International Relations and Diplomacy (ISSN2328-2134) Volume 7, Number 6,2019

International Relations
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Volume 7, Number 6, June 2019 (Serial Number 69)
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Zealand); ★Peter A. Mattsson (Swedish Defense College, Sweden);
★Constanze Bauer (Western Institute of Technology of ★Peter Simon Sapaty (National Academy of Sciences of
Taranaki, New Zealand); Ukraine, Ukraine);
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★Dimitris Tsarouhas (Bilkent University, Turkey); ★Satoru Nagao (Gakushuin University, Japan);
★Fatima Sadiqi (International Institute for Languages and ★Sanjay Singh (Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
Cultures, Morocco); University, India);
★Ghadah AlMurshidi (Michigan State University, USA); ★Shkumbin Misini (Public University, Kosovo);
★Guseletov Boris (Just World Institute, Russia); ★Sotiris Serbos (Democritus University of Thrace,Greece);
★Hanako Koyama (The University of Morioka, Japan); ★Stéphanie A. H. Bélanger (Royal Military College of
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The Editors wish to express their warm thanks to the people who have generously contributed to the
process of the peer review of articles submitted to International Relations and Diplomacy.
International Relations
and Diplomacy
Volume 7, Number 6, June 2019 (Serial Number 69)
Contents
Pacifist Concepts
Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts under the Second Abe Administration
from a Role Theory Perspective 245
Tatsuro Debroux
Cross-Strait Relations
Cross-Strait Relations―From the Sole China, Two Chinas and the Greater China 258
David J. Sarquis, Wei-Chiao Ying
Cultural Heritage
Cultural Heritage Confronting Climate Change 279

Từ Thị Loan
Tribal Policy in Iraq
Al-Maliki Tribal Policy and the Emergence of the New Shaykhs in Iraq 288
Haidar Reda
International Relations and Diplomacy, June 2019, Vol. 7, No. 06, 245-257
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.06.001
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts under the Second

Abe Administration from a Role Theory Perspective
Tatsuro Debroux
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain
This article examines a concept ‘pacifism’ described by Japanese prime minister and Liberal Democratic Party's
(LDP) president Abe Shinzo and the New Komei Party's (NKP) leader Yamaguchi Natsuo through a lens of role
theory to understand what roles they think Japan should play. First, how the concept 'pacifism' is used in statements
(speeches, interviews, and remarks on the press) of Abe, Yamaguchi and other related materials, which are assumed
to give a clue about their ideas of Japan's role in the world related to pacifism, is examined because this comparison
enables to expose accord and discord between them. Second, national role conception or NRC (an actor’s
subjective understanding of the country’s appropriate role in the world and the perception of domestic and foreign
expectations) about Japan's role and the worldview of each party is discussed in connection with the issue of the
revision of the Japanese Constitution which stipulates a general framework of Japan's foreign policy. The LDP aims
to play more proactive roles by revising the constitution and Abe dismisses the current constitution as it makes only
'one-country pacifism' possible. On the other hand, the NKP tries to maintain the constitution as it is to protect
traditional non-military pacifism.
Keywords: Foreign policy, Security, the Japanese Constitution, The Liberal Democratic Party, The New Komei
Party, Role theory
Introduction
This article attempts to clarify the difference in the concept of pacifism the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
to which prime minister Abe Shinzo belongs and the New Komei Party (NKP) have and how the latter affects
the former in policy-making by analyzing statements (speeches, interviews, and remarks on the press) by
political leaders of the two political parties. Although they have formed a coalition government since 1999
except for the Democratic Party of Japan’s ruling period (September 2009-December 2012), they have
expressed different viewpoints on pacifism concepts on numerous occasions. The LDP pursues pacifism
through amending the Japanese Constitution, namely Article 9, to expand the Self Defense Forces (SDF)’ roles
and through countering China by force. By contrast, the NKP opposes the revision of Article 9, which will lead
Japan to renounce its non-military pacifist stance, cornerstone of its foreign policy, since the end of the Second
World War. This difference between the two coalition parties disturbs Abe’s plan to amend the constitution
now regardless of the favorable situation for him where two-thirds seats (The Mainichi, 2016)1 in the House of
Tatsuro Debroux, Ph.D., law department, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain.
1
Achieving two-thirds majority votes in both chambers of the Diet is necessary to propose an amendment to the constitution.
Next, the majority of the total votes in a national referendum are required.
246 ANALYSIS OF TWO DIFFERENT PACIFIST CONCEPTS
Representatives and the House of Councilors in the Diet were occupied by pro-revision camp composed of the
LDP, the NKP (The Japan Times, 2016)2, and the Osaka Restoration Party for the first time as a result of the
House of Councilors election in July 2016. Abe wants to revise Article 9 to facilitate the use of the defense
capability and to deepen security ties with the United States (US) and other like-minded countries to counter
perceived threats came from China and North Korea but he cannot complete this task because the NKP hinders
it. The NKP is not against the amendment to the constitution itself or the existence of the SDF but the party is
based on the Buddhist group named the Soka Gakkai (literally “Value Creating Society”) which supports
non-military pacifism. Therefore, the impact on role formulation by the NKP cannot be ignored. As some
researchers already indicate (Sakaki, 2015; Fisker-Nielsen, 2016; Akimoto, 2016), it can be said that the NKP
is not just a junior coalition partner of the LDP but rather has largely taken the initiative in the debate of the
amendment to the constitution and the security policies during the second Abe administration. To make this
view more persuasive, it is necessary to consider in detail what the NKP has expected of the Abe government
and how the latter has reacted. In this line of thought, this article explains the interactive process between the
two parties by role theory as a theoretical framework in answering the question “how different notions do the
LDP and the NKP have about Japan’s pacifism?”.
Role Theory
Role theory originates from social psychology and sociology. The evolving intersubjective process
between a decision-maker and others shapes National Role Conception (NRC), which can be defined as such:
A national role conception includes the policy-makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions,
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a
continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. (Holsti, 1970, p. 245-246)
NRC consists not only of this ego-part but also of alter-part referring to expectations held by external
actors (Le Prestre, 1997) and both affect formation of NRCs to generate specific role performances. In other
words, decision-makers have to accommodate demands of both domestic and international actors and this
social interaction (including confrontation) can induce role changes. If they fail in accommodating different
roles, it will cause role conflict. It can be assumed that now Japan has had two main non-partisan NRCs in the
postwar period: reliable security partner of the US and like-minded countries and non-military pacifist country.
Biddle (1986, p. 82) defines role conflict as the “concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible
expectations for the behavior of a [state]”. Sakaki (2011, p. 31) distinguishes two main types of role conflicts:
ego/alter role conflict when there is a divergence between ego-part and alter-part about a role conception and
“endogenous role conflict” where the decision-maker faces different expectations of a role concept that are
incompatible or extremely difficult to reconcile within the ego-part. If a compromise can be found, both role
conflicts can be avoided. In this article, Japan is supposed to be a pluralist state in which ego-part consists not
only of the Japanese government but also of the NKP to emphasize that the decision-maker has to find a
meeting ground with important domestic actors. The interaction between the Abe administration and the NKP
is interesting to observe because the two parties have different views on what Japan should do in the world and
how roles should be played and thus it is possible that Abe’s NRCs are incompatible with the NKP’s ones.
2
The NKP argued to add clauses on the people’s privacy and right to a healthy environment to the constitution (The Japan Times,
2016).
ANALYSIS OF TWO DIFFERENT PACIFIST CONCEPTS 247
The Abe Administration’s NRC

The LDP has advocated the amendment to the constitution drafted in 1946 under the US occupation era
since 1955 when the political party was established. Abe is in this line of thought as he states that
“constitutional revision has been among the fundamental thinking underlying the policies of the LDP ever since
the party was founded” (Abe, 2017). He thinks that the constitution drafted by the Occupied Forces was
unilateral and also does not suit the current era. As seen above he is especially averse to Article 9 of the
Japanese Constitution in which it is stipulated that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” (The Prime Minister of
Japan and His Cabinet, 1946), putting strong constraints on Japan’s security activity regardless of the fact that
Japan is a member of the United Nations (UN) who has the right to both individual and collective self-defense
as explicitly stated in Article 51 of the UN Convention. Also, the Supreme Court has not judged the SDF’s
constitutionality yet. Abe’s viewpoint is that such constraint deprives Japan of a fundamental right of an
independent country. Abe’s desire to change the 2nd clause of Article 9 is clear in the LDP’s draft of its new
constitution in April 2012 (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016) in which Article 9 explicitly clarifies that the constitution
does not prevent Japan from having a right to “self-defense” including collective self-defense in the name of
“peace and security of international society”, by “National Defense Forces” (Liberal Democratic Constitutional
Reform Promotion Headquarters, 2012). The 2012 draft indicates that the new forces can theoretically
participate in combats around the world with the US, Japan’s ally, unless the Diet disallows the activity. During
a snap election in December 2014, he reconfirmed his intention to revise the constitution and erase the military
restrictions (Carr & Wallis, 2016).
Leaders’ images of the appropriate direction or functions of their country in the world are included in
NRC (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246). As such, it is assumed that Japan’s contribution must be reinforced by
making laws and building institutions. Abe’s desire of the enactment of the law allowing the exercise of
collective self-defense reflects his concern that the country’s continued self-imposed ban on exercising its right
to collective self-defense will adversely affect the Japan-US alliance. In the present state of affairs, for example,
coming to the aid of an ally under attack is considered beyond the “minimum necessary” use of force permitted
by the conventional interpretation of the pacifist constitution. Therefore, the second Abe administration focuses
on reinforcing the role of a reliable security ally. Feeling the duty to perform the role, Abe expressed his
dissatisfaction with the current situation. He clearly states that he does not aim to follow traditional pacifism,
criticizing it as the “one-country pacifism” because of its inward-looking focus on Japan’s peace and security
(Abe, 2014a). He perceives a need to make Japanese pacifism more proactive, which does not avoid
involvement in armed conflicts under any circumstances.
This NRC requires the reinforcement of relations with the US. To do so, the removal of the geographic
limitations of the SDF activities and the enlargement of their activities are important. Abe stresses his desire to
utilize the new security-related laws as seen below to carve out more proactive roles for Japan, in the
“Asia-Pacific and beyond” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Abe’s statements emphasize the US presence as
a deterrent to stabilize the Asia-Pacific region and express doubt about the effectiveness of an exclusively
defensive security policy. The strict ban on overseas deployment of the SDF is a source of tension with the US,
which could lead to loss of trust from the US. Taking up a case where the Japanese refugees who fled a conflict
were rescued by the US in international waters near Japan, Abe questioned current constitutional interpretation:
“Even in such cases, unless the Japanese nationals themselves were attacked, the Japan Self-Defense Forces
(JSDF) could not defend the U.S. vessels transporting the Japanese nationals” (Abe, 2014b).
Abe reinterpreted Japan’s constitution to allow for collective self-defense in July 2014 by the cabinet
decision to have Japan play a more active role mainly with the US. His statements highlight the necessity for
Japan to share the security burden if Japan desires to be regarded as a reliable security partner in the region and
the world. Abe expects that changing a decades-old interpretation of the constitution has a huge implication for
Japan’s foreign policy as a whole, regionally and globally, either inside the Japan-US alliance or outside it.
However, the main reason for Abe’s desire of the US presence in East Asia derives from his doubt of
non-military pacifist NRC because the international security-related climate is deteriorating resulting from the
rise of China (Abe, 2014c). From the beginning of the Abe administration, it has maintained the idea that China,
which has increased its defense expenditures annually by more than 10 percent since 1989, is a threat and Japan
has to strengthen the defense capability to deter China (Abe, 2013). In addition to suggest a plan to station
official workers in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea for which Japan and China claimed the
territorial right just before he became a prime minister in December 2012 (The Japan Times, 2012), Abe
decided to launch an earnest defense buildup program, with particular weight given to the Nansei Islands,
which form a chain of islands from Kyushu to Taiwan. Abe showed his determination “to defend fully people’s
lives, our territory, and our beautiful ocean” (Abe, 2012) and this determination is motivated by his sense of
danger that “the security of Japan is not someone else’s problem; it is a crisis that exists right there and now”
(Abe, 2012). His statements also revealed that deterrents such as the Japan Coast Guard and the SDF play
important roles. As a consequence, to counterbalance China’s increasing relative power, the second Abe
administration increased Japan’s defense budget in 2013, for the first time in more than a decade and it reached
the largest amount in the postwar period in 2015 and 2016 (Hughes, 2017). Abe (2012) also proposed the idea
of the “Democratic Security Diamond” related to his China policy. The objective is to form a diamond among
Japan, Australia, India, and Hawaii (the US) to cope with China.
Perception of the threat to Japan’s security and the willingness to cope with it appear in Abe’s statements
related to the reliable security partner NRC. His determination to play the role was reflected in his speech to the
US Congress during his visit to the US about security-related laws:
In Japan we are working hard to enhance the legislative foundations for our security. [...] These enhanced legislative
foundations should make the cooperation between the U.S. military and Japan’s Self Defense Forces even stronger, and the
alliance still more solid, providing credible deterrence for the peace in the region. This reform is the first of its kind and a
sweeping one in our postwar history. We will achieve this by this coming summer. (Abe, 2015a)
His willingness to expand and clarify Japan’s security roles led to the enactment of the subsequent bundle
of laws. Abe legislated security-related laws in the Diet in September 2015 and they took effect in March 2016.
The Diet revised 10 security-related laws (Akimoto, 2016, p. 143)3, the most significant ones being the
following: The Law on Response to Contingencies enables Japan to exercise collective self-defense under
certain conditions explained below; the Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan,
3
(1) Self-Defense Forces Law (SDF Law), (2) International Peace Cooperation Law or UN Peacekeeping Operations
Cooperation Act (PKO Law), (3) Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas
Surrounding Japan, (4) Ship Inspection Operations Law, (5) Legislation for Responses to Armed Attack Situations, (6) Act on
Measures Conducted by the Government in Line With U.S. Military Actions in Armed Attack Situations, (7) Law Concerning the
Use of Specific Public Facilities, (8) Marine Transport Restriction Act, (9) Prisoner Treatment Act, and (10) National Security
Council (NSC) Establishment Act.
which replaced the 1999 Regional Contingencies Law, was intended to strengthen the SDF’s backup support
for the US and other partner countries outside combat zones; the International Peace Support Law eliminates
the need for Japan to enact separate laws for each SDF dispatch providing logistical support to foreign forces in
UN-authorized missions, and the revised PKO Law allows the SDF to use weapon besides the defense of SDF
personnel, for instance to protect other civilians and the UN personnel. In addition, the law enables the dispatch
of the SDF not only in Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) but also in other international peace cooperation
activities (Hughes, 2016, p. 143; Akimoto, 2016, p. 143). The revision of PKO-related laws means Abe’s desire
of peace keeping activities with countries other than the US worldwide under the UN framework as he said in
the North Atlantic Council:
First, Japan enacted a series of Peace and Security legislations. Our International Peace Cooperation Act was revised
to allow Japanese Peace Cooperation personnel to adapt to diversifying U.N. PKOs, thus broadening the range of activities
in which Japan could participate. Under this new legal framework, Japan can and will further expand its contributions to
U.N. PKOs. (Abe, 2015b)
However, the revised PKO law retains five PKO principles4. If fighting were to break out, the SDF would
have to halt their activities and withdraw. The laws thus deny participation in activities involving the use of
force and would still not authorize the dispatch in situations such as the Vietnam War and the 2001 Afghanistan
War even at the request of the US (Akimoto, 2016, pp. 156-157).
Overall, Abe’s NRCs reveal that the need for a transformation of the concept of pacifism is present in
Abe’s mind, both in the Japan-US alliance and in the UN PKO. Abe seeks to build up the image of Japan
considered influential in the world and not bound to the constitution drafted about 70 years ago.
Once again, however, the ultimatum objective of expansion of the SDF’s activity is for Japan to survive in
a changed security environment where China is becoming a threat more than ever. This stance is exemplified in
the following speech in which Abe claims:
I perceive that precisely by having the ability to respond to every possible situation and developing legal system
which enables such responses, deterrence will be enhanced, and thus conflict will be prevented and Japan’s embroilment in
war will be eliminated. (Abe, 2014b)
Thus, it is clear that Abe’s conception of pacifism does not adhere to the non-military principle and can
justify the use of force if necessary.
The NKP’s NRCs and the Implication

The NKP presents itself as the defender of traditional pacifism representing those in the population who
are reluctant to accept the stance of Abe’s security policy (Pugliese, 2015, p. 107). The NKP influences the
administration’s foreign policy not to deviate from postwar pacifism because if the NKP leaves the ruling
coalition, the LDP will lose the important electoral support from the Soka Gakkai (Yakushiji, 2014). The
analysis related to the NKP focuses on the statements of Yamaguchi Natsuo, its Chief Representative since
September 2009. As exemplified by his following declaration, the NKP seeks to maintain the constitution based
on the concept of the defense-only policy: “The constitution only allows the exercise of the minimum necessary
force for self-defense” (Yamaguchi, 2012). Yamaguchi shared with the Abe administration the conviction that
the security environment Japan faces is “becoming increasingly challenging” because of North Korea’s missile
4
See the website of Cabinet Office: http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/faq/faq.html.
development. He agreed with the notion that deterrent by security-related laws gives “material weight to
Japan’s peace diplomacy, serving to drive it forward” (Yamaguchi, 2015). However, the NKP has consistently
demanded that Japanese international contribution be based on non-military means as the past governments did.
The following comment of Yamaguchi indicates: “We stand firm on the point that we should conduct
international coordination, cooperation and contribution, while giving heed to the successive governments’
basic policy”. He went on to say,
the governments have held a stance that the spirit of the constitution is that Japan does not use force overseas. The
SDF has been used for humanitarian aid or disaster relief. Any attempts or consideration should be the extension of that
stance and within that boundary. (Yamaguchi, 2013a)
In other words, the NKP neither intends to ignore international needs nor adhere to “one-country pacifism” but
tries to respond to them as much as possible in the framework of the existing constitutional restraint. The
reason is to alleviate the concern of neighboring countries, suffering from Japan’s invasion and colonization.
As for the exercise of collective self-defense right, the NKP succeeded in imposing limitations on the
government’s initiatives to protect role conception of non-militarist Japan. The SDF’s use of force is still
contested and it has not been correctly implemented yet. In the case of the adoption of the new interpretation of
collective self-defense in July 2014, the NKP compromised with the LDP on the reinterpretation after a tough
debate between the two parties (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016) even though Yamaguchi opposed the reinterpretation,
saying: “If we suddenly change the interpretation, it would harm the domestic and international trust which
Japan has forged over the years” (Yamaguchi, 2013b). At first glance, it seems that the Abe government
overcame the opposition of the NKP, but it braked the exercise of collective self-defense to firmly maintain the
role of Japanese forces focused exclusively on the defense of Japan. In fact, Abe had to stress after the
reinterpretation that collective self-defense cannot yet be exercised to defend another country. This is the
outcome of the NKP’s proscription after consultations with the LDP. After the cabinet decision, Yamaguchi
indicated how he was proud of his success in preventing Abe from deviating from previous administrations in
terms of the interpretation of Article 9 at the NKP convention in Kumamoto prefecture (Yamaguchi, 2014a).
Abe’s response to the interrogation in the Diet concerning the potential change of interpretation of Article 9 is
formulated as such:
The measures that the Constitution of Japan permits are only self-defense measures for the purpose of ensuring
Japan’s survival and protecting its people. Japan will continue not to engage in the use of force for the purpose of
defending foreign countries. (Abe, 2014d)
Likewise, collective self-defense stipulated in security-related laws legislated in September 2015 was
limited to help a country with close ties to Japan against which armed aggression was directed and when it
results in a threat to “Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life,
liberty and pursuit of happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In this interpretation, collective
self-defense is thus limited to the situation in which Japan and Japanese people are under direct threat. In
addition, the right can only be used after it is clear that no other means are available to respond to it (Sakaki,
2015, p. 18; Nakanishi, 2015, p. 413).
Regarding that the laws also stipulated the deployment of the SDF overseas to support multinational forces,
either inside and outside PKO without making a special law each time, Yamaguchi assured in an interview with
the party organ newspaper Komei Shimbun that in addition to five PKO principles, the SDF could only be sent
overseas if their deployment was justified “under international law” and the dispatch will only be “validated
through a UN resolution” with “prior Diet authorization” every time. Yamaguchi emphasized the safety of SDF
personnel as he said:
The support activities of Japanese forces must remain separate and distinct from multinational troops engaged in the
use of force as that would be unconstitutional, which is why the former will not be permitted to operate in areas in which
fighting is currently taking place. (Yamaguchi, 2015)
The NKP is not rigidly ideological or insular. Rather, it helped the government establish a legal base for
the SDF to be able to provide logistic support, or reconstruction and humanitarian support under the
constitutional framework in the world other than the place where there are combat activities so that the
principle of an exclusively defense-oriented security policy remains intact. Similarly, with respect to the
government’s decision to ease previous restrictions on weapon exports to facilitate joint weapons development
with the US and like-minded countries, the NKP demanded a fixed limit on the policy by ensuring transparency
with an annual report which contained information about what kind of defense equipment was approved for
exporting (Komeito, 2014a). Yamaguchi questioned the government in the Diet in March 2014 about the
revision of the three principles of arms exports when he declared that:
I want the government to uphold the ideal of a peace-loving nation and make a fixed limit on the exports so that it will
not be unrestricted. [...] I also want the government to consider providing structures such as making decision-making
mechanism for [arms export] to serve to decide and explain its security policy transparency. (Yamaguchi, 2014b)
As is the case with collective self-defense, it can be said that the NKP’s demand was consistently taken
into account as Abe promised in his speech that the defense equipment Japan would export was not for war but
for non-military purposes, such as “rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping” under
scrutiny (Abe, 2014e). This is the same in the case of the state secrecy law enacted in November 2013, which
aims to prevent leakage of information related to diplomacy, defense, and anti-terrorism with a strengthened
penalty, targeting official workers, academics, journalists, or others (Maslow, 2016, pp. 200-201). While Abe
said in the LDP’s party convention in January 2014 that
important secrets should be safeguarded to protect the people from terrorists and spies. This is a common sense in the
world. Due to this law, more and more necessary and important information to protect the people’s life would enter Japan.
(Abe, 2014f)
The NKP insisted that the “right to know” and “freedom of press” be stipulated in the law and journalists
should be removed from target of penalty in principle and then this opinion was approved (Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, 2013). In addition to providing that they are considered enough, the Abe government also
acknowledged the need to establish a standing Information Monitoring Assessment Committee in the Diet
which too the NKP demanded to put information under democratic scrutiny so that the Japanese are
well-informed (Komeito, 2014b).
As for the constitutional amendment, there is scarcely any consensus between the two parties as to which
part of the constitution needs to be revised and how to proceed with it. The NKP is open to discuss
constitutional changes and is even thinking they are necessary such as adding clauses on the people’s privacy
and right to a healthy environment. However, changes should not depart from the stance that Japan is a pacifist
country based on non-militarism (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016). The NKP opposes any amendment to the constitution
which allows collective self-defense, which will lead to dilute war-renouncing aspect of Article 9. Yamaguchi
warned against the LDP’s move, hinting at the dissolution of the coalition: “The Constitution is an extremely
important law of the state. In discussions of this issue, the future of the coalition government should be taken
into account” (Yamaguchi, 2013c).
Instead, the NKP argues for Kaken (literally adding new elements to the constitution) to Article 9. This is
the position defended by the party as it appears in Yamaguchi’s interview: “70 years has passed since the
constitution was enacted. If there is appropriate value in a new constitution, I believe an approach of adding
onto existing provisions is valid”, asking Abe to leave the current clauses of Article 9. Also, Yamaguchi argued
for vigorous debate in both houses of parliament on the constitutional amendment as he said
a [constitutional amendment] is not something that the Diet can achieve as it pleases by simply garnering two-thirds
of votes in the upper and lower houses. […] In the Diet, the main opposition party and others have to be included in
widespread agreement… (Yamaguchi, 2017a)
While Abe perceives amending Article 9 of primary importance, Yamaguchi believes it is not a priority
because the public opinion has not evolved to the point of readily accepting a revision of the constitution that
will weaken non-military pacifist country NRC. Yamaguchi said in an interview with Reuters that “what is vital
is to make sincere efforts to respond steadily to the people’s expectations”, recalling the LDP and the NKP lost
power from 2009 to 2012. He also said “people are not calling for a change in the constitution as something
that hinders their livelihoods” (Yamaguchi, 2017b). In other words, Yamaguchi wants Abe to notice that the
constituents are chiefly interested in issues that affect their daily life, not with nationalism or security.
Considering the difficulty to meet the requirement of the amendment and the strong aversion within the
Japanese public against changing the constitution, especially Article 9, the NKP believes it is tough to do so.
As Abe is aware that adherence to the amendment will cause role conflict with the NKP over the reliable
security partner and non-military pacifism NRCs, he tones down his push for constitutional revisions. He
expects it will be a laborious and politically risky task to convince the NKP given the possibility of the
dissolution of the coalition. Thus, Abe acknowledged the importance of the debate across the parties and
decided to adopt the NKP’s idea of Kaken, which is unlikely to expand the SDF’s scope of operation. He does
not explicitly say the LDP dropped its 2012 draft altogether but he virtually sealed it. Abe changed his
objective from revising Article 9 just to add new sentences or clause which stipulates the existence of the SDF
to end the long-time debate whether the SDF is constitutional or not. His stance is revealed in the following
quotations:
Gaining a two-thirds approval in both houses of the Diet is in itself not so easy to begin with, and not achieved
without difficulty. First of all, I want to prioritize consideration of the contents so that the LDP proposal becomes one
regarding which we can hold constructive discussions that transcend the lines between the ruling and opposition parties.
(Abe, 2017)
Arranging an environment where all SDF personnel can fulfill their duties with strong pride is the responsibility of
politicians living in the present […] I am determined to fully carry out my duty. (Abe, 2018)
Exclusively defensive security policy was maintained until the end of 2018. The LDP wanted to draw up
new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPGs) for 2019 and beyond which included a variety of ideas for
example the SDF’s acquisition of capability to attack enemy bases (Asahi Shimbun, 2018) but the NKP
consistently questioned the necessity of it (Komeito, 2013). The NKP continued to emphasize exclusively
defensive security policy to ensure that Japan would not wage war again (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016) and the
position is respected well by the Abe administration. Finally the capability was not be included in the NDPGs.
Abe shows that he does not intend to put into question Japan’s pacifism. Its role performance is based on
security-related laws that do not send the SDF abroad to exercise collective self-defense and that maintains the
five PKO principles. Abe also accepted not to proceed with his original intention of an amendment to the
constitution. Therefore, it can be said that his role performance is generally consistent with conventional
non-military pacifist country role conception.
As for the relations with China too, there is a schism between the LDP and the NKP. While Abe does not
hide its sense of danger, it is not shared by the NKP. Also, while Yamaguchi understands the importance of the
US in security terms, he does not show enthusiasm in forming a security coalition with the US, Australia, and
India to deter China. He may think that the idea of China’s threat and the containment will adversely affect
Japan-China relations. Instead, he has consistently argued the importance of top-level meetings between
Japanese and Chinese political leaders to defuse strained regional environment since the beginning of the
second Abe administration (BBC, 2013; The Japan Times, 2018). It does not mean that the NKP lacks concern
about China’s maritime expansion but it argues that dialogue and communication should be given preference
over deterrent to avoid any contingencies resulting from distrust and miscommunication. The NKP expected
Abe to implement a foreign policy which could convince China that he would not fundamentally change
Japan’s pacifist NRC. For example, Yamaguchi does not support to strengthen control over the Senkaku Islands
not to incur China’s distrust. He was opposed to Abe’s campaign pledge in the December 2012 general election
to dispatch Japanese official workers in the islands. His viewpoint on this issue that the territorial dispute
should be handled carefully appears clearly in his declaration in a meeting held in the US: “Having Japanese
government employees stationed on the Senkaku Islands for the moment is not something we think that we
ought to do” (Yamaguchi, 2013d). Yamaguchi suggested shelving the Senkaku issue for a while to leave the
solution to a future generation (Yamaguchi, 2013e). This viewpoint is close to the tacit agreement allegedly
concluded in the process of the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972 (Hosaka & Togo, 2012). In this
line of thought, Abe postponed the implementation to station official workers in the islands indefinitely,
shelving the territorial dispute as the NKP demanded.
Yamaguchi suggested the creation of a “crisis management system” to avert a maritime clash between
Japan and China over the islands and argued that the two countries should cooperate in fields where they can
agree, for example on something such as an environmental issue, to build trust (Yamaguchi, 2013d). In this
way, Yamaguchi suggested solutions for regional issues related to China by building trust, not
counterbalancing. This kind of mechanism was adopted in May 2018 when Abe and Chinese prime minister
Li Keqiang agreed to establish a mechanism for their naval vessels to communicate at sea to avert maritime
incidents, to establish a hotline between both countries’ defense authorities and to hold regular meetings
between their defense officials every year although it did not cover the territorial waters around the Senkakus
(Reuters, 2018). Thus, so far, it can be said Abe acknowledges the NKP’s expectation and considers these
points in his foreign policy. Pressure from the ego-part NKP to strictly adhere to a dialogue prevents Abe from
escalating military tension with China. Despite Abe’s concern for China’s increasing military presence, his
behaviors reflected the NKP’s preference to promote dialogue and communication.
Conclusion
This research reveals that regarding the Abe administration’s and the NKP’s statements and role
performances, there is consistency between the set of Japan’s roles that Abe intends to fulfill and the
expectations of the NKP. The NKP is critically important to Japanese security policy direction. Abe makes
utmost efforts to downplay the worries and to persuade the NKP that his initiatives do not mean that Japan will
adopt aggressive policies. The Abe administration-NKP relationship in the ruling coalition reveals that political
leaders’ roles can show inconsistencies not only with those of powerful alter-parts like the US and China but
also within the ego-part. Due to the NKP, the issue on the amendment to the constitution was narrowed down to
Kaken and the SDF’s military activity is still severely limited because any dramatic moves in the direction of
militarization faced strong opposition that will jeopardize the existence of the coalition. So far, the NKP
influences Abe’s foreign policy by encouraging some policies and discouraging others. Since it is difficult to
get the NKP to agree on the expansion of the SDF, he had to accept to implement a security policy with various
constraints. The NKP succeeded in putting a brake on the government’s creation of a fait accompli now and in
the future by specifying what it can and cannot do in new laws. The principle that the SDF’s activity is only for
Japan’s defense remains in place.
The analysis of the statements of the NKP reveals that there was role conflict within the coalition
government and the NKP overwhelmed the LDP in it. Abe’s role performance to respect existing norms and
values in the Japanese Constitution is consistent with the NKP’s expectations to a considerable degree. He tries
to change Japan’s NRC by causing as little role inconsistency as possible because he is aware that disregarding
the NKP’s demands could lead to role conflict that could end the coalition government. This led Abe to
continually reiterate that he puts importance on the exclusively defensive security policy, civilian control,
non-military international contribution and diplomacy in his foreign policy.
The analysis of statements proves that the two parties have quite a different view of Japan’s reliable
security partner and pacifism-related NRCs. The NKP agrees on the necessity of increasing international
contribution with the US and like-minded countries but not to the extent to use force beyond individual
self-defense. The NKP’s pacifism imposes more various constraints on the government than the LDP’s
pacifism. As a result, Abe is unlikely to revise the constitution in the direction of the 2012 draft during his
office term. His initiative ended up just adding a few new elements to the constitution which the NKP had
supported.
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doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.06.002
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Cross-Strait Relations―From the Sole China, Two Chinas and

the Greater China
David J. Sarquis
Universidad del Mar (UMAR), Huatulco, Mexico
Wei-Chiao Ying
Tecnológico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico

This article analyses the bilateral relations across the Taiwan Straits, between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the Republic of China (ROC) tracing developments from the end of WWII to date, considering the dispute over
the legitimacy of the representation of the Chinese people as a whole. We attempt to draw a thorough picture of
how relations between the “two Chinas” evolved in the historical frame of the Cold War and the post-Cold War
period, in order to suggest the prospective for the near future. We conclude that the concept of the Greater China is
no longer restricted to the economic/commercial sphere but it can also be extended to all aspects of life in the
Chinese-speaking region. While the competition between the two Chinas remains tough, thanks to the characteristic
notion of “harmony but not uniformity” of the Chinese identity, the door to a peaceful reunification is open.
Keywords: Taiwan Straits, One-China Policy, the Greater China, Chinese identity
Introduction
When people talk about China today, in different parts of the world, most bring to mind almost instantly
the big giant that is emerging as a world power in the 21th century: the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The
“World Factory”, they say, although the fact is that many major multinational enterprises, which have invested
in China for decades since the 1978 economic reforms, is now even more interested in increasing the
opportunities to boost their sales in the Chinese massive domestic market. They have proposed ambitious plans
to expand in the PRC, considering the high sales figures and market opportunities they are bound to find once
established there. In order to achieve their goals in the PRC, companies like IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft have
complied with the Cybersecurity Law by forming partnerships with local companies to offer cloud computing
services based in the PRC and Apple has even gone one step further by announcing its plans to open a new data
center over there. No doubt, the PRC is being transformed from a manufacturing base to a consumer society
that is becoming as attractive as any major developed economy in the West, perhaps even more. Thus, China
has become a very attractive pole of development that the rest of the world is watching carefully, some with
more fear than hope.
David J. Sarquis, Ph.D. in International Relations, professor at the Institute of International Studies “Isidro Fabela”,
Universidad del Mar (UMAR), Huatulco, Mexico.
Wei-Chiao Ying, Ph.D. candidate, B.A. in Business Management, Graduate School of Social Science and Humanities,
Tecnológico de Monterrey, Campus Monterrey, Mexico.
FROM THE SOLE CHINA, TWO CHINAS AND THE GREATER CHINA 259
Given the fact that when multinational corporations outline their investment and marketing strategies in
China, they set up a “Greater China” headquarter instead of focusing exclusively in mainland China, the
following question is raised: Why the “Greater China” is an economic reality, but has struggled to become a
political reality in the PRC-ROC case? In this article, we recognize this as our main research question and in
order to provide an answer, we look at:
(a) How and why Taiwan became internationally recognized as the legitimate representative of all China
(until it was expelled from the UN in October 1971 in accordance with UN resolution 2758 of the General
Assembly). This can be, at least in part explained by the general conditions of the Cold War.
(b) How the communist in mainland and the nationalists in Taiwan developed a sense of separate
identities.
(c) At the end of the Cold War, we had two political entities that felt alienated from each other, but were
struggling for the same cause: True representability of the Chinese people.
(d) The new globalized order allowed for the development of an economic link between the “two Chinas”,
even though, the political question was still unresolved.
(e) This was important because, if the economic links grew strong, in the mid-term, a political answer
could also arise, given the mutual benefits of economic and cultural links based on the principle of “harmony
but not uniformity”.
We conclude that the emergence of two Chinas was more of a historical contingency aggravated by the
Cold War, than a natural occurrence in the process of configuration of the regional scenario of South-East Asia
following the Westphalian model of national states, thus a solution to this problem might be envisioned from
the perspective of the growth and consolidation of the Greater China in economic and cultural terms, which can
make a political solution more palatable to the parties involved.
China as a Civilization State

The Chinese have fought hard to earn their place in the Westphalian system of international relations,
which they entered forcefully during the 19th century. They came from a long-term tradition of political
organization, noticeably different from the European model of national states. They were better understood as a
“civilization-state” (Pye, 1990; Jacques, 2011) but under the influence of the European powers, they had to
adapt to the conditions of the Eurocentric model, and almost 200 years later, they now emerge as a rising world
power, not necessarily in the same European tradition under which they joined the international system
originally almost two centuries ago. This is not a minor achievement. China was almost fragmented to pieces
during the process of absorption into the Westphalian system. Nevertheless, the Chinese managed to survive
and successfully learned the game of politics Western style, which they are now playing at an advantage,
supported by the everlasting nature of a civilization state. More than two decades ago, this nature was
interpreted as a disadvantage for China; one that led to frustration in the transition to a modern nation state, as
Pye (1990) put it straight forward: “China is a civilization pretending to be a state”. Today, China has proved to
be a “civilizational state”, a hybrid of nation-state and civilization-state (Zhang, 2016), which conducts a grand
experiment on its own path to adapt to a nation-state while maintaining its own characteristics as a civilization.
A civilization, as we see, is determined by common social practices and values amongst groups of people of
different ethnic backgrounds, language, or creed, without the need of a political structure to bind them together.
It is not necessarily limited by national borders, but by common beliefs and it extends in time as long as those
260 FROM THE SOLE CHINA, TWO CHINAS AND THE GREATER CHINA
beliefs play a role in shaping the identity of the people committed to them. Christendom or the Muslim Umma
of the Middle Ages might be good examples. A civilization-state develops its own political structure, but it is
not necessarily the same as the characteristic structure of the national state, in the case of China:
The state is seen as the embodiment, guardian and defender of Chinese civilization. Maintaining the unity, cohesion
and integrity of Chinese civilization―of the civilization-state―is perceived as the highest political priority and is seen as
the sacrosanct task of the Chinese state. Unlike in the West, where the state is viewed with varying degrees of suspicion,
even hostility, and is regarded, as a consequence, as an outsider, in China the state is seen as an intimate, as part of the
family, indeed as the head of the family; interestingly, in this context, the Chinese term for nation-state is “nation-family”.
(Jacques, 2011)
The status quo of the relations between Taiwan Strait is a strong reflection of what it means to be a
“civilizational state”. The original and provisional settlement based on the 1992 Consensus and the endurance
of the Chinese identity in the context of a Greater China stands for that.
The notion of a Greater China as proposed in this paper goes beyond the basics of regionalization theory,
because we are not looking at an integration process solely based on convenient characteristics to optimize the
use of resources or benefit the most from geographic conditions or the use of existing infrastructure; not even
the advantages of complimentary scale economies. We find the term “region” rather ambiguous in that regard,
even though it has been widely used in different disciplines (Claval, 1987), such as geography, anthropology,
sociology, economy, or international relations, where a host of different authors suggest what they consider to
be the proper use of the term, from their own perspective. Even though there might be some solid arguments to
speak of the Greater China from the perspective of regionalization, we believe the main argument for such
concept derives from the notion of a civilizational rather than a national state. So, in spite of the advantages that
regionalization theory might offer in this case, we believe it falls short from the idea of a civilization to
integrate a group of people and the geographical space they share.
Before becoming the target of systematic concerns, regional studies sought, above all, to identify specificities,
curiosities and descriptions of the most different parts of the globe (Claval, 1974). From the mid-eighteenth century several
forms of description, classification and analysis techniques have been created without the intention to develop a more
“scientific” point of view about the term region. These concerns have become more common in the early twentieth century,
when the systematization of a “regional geography” began to take its first steps, both in Europe and in the United States
(Whitlessey, 1954); three were the main authors who developed the first theoretical definitions on the regional
phenomenon: Alfred Hettner, in Germany, Vidal de la Blache, in France, and A. J. Herbertson, in Great Britain (Duarte,
1980). Organized by Betioli Contel (2015).
As we can see, regionalization theory can be used both to justify the integration of an area according to
different criteria, and to fragment it, so, for example, some authors believe the U.S. can be culturally divide in a
dozen or so different regions. A civilization, from our point of view, is more a matter of values and principles
underlying socio-political behavior, and this is what we have in mind when talking about the Greater China.
The Sole Legitimate Representative of All China

China is currently becoming a leading power in the game of international politics and it is offering to
reestablish the rules of international order. However, it still has to overcome the challenges of reunification of a
single Chinese national state (Western style) because the PRC is not the only political entity claiming to be
China in the world today. As Hung and Kuo (2010) state:
The path along which the Qing Empire transformed into the People’s Republic of China as a modern nation-state is
perhaps the most peculiar in the world history of nation formation. While most other multinational world-empires, such as
the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, disintegrated into multiple relatively homogenous nation-states in their transition to
modernity, China managed to transform nearly all of its imperial territory into a singular nation-state despite the cultural
and ethnic heterogeneity of this geographical space. (Hung and Kuo, 2010, pp. 317-318)
By “nearly all of its imperial territory”, the two authors refer to the fact that the sole China split into two
different political entities when the Chinese civil war ended in 1949. The legendary Mao Zedong founded the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 after winning a long devastating civil war, and the Republic of
China (ROC) founded since 1912 by the national martyr Sun Yat-Sen after imperial China collapsed. The
nationalist government that ruled ROC under Chiang Kai Shek retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war,
and established itself there ever since, giving birth to the idea of “two Chinas”. The split entertained the
interests of the two world powers much more than those of the Chinese people.
ROC as the representative of the Free China, occupied the seat of the Chinese at the UN Security Council
for over two decades, and thus supposedly represented the Chinese people as a whole, since they did not
recognize the communists as a legitimate government. After political maneuvering on behalf of American
interests, the UN accepted the PRC as a member in 1971 and replaced ROC as a permanent member in the
Security Council. Chinese interests, on the whole were clearly viewed under the light of superpower interests.
On one hand, recognition by the UN was a milestone for the PRC, although most of its citizens did not
realize the importance of the change of role due to the traumatic Cultural Revolution, which lasted until 1976
when Mao died. It was also a breakthrough in the sense that it marked a major change of the world scenario
captured in frame of the Cold War. The division between the Communist World and the Free World was no
longer definite, since the great powers of the Free World granted their recognition to Communist China as the
sole legal representative of all China. On the other hand, the two-decade long fiction of Taiwan representing all
China officially broke, the ROC mourned as people there felt they had been abandoned by the international
community, but it was also a turning point for the youngsters in Taiwan to start questioning about their Chinese
identity, even though up to date the name of the country remains Republic of China and the legal fiction of
separate statehood remains a topic of debate.
The Merger of a Greater China

In the Chinese language, the modern usage of the concept the Greater China first appeared in a Taiwanese
journal in 1979. It advocated the creation of a “Chinese Common Market” that would link Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Macao, Singapore, and the Chinese Mainland. This was the result of the post-Mao reforms in Mainland, and it
intended to highlight the prospects that a similar growth might occur in the commercial relations between
Taiwan and Chinese Mainland following the imperatives of the globalizing trends (Harding, 1993). The PRC,
however, has always rejected the idea that Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macao were separate political entities. From
their point of view, they were patches of land forcefully stripped from Chinese sovereignty, to which they
should eventually be reintegrated, even though the Communist government was clearly aware of its own
limitations to do this in a forceful manner.
Whereas, in the English language, when The Economist mentioned in 1987 that Taiwan might eventually
join in a “Greater China Confederation” (The Economist, 1987), it opened the door to discussion about the
possibilities of a political reunification, although the concept of the Greater China was always more common to
describe the commercial ties between the main Chinese economies, in line with the notion of a world-economy
put forward by Wallerstein (1976, pp. 229-233). From this point of view, political communities can only make
sense in the context of the economic framework under which they operate. After the economic reforms of the
late seventies, the PRC started to grow into the powerful engine that drives today the largest part of prosperity
in South-East Asia, therefore compelling all the other economies in the region to gradually gravitate towards her.
In this century, the Greater China has become a firm commercial reality, but the light of a great political
unification is still dim. Hong Kong and Macao were returned to the PRC respectively in 1997 from the British
and in 1999 from the Portuguese and identify themselves as the Special Administrative Regions of the PRC.
Will Taiwan step on a similar road-map or in an alternative direction? There is much to be discussed. The
following historical overview provides us the grounds for further analysis.
A Historical Overview
From 1945 to 1949
When WWII came to an end in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China as Japan surrendered.
It was a dramatic year for Taiwan. After 50 years being a Japanese colony, many Taiwanese experienced an
identity crisis when the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party) sent troops to take over the island. First of all, the
majority of the people did not speak mandarin. Japanese was the official language and the dialects (Min, Hakka,
etc.) which originated from the south-eastern provinces in Mainland China that arrived with the islanders’
ancestors dating from the early 17th century were widely spoken. Plus, the local indigenous groups were
present and they preserve their own traditions and languages to date. We argue, however, that in spite of the
Japanese colonization process, and because Japan itself was a Sinic state, Taiwan did not become totally
alienated from its own Chinese legacy.
Second, the Kuomintang troops were not in their best conditions when they reached the Taiwanese shore.
Most of them were traumatized by the eight-year-long Anti-Japanese War and found themselves physically and
economically weak. The military leaders had a hard time maintaining the discipline and failed to build a good
reputation from the very first contact with the islanders.
In the Chinese mainland, the Kuomintang had little time to savor the victory against the Japanese. The
Civil war officially broke out between Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1946.
Kuomintang hired and kidnapped countless troops from Taiwan and sent them to the battle fields in Chinese
Mainland. Many of them were captured by the People’s Liberation Army (under CCP) and later participated in
the Korean War (Long, 2009). Throughout the civil war in Chinese Mainland, both Kuomintang and CCP
either hired or kidnapped male civilians and sent them to battlefields. At the end of the war, when Kuomintang
started to retreat to Taiwan, the officers and generals took along with them many soldiers who were not allowed
to leave the troops and neither had a chance to notify their families about their departure to the island across the
Strait. A new political reality was forged, against the background of the ancient Chinese civilization.
From 1949 to 1971
The general in command and also the president of the ROC, Chiang Kai-shek provisioned Kuomintang’s
failure in the civil war and ordered his son Chiang Ching-kuo to remove all the gold reserves from the Central
Bank of Shanghai to Taiwan in January 1949 as part of the top secret retreat plans. The total value of the gold
was 300 million USD, exactly equivalent to the loan that Mao Zedong asked from Stalin for the newly founded
PRC later (Chen, 2011). Some 1.3 million mainlanders were uprooted to Taiwan throughout 1949, and most of
them did not realize that it would be a four-decade farewell from their families in mainland. They settled down
in Taiwan and recognized as “the new arrivers or people from outer provinces” to date. Meanwhile, the
islanders, who identify themselves as “the natives or people from the original province” had a six-million
population that year (Jiang, Mi, & Zhang, 1996). Taiwan, despite the sudden population boost, thanks to the
gold transported from the mainland, successfully avoided a currency crisis and stabilized the island’s economy
in the 1950’s.
The USA was about to abandon Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang based regime when he swallowed
the bitter defeat by Mao Zedong. However, Mao was obliged to send a great number of Chinese troops across
the Chinese-Korean border in 1950, right after the U.S. announced their participation in the Korean War and
that fact twisted the ROC’s fate. Mao had little choice but to do as Stalin wished due to the pending 300 million
loans from the soviets to the Chinese. As a result, instead of focusing on “liberating” Taiwan from Kuomintang,
Mao lost more than 100,000 soldiers, including his own son, in Korea and found it more difficult to launch a
war cross the Taiwan Strait later when the U.S. 7th Fleet Detachment already set its base in the Taiwan’s main
harbor. Until then, from the point of view of international law, the Chinese question was a problem of
government recognition, rather than state partition.
Mainland China, due to the lack of funds, the extensive territory and the aftermath of the war, launched the
Great Leap Forward campaign in the late 1950’s, which aimed at transforming the country rapidly from an
agrarian society to a socialist and industrial society, but the policy turned out to be a complete failure that
caused the Great Chinese Famine.
In order to centralize power and distract the people from the economic crisis, in the mid-sixties, Mao
started the Chinese Cultural Revolution that put the PRC into a tragic 10-year-void regarding the mass
destruction of Confucian teachings and values. Hundreds of thousands of academics were sent to labor camps,
higher education institutions were forced to teach only political lessons, and it is still a taboo to discuss this
topic openly in mainland China. Nevertheless, considering the ever worsening Soviet-Sino relations, U.S.
President, Richard M. Nixon took advantage of the situation and decided to approach the leaders of the PRC in
attempt to isolate the Soviet Union from its emerging neighbor. Apart from the ideological dispute between the
Soviet Union and PRC, their conflicts escalated as the Sino-Soviet war broke out in March 1969 over the
uninhabited island Treasure (Zhenbao) in the Ussuri River (Gao, 2007, p. 7). Amid the ever intensified
Sino-Soviet conflicts, Nixon first signaled his interest in improving relations with PRC in his inaugural address
on 20 January 1969, months later announced to lift part of the sanctions on travel and trade1 against the PRC,
and by the end of the same year he also terminated regular 7th Fleet patrols in the Taiwan Straits (Lam, 2015, p.
54). Moreover, it was accepted by the UN in 1971 and immediately replaced the ROC as a member in the
Security Council, leaving ROC in a virtual political limbo, basically sustained by American interests in the
region.
From 1971 to 1987
With Henry Kissinger’s help, President Nixon visited Mainland China in 1972 and it was a milestone in
1
On 21 July 1969 the United States cancelled certain sanctions against the PRC and relaxed limitations on travel to China. In
August 1969, Nixon lifted the travel and trade ban, allowing his Secretary of State William Rogers to signal interest in opening a
dialogue. Crucially, in November 1969, he also terminated regular Seventh Fleet patrols in the Taiwan Straits (Lam, 2015, p. 54).
the PRC’s diplomatic history. Following the USA, Japan normalized its relations with PRC that same year.
Finally, President Carter established official diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1978 and recognized it as the
sole and legitimate China according to the One-China Policy still in place in U.S.-Chinese relations2, without
entirely abandoning the ROC to its own fate.
The ROC lost its legitimate status in the UN and became ever more isolated by international society when
the USA announced it would recognize the PRC and terminate the “Mutual Defense Treaty between the USA
and the ROC”. In 1979, the “Taiwan Relations Act” came into effect and relations between USA and the ROC
were redefined. Despite the fact that it has been considered a controversial law, since the PRC considers the Act
to be a major tool of the USA to interfere in China’s domestic politics and the ROC complains about the
unspecified promises that USA made to defend Taiwan’s sovereignty, the Act remains unmodified since 1979,
because it clearly suits American over Chinese interests. As for the international community, people were
gradually accustomed to addressing the PRC as China and the ROC as Taiwan respectively, without having a
deep knowledge or interest in the causes or consequences of the divide between the two governments.
Economically, both China and Taiwan took a great step forward in this period of time. In China, after
Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping took over and introduced the economic reforms in 1978, which modified
the practice of the socialist economy and opened the Chinese market to western capital. It was at this moment
that China unveiled itself to the world. As for Taiwan, Chiang Ching-kuo became president of the ROC a
couple of years after his father, Chiang Kai-shek passed away. He dominated the Ten Major Construction
projects, which provided the platform for Taiwan to emerge as one of the Four Asian Dragons3.
From 1987 to 1996
For many Taiwanese/Chinese, 1987 was the most emotional year of their lives. When Chiang Ching-kuo
lifted the Martial Law that had lasted for 38 years in the island, people were thrilled to see the release of the
political prisoners jailed under the white terror, the right to form political parties (DPP [the Democratic
Progressive Party] which advocates Taiwan’s independence from China became legalized), and to enjoy the
many other forms of freedom to come, including the right to visit mainland China. Heartbroken stories started
to be told when families across the strait reunited in mainland China. Most people who were uprooted in 1949
could not find their parents’ graves anymore; “everything has changed” literally, they claimed. An extreme case
was the disappearance of a 1,500-year-old ancient town named Chun-an in Zhejiang Province. Thousands of
mountains were submerged into the water due to the construction of a major dam in the area, what is left today
are the thousands mountain peaks which look just like small islands. The Qiandao Lake4 (Thousand Island
Lake) has been one of the most popular tourist attractions in south eastern China for several decades now.
2
In spite of President Trump’s threat to reconsider the One China Policy of his predecessors, no official move has been made to
change the status of the relation with the PRC.
3
The Four Asian Dragons or The Four Asian Tigers are made up of four countries in East Asia-South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
and Hong Kong. They all went through rapid growth by going through industrialization since the 1960s when TNCs looked for
areas with cheap labor and low costs for other things. They are considered as the first generation of NICs. Japanese TNCs were
among the first to seek new areas for their operations, so they chose their less developed neighbouring countries, particularly
South Korea and Taiwan as a host nation for factories and manufacturing. Retrieved November 6, 2017, from
http://developmentandglobalisation.weebly.com/the-asian-tigers.html.
4
Qiandao Lake, also known as Thousand Island Lake, is a sprawling body of fresh water, covering 573 sq. km. The name comes
from the fact that there are over a thousand islands in the lake. Qiandao Lake was created in 1959 when the valley at the base of
the Wu Shi (Five Lion) mountain was flooded to create the Xin’anjiang Reservoir and Xin’an River hydroelectric station.
Retrieved November 6, 2017, from http://www.uwphotographyguide.com/dive-qiandao-lake-china.
In comparison to the overjoy of the Taiwanese, people in mainland China lived through one of the most
dramatic incidents in contemporary Chinese history, the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Largely due to the
economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping and the consequent currency crisis that climbed to its peak in
1988, after months of protests and almost three weeks of hunger strikes organized by the students, on June 4th,
Beijing announced the square would be evacuated and also the national wide protests would be ended. High
casualties occurred in most of the major cities in mainland China, although there are no official records of
casualties. There were mass demonstrations in the Chinese communities abroad, too, including Hong Kong and
Taiwan. The ex-Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew expressed his support for Deng Xiaoping’s
decision, commenting in an interview that: “If I have to shoot 200,000 students to save China from another 100
years of disorder, so be it” (Lambert, Montagnon, & Dawkins, 1999). The aftermath of Tiananmen Square
protests is that until today, the EU and U.S. embargo on armament sales to the PRC remains in place, despite
the protests from Chinese officials (Weitz, 2012). Furthermore, when people talk about China’s human rights
issues, a sense of mistrust is always in the air and the ghost of Tiananmen seem to hover in the air.
Relations between Taiwan and mainland China were tense, but remained cordial on the whole. Actually,
the flow of Taiwanese tourists to mainland China, which had started towards the end of the eighties, did not
show signs of diminishing.
Regarding the idea of “One China”, an interesting Consensus was reached in 1992 by semi-official
representatives across the Strait, which confirmed the status quo and affirmed the “Different Interpretations”
regarding the One China Principle. It reads:
Concerning the meaning of “one China”, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait adhere to the one China principle. But
both sides ascribe different meanings to the term. The Chinese Communist authorities understand “one China” to mean the
“People’s Republic of China”. They think that after reunification, Taiwan will be a “Special Administrative Region”. We
think that “one China” means the Republic of China, founded in 1912. Its sovereignty includes the whole of China. But its
current jurisdiction is limited to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China. But the Chinese mainland is
also a part of China. (China Times Editorial, 2012)
From our point of view, this would indicate an implicit recognition of a common Chinese identity,
defining a vast population in the area, divided by the question of the legitimacy of the government that should
represent them.
In spite of the fact that during the nineties and the first decade of the new century the advocates of an
independent Taiwan still held a strong position, the rapid development of the economy in mainland China
helped develop economic ties that have made their option increasingly less realistic for many Taiwanese people
during the last decade, although this does not necessarily mean a definite change of heart toward mainland
China. The situation is still very complex and far from being satisfactorily resolved.
The 1992 Consensus is widely considered the base of the bilateral cross-strait relations today, although the
advocates of independence in Taiwan argue about the legitimacy of such document, saying it was signed by
semi-official representatives from the Chinese Communist Party and Kuomintang in private, so it can not
represent the voice of the Taiwanese people.
While progress was being made smoothly, the Qiandao Lake Incident5 that took place in 1994 involving
the death of 24 Taiwanese tourists, six mainland Chinese crews, and two mainland Chinese tour guides added
obstacles for the advancement of bilateral relations.
From 1996 to 2008
With the memory of the Qiandao Lake Incident and the threat of missiles ready to bomb Taiwan from the
Chinese Mainland, the results of the first direct presidential election in 1996 were far from the appeal of Beijing,
nevertheless, the crisis ended when two USA aircraft carriers approached Taiwan (Global Security.org, 2011).
The first directly elected ROC president, Lee Teng-hui was born under the Empire of Japan and the first
Native person (not migrant from mainland China in 1949 nor a decedent) to become the ROC president and
Kuomintang chairman. He was not welcomed by Beijing, since he was close to DPP and he promoted the
Movement of “Taiwanization” (Horowitz & Tan, 2005). After Lee Teng-hui was succeeded by Chen Shui-bian,
a DDP presidential candidate in 2000, Lee was expelled from Kuomintang officially for supporting the newly
founded Political Party, Taiwan Solidarity Union6 in public in 2001.
During the eight years DPP rule under President Chen Shui-bian, bilateral cross-strait relations were
literally frozen. Beijing could not stand DPP’s ideological values, which advocate for Taiwan’s independence
from the Chinese frame and they chose to confront each other in the toughest possible ways. First, Chen
introduced the concept of “One Country on Each Side” during a visit to Tokyo in 2002, which denies Taiwan’s
role under the One China frame which was earlier reached by Kuomintang in the 1992 Consensus. Chen
explained that “Taiwan is Taiwan, and China is China; we are different countries on each side of the strait”.
Second, when the epidemic SARS broke out in Canton province in mainland China, all the region was badly
affected. It spread so fast, mainly due to Beijing’s media censorship policy that people could not react to it
properly in the first place. Furthermore, Beijing interfered with the vaccine distribution from the World
Hygiene Organization to Taiwan arguing that since Taiwan is part of China, so the distribution work should be
organized by Beijing. This episode served as nothing more than an incentive to strengthen the voice of Chen’s
“One Country on Each Side” within Taiwan. Last but not least, after a three-year-long discussion, Beijing
passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 which is specifically directed to the bilateral cross-strait relations. It
defines that mainland China and Taiwan belong to one China and the “Taiwan issue” is a residual problem of
the Chinese civil war and it is an internal affair of China. Also, it legitimizes the right to conduct non-peaceful
measures whenever there is a perceived threat of Taiwan’s separation from China.
The cross-strait economic and cultural exchange was affected severely by the political turmoil. Everything
from the co-celebration of the Chinese New Year to university exchange programs stopped. Tension was the
5
In April 1994, 24 Taiwanese tourists died on a visit to Qiandao Lake in mainland China. According to the initial Chinese reports
on the deaths, the 24 tourists and eight mainland crew and guides on the Hairui pleasure boat were the victims of an accidental fire.
An official in Zhejiang said initial investigations pointed to an explosion on the vessel; deaths had been caused by fire or
drowning; there was no evidence of robbery and there had been “no abnormal wounds”. But the details of the affair soon cast
doubt on this account. The reservoir is not large, and some survivors might have been expected to swim to safety. Then, it
emerged that the bodies of all 32 people had been found in a small cabin on the bottom deck, where passengers are not supposed
to go. The Chinese imposed what amounted to a news blackout on the incident, Taiwanese journalists were banned from reporting
it, and Taiwan’s semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), which deals with mainland affairs, was not permitted to send a
representative to help the relatives. Retrieved November 6, 2017, from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/china-attempts-
to-cover-up-taiwanese-boat-murders-1372048.html.
6
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was founded in 2001 and regards the ex-ROC president Lee Teng-hui as its spiritual leader. The
Party advocates for Taiwan’s independence and wishes to deepen the Taiwanization movement. TSU has often been considered to
be much more drastic than the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which also advocates Taiwan’s independence.
word to describe the cross-strait relations in every aspect.

From 2008 to Date
The cross-strait relations made a U-turn in 2008 as Kuomintang regained power from DPP, when
President Ma Ying-jeou was elected. The door to dialogue opened up soon and a historical moment came when
the first direct cross-strait flight operated in December 2008.
Since then, the 1992 Consensus was re-celebrated and more than 20 agreements regarding the cross-strait
trade were signed. However, Ma Ying-jeou’s pro mainland policies have not been popular within the island and
people seem to blame Taiwan’s economic problems (high housing price, low income, food-security problems,
etc.) on Ma’s policies and his incompetent leadership.
Despite the political stability, Ma has faced tremendous challenges when he seeks to broaden and deepen
Taiwan’s economy interactions with mainland China. During the Sunflower Student Movement (J. R., 2014),
protesters occupied the debating chamber of the Legislative Yuan, ROC’s parliament for three weeks until Ma
agreed to postpone the free trade pact in services with mainland. A few months later, the Hong Kong Umbrella
Movement, which was triggered by Beijing’s decision to veto the candidates before they could be nominated to
run the direct chief executive election scheduled for 2017 (Ying & Sarquis, 2014) took place. Many Taiwanese
and Hong Kongnese people (especially the students and the younger generation) expressed sympathy by
shouting the slogan in the social media “Don’t let Taiwan become a second Hong Kong”.
The following local elections held in December 2014 proved to be a landslide victory for the DPP. The
DPP swept Kuomintang’s seats in the local mayor offices and councils to the surprise of most critics. The
results were interpreted as a punishment for Kuomintang and President Ma, although in many experts’ view, it
was unfair to blame Taiwan’s weak position in the globalized economy totally on the recent policies (Chen,
2014). Encouraged by the victory, DPP without surprise won the presidential election in 2016 and such result
again jeopardized the cross-strait relations.
Nevertheless, the confrontation between the DPP administration and Beijing has not been able to put the
cross-strait relations in turmoil, given that the cross-strait commercial and cultural ties established are too hard
to break and many Taiwanese people welcome the newly implemented policy which grants “quasi-citizenship”
to Taiwanese residents in mainland China with the 18-digit ID number (Chung, 2018). Furthermore, DPP lost
the local elections in December 2018 mainly due to failures to deliver economic improvements for Taiwan as
promised in the 2014 election campaigns.
Separate Identities in the Present

The Dichotomy of Autocracy and Democracy
When it comes to discussions on violations against human rights and the media repression in mainland
China, Beijing has always argued that, for China’s particular characteristics, their social and historical
development does not desire to imitate any foreign system: The form of communism implemented by the
Soviet Union did not apply to the country; neither should the democracy led by the USA today. China needs to
explore its own route.
What mainland China practices today is state authoritarianism and it seems to be effective regarding the
state’s economic development and political stability. While Taiwan is considered to be a role-model of
democracy in the region, following the U.S. model, it is also true that the island suffers greatly from political
turmoil under multi-party politics. The U-turn policies alternating between Kuomintang & DPP not only due to
their ideological differences but also considerations for elections have delayed Taiwan’s overall development in
the past two decades and put it in the lowest ranking of the four Asian dragons. The ex-Singaporean Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who led Singapore’s independence from Malaysia in the 1960’s and successfully
transformed the poor fishing village into a first world nation-city, is a firm believer of state authoritarianism
and has proved to be correct, at least within the territory of Singapore. He has mentioned in various occasions
that in order to have a first rate government, you need first rate talents to run the government. Without the state
elites, and the citizens who respect the state mechanism and follow the discipline, a country will never have the
opportunity to join in the first world club (Allison, Blackwill, & Wyne, 2012).
In the particular case of China, Lee commented that in China’s 5,000-year long history, the heads (votes)
were never counted; all the rulers named themselves the emperor, the son of heaven; if you disagreed, your
head would be cut instead of counted; If China becomes a liberal democracy, it will break down (Lee, 2001).
We tend to agree with Lee’s point of view, but we also disagree with the total practice of state
authoritarianism. In the direction of development, Singapore’s experience is much valued in the region: An
authoritarian government with high transparency, efficiency, and social equality is much more palatable for
public opinion on the whole. It is not perfect, just as no socio-political system is perfect in the world, for
instance it has never really solved the problems of racial integration between the three dominant ethnic groups
(the Chinese, Malay, and the Hindu), and nowadays, it faces the challenges of immigrants from the region and
their integration into Singaporean society. Furthermore, there is no comparison between the scale of China and
that of Singapore. What has worked in Singapore does not necessarily apply to China’s conditions. However, it
is clear that Singapore ranks amongst the most successful cases of development in the world in the modern
history. Another example is India: It is a country similar to China’s scale and it has been a democracy since its
independence from the English; it is also corrupt, inefficient, and burdened with bureaucracy. We definitely do
not want to see China heading into India’s direction. So, it goes back to Beijing’s statement: China needs to
explore its own route. And it is definitely worthwhile noting that the Chinese model accounts for the success
story that China has become since the last decade of the past century, which may lead their people to feel proud
to be Chinese.
Diplomatic Competitions
While the PRC replaced the ROC’s position in the UN Security Council in 1971 and established official
diplomatic ties with the USA, the ROC is still recognized currently as an independent Sovereign country only
by 17 states in the world (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC, 2019). Most of them are in Central America,
a handful is in South America, Oceania, and Africa and only one in Europe, the Vatican.
Under the One China Principle, every country has to choose between the PRC and the ROC in terms of
establishing formal diplomatic relations, and the international reality is that by choosing the former you gain
entry to a much bigger market and has a share in the Chinese version of Marshall Plan (Penna, 2014). The
benefits are obvious, so why not?
The Holy See has different concerns. Without the purpose of conventional trades, the Holy See seeks to
expand its influence as extensively as possible. For decades, after the founding of the PRC, the Vatican has
always been keen on absorbing the Catholics in the Chinese mainland, estimated at some 12 million followers,
in comparison to less than half a million in Taiwan (Mishkin & Anderlini, 2013).
However, the Vatican and Beijing have not established formal relations due to Beijing’s negative attitude
towards the Vatican administration. Currently, Beijing directly manages the “official” local church through the
Patriotic Association, deciding episcopal appointments without regard for Vatican instructions. The
“underground” church which is faithful to Rome is constantly subject to attacks, arrests, and oppression
(Vatican Insider Staff, 2015). There are signs of improvement since Beijing recently approved bishop
candidates from the province of Inner Mongolia and the province of Shaanxi in April this year. They were the
first bishop elections since Beijing and the Vatican signed a provisional agreement on appointing bishops in
September 2018 (Lau, 2019).
It is only natural for Beijing to insist on its power over the church. The Dalai Lama experience reminds
Beijing of the danger of a religious leader seeking political power and the mass gathering for prayer is also
unacceptable for its potential to develop into a state upheaval. As for the Holy See, considering the risks of
renouncing its “universality” of the doctrinal and institutional unity of the church and the potential undermining
of its “moral power” on the defense of religious freedom and other forms of human rights, there is still much to
negotiate before it finally severs diplomatic ties with Taipei and normalizes relations with Beijing (Bozzato,
2017).
Regarding international organizations, both the ROC and the PRC are members of the World Trade
Organization and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation. The ROC (Taiwan) was accepted in these organizations
under Beijing’s consent and in most of the other major organizations or events; Taiwan is known as “Chinese
Taipei”.
The Japan Paradox

Japan had been China’s enemy long before the beginning of WWII and Kuomintang fought against the
Japanese invasion with all its resources since the early thirties. As for Taiwan, Japan’s best friend in East Asia
(Taiwan donated more than any other country or region to Japan after the devastating earth-quake & tsunami
that occurred on March 11th 2011, Taipei Times, 2011), a lot of people still appreciate Japan for its
contribution in modernizing Taiwan.
On the contrary, throughout mainland China, people generally hold hostility against the Japanese for the
war crimes committed during WWII. Most mainland Chinese find it difficult to understand why Taiwanese
people (the natives, excluding the ones that arrived after 1949) highly praise Japanese culture, to the extent that
many elderly people consider themselves to be almost Japanese for the education they received in their younger
days. When Japan is brought to the topic, the mainland Chinese remember the pain inflicted upon them during
the war but the Taiwanese think of all the great contributions of the Japanese legacy remaining in the island.
The only topics that mainland China and Taiwan share in common regarding Japan might be the “Baodiao
Yundong” (Defend the Diaoyu Islands Movement) (Chen, 2009) and the sensitive issue of comfort women
during the WWII. Diaoyu Islands (the Japanese name them Senkaku Islands) are claimed to be China’s territory
since Japan surrendered in 1945 and returned Taiwan to China as Diaoyu Islands are considered the outlying
island of Taiwan. However, due to the U.S.’ blurry attitudes towards the islands and the diverse sources and
interpretations of the historical documents, the sovereignty of the islands remains undefined. The issue of
comfort women is a shared one among all the ex-Japanese occupied countries and regions during WWII, as the
women who were “in-service” mainly came from Korea, mainland China and Taiwan, it is a pending issue that
requires Japan’s official recognition and apologies.
The Chinese Language Orthodoxy

Even though the ROC is only recognized officially by 17 members of the UN, it has representative offices
(often named Taipei Representative Office) in almost every corner of the world. While the Confucius Institute
under Beijing expands extensively and promotes the Chinese language and culture, the Taipei office is also
doing its bid.
The main differences are that Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau reserve officially the writing system of
traditional Chinese characters, in comparison with the simplified Chinese characters in practice in mainland
China. After the New China (PRC) was established, in an attempt to increase literacy, simplified Chinese
characters were introduced in the 1950’s and the 1960’s, which were adopted by Singapore officially later and
they are recognized as standardized Chinese characters nowadays.
Naturally, when a foreigner learns Chinese, he/she is given the option to study the traditional Chinese
characters or the simplified Chinese characters and consequently determines to take the Chinese level test under
the Taiwanese system or the mainland Chinese system. The decision matters because, in most cases, for the
purpose of higher education, after receiving the scholarship from one government, you have little chances of
receiving it from another government in the future. This is one strong example of how politics affects personal
life.
In spite of the tremendous efforts that Beijing has made to spread its soft power, the government funded
Confucius Institute, which has more than 511 institutes in 123 countries since it opened in Seoul in 2004, has
faced challenges from the local communities in recent years, questioning the institute’s academic freedom and
transparency, especially from the developed countries (Tiezzi, 2014).
For instance, the Confucius Institute affiliated to the University of Chicago and the Confucius Institute at
Pennsylvania State University both closed down in 2014. The National Association of Scholars even published
a report stating the need to reexamine all the Confucius institutes in operation on U.S. campuses (Sharma,
2017).
However, there is still much to be done in the developed countries since among all the institutes, 110 are
in the U.S., more than 115 are in Asia, and some 160 are in Europe. While the number in the developed world
plateaus, there is great potential in other regions. The resources between Beijing and Taipei are incomparable,
and in the long run, Beijing will surely solidify its status through its immense extension.
Political Answers Empowered by the Economic Greater China

Since the beginning of the century, the Chinese Mainland has shown astonishing rapid growth and it has,
without question transformed itself into the commercial leader in the region. The Greater China has long
become a reality, in the sense of the ever stronger commercial ties between Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao,
Singapore, and mainland China. Numerous international banking groups and consulting firms locate their Asian
headquarters in the region of the Greater China, to a large extent for the convenience of an extensive
Chinese-speaking population. As the World’s second largest economy, the PRC has the vision to unify the
major economies in the region and is promoting the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership)
mainly with members from the ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations), previously viewed as a
counterbalance to the TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) led by the USA, currently considered to be the most
promising regional free trade agreement in South East Asia after U.S. withdrew from the TPP.
Taiwan (the ROC), as a pillar in the Greater China, is supposed to be a major member in RCEP, however,
the Taiwanese government seemed to be more eager to negotiate joining the TPP and putting the RCEP aside.
Now that TTP has been renamed as CPTTP and signed without U.S. participation in March 2018, Taiwan finds
itself in an awkward situation. The concerns are obvious, on the one hand, Taiwan considers the U.S. as a
strategic partner and on the other the Taiwanese have doubts about Beijing’s political intentions.
No matter how much the Taiwanese people want to change the status quo, the facts are that Taiwan has
invested extensively in mainland China since the 1978 economic reforms. Although China has been losing its
cheap labor incentives (from 2009 to 2014, the average salary growth in mainland China has reached more than
10% annually, and in some years peaked at 14%7) and lifting the tax incentives that used to attract foreign
capital, it is transforming its industrial structure from a labor-intensive model to a technology-intensive one
(China Briefing, 2013) and it is still the leading exporter to date (Statista, 2016). As a result, when China goes
through a lower economic growth mainly due to the demands that have dropped significantly in the EU and the
U.S. since the 2008 world financial crisis, Taiwan suffers, too.
Given that most of the Taiwanese firms which invest in mainland China are export-oriented, their revenues
have plateaued (Cheng, 2016) as the Chinese exports drop which in return affects the Taiwanese economy.
However, among the ones that have successfully embraced the mainland Chinese domestic market the picture
looks quite the opposite (Cheng, 2016), although faced with ever stiff competition from their mainland Chinese
counterparts (Horwitz, 2016).
Effectively, the Taiwanese government had encouraged its enterprises to diversify its investment in the
South-East Asia region, instead of concentrating its capital in mainland China. This policy is known as “Go
South” first promoted by President Lee Teng-hui in the 1990’s later strengthened by President Chen Shui-bian
in the first decade of this century (Chen, 2004), and currently a renewed version proposed by President Tsai
Ing-wen.
However, in comparison to its neighbors, mainland China provides relatively good infrastructure and
political stability, a situation that other countries in the region have failed to achieve. Despite the growing
production cost and the structural reforms, which have led to a sharp decrease in Taiwan’s investment in
mainland China, most of the Taiwanese capital remains there (MOEAIC, 2019a; 2019b)8. Out of the capital
that did extend to South-East Asia, Vietnam is the biggest destination to receive Taiwanese capital. With nearly
US$31 billion worth of investments in Vietnam, Taiwan is the fourth biggest foreign investor there, following
South Korea, Japan and Singapore (Vietrade, 2017). The 2014 Anti-Chinese Riot in Vietnam hit the Taiwanese
investors badly, with some 1,000 Taiwanese backed business affected (Jennings, 2014). The reality is that
Taiwan suffers from the territorial disputes between mainland China and Vietnam. When the anger in Vietnam
exploded, it targeted on “Chinese companies”, without differentiating the Taiwanese investment from the
mainland Chinese investment.
At present, with DPP back to the administration and its ideological reluctance to recognize the 1992
Consensus, the cross-strait relations once again have frozen, however, this time the chill remains only on the
7
The growth of 2014 refers to corresponding data by the third quarter recorded in mainland China. The index cited here was
presented by Xie Zengyi (xie.zengyi@cass.cn), lecturer & researcher in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in table
9 of the “Conference of International Studies on China and Mexico: a permanent cultural dialogue” (Coloquio internacional de
estudios chinos y mexicanos: un diálogo cultural permanente) whose topic was “The new road-map of the labor law in China, in
the frame of economic development”, October 8th, 9th, and 10th of 2014. Ciudad Universitaria, Coyoacán, Ciudad de México.
8
The figures vary but in general at least 70% of Taiwanese capital that invests overseas goes to mainland China every year.
central official level. Surprisingly, since 2013 the percentage of Taiwanese who also recognize themselves as
Chinese has risen and consequently the percentage of people who only recognize themselves as Taiwanese has
dropped (NCCU, 2019). Also, another survey reveals that from 2013 to 2017, on average there are 85% of
Taiwanese who identify themselves as part of the Chinese nation (Taiwan Competitiveness Forum, 2017).
The Taiwanese Independence Movement that we witness in Taiwan today, is a demonstration of
“peripheral nationalism”, similar to the situation in Hong Kong, although never identical, mainly due to the fact
that Hong Kong was never under the rule of the ROC, because it had been a British colony since the mid-19th
century until 1997.
However, critics consider that, applying the notion of peripheral nationalism to Hong Kong, and the
revival of a Hongkongese identity in recent years is clearly a counter-mobilization that aims at defending Hong
Kong’s autonomy, core values, lifestyle, and language (Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters) against
Beijing’s incorporation strategies (Fong, 2017). In the case of Taiwan, the Taiwanese identity is clearly under
the ROC frame since legally Taiwan represents the ROC and the center of the dispute is the orthodoxy of the
Chinese sovereignty, not the rejection of the Chinese national identity. Even the current President Tsai Ing-wen,
also the President of DPP said she would handle cross-strait relations in line with the constitution of the
Republic of China, a statement that essentially reflected her stance that she would not declare independence
(Chung, 2017).
Beijing also exercises incorporation strategies towards Taiwan. Only this time around, Beijing bypassed
the inter-governmental negotiations with Taipei and launched the “31 preference policies” (CnYES, 2018)
towards the Taiwanese people. During the 19th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2017, Beijing
introduced a new series of policies to provide even more benefits for Taiwanese people who work and study in
mainland China, and these policies came into effect on February 28th, 2018 with the Taiwan Affairs Office
announcement. To name just a few, on the personal level, Taiwanese are able to participate in the majority of
professional certification exams in mainland China, and for the ones that were already open to Taiwanese
candidates, such as medical license and teaching license, the process of certification and the application for
permit to practice have been simplified. On the organizational level, Taiwanese are allowed to invest in
state-owned enterprises and participate in public biddings and innovation programs in mainland China,
including the “Made in China 2025 projects” (Schubert, 2018). Since September 2018, Taiwanese people who
have received residence permit in mainland China, a card with 18-digit ID number the same as the mainland
Chinese ID card, are eligible to apply for the same housing subsidies and public medical insurances as the
mainland Chinese. This measure facilitates all kinds of activities that Taiwanese people wish to carry out in
mainland China, such as purchasing and obtaining the high-speed railway tickets online, realizing on-line
boarding for air travels, and registering in human resources systems for job opportunities, just as any other
Chinese mainland citizen. To sum up all these new policies, Taiwanese people who live in mainland China
have become “quasi PRC citizens” and they generally welcome these new measures. As a matter of fact, six out
of every 10 Taiwanese who work overseas are found in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao (DGBAS,
2017). The actual figure should be much higher as many Taiwanese who work in mainland China continue to
pay for the national labor insurance policy and the national health insurance policy of the ROC for the pensions
and medical benefits that they receive and these people are not considered to be working overseas.
A Cultural Greater China: Harmony but not Uniformity

Despite the political impasse, cross-strait interactions between the people have never stopped and they are
not limited to economic exchanges and merger as we have already stated.
In the peak of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the General Association of Chinese Culture (GACC) was
funded in 1967 in Taipei to lead the Chinese Cultural Renaissance, in opposition to the devastating cultural
destruction in mainland China. The GACC operates as an NGO to date and, in most cases, its chairman is the
President of the ROC; the current DPP president Tsai Ing-wen is no exception. However, decades after the
Chinese Cultural Revolution, the PRC strives to restore and revive the Chinese cultural heritage in Chinese
mainland and the results have been more than satisfying. One of the main goals of GACC today is to promote
cross-strait cultural exchange activities, despite the political disputes between the two sides.
Evidently, the ROC and the PRC share the title of China as well as many other cultural/academic assets.
The title Palace Museum exists both in Beijing and in Taipei, the former preserves the original architecture of
the Forbidden City and the latter has a most extensive and exquisite collection of the Chinese antiques taken
from the Forbidden City and many other locations in Chinese mainland during the Chinese civil war. The title
Tsinghua University is found both in Beijing and in Taiwan, the former is the original one founded in Beijing
in 1911 and the latter is the one re-established in Taiwan in 1956. The “two Tsinghua Universities” hold the
same motto “Self-Discipline and Social Commitment” and are among the best in the region. The same case
applies for the two “Chiao Tung Universities” in Shanghai and in Taiwan. Up to date, these universities
celebrate the same anniversary, build alliances, and exchange their resources, though operated separately and
placed individually on international rankings.
The most successful case of “Chinese cultural unification” in recent years might be the reunified landscape
painting “Dwelling in the Fuchun Mountains” painted during the Yuan dynasty and torn apart in two during the
Ming dynasty. This work of art was reunified in 2011 in the National Palace Museum in Taipei under the
consent of the ROC and the PRC governments. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of PRC made a statement “If the
painting can be brought together, so can our people” (Jacobs, 2011). The Chinese cultural identity is already a
shared one between the Taiwan Strait today, given the recognition of the same millennial historical and cultural
roots. However, in line with what McCarthy (2009) wisely observed in her studies of the Chinese ethnic groups:
on the one hand, a shared cultural identity is neither an inherent or necessary basis of cohesion; on the other
hand, conflict and lack of cohesion do not indicate the absence of a shared identity.
On the spiritual sphere, Fo Guang Shan and Mazu have proved to be embodiments of unbreakable spiritual
connections. Fo Guang Shan, a Taiwan based Buddhist organization, is undisputedly the most renowned
community for Chinese Buddhist Ritual Practice in the Greater China. Its founder and spiritual leader Master
Hsing Yun, was converted in mainland China and fled to Taiwan in 1949. Until 1989, Master Hsing Yun made
his great return to mainland China together with Fo Guang Shan’s Humanistic Buddhism philosophy, which
marked the first reencounter of cross-strait Chinese Buddhist communities in 40 years. The latest project in
which Fo Guang Shan has involved itself regarding the cross-strait relations is its participation and support in
the Belt and Road Asian Buddhist Forum which was significant in the sense that the cross-strait cooperation
radiated beyond the Greater China.
In the realm of Taoism, Mazu, the Chinese sea goddess, is worshipped by some 20 million people in more
than 5,000 temples in the Chinese Communities throughout the world (Wang, 2003), and among them, an
estimate 800 are found in Taiwan (Lin, 2003). Mazu, also known as the tianhou (the Empress of Heaven) takes
her annual tour cross-strait and around South East Asia among the Chinese communities. In 2017, the original
Mazu from Meizhou, Fujian province (recognized as Mazu’s birth place) made her presence in Taiwan for the
second time in two decades and toured around 26 Mazu temples in the island (Taipei City Government, 2017).
It must be emphasized that Buddhism, although originally from India, has integrated into Chinese culture
so successfully that in many temples, gods, goddesses and deities from both Buddhism and Taoism are found
under the same roof, as if there were no divisions. This fact also serves as a strong evidence of the principle of
“harmony but not uniformity” in Chinese civilization.
Taipei: The Nearest City to Beijing

The capital of the PRC is Beijing, meaning the “the Northern Capital”, laid down its curtains before the
whole world in the 2008 Summer Olympics. The capital of the ROC is Taipei, but before 1949, the capital of
the ROC was Nanjing, meaning the “Southern Capital”, and back then Beijing was known as Beiping, meaning
“the Northern Peace”. The name of the northern city was changed between Beijing and Beiping on many
occasions in Chinese History; when the capital of the dynasty was in the south, for instance in the Ming
dynasty (1368-1644), the city was addressed as Beiping; when the capital was in the north, in the case of the
Qing dynasty (1644-1912), the city’s name was Beijing. When Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan in 1949, many
people from Beiping followed and later settled down in Taiwan, not knowing that it was to be a new home
forever. As the capital of the many Chinese dynasties, Beiping had many noble families and intellectuals, all of
whom enjoyed privileges and preserved the traditional Confucian doctrines; they transferred their values and
way of life as they moved to Taipei, where it is recognized they have preserved most traditional Chinese
cultural elements among the cities with a major Chinese community in East Asia.
The Cantonese news journal Newsweekly opened a special column that was named “Taiwan, the most
beautiful scenery is its people” in 2012 and it was such a success that it was edited as a book and published in
2013 (Newsweekly Editorial, 2013). One of the most popular articles in the column was “Taipei, the neatest
city to Beiping”, which narrows the similarities between Taipei and Beiping and how much the modern
Chinese capital Beijing has been transformed, to an extent that the elder citizens do not recognize it anymore.
Taipei was voted by the readers of the Newsweekly as the “most distanced city” among the Chinese
communities in 1998; 15 years later, thanks to the open policies cross the Strait, Taipei has been transformed to
the “dearest city” in the vote (Yu, 2012). For one reason, many mainland Chinese found their childhood
memories and even the “soul” of Beiping in Taipei.
Among the mainland visitors in Taiwan, when asked about their impression of the island, many comment
that the first impression Taipei gives, is its old infrastructure and buildings, not even as developed as many
second-rank cities9 in mainland China; however, as the trip comes to an end, they realize the most beautiful
scenery of Taiwan is really its people, exceptionally hospitable, kind and polite in general, not like in most big
cities in mainland where indifference tends to dominate. Cultural differences may tend to divide communities
of the same origin, no doubt, but it is clear that there are sufficient similarities in the whole “Greater China” to
speak of a unified Chinese civilization and identity.
9
The first Rank cities in mainland China are Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou y Shenzhen, most of the capital cities of the
provinces are considered as second rank cities.
Conclusion
According to Hung and Kuo (2010), the transformation of China into a modern nation-state is perhaps the
most peculiar in the world history of nation formation, and in the opinion of Jacques (2011) and Zhang (2016),
China has never been a European style modern nation-state and very probably will never be one.
She is proud to be a long-lasting civilization in the world today, claiming to be a “civilizational state”
(Zhang, 2016). In this context, the concept of the Greater China has extended from the commercial realms to all
aspects of life, alongside the political divisions. The separation of Taiwan from mainland China is more of a
geopolitical accident than an inevitable fact of life. The divide between them is more due to historical
circumstances than to irreconcilable differences.
The case of the Taiwan Strait bilateral relations is the embodiment of the Chinese civilizational wisdom of
“harmony but not uniformity”. The 1992 Consensus permits the different interpretations of the Sole China and
thus provides the legitimate framework for cross-strait communications, practically in line with the ROC
constitutional status quo “One China, Two Regions” which refers to the region of Mainland China and the
region of Taiwan. Consequently, in different regions run different systems.
Whether the experiment of “One Country, Two Systems” has been a success in Hong Kong and Macao
remains an open question, so as to whether Taiwan will be converted into “another Hong Kong” following the
“One Country Two Systems” model though with substantive modifications.
Since the Chinese civil war, the cross-strait ties have never been entirely broken, and communications
accelerated after the lift of the four-decade long curfew in 1987. Emotionally, culturally and even institutionally
Taiwan and mainland belong to the Sole China, despite the ROC and PRC divisions. We firmly believe that the
concept of the Greater China truthfully reflects the status quo and conveys the message of the shared historical
and cultural roots. The comment “Taipei is the nearest city to Beiping” is also a shared one among the people
cross the Taiwan Strait.
The rise of the PRC to world power has already made the economic and cultural integration of the Greater
China a viable strategy and an ongoing reality. Political wisdom can, no doubt, contribute to a peaceful
reaccomodation of the Chinese civilizational state that may guide the current international system closer to its
point of equilibrium.
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DAVID PUBLISHING
Cultural Heritage Confronting Climate Change
Từ Thị Loan
Vietnam Institute of Culture and Arts Studies, Ha Noi, Vietnam

Climate change is the most serious, profound and comprehensive impact on the future of all humanity. In the
coming years, these impacts will increase and become more serious. Vietnam is one of the five countries in the
world most affected by climate change. The situation of climate change not only causes great impacts on economic
fields, social security, environment..., but also has a strong influence on the protection and promotion of people's
cultural heritage. For tangible cultural heritages that are invasive, reducing the lifespan of buildings, accelerating
the degradation process, even submerging archaeological sites and relics, making it difficult to preserve relics,
artifacts.... For intangible cultural heritage that is to change the way of living, transforming cultural space, leading
to the loss of traditional practices, deforming, even disappearing some types of cultural activities, indigenous
knowledge…. While governments and communities have very clear practical experiences on climate change, the
implementation of measures to respond, especially in the protection of cultural heritage, has progressed very slowly.
It is primarily a passive response, waiting for luck, no active plans and systems. Therefore, raising public awareness
and response links between sectors, communities, and countries is an urgent requirement.
Keywords: climate change, cultural heritage, Vietnam
Climate change has comprehensive and profound impacts on global society, and is now the most serious
challenge facing humanity. Climate change occurs every hour of every day, and has a powerful impact on the
development of all countries and regions. The increase in “greenhouse gas” emissions, principally CO2, is the
result of a combination of factors. These include mainly the influence of economic growth, industrialization,
and the increased use of hydrocarbons, mostly for energy generation and transportation.
Not only does climate change have a tremendous impact on economies, social security, and the
environment, but it is also a serious threat to national cultural heritages. With the increased frequency and
intensity of natural disasters and the growing level of damage they cause, the profound implications of climate
change for all aspects of human life must be better recognized if timely solutions to cope with them are to be
found and implemented.
Climate change regularly manifests itself in global warming, sea level rise, floods, and abnormally hot
weather, phenomena that are ever-present and inescapable. Nature seems to be forcing us to pay a very high
price for our invasive and environmentally destructive actions, taken in the name of “development” and based on the
misconceived idea that we are the “masters” who will overcome and stand above nature.
Climate Change in Vietnam in the Global Context and its Serious Consequences
Vietnam is one of the five countries that will be most severely affected by climate change. According to a
Từ Thị Loan, Doctor, associate professor, Vietnam Institute of Culture and Arts Studies, Ha Noi, Vietnam.
280 CULTURAL HERITAGE CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE
set of scenarios announced by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, there are three possibilities
for climate change and sea level rise in Vietnam, corresponding to a low, medium, or high rise of sea level.
According to the first, by the end of the 21st century, the average temperature across the country will
increase by 1.1-1.9 °C, resulting in a sea level rise of 65 cm. That would submerge more than 5,100 km2 of the
Mekong Delta, or nearly 13 percent of its area. Under the second scenario, by the end of the 21st century,
temperatures will have increased by 1.6-2.8 °C, total rainy season precipitation will have increased, whereas
that of the dry season will have decreased. This would result in a sea level rise of 75 cm, which would put 20
percent of the Mekong Delta below sea level. According to the third scenario, temperatures will increase by
3.6 °C and the sea level would rise by 1 m, resulting in the submergence more than 30 percent of the area of the
Mekong Delta (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, 2016).1
Because of the complexity and incomplete understanding of climate change, both in Vietnam and
globally, it was concluded that the first and third scenarios are unlikely. Rather, the second scenario is
considered the most likely to occur, and is therefore recommended as the baseline for designing action
plans to cope with climate change.
Based on that scenario, the climatic status of Vietnam in 2100, compared to the average of the period
1980-1999, is that temperature will have increased 2-3 °C, particularly in the Northeast and North Central
regions, and in the Central Highlands, where the temperature increase would be faster. Dry season rainfall will
decrease by up to 30 percent, whereas rainy season precipitation will increase by some 20-30 percent.
Exceptionally rainy days with double the present recorded amounts will increase in number. The sea level
rise would be the highest in the region between CàMau and Kiên Giang (82 cm), and the lowest in Móng Cái
(64 cm). The national average would be 72.6 cm (Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature and
Environment, 2008).2
In Vietnam, the effects of climate change can be seen clearly in recent years. The principal effects are:
(1) changes in the characteristics of rainfall, including amount, intensity, and the “precipitation process”, as
well as changes in the beginning and ending times of the rainy season; (2) changes in the frequency, intensity, and
patterns of extreme phenomena, including drought, forest fire, heavy rain, storm, flood, and tornadoes; and (3) the
increased atmospheric concentration of CO2.
The impact of climate change will become increasingly serious. In recent times, Vietnam has experienced
frequent unusual natural disasters, such as typhoons, floods, landslides, drought, damagingly cold weather, and
long heat spells. It is among the top 10 countries worldwide in the frequency of natural disasters. Increasingly,
climate change is more extreme and of a larger scale and scope that causes great damage to people and property.
Phenomena such as floods, cyclones, land subsidence, and landslides often occur in mountainous provinces,
whereas storms, floods, sea level rise, and salt intrusion occur in the coastal plains.
The Mekong Delta, which has more than 80 percent of its area situated at less than 2.5 m above sea
level, will be the region that suffers the most damage from climate change. Already the Mekong Delta has
been affected by changes in water level, salt intrusion, and flood tides.
1
According to this calculation, with 1 m rise in sea level, about 10 percent of the population would be affected directly, 90
percent of the rice area in the Mekong valley would be completely flooded, 4.4 percent of Vietnam would permanently flooded,
with about 20 percent of communes and 9,200 km of roads being destroyed.
2
Vietnam Association for Conservation of Nature and Environment, 2008. Conference on Global Climate Change and solutions
for Vietnam. HàNội, February 26.
CULTURAL HERITAGE CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE 281
It is predicted that climate change and its impacts on the environment will continue to worsen. These will be
extremely complex and unpredictable changes, such that promoting awareness of climate change and how to
adapt to it is becoming an extremely urgent necessity worldwide.
Overview of Vietnam Heritage Treasure

Up to 2018, in the tens of thousands of historical and cultural monuments and scenic spots in Vietnam,
95 monuments have been classified as “National Special Monuments”; 3,447 monuments classified as
“National Monument” and 6,092 classified as “Provincial Monument” (Ministry of Culture, Sports and
Tourism, 2018).
And, so far, eight tangible heritages in Vietnam have been recognized as a World Heritage Site. These are
the monuments of Huế, the scenic spot of Hạ Long Bay, Mỹ Sơn Holy Land, Hội An ancient town, Phong
Nha-Kẻ Bàng National Park, the Imperial Citadel of Thăng Long, the Citadel of Hồ Dynasty, and Trang An
relics complex. Other natural and cultural heritages will continue to be added.
Besides the archaeological monuments from the Stone Age, Bronze Age, and Metal Age, the unique
artistic architectural monuments of the past, such as communal houses, temples, pagodas and shrines, palaces,
tombs, ancient urban areas, trade villages, and trade streets, are among the historical and cultural monument
treasures of Vietnam. Similar are typical historical monuments of the struggle, construction, and protection of
the independence of the nation. These include the monuments of Bạch Đằng, Chi Lăng, Đống Đa, Điện Biên
Phủ, and the Hồ ChíMinh Road, as well as the Củ Chi tunnels, Vĩnh Mốc, the prisons of Côn Đảo and Phú
Quốc.
On the other hand, the tangible cultural heritage of Vietnam includes tens of millions of relics, antiques,
and valuable national treasures. These are preserved and displayed in 159 museums distributed throughout
the country, although most are concentrated in the great culture and tourist centers (Ministry of Culture, Sports
and Tourism, 2018).
The cultural heritage of Vietnam also includes typical intangible cultural heritages, such as oral materials,
handwriting, customs and habits, festivals, performing arts, traditional handicraft, outstanding medical values,
traditional pharmaceutics, culinary culture, and the traditional costumes of the ethnic groups of Vietnam. So far,
12 heritages have been recognized as representative of the intangible cultural heritage of humanity and
intangible heritage in need of urgent safeguarding. For example, these are the Huế royal court music, the Space
of Gong Culture in the Central Highlands, Bắc Ninh folk songs, Ca trù(ceremonial songs), the Gióng Festival of
Phù Đổng and Sóc Temples, hát xoan (folk songs of PhúThọ Province), etc.
Rich, diverse and unique cultural heritages are clustered in the North Delta and the Mekong Delta, the
Northern Mountain Region and the Central Highlands, along the coastal region, along the trans-Vietnam
road axis near major urban areas, and at major international border gateways. This provides favorable
conditions for organizing focal centers of tourism. For many years, Vietnamese tangible and intangible cultural
heritages have been an important tourist resource, and much attention has been paid to developing. However,
they are often subject to the impacts of nature.
The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Heritage in Vietnam

Tangible Cultural Heritage
According to the Law on Cultural Heritage, “tangible cultural heritage is the physical product of
historical, cultural, scientific value, including historical-cultural relics, landscapes, antiques, and national
treasures” (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2010, Article 4.2). Tangible cultural heritages in Vietnam are those
most frequently affected by the natural environment, so they will suffer increasing challenges from climate
change. These may be either direct effects, such as storms, floods, high temperature, and erosion caused by
heavy rains, or indirect effects, like high humidity, or damage caused by insects and micro-organisms that
proliferate easily.
Vietnam has thousands of historical and cultural monuments and famous landscapes spread all across the
country. Tangible cultural heritages are very abundant, with many tombs, temples, architecturally significant
buildings, and ancient religious establishments. These heritages face the great impact of climate change.
Regularly occurring annual rains and floods are damaging to the old houses and the historical and cultural relics
in Hội An, the Imperial Citadel of Thăng Long, and the relic complex in the Huế Ancient Capital.
Thunderstorms, flash floods, high temperatures, intense sunshine, and prolonged rain are threatening the
survival of Mỹ Sơn Holy Land and Citadel of the Hồ Dynasty, as well as the ecosystem of the Phong Nha-Kẻ
Bàng National Park.
For Huế Ancient Capital, several potential dangers can be identified resulting from climate change
affecting heritage sites and relics. The first is unusual natural disasters, like floods, heavy rains, and storms,
affect the clusters of relics and historical works, because they are usually located near the Hương River. This is
exemplified by the Gia Long tomb and the Minh Mang tomb, as well as ancient trees, historical landscapes,
various environments, and the system regulating water circulation in the area of the Imperial City. The second
is the increased average annual temperature which is causing increased humidity and atmospheric pollution that
affects the material quality of relics, particularly wooden relics with red-lacquer paint (sơn thếp), stone materials,
and traditional mortar. Thermal expansion coefficients vary according to the type of building material. As a
consequence, when the temperature changes the link between them is affected. Thus, a brick surface will be
destroyed rapidly by the action of rainwater and the salt within the rain. This then permits an increased growth
of plants on the brick surface and the development plant root systems on the wall. Mildew infestation also
increases. The third is the risk of sea level rise that can affect several relics located near the sea, such as Hải
Thanh Town (Phan, 2013, p. 395).
All heritages are now confronting the ravages of floods, storms, and heat, but those located in coastal areas
are particularly vulnerable. With a coastline of 3,500 km, a great many communal houses, temples, pagodas,
and shrines located in coastal villages are in danger of permanent disappearance as a consequence of marine
transgression. Each year the coast of Vietnam is ravaged and abraded by dozens of powerful storms. In
particular, monuments and archaeological sites, including the relics of cultures of Sa Huỳnh, in the Central
Region, and Óc Eo, in the Southern Region, will be very difficult to maintain and preserve in the face of
adverse weather conditions. This is because they are located mainly in coastal river basins and low-lying plains,
so are prone to being easily swept away, disturbed and filled-in when disaster strikes. In the deltas of Vietnam,
especially the Mekong Delta, thousands of old houses, works of art, and architectural monuments are
threatened with deterioration owing to changes in climate and other natural conditions, not to mention by
extreme and unusual weather phenomena. And the hot and humid tropical climate and increasing frequency of
inundation will create ideal conditions for termites, various “worms”, moss, and moulds to attack heritages.
Many architectural monuments of the Việt people in the Hồng River Delta are located along the bank of
the Hồng River. As a consequence, they are always at risk of being destroyed by flooding that causes erosion of
the banks and changes the river bed. History provides many examples of relics that suffered this fate. The Keo
Pagoda is one case. This famous pagoda is said to date from the Ly dynasty. In the 17th century, owing to a
landslide the pagoda was submerged in the Hồng River. The inhabitants of Dũng Nhuệ (Thái Bình) and Hành
Thiện (Nam Định) villages rebuilt the Keo Pagoda along both sides of the river, as it is nowadays. Flooding
also caused architecture relics in the low-lying areas to be long immersed in deep in water. This seriously
affected the frame, materials and decorative art of the structure (Nguyễn, 2013, p. 199).
Often the architectural relics of the Việt people in the Hồng Delta are connected intimately with landscape
space and are integrated with plants. Architecture and landscape space are two main closely interconnected
factors that create the values of an architectural relic. Many relics are hidden under a canopy of ancient trees,
creating a quiet and spiritual beauty. Climate change, though flooding, typhoon, and drought can destroy the
plants around relics. In contrast, dry weather heightens the risk of fire destroying relics.
Together with the passage of time, climate change is always a major threat to tangible cultural relics. In
the mountainous province of Lào Cai, the outdoor tangible cultural relics have been and will continue to be
influenced directly, and will suffer rapid degradation, as exemplified below. The Sa Pa Ancient Rock Field was
recognized by the Ministry of Culture and Information as a National Historic Relic in 1994. It has more than
200 rocks3, and is located along an 8 km2 area in the Mường Hoa Valley, of the communes of Lao Chải, Tả
Van, Hầu Thào, and Sử Pán. More than 60 percent of rocks have been seriously degraded. Over 50 rocks carry
a variety of patterns and complex characters that have not yet been deciphered. These engravings are the
only remaining legacy of an as yet unknown culture(s) that once inhabited the valley.4 As such they have
enormous value in terms of science, culture, and history. However, climate change has caused the surface of the
ancient carved rocks peel or crack, destroying all ancient characters and patterns (Lương Hồng, 2013, p. 58).
In addition, trade villages, cities, and a rich system of holy places are spread throughout Vietnam. They
are similarly at risk if soaked by floods or high tides or affected by salt intrusion. Architectural works and
ancient religious structures are usually made wood and brick, and so cannot easily withstand severe weather.
The impact of rising temperatures, scorching sunshine, or rain accompanied by windstorms will degrade such
structures rapidly.
Tens of millions of relics, antiques, and national treasures are preserved and displayed in 159 museums
throughout Vietnam. Climate change makes the preservation of artifacts and relics more difficult, since they are
usually made of paper, wood, bamboo, and iron, which are likely to be affected by changes in humidity, light
and temperature. Hot and humid tropical climates create ideal conditions for the growth of microorganisms
damaging to paper, woven, and leather goods, as well as to works of art such as oil paintings and silk paintings.
Other materials, like sculptured stone, reliefs, and epitaphs, are more resistant. However, under the effects of extreme
weather they are easily degraded, especially when kept constantly outdoors. Thus older architectural monuments
are vulnerable to the effects of climate.
In addition, Vietnam is also extremely rich in natural heritages and renowned scenic spots, especially in
coastal areas. Climate change will have a strong influence on biosphere reserves (Kiên Giang and CàMau),
forest ecosystems (U Minh Thượng and U Minh Hạ), national parks (PhúQuốc, Kiên Giang, and An Giang), coral
reef ecosystems, mangroves, and tropical forest sites. Some biosphere reserves and forest ecosystems will be
3
Survey and inventory data of 2007 of the Lào Cai Department of Culture and Information.
4
Product of the cooperation program between the Lào Cai Department of Culture and Information and the Ancient Far East
Institute.
reduced in extent or even disappear completely. Their loss could never be compensated for.
Intangible Cultural Heritage
The treasure of Vietnamese cultural heritages also includes the diverse and special intangible cultural
heritages of many ethnic communities, all with their traditions, customs, festivals, performing arts, traditional
crafts, indigenous knowledge of traditional medicine, cuisine, dress, and behavior, that are adapted to and
compatible with local ecological systems.
Intangible cultural heritage embraces the behavior of a person with respect to the natural environment, a
cultural creation made to adapt to the conditions of the natural environment, including the climate, mode of
living, means of production, and cultural activities associated with particular living conditions.
Climate change will alter the human ecological environment and living conditions of communities,
thereby modifying cultural space, and disrupting the environment nurturing the intangible cultural heritage
associated with it. Thus, the final consequence is that people change their cultural characteristics, such that some
types of traditional cultural heritage become distorted, fall into oblivion, or even disappear entirely. For example,
some forms of rituals and festivals associated with fisheries, agriculture, and forestry will gradually disappear
when a landscape and environment changes. The scarcity of traditional materials will lead to some products
of traditional trade villages being altered or lost (e.g., pottery, silk, seafood, agricultural products, and food
types, among many other things).
Climate change would also alter the production practices, farming methods, habits, and way of living of people.
That would accelerate the process of deformation and passing into oblivion of traditional cultural values
embedded in customs and practices, local knowledge, labor, production, behavior toward the natural
environment, and health care and protection. Climate change will have its most powerful impact on the lives
of those communities with livelihoods tied to primary production, i.e., agriculture, forestry, farming, and
fishing.
Intangible cultural heritage is an important component of the national cultural heritage, contributing to the
enrichment of human life and forming the manner, style, and cultural characteristics of each region. Lacking a
policy to respond promptly for their protection, these cultural heritages would be vulnerable to disappearance.
For example, the special natural conditions of the Mekong Delta have contributed to various types of unique
cultural heritage, and cultural creations associated with a canal civilization. Climate change and sea level rise
would inundate most of the land, submerging the cultural space with all its cultural assets.
The Gap between Awareness and Action in the Protection of Cultural Heritages
Although the government and communities have a fairly complete awareness of and information about
climate change and its harmful impact on economy, environment, and social security, their understanding of its
implications for cultural heritages seems vague and lacking urgency. As a consequence, the implementation of
coping measures and those to minimize its negative impacts on cultural heritages is slow.
On this issue, there is a large gap between the government and the general public in terms of
awareness and action. Responses of authorities at all levels, relevant ministries and agencies, and
communities are mostly passive, fragmentary, and unplanned. Heritage protection plans are not made in a
positive, consistent, and proactive manner. Local awareness of prevention measures and the protection of
cultural heritages faced with the impacts of climate change are still very sketchy and superficial. Many people are
indifferent and passive to the point of being irresponsible regarding the potential risks of climate change.
In Vietnam, most researches to provide a scientific basis for actions to protect cultural heritages and cope with
climate change are in its initial stages. Although some scientific themes have been developed by institutes,
and a number of programs and action plans for heritage conservation set up, they lack uniformity and
coordination among the ministries, agencies, and sectors involved. In reality, they do not provide practical
solutions to the problems raised by climate change.
The Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism also has made preliminary studies on this issue, mainly to identify
the current status of climate change impacts on its areas of responsibility. However, the participation of State
specialized management agencies is incomplete, and the ministry lacks a long-term strategy and plans for this work.
Several Measures for Protecting Cultural Heritages

Protection of cultural heritages against climate change is urgent and immediate, yet long-term and
complicated. Implementation of programs for coping with and reducing climate change impacts on cultural
heritages must be embedded within the overall strategies of the relevant ministries and agencies. At the same
time, implementation should be coordinated and integrated with the social and economic development
programs of each locality.
To help reduce the risk of climate change and cope with its impacts on cultural heritages, attention should be
paid to some of the following solutions.
Solutions to Raise Awareness and Promote Education
First, it is necessary to raise government and public awareness about the harmful effects of climate change
on cultural heritages. As part of this, it is advisable to strengthen information and disseminate knowledge for
coping with climate change to preserve the cultural heritages of Vietnam.
Second, to ensure the protection of cultural heritage in an environmentally friendly, non-invasive manner, it is
necessary to promote education and encourage the general public to change its behavior toward the environment.
Often, the causes of climate change include both natural and human agents, although the latter play the major
role.
Third, it is advisable to design the contents, approaches, and practical methods to implement extensive
educational programs, in order to promote the general public’s interest in protecting cultural heritages against
climate change.
Solutions to Establish a Scientific Basis for Actions
It is necessary to promote scientific research for assessing the risk, scope, and transformation of climate
change having an impact on cultural heritages. It is essential to have in-depth research for a complete and
comprehensive evaluation to obtain practical and accurate data that will provide a sound basis for action.
It is necessary to inventory heritages and heritage groups with a high risk of being destroyed or
disappearing from the impacts of climate change. This activity should focus on the coastal provinces of
Vietnam. It is essential to promptly remove or protect heritages from the threat of natural disasters. Also, it is
advisable to develop research programs that follow closely the conditions in each region, and to propose
response plans appropriate to each object.
It is necessary to create a long-term strategy to deal with climate change and prevent or mitigate its
impacts. Implementation must be in stages, and realized via programs and specific action plans.
Solutions to Implement the Action Plan

To realize the programs and action plans stated above, it is necessary to have specific solutions consistent with the
protection of the cultural heritages in different geographical areas.
It is imperative to attract financial and human resources to enable timely and specific responses aimed at
preventing or slowing down the process of climate change, at reducing its impact on cultural heritages, and at
adapting to climate change.
It is necessary to apply advanced science and technology, and therefore necessary to strengthen
international cooperation to address issues of climate change and cultural heritage conservation. It is necessary
to enlist the support of the communities, as well as national and international organizations.
Solutions for Synchronous Operation
It is necessary to link ministries, industries, and sectors in coordinated action to deal with climate change, so
that the protection of cultural heritages is synchronized between the central and local levels, and between
government and the general public.
The preservation and promotion of Vietnamese cultural heritage values cannot be separated from other
activities, including environmental protection, prevention of and recovery from natural disasters, and coping with
and reducing the impacts of climate change.
Mitigation of the negative impacts of climate change on the development of all aspects of the country in general,
and on protection of the national cultural heritages in particular is now an urgent and shared task. This task
requires the support, efforts, enthusiasm, wisdom, and commitment of the whole of Vietnamese society,
including those who work on cultural aspects.
Conclusion
As one of the countries most heavily affected by climate change, Vietnam considers it a vital issue to deal
with. The existence of climate change in Vietnam has become clearer than ever. Increasing temperatures, rising
sea levels will cause flooding, salinity, water sources affecting agriculture, causing great risks to industry and
future socio-economic systems.
Therefore, Viet Nam's response to climate change must be linked to and towards sustainable development,
based on low carbon economy and green growth, taking advantage of opportunities to innovate and enhance
national strength. The government must conduct at the same time minimize greenhouse gas emissions and
adapt to climate change, in which adaptation in the first decades of the 21st century must be the focus.
In responding to climate change, solutions must be integrated, systematic, synchronous, interdisciplinary,
inter-regional, combining global and national, prioritizing focus suitable to each stage. In addition, solutions
must be fully considered on the basis of science, economic efficiency and taking into account the risks and
uncertainties of climate change, combining technical solutions and social, cultural solutions, combining
scientific knowledge and indigenous knowledge.
References
Department of Meteorology and Hydrology. (2010). Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and Department of Natural
Resources & Environment of Quảng Bì nh Province. Conference on "Raising Awareness to Cope With Climate Change”,
March 5, Quảng Bình Province, Vietnam.
Lương Hồng, Q. (2013). Initial assessment of impacts of climate change on cultural and artistic activities. HàNội: Social Sciences
Publinshing House.
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. (2018). Report on development of culture, sports and tourism of Vietnam. Retrieved
from https://bvhttdl.gov.vn/di-san-van-hoa-620492.htm
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. (2016). Three climate change scenarios. Retrieved from
http://www.imh.ac.vn/files/doc/KichbanBDKH/TTkichban_2016.pdf
Nguyễn, T. T. T. (2013). Impact of climate change on the architectural heritage of the Hồng River Delta and Cửu Long Deltas,
Vietnam. HàNội: Social Sciences Publinshing House.
Phan, T. H. (2013). The cultural heritage of Huế confronting climate change. HàNội: Social Sciences Publinshing House.
Socialist Republic of Vietnam. (2010). Law on cultural heritage. Retrieved from https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/
Van-hoa-Xa-hoi/Van-ban-hop-nhat-10-VBHN-VPQH-2013-hop-nhat-Luat-di-san-van-hoa-204826.aspx
UNDP. (2008). The fight against climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. Human Development Report 2007-2008.
Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf
Võ, Q. (2009). Climate change and biodiversity in Vietnam. Bulletin No. 219, HàNội National University.
Vũ, V. (2009). Climate change: Human threat in the future. Electronic Newspapers, June 1, 2009.
doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.06.004
D
DAVID PUBLISHING
Al-Maliki Tribal Policy and the Emergence of the

New Shaykhs in Iraq
Haidar Reda
Chiba University, Chiba, Japan
The state collapse in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003 resulted in a vacuum of state institution. This helped the
emergence and increase of sectarian violence between Shia and Sunni, which led to civil war in 2006-2007. In
order to end the violence and to alienate Al-Qaeda, the US authorities and Iraqi government began supporting tribal
leaders during the civil war. In 2008, the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki created tribal council called (Majālis
al-Asnād) to utilize the tribal groups mainly belong to Shia sect. This article tries to explain the emergence of new
social strata called New Shaykhs in Iraqi society, as a result of Maliki’s tribal policy. It is due to the failed state
situation in Iraq since 2003 which helped non-state actors to be more and more active, such as new tribal leaders.
This paper focus on the political manipulation of tribal societies which is different after 2003, compared to
traditional policy in Iraq which have used and mobilized the tribal societies.
Keywords: failed state, tribalism, Iraq, sectarian violence
Introduction
The collapse of the regime in Iraq in 2003 by US forces brought a vacuum of state institutions. Number of
casualties of both US soldiers and Iraqi civilians increased after “the end of the major combat” that Bush
administration declared in 1 May 2003 and reached to the level of “civil war” during 2006-2007, which was
understood as “sectarian conflicts”. In order to end such increase of sectarian hostility and anti-US violence, the
US authorities and Iraqi government empowered the tribe leaders in Anbar province to stabilize the security
and end the anti-US Sunni revolt and to fight Al-Qaeda1 in Iraq. In this process, however, then the Prime
Minister Nouri Al-Maliki2 introduced his own way to utilize the tribal groups, supporting new tribe leaders in
Baghdad that mainly belong to Shia sect for the propose to create his supportive body there. In this way, the
importance of tribes and tribe leaders in the social and political life of Iraq increased after 2003 in various
phases.
This article tries to explain the role of tribal society in Iraq during Al-Maliki role 2006-2014, and how
political actors try to manipulate the power and influence of tribal groups in Iraq. It is true that the rulers in Iraq
historically used the tribal forces in order to use them as a political tool, from the era of Ottoman to the regime
of Saddam Hussein. However, we can find a difference in the pattern of tribal policy in the post-2003 regime,
Haidar Reda, Ph.D. student, Graduate School of Humanities and Studies of Public Affairs, Chiba University, Chiba, Japan.
1
Al-Qaeda in Iraq appeared for the first time in 2004 when al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant leader, already leading
insurgent attacks against foreign troops and Shia in Iraq, formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda.
2
Nori Kamil Al-Maliki is an Iraqi Shia politician who was Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 2014. He is secretary-general of
the Islamic Dawa Party.
AL-MALIKI TRIBAL POLICY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SHAYKHS IN IRAQ 289
compared to the historical usage before. The essential questions to be asked here are; why the way of tribal
mobilization is new in Al-Maliki administration (2006-2014), comparing with those of previous regimes? How
do tribal leaders contribute to stabilizing and de-stabilizing the country after 2003?
Theoretical framework of this article is based on Robert I. Rotberg failed state theory. Failed states suffer
from limited power to influence social control. According to Robert I. Rotberg (2007), failed states can be
characterized as undergoing violent conflict. Often the state has little to no effective control over outlying areas
and little connection to, or support from, most of the population. Collapse states are extreme cases of failed
states, in which there is a vacuum of authority, and what little provision of political goods does exist tends to be
provided on a localized level by forces that have little control at the state level. In the aftermath of state
collapse, the geographical boundaries are meaningless and decision-making power leaks out to neighbors and
international actors as they are dragged into the conflict (Dodge 2007, p. 26).
In the case of Iraq, failed state theory can be best applied in the post-2003 period. In failed state, political
elite focuses on military and security solutions instead of political reforms (Lynch 2016, p. 34). The most
dramatic case was that of Nouri Al-Maliki creating new tribe leaders and tribe assembly in Baghdad and other
Shia areas in the south to stabilize the security and to gain political and public support.
Traditionally Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa share in common that they are based on tribal
societies and tribal nature remains there. The word tribe (‘ashīrah) refers to a group of people sharing in
common same male ancestor and the word Shaykh refers to tribe leader. Shaykhs usually belong to strong
families with strong influence over the society (Al-‘Amary, 1992, pp. 28-31).
Tribal Uprising Against Al-Qaeda

During this quasi-civil war in 2006-2007, the US forces and the new Iraqi government had no control over
many territories especially in the north west of Iraq. They began in 2007 arming the tribes to fight against
Al-Qaeda, especially in Anbar Province, west to Baghdad where the most population are Sunni and north of
Babil Province, suburb of Baghdad, in order to end the anti-US Sunni revolt, Al-Qaeda, and stabilize those
territories (Gartenstein-Ross & Jenson, 2015).
Sahwa al-‘A’shā’ir (Tribal Awaking) was established in order to fight against Al-Qaeda in al-Anbar city,
north-west of Baghdad. Shaykhs (tribal leaders) gathered in Anbar and announced the Sahwa in September
2006 to fight against Al-Qaeda. There are many factors that made the tribes to rise against Al-Qaeda. First,
al-Zarqawi, and other leaders of Al-Qaeda also rejected any kind of political formations because they believed
all matters should be solved under the leadership of the Al-Qaeda. Therefore, the leaders of Al-Qaeda tried to
eliminate the tribe leaders and make the tribesman loyal only to Al-Qaeda (Gartenstein-Ross & Jenson, 2015,
103-104). Second, Al-Qaeda forbade Sunnis to join the new political life which made the new government
majority Shia and Kurds. Moreover, Al-Qaeda organized assassination against Sunni politicians and tribe
leaders who joined the new regime, which created conflicts within the tribes because of the revenge system
(Benraad, 2011).
The Iraqi government increased the budget for Anbar province and supported the Sahwa with money and
weapons. In addition, the tribal leaders asked the US authorities and the Iraqi government to release all prisoners
who were kept in prison without charges and deploy tribesmen as the national army. The tribal leaders of Anbar
asked the US authorities to deploy more of their tribesmen into the army to stop the central government from
sending soldiers from other cities, mainly from Shia cities, to protect the Sunni areas (BBC, 2007).
290 AL-MALIKI TRIBAL POLICY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SHAYKHS IN IRAQ
This motivated other tribes, especially Shia, to cooperate with the government against the Shia militias,
such as al-Mahdi Army, led by al-Sadr Tendency in their towns; the case typically is the battle in Basra
between Iraqi army and Mahdi Army on March 2008. This cooperation between the government and the tribes
led to stabilization and decline in sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia. According to witnesses whom the
author conducted interviews, regular meetings were organized among Sunni and Shia tribe leaders to discuss
the ending and prevention of any sectarian conflict in the future. A Shia interviewee <A> from Baghdad said in
November 20173,
During the conflict and the rise of militia, we couldn’t talk and stop them because they will consider us as betrayers.
After Jaysh al-Mahdi (Shia militia) did a lot of atrocities, not only against Wahhabism, but also against us, against Shia for
ransom or if there is was a personal problem. Then people realized and began helping the government by providing
information. In 2008 we began cooperating with other Sunni Shaykhs to end the violence, because we all are brothers, and
to prevent those criminals to create problems.
Another Shia interviewee from Baghdad Shaykh <B> said in November 2017:
We have to end this violence, there is no such thing Shia and Sunni. We are all Arabs; I have many Shia and Sunni
members in my tribe here in Baghdad. I protect them all. No one can kill or fight with his own cousin. In Baghdad it’s
different than rural areas so our main Shaykhs don’t really know what’s going on here in Baghdad.
The tribal fighting against Al-Qaeda began in Anbar, and then it spread to other rural areas, mainly in
Salahuddin, Baghdad, north Babel, and Diyala. The US forces supported also the tribes in these other areas
(Al-Malaf Press, 2007). However, beside the expected outcome, fighting against Al-Qaeda, this also increased
the clashes between the tribes.
Creation of Majālis al-Asnād

After the model of Sahwa al-‘A’shā’ir was successful in Anbar, the government of Nuri Al-Maliki
announced the establishment of Majālis Al-‘asnād in 2008, a Baghdad based council of Shaykhs chosen by the
government. The role of this council was not only to provide security assistance and solve the problems among
tribes but also to serve as a connection between the people and the government, according to the official
website of the Prime Minister Majālis Al-‘asnād (2008). Most of these councilors were freshly bestowed with
the title of a Shaykh by the prime minister office, but all of them were chosen according to their loyalty to the
government. They are called as “new Shaykhs” among the tribal society in order to differentiate from
traditionally established tribal system. Thus, the author used the term “New Shaykh” to describe this newly
appointed tribal leaders politically selected by the post-war regime in this paper. According to the witnesses,
the new Shaykhs received identification cards as well from the ministry of interior to prove their new title and
role. In November 2017, an interviewee from Baghdad <C> said:
I’m a Shaykh of a fakhdh, our general Shaykh i.e., Shaykh al-‘ashīra asked me to be Shaykh in Baghdad to take care
of our people because there are many people who claim to be Shaykhs. Those new Shaykhs created many problems
because they don’t know about our tribal traditions, norms, and laws. Most of them belong to or they are supported by
political parties and they claim to be Shaykh just because they have ID issued by the ministry of interior”.
3
In 2017, I conducted a field research in Iraq from November 6th to January 25th. For security reasons, I chose not to mention
the names of Shaykhs I interviewed. On November 12th, I interviewed Shaykh A in Baghdad. On November 20th, I interviewed
Shaykh B in Baghdad. On November 21st, I interviewed Shaykh C in Baghdad. On November 10th, I interviewed Shaykh D in
Baghdad. On January 24th, I interviewed person E in Baghdad. On November 19th, I interviewed Syed F in Baghdad. On
November 26th, I interviewed Shaykh G in Babel. And, Shaykh H. was interviewed on November 17th in Baghdad.
The Maliki tribal policy created conflicts between different tribes and even among people of the same tribe.
Interviewees point out the presence of three types of Shaykhs under and after Al-Maliki administration: original
Shaykhs (who inherited the title from their fathers), 1990’s Shaykhs, appointed by Saddam Hussein, and 2003’s
Shaykhs, nominated by Nori Al Malik. An interviewee, for example, Shaykh <D> from Baghdad said, in
November 2017:
I’m not actually a Shaykh, but our Shaykh asked me to be his representative in Baghdad. The violence in 2006-2007
ended because people got tired of the militia’s behavior towards them and began helping the security forces, which also
increased the government’s power. Both Sunni and Shia tribal leaders put aside their hatred for each other and started
communicating, supporting the official forces and solving whatever conflicts they could through tribal norms. Al-Maliki
continued a similar policy to Saddam’s by creating Shaykhs. We call them Shaykhs of 1990s. Al-Maliki also began
creating new tribe leaders to support him and he claimed they helped ending violence, but in fact they did not, they formed
groups similar to mafias. Every day we hear of tribal violence in Baghdad, they are using gunfire. It wasn’t like that
before.
The third type of Shaykhs mentioned above is also called by some people “rental tribe leaders”. It means
that these Shaykhs, in exchange for money, will represent whoever is in need of their services, usually
wrongdoers, and try to solve any problem the tribal way. These practices are, in truth, rejected by the tribal
societies. An interviewee <E>said:
Last year a group of people robbed my brother. We sued them (they have some footage of the robbers caught by a
security camera), but the case is still going in the court. The Judge asked us if we have tried to solve it the tribal way. The
truth is that we tried to do so, but they sent us rental tribal leaders which we can’t and won’t accept. However, the Judge
postponed the case for another week hoping it would be solved through tribal leaders.
Moreover, a tribal man4 belonging to al-Hachim tribe provided me with a copy of a letter signed by the
original tribe leaders of al-Hachim, declaring that there is no tribe leader in Baghdad and that the new tribal
leader named (Sattar Karim) does not represent al-Hachim tribe in Baghdad. At the end of the letter, it is
mentioned that a copy of the letter was given to the Ministry of Interior, Department of Tribal Affairs. During
the field research in Iraq on 2017-2018, the author attends several tribe meetings and heard of similar cases of
the new tribe leaders in Baghdad creating even more problems due to their lack of understanding of tribal
norms.
Failing to establish strong state against society, Al-Maliki too, as others did before him, relied on tribes to
stabilize the country. However, many old tribe Shaykhs believed he tried to gain political influence and power.
In November 2017, Shaykh <G> from Babel an interviewee described the situation saying:
I’m Shaykh, son of Shaykh. Tribesmen come to us, from the city and villages, for help if they have any problem. The
problems increased after 2003, particularly related to violence. We could solve many problems using our connections with
other real tribe leaders Shia and Sunni. However, the main problem we faced was that of some new tribe leaders that were
hired by Al-Maliki or the government. Many of the new tribe leaders created problems because they don’t know our rules.
Moreover, other political parties began to create new tribe leaders just to gain power and to show popularity.
Following an example from Baghdad, Majālis al-Asnād offices were created all over Shiite areas in
Southern Iraq, which created problems with the ruling political parties of these areas. The governor of Al
Diwaniyah even threatened to imprison anyone planning to open any Majālis al-Asnād other than his own
4
During my field research on January 2018, I attend a tribal meeting and met Firas al-Hachimi. On February 2019, he sent me a
copy of the letter.
(Azzaman, 08-14-2008). Every political party started appointing new Shaykhs and creating similar councils to
gain popularity.
The Consequences of Al-Maliki’s Retribalization Policy Since 2006

Using a tribe to gain political power or to stabilize an area was not a new strategy in Iraq. The novelty of
Al-Maliki’s policy is based on two points: The first is reliance on newly appointed tribe leaders in urban areas,
as opposed to the Ottoman’s, British, and Saddam’s regimes which relied on tribes only in rural areas. Second,
he relied mainly on Shia tribe leaders.
The new tribe leaders do not have in fact any real social power, beside the support from the political
parties that appointed them or from the militias. This can be also understood from the words of an interviewee
<F> who belong to Sādah family5 from Baghdad, in November 2017:
I often become a mediator when there is a fight between tribes. The tribal problems increased in Baghdad recently,
particularly since 2008. The problem is that after 2008 many Shaykhs appeared from nowhere and created a few groups
around them to fight. Those Shaykhs don’t know much about the rules of Shaykhs. However, some of them get some
support from some political parties. We are trying not to turn any tribal conflict into a sectarian one because it will be hard
to solve, and it might spread to other areas. We get support from the authorities; we visit the police officers and army to
talk about what’s going in the area.
According to the interviewees, soon after forming Majālis al-Asnād in 2008, various persons started
claiming that they were new Shaykhs and they formed new clans. People who needed protection were hiring
mainly the clansmen of these new “Shaykhs”. This made the new tribe leaders and their groups function like
mafia. Any kind of violence could be solved through the tribe instead of the state’s justice. According to the
witnesses, there were cases of tribesmen carrying guns and attacking houses or buildings belonging to people
from other tribes, while the police and the army remained silent. This made the people seek tribe’s justice more
than state justice. In November 2017, Shaykh <H> from Baghdad summarized it by saying:
I tried to solve some problems; people rather prefer tribal solutions than governmental help. If there is a tribal conflict
or any kind of problem and tribesmen attack one house using guns, the police won’t intervene because they believe it will
be solved through tribe leaders. There are even people from other tribes both Sunni and Shia that came to me asking for
help and protection. Today, the protection of tribe is the most important thing to get.
The tribes became stronger after the creation of Majālis al-Asnād and started creating more violence,
especially in Baghdad. A declaration was signed in February 2018 by Minister of Interior and some tribe
leaders. The tribal leaders promised the government that not to attack the families of people who wronged in
their eyes or other tribes using guns, nor to threaten them to leave the city (Baghdad Today, 2018).
The tribes in Anbar grew stronger after the creation of Sahwa, which made Nori Al-Maliki afraid of them.
In 2008, he began arresting members of Sahwa to weaken their forces (Azzaman, 08-23-2008). Meanwhile, he
kept supporting the Shia tribe leaders that were loyal to him. The opposition political parties consider this act of
Al-Maliki and his party as means to gain more power (Al Mada, 09-13-2013). However, most of the political
parties and Shia militias began creating new tribe leaders and support them in return those tribe leaders support
these parties.
5
The Sādah family claim to be descendants of the Prophet Muhammed, to be a Sayyid (singular) is a matter of birth. In a way,
Sādah can be categorized as a part of tribal society and as a part of religious circle, and it played a role to bridge between the two.
Soon after the U.S. troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, Al-Maliki and his government issued an
arrest warrant for the Sunni politician, vice president and the leader of the Iraqi Islamic party Tareq Al Hashimi,
who fled the country in December 19th, 2011. It was followed by the arrest the bodyguard of another Sunni
political leader and finance minister, Rafi’ Al Essawi in 2012, by counterterrorism forces controlled by
Al-Maliki. Moreover, a Sunni politician and parliament member Ahmad Al Alwani was arrested after clashes
occurred with the counterterrorism forces (Adnan & Arango, 2012).
Sunnis in Anbar city began protesting against the government as they considered these acts were against
Sunni people. The tribe leaders in Anbar supported these protests by providing them with daily meals and daily
speeches encouraging people to join the crowd and demand their right and accuse the Shia-led government of
being sectarian (The Civil-Military Fusion Centre [CFC] April, 2013). On the other hand, Al-Maliki accused
the protest leaders of inciting violence, sectarianism, and sympathy for Al-Qaeda. The government lost control
of many territories in Anbar after the protest turn to violence and some soldiers were killed. Moreover, a Sunni
tribe leader in Anbar, Ali Hatem Al Sulaiman6, claimed to be the head of the Tribal Military Council, which
was also called Tribal Revolutionary He supposed that the council will get rid of the Shia-led government and
he be in charge of the security in Anbar (Gartenstein-Ross & Jenson, 2015).
This led to a split among Sunni tribes in Anbar on how to address this crisis. The head of Sahwa, Abu
Risha, decided to coordinate with Al-Maliki to end the crises (Ali Inoma, 2014). Thus, Maliki policy in 2011
produced a tribal conflict among Sunni tribes and political parties in Anbar over the leadership (Alhayat, 2018).
The Maliki policy towards the tribes had a big impact on the relationship among the tribal societies in Iraq.
Conclusion
After the US invasion to Iraq, the state was newly constructed without solid social supportive base.
Therefore, the US authorities and Iraqi government had to rely on the tribes to stabilize the state, which gave
the tribes an opportunity to become an essential authority. The US authorities cooperated with the tribes,
especially Sunni tribes, to fight against Al-Qaeda. To balance the power between Sunni and Shia tribes,
Al-Maliki created new tribal leaders and formed what it is called Majālis al-Asnād.
Moreover, the tribal policy from 2008 is the result of social transformation of the Iraqi society, particularly
in the urban areas. The failed and collapsed state in Iraq after 2003, allowed the increasing number of non-state
actors in Iraq to be more and more active, such as sectarian groups, tribal groups, and mafia. The state started
providing Shaykhs with weapons, money, and authority over their tribesmen to help decrease and end sectarian
violence and to stabilize the security. The result is that these actions ended the sectarian violence, but they also
tribalized the society and determined people to seek tribal justice over state justice.
The implication of Al-Maliki tribal policy is, first, that it created conflict between new and old Shaykhs;
second, it tribalized the urban areas particularly in Baghdad. Third, instead of relying on state security, people
and even government relied on tribal society to solve problems among people and stabilized the security.
However, Al-Maliki did not take advantage of security stabilized after 2008 and do political reformation but
instead he relied on the sectarian and tribal groups which led to violence again in 2011.
6
Ali Hatem al-Sulaiman is a Shaykh of al-Dulaimi tribe in Anbar. He stablished the tribal military council in 2014 to fight
against the Shia-led government, for more details see https://is.gd/vSYDzk.
References
Adnan, D., & Arango, T. (2012). Arrest of a Sunni Minister’s bodyguards prompts protests in Iraq. The New York Times.
Retrieved 7/20/2018 from https://is.gd/136rye
Al-‘Amry, T. A. (1992). Mawsw’ah al-‘ashāir al-‘arāqyah. Baghdad: Dar Al-Shu’wn Al-thqafyah Al-‘amah.
Alhayat. (2018). Retrieved 8/28/2018 from https://is.gd/Mu9dD3
Ali Inoma. (2014). Anbar witnesses political divide amid ongoing clashes. AlMonitor. Retrieved 7/11/2018 from
http://www.almonitor
Al-Malaf Press. (2007). Retrieved 7/20/2018 from https://is.gd/uhqlol
Baghdad Today. (2018). Retrieved 12/22/2018 from https://is.gd/mwhfIE
BBC. (2007). Retrieved 6/24/2018 from https://is.gd/ojqVh2
Benraad, M. (2011). Iraq’s tribal “Sahwa”: Its rise and Fall XVIII. Retrieved 8/20/2018 from https://is.gd/7KYguI
Dodge, T. (2007). State collapse and the rise of identity politics. In M. E. Bouillon, D. Malone, and B. Rowswell (Eds.), Iraq:
Preventing a new generation of conflict. Boulder, London: L. Rienner (A project of the International Peace Academy).
Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Jenson, S. (2015). The role of Iraqi Tribes after the Islamic State’s Ascendance. Retrieved 5/20/2018
from https://is.gd/M8tuoB
Lynch, M. (2016). Failed states and ungoverned spaces. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
668(1), 24-35. doi: 10.1177/0002716216666028
Majālis al-Asnād. (2018). Prime minister official website. Baghdad. Retrieved 7/15/2018 from https://is.gd/VZdN05
Rice, S. E., Graff, C., & Pascual, C. (2010). Confronting poverty: Weak states and U.S. national security. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press.
Rotberg, R. I. (2007). When states fail: Causes and consequences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
The Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC). (April, 2013). The re-awakening of Anbar. Retrieved 8/22/2018 from
https://is.gd/O93wbv

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International Relations

David Publishing Company

Aims and Scope:

David Publishing Company

David Publishing Company

Editorial Board Members of International Relations and Diplomacy:

Cultural Heritage Confronting Climate Change 279

Tribal Policy in Iraq

Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts under the Second

The Abe Administration’s NRC

The NKP’s NRCs and the Implication

Cross-Strait Relations―From the Sole China, Two Chinas and

China as a Civilization State

The Sole Legitimate Representative of All China

The Merger of a Greater China

word to describe the cross-strait relations in every aspect.

Separate Identities in the Present

The Japan Paradox

The Chinese Language Orthodoxy

Political Answers Empowered by the Economic Greater China

A Cultural Greater China: Harmony but not Uniformity

Taipei: The Nearest City to Beijing

Cultural Heritage Confronting Climate Change

Keywords: climate change, cultural heritage, Vietnam

Overview of Vietnam Heritage Treasure

The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Heritage in Vietnam

Several Measures for Protecting Cultural Heritages

Solutions to Implement the Action Plan

Al-Maliki Tribal Policy and the Emergence of the

Keywords: failed state, tribalism, Iraq, sectarian violence

Tribal Uprising Against Al-Qaeda

Creation of Majālis al-Asnād

The Consequences of Al-Maliki’s Retribalization Policy Since 2006

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