AD11A
1896
Italy, which completed its unification as a national state
only with the occupation of Rome on 20 September 1870,
was-like Germany-a late arrival on the colonial scene.
As a result, it only secured a slight part ofthe spoils-along
the coasts of the Red Sea and Somaliland-in the "scramble
for Africa" at the end of the 19th century. However, it
seemed that it had a good chance of extending its possessions
in the direction of the interior since the neighbouring Chris-
tian feudal monarchy of Ethiopia was affected by internal
chaos which weakened its defensive potential. To gain time,
Emperor Menelik II was ready to sign the treaty of friend-
ship of Ucciali on 2 May 1889 after he had ascended the
throne but the discriminating interpretation of this by Italy
led to the outbreak of war again alread y in 1894. The
English government, which was taking action against the
Mahdi state in the Sudan at this time, gave diplomatic sup-
port to Italy while France and Russia-the latter primarily
for religious reasons-provided Ethiopia with some material
assistance.
After suffering minor defeats at the beginning, Menelik
was able to achieve a significant increase in the numbers of
his forces by the end of 1895 and to improve their equip-
mento He now crossed the frontier between the orth of
Ethiopia and Eritrea arbitrarily fixed by the Italian colo-
nial administration. His advance guard under Ras Makon-
nen destroyed an Italian advance detachment under Major
Toselli at Amba Alege on 7 December 1895. Fort Makale
was then besieged and its garrison surrendered at the end
of J anuary 1896. These two successes raised the morale of
the Ethiopian troops and contributed to the development of
a popular war against the Italian occupation forces in the
province ofTigre.
Only a small part of the Ethiopian forces, which are
clearly shown by illustrations to have consisted of several
tribal formations, was organized in a systematic manner.
In addition to a hard core of 30,000 men, including a
mounted bodyguard of 3,000 troops, and 32 guns, there
were the provincial contingents raised by the princely
governors, the "Ras", the strength and fighting efficiency
ofwhich varied greatly. The Ethiopian army, whose leaders
mostly carne from the Amharic aristocracy, numbered
about 80,000 men, 8,600 horses and 42 guns at the begin-
ning of 1896. The foot-troops of these peasant warriors were
armed with guns or spears. The firearms included both an-
cient flintlocks and modern repeating-rifles. The ordnances
were all quick-firing field-guns but were not usually used
in battle, being more frequently employed for siege purpo-
ses and military parades. The guns obviously included some
Maxim and ordenfeld machine-guns but these, like the
field-guns, were hardly ever used. The mounted units-
some of whom were drawn from the Galla tribes-fought
with sabres and were famous for their fine horses.
Their attacks were opened by fire from long lines of
riflemen whose task was to tie down the enemy while spcar-
men encircled the enemy positions at the same time and at-
tacked them from the flanks and the rear. As soon as the
enemy began to withdraw, the cavalry likewise attacked
the flanks and turned the retreat into a rout, making any
further resistance impossible. Although they advanced in
large, tightly packed groups, the infantry knew how to ex-
ploit the cover offered by the terrain. atural features such
as valleys, elevations and rocks were used to surprise the
enemy and launch hand-to-hand actions.
1t was clear that tactics such as these could not prevail
against regular troops equipped with the latest weapons
who had sufficient ammunition and were capable of adapt-
ing their combat techniques to the terrain in question and
to the irregular methods of fighting of their opponents,
even though the latter outnumbered them several times
over. This was why Menelik organized a quite outstanding
espionage system which provided him with accurate infor-
mation about all the intentions of the enemy, his probable
movements, strength, weapons and stocks of ammunition.
Siege and storming of Makale by Ethiopian troops. Lithograph
from an illustrated newspaper.
'..'
Syrnbolic Ethiopian representation ofthe battle of Adua.
Prívate collection of Prof. Dr. Franz Ansprenger, Berlín (\Vest).
 He was adroit at providing the enemy reconnaissance The Italian troops likewise reached the heights ofSauria 31
forces with false news to unsettle the enemy and induce him 111mid-February and prepared defensive positions there.
. to take ill-considered action. However, their commander was unable to establish reliable
After the defeat at Amba Alege, the Italian colonial communications with the base in Eritrea to ensure the deliv-
army was reinforced to corps strength and in February 1896 ery of supplies and food. Baratieri was thus confronted with
consisted of four brigades, three of which consisted of regu- the alternative of either retreating in the direction of Mas-
lar Italian troops while the other was recruited from Eri- sawa or, by the occupation of Adua, attempting to improve
trean mercenaries. The infantry were equipped with modi- his supply situation on his own initiative. He had decided in
fiedVetterli-Vitali magazine-rifles which had been supplied favour ofmarching back on the 23rd ofFebruary but had to
to the Italian army only after 1887. Like al! modified fire- change this decision on the following day when informed
arms, they tended to jam when used Ior long periods and that Ethiopian militia forces were seriously threatening the
then they could only be used as single-shot weapons, as- only possible line of retreat. U nder these circumstances,
suming that they did not fail completely. The artil!ery had Baratieri considered it more advisable to advance on Adua
32 mountain-guns of 75-mm calibre, 12 rapid-fire guns of and force the enemy either to attack him or to withdraw lO
+2-mmcalibre and eight older pieces of artil!ery which were the interior ofthe country.
manned by Eritreans. Baratieri's hesitation for several days raised a pro test
In all, there were 20,170 men in the expeditionary from his brigade commanders who confidently asserted
corps. In addition, the detachmenls guarding the ammuni- that an attack on the allegedly totally demoralized Ethio-
tion stores and important areas of terrain in the strength of pian forces at Adua ofTered the prospect of a great victory,
a regiment 01' battalion totalled 5,830. Reinforcements from After a council ofwar, the supreme commander did decide
ltaly were on the way by the sea-route and were expecled at lo advance in the direction of Adua but halted at the half-
Xlassawa between the end of February and mid-March. way stage to occupy a ridge which seemed to offer a partic-
The governor o( the colony and the commander o( lhc ulady Iavouraole deíensive position (rom whi.ch to await
expeditionary corps was General Baratieri, the last active the Ethiopian attack. Since the ltalians had no maps and
associate ofGaribaldi sti11 serving. The Crispi governmenl, the designation of the areas of terrain was vague, there
angered by the defeats, stripped him of his Iunctions on the were obviously misunderstandings between Baratieri and
zznd of February and appointed General Baldissera as his his brigade commanders as to the line to be reached. Con-
successor but at the same time neglected to advise the per- sequently, those commanders who did not approve ofwhat
son most concerned of his dismissal. He, in turn, who had they considered the weak leadership of the general saw no
hitherto been contenl to move his troops in paral!el with reason and without formally deviating from thc order
those of the enemy, felt obliged by the reproachful dis- given-why they should not advance so Iar with thcir bri-
patches from Rome to display greater activity. His intention gade that they could dare to makc a surprise attack on the
was to occupy an area ofterrain ofTering a tactical advan- Ethiopian camps.
tage and force Menelik to attack him there. He was certain A march during the night ofthe 29th of Fcbruaryj i st of
that the enemy could be repulsed and heavy losses inflicted, March to Adua across unfamiliar territory led to the first
inducing him to open negotiations, the results of which trouble between the four columns. When the line designated
would correspond lo the interests ofItalian colonial policy. by Baratieri was reached during the early hours ofthe morn-
After his success at Iakale, Menelik continued his ad- ing, the column on the left wing continued to move on ancl,
vance in a northerly direction but, after reaching the heights wit h its advance detachment, attacked the Ethiopian camp
ofSauria, turned back again towards Adua, the capital o, which was directly in the vicinity. The column in the
Tigre, to obtain supplies of food. He assembled his forces centre and the reserve column remained in the position they
here in several camps. His spies spread convincing rumours had be en assigned and made preparations for its defence
about alleged disagreements bctwccn the Ethiopian leaders but their left flank was now cxposcd. Thc column on thc
and the low combat morale oftheir army. right wing, which had initially halted, then began to movc
16 Iorward again and lost contact with thc centre. Ir uncxpcct- tlic Ethiopians usual ly emasculatecl their captivcs may IJ;¡\'c
edly clashcd with a stronger enemy forrnation which imme- contributed to ihis.
diately opened fire and praetically wiped out thc isolated Baratieri and other officers tried in vain to at least guide
Italia n brigade. the flight to their own fortified campo However, fear ofthe
i\Ienelik had been advised by his scouts that the enemy cavalry which was sighted time and again on the right
was marching in his direction. He assumed that an attack Aank drove the fleeing troops to the Northeast, i.e., in
would be made on his camps and instructed the subordinate the direction of the coast, although the way there was un-
commanders to take the appropri at e measures but to Icave known and local guides were not available. The situation of
the camps apparently unprcparcd and undefcndcd. The pe- the Italian troops was alIeviated to some extent by the faet
rimeter guards wcre to hastily retire and thus provokc the that the enemy first stormed the camp on the height of
cncrny into pursuing thcrn withou t taking the usual precau- Sauria and only made a half-hearted pursuit. Menelik
tions. Mcnelik plannecl to launch a counter-attack and for made no effor t to cut off the disappearing enemy and com-
this purpose dispatched a fairly strong force, including the pletely destroy his forces. lt was only on the 3rd of Mareh
wholc of his cavalry, to take up concealed positions near the that Baratieri, who had now Iearnt of his dismissal at last,
arca which thc flan ks of'thc enemy were expected to cross. The was able to eollect the survivors and re-organize them. He
emperor's calculatious preved correct, particularly on ac- found that only 3,520 officers and other ranks were left of
count of thc Italian brigade commanclers taking independ- the original 20,000 troops in the expeditionary corps.
ent aetion, continuing thcir advance and thus thwarting The defeat by itself did not mean the end of'the war. The
the intentions of their general. Iall of the Crispi cabinet which resulted from it and which
In the attempt to beat off the Ethiopian counter-attack had based its actions on the Triple AlIiance with Germany
provokcd by its advance attachment, the Italian column and Austria, brought about a change in the Italian poliey
on the lcft wing cornplctcly disintegrated even beforc it of "transformism" which ultimately led to Italy joining the
could be cleployecl in any combar formation at all, Its with- Entente Powers in 1915 and fighting against its forrner
drawal becarnc a panic-stricken Aight immediatcly Ethio- Allies.
pian cavalry appearcd on the Ilank. In the meantime, the On the other hand, Adua was not the first victory of
Ethiopians had gone ovcr to the attack on a broad Iro nt and African forces over European colonial troops in the late
had already begun to encircle the enell1y centre. When Bara- r qth century. The Zulus in South Africa, Samory Touré in
tieri tricd to covcr the two flanks of the centre with his Mandingo Land in West Africa, the Mahdi, Mohammed
reserve column, he found that this was almost cornpletely Ahmed ibn-Abdullah, in the Sudan and others had been
tied down. Thc artillery likcwise preved to be incapable of abIe to defeat the invaders on various occasions. However,
holding up the enemy since they hacl rapidly exhausted the victory which caught the attention of an en tire op-
their ammunition and it had become impossible in the mean- pressed continent and gave it new courage was \\'011 by
time to bring up further supplies Irorn the rear. DirectIy Ethiopian soldiers 011 that r st of March in 1896.
thc artillery moved to the rear with the guns still in their
possession, they were followcd by the rest of the ltalian
forrcs. Baratieri certainly endeavoured to organize an orcler-
Iy retreat at about noon but he did not even succeed in Iorrn-
ing an cffcctivc rearguard. The Italian battalions lost all
tactical cohesion, discipline broke up and a disorderly
Ilight was the result. Weapons and every other item of
equipment werc thrown away and the expeditionary corps
became a horde of men in uniform with only one aim in
mind-to save their skins at any price. The legend that was
circulating everywherc at the time and according to which
IIVEDEN
In the division of China into "spheres of iníluences" by the el and many ofits officers studied at the Military Academy
Great Powers, J apan considered that not enough attention in Berlin and gained practica] experience in military leader-
had been paid to its interests. In 1894/95, it had won a war ship by serving in the Hohenzollcrn army. Its industry was
against the "Ern pire of the Cen tre" bu t, in the face of pro- already able to produce all the equipment for military
test by Cerrnany, Russia ancl France, had not been able to operations on land with exception oflarge-calibre guns and
enforce the terms of the Peace of Shimonoseki. After the optical instruments which were imported from Europe. The
suppression of the revolutionary Chinese Ihotwan movc- Japanese army was equipped with srnall-calibre magazine
ment-known in Europe as the "Boxer Rebellion" -by an rifles for the infantry, qui k-firing field- and mountain-
international expeditionary force in 1900/01, a head-on guns for the artillery and a considerable number of ma-
clash occurrcd bctwcen the Russians andJapanese in Man- chine-guns. In addition, it was well supplied with cornmu-
churia and Korea. In the night of 8th/9th February 1904, nieations and engineering equipment.
Japan, which was backed up by an alliance signed with At the beginning of the war, there were r 3 divisions on
England in 1902, opened hostilities without a formal decla- active service, the rapid mobilization ofwhieh was favoured
ration of war by attacking the Russian Aeet anchored off by the fact that their depot were located in the areas Irorn
Port Arthur. which their recruits were rai ed. Each división had two in-
The only link between Russia and the theatre of war fantry brigades oftwo regiments each, an artillery regiment
was the Trans-Siberian railway, which had been completed with 36 guns, a cavalry regiment, an engineering battalion,
in 1903 but had only one track. The Russian forces could a supply battalion and a telegraph section. The thoroughly
not exploit their superiority on land whereas Japan could prepared and thus rapid raising of t 5 re erve brigade was
make full use of thc easily won command of the sea in Far carried out in the divisional districts ancl it was this which
East waters. The campaign of 1904 favoured the J apanesc enabled the Supreme Command to operate in Manehuria
but this did not determine the outcome of the war. Following with far more powerful forces than had bcen cxpectcd by
an indecisivc battle at the Shaho in October, theRussianshad the enem)'.
gone over to a static form of warfarc. \Videly distributed After the surrender ofthe Rus ian fortress at Port Arthur
trench system were eonstructed along a front of 90 kilo- on 2 Jan uary 1905, the siege troops no longer req uired
metres, making it very difficult if not completely impossiblc were transported to Mukden. After their arrival, Ficld-
to launch frontal attacks with a subsequent breakthrough. Marshal Prince Oyama-Minister ofWar and Chief ofthe
Alter a vain attempt by the Russian upreme Command to General taff for many years and Cornmander-in-Chief in
gain the initiativc at San-de-pu bct wccn the 25th and the the war against China in r894/95-had five armies, or
28th J anuary 1905, before all the J apanese armies to the army corps in actual fact, at his disposa!. With a total
south of Mukden (now known as Shen-yang) could join u p strength of 350,000 men, there were at least 3°0,000 under
with each other, both sides made preparations for a deci- arms, which was only possible through forcing Chinese
sive battle not far from the old residential city ofthe Man- coolies to bring up ammunition and supplics. Fircpower was
chu rulers. provided by about r ,000 guns, including 170 big and very
Within a few decades,Japan had totally modernized its big models, howitzers of up to 28-cm-calibre and about
feudal mi litarv systcm and, with the aid of Freneh and, 200 machine-guns.
later, Gerl1lan instructors, established powerful military Although it had almost a lways been succes fui in the
forccs. The rni litarv svstern was based on the Prussian mod- previous battle , the losses sustained in men ancl material
18 _ Russian Iorces
c::;;¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡j Russian cavalry

c=J J apanese [ore es

~ Japanesc cavalry
preparcd Russian defencc line
.".. ..•..:
rP
--~ Japanese direction of attack
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army staffs
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were intolerable for the J apanese army over a long periodo The Russian commander-in-chief and one-time Minis-
The Court and the government consequently insisted on an ter of War, General Kuropatkin, had at his disposal, it is
end to the protracted and exhausting sta tic warfare by an true, the whole of the so-called Manchurian Army with
offensive to bring about a decisive turn in the fighting. To some 500,000 men but the total strength of the three armies
improve the prospects of success, the Supreme Command which fought along the Shaho front was only 305,000 as re-
made efforts to achieve a fundamental improvement in its gards the actualcombatants. Numerousunitsguarded thevi-
assault tactics, especially by co-ordinating the infantry and tal South Manchurian railway, which branched offfrom the
the artillery. Every J apanese attack against permanent de- Trans-Siberian line at Harbin since this was subject to un-
fensive systems was to be preceded by sufficient artillery ceasing attacks by J apanese cavalry forces. Other detach-
fire. The infantry was instructed to advance in small, open ments were used for supply duties or were scattered over
groups and in short, sharp movements against the enemy wide areas to ensure protection of the ftanks.
trenches, the task of the artillery being to give them contin- Due to the outdated social relations ancl the backward
uous support and to use the indirect aim method for this. political system, the re-organization of the czarist military
Oyama realized that the enemy was constantly receiv- system carried out in the 1860'S and 1870's had not been
ing reinforcements and would soon achieve absolute supe- able to eliminate the sluggishness of the military apparatus,
riority. However, he relied on the energy ofhis officers and although some improvement had been achieved. The cor-
on the total discipline and courage ofthe soldiers whose con- rupt and incapable military bureaucracy-which made up
fidence had been increased by the previous victories over the for these deficiencies by its arrogance-was not affected by
"Whites". This was why he decided in the second half of these reforms. With the adoption of general conscription in
February in favour of an offensive battle. 1874, the Russian army was numerically the strongest of
thc world. This mass-army necessitatcd certain ehanges in duly weaken Russia's position in the system o[ European 3
the mili tary apparatus and in the organization of its levels military blocks, the Court and government did not dare
al command but only the establishment of military districts to send active units of the line Irom the western military
and an improvernent in the lraining of officers produced a districts to the theatre of war in the Far East, although only
positive, effect. these could have brought about a decisive change in the
shortcoming of a special kind was the strict separation situation. The soldiers were indeed brave and prepared to
of Guard units from the troops ofthe line. The General Staff bear hardship but the war aims, which were totally alíen
did not maintain close contacts with actual military prac- to them, the succession of defeats, and the shortage of food
iice and was unfamiliar with the many requirements of -bread in particular-, ammunition and medical supplies
effective leadership. As a result, Kuropatkin's staff consid- caused a deterioration in their combat morale. The many
ered the timely organization of an espionage service behind religious services in the numerous tent-churches could not
ihe japanese line as beneath its dignity and left this matter change this situation. The officers lost their illusions about
lo the secret police. It had likewise neglected to obtain rnaps a dashing colonial war against an allegedly serni-barbarian
in good time for the areas in Manchuria where the nex t people and the sobering effect of all this even affected the
fighting would take place o r to place these at the disposal gen erais.
of the commanders in t hc field, as they had reckoned with On the 19th of February, a council of war decided to
a campaign in Korea. anticípate the Japanese attack which was to be expected
The infantry and the artillery were equipped with mod- following the capture of Port Arthur by opening an offen-
ern weapons but there were no high-explosive shells for sive on the right wing. The IInd Army was assigned the
the excellent 7.62-cm field-guns so that they could only fire execution of this task and the operational reserve was plac-
shrapnel shells. There were hardly any howitzers or moun- ed at its disposa!. On that very day, however, Oyama had
tain-guns at the Shaho which had particularly serious con- already completed the re-grouping of his troops and the
sequences on positional warfare. The batteries only moved 5th Army on his right wing and the 3rd Army on his left
up into exposed positions in the field for the direct bornbard- were about to undertake far-ranging encircling manoeuvres.
ment of the enemy and bayonet attacks were preferred for The 5th Army began to move Iorward on the zoth ofFeb-
infantry actions. Attacks were still launched in tightly- bruary and was followed on the 24th by the ist Arrny.
packed formations which represented an easy target for The pressure on his left flank forced Kuropatkin on the
the enemy artillery even before they could reach the enemy 24th of February to cancel the attack by the IInd Army
lines. planned for the following day and to immediately move
In mid-February, the Manchurian rmy nevertheless the reserves deployed there to the east, towards the threat-
numbered twelve army corps with two infantry divisions ened left wing. In actual fact, the Ru sians were able to
cacho These, in turn, consisted of lwo infantry brigades, withstand the J apanese attack a1though the Russian IIIrd
one cavalry brigade and an arti llery brigade of 4.8 or 64 Army had to fight a major artillery action. However, Oya-
guns, a pioneer company and the communications and ma's principal objective with his advance on the east wing
supply services. In addition to these Iorces, Kuropatkin had was to divert the enemy's attention from the main attack
some independent rifle brigades and a strang contingent and to provoke him into making premature use of his re-
of Cossack cavalry, The artillery had 1,439 guns, 226 of serves.
these being large-calibre ordnances. However, therc were Really decisive fighting commenced on the 27th of Feb-
only 52 machine-guns and there was also a serious shortage ruary when the J apanese 3rd Army began to encircle the
of communications equipment. Russian right wing in a manoeuvre covering a large area.
The reinforcements which arrived after a journey 01" Taken by surprise and incapable of organizing effective
several weeks on the Trans-Siberian railway were mostly counter-rneasures, the command of the Russian IInd Arrny
units of thirty-to forty-years old r eservists. Mindful of the withdrew its troops from the Shaho. It was only on the znd
approaching revolutionary crisis and not wishing to un- of March, when the Japanese cavalry frorn the orthwest
2O were alread y reported via Mukden, that Kuropatkin took was rendered ineffective by a subsequent shortage of arn-
a large number of units frorn the Ist Army in the centre and munition and by a violent winter sandstorm.
frorn the I11rd, which was involved in bitter fighting with . On the same day, the]apanese 5th Army broke through
cnemy Iorces, in order to reinforce with these troops the the front at the Hunho to the east of Mukden, when it be-
I1nd Army which in the meantime had occupied a pre- came evident that the Manchurian Arrny was threatened
pared line of defence 20 kilometres to the west ofMukden. by a pincer movement. In view of this critieal development.
However, the counter-attacks by numerically superior Kuropatkin immediately broke offthe battle and his armies
forces on the 6th of March were carried out in a scattered began to retreat already on the roth of March. Crowd-
manner and consequently did not achieve anything. Oya- ed into a corridor 10 kilometres wide and exposed to vio-
ma rapidly brought up reinforcements to support the wing lent] apanese artillery fire on both flanks, they fol!owed the
making the encircling movement to the wcst which had railway for several days, covered by the stubbornly resist-
been attacked. ing rearguard forces.
Since the weakened defensive capability of the Illrd On the 9th of March, ]apanese cavalry units entered
and Ist Armies was unable to throw back the] apanese at- Mukden and two days later the 3rd and the 5th Army
tack which had now been launched aJong the entire front, joined up to the north ofthe ity. However, only rearguard
Kuropatkin ordered his troops on the 7th of March to troops and stragglers fel! in to the hands of the] apanese, the
withdraw from the Shaho to the other side of the Hunho. main Russian forces being able to escape encirclement.
To remove the continuing pressure on Mukden, he assern- Since the three weeks of fighting under very severe winter
bled a large number of battalions from al! the army corps conditions had also exhausted the] apanese troops, Oyama
and with these forces on the curved right wing started a was unable to organize an effective pursuit of the enemy,
new counter-attack on the 9th ofMarch against the advanc- all his reserves having already been committed. Never-
ing Japanese 3rd Army. However, this counter-attack, too, theless, this was a notable] apanese victory against a nurner-

Japancsc infantry in action in the tronches at

Shaho. Documentary photo
ically superior enemy. The Manchurian Army left 92,000
dead, wounded and prisoners on the battlefield while the
victor lost 40,000 men.
The battle of Mukden illustrated the new dimensions in
warfare with massed armies: creeping barrages, trench po-
sitions behind barbed wire, battlefields covering a vast
area and fighting over a long period of time. In the Russo-
Japanese War, this type of warfare was not taken any
further since Oyama did not dare to attack the switch line
at Ch'ang-ch'un and Tokyo's Anglo-Saxon creditors were
beginning to become nervous. The czar's primary concern
wasto anticipate the revolution already shown to be immi-
nent by the sailors of the battle-cruiser "Potemkin" and
Russian infantry attacking in close lines of battle and without
covering tire. Painting by Fr ancois Roubaud (Ig07).
by the barricades of Lodz. Consequently, after the sinking
of his "Second Pacific Squadron" in the sea-battle of Tsu-
shima (on the 27th/28th of May), he hastily signed the
Peace of Portsmouth (USA) on 5 September Ig05, ending
the war in which J apan, by force of arms, was admitted to
the circle of the imperialist Great Powers.