SPOUSES ANDRADA VS PILHINO SALES CORP
This restriction of the review to questions of law has been
FACTS: Pilhino Corp (Pilhino) is suing the spouses Andrada for
recovery of money. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment against two trucks (Fuso and Hino truck) both
owned by Jose Andrada. However, the levies on attachment
were lifted after Jose filed a counter-bond.
In due course, the RTC rendered a decision against Jose.
Pilhino opted to enforce the writ of execution instead of going
after the counter-bond since the bond’s premium was not
paid. As a result, the sheriff seized the Hino truck and
auctioned it, with Pilhino was the highest bidder. However,
the Hino truck could not be transferred to Pilhino’s name due
to its having been already registered in the name of petitioner
Moises Andrada.
It appears that the Hino truck had been meanwhile sold by
Jose Andrada, Jr. to Moises Andrada, which sale was unknown
to Pilhino, and that Moises had mortgaged the truck to BA
Finance Corporation (BA Finance) to secure his own
obligation. When Moises failed to pay, the truck was also
auctioned, with BA Finance as the highest bidder. Hence,
Pilhino instituted this action against the Andradas and BA
Finance.
Jose Andrada and his wife entered into a compromise
agreement with Pilhino (sila ra ha). Moises and his wife on the
other hand averred defences that they acquired the truck in
good faith. RTC, owing to the compromise agreement
between Jose and Pilhino, dismissed the case with Moises,
Pilhino and BA Finance. Spouses Moises Andrada appealed to
the CA to the extent that RTC dismissed also its counterclaim
for damages against Pilhino. The CA only affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Hence, they filed this petition for
certiorari arguing that they deserve damages under Article 21
of the Civil Code, and attorney fees under Art 2208 of the
same Code.
ISSUE: WON the spouses are entitled to damages/fees?
RULING: NO. We cannot side with the petitioners. Their
insistence, which represents their disagreement with the CA’s
declaration that the second and third elements of abuse of
rights, supra, were not established, requires the
consideration and review of factual issues. Hence, this
appeal cannot succeed, for an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise
of its power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and
does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.
institutionalized in Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It
is true that the Court has, at times, allowed exceptions from
the restriction. Among the recognized exceptions are the
following, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (b) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) When there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) When the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (e) When the findings of facts are
conflicting; (f) When in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
When the CA’s findings are contrary to those by the trial
court; (h) When the findings are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) When the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j)
When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; or (k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
However, the circumstances of this case do not warrant
reversing or modifying the findings of the CA, which are
consistent with the established facts. Verily, the petitioners
did not prove the concurrence of the elements of abuse of
rights.
They are not also entitled to attorney’s fees since the very
element of bad faith was not duly proven. Accordingly, the
petitioners’ demand for attorney’s fees under Article 2208
must fail. As noted by the Court in Morales v. Court of
Appeals,15 the award of attorney’s fees is the exception
rather than the rule. The power of a court to award attorney’s
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation and conjecture.
VIVARES VS SPOUSES SUZARA
FACTS: Julia Daluz and Vida Suzara were senior STC students
who posted pictures of themselves in brassieres, smoking and
possessing hard liquor on Facebook. Such information
reached Ms. Escudero, a computer teacher, who learned
about the event. The girls were identified by fellow STC
students in class. Ms. Escudero wasted no time and reported
the matter to Ms. Tigol, STC’s discipline-in-charge.

Thereafter, the STC started an investigation and found the
students for violating the rules prescribed in the Student
Handbook such as: possession of hard liquor, obscenity,
wearing clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour and
engaging in immoral or lewd acts. The students reported to
the office of the principal and were allegedly “verbally
abused”. The principal also informed the parents that as part
of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises.
A week before the graduation, the mothers of the students
filed a petition for injunction and damages, and prayed that
the school be enjoined from precluding the students from
joining the commencement exercises. Though RTC issued a
TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned students from
participating. Thereafter, the petitioners filed before the RTC a
petition for the issuance of habeas data since the students
had a reasonable expectation of privacy (since the settings
were set to “Friends Only”) and that there were “victims” in
this case since the photos were showed to the STC officials. To
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an
invasion of their children’s privacy.
RTC, however, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data. To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’
right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data. Not satisfied with the outcome,
petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section
19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.
ISSUE: WON the writ should be issued?
RULING: NO. In order for one to have an expectation of
privacy, it is necessary that there is a manifest intention to
keep certain posts private. Note that the Supreme Court did
not expressly mention any discussion about “Appeals in
Special Rules”, but merely discussed the applicability of the
Writ of Habeas Data in the case at bar. I will check the SCRA
later for any “implied discussion”.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in
the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.11
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom
of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to
protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Contrary to respondent’s contention, it is not only confined to
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. In
Sec 2 on the Rules of Habeas Data:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition
may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved
party, namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity
or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding
paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation
of the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Also, respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may
not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless,
erroneous.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business.
However, despite the erroneous arguments of STC, the writ of
habeas data still does not issue in this case, owing to the fact
that the students did now show any manifest intention to
keep their posts and pictures private.
In former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy,20 he explained the three strands of
the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is
the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the
right of individuals to control information about themselves.

Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her

online social network (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit
its visibility. United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more
open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect.

It is to be noted that the default setting of Facebook is

“Public”. The contention of the students that they set their
setting to “friends only” was self-serving and was not properly
proven.