First Division G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS "ABE", Accused

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS "ABE", Accused-

Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias "Abe" (Palanas)
assailing the Decision2 dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04925,
which affirmed the Decision3 dated October 20, 2010, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 133352-H finding Palanas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
The Facts
An Information4 was filed before the RTC charging Palanas of the murder of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio
(SPO2 Borre), viz.:
On or about March 26, 2006, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
[Palanas], acting in conspiracy with one male person who is at-large, whose true identity and whereabout[s]
are still unknown acted as co-principal in the killing of one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio, committed as follows:
said male person, armed with a gun, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstances of treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shot
one SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio on his head and different parts of his body which directly caused his death,
and thereafter, took the firearm of the said victim, boarded a motorcycle driven by the accused who
thereafter, drove the motorcycle away from the scene of the crime.
Contrary to Law.5
The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:
At around 6:40 in the morning of March 26, 2006, SPO2 Borre took his five (5)-month-old grandson outside
his residence at Block 14, Kenneth Street corner Eusebio Avenue, Pasig City. PO3 Leopoldo Zapanta (PO3
Zapanta), who slept at SPO2 Borre's residence, was watching television when four (4) successive gunshots
rang out. PO3 Zapanta looked through the open door of SPO2 Borre's house and saw two (2) men armed
with .38 caliber revolvers standing a meter away from SPO2 Borre. He saw Palanas deliver the fourth shot to
SPO2 Borre, but he could not identify the other shooter. Thereafter, the two (2) assailants fled on a
motorcycle.6
PO3 Zapanta, together with SPO2 Borre's stepson Ramil Ranola (Ramil), brought SPO2 Borre to the Pasig
City General Hospital. On the way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre told Ramil and PO3 Zapanta that it was "Abe,"
"Aspog," or "Abe Palanas" - referring to his neighbor, Palanas -who shot him. This statement was repeated
to his wife, Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion), who followed him at the hospital. At around 11 o'clock in the
morning of even date, SPO2 Borre died due to gunshot wounds on his head and trunk.7
For his part, Palanas interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that on March 25, 2006 he was
in Parafiaque City attending to the needs of his sick father. The next day, he went to a baptism in Tondo,
Manila and stayed there from morning until 9 o'clock in the evening, after which he returned to his father in
Parafiaque City. He maintained that he was not aware of the death of SPO2 Borre until he was informed by a
neighbor that Resurreccion was accusing him of killing her husband. He also denied any knowledge why
Resurreccion would blame him for SPO2 Borre's death.8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated October 20, 2010, the RTC convicted Palanas of the crime of Murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the heirs of SPO2 Borre the amounts of:
(a) f»50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (d) P2,464,865.0710 as actual damages.11
The RTC found that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that Palanas and his
companion were the ones who killed SPO2 Borre through the positive identification of the eyewitnesses to
the incident. Moreover, SPO2 Borre's statements that Palanas shot him constituted an ante
mortemstatement and formed part of the res gestae, and, thus, admissible as evidence against Palanas. It
further opined that treachery attended SPO2 Borre's killing as he had no inkling that the attack would take
place, and that he was in no position to mount any feasible defense.12 The RTC, however, did not appreciate
evident premeditation because of the absence of the following elements: (a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time
to reflect upon the consequences of his act.13
On the other hand, the RTC gave no credence to Palanas's defense of alibi. It observed that it was not
physically impossible for Palanas to be at the locus criminis as his own witness even stated that the distance
between Pasig City and Paranaque City could be traversed in less than one (1) hour.14
Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the CA.15
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated January 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling with modification increasing the
amounts awarded to the heirs of SPO2 Borre to F75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The C A found all the elements of the crime of Murder to be present, giving probative weight to the dying
declaration of SPO2 Borre that it was Palanas who shot him. It also found the presence of treachery as SPO2
Borre was in no position to defend himself when he was successively shot.17
Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal.18
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Palanas's conviction for the crime of Murder should be
upheld.chanRob lesvi rtual Lawl ibra ry
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Murder is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA)
7659,19 as follows: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
xxxx
Treachery is a well-established concept in criminal law. "There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make."20 There are two (2) conditions therefore that must be met for treachery to be
appreciated: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.21
The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected
manner, granting the victim no chance to resist or escape. The attack must be sudden and unexpected
rendering the victim unable and unprepared to put up a defense.22
With the foregoing in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that Pal anas killed
SPO2 Borre, and that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the same. The records show that
SPO2 Borre was outside carrying his grandson when two (2) assailants shot him. During the attack, SPO2
Borre had no opportunity to raise any meaningful defense against his assailants; and consequently, he
suffered multiple gunshot wounds on his head and trunk, causing his death.23
The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre's statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both as
a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.
For a dying declaration24 to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule,25 four (4) conditions must
concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death; (c) the
declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide,
Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the victim.26 On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to
form part of the res gestae,27 and thus, constitute another exception to the rule on hearsay evidence,
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.28
In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre's statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds,
it may be reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was
already imminent.29 This declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost
credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation.30 Verily, because the declaration was made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death
and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations
to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an obligation equal to
that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.31
In the same vein, SPO2 Borre's statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. "Res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to
illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is,
therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony."32 In this case, SPO2
Borre's statements refer to a startling occurrence, i. e., him being shot by Palanas and his companion. While
on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants. Hence, his
utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing
of SPO2 Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.33
On the other hand, the Court does not find credence in Palanas's defense of alibi. It is axiomatic that alibi is
an inherently weak defense,34 and may only be considered if the following circumstances are shown: (a) he
was somewhere else when the crime occurred; and (b) it would be physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.35 In this case, the RTC correctly observed that aside from
the admission that travel from Paranaque City to Pasig City only takes about one (1) hour, the incident
occurred on a Sunday when traffic is not usually heavy. Moreover, Palanas had access to a motorcycle that
allowed him to travel faster on the date and time of the incident.36 Under the circumstances, there is the
possibility that Palanas could have been present at the locus criminis at the time of the shooting.
Accordingly, his defense of alibi must fall.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed upon Palanas, Section 3 of RA 934637 provides that "[p]ersons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended." Pursuant thereto, Palanas should be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.38
Finally, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court increases the amounts of damages awarded to
the heirs of SPO2 Borre, as follows: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages;
and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,39 all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated January 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 04925 finding accused-appellant Bernabe P. Palanas alias "Abe", GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, and ordered to pay the heirs of SPO2 Ramon Borre y Orio
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P2,464,865.07 as actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 213886
JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated December 6,
2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac
Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Facts
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide,
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial
Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of
Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one ELNER ARO y
LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his death
thereafter.
That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
April 11, 2004, he was eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay,
Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus
was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at
Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.5
At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum" and was set for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his
ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and
that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the bile. However, Aro
suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6
Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and
eventually, died the next day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his
death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis
secondary to mauling," an autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death
was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic injuries."7
In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They
averred that while playing pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly
and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but
Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for
Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the ground.
Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered
and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told
Wacoy to go home.8
The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of
the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay Aro's heirs the
amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.10
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy
and Quibac conspired in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in
stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the mauling directly contributed to his death. 11
In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show
the extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his
death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a
Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide.12
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of
Homicide under A1iicle 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six percent ( 6%)
per annum on the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.15
In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this
relation, it observed that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his
credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was driven by any ill motive.16 However,
contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be convicted of the
crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm
on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were
convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to
maltreat or inflict physical harm on him.17
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July
21, 2014, the CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;20 hence, the instant petitions.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open
for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the
parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.21
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s
conviction from Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained
hereunder.
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as
follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups
organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and
assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be punished by
prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall
have used violence upon the person of the victim.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one
another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.22Based on
case law, a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they
engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.23
On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC,
which reads:
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another, without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of
Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying
circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.24
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of
which Aro died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2)
1âwphi1
persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him
repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was no confusion
and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that fateful
incident.25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's
death cannot be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray.26 Therefore, the CA correctly held
that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of mauling Aro was the proximate cause27 of the latter's death; and as
such, they must be held criminally liable therefore, specifically for the crime of Homicide.
On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to
inflict slight physical injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore
in its maximum period,28pursuant to Article 49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that
intended. - In cases in which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall be observed.
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the
offense which the accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall
be imposed in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the
one which the accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts
committed by the guilty person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another
crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the
penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in the maximum
period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different
from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and
not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his
felonious act (praeter intentionem),29
as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the
consequences thereof.31
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due
to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under
Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In
determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention is a mental
process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and
external overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and
Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the
stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or
inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty
of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into
consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each
are increased to ₱75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.33 All other
awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the
monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are retained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution
dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to
pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 213383 June 22, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ERNIE INCIONG y ORENSE, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Ernie Inciong y Orense (accused-
appellant) from the Decision2 dated December 5, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 05549 affirming his conviction for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Facts
At around 11 :30 in the morning of July 18, 2008, accused-appellant was having a drinking spree
with a certain Bico3and Eman in a restaurant or carinderia located at Banay-Banay II, San Jose,
Batangas opposite the building of Metro Batangas Concrete Mix Corporation.4 Sometime hereafter,
victim Jumar Lumbera (Lumbera) crossed the street going to the carinderia and, as he reached the
other side, he encountered accused-appellant who suddenly poked him with an iron pipe, which
turned out to be a homemade firearm or sumpak. Then, accused-appellant fired the sumpak, hitting
Lumbera in the stomach, causing him to slowly fall down to the ground. Apparently not satisfied,
accused-appellant approached the fallen Lumbera and hit the latter's head twice with the sumpak.
Thereafter, accused-appellant hastily left.5 Unfortunately, while Lumbera was immediately brought to
the hospital for medical treatment, he died as a result of the gunshot wound in his abdomen, as well
as traumatic head injuries.6 Prosecution witness Elena Villa de Leon (de Leon) witnessed the
incident as she happened to be near Lumbera while crossing the street headed towards the side of
the carinderia. Upon reaching the side of the road, they met accused-appellant, whom she duly
identified in open court as the person who poked and shot Lumbera with an iron pipe.7
Finally, Thelma Mendoza Lumbera, the victim's widow, testified that she spent ₱11,500.00 for
hospital bills, ₱2,033.00 for the wake, ₱1,500.00 for the flowers, ₱28,000.00 for funeral expenses,
and ₱3,500.00 for autopsy services.8
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with Murder in an Information9 dated September 8,

2008, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2008, at about 11:30 o'clock in the morning, at Barangay
Banay-Banay 2nd, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(sumpak), with intent to kill, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and cruelty and without any justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearm one Jwnar Lumbera y Ramos, suddenly and without
warning and thereafter hit him twice on his head, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound,
abdomen and traumatic head injury which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
For his part, accused-appellant admitted having shot Lumbera but claimed self-defense, explaining
that he shot the latter because he lost his mind due to anger, "Nagdilim na po ang aking paningin at
doon ko po ipinutok. "10 He averred that on the date and time in question, he was at the tricycle
terminal near the Metro Batangas Concrete Mix Corporation where Lumbera worked when the latter
suddenly approached, boxed, and threatened to kill him. He was about to retaliate but someone
pacified him. Thereafter, Lumbera went inside his office. Then, someone shouted that Lumbera was
making his way back and when accused-appellant looked behind him, he saw Lumbera pointing a
sumpak at him. They struggled for the possession of the weapon and it was when accused-appellant
finally took hold of it that he fired at Lumbera. When accused-appellant saw that Lumbera had fallen
to the ground, he immediately left the place and went into hiding until he was finally arrested in
Tanay, Rizal.11
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision12 dated February 27, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West, Batangas City,
Branch 3 (RTC) found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as to pay the heirs of Lumbera the
following amounts: (1) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱44,500.00 as actual damages; (3)
₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and (4) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.13
In convicting accused-appellant, the R TC found that he failed to satisfy the first and most important
element of self-defense, i.e., unlawful aggression. Taking into consideration the version of the facts
as narrated by accused-appellant that it was Lumbera who first boxed him and subsequently,
pointed a sumpak at him and that they grappled for the possession thereof, the R TC opined that it
was not sufficient to establish unlawful aggression. Moreover, the manner of shooting Lumbera and
the injuries on his head showed a determined effort to kill which, thus, belies self-defense.14
Likewise, the R TC held that treachery attended the killing, as Lumbera was not given the time to
flee or to prepare a defense or at the least, offer any resistance against the sudden attack.
Parenthetically, the RTC ruled that even if the attack had been frontally made, it did not preclude the
attendance of treachery, the attack being no less unexpected and sudden.15
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated December 5, 2013, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant upon a
finding that he failed to establish the elements of self-defense, to wit: ( 1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.17 The CA held that
no unlawful aggression emanated from Lumbera as in fact, it was accused-appellant who was the
aggressor, having shot Lumbera without any warning. Moreover, when Lumbera had already fallen
to the ground, accused-appellant even hit his head twice. Corollarily, the number, location, and
severity of the wounds inflicted upon Lumbera effectively negated accused-appellant's claim of self-
defense, which, by and large, was also uncorroborated and unsubstantiated.18
Neither did the CA give credence to accused-appellant's insistence that the mitigating circumstance
of passion or obfuscation was present in the killing of Lumbera. To reiterate, records show that
Lumbera did not do anything that would have reasonably incited accused-appellant to attack him.
Nor could accused-appellant properly claim that he lost his mind due to anger as would have pushed
him to shoot Lumbera.19
Finally, the CA upheld the amounts of damages awarded by the RTC.20
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the CA erred in upholding accused-appellant's
conviction for the crime of Murder.
The Court's Ruling
In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.21 An accused who invokes self-defense has
the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression.
Being the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense,22 unlawful aggression must be proved first in
order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.23 No self-defense
can exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent
or repel.24
In this case, the requisite unlawful aggression from the victim, Lumbera, is patently absent. The
evidence failed to establish that accused-appellant' s life was in danger when he encountered
Lumbera. Instead, and as aptly pointed out by the CA, it was accused-appellant who was the
aggressor, having fired the sumpak at Lumbera when they crossed paths by the side of the road,
and when the latter had fallen to the ground, hit his head twice with the said weapon. The entire
incident was witnessed by de Leon, whose testimony was correctly given probative weight and value
by the RTC and the CA, being a disinterested witness and bereft of ill motive to testify falsely against
accused-appellant.25 Accused-appellant, having failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful
aggression, the Court therefore affirms the finding of the R TC and the CA that he did not act in self-
defense.
Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present

when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.26 In this case, a credible eyewitness
account established that accused-appellant, upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired
a sumpak against the latter, leaving him unable to defend himself or evade the attack. The assault
on Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to
his own person, hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an
unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the information, the Court shall no longer delve upon
its significance in this case, the same not having been appreciated by the courts a quo.
On this score, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction, it
generally defers to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such findings
are affirmed by the CA. This must be so since the trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed first-hand their
deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.27
In view of the foregoing, the R TC and the CA correctly sentenced accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua. However, pursuant to Section 328 of Republic Act No. 9346,29 accused-appellant shall not
be eligible for parole.30
Also, the Court finds it necessary to modify the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.31 Hence, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances in this case, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the amount of ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Lumbera. Likewise, the total
amount of actual damages awarded, as evidenced by the receipts on record,32 should be ₱44,345.50
instead of ₱44,500.00. Meanwhile, the award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is affirmed. In
addition, the Court imposes, on all monetary awards for damages, interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.33
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated December 5, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 05549 finding accused-appellant Ernie Inciong y Orense
(accused-appellant) GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION sentencing accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Jumar Lumbera the following amounts: (a)
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱44,345.50 as actual
damages; and (d) ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All damages awarded in this case shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 214466 July 1, 2015

vs.
ANTONIO BALCUEVA y BANDOCOY, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Antonio Balcueva y Bondocoy
(Balcueva) assailing the Decision2 dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 05791, which affirmed the Decision3 dated September 11, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 89 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. Q-07-145 514 finding Balcueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended
by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,4 otherwise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
The Facts
On February 20, 2007 a criminal information was filed before the RTC charging Balcueva of raping
his biological daughter, AAA.5 viz.:
That on or about the 15th day of February 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design by means of force, threat and
intimidation had carnal knowledge upon the person of [AAA], a minor fourteen (14) years of age, his
daughter, against her will and without her consent, to her damage and prejudice. Contrary to law.6
According to the prosecution, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, AAA just
returned home from school and since Balcueva did not want her to leave the house, she decided to
just take an afternoon nap. At that time, Balcueva asked AAA's siblings to leave the house and
thereafter, approached AAA who was lying in bed, removed her shorts and underwear, and
threatened to spank her if she told anybody about this incident. Balcueva then removed his shorts
and underwear, mounted AAA, restrained her hands, and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA
resisted and even told Balcueva that she was having her menstruation, but Balcueva simply told her
to keep quiet and that it was better as she will not get pregnant. While Balcueva was ravishing AAA,
the latter's sister sought the help of their neighbor, who then peeped through a hole, interrupting
Balcueva in his dastardly act. Thereafter, AAA's sister and their neighbor reported the incident to the
barangay hall, which led to Balcueva's apprehension.7
For his part, Balcueva interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He averred that at around 12 and 1
o'clock in the afternoon of February 15, 2007, he was repairing appliances when AAA and a friend
arrived from school and asked him if they can roam around. When he did not allow them to do so,
AAA and her friend got angry. In retaliation, they went to the barangay hall and fabricated the story
that he raped AAA.8
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision9 dated September 11, 2012, the RTC found Balcueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Qualified Rape and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordered him to pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.10
It found that the prosecution was able to prove that Balcueva indeed raped AAA, pointing out that
her failure to shout for help while she was being ravished by her father does not mean she was not
raped; rather, it showed the moral ascendancy and influence Balcueva exerted over her, and that
the absence of injuries on AAA's hymen did not negate a finding of rape. In this relation, the RTC
observed that no woman would undergo the rigors of trial if she was not motivated to put her culprit
behind bars.11 Moreover, the RTC did not give any probative value to AAA's subsequent desistance
from pursuing the case, considering that she had completed her testimony at that time, and that it
found her desistance to be a mere afterthought. Finally, it declared that Balcueva's defense of denial
and alibi could not prevail over AAA's positive identification.12
Aggrieved, Balcueva appealed13 his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated April 30, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling in toto.15 In upholding
Balcueva's conviction, the CA relied on AAA's testimony, holding that it is unlikely for a young lass
like AAA to concoct a story of her being raped by her own father and to go through the rigors of trial
if she was not telling the truth.16
Hence, the instant appeal.
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether Balcueva's conviction for Qualified Rape should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The Court sustains Balcueva's conviction.
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC reads:
Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
xxxx
Art. 266-B. Penalty. – x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the victim i$ a
female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through
force, threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by
means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.17
A perusal of the. records discloses the presence of the aforesaid elements in this case. Thus, the
RTC and the CA committed no reversible error in convicting Balcueva of the crime of Qualified
Rape.
As correctly ruled, AAA's clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed
raped by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva's flimsy defense of denial and
1âwphi1
alibi cannot prevail over AAA's positive and categorical testimony and identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime.18 Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as
rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject
herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent
desire to seek justice.19 Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own
father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.20
Anent the penalty to be imposed on Balcueva, the R TC and the CA properly sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole,21 in accordance with Sections 2 and 3
of RA 9346.22
Finally, in view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which,
however, cannot be imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of RA 9346, the Court
hereby increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.23 In addition, the
Court imposes interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from
the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.24 WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05791 finding
accused-appellant Antonio Balcueva y Bondocoy (accused-appellant) GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Rape as defined and punished under Article 266-A, in relation to
Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED sentencing accused-appellant to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, with MODIFICATION ordering
him to pay AAA the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y
RAMOS, and RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron
(Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and
Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.
The Facts
At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his
brother Edwin Navarro (Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes
later, he received a text message from another brother who told him that Edwin had been
kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano,
forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark green
Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately
reported the incident to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received
a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to
the police.4
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment
of ransom money in the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as
he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003, after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers
agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of ₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed
to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5
At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver
the ransom money, the kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he
was driving and to turn on the hazard light when he reaches the designated place. After a while,
Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5 until he
arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga Bayani. After
several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle
where four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering
the word "alat," the men returned to their car and drove away.6
Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3
Romeo Caballero (SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp
Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation,
Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym, confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of
the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off Mariano, Renato, Armando and a
certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the ransom money.
Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12,
2003. In the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the
dead body of Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9
Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:
That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN
NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial
and alibi. Except for Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their
respective houses when they were taken by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to
Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the other hand, Rodolfo, for himself,
averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his way home, he
noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle,
boarded him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was
made to sign an extrajudicial confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had
been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do so.12
During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death13 with
Registry No. 2003-050 (subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a
gunshot wound on the head.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in
Crim. Case No. C-68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which
clearly established that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a
car and, consequently, deprived him of his liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants‟
respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not substantiated. It also held that the crime of
Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is punishable by death.
However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No.
(RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation
was geared toward a joint purpose and criminal design.18
Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim
Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the
subject certificate of death, it did not consider said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-
appellants, finding that the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is
committed simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a
minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.21 It likewise
sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, as
sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that
conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from
the same purpose or common design, and they were united in its execution.23
Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that
Rodolfo voluntarily signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent
counsel in its execution.24
Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the
crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight,
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.25
In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these
testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took
the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of
extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of the
court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score. 1âwphi1
Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the
conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective,
not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted
action, and community of interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show
that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution,29 the CA,
affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC
and the CA, as the crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously
bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death,
which was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30and (b) clearly established during the trial of
this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same
should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an
appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court
can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.31
After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of
the same Code now provides:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to
torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)
The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for
ransom and murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court
modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for
ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of
kidnapping with murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts
between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the
accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an
afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought,
the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art.
267, as amended by RA No. 7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which
carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the
imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial
court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds
that the accused-appellants are not eligible for parole.34
On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well
as damages to the family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even
if the death penalty was not to be imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA
9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless proper, not being dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the
imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.36 In the present case,
considering that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during
captivity were duly alleged in the information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of
₱100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family of the victim, to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.37
Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code
provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It cannot be denied, in
this case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious anxiety over the
detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the
family of the victim.
Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid
qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the
amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the
accusedappellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro
the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
·from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
October 19, 2015
G.R. No. 214506
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
OSCAR PARBA y SOLON, Accused-Appellant
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Oscar Parba y Solon (Parba)
assailing the Decision2 dated May 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05266, which affirmed the Decision3 dated September 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. CBU-44139, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Facts
Parba and· a John Doe were charged with the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
2484 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in an Information5 dated March 14, 1997, the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 1997 at about 6:55 A.M. in the City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there attack, assault and shot one Mark P. Navaja with the
gun, hitting the latter on his head and inflicting upon him the following wounds:
"SHOCK, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND ON THE HEAD (L) OCCIPITAL AREA." and as a
consequence of said injuries Mark P. Navaja died few minutes later.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Parba pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.6
The prosecution alleged that at around 6:55 in the morning of January 6, 1997, Jesus Catapan
(Catapan), a security guard of the Salazar Institute of Technology (SIT) in Natalio Bacalso Avenue,
Labangon, Cebu City, was buying cigarettes from a vendor stationed near the main gate of SIT
Elementary Department. Suddenly, Parba, who was then seated beside the vendor, stood up, pulled
a gun from his belt bag, and shot a man at the back of the head while the latter was helping his
daughter disembark from a motorcycle.7 At that instance, the victim, later on identified as Mark P.
Navaja (Navaja), fell to the ground, while Parba and a companion exited towards the highway,
chased by Nestor Buenavista (Buenavista) and Fernando Cuizon (Cuizon), fellow security guards of
Catapan.8 As they were running, Parba pointed a gun at Buenavista and Cuizon, prompting the two
to seek cover. Parba then boarded a jeepney while Buenavista and Cuizon followed via a separate
jeepney and continued their pursuit.9Eventually, Parba disembarked at Tabada Street and the two
security guards lost sight of him.
The following day, the policemen, who were only able to arrest Parba, subjected him to a paraffin
test, where the casts taken off his hands tested positive for the presence of gunpowder
residue.10 Likewise, Dr. Jesus Cerna, the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Navaja,
reported that the latter died due to a gunshot wound at the back of the head.11
In his defense, Parba denied committing the crime and interposed alibi, denial, and set-up as
defenses. He averred that on the date of the incident, he was sleeping in his house until 10 o’clock in
the morning as he came from a drinking spree with his brother the night before.12 Later in the
afternoon, Jose Leeway Rivera (Rivera), a police officer, arrived and allowed Parba to test a gun
which the former promised to give him. After firing the gun, Rivera invited Parba to the police
headquarters where he learned for the first time that he was suspected of killing Navaja.13Parba
admitted that he knew Navaja since they were neighbors and had been friends since childhood,
claiming that the latter was known as a tough guy who had many enemies because of his
attitude.14 However, Parba maintained that he held no personal grudge against Navaja.15
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 22, 2011, the RTC convicted Parba as charged, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the
heirs of Navaja ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.17
The RTC refused to give credence to Parba’s alibi finding the same to be weak and unsubstantiated,
noting that Parba failed to present his wife or his brother to corroborate his testimony and to show
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place of the incident. In fact, the short distance
of 100 meters between the crime scene and Parba’s house, where he said he was, did not foreclose
the possibility of his presence at the crime scene since it would only take around 20 minutes to get to
the place.18
On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses – Catapan, Buenavista, and Cuizon – who saw the
crime, positively identified Parba as the one who shot Navaja at the back of his head. It is
undisputed that immediately after the shooting, Buenavista and Cuizon chased Parba and had a
good look at him when he pointed a gun at them.19Moreover, Buenavista was familiar with the face of
Parba since he was a former barangay tanod of Labangon City where he often saw the latter.20
Further, the RTC appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since the attack was so sudden
and unexpected, which rendered Navaja totally defenseless. However, the other aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation was not appreciated since the prosecution failed to prove the
same with certainty.21
Aggrieved, Parba appealed22 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision23 dated May 19, 2014, the CA affirmed Parba’s conviction but modified the award of
damages.
It found the elements of Murder to have been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt and
attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. It also found the alibi of Parba weak for failure
1âwphi1
to prove that he was in another place when the crime was committed. More importantly, the positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses greatly outweighs his uncorroborated alibi.24
However, the CA modified the awards of damages in favor of Navaja’s heirs and ordered Parba to
pay ₱17,000.00 as actual damages which was amply supported by receipts, ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.25 Hence, the
instant appeal.
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Parba’s conviction
for Murder.
The Court’s Ruling
In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him
or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.26
One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.27 In People v.
Gunda,28 it was explained that when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden and
unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant was about to do, there is treachery.29
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Parba’s attack on Navaja was so sudden and
executed in such a manner that Navaja was caught off-guard on what Parba intended to do.
Eyewitnesses testified that at the time of the attack, Navaja was helping his child alight from the
motorcycle when Parba, without warning, shot him at the back of his head. It is inconceivable how
Navaja could have expected the attack since clearly, he merely intended to take his daughter to
school. As the RTC and CA correctly pointed out, the treacherous nature of the attack rendered
Navaja completely defenseless, noting that the attack was from behind.30 Thus, in view of the
principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great
weight and respect,31 the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
Anent Parba’s alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a defense
is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult to
disprove.32 To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.33
In People v. Marquez,34 the Court explained that "physical impossibility" refers to the distance
between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.35
Thus, a distance of one and a half (1½) to two (2) kilometers36 was held not too far to traverse by
walking.37Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers,38 three (3) kilometers,39 or even five (5)
kilometers40 were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was
present at the locus criminis.41 Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the
"physical impossibility" contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi.
Moreover, considering its doubtful nature, clear and convincing evidence must be submitted to
support the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered negative, self-serving, and undeserving of
weight in law.42 Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as
the perpetrator of the crime, especially in cases where the testimonies of the witnesses are
categorical, consistent and untainted by illwill.43
Here, Parba failed to satisfy the aforementioned requisites to establish his alibi. Other than Parba’s
bare assertions that he was at home sleeping in late and doing household chores at the time of the
incident,44 there was no proof and no other witness showing the physical impossibility of his presence
at SIT, which was only 100 meters away. On the contrary, the positive, straightforward, and
convincing testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to the details of that fateful morning incident
heavily outweigh Parba’s alibi.
As narrated, Catapan personally witnessed Parba pull out a gun and shoot Navaja in the head,
which led to his untimely demise, while Buenavista and Cuizon immediately chased Parba after the
shooting and further encountered him face-to-face when he turned around and pointed a gun at
them. Thus, there was no break in the chain of events that would cause any doubt as to the truth
and veracity of the facts which point to the guilt of Parba. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses, who
were merely bystanders at the time the crime occurred, were not impelled by any improper motive to
falsely testify against Parba. Thus, Parba’s alibi fails to convince the Court.
Finally, on the matter of damages, when death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs of
the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime;45 (b) actual or compensatory
damages to the extent proved,46 or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty;47 (c) moral damages;48 and (d) exemplary
damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.49
Thus, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the amount of moral
damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 and to sustain the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.50 The Court also deems it proper to award the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount, i.e., ₱17,000.00.51 Considering further that
the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of ₱30,000.00 is also
granted. Lastly, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid is imposed on all monetary awards.52
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 19, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05266 finding accused-appellant Oscar Parba y Solon GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION ordering accused-appellant to
pay the heirs of Mark P. Navaja the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015
ADINA B. MANANSALA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated April 16, 2014 and the
Resolution3 dated October 7, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34763, affirming the
conviction of petitioner Adina B. Manansala (Manansala) for the crime of Falsification of Private Documents,
defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (4), of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
On May 31, 1999, private complainant Kathleen L. Siy (Siy), former Vice President for Finance of Urban
Finance and Leasing Corporation, now UMC Finance and Leasing Corporation (UMC), instructed her
secretary, Marissa Bautista (Bautista), to withdraw via Automated Teller Machine (ATM) the amount of
P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista was
not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM was offline so she took it upon herself to get such amount
from the petty cash custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy where she got the money. On
June 9, 1999, UMC Finance Manager Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao (Lacanilao) informed Siy that as per the
Petty Cash Replenishment Report (subject report) of the same date prepared by UMC Petty Cash Custodian
Manansala, she allegedly made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00 which remained unliquidated. It
was only then that Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she immediately rectified the situation by
issuing two (2) checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash account. As the checks were eventually encashed
resulting in the replenishment of UMC's petty cash account, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the
subject report by deleting the entry relating to Siy's alleged cash advance, to which Manansala acceded. On
June 11, 1999, Lacanilao reported the incident to UMC President Conrado G. Marty (Marty).4
Sometime in March 2000, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to retrieve the subject report, re-insert the entry
relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint the same on a scratch paper, and repeatedly fold the
paper to make it look old. On the basis of the reprinted subject document, Siy was administratively charged
for using office funds for personal use. On April 18, 2000, Siy was terminated from her job and Lacanilao
succeeded the former in the position she left vacant. The foregoing prompted Siy to pursue criminal charges
against Marty, Lacanilao, and Manansala for Falsification of Private Documents. Eventually, the charge
against Marty was withdrawn, and an Amended Information5 dated July 19, 2001 for the aforesaid crime
was filed against Lacanilao and Manansala before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65
(MeTC).6
In her defense, Manansala maintained that she was just following Lacanilao's orders as the latter is her
superior who approves her work. She added that when Lacanilao instructed her to reprint the subject report,
she was apprehensive to follow because she suspected something, but nevertheless acquiesced to such
instruction.7
The MeTC Ruling
In a Decision8 dated October 27, 2010, the MeTC both found Lacanilao and Manansala guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents and, accordingly: (a)
sentenced Lacanilao to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of one (1) year and
one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum, as minimum, to three (3) years,
six (6) months, and twenty one (21) days of prision correccional medium and maximum, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of P3,000.00; (b) sentenced Manansala to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
indeterminate period of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional
minimum, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional
medium and maximum, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P2,000.00; and (c) ordered each of the accused
to pay Siy the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.9
The MeTC found that Lacanilao and Manansala conspired in falsifying the subject report by stating therein
that Siy made a cash advance and used it for her personal use, despite knowing all along that Siy never did
so; thus, resulting in Siy's termination from her work. In this regard, the MeTC tagged Lacanilao as the
mastermind of the crime as she benefited the most from Siy's termination, while Manansala aided Lacanilao
in the realization of her sinister motive.10
Nonetheless, the MeTC appreciated the mitigating circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable
fear in favor of Manansala, noting that she merely acted upon Lacanilao's instructions and that she only
performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her job if she defied her superior's orders.11 Manansala
moved for reconsideration12 but was denied in an Order13 dated January 31, 2011.
Aggrieved, Manansala appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142
(RTC).14Records are, however, bereft of any showing that Lacanilao made any similar appeal, thus, her
conviction had lapsed into finality.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision15 dated October 20, 2011, the RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling in toto. It held that Manansala
clearly falsified the subject report by inserting a statement therein which she knew from the start to be
untruthful - that Siy made a cash advance for her personal needs - resulting in prejudice on the part of
Siy.16
Manansala moved for reconsideration,17 but was denied in an Order18 dated January 30, 2012. Undaunted,
she elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for review.19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated April 16, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling. The CA agreed with the MeTC and
RTC's findings that Manansala made untruthful statements in the subject report which was contrary to her
duty as UMC Petty Cash Custodian and that such findings were utilized to the detriment of Siy who was
terminated on the basis of said falsified report.21
Dissatisfied, Manansala moved for reconsideration,22 which was, however, denied in a Resolution23 dated
October 7, 2014; hence, this petition.
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Manansala's conviction
for Falsification of Private Documents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of
the penal law.24
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the ruling of the courts a quo convicting Manansala of
the crime of Falsification of Private Documents, but disagrees in the appreciation of the "mitigating
circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear in her favor.
As already stated, Manansala was charged with committing the crime of Falsification of Private Documents
defined and penalized under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (4), of the RPC, which respectively
read as follows:
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
xxxx
ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon: chanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
xxxx
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxxx
The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172 (2) of the RPC are: (a) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171 (7) of the same Code; (b)
that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification caused damage to
a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.25On the other
hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171 (4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the offender makes in
a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.26
In the instant case, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all correctly found Manansala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose
only truthful statements in the documents she prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject
report; (b) she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for
her personal use; (c) despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting
therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great prejudice to Siy as the
latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified report that she prepared. Basic is the rule that
findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate
tribunal27 and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the
case or any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its
findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court,28 as in this
case.
While the conviction of Manansala for the aforesaid crime was proper, it was error for the MeTC to
appreciate the "mitigating circumstance" of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear and for the RTC
and the CA to affirm in toto the MeTC's ruling without correcting the latter court's mistake.
To begin with, "acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear" is not among the mitigating circumstances
enumerated in Article 13 of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12 (6) of the
same Code. Moreover, for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following
elements must concur: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.29 For such
defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.30
In the instant case, while the records show that Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the
preparation of the subject report as she did not know the repercussions of her actions,31 nothing would show
that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors at UMC for that matter, threatened her with loss of employment
should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion
that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her
favor.
Hence, as there should be no mitigating circumstance that would modify Manansala's criminal liability in this
case - and also taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law - she must be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 16, 2014 and the Resolution
dated October 7, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34763 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Adina B. Manansala to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for the indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

First Division G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS "ABE", Accused

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 214453, June 17, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNABE P. PALANAS ALIAS "ABE", Accused-

The prosecution presents the following version of the facts:

The RTC Ruling

Dissatisfied, Palanas appealed his conviction to the CA.15

Aggrieved, Palanas filed the instant appeal.18

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213383 June 22, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with Murder in an Information9 dated September 8,

The RTC Ruling

Finally, the CA upheld the amounts of damages awarded by the RTC.20

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 214466 July 1, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, Balcueva appealed13 his conviction to the CA.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains Balcueva's conviction.

Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC reads:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. – Rape is committed –

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

Art. 266-B. Penalty. – x x x.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 207949 July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32

October 19, 2015

G.R. No. 214506

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

The RTC Ruling

Aggrieved, Parba appealed22 to the CA.

The Issue Before the Court

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

G.R. No. 215424, December 09, 2015