CASE DIGEST : Estrada Vs Escritor

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

FACTS : Complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly
have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Estrada is not personally related either to Escritor or her partner.
Nevertheless, he filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes
the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act. Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already
a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr.
without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is
in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991
a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about
the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.

ISSUE : Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of "gross and immoral
conduct."

HELD : The two streams of jurisprudence - separationist or accommodationist - are anchored on a different
reading of the "wall of separation." Separationist - This approach erects an absolute barrier to formal
interdependence of religion and state. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect,
from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs placed on
believers. the strict neutrality or separationist view is largely used by the Court, showing the Court’s tendency to
press relentlessly towards a more secular society Accommodationist - Benevolent neutrality thus recognizes that
religion plays an important role in the public life of the United States as shown by many traditional government
practices which An accommodationist holds that it is good public policy, and sometimes constitutionally required,
for the state to make conscious and deliberate efforts to avoid interference with religious freedom. On the other
hand, the strict neutrality adherent believes that it is good public policy, and also constitutionally required, for
the government to avoid religion-specific policy even at the cost of inhibiting religious exercise First, the
accommodationist interpretation is most consistent with the language of the First Amendment. Second, the
accommodationist position best achieves the purposes of the First Amendment. Third, the accommodationist
interpretation is particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority religions from the inevitable effects of
majoritarianism, which include ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority Fourth, the
accommodationist position is practical as it is a commonsensical way to deal with the various needs and beliefs
of different faiths in a pluralistic nation. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved
for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state’s interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the
state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary In applying the test,
the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that
choosing between keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the
one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand, puts
a burden on her free exercise of religion The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious
belief. Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using the
"Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness" to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration
only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only after an
administrative case for immorality was filed against her. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private
person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged
by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue
in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest
it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and
punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)

Facts of the case

Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-
secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-
public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular
subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public
elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.

The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed
that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant
Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion
to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island
who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held
that the statute violated the First Amendment.

Question

Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment?

Conclusion

8–1 DECISION FOR LEMON

MAJORITY OPINION BY WARREN E. BURGER

Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that a statute
must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have
a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither promotes nor inhibits
religion, and it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that
both the state statutes in question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire of the
states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The
Court did not reach a holding regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes
constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount
of oversight of teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion
into secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of religious
education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state
funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such institutions
inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state. The Court also
noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming
politically divisive.

In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the intrusion of the government into the
running of non-public schools through grants and other funding creates the entanglement that the
Establishment Clause prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools are so thoroughly governed by
religious ideologies that any amount of public funding supports those doctrines, which the Framers of the
Constitution dictated the government must not do. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence, and
Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts relating to case numbers 569 and 570. Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate concurrence in which he argued that the danger was not only that religion
would infiltrate the government, but also that the government would push secularization onto religious
creeds. An analysis of the statutes in question shows that they impermissible involve the government in
“essentially religious activities,” which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority opinion goes too
far and, in restricting the use of state funds in non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public
funds for secular education. He argued that there was no proof that religion would invade secular education
or that the government oversight of the use of public funds would be so extensive as to constitute
entanglement.

Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of case number 89.

Held: Both statutes are unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, as the
cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes involves excessive entanglement
between government and religion. Pp.403 U. S. 611-625.

(a) The entanglement in the Rhode Island program arises because of the religious activity and purpose of
the church-affiliated schools, especially with respect to children of impressionable age in the primary grades,
and the dangers that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of religious
from purely secular aspects of elementary education in such schools. These factors require continuing state
surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected. Furthermore, under the Act, the government must inspect school records to determine what part
of the expenditures is attributable to secular education, as opposed to religious activity, in the event a
nonpublic school's expenditures per pupil exceed the comparable figures for public schools. Pp. 403 U. S.
615-620.

(b) The entanglement in the Pennsylvania program also arises from the restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role and the state supervision of nonpublic
school accounting procedures required to establish the cost of secular, as distinguished from religious,
education. In addition, the Pennsylvania statute has the further defect of providing continuing financial aid
directly to the church-related schools. Historically, governmental control and surveillance measures tend to
follow cash grant programs, and here the government's post-audit power to inspect the financial records of
church-related schools creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state. Pp. 403
U. S. 620-622.

(c) Political division along religious lines was one of the evils at which the First Amendment aimed, and in
these programs, where successive and probably permanent annual appropriations that benefit relatively
few religious groups are involved, political fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines are likely to be
intensified. Pp. 403 U. S. 622-624.
(d) Unlike the tax exemption for places of religious worship, upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S.
664, which was based on a practice of 200 years, these innovative programs have self-perpetuating and
self-expanding propensities which provide a warning signal against entanglement between government and
religion. Pp. 624-625.
No. 89, 310 F.Supp. 35, reversed and remanded; Nos. 569 and 570, 316 F.Supp. 112, affirmed.

BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACK, DOUGLAS, HARLAN, STEWART,
MARSHALL (as to Nos. 569 and 570), and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 403 U. S. 625, in which BLACK, J., joined, and in which MARSHALL, J. (as to Nos. 569
and 570), joined, filing a separate statement, post, p. 403 U. S. 642. BRENNAN, J., filed a concurring
opinion, post, p. 403 U. S. 642. WHITE, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in No. 89 and
dissenting in Nos. 569 and 570, post, p. 403 U. S. 661. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration
or decision of No. 89.
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
Facts of the case

A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks
to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of
Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education,
requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the
board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the
boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing,
but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school
they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.

Question

Do the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment forbid New York from
requiring that public school boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without cost?

Conclusion

6–3 DECISION

MAJORITY OPINION BY BYRON R. WHITE

No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the Court applied the test constructed in
Abington School District v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative purpose and necessary
effects of the statute did not advance any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate the
First Amendment. Because the books were given to the students, rather than the parochial schools
themselves, the Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and children, not schools."

Syllabus

New York's Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge
to all students in grades seven to 12, including those in private schools. Appellant school boards sought a
declaration that the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the State and Federal Constitutions,
an order barring appellee Commissioner of Education from removing appellants' members from office for
failing to comply with it, and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to
be lent to parochial students. The trial court held the law unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and entered summary judgment for appellants on the pleadings; the Appellate Division
reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed since appellant school boards had no standing to attack the
statute, and the New York Court of Appeals held that appellants did have standing, but that the statute did
not violate the State or Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeals said that the law was to benefit all
school children, without regard to the type of school attended, that only textbooks approved by school
authorities could be loaned, and therefore the statute was "completely neutral with respect to religion."

Held: The statute does not violate the Establishment or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Pp. 392 U. S. 241-249.

(1) The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational opportunities for the young, and
the law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school books free
of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools. Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U. S. 1. Pp. 392 U. S. 243-244.

(2) There is no evidence that religious books have been loaned, and it cannot be assumed that school
authorities are unable to distinguish between secular and religious books, or that they will not honestly
discharge their duties to approve only secular books. Pp. 392 U. S. 244-245.
Page 392 U. S. 237

(3) Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the task of secular education, and, on
the basis of this meager record, the Court cannot agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school
is religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular textbooks furnished
to students are, in fact, instrumental in teaching religion. Pp. 392 U. S. 245-248.

(4) In the absence of specific evidence, and based solely on judicial notice, it cannot be concluded that the
statute results in unconstitutional state involvement with religious instruction or violates the Establishment
Clause. P. 392 U. S. 248.

(5) Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any way in the practice of religion, there
is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Pp. 392 U. S. 248-249.

20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, affirmed.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996
DECISION

PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS

Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo” of the religious group Iglesia ni
Cristo (INC) were rated “X” – i.e., not for public viewing – by the respondent Board of Review for Moving
Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly “offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law” because of petitioner INC’s controversial biblical
interpretations and its “attacks” against contrary religious beliefs.

Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the
respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the
respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and
power to review the TV program “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,” and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”
on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV
series “indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.” Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner
INC appealed to the Supreme Court.

II. THE ISSUES

(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioner’s TV program?

(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing
of petitioner’s religious program?

III. THE RULING

[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent
Board’s X-rating petitioner’s TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA
insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioner’s TV program
entitled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.”]

1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioner’s TV program.

Petitioner contends that the term “television program” [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent
Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program “Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo.” A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which
guarantees that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed.”

[The Court however] reject petitioner’s postulate. Petitioner’s public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears
of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when
it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent,
i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez
faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against
its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he
Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still.

2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioner’s religious
program.

[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with
furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge
this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.

The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for “attacking” either
religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called
“attacks” are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes
were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public
viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes
with its right to free exercise of religion. xxx.

The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it
no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not
the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine,
respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there
ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against
bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served
by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas
demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding
ideas that can fan the embers of truth.

In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger
rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: “The constitutional guaranty of free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there
is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.” In Victoriano vs.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that “. . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.”

The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court,
is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes
will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent
evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
CASE DIGEST : Taruc Vs De La Cruz
FACTS : he antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish
priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the
transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records
that the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the
animosity between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wife’s political camp. Bishop de la
Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried to
organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro.
When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing through with
it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish
priest were in doubt On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from
the Philippine Independent Church Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of
Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired
with the Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their
expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law

ISSUE : WON the court has jurisdiction

HELD : The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to Ceasar what
is Ceasar’s and to God what is God’s." upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that
cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the profoundest attention from the
courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in
human society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having
been found that, in a form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is
insisted upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical nature
The SC agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with faith, practice, doctrine, form of
worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from
the church those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts.
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and
selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be
a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President
of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the respondent publicly announced having
sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing as follows:

“In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green,
brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and
50 centavos.”

The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold.
The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant
case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition
as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-
judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction
may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or
ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . .
. .” (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms “judicial” and “ministerial” used with reference to
“functions” in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent
Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari
“without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction.” The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of
prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own
jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in
appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently,
“the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the
strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions.” (Dimayuga and Fajardo
vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent
in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. It is
alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the
use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium.
 The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to
say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is
prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages
of our constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley’s Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution
of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this
country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the
lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized implications. It should
be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power
that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the
preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that
shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and
secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and
democracy,” they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws
exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344,
par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher
or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9 sec.
13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by
constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm.
Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal
holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral
results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship
are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question
under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME
AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE
COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and
by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any
funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates and printing of postage stamps
with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby
authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated
and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government”. The
printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the
President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent’s memorandum as
Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed
for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at
P1,618,17.10 and states that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the
Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the
use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not
inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it
appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner’s
complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract
more tourist to this country.” The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of
international importance “to give publicity to the Philippines and its people” (Letter of the Undersecretary of
Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner’s complaint).
It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila,
and an inscription as follows: “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.” What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that
congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should
not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the
purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs.
Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate
the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and prescription, care should be
taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may
lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But,
upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have
come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants
the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to
misuse postage stamps with new designs “as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.” Even
if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps
in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment
and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting
aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby DENIED, without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.