in that State,
such marriage was not only void in New York as opposed to natural law but is contrary to the provisions
of subdivision 3 of *490 section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law. Accordingly the Surrogate concluded
that Sam May did not qualify in this jurisdiction for letters of administration as the surviving spouse of
the decedent.

At the Appellate Division the order of the Surrogate was reversed on the law and the proceeding was
remitted to Surrogate’s Court with direction that letters of administration upon decedent’s estate be
granted to Sam May who was held to be the surviving spouse of the decedent. In reaching that decision
the Appellate Division concluded that the 1913 marriage of Sam May and the decedent in Rhode Island,
being concededly valid in that State, is valid in New York where the degree of consanguinity of uncle and
niece is not so close as to be repugnant to our concept of natural law, and that the statute (Domestic
Relations Law, § 5, subd. 3) — which declares such a marriage to be incestuous and void — lacks express
language which gives it [**6] extraterritorial force. The case comes to us upon appeal as of right by the
petitioner and her two sisters Ruth Weisbrout and Evelyn May.

We regard the law as settled that, subject to two exceptions presently to be considered, and in the
absence of a statute expressly regulating within the domiciliary State marriages solemnized abroad, the
legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place where it is
celebrated. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 24; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 605-606; Moore v.
Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521, 524; Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 159-160; Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md.
131; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 121. 131, 132; Story on Conflict of Laws [7th ed.], § 113; 2 Beale.
Conflict of Laws, pp. 669-670; 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 856.)

In Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (supra) the decision turned upon the civil status in this State of a divorced
husband and his second wife whom he had married in Connecticut to evade the prohibition of a
judgment of divorce which, pursuant to New York law then prevailing, forbade his remarriage until the
death of his former wife. In reaching its decision, which held valid the Connecticut marriage there
involved, this court noted the fact that in the much earlier case of Decouche v. Savetier (3 Johns. Ch.
190, 211 [1817]), Chancellor KENT had recognized the general [*491] principle “* * * that the rights
dependent upon nuptial contracts, are to be determined by the lex loci.” Incidental to the decision in
Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (supra) which followed the general rule that “* * * recognizes as valid a
marriage considered valid in the place where celebrated” (id., p. 25), this court gave careful
consideration to, and held against the application of two exceptions to that rule — viz., cases within the
prohibition of positive law; and cases involving polygamy or incest in a degree regarded generally as
within the prohibition of natural law.

We think the Appellate Division in the case at bar rightly held that the principle of law which ruled Van
Voorhis v. Brintnall and kindred cases cited (supra) was decisive of the present case and that neither of
the two exceptions to that general rule is here applicable.

The statute of New York upon which the appellants rely is subdivision 3 of section 5 of the Domestic
Relations Law which, insofar as relevant to our problem, provides:

Ҥ 5. Incestuous and void marriages.

“A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate between either:

“1. * * *

“2. * * *

“3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew.

“If a marriage prohibited by the foregoing provisions of this section be solemnized it shall be void, and
the parties thereto shall each be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars and may, in
the discretion of the court in addition to said fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months.
Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize such marriage, or procure or aid in the
solemnization of the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined or imprisoned in
like manner.”

Although the New York statute quoted above declares to be incestuous and void a marriage between an
uncle and a niece and imposes penal measures upon the parties thereto, it is important to note that the
statute does not by express terms regulate a marriage solemnized in another State where, as in our
present case, the marriage was concededly legal. In the case at hand, as we *492 have seen, the parties
to the challenged marriage were adherents of the Jewish faith which, according to Biblical [**7] law
and Jewish tradition — made the subject of proof in this case — permits a marriage between an uncle
and a niece; they were married by a Jewish rabbi in the State of Rhode Island where, on the date of such
marriage in 1913 and ever since, a statute forbidding the marriage of an uncle and a niece was expressly
qualified by the following statutory exceptions appearing in 1913 in Rhode Island General Laws (tit.
XXIV, ch. 243, §§ 4, 9; now tit. XXXVI, ch. 415, §§ 4, 9):

Ҥ 4. The provisions of the preceding sections shall not extend to, or in any way affect, any marriage
which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by
their religion.”

Ҥ 9. Any marriage which may be had and solemnized among the people called Quakers, or Friends, in
the manner and form used or practised in their societies, or among persons professing the Jewish
religion, according to their rites and ceremonies, shall be good and valid in law; and wherever the words
“ minister” and “elder” are used in this chapter, they shall be held to include all of the persons
connected with the society of Friends, or Quakers, and with the Jewish religion, who perform or have
charge of the marriage ceremony according to their rites and ceremonies.”

As section 5 of the New York Domestic Relations Law (quoted, supra) does not expressly declare void a
marriage of its domiciliaries solemnized in a foreign State where such marriage is valid, the statute’s
scope should not be extended by judicial construction. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, p. 33.) Indeed,
had the Legislature been so disposed it could have declared by appropriate enactment that marriages
contracted in another State — which if entered into here would be void — shall have no force in this
State. (Putnam v. Putnam, 25 Mass. 433, 435.) Although examples of such legislation are not wanting
[FNa1], we find none in New York which serve to give subdivision 3 of section 5 of the Domestic
Relations Law extraterritorial effectiveness. (Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, supra, pp. 25-37.) Accordingly, as
to *493 the first exception to the general rule that a marriage valid where performed is valid
everywhere, we conclude that, absent any New York statute expressing clearly the Legislature’s intent
to regulate within this State marriages of its domiciliaries solemnized abroad, there is no “positive law”
in this jurisdiction which serves to interdict the 1913 marriage in Rhode Island of the respondent Sam
May and the decedent.
a1. See 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, § 129.6, p. 681, and statutes there collated.

As to the application of the second exception to the marriage here involved — between persons of the
Jewish faith whose kinship was not in the direct ascending or descending line of consanguinity and who
were not brother and sister — we conclude that such marriage, solemnized, as it was, in accord with the
ritual of the Jewish faith in a State whose legislative body has declared such a marriage to be “good and
valid in law”, was not offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with
abhorrence and thus was not within the inhibitions of natural law.

A remaining point relates to an assertion by the petitioner-appellant that it was an abuse of discretion
for the Appellate Division to have awarded costs against her personally. The award of costs in the
Appellate Division was a matter of statutory discretion (Surrogate’s Ct. Act, § 283, subd. 2) with which
we will not interfere.

The decree of the Surrogate’s Court should be affirmed, with one bill of costs to respondents, payable
out of the estate.

DESMOND, J. (dissenting).
It is fundamental that every State has the right to determine the marital status of its [**8] own citizens
(Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190; Hunt v. Hunt, 131 U. S., Appendix, clxv; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535,
544; Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N. Y. 282; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 347; Bell v. Little, 204
App. Div. 235, 237, affd. 237 N. Y. 519). Exercising that right, New York has declared in section 5 of the
Domestic Relations Law that a marriage between uncle and niece is incestuous, void and criminal. Such
marriages, while not within the Levitical forbidden degrees of the Old Testament, have been condemned
by public opinion for centuries (see 1 Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, § 738), and are void,
by statute in (it would seem) forty-seven of the States of [*494] the Union (all except Georgia, see
Martindale-Hubbel, Law Digests, and except, also, that Rhode Island, one of the fortyseven, exempts
from its local statute “any marriage which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the degrees of
affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion”, Gen. L. of R. I., ch. 415, § 4). It is undisputed here
that this uncle and niece were both domiciled in New York in 1913, when they left New York for the sole
purpose of going to Rhode Island to be married there, and that they were married in that State
conformably to its laws (see above) and immediately returned to New York and ever afterwards resided
in this State. That Rhode Island marriage, between two New York residents, was, in New York, absolutely
void for any and all purposes, by positive New York law which declares a strong public policy of this State
(see Penal Law, § 1110).

The general rule that “a marriage valid where solemnized is valid everywhere” (see Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, § 121) does not apply. To that rule there is a proviso or exception, recognized, it would
seem, by all the States, as follows: “unless contrary to the prohibitions of natural law or the express
prohibitions of a statute” (see Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 605). Section 132 of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws states the rule apparently followed throughout America: “A marriage which is against
the law of the state of domicil of either party, though the requirements of the law of the state of
celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases: * * * (b)
incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their marriage is contrary to a strong public
policy of the domicil” (see 35 Am. Jur., Marriage, § 180; 55 C. J. S., Marriage, § 16; Grosman, New York
Law of Domestic Relations, § 34). The old and famous New York case of Wightman v. Wightman (4
Johns. Ch. 343, 349, 350). decided in 1820 when there were no marriage statutes in our State, says that
marriages may be declared by “appropriate legislation”, to be incestuous. New York, as a sovereign
State with absolute powers over the marital status of its citizens, has enacted such legislation, but we,
by this decision, are denying it efficacy.

Van Voorhis v. Brintnall (86 N. Y. 18) does not save this marriage. That case dealt not with a marriage
void under section *495 5 of the Domestic Relations Law, but one forbidden by section 8 thereof.
Section 8 forbids the guilty party, in a New York divorce judgment, to marry again within a certain time,
and the Van Voorhis ruling was that, by section 8, the Legislature did not intend to make such marriages
contracted outside this State absolutely void, but merely stated an in personam prohibition against the
adjudged adulterer marrying, for a period of time (see analysis of Van Voorhis v. Brintnall in Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 63 Misc. 580, 586). This court’s opinion in the Van Voorhis case, while stating the general rule
that the validity of a marriage depends on the law of the place of marriage, noted that there are
exceptions thereto in cases of incest, within the prohibition of natural law, and “prohibition by positive
law” (86 N. Y., at p. 26). Section 5 of the Domestic Relations Law, the one we are concerned with here,
lists the marriages which are “incestuous [**9] and void” in New York, as being those between parent
and child, brother and sister, uncle and niece, and aunt and nephew. All such misalliances are
incestuous, and all, equally, are void. The policy, language, meaning and validity of the statute are
beyond dispute. It should be enforced by the courts.

The order should be reversed and the proceeding remitted to the Surrogate for appropriate
proceedings, with costs to abide the event.

Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966

FACTS:

Sometime in 1952, Lazaro Rayray, a Filipino, and Chae Kyung Lee, a Korean, met in Pusan Korea, they
lived together from November 1952 to April 1955 before they were married in Pusan Korea, on March
15, 1953. Before the wedding, Chae Kyung Lee obtained the "police clearance" written in Korean
language dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage. On
June 30, 1953, Lazaro Rayray proceeded to India and left Chae Kyung Lee, then in advanced stage of
pregnancy, in Korea. On October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her the Police Clearance
and its translation into English. He then noticed that Chae Kyung Lee was already married, according to
said translation.

He confronted the defendant with the contents of the document, her reply was that it is not unusual
for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953,
defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding,
however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they
were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him. Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeked the
annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee.

The lower court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to Articles 88 and 101 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for the purpose of determining whether or not collusion between the
parties exists. Said officer having found no such collusion, the case was heard on the merits.
In due course, thereafter, decision was rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs, upon
the ground: that the court could not nullify a marriage contracted abroad

ISSUE

Whether or not the court could nullify the marriage of Lazaro Rayray and Chae Kyung Lee being
contracted abroad.

Ruling:

Yes, the court could nullify the marriage of Lazaro Rayray and Chae Kyung Lee even if it was contracted
abroad. Lazaro Rayray is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject
to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and — under plaintiff's — theory still is a
non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the
validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

Tenchavez vs. Escano, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married
on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was
duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in
a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went
back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued
by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage
to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has
begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against
Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from
defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Quita vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. No
children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954, petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan, claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the
petition. The RTC expressed that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was clearly void
since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner. The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Issues:

1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent?

Held:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to
the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

No dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there
are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their respective hereditary shares.

Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a
legitimate relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito
under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

Republic vs. CA and Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992

FACTS:

Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since
4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with
copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also
posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment
declared that surname of the child be changed to “Bobiles”.

ISSUE: WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition.

HELD:

The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code),
where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its
favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint
adoption of both spouses is mandatory.
Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will
have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and
thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached
by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and
subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of
an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural
rules on the form of the pleadings.

Hence, Petition was denied.

Uggi Lindamand Therkelsen vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21951,November 27,1964

Facts:

UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN (Danish) and ERLINDA BLANCAFLOR (Filipina) were married. They
wanted to adopt CHARLES BLANCAFLOR WEEKS, natural child of Erlinda with Charles Joseph Weeks who
abandoned them after Charles was born. JDRC denied petition: an alien may only adopt a Filipino when
the adoption would make the Filipino minor a citizen of the adopter's country, i.e. if the child would
become Danish.

Issue: Whether or not acquisition of the citizenship of the adopter is necessary to grant adoption?

Ruling: NO.

The civil code under Article 335 only required 2 disqualifications:

Non-residents

Residents but RP has broken diplomatic relations with their government

Citizenship of the adopter is a matter political and not civil in nature: not within the province of Civil law
to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired.

Llantino vs. Co Liong Chong, G.R. No. L-29663, August 20, 1990

Facts: Co Liong Chong entered a contract with Llantino Sps for a lease of land for a period of 60 years.
Note that Co Liong Chong was naturalized as a Filipino citizen (changed name to Juan Molina).Llantino
sps wanted to recover the property from Co Liong Chong.
Issue:

WON the lease contract is invalid because at the time of its execution, he was a Chinese?

Held:

NO. It was valid. Lease contracts with Aliens allowed since an alien's stay in RP is temporary, they may
be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not prohibited by the constitution -the
lease contract is valid as long as there are no circumstances attendant to its execution which are used to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition such as an option to buy the contract or a lease for more than
50 years.An exception to this exception is when the alien subsequently acquires Philippine Citizenship.

Cheesman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, January 21,1991

Facts:

This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul for
lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to
Estelita Padilla December 4, 1970. Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have
been separated since February 15, 1981June 4, 1974. A Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights
was executed by Armando Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax declarations
for the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive
management and administration of the property July 1, 1981. Criselda sold the property to Estelita
Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas July 31, 1981. Thomas filed a suit for the annulment
of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent.
Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold was paraphernal, having purchased the property
from her own money; that Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right of
ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith. During the trial, it was found out that
the transfer of property took place during the existence of their marriage as it was acquired on June 4,
1974June 24, 1982. RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the delivery of
the property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property. The judgment was however set aside
as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or
excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her right to present her case adequately. "After the
petition for relief from judgment was given due course," according to petitioner, "a new judge presided
over the case."Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of of granting Estelita Padilla's
petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said petition; of declaring valid the sale to
Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal
character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code; of disregarding the
judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda Cheesman, continued to
be binding on her; and of making findings of fact not supported by evidence. On January 7, 1986, IAC
found all of these contentions without merit. Hence this petition
Issue:

1. WoN Criselda can sell the property in question without her husband’s consent;

2. WoN Thomas, being an American citizen, can question the sale; NO3. WoN Estelita was a buyer of
good faith;

Ruling:

The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his
wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the
Constitution;the sale as to him was null and void.

In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same
property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband
in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. As already
observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and will
not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife
had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high
constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof.

Liljedahl vs. Glassgow, 190 Iowa 827 (1921)

Facts:

BAILEY (DEBTOR-MORTGAGOR) executed a mortgage in favor of Foskett (original creditor). Foskett

assigned the proceeds of the loan and the mortgage to Liljedahl. Land mortgaged was in Colorado. The
principal loan payable in Iowa. Bailey sold the mortgaged land to GLASSGOW w/ a deed containing a
blank space for the insertion of the name of the grantee (and w/ a statement as follows: "grantee
assumed and agreed to pay the plaintiff's mortgage". Glassgow, though, did not put his name on the
blank. Glassgow later transferred the land to another. Liljedahl now sues Glassgow as the grantee of the
land

Issue: WON Glassgow is liable?

Ruling:

YES. Apply Colorado Law

Instruments of conveyance primarily or directly relating to the tile follow lex rei sitae; personal
covenants or agreements in instruments of conveyance follow law of the place where the same is
executed and to be performed.

Contracts made and to be performed in a particular state are made with reference to the law of that
state. Glassgow and Hiatt were residents of Iowa. The mortgage was payable in Iowa (in Shenandoah).
Delivery by Bailey to Glassgow is presumed to be in Iowa also evidence was introduced before the jury
that Glassgow and Hilger (also a subsequent transferee) understood the legal implications of accepting a
deed containing the statement making them liable (Hilger, after finding out that there was a deed saying
the said statement, he returned the deed and rescinded the contract).

Cayetano vs. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister; that
during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed, and
registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate
of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate of
Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for
him.

ISSUES

[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed by
an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING

[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for
by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public
policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.”

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil
Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for
legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

In re Estate of Johnson, supra.

Facts. Johnson created a will using a standard blank will form. The only provisions in his own
handwriting that were, his name and addresses, the beneficiaries’ names and addresses, and the phrase
“To John M. Johnson 1/8 of my Estate.” The trial court held that the form did not qualify as a
holographic will.

Issue. Whether an instrument constitutes a valid holographic will if the words essential to proving
testamentary intent are not in the testator’s own handwriting.

Held. No. The handwritten portions of the will without the printed words did not express testamentary
intent because the handwritten words alone did not require that a disposition be made at death.
Though the testator used the word, “estate”, the definition of that word refers to the extent of one’s
interest in land or property or it can also signify the assets and liabilities left by a person at death.

Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, G.R. No. L-28328, October 2, 1928.

Facts: Beatrice Babcock Templeton filed a petition for probate of a paper writing purporting to express
the wishes of her mother, Jennie Rider Babcock, with reference to the post mortem disposition
of all her property, consisting of corporate stock, jewelry, personal effects, and money. The deceased
left her stock and money to her three grandchildren, bearing the surname Templeton, but all
interest and dividends are to be given to her only daughter, Mrs. Templeton, as well as her
jewelry and personal effects for their support until the youngest of his age.

Issue: WON Jennie, at the time the will was made, was a citizen of California (so that her will may be
probated in accordance with California laws)?

WON Jennie subsequently lost her domicile in California?

Ruling: YES

1. Citizenship: how determined here: According to 14th Amendment of US Constitution, citizenship

of a person born in US is dependent upon the place of residence or domicile of the person. - so
it was essential to determine WON she had domicile in California

Jennie voted in California! Voting in a place is an important circumstance and , where the evidence is
scanty, may have decisive weight. The exercise of franchise is one of the highest prerogatives of
citizenship, and in no other act of his life does the citizen identify his interests with the state in which he
lives more than in the act of voting.

No evidence to refute the conclusion that Jennie obtained domicile in California

3. NO Intention [to establish domicile in one place] determines WON domicile has been
abandoned; intention is revealed only in the acts and declarations of the person concerned

No intention to establish domicile in NY: Short stay and repeated statements that she DID NOT INTEND
TO ESTABLISH DOMICILE IN NY. No intention to establish domicile in RP: even though she has been a
resident of RP for a long time (place of permanent residence), she at no time had any intention of
residing here permanently but repeated declarations revealed a fixed intention of returning ultimately
to US

A citizen of US cannot acquire RP Citizenship by mere residence alone since she is not a Filipino Citizen,
she is considered an alien whose will is provable as the will of a citizen of another state or country.

Bellis vs. Bellis

Facts:

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before he died, he
made two wills, one disposing his Texas properties, the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both
wills, the recognized illegitimate children were not given any share. Texas has no conflict rule (Rule of
Private International Law) governing successional rights. Furthermore, under Texas law, there are no
compulsory heirs.
Issue:

Whether or not such illegitimate children of Bellis be entitled to successional rights.

Held:

The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes. Under Texas law, there are no
legitimes. Even if the other will was executed in the Philippines, his national law, still, will govern the
properties for succession even if it is stated in his testate that it shall be governed by the Philippine law.

Suntay vs. Suntay, G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088, July 31, 1954

ACTS:

Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the
estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico
and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.

The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico
anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s
Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be
upheld.

ISSUE:

In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?

Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

RULING:

Petition dismissed

Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85
of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage
may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may
be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable
marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not
the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage,
is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Juridically, theannulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract
as if it had never been entered into but the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out.

The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the
status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides
that “ children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate.”

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents
of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of
survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be
presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their
home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the
wills.
Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing
that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed
in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers
and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud
failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in
accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the
reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this
country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities
observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine
laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted
to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a
foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court,
1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country
is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has
always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider
herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be
given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original
will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of
the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
"court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be
addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable
time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all
pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated Inc., G.R. No. L-23145, November 29, 1968

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock
certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary
administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with
them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock
certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing
Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost
as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the
decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set
forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign
country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's
last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the
ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual
debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right
to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant]
Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of
stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the
instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled
[here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not
dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

Macmillan & Bloedel vs. T.H. Valderama and Sons, 61 OG 1696 (1964)

FACTS:

Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel
Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling
and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the
central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the
contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.

2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made
other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda
owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so
the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental
Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North
Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar
cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from
the hacienda owners’ lands

HELD: NO

The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North
Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the
construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar
cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear that the
easement was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the
milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it
is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates
since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of
easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the
central from obtaining other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art.
543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit
excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros
transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same
area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the
estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners
no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to the
easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by
the owners has no basis.

Vita Food Products vs. Unus Shipping [1939] 63 Ll, L. Rep. 21

FACTS:

Three lots of herring were accepted by the Hurry On (owned by Unus Shipping, a Nova Scotia
corporation) at Middle Arm, Newfoundland for shipment to Vita Foods of New York. The bills of lading
— which, the judgment states, "[b]y some error or inadvertence ... were old ones used outside
Newfoundland", — provided for exemption from liability for master’s negligence in navigation which
was allowed under the Hague Rules, which further provided that any clause or agreement in the bills of
lading relieving the carrier from liability for negligence imposed by the Rules was void. There was a
further provision in the bills of lading that, in the case of shipment from the United States, the Harter
Act should apply and that, unless otherwise provided, the bill of lading was subject to the terms of the
Canadian Water Carriage of Goods Act, 1910. Finally the bills of lading contained the following clause:
"This contract shall be governed by English law."

The bills of lading for these lots did not conform to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1932
(Newfoundland), which required that they contain an express clause paramount that the Hague Rules
applied.

During the voyage, the ship ran into bad weather and ice off Nova Scotia and went ashore in a gale of
wind. The ship was eventually set free, and made for Guysborough, where the cargo was unloaded,
reconditioned and forwarded by another ship to New York, where Vita took delivery of the cargo in its
damaged condition and paid for the freight.

Vita sued Unus in Nova Scotia for the damage to the cargo, salvage and other expenses. It also alleged
that the Hurry On was unseaworthy, and that the bills of lading were illegal because they did not contain
an express clause adopting the Hague Rules, and thus was subject to the liabilities of a common carrier.
Unus, in its defence, asserted that, as the bills stated that they would be governed by English law, the
Hague Rules were incorporated by reference, as they were the ones in force under the English Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act 1924.

Issue:

Ruling: Whether or not goods were shipped under a bill of lading;

Ratio: (Nova Scotia) Goods were shipped from Newfoundland under a bill of lading which contained an
exemption for loss caused by the servants of the carrier. This exemption was void by the law of
Newfoundland, whose legislature had enacted the Hague Rules, but the action was brought in Nova
Scotia where the courts had to apply the proper law of the contract contained in its bill of lading –
English law – by which the exemption clause was valid. Lord Wright: ‘But whatever view a
Newfoundland Court might take, whether they would hold that the contracts contained in the bills of
lading must be taken to have incorporated the Hague Rules or whether they would hold them to have
been illegal, the result would be the same in the present case, where the action was brought not in a
Newfoundland but in a Nova Scotian Court. It may be that, if suit were brought on these bills of lading in
a Newfoundland Court, and the Court held they were illegal, the Court would refuse to give effect to
them, on the basis that a Court is bound to obey the laws of its own Legislature or its own common law .
. But it does not follow that any other Court could properly act in the same way. If it has before it a
contract good by its own law or by the proper law of the contract, it will in proper cases give effect to
the contract and ignore the foreign law.’

Lord Wright said: ‘Each case has to be considered on its merits. Nor must it be forgotten that the rule by
which contracts not expressly forbidden by statute or declared to be void are in proper cases nullified
for disobedience to a statute is a rule of public policy only, and public policy understood in a wider sense
may at times be better served by refusing to nullify a bargain save on serious and sufficient grounds.’