Land Titles Sec. 14 To IPRA

Land Titles and Deeds | 1
G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962
IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance
of Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo
and Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied
by the latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of
land, with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who
inherited it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears
registered, as shown by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property
is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration
sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in
the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side
took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by 1958, the bank
thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original site, and an alluvial deposit
of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to the registered area
(Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of
Isabela against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by
accretion, alleging in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their
predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until
September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners
also asked for damages corresponding to the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's
fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in
themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said
portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the
premises and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages
and costs. Said decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit
of alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to
believe that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors
found out that the northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River,
and not the land in question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or
begun in 1931. And, as declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on
the northwest of the registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one
hectare, including the stony portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant
Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was
formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro
Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that the accretion with an area of 4 hectare
more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only declared in that same year for
taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2") when they entered upon the
land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this declaration
begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation purposes
since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is a
new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art.
366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants
since 1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on
the part of the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest
(Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation
on the part of the reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial
formation, as the law does not require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been
in possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription.
Assuming that they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was
commenced on January 25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years;
hence, they could not have acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New
Civil Code). Moreover, as the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the
same may be considered as registered property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496:
and, therefore, it could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14,
1960, the decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started
in the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law,
therefore, unless some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian
owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil
Code (now Article 457), which provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers,
belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."
The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired ownership through prescription. This
contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the
plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question pertains to the original
estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion, consequently, falls
within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession";
and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of September, 1948,
or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An
accretion to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the
owner of the land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the
protection of the rule of imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such
protection does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical
description of the land given therein, of their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area
of the land that is registered. Just as the Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated
that registration does not protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land
through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v.
Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights conferred by Land
Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What rights he has, are
declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions
do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This Court
has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length
of time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied
the land in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area
under occupancy gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for
purposes of taxation (Exhibit 1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2),
after the name of the municipality wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay.
Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro
Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the
land in question adjoins his own on the south, and that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it
to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants. Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect,
although, he said that the defendants' possession started sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area
thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than
that of the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that
the defendants occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to
the fact that the land was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that
the plaintiffs did not file an action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to
obtain the certificate of title from the surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the
land in question for taxation purposes or paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the
defendants had the said land surveyed in April, 1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he
claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs, but because the survey included a portion of
the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded by the defendants who, accordingly,
relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing an area of some 458 square
meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to
1958 — is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and
not the plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional
circumstance that if the plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in
1948, they would have immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not
doing so, namely, that they did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property
until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit
any serious consideration. The payment of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to
obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in
order to file an action to recover the land which was legally theirs by accession and of which, as
they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the defendants. We are convinced, upon
consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in possession since 1934, immediately
after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up to their rights only when they
received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in
favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property
in question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the
old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of
the land which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered
land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial
property imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension,
become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under
the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by
the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is
provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does
not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this
protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided. The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought
registration of said alluvial property (which was formed sometime after petitioners' property
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment,
therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject to the protection
of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was
subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription?
This is a question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration
of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-
appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and
adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the
existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of
the Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old
Civil Code were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the
conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by
acquisitive prescription is in accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., Regala and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R,
raising the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title
over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area
for medical center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with
the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio
Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what
was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed
bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a
certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however,
annulled the auction sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to
participate in the bidding for non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus
was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit
of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the
dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection with the Sales
Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and existing regulations, the land covered
thereby is herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or
P2,211.00 for the whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales Application No. 3231,
covering the tract herein awarded, which is more particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW—Public Land;
W—Municipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his
Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936,
the plan was approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-
A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of
Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of
Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231)
of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said
application is amended so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back
thereof, and as thus amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was
Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot
No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for
20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did
not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from
the Sales Application at the time the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then
Director of Lands Jose P. Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his
Sales Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of
Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public
land situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20
hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for
resettlement of the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9, President
Magsaysay revoked this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical
center site purposes under the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The
Medical Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350
reserving the area for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de
Jesus, opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a
vested right on the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of
Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-
hectare portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on
Plan Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081
square meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services,
Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial
court and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant
Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,
registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081
square meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby
ordered to relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical
center and nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining
ownership over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of
Five denied the motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of
12.8081 hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the
Medical Center, its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No.
350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao
Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity
sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a
"fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122
of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that
"Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the Philippines
are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land Registration Act, Act 496] and shall
become registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule that, on the basis of
Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion occupied by it, its
nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent of the
reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized
competence of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public
domain for a specific public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code
empowers the president "(t)o reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for
service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law. the land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes
directed by such executive order until otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the
Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts
of land of the public domain as reservations for the use ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or
of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for quasi-public uses or purposes when
the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other improvements for the public
benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus,
had acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award
issued to him on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33
hectares applied for, including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record
for the Appellate Court to draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes
the tract awarded as located in Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares, and bounded on
the north by Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary
Gohn; on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22
hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands.
The same area was reckoned with by then Lands Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the
issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for his application filed on January 22,
1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of
Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio de Jesus on the
same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano
Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land
situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64,
ares 00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales
Patent, invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares,
it becomes imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only
20.6400 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted
a bid of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which amount represents
10% of the purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00
for 22 hectares, 10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase
price would be P3,316.50 at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would be P331.65, not
P221.00, as what was actually deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de
Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares in that public bidding, he should have made the required 10%
deposit of P331.65. That he merely deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for
and awarded to him was only 22 hectares and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact,
his last payment of P660.45 on November 29, 1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to
cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after the amendment of the Sales Application on
August 28, 1936, excluding "the military camp site [Lot 1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason
that the said site, at the time of last installment was already excluded from Sale Application SA-
5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws
only 22 hectares and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an amendment
excluding the military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then would have been
left to applicant Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been left in the Sales
Patent. The Appellate Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was ordered
amended was the Sales Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400
hectares. The Order states: "Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because the
amendment was already reflected in the Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was
awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the
conclusion that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33
hectares. Such general description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description
delineating the area in quantity and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area
awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central, Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the
property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the southwest by a provincial road and the
property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on the west by a municipal road. 16
Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general description, or that which is more certain to
what which is less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered that the series of executive
proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the
Government to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most strongly
against the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the
Government, is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the land granted must be
ascertained from the description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And
courts do not usually go beyond a description of a tract in a patent and determine the tract and
quantity of land apart from the patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp
site) since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the
land, which right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued
to him in 1934. Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later
found to be 20,6400 fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the privilege of
occupying public lands a view to preemption confers np contractual or vested right in the lands
occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title threof
stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by
reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 23 The
claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is
later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually respected, but
where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands and
warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such
lands by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24
And patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are
void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there
be," but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the
property reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and
convincing evidence that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information
title, or any other means for the acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property
must be held to be part of the public domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus
legetimately claim to have obtained title by prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares,
inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot
was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares), his father, Eugenio de Jesus,
necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public domain, against which no
acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A. 141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary
Serafin Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition
that it would be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by
the trial court in 1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no
Defense Secretary by the name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed of donation with
Eugenio de Jesus over Lot 1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National
Defense was only organized in 1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by
secondary evidence the existence of such donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly
saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides that before the terms of a transaction in realty may be
established by secondary evidence, it is n that the due execution and subsequent loss of the
original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
document and its subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. And the due of the execution of the
document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who executed it; (2)
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present and saw it
executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
execution thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de
Jesus. His predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that he
executed a deed f donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense
Department was not yet in existence. The notary public who presumptively acknowledged the
donation or the witnesses to the instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that the
failure of the party to present the notary Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the
document as witnesses to testify on its execution interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence
of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new
Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in a public document in order to be valid. The
testimony of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de jesus, brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a
copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting
Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus went to his office to
register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of former Secretary
Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by Eugenio de
Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as to which very strict
compliance is imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First none of these
persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and
delivery ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" ambigous as
to be synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed,
Sesinando de Jesus and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. Respondent
Alejandro de Jesus's narration of the existence and loss of the document equally deserves no
credence. As found by the trial court, he testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept
was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle, Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself,
Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of the deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese
occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting
Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed for military purposes" and may not
therefore be released from the reservation cannot substitute the proof so required. These replies
are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less official admissions thereof.
Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed
between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because
Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in
1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or
settlement and reserved it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however,
rationalizes that the subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and special
proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in
donation may consist of a thing or right. 31 But the term "right" must be understood in a
"propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus disponendi. 32 This is because, in true
donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets. 33
Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33
hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare lot
had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by Proclamation No. 85 and
excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a consequence of such
donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia argumenti that the
12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of
donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take possession
of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other words,
the right granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from "proprietary
right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and registration
thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be
considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the
singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable" by the Director
of Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional because the
applicant has still to comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only
after compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the
patent is issued and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of by the Government."
This again is a circumstance that demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere
desistance of the sales applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual
revocation of the donation.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and
its resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby
reversed and set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing
an area of 12.8081 hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center.
The urgent motion of the petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a)
communicable and contagious diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters,
is hereby granted. With costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the
trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation
duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision
of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took
place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of
the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same
came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were
granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is
already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic
Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied
by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court
during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was
duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have
negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this
negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special session on November
22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the
1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration
proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution
which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court
which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert
before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in
question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by
themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially
confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it
in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of
the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously
does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1
where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation
more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific
War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply
for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or
natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco
appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section
48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on
the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino
in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed
the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the
correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word
of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration
was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained
would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in
Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any
right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7
Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico
vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has
vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public
land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of
time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested.
The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm
such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of
possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it
must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing
in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into
effect later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right
to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which
the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only
limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations
from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came
into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in
analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by
the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name
must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more
than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought
to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it
is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the
1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-
interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in
Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and
on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at
the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there
being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title
under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its
answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court
actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in
the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is
no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all
the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified
to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone,
by a liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the
dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real
sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the
soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief
Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the
petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973
Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the
main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE
ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS,
MAXIMO BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO
CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA,
DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO
DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA, MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO
ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA
GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA, TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO
ONGRIA, ERNESTO PANARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA,
ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
DAVAO, and BINAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES
and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying a
private corporation from purchasing public lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of
Lands, for which a sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to the 1964 decision of
the trial court, ejecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was
affirmed in 1975 by the Court of Appeals. That legal question arises under the following facts:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Biñan Development Co., Inc.
on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio
Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of Lands in his decision of August
30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their
improvements. No appeal was made from that decision.
The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are
now petitioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarded to the corporation and,
therefore, they could not be regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director characterized
them as squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30, Rollo of L-43505,
Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of execution but the protestants defied the writ and refused to
vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). **
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them on
February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit
(accion publiciana). The forty defendants were Identified as follows:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic
2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic

4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia
6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban
7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas
8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante
9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila
10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay
11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac
12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy
14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa
15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante
18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani
20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court found that the protests of
twenty of the abovenamed defendants were among those that were dismissed by the Director of
Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned.
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan Development
Co., Inc. On November 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation
report wherein it was stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation and other
requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price of the land (p. 248, Rollo).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when Sales Patent No. 5681 was
issued to the corporation for that lot with a reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was
registered. Original Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the Secretary of Natural
Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation
had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, that the
land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was in
conformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice
Vicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the
Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).
Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent on August 14, 1975, noted
that the applicant had acquired a nested right to its issuance (p. 259, Rollo).
Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit. Fifteen defendants (out of
forty), namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy, Generoso Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose
Emperado, Arcadio Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon
Samsa, Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan, testified that they entered the
disputed land long before 1951 and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit
trees. (p. 28, Record on Appeal).
The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the report of an official of the
Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free from private claims and conflicts and it gave much
weight to the decision of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against
the sales award (p. 30, Record on Appeal).
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on November 8, 1964 found
that the plantings on the land could not be more than ten years old, meaning that they were not
existing in 1953 when the sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to
vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The Court of Appeals
affirmed that judgment on December 5, 1975 in its decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs,
Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R. The review of the decision was denied by this Court on May 17, 1976
in Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a motion for execution. The
defendants, some of whom are now petitioners herein, opposed the motion. They contended that
the adoption of the Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact
which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the
constitutional prohibition, already mentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."
The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of the manifestation of the
defendants that they would file a petition for prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the
instant prohibition action was filed. Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment
case.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is barred by
the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person
or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested,
to enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J. 955,
Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and
is no longer open to doubt or controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses the concept of present fixed
interest, which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State
action, or an innately just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the applicant, before the
Constitution took effect, had fully complied with all his obligations under the Public Land Act in
order to entitle him to a sales patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for
refusing to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant had fulfilled the
construction or cultivation requirements and has fully paid the purchase price, he should be
deemed to have acquired by purchase the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in
the new Constitution would not apply.
In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where the cultivation
requirements were fulfilled before the new Constitution took effect but the full payment of the
price was completed after January 17, 1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a sales
patent (p. 256, Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official

carries great weight and should be accorded much respect. It is a correct interpretation of section
11 of Article XIV.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for that land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).
As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we cannot
entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by themselves and through their predecessors-
in-interest have possessed portions of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead
or free patent applications.
Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is
an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting
the petitioners. On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability.
Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and to dispel the notion that
the law grinds the faces of the poor, the administrative authorities should find ways and means of
accommodating some of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the soil who in
the words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in their stomachs, a little more shelter
over their heads and a little more clothing on their backs. The State should endeavor to help the
poor who find it difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer privations in the universal
struggle for existence.
A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights, particularly freedom from want. The
common man should be assisted in possessing and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance, to
give him social security and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic society.
To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a subversive or from rebelling
against a social order where, as the architect of the French Revolution observed, the rich are
choking with the superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands
by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage "owner-
cultivatorship and the economic family- size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the
instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest.
Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development Co., Inc. seeks to execute the judgment in Civil
Case No. 3711, the ejectment suit from which this prohibition case arose, against some of the
petitioners who were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the ejectment suit. Nor do
they derive their right of possession from the said defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of
the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were not defendants in
that litigation or who were not summoned and heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the
law that no man shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co. vs
Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).
To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who occupy portions
of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the defendants in the
ejectment suit, would be violative of due process of law, the law which, according to Daniel
Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the land, a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. "The
meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the
protection of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in Lopez vs. Director of Lands, 47 Phil.
23, 32. See Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75
SCRA 234 and Berses vs. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case, or at about four o'clock in the morning of
December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac,
employees of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a
portion of the disputed land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador, one of the petitioners
herein. The disputed land was leased by Biñan Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about five thousand pesos
consisting of coffee, coconut and banana plants. Emberador was in the hospital at the time the
alleged destruction of the improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that Emberador
was not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he is not included in the
trial court's decision although he was joined as a co-petitioner in this prohibition case.
The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four tractor drivers and Honesto
Garcia, the manager of Biñan Development Co., Inc., be declared in contempt of court for having
disregarded the restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1977, enjoining specifically
Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing the decision in the ejectment suit,
Civil Case No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138- 141, Rollo).
Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was assigned for hearing to Judge
Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Judge Martinez found that the plowing
was made at the instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain, petitioner Lausan Ayog, a Bagobo,
that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the termination of this case.
The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said incident, Emberador, in
consideration of P3,500, as the value of the improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in
favor of the Crown Fruits and Cannery Corporation (Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
We hold that no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining order was not directed to
Biñan Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in
the trial court's judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against Emberador by reason of the
destruction of his improvements, his remedy is not in a contempt proceeding but in some
appropriate civil and criminal actions against the destroyer of the improvements.
In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action. The constitutional
prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to stop the execution of the judgment in the
ejectment suit has no retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the clarification that the said
judgment cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein who were not defendants in the
ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction.
The contempt proceeding is also dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed
MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS
REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.

Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants'
"application for registration of the parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated
in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in
amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from
their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as
"Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the
Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter
VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of
owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa,
Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares,
more or less, was included in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de
Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court, which was decided by this same Court
through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30, 1949; that
the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that
they (the oppositors Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the
land in question because for a period more than sixty (60) years, the de Villas have been in
possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and under
the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at
the case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property,
barred them from raising the same issue in another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case
No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R. No. 5847-R is
concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" — in other words, the cause of action of the applicant
is now barred by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the decision of the Court in said case having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a
motion to dismiss, invoking the same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that
the land applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the former
registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated
January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land
by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land registration
proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale, by lease,
by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of
Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the
1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring
the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an alleged
possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty
years, pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This
provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act
No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of
ownership under Act 496 or for judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on
adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although they were not
actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the
first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had
constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly pertains to the
Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to be public land.
In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such
declaration, for precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of the decree of judicial
confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer
part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he
is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality
to file an opposition, we find in their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of
the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for
trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16, 2008
resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of
land1 located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch
1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976.2 She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked,
developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly
and adversely for more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed
the application because the land in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation
(FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3 in 1955. Thus, it was
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes4 that the
property subject of Garcia’s application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation.
Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name
of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Parañaque Investment
and Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the
decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia’s favor in a decision5 dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its
decision6 dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7
the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was
applicable to petitioner’s case as it involved the same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory
Information Title No. 216. As Garcia’s right to the property was largely dependent on the existence
and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of which had already been
passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military
reservation, the CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs,
one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.81avvphi1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was
pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the records from the former CFI.
Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as
ponente, issued a resolution9 upholding petitioner’s right to recall the records of the case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the
matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its
claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner
withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a
motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.11 On January 12,
2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of
registration in petitioner’s favor.12
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG
informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the amicable settlement was still
within the military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution)13 annulling the
compromise agreement entered into between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive
portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x
(3) x x x x x x
(4) x x x x x x
(5) x x x x x x
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement
dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia
Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the
Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby
DECLARED to be without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and,
consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other
matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz
over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May
18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement
and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution;
and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz’
registration herein.
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza
decision – the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the CA’s amended resolution. She alleged
that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial stages of the land
registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the
case reached the CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her
constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void.
The motion was denied.14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15 in this Court. It was denied for
raising factual issues.16 She moved for reconsideration.17 This motion was denied with finality on
the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Court’s
resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we
ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file
a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc.19 The
Court denied20 it considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21
Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.22 We reiterated
our directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in
due course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo
A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23 The
body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby
reproduced in its entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country
which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us.
(Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that
is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that
will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for
Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be
elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving
the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then
Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it
became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of
the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the
Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the
oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost.
In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case.
In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who
admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.
In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is
simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and
reverse the very decision in which he had lost.
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put
the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I
however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good
name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect
its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves.
I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that
surround us everyday.
I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again,
so that the next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I
suffered under our judicial system.
Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).
The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely

worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise
legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner’s letter/third motion for
reconsideration.
APPLICABILITY OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic’s position that Reyes is applicable to this case.
To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties;
and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. 24
The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes
exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for
review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two cases are different, the
merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands.26 In that
case, Quintin Tañedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his
possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the
trial court’s decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public
domain. Quintin’s successor-in-interest, Florencia Tañedo, who despite knowledge of the
proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino.
The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one,
was whether our decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res
judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the
Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order
dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the public domain
constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27
We also declared in Aquino that:

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the case" or at
least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly
erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the
Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last resort
that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed
to further argument. x x x28
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of
petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28,
1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Thus,
petitioner’s argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding
on us – on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind
even this Court – is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Court’s ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should have been a
matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and
disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military
reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and
therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse
of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is
their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts
demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of
our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme
Court from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."31
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to
private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is
situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it
is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of
fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32
Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not
registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are excluded. It is well-settled that forest
land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using
the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the title.
(Emphasis supplied).33
However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as
alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the
proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands)34 coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to
produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-in-
interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the
conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be
counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act.35 This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.36
The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.37
Coming now to petitioner’s contention that her "private rights" to the property, meaning her and
her predecessors’ possession thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected,
the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the same land to be public
forest even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it
is shown by the evidence that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of
fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a
military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation
by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the
inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of
ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage
Law.
xxx
During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under
the ‘kaingin’ system, while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter,
Maria Padilla, caused the planting of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose.
During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle,
do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive
and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over
land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere
occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The
possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto
upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.38
xxx
Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim
of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,39 thus rendering its probative value suspect,
further militates against granting her application for registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same was null
and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must

necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the
appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office of the President, was secured by
the OSG when it executed the agreement with her.40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG
rendered the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the
duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration proceedings, it must do
so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the
Philippines.41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it was never
given the specific or special authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is
in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires "special
authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. – Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise
their client’s litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in
cash. (Emphasis supplied).
Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because,
being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be
the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by
law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may
likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and against
public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of petitioner’s withdrawal of her
application for registration of title from that portion of the property located within the military
reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said
reservation. The Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the
agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONER’S CONTEMPT OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just
sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.
That petitioner’s letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court cannot be
denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country
which is suffering from moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us.
(Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]
It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she perceived as this
Court’s failure to exercise "utmost prudence" in rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case.
Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that
is humanly possible to convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that
will result from the implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for
Review.
Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be
elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving
the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".
The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then
Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.
It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it
became possible for him to discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of
the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the
Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic, as the
oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to expose
the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant
declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put
the Supreme Court in bad light.
But she hastens to add in the same breath that:
I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an
action will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.
Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:
. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who
seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.
When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless charges
and veiled threats, petitioner answered:
xxx
The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the
Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys"
case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity
over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of
her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and
ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional
[r]ight to fundamental fair play – for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge
without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.
Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because
correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional
delivery, she has offended your honors’ sensibilities, she is ready for the punishment, and only
prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion – as her letter to the Chief Justice was never
written with a view of threatening the Court.
xxx
Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity
bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.
The Court now puts an end to petitioner’s irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public"
with this case. We are not blind to petitioner’s clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with
false concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor
favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the
facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that
all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the
appellate court and this Court in their respective resolutions.
As to petitioner’s complaint regarding this Court’s denial of her petition through a mere minute
resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown
decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-
bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its
authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute
resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive
motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our
repeated warnings that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case." Her unreasonable
persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Court’s orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure.
This, alongside her thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy –
although the tone of petitioner’s compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly
subdued compared to her earlier letters – constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex,43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the
Court has already considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case
with finality. It is a directive to the parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions.
Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due process,
then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only
after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise
agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her
present counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his client’s lost
cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her petition to this Court
that:
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of
Appeals that places in doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the
rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for
registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz, who died in 1993, and
the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia’s successor-in-
interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia.44 (Emphasis supplied).
The above cited statement does not help petitioner’s cause at all. If anything, it only proves how
desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby
treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is DENIED considering that a third motion
for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is
hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby
WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 2869 March 25, 1907
MATEO CARIÑO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, respondent-appellee.
Coudert Brothers for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
Mateo Cariño, the appellant herein, on the 23d of February, 1904, filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration praying that there be granted to him title to a parcel of land consisting of 40
hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, and situated in the town of Baguio, Province of Benguet, together
with a house erected thereon and constructed of wood and roofed with rimo, and bounded as
follows: On the north, in lines running 1,048 metes and 20 decimeters with the lands of Sepa
Cariño, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, and Calsi; on the east, in lines running 991 meters and 50 decimeters
with the land of Kuidno, Esteban Gonzales, and of the Civil Government; on the south, in lines of
115 meters and 60 decimeters, with the lands of Talaca; and on the west, in lines running 982
meters and 20 decimeters, with the lands of Sisco Cariño and Mayengmeng.
By order of the court the hearing of this petition, No. 561, and that of Antonio Rebollo and Vicente
Valpiedad filed under No. 834, were heard together for the reason that the latter petition claimed a
small portion of land included in the parcel set out in the former petition.
The Insular Government opposed the granting of these petitions, alleging that the whole parcel of
land is public property of the Government and that the same was never acquired in any manner or
through any title of egresion from the State.
After trial, and the hearing of documentary and oral proof, the court of Land Registration rendered
its judgment in these terms:
Therefore the court finds that Cariño and his predecessors have not possessed exclusively and
adversely any part of the said property prior to the date on which Cariño constructed the house
now there — that is to say, for the years 1897 and 1898, and Cariño held possession for some years
afterwards of but a part of the property to which he claims title. Both petitions are dismissed and
the property in question is adjudged to be public land. (Bill of exceptions, p. 15.)
The conclusions arrived at the set forth in definite terms in the decision of the court below are the
following:
From the testimony given by Cariño as well as from that of several of the witnesses for the
Government it is deduced, that in or about the year 1884 Cariño erected and utilized as a domicile a
house on the property situated to the north of that property now in question, property which,
according to the plan attached to expediente No. 561, appears to be property belonging to
Donaldson Sim; that during the year 1893 Cariño sold said house to one Cristobal Ramos, who in
turn sold the same to Donaldson Sim, moving to and living on the adjoining property, which
appears on the plan aforesaid to be the property of H. Phelps Whitmarsh, a place where the father
and the grandfather of his wife, that is to say, Ortega and Minse, had lived . . ..
In or about the years 1898 Cariño abandoned the property of Whitmarsh and located on the
property described in the plan attached to expediente No. 561, having constructed a house thereon
in which he now lives, and which house is situated in the center of the property, as is indicated on
the plan; and since which time he has undoubtedly occupied some portion of the property now
claimed by him. (Bill of exceptions, pp. 11 and 12.)
1. Therefore it is evident that this court can not decree the registration of all of the superficial
extension of the land described in the petition and as appears on the plan filed herein, such
extension containing 40 hectares, 1 are, and 13 centares, inasmuch as the documentary evidence
accompanying the petition is conclusive proof against the petitioners; this documentary proof
consists of a possessory information under date of March 7, 1901, and registered on the 11th day
of the same month and year; and, according to such possessory information, the land therein
described contains an extension of only 28 hectares limited by "the country road to the barrio of
Pias," a road appearing on the plan now presented and cutting the land, as might be said, in half, or
running through its center from north to south, a considerable extension of land remaining on the
other side of the said road, the west side, and which could not have been included in the
possessory information mentioned.
2. As has been shown during the trial of this case, this land, of which mention is made in said
possessory information, and upon which is situated the house now actually occupied by the
petitioner, all of which is set forth as argument as to the possession in the judgment, is "used for
pasture and sowing," and belongs to the class called public lands.
3. Under the express provisions of law, a parcel of land, being of common origin,
presumptively belonged to the State during its sovereignty, and, in order to perfect the legitimate
acquisition of such land by private persons, it was necessary that the possession of the same pass
from the State. And there is no evidence or proof of title of egresion of this land from the domain of
the Spanish Government, nor is there any possessory information equivalent to title by
composicion or under agreement. 4, The possessory information filed herein is not the title to
property authorized in substitution for that of adjustment by the royal decree of February 13, 1894,
this being the last law or legal disposition of the former sovereignty applicable to the present
subject-matter of common lands: First, for the reason that the land referred to herein is not
covered nor does it come within any one of the three conditions required by article 19 of the said
royal decree, to wit, that the land has been in an uninterrupted state of cultivation during a period
of six years last past; or that the same has been possessed without interruption during a period of
twelve years and has been in a state of cultivation up to the date of the information and during the
three years immediately preceding such information; or that such land had been possessed openly
without interruption during a period of thirty or more years, notwithstanding the land had not been
cultivated; nor is it necessary to refer to the testimony given by the two witnesses to the
possessory information for the following reason: Second, because the possessory information
authorized by said royal decree or last legal disposition of the Spanish Government, as title or for
the purpose of acquiring actual proprietary right, equivalent to that of adjustment with the Spanish
Government and required and necessary at all times until the publication of said royal decree was
limited in time to one year, in accordance with article 21, which is as follows: " A period of one year,
not to be extended, is allowed to verify the possessory informations which are referred to in
articles 19 and 20. After the expiration of this period of the right of the cultivators and persons in
possession to obtain gratuitous title thereto lapses and the land together with full possession
reverts to the state, or, as the case may be, to the community, and the said possessors and
cultivators or their assigns would simply have rights under universal or general title of average in
the event that the land is sold within a period of five years immediately following the cancellation.
The possessors not included under this chapter can only acquire by time the ownership and title to
unappropriated or royal lands in accordance with common law."
5. In accordance with the preceding provisions, the right that remained to Cariño, if it be
certain that he was the true possessor of the land in question, was the right of average in case the
Government or State could have sold the same within the period of five years immediately
following for example, if the denouncement of purchase had been carried out by Felipe Zafra or any
other person, as appears from the record of the trial of the case. Aside from this right, in such
event, his possession as attested in the possessory information herein could not, in accordance
with common law, go to show any right of ownership until after the expiration of twenty years from
the expiration of twenty years from the verification and registry of the same in conformity with the
provisions of article 393 of the Mortgage Law and other conditions prescribe by this law.
6. The right of possession in accordance with common law — that is to say, civil law — remains
at all times subordinate to the Spanish administrative law, inasmuch as it could only be of force
when pertaining to royal transferable or alienable lands, which condition and the determination
thereof is reversed to the government, which classified and designated the royal alienable lands for
the purpose of distinguishing them from those lands strictly public, and from forestry lands which
could at no time pass to private ownership nor be acquired through time even after the said royal
decree of February 13, 1894.
7. The advent of the new sovereignty necessarily brought a new method of dealing with lands
and particularly as to the classification and manner of transfer and acquisition of royal or common
lands then appropriated, which were thenceforth merely called public lands, the alienation of
which was reserved to the Government, in accordance with section 12 and 13 of the act of
Congress of July 1, 1902,1 and in conformity with other laws enacted under this act of Congress by
the Philippine Commission prescribing rules for the execution thereof, one of which is Act No. 648,2
herein mentioned by the petitioner, in connection with Act No. 627,3 which appears to be the law
upon which the petition herein is founded.
8. Section 6 of Act No. 627 admits prescription, in accordance with the provisions contained in
Act No. 190, as a basis for obtaining the right of ownership. "The petitioners claims title under the
period of prescription of ten years established by that act, as well as by reason of his occupancy and
use thereof from time immemorial." (Allegation 1.) But said act admits such prescription for the
purpose of obtaining title and ownership to lands "not exceeding more that sixteen hectares in
extent." (Sec. 6 of said act.) The land claimed by Cariño is 40 hectares in extent, if we take into
consideration his petition, or an extension of 28 hectares, according to the possessory information,
the only thing that can be considered. Therefore, it follows that the judgment denying the petition
herein and now appealed from was strictly in accordance with the law invoked herein.
9. And of the 28 hectares of land as set out in the possessory information, one part of same,
according to the testimony of Cariño, belongs to Vicente Valpiedad, the extent of which is not
determined. From all of which it follows that the precise extent has not been determined in the
trial of this case on which judgment might be based in the event that the judgment and title be
declared in favor of the petitioner, Mateo Cariño. And we should not lose sight of the fact that,
considering the intention of Congress in granting ownership and title to 16 hectares, that Mateo
Cariño and his children have already exceeded such amount in various acquirements of lands, all of
which is shown in different cases decided by the said Court of Land Registration, donations or gifts
of land that could only have been made efficacious as to the conveyance thereof with the
assistance of these new laws.
By reason of the findings set forth it is clearly seen that the court below did not err:
1. In finding that Mateo Cariño and those from whom he claims his right had not possessed
and claimed as owners the lands in question since time immemorial;
2. In finding that the land in question did not belong to the petitioner, but that, on the
contrary, it was the property of the Government. (Allegation 21.)
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the
appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the notification of this decision let judgment be
entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter let the case be remanded to the court
from whence it came for proper action. So ordered.
Torres, Mapa, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,

vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING,
DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY
INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW
ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS,
GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G.
PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO,
SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO
CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR,
MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL,
MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS,
JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S.
MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY,
LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO,
MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON,
SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON
P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L.
MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA,
JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by
her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN
TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN
VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment.1 In
compliance, respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement its
provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the
constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed
through the Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the
IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors
of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the
leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene
and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of
parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those
who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition
be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to
Intervene with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that
IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus
be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings
and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b)
which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including
inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral domains;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over the
ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas
claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous
peoples for the development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect
and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary for
critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of "ancestral

domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands found within said areas,
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of
the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral
domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of
the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains and
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an
ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Justice and Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials
over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples
shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and
settlement of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
of the indigenous peoples."5
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office
of the President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and
program coordination." They contend that said Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control
over executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
Petitioners pray for the following:
"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP
to cease and desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing
Rules;
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of
R.A. 8371; and
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural
resources."7
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice
and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged
provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural
resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On
the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not
raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality
of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions
of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59,
65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose
rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the
view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case
was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO

B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO
T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA,
ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA,
FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE &
NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO
GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER
ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR
TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life
on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules
flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume
their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they
continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die
as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held
Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the
precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this
precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries,
it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among
us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the
well-being and economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the
new Constitution affirmed this goal adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the
soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted
one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but
undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the
following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already
been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated
principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was
promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory
acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring
full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on
July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions,
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above.
They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of
each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned
by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O.
No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228.
The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure
to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the
recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay 5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just
compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form
of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only
of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners
of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers
are deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers
of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in
behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination
of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the cases
invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in
Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless,
this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the
same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a
1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the
payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the
basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400
planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No.
229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as
decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that
the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so
only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the
interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229
would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due
process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform
Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the
receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten
wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources
as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund
shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation the
amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of
the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in an amount to be established by the
government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value as
provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any
of several modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically,
or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the
landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a
careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that
can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been
lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the
country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. Both motions were granted by the
Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and
that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated.
Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial
appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum rather than the maximum
authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been
certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the
violation of the fundamental right to own property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation
of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax
purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to
immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the
expropriation as explained in the "whereas" clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary
to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a general
survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that
they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the
possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of
private agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be
premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of
public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in
existence can be the subject of an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as
Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum
appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later
when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing
the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends
that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from
the House of Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land
Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition
was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which
had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his
motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private
respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The
legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency
measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law
and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of
the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the
provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be
considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion
for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity
of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6,
Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is
convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was
tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization
payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the
promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public
respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who
are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and
the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules
required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes
from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners
do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to
wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners,
with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December
29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners),
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to
Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land
Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention
under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of
discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this
function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not
in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in
Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere
letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the
acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental
law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this
power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes
upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the
other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as
unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The
theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by
Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en
banc.11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary
to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold
that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or
is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13
And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide
discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing
and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were
invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this exception
in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make
the hammer fall, and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these
departments, or of any public official, betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically
resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial
law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it
on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the
Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her
legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by
subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquino's loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by
her when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A.
No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said
measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and
21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law. 18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the
requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No.
131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is
not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is
to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section
25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could
not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now
has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation measures, had not yet been convened when the
proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the
Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the
Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly
or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil
fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but
in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be
awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at
least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of
the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only
one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of
the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in
the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No.
79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the former was only a letter of
instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law
during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with
the requirement for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published
in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force
and effect if they were among those enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was
published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific
department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one
important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to
compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in
the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the
extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the
courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will
require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an
unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great detriment of all parties
concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it
jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require
that jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be
permitted if the issue raised is a question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case
of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held
that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was
wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious
or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be
demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of
public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police
power in a famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went
"too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might cause the subsidence of structures for human
habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier
granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee
assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that
there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the
owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights
in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely
the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner.
The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from
making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited
ceases to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and
the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the
power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been
accepted. 26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois
College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which
sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain
powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing
public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available for public use,"
literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive task of
preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an analogy to
nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm
bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have
afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in
land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government
often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police
power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker,
which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to match that of the police
power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the
District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the
attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of
eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of
the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the
Terminal, which had been designated a historic landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to
be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the
Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in
the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking,
the Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal
which it said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair
compensation," as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized
to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to
the Terminal's designation as a landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-
story building that the city refused to countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions
on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its
losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence
more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking
is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess
and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several
measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are
prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many
bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally
agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not
discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection
with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of
expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that
they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform
to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it
must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have
been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the
State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject
and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the
first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method
employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is
also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere
expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even the
strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a,
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as
against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9,
which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no
need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only
where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the
vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of
the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible
demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power,
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence
that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper
exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the
decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made
by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified
in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the
case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even so, this should not be construed as a license
for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the
redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its authority, which we may assert only if we believe that
the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river
between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the
present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of
said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that determination is conclusive in
condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for
judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why
private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an
elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken
shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of
private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of
all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to the just compensation mandated by the
Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the
following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must
be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are
envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of
the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising
the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with
the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is
entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is
made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the
offer of the government to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to
the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide
the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice
and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44
resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just
compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the property by
the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring
these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a
matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would
be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process
clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees
during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only
to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as
the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the
courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its
predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to
allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of
a court promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the property, after
evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations
essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the
proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned.
Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination
in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such
amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the
criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be
finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-
five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent
(30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance
to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,

physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part,
he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the
Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the
same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of

stock owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale industry,
in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds
for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the
financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned
above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government
hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional
insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation
therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this
contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always
been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity. The market value of the
land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an
owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for
such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight
of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in
money and not otherwise. Thus —
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel
the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to
pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner
prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes. When the power of eminent domain is resorted to,
there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed
that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a
reliable and constant standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which
must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the
Legislature to substitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage.
49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the
past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the
power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps
local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind
of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory
of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and
edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to
come are as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a
richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness
today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has
ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands
that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their
deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds
of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our present standards. Such amount is in fact
not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that
when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of
the entire amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that
what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which
was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement
among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as
applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the
suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the demands of the project even as it was also felt
that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment should be made to the
landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end,
however, no special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was
reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of
the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We
are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program,
killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of
discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the
Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is
not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly
hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their
forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of
the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the
Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem
to be viable any more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section
14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure
but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the
valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes. On the
contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the
factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to
the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor
until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates
back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's
report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact,
the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it
was held that "actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent
to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not to the appropriation of it to
public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction
upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment.
Kennedy further said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on
and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his
consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it
will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford
absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling
owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972
and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized
farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and
until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land
they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-
fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it
was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to
the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership
after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. 57 No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as
recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should
counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose
lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs
who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed
by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have
said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate
resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative
level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own
other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be
scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be
continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments for the better
protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian
reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use
Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we
venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we
should strive for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from
the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse
the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended
forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth
that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him
only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at
last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in
it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against
all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy
the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103302 August 12, 1993
NATALIA REALTY, INC., AND ESTATE DEVELOPERS AND INVESTORS CORP., petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SEC. BENJAMIN T. LEONG and DIR. WILFREDO LEANO, DAR
REGION IV, respondents.
Lino M. Patajo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are lands already classified for residential, commercial or industrial use, as approved by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and its precursor agencies1 prior to 15 June 1988,2
covered by R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988? This
is the pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari assailing the Notice of Coverage3 of the Department
of Agrarian Reform over parcels of land already reserved as townsite areas before the enactment of
the law.
Petitioner Natalia Realty, Inc. (NATALIA, for brevity) is the owner of three (3) contiguous parcels of
land located in Banaba, Antipolo, Rizal, with areas of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205 hectares and
2.7080 hectares, or a total of 125.0078 hectares, and embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
31527 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
On 18 April 1979, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in
the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the
population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite.
The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as townsite reservation.
Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into low-cost housing
subdivisions within the reservation, petitioner Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC,
for brevity), as developer of NATALIA properties, applied for and was granted preliminary approval
and locational clearances by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. The necessary permit
for Phase I of the subdivision project, which consisted of 13.2371 hectares, was issued sometime in
1982;4 for Phase II, with an area of 80,000 hectares, on 13 October 1983;5 and for Phase III, which
consisted of the remaining 31.7707 hectares, on 25 April 1986.6 Petitioner were likewise issued
development permits7 after complying with the requirements. Thus the NATALIA properties later
became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.
On 15 June 1988, R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988" (CARL, for brevity), went into effect. Conformably therewith, respondent Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR, for brevity), through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued on 22
November 1990 a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the
notice of Coverage.
EDIC also protested to respondent Director Wilfredo Leano of the DAR Region IV Office and twice
wrote him requesting the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
On 17 January 1991, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo, Inc. (SAMBA, for
the brevity), filed a complaint against NATALIA and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to
restrain petitioners from developing areas under cultivation by SAMBA members.8 The Regional
Adjudicator temporarily restrained petitioners from proceeding with the development of the
subdivision. Petitioners then moved to dismiss the complaint; it was denied. Instead, the Regional
Adjudicator issued on 5 March 1991 a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioners NATALIA and EDIC elevated their cause to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB);
however, on 16 December 1991 the DARAB merely remanded the case to the Regional Adjudicator
for further proceedings.9
In the interim, NATALIA wrote respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform reiterating its request to
set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither respondent Secretary nor respondent Director took action
on the protest-letters, thus compelling petitioners to institute this proceeding more than a year
thereafter.
NATALIA and EDIC both impute grave abuse of discretion to respondent DAR for including
undedeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision within the coverage of the CARL. They
argue that NATALIA properties already ceased to be agricultural lands when they were included in
the areas reserved by presidential fiat for the townsite reservation.
Public respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General dispute this contention. They
maintain that the permits granted petitioners were not valid and binding because they did not
comply with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957, otherwise known as
"The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree," in that no application for conversion
of the NATALIA lands from agricultural residential was ever filed with the DAR. In other words,
there was no valid conversion. Moreover, public respondents allege that the instant petition was
prematurely filed because the case instituted by SAMBA against petitioners before the DAR
Regional Adjudicator has not yet terminated. Respondents conclude, as a consequence, that
petitioners failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies available to them before coming to
court.
The petition is impressed with merit. A cursory reading of the Preliminary Approval and Locational
Clearances as well as the Development Permits granted petitioners for Phases I, II and III of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision reveals that contrary to the claim of public respondents, petitioners
NATALIA and EDIC did in fact comply with all the requirements of law.
Petitioners first secured favorable recommendations from the Lungsod Silangan Development
Corporation, the agency tasked to oversee the implementation of the development of the townsite
reservation, before applying for the necessary permits from the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission. 10 And, in all permits granted to petitioners, the Commission
stated invariably therein that the applications were in "conformance" 11 or "conformity" 12 or
"conforming" 13 with the implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957. Hence, the
argument of public respondents that not all of the requirements were complied with cannot be
sustained.
As a matter of fact, there was even no need for petitioners to secure a clearance or prior approval
from DAR. The NATALIA properties were within the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan
Reservation. Since Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 created the townsite reservation for the
purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect
converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were
met. And, in the case at bar, there was compliance with all relevant rules and requirements. Even in
their applications for the development of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, the predecessor agency of
HLURB noted that petitioners NATALIA and EDIC complied with all the requirements prescribed by
P.D. 957.
The implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of P.D. 957 applied to all subdivisions and
condominiums in general. On the other hand, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 referred only to
the Lungsod Silangan Reservation, which makes it a special law. It is a basic tenet in statutory
construction that between a general law and a special law, the latter prevails. 14
Interestingly, the Office of the Solicitor General does not contest the conversion of portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision which have already been developed. 15 Of course, this is contrary to its
earlier position that there was no valid conversion. The applications for the developed and
undeveloped portions of subject subdivision were similarly situated. Consequently, both did not
need prior DAR approval.
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides
that the CARL shall "cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public
and private agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is referred to as "land
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land." 16 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable
agricultural lands" and "do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands." 17
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision
cannot in any language be considered as "agricultural lands." These lots were intended for
residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod
Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question continued to be developed as a low-cost
housing subdivision, albeit at a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA
members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from continuing with such development.
The enormity of the resources needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its
completion but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still residential lands and
outside the ambit of the CARL.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include
lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government
agencies other than respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of
Private Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses, 18 DAR itself defined "agricultural land" thus —
. . . Agricultural lands refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A. 6657 and not
classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances as approved
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities
prior to 15 June 1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use.
Since the NATALIA lands were converted prior to 15 June 1988, respondent DAR is bound by such
conversion. It was therefore error to include the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision within the coverage of CARL.
Be that as it may, the Secretary of Justice, responding to a query by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, noted in an Opinion 19 that lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, inter
alia, of which the NATALIA lands are part, having been reserved for townsite purposes "to be
developed as human settlements by the proper land and housing agency," are "not deemed
'agricultural lands' within the meaning and intent of Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. " Not being
deemed "agricultural lands," they are outside the coverage of CARL.
Anent the argument that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the instant
petition, suffice it to say that the issues raised in the case filed by SAMBA members differ from
those of petitioners. The former involve possession; the latter, the propriety of including under the
operation of CARL lands already converted for residential use prior to its effectivity.
Besides, petitioners were not supposed to wait until public respondents acted on their letter-
protests, this after sitting it out for almost a year. Given the official indifference, which under the
circumstances could have continued forever, petitioners had to act to assert and protect their
interests. 20
In fine, we rule for petitioners and hold that public respondents gravely abused their discretion in
issuing the assailed Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990 by of lands over which they no longer
have jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Notice of Coverage of 22 November 1990
by virtue of which undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision were placed under CARL
coverage is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 86889 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 51
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondent.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting
without jurisdiction in enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same apply to
herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657
(Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the
enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No.
6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by
the DAR on January 9, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).: rd
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional.
Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued
enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz
Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4, 1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz Farms' prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26, and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p.
98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by this Court of an
injunction bond in the amount of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p. 119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor General adopted his Comment to the petition as his
Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to
commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided, That
these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the
DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit
after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of the
end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No.
6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising
of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith.:-cralaw
The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
ARTICLE XIII
x x x
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till
or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
x x x"
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety. In fact, it
acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the case of the Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989)
affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that
Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including
land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 131). Livestock
or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial
livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the
country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes,
under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial
livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo, p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other amenities
attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal
factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. Including backyard raisers, about 80% of
those in commercial livestock and poultry production occupy five hectares or less. The remaining
20% are mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in
the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is
proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the
following words:
"Agriculture — the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often,
including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . .

Livestock — domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm — a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo, pp. 82-
83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of constitutional construction. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in
the adoption of the Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413
[1970]).: rd
Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the
document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails
(J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful
meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on
the intent of the framers of the Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not
controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to the adoption by the people of the
Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the terms of the
constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward
explaining the understanding of the people when they ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183
[1974]).
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of
the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A.
3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds,
idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner
Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such
lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under
the general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands
(Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice), posed several
questions, among others, quoted as follows:
x x x
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program founded on the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers. I wonder if it means that leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under this provision
because it speaks of the primary right of farmers and farmworkers to own directly or collectively
the lands they till. As also mentioned by Commissioner Tadeo, farmworkers include those who
work in piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery or a

poultry project and for that purpose hires farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will
automatically have the right to own eventually, directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on
which the piggeries and poultry projects were constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, p.
618).
x x x
The questions were answered and explained in the statement of then Commissioner Tadeo, quoted
as follows:
x x x
"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam ko kay
Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin inilagay ang agricultural worker sa kadahilanang kasama
rito ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay farm worker kaya hindi
kasama ang piggery, poultry at livestock workers (Record, CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private
agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of
"commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made
to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include
livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A.
6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and
implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby
they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent
(10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being
confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).:-cralaw
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if
it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself (Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777,
14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional
issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done.
In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience
gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual
as intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will not
hesitate "to make the hammer fall heavily," where the acts of these departments, or of any official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution (Association of Small Landowners of the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v.
Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had
assumed to do, as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "(I)n one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of
the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which power this
Court has exercised in many instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208 [1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as
well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby
DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is
hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.

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Land Titles and Deeds | 1

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,

Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.

Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.

Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1

N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;

SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;

On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1

We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic

2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic

3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic

4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales

5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia

6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban

7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas

8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante

9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila

10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay

11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac

12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday

13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy

14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa

15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa

16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa

17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante

18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante

19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani

20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas

Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a high executive official

G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967

Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.

The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.

xxx xxx xxx

G.R. No. 181502 February 2, 2010

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, Petitioner,

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

The language of petitioner’s letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

This contention is erroneous.

We also declared in Aquino that:

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.