DISINHERITANCE – this may only be effected in a will.
influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already
It is not available if the testator died intestate.
What are the requisites for a valid disinheritance?
1. The disinheritance must be effected in a valid will
2. The cause must be specified by the Testator(TR)
3. It must be a legal cause/ a cause specified by law
4. It must be Total
5. It must not be Conditional
6. The heir disinherited must be expressly identified or
particularly identified
We have separate grounds for disinheriting:
1. For descendants (Article 919)
2. For ascendant (Article 920)
3. For the surviving spouse (Article 921)
Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
 (GAFRAMDI)
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
 disinheritance then such is an INEFFECTIVE DISINHERITANCE.
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or
ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or
descendant;
 The law presumes that the parents cannot be guilty of living a
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful
life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil
interdiction.
Art. 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for the
disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate:
 (ACAFAPAR)
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced their
daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an attempt
against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
 one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution of heirs
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a crime
for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if
the accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
 3 underlined above are those that make the disinheritance Imperfect/
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or
undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this Code;

(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without
justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the other,
unless there has been a reconciliation between them.
Art. 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for disinheriting a
spouse:
 (CAFLAR)
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the life
of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for which the
law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation
has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
made;

(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental
authority;

(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other spouse.
So if I say I disinherit my son because he is working as a male
prostitute, will that be a valid ground?
YES.Since he is a descendant/ child who is living a dishonorable and
disgraceful life.
On the assumption that the son who is a male prostitute was
induced by the father to do so, may the son disinherit the father
on the ground of inducement?
NO. The ground for inducement refers only to daughters and not to
sons.
On what ground can such son disinherit the father?
The father may be disinherited on the ground of Loss of Parental
Authority.
These causes are very strict because disinheritance is construed
strictly that these causes must be specified by the code and one of the
grounds for disinheriting.
If you made a mistake and your cause is not one of those grounds for
The causes must be peculiar to the person being disinherited like for
child/descendant, parents/ascendants and spouse. They may not be
interchanged.
Like for example: May you disinherit your father because he is a
male prostitute?
NO. That is only a cause for disinheriting a child/descendant.
dishonorable or disgraceful life, palagisilang tama.
Tayonaman on our part we can do that to our own child/descendants
but so far as our parents our concerned we cannot do that.
Disinheritance will deprive the compulsory heir of his legitime and as
well as the free portion. He loses both. So if the disinheritance is
validly effected: as when it is for a true cause/ valid cause/ cause
specified by law, in a valid will, heir was identified, express, then the
disinherited heir will lose both.
If the disinheritance is: ineffective/ invalid/ imperfect (Art. 918)
Art. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a
cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not
insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises
and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to
such extent as will not impair the legitime.
Ineffective.
Thus the imperfectly disinherited heir will still get his right to the
legitime only.
Bakitlegitimelang at di kasamaung free portion?
Because in disinheritance the intent of the TR is really to deprive the
disinherited heir of his entire share.
Kaya langnatinbinibigayunglegitimenya because the disinheritance
was imperfect in the first place.
So in order not to fully prejudice the heir we still give him his right to
his legitime.
But if the disinheritance is valid, the disinherited heir will not get his
legitime but it will go to his descendants.
The right of the disinherited heir to his legitime in case the
disinheritance is valid, will now go down to his descendants by right
of representation.
So if the disinherited heir is validly disinherited but he has
children/descendants, then they will acquire his right to the legitime.
In Preterition: there is partial intestacy, where there is a legacy in
favor of a stranger, you give the legacy and the balance will be divided
equally between the or among the compulsory heirs. Total intestacy
results, except the legacy or devise that becomes inofficious.
If it is an imperfect disinheritance, the entire balance of the free
portion after satisfying the legitimes of the imperfectly disinherited
heir, will all go to the instituted heirs.
So the imperfectly disinherited heir though instituted will not get any
part of the free portion.
Let us suppose that A is the son of X and Y, and A attempted
against the life of X but in order to avoid public scandal, the
family did not press charges against A, can X disinherit A, if yes,
on what ground?
For an attempt to be a cause for disinheritance, there must be a
conviction of the descendant, but if there are no charges filed,
how can there be conviction? So if yes, on what ground?
The child/descendant may be disinherited on the ground of
maltreatment by word or by deed.
FILOMENA PECSON v. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
FACTS:
 Rosario Mediavillo and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate
child of the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of
the TR, Florencio Pecson, thus Rosario and Joaquin were the
grandchildren of the TR.
 Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the TR Florencio Pecson(Paragraph 3 of the will: I
declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased,
left a legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also
declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and
because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she
raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said
Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.)
 TC ruled in favor of Rosario.
 It found that: Deceased had eight children by his wife
NicolasaManjares, likewise deceased. Teresa Pecson married
BasilisoMediavillo, by whom she had two children, Joaquin and
Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these 2 children
and her husband, BasilisoMediavillo. Her son Joaquin died,
unmarried and childless, before the death of the TR, Florencio
Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of Teresa and the
latter's husband, BasilisoMediavillo, is also living. Then Rosario
became insane, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this that
she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him,
and, as the TR states in the 3rd paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and
who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for
her acts and should not have been disinherited by her
grandfather.
ISSUES:
1. WON the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may
inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide if there
was or not a ground for such disinheritance.
2. WON the TC erred by decreeing that BasilisoMediavillo, the
father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the
1/2 of the 1/7 of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo.
RULING:
1. Art. 915 provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one
of the causes expressly fixed by law. Art. 919, 920 and 921 provide
the cases or causes for disinheritance in which the ancestors may by
will disinherit their heirs. Art. 916 provides that the disinheritance
can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned
the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that
heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in
the Civil Code, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly
inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for
the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into
the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the
disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions
of the Civil Code. Art 917 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness
of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of
the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear
then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of
the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his
allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not
the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the
provisions of Art. 918, which in part provides that: Disinheritance
made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of
which, if contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the
designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person
disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts
may inquire into the justice of a disinheritance such as was
attempted in the present case, and if they find that the
disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament or will
may be pronounced null and void.
TC taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she
very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the
conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect
and disobedience shown to her grandfather.
2. TC gave 1/2 of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to
Rosario Mediavillo and the share that would have gone to Joaquin
Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin
Mediavillo, to his father BasilisoMediavillo. LC erred here. The
appellant relies upon the provisions of Art. 972which provides that:
The right of representation shall always take place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it
shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the whole or half blood.
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the TC, cites: Art 985
provides that: In the absence of legitimate children and descendants
of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the
exclusion of collaterals.
Art 986 provides that: The father and mother, if living shall inherits
share and share alike. If one of them only survive, he or she shall
succeed to the son's entire estate.
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants
was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court
evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children,
descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the
father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as
ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the
direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for the
reason the TC committed an error in declaring that
BasilisoMediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate
that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living.
RAMON CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC v. HON.
RODRIGUEZ
FACTS:
 Respondents are the heirs of Antonio Ching(Antonio).
Respondents Joseph Cheng(Joseph) and Jaime Cheng(Jaime) are
allegedly the children of Antonio with his common-law wife,
Mercedes Igne(Mercedes). Lucina Santos(Lucina) claimed that
she was also a common-law wife of Antonio. Ramon
misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in
truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was
merely simulated. Antonio died of a stab wound. Police
investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now
stands as the lone accused in a criminal case for murder filed
against him. Warrants of arrest issued against him have
remained unserved as he is at large.
 From the foregoing circumstances and upon the authority of Art
919the respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally
 disinherited, hence, prohibited from receiving any share from
the estate of Antonio.
ISSUES: WON there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?
And WON defendant Ramon Ching can be legally disinherited from
the estate of his father?
RULING: Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected
only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents
in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance
of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the
disposition of Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite
the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the Civil Case does not partake
of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
With respect to the spouse, Art. 921, par 4, when the spouse has given
cause for legal separation. It does not require for purposes of
disinheritance that the spouse actually file a case for legal separation
for as long as the guilty spouse has given cause for legal separation.
Kung may infidelity or other causes mentioned in Art. 55 of the FC:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
 (1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to
change religious or political affiliation;
 of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution,
or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of
more than six years, even if pardoned;
 the testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the law within a
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
 month, unless the authorities have already taken action; this
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
 adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
 (6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
 For purposes of this Article, the term
"child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
It is enough ground to disinherit without necessity to file a legal
separation case.
However if there is already a case filed by the innocent spouse and
the guilty spouse was declared really the guilty one then the latter
becomes disqualified to inherit from the former by intestate
succession and provisions of the will made in favor by the former to
the latter are revoked by operation of law.
Anong implication nito?
Pag nag file kang legal separation, the disqualification is automatic
once the guilty spouse is declared as such.
Anoang qualification?
With respect to testamentary provisions, those revoked are those in
an existing will, so Art. 921 in relation to Art. 63 of FC. It does not
refer to a will which is subsequently executed by the innocent spouse
in favor of the guilty spouse.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following
effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other,
but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be
dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right
to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or
the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with
the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the
innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code;
and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from
the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in
favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse
shall be revoked by operation of law.
Example: X and Y are husband and wife and X filed a petition for
legal separation and then Y was declared as guilty spouse and
after the judgment became final, X executed a will giving her
entire estate to Y. When X dies will Y inherit?
YES. Because that will is not covered by Art. 63, it will operate as a
written pardon.
If you look at Art. 1032, those causes for unworthiness
hindinatinpwedengiseparateyunsa disinheritance because they have
the same grounds.
Pag may will – provisions of disinheritance will apply.
Pagwalang will / intestacy – provisions of unworthiness will apply.
Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of
unworthiness:
 (PACAFAFF)
daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue; 

(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life


(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the
law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation
has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of
prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is
no obligation to make an accusation; (5) Any person convicted of
influence should cause the testator to make a will or to change one
already made;

(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from
making a will, or from revoking one already made, or who supplants,
conceals, or alters the latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the
decedent.
Why is this important?
Art. 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the
offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and
renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
If a disinheritance is made in the will, but subsequent to the execution
of the will, nagkabatisilang mag ama, without exchanging his will,
pero prior to death nagkabatisila, reconciliation for purposes of
disinheritance, is the resumption of the cordial relation existing
between the parties. It is not enough that you are on speaking terms,
there must be a genuine cordial relationship existing before the
disinheritance was effected, yungtotoong reconciliation at
hindiyungplastikan lang.
So sa disinheritance kahitwalang written document
napinapardonkang offended person, as long as you can prove that
there was a subsequent reconciliation between the 2 of you, you are
restored to your right to inherit, you will inherit.
Pag unworthiness, mas strict ang requirementng law, kasi:
Art. 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if the
testator had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will, or if,
having known of them subsequently, he should condone them in
writing. (written pardon)
Example: if the son gets convicted for the attempt against the life of
the TR, his father, he becomes disqualified to inherit, pagwalang will
di mag aapplyang disinheritance, but he may still be disqualified
because it is a ground under Art. 1032. However if subsequent to the
conviction of the son, the father executes a will giving the convicted
son a share in his estate, then that would operate as a written pardon
to the offending son.
Di naman strictly nakailagan I pardon my son, basta any acts which
will indicate that the offended TR intended to forgive in writing, will
be considered as a written pardon.
If the execution of the will came after the conviction of the son, then
the son would be qualified to inherit.
To sum it up:
Disinheritance at walang conviction – di siyapwedengidisinherit.
Pwedelang on the ground of maltreatment.
So in the assumption that there was no will, the TR died intestate, the
son was found guilty of an attempt gaianst the life of the TR,
hindisiyanadisinherit, but the son is still disqualified under Art. 1032
for being convicted of an attempt against the life of the TR.
However if the father, would institute the son after the conviction
then that would restore the son’s right to inherit because the
execution of the will after conviction operates as a written pardon.
Art. 922 Art. 1033
Not required to be in writing the It is required to be in a written
reconciliation. instrument, a written pardon.
Example: if S2(brother) gets convicted of an attempt against the
life of X2(brother), can X(father) disinherit S2?
Dishonorable or disgraceful life requires a continuity of acts, it is not
limited to a single act, so you are entitled once in your life to commit
mistakes.
So X cannot disinherit S2 since, law provides that the descendant is
convicted for an attempt against the life of the TR,
descendants/ascendants/ spouse and does not include the
brothers/sisters.
What if the conviction of S2 was against the life of S1?
YES. Since S1 is a descendant of X. since they have common parents.
Because it is an attempt against the life of the descendant of the TR.
If S2 gets convicted of an attempt against the life of S1, may S1
disinherit S2?
NO. because S2 is not a compulsory heir, he is just a brother, a
collateral relative, he is not even an heir unless he is instituted in the
will.
QUESTION: with regard to legal separation, there is no need to
file a complaint, what if a complaint for legal separation was
filed and thereafter the court decreed that there was no cause
for legal separation / that legal separation was not proper and
the court disallowed the legal separation, will that result in an
ineffective disinheritance?
Art. 921, for the purposes of disinheritance, does not require that the
legal separation must be issued by the court, so as long as in the mind
of the TR, the spouse has given cause for legal separation regardless
of its denial by the TC, then he may disinherit the other spouse,
however subject to the right of the spouse to deny, and it is the other
heirs of the TR that has the burden of proving the cause or the truth
of the cause for disinheritance.
There was one question in the bar, Bert and Joe was living as
common law spouses and then they acquired several properties,
is it governed by Art. 147?
NO. because they are not man and woman capacitated to marry each
other because they are man and man, bert and joe.
But I did not agree with the answer of one dean, I just kept my mouth
shut, because one question as follow up to that was:
If Bert and Joe, decide to adopt the son of Bert’s living brother, so
in other words, pamangkinnibert and iaadoptnila, should the
adoption be granted?
ANSWER OF ONE DEAN: you cannot allow them to adopt because
they are not husband and wife and under the FC it is mandatory for
husband and wife to adopt.
ANSWER OF DEAN PAGUIRIGAN: there is no requirement in the FC
that the persons who should adopt must be husband and wife,
sinabilangnayung joint adoption dapat husband and wife. Since the
adoption is for the purposes of the benefit of the child, ayaw pa
niyayunnadalawayungkanyang parents? Angsagot pa ngisang dean
kasidawpanobaung parental authority(PA) nun? Problemaba un PA.
kasi otherwise mawawalanngsaysayung other provisions ng
Domestic Adoption Act(DAA) that a child can be adopted diba, ang
requirement lang that the adopter must be a Filipino citizen, has
capacity to care for his children and must at least be 16 years older
than the person to be adopted.
So bakit pa natininenumerateyan kung limited langpalasa husband
and wife ang adoption? 
So in Dean Paguirigan’s view, it is a simple co-ownership, because
rule 148 also refers to strict man and woman / husband and wife.
QUESTION: In case of ineffective disinheritance, may the
disinherited heir will be able to inherit from the TR?
His legitime only.
In all instances, he will not inherit the free portion?
If the free portion is already given or distributed by the TR to the
others then he cannot get any portion of it.
For example: among brothers, ½ brothers were instituted and the son
was disinherited ineffectively, so such would only get his share in the
legitime and not in the free portion. And the free portion will pertain
only to the 2 brothers instituted. Kasingaang intent ng TR in
disinheritance is to deprive the heir his share in the estate, kaya
langnamannatinsyabinibigyannglegitime is because of the fact that
the disinheritance is ineffective.
If the free portion was not distributed to the other heirs, the
ineffectively disinherited heir may participate?
If it is covered by intestacy, but rarely do we have intestacy if it is
disinheritance, preteritionpwede.
So pagna declared void ung will containing the disinheritance clause,
patiung disinheritance walang effect, because it has to be a valid will.
If will is void, then the disinheritance clause will also be void.
Meaning he will get his share in both the free portion and legitime.
QUESTION: if there is property donated to the heir and such is
disinherited, will the donated property be given back to the TR?
NO. it will only be collated.
Because a donation transfers ownership.
And the grounds for revoking a donation are too specific.
You have either: bar, birth, adoption, or failed to comply with a
condition or because it is inofficious or because you committed an act
of ingratitude against the TR. These are the grounds for revoking a
donation and if it is not one of these grounds, the donation stays.
Kasimeronpwedengmangyarinadinisinheritka, tapos nag
reklamokapero, the property received by way of donation mas malaki
pa sa property mo, mas kawawaka pa pag nag reklamoka, so you
know when to complain and not.
Mag compute kamuna. 
LEGACIES AND DEVICES – are gifts of specific personal property in
the estate or specific real property in the estate, the limitation of the
right of the TR to give out legacies and devices are of course they
cannot in any way impair the legitimes of his compulsory heirs, this is
quite clear under:
Art 911 –After the legitime has been determined in accordance with
the three preceding articles, the reduction shall be made as follows:

(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be
covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies
made in the will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata, without
any distinction whatever.
 If the testator has directed that a certain
devise or legacy be paid in preference to others, it shall not suffer any
reduction until the latter have been applied in full to the payment of
the legitime.
(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life annuity, whose
value may be considered greater than that of the disposable portion,
the compulsory heirs may choose between complying with the
testamentary provision and delivering to the devisee or legatee the
part of the inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose.
The legitime occupies the highest position that it has to be satisfied
over the legacies and devices.
Legacies and devises(l&d), are still part of the estate, the value of the
property given by way of l&d need not further be added to the value
of the estate because they are part of the estate.
Unlike donations inter vivos, diba we made an example that the value
of such will be added to the value of the estate for purposes of
computing the net hereditary estate.
L&d not anymore add since it is still part of the estate.
Who may be charged by the TR with l&d?
He may charge his compulsory heirs, the limit is of course whatever
the compulsory heirs may have received in the free portion of the
estate.
He may also charge his own legatees and devisees, with a sub legacy
and sub device but in that case the charge imposed upon a particular
devisee or legatee is limited only to the property given to him by the
TR.
Parang Katanga tangalang din yank c minsan may bigay-bawi but that
is valid which is sub-legacy/ sub-device, example: kotsena 500 tapos
deliver ka watch na tag 500 din. 
For compulsory heirs the charge must be limited to value of free
portion received by the compulsory heir.
But if the charge is imposed by the legatees or devisees themselves,
the limit is the value of the thing received by them from TR. Which is
not necessarily the entire free portion.
So what is the effect of a legacy of a thing which the TR
erroneously believed to belong to him?
If he erroneously believed that it belonged to him but in fact it did not,
the l&d is void.
Can the TR say I hereby give a house and lot located in 123
espanast. belonging to Mr. B and I am giving it to Mr. C, is that
valid?
YES. Because he knows that he does not own the property so it is
equivalent to an order to the administrator/executors/heirs to
acquire the property and deliver it to the devisee or legatee for that
matter.
So the l&d will only become void if the TR erroneously believed that
the things belonged to him but if he knows for a fact that the things
does not belong to him, then the legacy is considered valid and the
executor/administrator is mandated to acquire it from the owner,
except if the owner demands an excessive price therefore, in which
case, they will be justified in just delivering the value of the property
to the l&d.
So if nka state sa facts naalamnyanahindikanyaung property,
yanaapply.
But erroneously thought it belonged to him but not: if sinabinya I
hereby decree Rizal park or devise it, this is not valid.
LEGACY DEVISE
Personal property Real property
Bequeathed Devised
What if baliktarinnatin, hindiang TR ang may
ariperoangmismong legatee ang may-aring thing bequeathed at
the time of the execution of the will?
L&d shall be considered void.
This rule is true even if the l&d subsequently alienates the thing.
Because the impt/ reckoning point for the determination if the l&d is
valid, is at the time of the execution of the will.
So pagkanyanayun at the time of the execution of the will, the l&d is
without effect.
However, supposed that the will was executed in 2010 and the
legatee, the TR(Mr. T) said I hereby give the car belonging to Mr.
X to my friend Mr. Y.
So at the time of the execution of the will, Y did not yet own the
car of Mr. X, so subsequent to the execution of the will, Mr. X
donated the car of Mr. Y, may Y claim anything to the estate of
Mr. T?
NO. because the acquisition by the legatee was by gratuitous title.
Void legacy / without effect if legatee or devisee was already the
owner at time of the execution of the will.
If he acquired it after the execution of the will, his right against the
estate of the TR will depend on the nature of his acquisition of the
thing:
If it is by onerous title – then he can claim the value or price which he
paid.
If he acquired it gratuitously after the execution of the will – then he
cannot claim anything by virtue of that l&d.
Can you say I hereby bequeath some of my animals to Mr. T?
Object of legacy is generic personal property but I hereby
bequeath some of my animals to Mr. T, valid or void?
While a generic personal property is valid even if the estate does not
have any, the rule is: if it is legacy of generic personal property, it is
valid even if the estate does not have any of the kind. But it is
required that the sub genus must be specified otherwise, you cannot
determine the property that is being bequeathed. So in this example,
some animals, this is not valid.
So even if it is generic personal property, the sub genus must be
specified.
Angpwede is: I hereby bequeath 3 of my horses to Mr. X.
Generic man ang horse, the sub genus is specified.
But when it comes to real property, in order for the devise to be valid,
generic sya, the devise of real property to be valid, the estate must
have that kind of real property in the inventory.
For example: Mr. P devised a farm land to his cousin C, so generic real
property. But if in the estate of Mr. P the TR, no farm land, all of them
are condo units, then the devise is not valid. because the genus in real
property does not exist, it is only determined by the individualization
of acts of man.
Kung yan ay residential, or yan ay agricultural, it is man who dictates
it.
So if it is a generic devise of real property it is only valid, if the estate
has that kind of real estate. But if the estate does not have any, then
the devise is void.
Legacy of a credit – you are assigning to your legatee, you right of
action against another person(debtor).
It is not the executor who will collect for the legatee, what the estate
should do in order to comply with a legacy of a credit is to assign all
rights of action which the decedent had a against a particular debtor.
But this will be valid only up to the extent of the credit that is existing
at the time of death.

Legacy of remission–if your legatee owes you something, legatee
mo, debtor mo, then in your will you give him a remission of his debt.
This is only valid for debts existing, if it is generic, at the time of the
execution of the will.
For example: legacy of remission made by T in favor of M, is
generic in the sense that: I hereby condone all obligations of M to
me, whether secured or unsecured. And will was executed in
2012 and at the time of execution of the will, M owed P 2M, one
secured and one unsecured, so subsequent to the execution of
the will, M borrowed another 1M from P and subsequently P
died. Can M contend that all his obligations are condoned?
NO. because if the legacy of remission is generic, it will only consist of
those debts that are existing at the time of the execution of the will.
And not those which are acquired thereafter.
What about partly onerous and partly gratuitous?
2 things will matter, there are 2 legacies, 1 is onerous ad 1 is
gratuitous or there is 1 legacy but part of it is onerous and another
part of it is gratuitous.
For example: I give you 2 cars which is part of my estate, but the 1 st
legacy is without condition and the 2nd is with a condition/ charge. As
a rule: the legatee cannot accept the gratuitous and reject the
onerous.
He may either accept both or reject both. But he cannot accept the
gratuitous and reject the onerous. But he is free to reject the
gratuitous and accept the onerous.
So hindipwedenaungwalang condition langungtatanggapinmo and
yung may condition irereject mo. Peropwedeungkabaliktaran.
I forgot to mention, hindipwede conditional yung disinheritance ha.
Pagsinabinatinna I disinherit my daughter if she lives with a married
man, this is not valid because the cause is not existing.
But please differentiate disinheritance itself which is conditional,
from the revocation of the disinheritance which is conditional.
DISINHERITANCE REVOCATION OF DISINHERITANCE
ITSELF WHICH IS WHICH IS CONDITIONAL
CONDITIONAL
Example: I hereby Example: My daughter is presently living
disinherit my daughter with a married man, I disinherit her, but if
if she lives with a she returns to the family before my death,
married man. This is not the disinheritance is revoked.
valid because the cause It is not the disinheritance which is
is not existing. conditional, but it is the revocation of the
disinheritance thus it is valid.
In the distribution of the estate, if the TR does not have any
compulsory heirs, the distribution of the estate among the l&d must
be in accordance of:
Art 950 - If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all the legacies
or devises, their payment shall be made in the following order:
 right of representation.
(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be preferential;
 For as long as all the children of the decedent are alive, his grand
(3) Legacies for support;
 children will not inherit and similarly if the person who died is a
(4) Legacies for education;
(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which forms a
part of the estate;
 inherit from him.
(6) All others pro rata.
If the institution of the heir is for a condition which did not happen
which is suspensive, or when a resolutory condition happens, there
are other causes for intestacy, for example: preterition, but not for
those l&d which are not inofficious. Or if the will was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. When it is
subsequently declared void by failure to comply with Art. 805-830.
Whether holographic or ordinary.
RULE OF PREFERENCE BETWEEN LINES(RPBL)
RULE OF PROXIMITY (962) (RP)
RULE OF EQUAL DIVISION (GR) (RED)
(XPNS: 987, 1006, 974 – REPRESENTATION, 176 OF FC)
RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION (RR)
RULE OF BARRIER / IRON CURTAIN RULE (992) (RB/ICR)
Master the rules and alamnyonaung intestacy.
Rule of preference between lines:
For purposes of succession: Love first descends, then ascends, then
finally it spreads sideways.
This is in essence the rule of preference.
1. The descending
2. The ascending
3. The collateral
Bakit?
Because children are the 1st in the order of preference of succession,
then ascends to your parents/ascendants and then spreads to your
collaterals.
So intestacy – not all intestate heirs are compulsory heirs, who
are those?
Brothers and sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins, etc.
They are intestate heirs but not compulsory heirs.
For as long as there are descendants, as a GR the ascendants
cannot invoke their right to the estate of the deceased child,
what is the exception?
If the child dies is legitimate and he only has illegitimate children and
legitimate parent thus the latter are not excluded by the presence of
the former and they concur with each other.
You have to take a look at the status of the decedent.
Legitimate decedent – legitimate children exclude legitimate parents.
Legitimate decedent – illegitimate children concur with legitimate
parents.
Unang preference is subject to the right of LPAs concurring with the
illegitimate children because they are concurring heirs.
In the absence of descendants, the inheritance shall pertain to the
ascending line, to the exclusion of all the collateral relatives.
Hindi pwede mag concur ang collateral at direct.
Because the collateral will always be excluded by the direct line.
The right to inherit of those in the collateral line is limited only to the
5th degree and beyond that is not any more considered ties for the
purposes of succession, though as a GR:
dumadamiangkamaganakpagnamamatay.
Rule of proximity:
Relatives nearer in degree exclude the more distant ones save the
brother, and all the brothers and sisters of this deceased brother are
alive, then the nephews and nieces of this deceased person will not
Sometimes kasimgaapo feeling nila they have a sense of entitlement.
Buhay pa yung parents nila, anginiisip ay ung share sa estate
ngloloperowaladahilsa rule of proximity.
They can only inherit by right of representation if the parents
predecease, or incapacitated or renunciation of all the children of the
decedent(RIP)
In the counting of degrees, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and descent is made to the person from whom computation is to be
made.
The moment the line is diretsolangaakyat at hindipumupuntang other
side, then that is direct line.
The moment you go to the line on the side, that is collateral relatives.
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE V. CA
FACTS:
 Private respondent Benedicto Estrada(BE) is the son of
AgatonicaArreza, whose parents were Pedro Arreza and Ursula
Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro Arreza, Ursula married Juan
Arnaldo by whom she had another daughter, the decedent Justa.
BE is thus the nephew of Justa by her half sister Agatonica.
 Petitioners,heirs of Pascasio Uriarte(heirs of PU) are the
relatives within the 5th degree of consanguinity, of Justa by her
cousin PrimitivaArnaldoUriarte.
 The other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within
the fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio
Arnaldo and PrimitivaArnaldo.
 TC ruled in favor of heirs of PU.It stated, her nearest surviving
relatives are the children of her uncle Domingo Arnaldo, to
whom her entire estate passed on after her death by operation of
law, to the exclusion of all other relatives. Thus, the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent.
 CA reversed. It found that the 0.5 hectares had been acquired by
Justas parents, Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, during their
marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica,
private respondent was held to be entitled to share in the estate
of Justa.
ISSUE:Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is
entitled to Justas estate as her nearest relatives within the meaning of
Art. 962.
RULING:This 2.58-hectare land was inherited by BE as Justas nearest
surviving relative. As the CA held:According to Article 962 of the Civil
Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly
takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to
the provisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and
half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division
between paternal and maternal lines.The manner of determining the
proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the
Civil Code.
ART. 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of
generations. Each generation forms a degree.
ART. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct
or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come
from a common ancestor.
ART. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
ART. 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as there are
generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus the
child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the
grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then
descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be
made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three
from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first
cousin, and so forth.
In this case, plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He
is thus a third degree relative of Justa.
On the other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and
daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of
Justa.
Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then
plaintiff is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a
half-sister of Justa is of no moment.
BE is the son of Justas half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justas
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit
if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent.That
private respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This
alone does not disqualify him from being his aunts heir. As the Court
of Appeals correctly pointed out, The determination of whether the
relationship is of the full or half blood is important only to determine
the extent of the share of the survivors.
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU v. PASTORA PIEDAD
FACTS:
 Ofelia Bagunu(OB) is a collateral relative within the fifth degree
of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin
of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, OB seek to inherit from the
estate of Augusto H. Piedad; and that the intestate court has
already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estate
of Augusto H. Piedad to PastoraPiedad(PP)
ISSUE: WON OB, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree can
inherit alongside PP, a collateral relative of the third civil degree/
Does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application
among collateral relatives?
RULING: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or
ascendants. PP is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree
relative of the decedent, while OB is the daughter of a first cousin of
the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in
degree to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except
when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation
when it properly takes place. Relatives in the same degree shall
inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article 1006 with
respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987,
paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternal
lines.By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a
decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and
degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the
person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the
person to whose estate the person represented would have
succeeded.
ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one whom the person
represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the
descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the
right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with
their uncles or aunts.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending. In the collateral line, it
takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters,
whether they be of the full or half blood.
ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the
division of the estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that
the representative or representatives shall not inherit more than
what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or
could inherit.
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation,
if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral
relatives within the fifth civil degree who are sixth in the order of
preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and
descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly,
the illegitimate children and
descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers
and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral
relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the
decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute
rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral
relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.
Article 966. x xxIn the collateral line, ascent is made to the common
ancestor and then descent is made to the person with whom the
computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed
from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his
father, four from his first cousin and so forth.
PP, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.
Piedad excludes OB, a relative of the fifth degree, from
succeeding abintestato to the estate of the decedent.
Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.The latter shall succeed without distinction of
lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood.
Article 1010. The right to inherit abintestato shall not extend beyond
the fifth degree of relationship in the collateral line.
The law means only that among the other collateral relatives (the
sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall
be observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a
maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first
cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin of the
half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative,
excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degree of
relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a
fifth-degree relative.
The rule of equal division:
If you are in the same degree, parehokayong 2nd degree, 3rd degree,
etc. the rule is that you are supposed to get equal shares in the estate.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal parts.
What are the xpns in the rule of equal division?
Meaning kahitparepareho kayo ng degree of relationship to the
decedent, you do not get equal shares.
XPNS:
1. Art 987 - In default of the father and mother, the ascendants
nearest in degree shall inherit.
Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the same
line they shall divide the inheritance per capita; should they be of
different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall go to the paternal
and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In each line the
division shall be made per capita.
Remember in testamentary succession: if you father and mother are
both alive, in testate succession, based on an estate of 2M, both M and
N will get 500k equally but if one is dead, the entire legitime passes to
the surviving parent and hindisyaaakyatkasiwalang RR sa ascending
line.
But if both the father and mother are dead intestamentary, the
legitime, goes up to the next line of ascendants and if there are
several then the legitime should be divided between both line,
maternal v. paternal line.
Legitime pertaining to F, goes to PGM and PGF.
Legitime pertaining to M, goes to MGM and MGF.
Same in Art. 987, only that it applies to the whole estate.
If it is intestate, same principle applies that the 2M will go up to your
father and mother if they are still alive, in case one is dead and the
entire estate passes to the survivor, bakithindipwedepaakyat?
Because of proximity and no RR on the ascending.
So if both of them are dead then it will go up to the paternal and
maternal grand parents.
But assuming that in the paternal line only one is surviving, even if
they are all 2 degrees removed from S, they do not get equal shares,
why?
Because the 1M of the paternal line will go entirely to PGM, while the
1M of maternal, will be divided between the two.
So they don’t get equal shares, even if they are all 2nd degree relatives
of S1.
2. So if decedent of P is F his family is already dead but survived by
Full blood brothers(FBB) and Half Blood Brothers (HBB)
Example:
FBB: A-E
HBB: G-K
If his estate is 1.5M
Pursuant to the rule on:
Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive
together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall
be entitled to a share double that of the latter.
Each FBB will get 200k each and HBB will get 100k each.
Even if you are a HBB you are still in the 2nd degree same with the
FBB but pursuant to that special rule, you cannot get equal share with
the FBB.
Legally they are in the same degree but they don’t get equal share as
an xpn.
Right of representation (RR):
First you know in representation, the representative is only supposed
to get what the person represented would be entitled to receive.
Intestate:
X died and all his children predeceased him, his grandchildren are all
2nd degree relatives of the grandfather, but since they are inheriting
from RR, they don’t get equal shares because they are supposed to get
what their parents are entitled to receive if they are alive and could
inherit.
If all the children are alive, they are entitled to 600k each, which in
case of their predeceased capacity, would go down to their respective
representatives.
Mgaaposilanglahatpero di sila equal pero di pwede mag reklamo.
So division in RR is:
Per stirpes / per group—the representative or representatives
receive only what the person represented would have received.
If there are more than one representative in the same degree, then
DIVIDE THE PORTION EQUALLY, without prejudice to the distinction
between legitimate and illegitimate children, when applicable.
But if there is inheritance by your own right, you inherit it per capita
– per head.
Grandchildren inherit always by RR except when all the children of X
repudiate the inheritance..
That’s the only case where the grandchildren will inherit by their own
right and not by RR.
So pag in their own right ung 1.8M hindimoididivide by 3,
ididividemosya by 9.
If the case for the children not to inherit is the repudiation of all of
them, this is the time that grandchildren will inherit by their own
right and not by RR because a person who renounces the inheritance
may not be represented.
Then each grandchild will get 200k each. Divide 1.8 by 9.
Kung isalangang nag repudiate si C lang and angdalawa nag
predecease, yung children niyapano?
They don’t get anything. Not even the legitime.
Entire 1.8 will be divided by 2.
So children of A and B will get the entire estate to the exclusion of C.
Incapacity or predecease – there is always representation in case of
grand children.
The only time that grand children inherit per capita is in the case of
repudiation of their parents.
Right of the children vis a vis nephews and nieces is different.
Titingnanmo kung sinoyungnamatay.
Pagloloungnamatay, grandchildren inherit by RR if incapacity or
predecease.
Inherit by their own right incase of repudiation by all the children.
Suppose if it is P who died and A predecease, and B is alive, C is alive,
the children of P will not inherit anything because the children are
still alive. But in the case of A since he predeceased, his own children
can represent him on the estate of P.
Involved here are: the grandchildren and nephews of the decedent.
Pag nephews and nieces, if all the children of the brothers predecease,
the nephews and nieces inherit per capita and not by RR, they inherit
by their own right.If they survive alone.
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation,
if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
When do they inherit by RR? What is the condition?
Condition is that there must be one uncle and aunt surviving with
them.
SAYSON V. CA
FACTS:
 Eleno and Rafaela Sayson’s properties were left in the possession
of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim
to be their children.
 Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
 Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time
for the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno
and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children.
The complainants asserted the defense to wit, that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right
of representation.
RULING: SC hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children,
are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in
the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love
descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to
his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is
also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them
and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from
this earth.
Right of representation:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue
of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of
the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law
and not by the person represented. The representative does not
succeed the person represented but the one who the person
represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to
represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate
estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is
entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'
other children.
RR presupposes the right of person representing to inherit is to be
determined, not from the person represented but from the decedent.
Legitimate Children(LC) v. illegitimate children(ILC)
If the estate is not sufficient, as long as you satisfy the legitime of the
LC first then the spouse then the remainder you divide it among the
ILC.
Theory of concurrence – whatever remains after satisfying the
legitimes, we still give the ILC a share of whatever remains.
Theory of exclusion – since LC are on a higher lane than ILC, we
exclude the ILC from the distribution of the balance of the remainder
of the estate.
But under Philippine law, this jurisdiction, we follow the theory of
concurrence, thus we still give to the ILC a share in whatever remains
after satisfying the legitimes of the LC and the surviving spouse, as
well as the ILC.
RR - a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he
were living or if he could have inherited.
Remember 2 things:
1. Representation only takes place in the direct descending, never in
the ascending;
2. In the collateral line it is limited only to the children of the brothers
and sisters.
So in RR, the capacity of the representative should be reckoned not
from the person represented, so in other words yung representative
pwedeng incapacitated, to inherit from person represented but he is
capacitated to inherit from the decedent.
Representative inherits from the deceased and not from the person
represented.
He inherits not from the person represented, but from the person to
whom the person represented would have succeeded.
He inherits from the decedent

RR, right of representative cannot be higher than right if person
represented.
Whatever the person represented would have received, would pass
on the representative.
Take note: of the status of the person represented.
So assuming that all the legitimate and illegitimate children of
F(decedent) predeceased, since A B and C are LC, who can represent
A?
Since A is legitimate, only legitimate can represent and not
illegitimate since the barrier applies.
RULE OF BARRIER / IRON CURTAIN RULE (RB/ICR)
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
This is the well-known, and much criticized, successional barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent.
The feeling is mutual here. Law considers no mutual succession
between them.
An ILC has no right to inherit ab intestate from the Legitimate
relatives of his father.
But if he is ILC he has no legitimate parents for the barrier to apply,
thus he can be represented by his illegitimate children.
An ILC can be represented by both LC and ILC.
ANSELMA DIAZ v. IAC and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN
FACTS:
 FelisaPamutiJardin(Felisa) is a niece of SimonaPamutiVda. de
Santero who together with Felisa’s mother Juliana were the only
legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion
 Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
FelisaPamuti and another child who died during infancy
 SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero is the widow of PascualSantero
and the mother of Pablo Santero
 Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents
PascualSantero and SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero
 PascualSantero died in 1970, Pablo Santero in 1973 and
SimonaSantero in 1976, Pablo Santero, at the time of his death
was survived by his mother SimonaSantero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz
and two minor children with FelixbertaPacursa.
ISSUE: Who are the legal heirs of SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero —
her niece FelisaPamutiJardin or her grandchildren (the natural
children of Pablo Santero)?
RULING: Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate
estate of SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother
of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of Art. 992 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On
the other hand, Anselma Diaz et. al.. are the illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art.
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero
in the succession of the letter to the intestate estate of his legitimate
mother SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero, because of the barrier
provided for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the
phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother"
includes SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero as the word "relative"
includes all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows
that from the commencement of this case the only parties who
claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late SimonaPamutiVda. de
Santero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the six minor natural or
illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are
barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding FelisaPamuti-
Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
SimonaPamutiVda. de Santero.
How do you prevent Art. 992 from coming into operation?
Do not die intestate. Execute a will. Art 992 only applies in intestacy.
TOMAS CORPUS vs. ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.
Yangco
FACTS:
 Teodoro R. Yangco died at the age of 77 years. His will was
probated. The decree of probate was affirmed.
 Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest
relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half
sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus,
Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half
brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the
daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October,
1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
 Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and
Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union
with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with
Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus
and Jose Corpus.
 Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition
was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in
the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of
Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should
be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of
heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who
represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de
Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel.
ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a
legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover
his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
RULING:Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child
or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child
of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant
Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed
hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because
there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of
Tomas Corpus.
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code
which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to
inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further
grounds of resentment.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that
the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate
child.
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his
natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased
uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother.
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA vs. CA and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA
FACTS:
 DomingaRevuelta died at the age of 92, with a will leaving her
properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta. Isabel was given
the free portion in addition to her legitime and was appointed
executrix of the will.
 Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate
proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a monthly
allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta.
ISSUE: May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional
rights to the estate of DomingaRevuelta?
RULING:Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the
degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the
latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first
reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and
the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
The law is clear that there is representation only when relatives of a
deceased person try to succeed him in his rights which he would have
had if still living. In the present case, however, said deceased had
already succeeded his aunt, the testatrix herein. . . . It is a fact that at
the time of the death of the testatrix, Reynaldo Cuison was still alive.
He died two months after her (testatrix's) death. And upon his death,
he transmitted to his heirs, the petitioners herein Elisa Cuison et al.,
the legacy or the right to succeed to the legacy. . . . In other words, the
herein petitioners-appellants are not trying to succeed to the right to
the property of the testatrix, but rather to the right of the legatee
Reynaldo Cuison in said property.
Not having predeceased DomingaRevuelta, her son Vicente had the
right to inherit from her directly or in his own right. No right of
representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita
upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It
would have been different if Vicente was already dead when
DomingaRevuelta died. Carmelita could then have inherited from her
in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the private
respondent was a lawful heir.
But herein lies the crux, for she is not. As a spurious child of Vicente,
Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of Article
992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the
legitimate and illegitimate families.
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in
that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie
of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is
presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former in turn sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred
from inheriting from DomingaRevuelta for there would be no natural
kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind
them either. As aptly pointed out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino: If the
adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannot
represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or
ascendants of the adopter. The adopted child is not related to the
deceased in that case, because the filiation created by fiction of law is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted. "By adoption, the
adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make
one for their kindred.
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la
Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but
not to the estate of DomingaRevuelta. Her claims for support and
inheritance should therefore be filed in the proceedings for the
settlement of her own father's
estate and cannot be considered in the probate of DomingaRevuelta's
Will.
PASCUAL V. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
 Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late EligioPascual, the
latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres
Pascual
ISSUE: WON Art 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be
interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the
inheritance of the deceased.
RULING: Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v.
IAC, supra, where this Court ruled that: Article 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is
in turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child
nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken
in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment.
EligioPascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate
children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did
not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their
father EligioPascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.
The Court held: Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of
successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants
(of these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right
of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever
manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions
are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not
available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the
inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
MANUEL V. FERRER
FACTS:
 The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is
the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died intestate
without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
 Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel
and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula
Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born.
 Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza
Gamba. In consideration of the marriage, a donation propter
nuptias over a parcel of land was executed in favor of Juan
Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land were
later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were
not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one
impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta
Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter".
 Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption)
over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land. Two years
laterEsperanza Gamba also passed away.
RULING: What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an
illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code,
there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from
members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this
barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters,
cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law
speaks of "brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of
an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as
well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such
brothers and sisters.
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a
succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be
an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child
is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the
legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the
illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this
truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in
several other cases. Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child
had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the
former's inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the
mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; that a natural
child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot
succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate
brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform
general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by,
but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to
produce a harmonious whole.
Q: The order of intestate succession when the decedent is legitimate
In other words who are preferred in the order of succession when the
decedent is legitimate?
A: Legitimate children and descendants
Legitimate parents and ascendants
Illegitimate Children
Surviving Spouse
Brothers/ Sisters
Other Collaterals
State
But if the decedent is an illegitimate person of course the order of
intestate succession would differ
A: Legitimate Children
Illegitimate Children
Illegitimate Parents
Surviving Spouse
Brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces
Other Collaterals
State
The Division of Estate Intestate is subject to the following rules:
The Rule of Preference
The Rule of Equality
The Rule of Proximity
The Right of Representation
The Rule of Barrier between legitimate and illegitimate
Concurring Heirs in Intestacy:
Illegitimate Children concurs with everyone, so just like the surviving
spouse concurs with everyone.
Illegitimate Children concur, Legitimate Children, Surviving spouse as
well as the legitimate parents of the decedent.
BUT THEY EXCLUDE but who do they exclude, the illegitimate
children?
Brothers and Sisters and Other Collaterals.
But how about the legitimate parents/ascendants? They concur with
the illegitimate children, surviving spouse but they exclude brothers
and sisters as well as other collaterals.
Now what about the surviving spouse? Ito ang universal heir nglahat.
Except the state of course and other collaterals. So the surviving
spouse will exclude other collateral relatives as well as the state.
So brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces exclude other
collaterals pursuant to Article 1009. Among themselves they are
subject to the rule that full blood gets double the share of the half
blood and this rule will also apply to nephews and nieces. Whether
inherting in their own right or by right of representation.
So other collaterals among themselves, they are still subject to Rule of
Proximity. Meaning to say that not all relatives withing the 5 th
degree. Kasimagiinheritlangnamanyung 4th and the 5th degree
pagwalang 3rd. So Among themselves if they are 4th degree relatives
they will also exclude the 5th degree relatives.
But Please take note that the rule of barrier between legitimates and
illegitimates will likewise apply to nephews and nieces such that if
there are legitimate brothers of the deceased, and this legitimate
brothers have illegitimate children the illegitimate children of a
predeceased brother can NOT represent the estate of the legitimate
brother. So pagnakitanyoyung Art 994,when it speaks of brothers INTESTATE
and sisters, nephews and nieces inheriting from an illegitimate child LEGITIME/TESTATE
they refer to illegitimate brothers and sister also. 2(LC)A=142,857 + 57,142.55
Kasingahindipwedekasi there is a barrier kapag intestacy. So when 200,000
the law speaks of illegitimate brothers or sisters, nephews and nieces 2(LC)B= 142,857 + 57, 142.55
for that matter inheriting from the illegitimate decedent brother they 200,000
only refer to illegitimate brothers or sister. 2(LC)C= 142,857 + “ “
200,000
The Division of Estate Intestate 2(LC)D= 142,857 + “ “
(Ma’am writes on the board) (example) 200,000
2(LC)E= 142, 857 + “ “
So when there are concurring heirs in intestacy the general rule is ½ 200,000
of the estate goes to one group and ½ goes to the other group. So Mas 2(LC)F= 142, 857 +” “
madaliang division sa intestacy kasi the basic fraction that you have 200,000
to remember is ½. ½ for each group. 2(LC)G= 142, 857 +” “
200,000
Surviving Spouse, what’s the fraction ½ and divide the number of ____________
each legitimate children. P 1M

So now what we will do is I’ll ask one group to compute intestate and The legitime of the legitimate children is 1,000,000 divided 7
the other testate. So the group that will compute for the testate will
determine the legitimes of the survivors. Marring may free portion And the illegitimate children divide the legitime of Legitimate to 2
maaringwala. Sa intestacy naman you distribute the entire.
1(IC) H= 71,428.57+ 28, 571.429
In succession your treat the spouse as a child and sometimes they act 100,000
like one  So, they get the same share as one child. 1(IC) I= 71,428.57+ 28, 571.429
Angtatandaannyopag intestacy the intestate share is always equal to 100,000
or more than the legitime but never less. What’s the exception. 1(IC) J= 71, 428.57+ “ “
Incase of illegitimate children, their intestate share may be less when 100,000
the estate is not sufficient. Ganoon din sa testate diba? If there are 1(IC) K= 71, 428.57+ “ “
several illegitimate children and we cannot comply with the rule that 100,000
an illegitimate children must get ½ of the share of each legitimate 1(IC) L= 71, 428.57+ “ “
child we divide the balance among the illegitmate children. Sa 100,000
intestacy ganoon din but we’re talking about the entire estate. 1(IC) M= 71,428.57+ “ “
100,000
The intent of the law is to give the surviving spouse the share as one __ ______________
legitimate child. _________________________
20 428, 571.42
In case of partial intestacy you get the share of a legatee for example P 2,000,000
from the intestate heir who gets more than his/ her legitime.
Estate: 2,000,000
Example: If the testator left a legacy to XYZ which is an organization Less 1,428,571.42
for street children. Angbinigaylangng testator ay 1/8 so assuming _______________________________
that there are no other provisions in the will. Intestacy governs with 51,428. 58 divided by 20 = 28,571.429 x 2 = 57,142.558
respect to the rest of the estate. So if his survivors are parents A & B,
his spouse S, and one illegitimate child. What could have been the So If you distribute this 2:1 this is how will it look like 200,000 for
intestate shares of these 3? each legitimate child, 100,000 for each illegitimate child.

ESTATE 120,000 If you countercheck it’s alright. It’s still better that you do the long
Parents A & B = 60,000 method that you know you will not impair the legitime of the
Surviving Spouse= 30,000 legitimate children. So if you can see in this example if you distribute
Illegitimate Child= 30,000 in proportion in 2:1. The estate is sufficient. and If you compute it the
long way they will get the same share. Based on the legitime and
So satisfy the legacy in favor of XYZ Corporation. So pagsinabing whatever remains divided by 20.
testator, “I hereby give the 1/8 balance of my estate” so 1/8 of
120,000 is how much? 15,000. So who among these intestate heirs get
more than his/her legitime if the deceased died testate, if we’re GAME:
distributing testate? Sino satatloangnakakuhang mas
malakisalegitime? Answer: The Surviving Spouse. The spouse gets COMPUTE TESTATE (Legitime, Free Portion) /INTESTATE
1/8 in testamentary succession. So you will deduct the legacy of 1/8
from the spouse. She cannot complain because her legitime has been Q: 1.ESTATE: 240,000
satisfied. So that’s the rule incase of partial intestacy you get the Decedent P
legacy/devise form the share of the intestate heir who gets more than Survivors: 3 LC and Surviving Spouse
his/her legitime.
Testate:
Example: A (LC) 40,000
B (LC) 40,000
Estate is 2,000,000 C (LC) 40,000
Survivors: 7 Legitimate Children (LC) Surviving Spouse 40,000
6 Illegitimate Children (IC) FP: 80, 000

Class, for the purposes of our exam. If I Ask you to divide the estate,
assume that the conjugal share of the spouse is out. Ibigsabihin out
naang share ng spouse. So it is the estate of the deceased only.
Q: 2. ESTATE: 480,000
Survivors: 3 LC, 2 IC, and Surviving Spouse
Testate:
A (LC) 80,000
B (LC) 80,000
C ( LC) 80,000
D (IC) 40,000
E (IC) 40,000
Surviving Spouse: 80,000
FP: 80,000
Q: 3. S is the Son of F & M
F is the Son of P
M is the Daughter of G
S died leaving an estate of 120,000
Survived by F, P & G
Q: 4.Decedent D died
Estate: 3M
Survived by his legitimate parents, Surviving spouse S
Q: T died survived by his spouse and 6 illegitimate children
A,B,C,D,E,F. His estate is 720,000
Q: D died survived by his legitimate parents F and M and 4
illegitimate children A,B,C,D. His estate is 360,000.
Q: D died survived by his legitimate parents X and Y, his e2
illegitimate children A and B, and his spouse S. His estate is 480,000.
Q: I is an illegitimate child of P. He died survived by P and his wife S
leaving an estate of 240,000.
When a deceased is an illegitimate child and he is survived by his
spouse and his parents, in intestacy there is no article governing such
but we apply article 997 by analogy.
Q: B died leaving an estate of 3,000,000 survived by his wife S, 2 full
blood brothers and 2 half blood brothers.
Q: G died and he has 3 full blood brothers A,B and C. A predeceased
leaving behind 2 children A1 and A1. He also have 3 half blood
brothers D,E and F. E is incapacitated to succeed from G and he left 1
child E1. His estate is 3,600,000
Q: X has 5 legitimate children A,B,C,D and E. C has 2 children C1 and
C2. D has 2 children D1 and D2. E has 2 children E1 and E2. C
predecease, D is incapacitated and E renounced his inheritance. His
estate is 600,000.
Q: X died survived by his legitimate parents A and B, 3 legitimate
children C1,C2 and C3. 6 illegitimate children D1 to D6 and his spouse
S. His estate is 360,000.
Q: D died leaving a will instituting his 2 full blood brothers to ¼ of the
free portion of his estate as well as a friend F also ¼. B1 predeceased
D leaving a child A but D died survived by the following: his wife S, his
illegitimate parents X and Y and his brother B2 and the child of B1, A
as well as F.
Verdad vs. CA (Arts. 995 and 1001)
When does the legal redemption starts to run with respect to
coowners? Reckoning point?
Within 30 days from notice in writing the coowners are given the
right of legal redemption of the share of their coowners if the
property is sold to a stranger. Verdad is not a part of the original
coownership and the share of the other coowners were sold without
written notice of Socorro.
Why would Socorro be entitled to a written notice when in fact she is
not an original coowner?
Whatever rights David has with respect to the land now passed to his
own heirs and Socorro is an heir of David. She merely step in the
shoes of David and that entitled her to a right of legal redemption
because of the lack of written notice of sale. The 30 day period did not
run until written notice is given to Socorro.
Tison v. Ca (Art. 995 and 1001)
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the
property in question by right of representation?
The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation,
if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants,
and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate,
without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, should there be any, under Article 1001.
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or theirs children to the
other half.
Upon the death of TeodoraDezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners (niece and
nephew of the deceased) who are entitled to jointly inherit in their
own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only validly alienate his
total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the entire property to
herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and private
respondent are deemed co-owners of the property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 374012 in the proportion of an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
Cacho v. Udan (Art. 1002)
Whether‬or not the ‬brothers John‬andRusticoUdan may claim to
be‬heirs intestate of their legitimate sister Silvina?
NO. The lower court correctly held that they were not, for at the time
of her death, Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her
heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from
Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines,
in force at the time of the death of the testatrix:
ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who
died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants,
ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and
sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article
1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving
children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003).
That Francisco Udan was the illegitimate son of the late Silvina is not
denied by the oppositor; and he is so acknowledged to be in the
testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix. As
the latter was admittedly single, the son must be necessarily
illegitimate (presumptively natural under Article 277).
The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not
improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former
are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the
appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason
that, as correctly decided by the lower court, the legitimate relatives
of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from
Article 992 of the Civil Code: “An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child.”
Solivio v. CA (Arts. 1003 and 1004)
The decedent (Esteban) died leaving only two aunts. The issue is
WON they can inherit considering that the property originally came
from the mother (Salustia) of the decedent. It was contended that the
sister of Salustia is the only the only relative in the maternal side and
therefore the property left by the decedent should pertain to her.
There was even an issue on reserve troncal. The SC said that there
was no reserve troncal because the property, while it descended to
Esteban there was no further ascendant who inherited the property
from Esteban because his father predeceased him when he was still
an infant. Therefore, the two aunts on the maternal and paternal side,
in the absence of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, are both
entitled to inherit from Esteban without distinction as to the source of
the property. As collateral relatives, they are entitled to share the
estate as there are no other nearer relatives entitled left by the
deceased. They are both relatives in the 3 rd degree and they are
entitled to inherit from the decedent Estaban.
Sarita v. Candia (Art. 1005)
Manuel Sarita, the principal petitioner, who requested the
engagement of all the petitioners to confide the suit to the attorney,
has absolutely no right to do so because he cannot represent his
grandfather Domingo. In the collateral line, the right of
representation can only take place in favor of the children of
brothers/sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother. In
this case, Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeño who, in turn, was the
daughter of Domingo Cedeño (brother of Apolinario), cannot be a
party to the case.
On the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the
intestate succession of Apolinario, does exist, it could only be
exercised by CristetaCedeño (sister of Apolinario), the children of
MacarioCedeño (brother of Apolinario), and those of Domingo
Cedeño (brother of Apolinario), but not by Manuel Sarita, because in
inheritance, the nearer relative excludes the more remote,
excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Art. 921 of
Old Civil Code). Thus, it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta,
the children of Macario and those of Domingo, to exercise such a
hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of
these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita,
the son of Sofia, of a more remote degree.
Cristeta, being the only living sister of Apolinario together with the
children of his predeceased brothers and sisters, will inherit the
estate to the exclusion of Manuel.
GSIS v. Custodio (Art. 1005)
Whether or not Susana (surviving sister of the decedent and the aunt
of the other defendants) may claim GSIS proceeds as the sole
beneficiary thereof?
That the intestate heirs, Macario C., Luisa and David Custodio who did
not sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement, not be considered as
having recognized Susana Custodio, as the only beneficiary of
Simeon's retirement money. There is no evidence the case having
been submitted for decision below solely on a stipulation of facts, that
these non-signatory heirs had agreed, or accepted other benefits
under the deed of partition, as appellee now claims. Susana Custodio
did not oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and,
actually, even prayed that said motion be granted, although the court
denied it just the same. These three (3) heirs should inherit per
stirpes, in accordance with Article 1005 of the Civil Code. As
Macario C. Custodio (as distinguished from Macario A., who signed
the agreement) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C. inherits
by representation the one-fourth (¼) share pertaining to his
father, while Luisa and David Custodio being two (2) of six (6)
children of Jacinto, are each entitled to a sixth of one-fourth (1/6
x 1/4) equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass.
Abella de Bacayo v. Borromeo (Art. 1006)
WON the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in
the inheritance.
–NO. The aunt will be excluded.
Filomena, being under the category of “other collaterals” is excluded
by the presence of Arturo’s children who are the nephews and nieces
of the decedent. The moment there is one newphew or niece of the
decedent, his/her other collaterals will be excluded from his estate. If
the person does not fall under the BSNN (brother, sister, nephew or
niece), and he is claiming the estate against the BSNN, he is “another
collateral” and will be excluded from the decedent’s estate. In this
case, Filemona is excluded by the presence of the children of the
decedent’s predeceased brother.
BicomongvsAlmanza (Art. 1006)
Q: While Kristeta will not exclude the half-blood nephews and nieces,
the SC followed the 2:1 Rule wherein they gave Kristeta double the
share of the half-blood nephews and nieces following the Rule in
1006 which is applicable to brothers and sisters. So the SC also
applied that to nephews and nieces. So if the decedent is survived by
full-blood nieces and half-blood nieces, the rule on double the share
will likewise apply.
Fernandez vs Fernandez (Art. 1009)
In the absence of collateral relatives up to the fifth degree, the law
does not consider ties of bloods anymore for purposes of succession.
Estate will go to the State.
If the deceased is a resident of the Philippines, the personal property
of the deceased will be assigned to the municipality where the
deceased last resided while real property to the municipality where it
is located. For practical reasons you cannot assign an estate in Manila
to municipality of Bulacan.
When deceased is not a resident of the Philippines, assign to
municipality where located.
For the State to get the property, proper escheat proceeding must be
instituted at the instance of the government.
City of Manila (Art. 1011-1012)
The State will only be an heir if the decedent died intestate.
Accretion
- provision common to both testate and intestate. However
in intestate succession, the vacant portion will pass on to the
representative of the heir who predeceased or is incapacitated to
succeed. Accretion in intestacy apply only in repudiation because the
“vacant” portion here is not really vacant but passed on the
representative. In repudiation, since a person who renounced cannot
be represented, there will be a vacant portion in which case, the
portion rendered vacant shall be disposed of as follows: (a) if
testamentary and there is substitute designated by testator, then
substitution takes precedence over accretion. Meaning, substitution is
superior to the rights of the co-heirs by accretion. REASON:
Substitution is based on the express will of the testator while
accretion is based on the presumed will.

Requisites of Accretion:
1) Plurality of Subject - there must be two or more called to the same
inheritance
2) Unity of Object - same inheritance
3) There must be no earmarking of the shares.

Accretion is a right by virtue of which the share which pertains to the

heir who is incapacitated or predeceased or renounces inheritance is
added to the shares of his co-heirs, co-devisees, co-legatees. But it is
important that you are called to the same inheritance. The moment
there is earmarking of shares in such a way that the share which
pertains to one heir is physically segregated from all the others of the
same class, then there can be no accretion.

E.g. T gave his entire deposit at BPI Moratya to A, BDO Recto to B and
Security Bank UST Branch to C. If A predeceased, there can be no
accretion with respect to the portion pertaining to A precisely
because their shares are earmarked. In that case in the absence of a
qualified substitute in the will of the testator, the portion of A will
pass to his intestate heirs. The law requires earmarking for
precluding accretion from taking place but if there is no earmarking
but merely a mention of the fractional part, for as long as the
fractional part remain pro-indiviso, will not preclude the right of
accretion. Meaning if what has been mentioned was “I hereby give to Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
A ¼ and the other ¼ to B of the FP of my estate, there is still state of
indivision and accretion will take place in case of RIP. Article 1024. Persons not incapacitated by law may succeed by
will or abintestato.
(Board Example)
The provisions relating to incapacity by will are equally
Testate applicable to intestate succession.

xxx Article 1025. In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir,

A compulsory heir can only be represented with respect to the
legitime, he cannot be represented to the free portion because of Art
856. Because if he is instituted to the FP he is considered a voluntary
heir with respect to his institution to the free portion therefore 856
will operate. So the FP in the absence of a qualified substitute will go
to the co-heirs.
Intestate
Simply divide by four (number of heirs) then the portion rendered
vacant will be divided by the number of remaining co-heirs.
Variance of opinions among authors with respect to the legitime if it
is repudiated, some say that it goes to the other compulsory heirs in
their own right but other authors say it goes to the legal heirs of the
testator. But the result is still the same.
Torres vs Lopez (Art. 1017 – 1022)
Margarita Lopez and the other claimant cannot obviously have a
better right than the co-heir because the right of accretion prevails
over the right of intestate succession. So, 1) substitution 2) accretion
(in the absence of substitute) 3) intestate heirs.
devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession
opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper.
A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent
is capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the
conditions prescribed in article 41.
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if
it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.
Complete separation from the mother's womb takes place
after the cutting of the umbilical cord.
If the instituted heir has not yet been conceived at the time
of the death of the testator, he will not inherit for lack of
capacity to inherit.
Absolute incapacity to succeed
Persons not yet conceived at the time of death of the testator
Relative incapacity to succeed - cannot inherit only from certain
persons
1. Those disqualified for reasons of possible undue influence
2. Barred from inheriting from one another by reason of public policy
and morality
3. Unworthiness to succeed
Article 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during
his last illness, or the minister of the gospel who extended
spiritual aid to him during the same period;
Not necessarily a catholic priest
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within
the fourth degree, the church, order, chapter, community,
organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may
belong;
4th degree blood relatives only and not those by affinity.
Spouse of the priest is not mentioned in the disqualification.
If there is in fact undue influence exerted by the spouse of
the minister:
 If the undue influence exerted was for the particular
disposition in favor of the spouse of the minister, the
spouse of the minister becomes disqualified to inherit.
The will is still is valid.
 If the undue influence exerted upon the execution of the
entire will itself, the entire will may be disallowed in
relation to Art. 839.
Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other
person;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given
by a ward in his favor before the final accounts of the
guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should die
after the approval thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by
the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his
ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid;
Two different opinions with regards to the guardian:
 As the law provides that there should be a final account
by the guardian, it only includes a guardian with whom
the property of the ward is entrusted.
 As the law did not distinguish, both a guardian as to the
property as well as those as to the person of the ward is
included.
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse,
parents, or children, or any one claiming under such witness,
spouse, parents, or children;
Article 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to
whom or to whose spouse, or parent, or child, a devise or
legacy is given by such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far
only as concerns such person, or spouse, or parent, or child of
such person, or any one claiming under such person or spouse,
or parent, or child, be void, unless there are three other
competent witnesses to such will. However, such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise or
legacy had not been made or given.
Rules when a witness is also a legatee or devisee:
 If there are more than 3 witnesses, the devise/legacy
and the will are both considered valid. Even if we
remove the witness who was given a devise/legacy,
there still remains the required number of witnesses.
The exertion of undue influence is removed.
 If there 3 witnesses, the devise/legacy will be void but
the will is still valid
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who
took care of the testator during his last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by
law to inherit.
The disqualification in Art. 1027 would only affect the Free
Portion and not the legitime.
Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in article 739,
concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.
Article 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same
criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and
ascendants, by reason of his office.
Nepomuceno v. CA
In Article III of the disputed Will, executed on August 15, 1968, or
almost six years before the testator's death on July 16, 1974, Martin
Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from
whom he had been estranged "for so many years." He also declared
that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his legitimate
children. In Article IV, he stated that he had been living as man and
wife with the petitioner since 1952. Testator Jugo declared that the
petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that
Nepomuceno represented Jugo as her own husband but "in truth and
in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to me in
the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned previous
marriage.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior
existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. There is also
no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an
ostensible marital relationship for 22 years until his death.
Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against
the making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery
or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very
wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage.
Article 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by
reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their
daughters to lead a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against
their virtue;
In the opinion of Sen. Tolentino, granddaughters are also
included.
What if it is the son who was induced to lead a corrupt or
moral life?
The law should be strictly construed since it is a
disqualification and thus, sons are not included.

(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the
life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which
the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent
death of the testator, should fail to report it to an officer of the
law within a month, unless the authorities have already taken
action; this prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein,
according to law, there is no obligation to make an accusation;
This disqualification will only apply of the heir is obligated
to report the violent death of the testator. If for example the
heir instituted is not a compulsory heir but a stranger, he is
not required to report the violent death of the testator as he
is not the proper party. It only applies to blood relatives.
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator;
A, the 1st wife of the testator C died, B is the 2nd wife. What
if X the son of A and C had an affair with B and both are
convicted? Who is/are disqualified?
The son is disqualified by reason of unworthiness to
succeed. The disqualification of unworthiness only applies
to the person found guilty with the offending spouse but not
as to the offending spouse. The remedy of the offended
spouse is to disinherit the offending spouse by reason of
giving cause for legal separation. Another option is to
institute an action for legal separation because if it is
granted, the offending spouse is disqualified from inheriting
from the offended spouse as provided for by Art. 63 of the
Family Code by operation of law.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the
following effects:
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting
from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of
the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
It is not necessary for disinheritance purposes that the
offending spouse be found guilty. It is enough that there is
cause for legal separation to disinherit the offending spouse.
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence should cause the testator to make a will or to change
one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from
making a will, or from revoking one already made, or who
supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will;
If the testator has 2 sons A and B, are instituted to the Free
Portion of his estate, a bigger part was given A. The son B
altered the provision of the notarial will making it appear
that the bigger portion was give to him. Is B disqualified?
Will it render the entire will void?
B will be disqualified by reason of unworthiness. B will lose
both the Free Portion as well as his legitime. If B has his own
heirs, they would inherit by right of representation only as
to the legitime of B. The will is still valid.
If it is testate, the legitime of the disqualified or
incapacitated to succeed heir will go to his representatives.
If it is intestate the entire intestate share will go to the
representatives.
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the
decedent.
Article 1033. The cause of unworthiness shall be without effect if
the testator had knowledge thereof at the time he made the will,
or if, having known of them subsequently, he should condone
them in writing.
 If the testator already knows that there is a cause
for unworthiness but later on executes a will
instituting such heir, the unworthiness will be
erased as it operates as a written pardon.
 If the testator does not know that there is a cause of
unworthiness and executes a will instituting such
heir and then subsequently learns of the cause, the
testator should execute a written pardon to restore
the unworthy heir's capacity to inherit.
Disinheritance vs. Unworthiness
Article 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender
and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to
disinherit, and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that
may have been made.
The subsequent reconciliation between the testator and the
disinherited heir renders the disinheritance ineffectual. It is
not necessary to execute a written pardon. It is the
disinherited heir who must prove that there has indeed
been reconciliation.
Reconciliation is the resumption of the genuine cordial
relationship which existed between of the spouses before
the issuance of the decree of legal separation.
Article 1040. The action for a declaration of incapacity and for
the recovery of the inheritance, devise or legacy shall be brought
within five years from the time the disqualified person took
possession thereof. It may be brought by any one who may have
an interest in the succession.
Acceptance and Repudiation of the Inheritance
Article 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the inheritance is
an act which is purely voluntary and free.
No person may be compelled to accept the liberality of
another.
Before accepting or repudiating, 2 things must be certain:
 The right to inherit
 Death of the decedent
Rights of succession are transmitted from the moment of
death, any repudiation or acceptance before the death is
useless, futile and without effect.
Article 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an inheritance
unless he is certain of the death of the person from whom he is to
inherit, and of his right to the inheritance.
A waiver of the inheritance made before the death is void
for 2 reason.
 Art. 777
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of the death of the decedent.
 The waiver lacks a valid object. The inheritance.
Modes of Acceptance
Express Express
Article 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or private
document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the
intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which one would
have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not
imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through such acts, the
title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed.
Implied Acceptance
Article 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or
to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though gratuitously, for
the benefit of one or more of his co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-heirs
indiscriminately; but if this renunciation should be gratuitous,
and the co-heirs in whose favor it is made are those upon whom
the portion renounced should devolve by virtue of accretion, the
inheritance shall not be deemed as accepted.
Article 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the
Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to
the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have
accepted the inheritance.
Article 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in
a public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the
court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings.
The law is more liberal in acceptance. It allows implied
acceptance but does not allow for implied repudiation. The
law is more strict in repudiation because it deprives the heir
of his share in the inheritance as well as his representatives.
Article 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance,
once made, is irrevocable, and cannot be impugned, except when
it was made through any of the causes that vitiate consent, or
when an unknown will appears.
Republic vs. Guzman
However, the inexistence of a donation does not render the
repudiation made by Helen in favor of David valid. There is no valid
repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of
the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on 29
December 1970 dividing and adjudicating between the two (2) of
them all the property in Simeons estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and
her sons name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years
they possessed the lands in the concept of owner. Article 1056 of the
Civil Code provides -
The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once made is
irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made
through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an
unknown will appears.
Nothing on record shows that Helens acceptance of her inheritance
from Simeon was made through any of the causes which vitiated her
consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown will
executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot
belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or
impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeons estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim
deeds which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted
the inheritance have no legal force and effect.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the repudiation does not ipso
facto operate to convert the parcels of land into res nullius to be
escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation being of no
effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their private
owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is qualified by
hereditary succession to own the property subject of the litigation.
Pastor v. CA
When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside
from his two legitimate children and one illegitimate son. There is
therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart
the share of PASTOR, SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership
preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. which will include, among others, the determination of
the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife until her
death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on December 5,
1972, there had been no liquidation of the community properties of
PASTOR, SR. and his wife.
So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive
determination of the assets of the estate of PASTOR, SR. There was an
inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special
administrator, but it does not appear that it was ever the subject of a
hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or
recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of
PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another court.
There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the
debts of the decedent and his estate. Indeed, it was only in the
Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court ordered
that-
... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, requiring all persons having money
claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the
Branch Clerk of this Court."
Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided
for, as of December 5, 1972.
The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime
of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained.
All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to
determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a fixed share in a
specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of
the deceased - would produce an impairment of the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
Collation
Collation is either a mathematical process or actual collation of
restoring to the mass of hereditary the value of donations inter vivos
made by the decedent
3 Fold purpose
1. Computation of the net hereditary estate
2. Imputation of donations made to children or compulsory heirs to
their legitimes
3. Reduction or revocation of donations inter vivos in case it is found
to impair the legitimes
All donations made by the decedent are subject to collation (to
compulsory heirs and strangers).
Expenses not subject to collation (not charged to legitime)
Article 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical
attendance, even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to
collation.
Article 1068. Expenses incurred by the parents in giving their
children a professional, vocational or other career shall not be
brought to collation unless the parents so provide, or unless they
impair the legitime; but when their collation is required, the sum
which the child would have spent if he had lived in the house and
company of his parents shall be deducted therefrom.
The exception is if it already impairs the legitime. (E.g.
Perpetual student)
Article 1070. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting
of jewelry, clothing, and outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious
except insofar as they may exceed one-tenth of the sum which is
disposable by will.
Wedding gifts have an exclusive list for it not to be subject to
collation. (E.g. Vessels are not included as an exception)
If the free portion is P500,000 and the wedding gift is
P100,000, P50,000 will be charged to the free portion while
the other P50,000 will be charged to the legitime. The excess
of the 1/10 is to be charged to the free portion.
If the testator provides that such donation will not be
charged to the legitime of the compulsory heir, it will be
charged against the free portion instead. It may still be
subject to reduction if it encroaches the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Expenses subject to collation
Article 1067. Expenses for support, education, medical
attendance, even in extraordinary illness, apprenticeship,
ordinary equipment, or customary gifts are not subject to
collation.
Customary gifts are relative to the earning capacity of the
decedent.
Indirect donations
Article 1069. Any sums paid by a parent in satisfaction of the
debts of his children, election expenses, fines, and similar
expenses shall be brought to collation.
Basis of the value of the property to be collated
Article 1071. The same things donated are not to be brought to
collation and partition, but only their value at the time of the
donation, even though their just value may not then have been
assessed.
Their subsequent increase or deterioration and even their total
loss or destruction, be it accidental or culpable, shall be for the
benefit or account and risk of the donee.
Donation transfer ownership and the owner bears the
increase or decrease in the value of the property donated.
Article 1065. Parents are not obliged to bring to collation in the
inheritance of their ascendants any property which may have
been donated by the latter to their children.
If a grandfather donates directly to the grandson, the son is
not obliged to collate the value of the donation made to the
grandson. If the grandson inherits by right of representation
from the grandfather, the grandson is obliged to collate the
property received.
Sanchez v. CA
Similarly, petitioners allegations of fraud in the execution of the
questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance, in view of the
palpable absence of evidence to support them. The legal presumption
of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale, being duly
notarized public documents, has not been overcome. On the other
hand, fraud is not presumed. It must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, and not by mere conjectures or speculations. We
stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of
future inheritance; these were contracts of sale perfected by the
decedents during their lifetime. Hence, the properties conveyed
thereby are not collationable because, essentially, collation mandated
under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties
conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heirby way of donation or
other gratuitous title.
Nazareno v. CA
Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to give
the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their parents
executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was
the only "female and the only unmarried member of the family." She
was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings.
As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to
Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. There was thus an
implied trust constituted in her favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code
states:
There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person
but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the
donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only
a part thereof.
There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore
subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Zaragosa v. CA
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the
lifetime of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his
properties among his three children, excepting private respondent,
through deeds of sale. A deed of sale was not executed in favor of
private respondent because she had become an American citizen and
the Constitution prohibited a sale in her favor. Petitioner admitted
Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the private respondent.
These are factual determinations of the Court of Appeals, based on
documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we are bound by
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals. Was the partition done
during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is
basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done
for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code
is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after
collation, as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other
compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may
be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the
original petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one
of the other compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be
dismissed without prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding
where all the indispensable parties are present for the rightful
determination of their respective legitime and if the legitimes were
prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
If a devise or legacy is left by the testator in his will to a compulsory
heir, the general rule is that it should not be charged against the
legitime of the compulsory heir. The purpose of the testator is
inequality. It will be charged against the free portion and is subject to
reduction if it encroaches upon the legitime of the other compulsory
heirs.
Partition and Distribution of the Estate
Article 1079. Partition, in general, is the separation, division and
assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value.
Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to
be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Partition does not necessarily have to be written. If the co-
owners possess a definite portion of a property owned in
common for so long a time to be ignored, that act of the co-
owners shall be considered as a partition.
If A, B and C each occupies a definite portion of a land left by
their father and that they each remained undisturbed for so
long a time. If C subsequently ask for a partition stating that
he does not like a portion he currently occupies, C's action
must fail on the ground that there was already an informal
partition between A, B and C. There is no form required for
the validity of a partition agreement. For purposes of
registration of partition, the parties may compel one
another to observe the formalities required by law (public
instrument).
Mendoza v. CA
In resolving the first issue, We have to settle two (2) sub-issues: (1)
has Lot 3 been partitioned; and (2) if so, has the subject lot been
adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza? In this case, the
source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession.
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs (Article 1078
of the Civil Code). Petitioners' co-ownership over Lot 3 was
extinguished when it was subdivided into Lot 3-A and Lot 3-B, which
portions were concretely determined and technically described
(see de la Cruz v. Cruz, G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA
307). Against the impetuous denial of petitioners that Lot 3 has been
partitioned is Exhibit A which is the Subdivision Plan of Lot 3, (LRC)
PSD-17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration. It is also Our finding that Lot 3-A
has been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza. We
take into account the pertinent provisions of the
"DokumentongBilihan" and estoppel on the part of petitioners.
Therefore, the "DokumentongBilihan" is a valid document.
Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. CA
In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de
facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided
without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may receive
evidence upon the question of title to the property but solely for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession.
In the instant case, private respondents have set up the defense of
ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the subject lot,
alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale
upon which petitioner bases its title is null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently made.
First, private respondents claim that not all the known heirs of
CrisantaMaloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial partition, and
that two persons who participated and were made parties thereto
were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true, would not warrant
rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code, "[a]
partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall
not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud
on the part of the persons interested; but the latter shall be
proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which
belongs to him." In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud
is extant from the records. As to the two parties to the deed who were
allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: "A partition
which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall
be void only with respect to such person." In other words, the
participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its
entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them.
Partition may be made inter vivos
Article 1080. Should a person make partition of his estate by an
act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory
heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, desires to keep
any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact,
may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by
ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned, be paid in cash.
Co-heirs may demand partition at any time after death
unless the heir is subject to a suspensive condition unless
the condition has been complied with. No co-owner may be
compelled to remain in a co-ownership.
If it is the heirs that have agreed by contract to not partition
the estate, the period must not exceed 10 years but is
subject to renewal. If it is the testator himself who
designated that no partition of the estate be made, the
period must not exceed 20 years.
Balanay v. Martinez
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should
not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but
should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is
contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by
an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any
agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact,
may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by
ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the
property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)
The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate
among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary
rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole
estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence,
she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the
other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of
twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided
during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for
twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling
reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his
one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041,
Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of
his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art.
1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed
in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate
should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and
maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the
will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect
if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of
Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably
divided among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's
conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary
rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition
made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the
rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after
the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at
the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that
such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the
legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the
testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if
the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he
made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her
husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set
forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by
will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since
the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
Article 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the division of
the estate unless the testator should have expressly forbidden its
partition, in which case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in article 494. This power of the
testator to prohibit division applies to the legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-ownership
terminates when any of the causes for which partnership is
dissolved takes place, or when the court finds for compelling
reasons that division should be ordered, upon petition of one of
the co-heirs.
Ralla v. Untalan
The first argument is stated as follows:
... The extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the
filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before said
Will was probated, is a NULLITY, considering that as already
decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, vs.
Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid
partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated. ...
The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the
simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil
case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from,
and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the
will of RosendoRalla.
Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs
till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that
the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in
the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where
there are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and
Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each
involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and
RosendoRalla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties.
x xx
Consider the following undisputed facts: the properties involved in
the present petition were the subject of the project of partition signed
by both the petitioner, Pablo Ralla, and Pedro Ralla in Civil Case No.
2023; the lower court approved the said project of partition on
December 19, 1967; subsequently, Pablo and Pedro Ralla jointly
manifested that they had already received "the ownership and
possession of the respective parcels of land adjudicated to them in the
said project of partition,"
Article 1086. Should a thing be indivisible, or would be much
impaired by its being divided, it may be adjudicated to one of the
heirs, provided he shall pay the others the excess in cash.
Nevertheless, if any of the heirs should demand that the thing be
sold at public auction and that strangers be allowed to bid, this
must be done.
Co-heirs have the same rights as that of co-owners of an
undivided property.
Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding
article, the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of
the thing owned in common, when to do so would render it
unserviceable for the use for which it is intended. But the co-
ownership may be terminated in accordance with article 498.
Article 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to
a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by
the vendor.
Plan v. IAC
Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this
case because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific
properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as to
which there is no legal redemption.
"In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased
person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are
final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution
sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of
property for payment of debts of a deceased person" (Abarro vs. De
Guia, 72 Phil. 245). Such sale is not the one contemplated in article
1067, now article 1088 of the Civil Code (Vda. de Mendoza, 69 Phil.
155).
In Jimenez vs. Jimenez, 67 Phil. 263, the deceased Josefa Jimenez left
an estate consisting of Lot No. 1090 with a house of mixed materials
with a total assessed value of P490. Geronimo Jimenez had a claim
against her estate in the sum of P359 for expenses of her last illness
and funeral.
The Cavite Court of First Instance ordered the sale of the said lot and
house to pay the claim of Geronimo. At the auction sale, Geronimo
was the only bidder. The property was adjudicated to him for P432.
He was placed by the sheriff in possession of said property. One
Gregoria Jimenez, an heir of the deceased Josefa Jimenez, filed a
motion praying that she be allowed to redeem the property from
Geronimo. The Cavite court denied the motion.
It was held that Gregoria could not be allowed to redeem the property
because properties of a decedent, which are sold at public auction for
the payment of his debts, are not subject to redemption.
Article 1092. After the partition has been made, the co-heirs
shall be reciprocally bound to warrant the title to, and the
quality of, each property adjudicated.
Article 1098. A partition, judicial or extra-judicial, may also be
rescinded on account of lesion, when any one of the co-heirs
received things whose value is less, by at least one-fourth, than
the share to which he is entitled, considering the value of the
things at the time they were adjudicated.
If an heirs is supposed to receive P2,000,000 and he
receives only P1,500,000, he is entitled to rescind the
partion by reason of lession.
Article 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall
prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made.
Opulencia v. CA
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs
from the moment of the decedents death. Petitioner, therefore,
became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father
died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the
Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to
sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.
. And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person,
each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate
left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to
him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the
coowners of the estate while it remains undivided.
Petitioner further contends that [t]o sanction the sale at this stage
would bring about a partial distribution of the decedents estate
pending the final termination of the testate proceedings.
Petitioners contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell
stipulates that petitioners offer to sell is contingent on the complete
clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father.
The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided
in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon
the ground of fraud...may be filed within four years from the
discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken
place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January
28, 1987, or three years and ten months after the questioned
extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we hold
that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not
yet prescribed.
Article 1094. An action to enforce the warranty among heirs
must be brought within ten years from the date the right of
action accrues.
The period should not be counted, not from the time of
death but from the time the cause of action accrues. The
cause of action accrues from the time there is eviction.
Article 1095. If a credit should be assigned as collectible, the co-
heirs shall not be liable for the subsequent insolvency of the
debtor of the estate, but only for his insolvency at the time the
partition is made.
The warranty of the solvency of the debtor can only be enforced
during the five years following the partition.
Co-heirs do not warrant bad debts, if so known to, and accepted
by, the distributee. But if such debts are not assigned to a co-
heir, and should be collected, in whole or in part, the amount
collected shall be distributed proportionately among the heirs.
As a general rule, the co-heirs does not warrant the solvency
of the debtor after the partition is made. The co-heirs may
stipulate that they warrant the solvency of the debtor after
the partition is made but only for a period of 5 years from
the time the partition is made

The Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private
respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the
consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel
of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the
purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate
proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioners apprehension
that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and
distribution of the properties of the estate.

Rodriguez v. CA

Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to

persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the

extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the two-year prescriptive period
is not applicable in her case.