7. REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA VS.

MARIO AND MARGIE LAURON

 This is a case for ejectment filed with MTC in Iloilo

 Lorenzo Lizada is the original owner of the subject lot; he was succeeded by his sole heir-
Jesusa Losanes;
 Jesusa Losanes is married to Hilarion Castigador, they had a child- Lilia Castigador;
 Lilia Castigador is married to Maximo Catedrilla, they had children, one of whom is the
petitioner.
 Spouses Jesusa and Hilarion Castigador died; the heirs agreed among themselves to
subdivide the subject land; one of the subdivided lands is Lot No. 5 which is agreed upon
to be given to the heirs of the deceased Lilia Castigador, one of whom is petitioner;
 Now, through the tolerance of the heirs of the late Lilia Castigador, spouses Lauron
constructed a building in Lot No. 5. Said building is alleged to be owned by the sister of
respondent Margie Lauron- Mildred Kascher.
 The heirs of Lilia made various demands to vacate the said property but all were left
unheeded.

Issues before the MTC:

1. Respondents aver that petitioner has no cause of action against them because
they are not the owner of the building built on Lot No. 5 but Mildred. As a legal
consequence therefore, respondents maintain their defense that Mildred is an
indispensable party who must be impleaded by the plaintiff
2. Since an amicable settlement was entered into between Mildred and petitioner’s
father, and the latter failed to comply with the provisions of the same, the case is
now considered to be barred by prior judgement.
Ruling of the MTC:

1. Ruled in favor of petitioner

2. Respondents can be sued because they are the occupants of the building.
Ownership is not the primordial issue in a case for ejectment, it is possession that
is the subject matter here. Therefore, since respondents are indisputably the
occupants of the building, they are the proper party.
Ruling of the RTC:
1. Affirm the MTC
2. Petitioner, being one of the co-owners of the subject lot, is the proper party in
interest to prosecute against any intruder thereon
3. The amicable settlement signed and executed by the representatives of the
registered owner of the premises before the Lupon is not binding and
unenforceable between the parties.
4. Mildred should have intervened and proved that she is an indispensable party
because the records showed that she was not in actual possession of the subject
lot.
Ruling of the CA:
1. Reverse RTC, MTC
2. The other heirs should have been impleaded as plaintiffs
3. The presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power
 4. Petitioner still cannot disclaim knowledge that it was to Mildred to whom his co-
owners offered the property for sale, thus, he knew all along that the real owner
of the house on the subject lot is Mildred and not respondents
Issues before the SC:

1. Petitioner's co-heirs to the subject lot should have been impleaded as co-plaintiffs
in the ejectment case against respondents?
a. Ruling: Petitioner can file the action for ejectment without impleading his
co-owners; Article 487 of the New Civil Code is explicit- “Any one of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment.”
2. Did the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Mildred Kascher is an
indispensable party?
a. Ruling: Yes. The CA erred. It based its findings that Mildred is an
indispensable party because it found that petitioner knew all along that
Mildred is the owner of the house. However, nowhere in the affidavits
executed or records of the case show that Mildred is the owner of the house
constructed on the subject lot.
3. Is the case barred by prior judgement because of the amicable settlement entered
into by respondent and petitioner’s father?
a. Ruling: at the outset, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
provides that an amicable settlement reached after barangay conciliation
proceedings has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court if not
repudiated. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of
res judicata
b. While the amicable settlement executed between Maximo and respondent
Margie before the Barangay had the force and effect of a final judgment of
a court, it appears that there was non-compliance thereto by respondent
Margie on behalf of her parents which may be construed as repudiation.
The settlement is considered rescinded in accordance with the provision
of Article 2041 of the Civil Code. Since the settlement was rescinded,
petitioner, as a co-owner, properly instituted the action for ejectment to
recover possession of the subject lot against respondents who are in
possession of the same.
4. Dispositive portion: Petition is granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside. Order of the RTC is reinstated.

8. JUANA COMPLEX I HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., et. al. vs. FIL-ESTATE LAND, INC., et.
al.

 Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc. (JCHA), together with individual

residents of Juana Complex I and other neighboring subdivisions instituted a
complaint for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit representing the regular
commuters and motorists of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions who were
deprived of the use of La Paz Road, against Fil-Estate Land, Inc.
 The complaint alleged that JCHA, et al. were regular commuters and motorists who
pass through the right-of-way public road known as La Paz Road.
 In August 1998, Fil-estate excavated, broke and deliberately ruined La Paz Road.
 The act of Fil-estate in excavating La Paz Road caused damage, prejudice,
inconvenience, annoyance, and loss of precious hours to them, to the commuters and
motorists because traffic was re-routed to narrow streets.
 Accordingly, JCHA, et al. also prayed for the immediate issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) to enjoin Fil-Estate,
et al. from stopping and intimidating them in their use of La Paz Road.
Ruling of the RTC:
1. TRO is issued ordering Fil-Estate, et al, for a period of twenty (20) days, to stop
preventing, coercing, intimidating or harassing the commuters and motorists
from using the La Paz Road.
2. Hearings were conducted.
Issues before the RTC:
1. Fil-Estate filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action and that it was improperly filed as a class suit.
a. Ruling: Denied.
Issues before the CA:

1. The complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was improperly filed
as a class suit.
a. Ruling: the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action when JCHA, et al.
alleged in their complaint that they had been using La Paz Road for more
than ten (10) years and that their right was violated when Fil-Estate closed
and excavated the road.
b. the complaint was properly filed as a class suit as it was shown that the
case was of common interest and that the individuals sought to be
represented were so numerous that it was impractical to include all of them
as parties.
2. With regard to the issuance of the WPI, the defendants averred that JCHA, et al.
failed to show that they had a clear and unmistakable right to the use of La Paz
Road.
a. Ruling: Annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC. It is
for failure of JCHA, et al. to prove their clear and present right over La Paz
Road.
b. CA ordered the case to be remanded back to the RTC for a full-blown trial
on the merits to determine the right of the JCHA to use the subject road.
3. Ruling of the CA- partially grant; annulled and set aside the preliminary
injunction issued by RTC.
Issues before the SC:

1. For JCHA, they disagree with the CA’s pronouncement that a full-blown trial
on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the
application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz
Road was a public road and that commuters are using it.
a. Ruling: The case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties
can fully prove their respective positions on the issues. Due process
considerations.
2. For JCHA, they argue that the CA erred when it voided the WPI because the
public nature of La Paz Road had been sufficiently proven.
a. Ruling: JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of
their right to justify the issuance of a WPI. Private respondents
(petitioners herein) failed to prove as yet that they have a clear and
unmistakable right over the La Paz Road – which was sought to be
 protected by the injunctive writ. They merely anchor their purported
right over the La Paz Road on the bare allegation that they have been
using the same as public road right-of-way for more than ten years.
b. The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the existence of a clear and
unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ
to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right, a legal
right which must be shown to be clear and positive.
3. For Fil-Estate, it insists that the complaint did not sufficiently contain the
ultimate facts to show a cause of action.
a. Ruling: The Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to
establish a cause of action. First, JCHA, et al.’s averments in the
complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. Second, there is
an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et al. when
they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists
from using the same. Third, JCHA, et al. consequently suffered injury.
4. The case was improperly instituted as a class suit.
a. Ruling: This contention is without merit. All he necessary elements for
the maintenance of a class suit are sufficiently alleged:
i. the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general
interest to many persons;
ii. the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to court; and
iii. the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests
of all concerned.
5. Dispositive portion: the petitions are DENIED; the decisions and resolutions of
the CA are AFFIRMED.

9. LIANA’S SUPERMARKET vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND NATIONAL

LABOR UNION

 Liana’s Supermarket employed as workers members of private respondent

National Labor Union.
 In the course of their employment they were allegedly underpaid and required
to work more than eight (8) hours a day without overtime pay.
 They formed a labor and demanded from petitioner recognition and compliance
with existing labor laws.
 In 1983, petitioner entered into a three-year contract with Warner Laputt,
owner of BAVSPIA International Services, to supply petitioner with laborers.
 Peter Sy and Rosa Sy required the other employees to resign from employment
and to accomplish application forms with BAVSPIA otherwise they would be
dismissed and/or not paid their salaries.
 With some degree of reluctance, they complied.
 The case:
o Respondent Union on behalf of its members filed a complaint against
petitioner and/or Peter Sy, Rosa Sy, BAVSPIA and Warner Laputt before
 the Labor Arbiter for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime
pay, monthly emergency allowance, etc.
o The complaint was amended since respondent Union manifested through
its authorized representative that it was intended as a class suit.
o Subsequently, four cases were filed with the NLRC, with different
workers as complainants; these cases were thereafter consolidated.
o There were eighty-five (85) original complainants. However, several of
them withdrew their complaints, some settled with petitioner, and some
were found to be non-employees. The total number of complainants
dropped to sixty-one (61).
o But twenty-seven (27) more employees submitted their sworn statements
thus increasing again the number of complainants to eighty-eight (88).
Issues before the Labor Arbiter:

1. There was no unfair labor practice because the dismissals were not effected by
petitioner as complainants were not its employees but of BAVSPIA.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter:

1. Petitioner was the employer of complainants with BAVSPIA being engaged in

labor-only contracting; complainants were illegally dismissed.
2. The charge of unfair labor practice and all labor standards claims were
unsubstantiated by evidence.
Ruling of the NLRC
1. Affirm the Labor Arbiter
Issue/s before the SC:

1. According to petitioner, these cases do not fall under the term "class suit" as
defined in Sec. 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court because the parties are not so
numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the court.
a. Ruling- This is a "representative suit" as distinguished from "class suit"
b. What makes the situation a proper case for a class suit is the circumstance
that there is only one right or cause of action pertaining or belonging in
common to many persons, not separately or severally to distinct
individuals.
c. The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful that the parties
be so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the
court.
d. In the present case, there are multiple rights or causes of action pertaining
separately to several, distinct employees who are members of respondent
Union. Therefore, the applicable rule is that provided in Sec. 3, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court on "representative parties"
e. A "representative suit" is akin to a "class suit" in the limited sense that
both suits are always filed in behalf of another or others.
2. Petitioner claims that there are only seven (7) individual complainants in these
cases whose names appear in the captions of the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Anent thereto, petitioner argues that Sec. 3, Rule 6, of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that the names and residences of the parties plaintiff and defendant
must be stated.
 a. Ruling- The detail that the number and names of the striking members of
petitioner union were not specified in the decision nor in the complaint is
of no consequence.
b. It was the function precisely of a labor union to carry the representation
of its members and to file an action for their benefit and behalf without
joining them and avoid the cumbersome procedure of joining each and
every member.
3. Dispositive portion- Decision of the NLRC is affirmed.

10. LILIA B. ADA, et. al. vs. FLORANTE BAYLON

 Spouses Baylon were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita,

Victoria, Dolores, Panfila, Ramon, and herein petitioner Lilia.
 Dolores died intestate and without issue.
 Victoria died and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B.
Adanza.
 Ramon died intestate and was survived by:
o herein respondent Florante Baylon (his child from his first
marriage);
o petitioner Flora Baylon (his second wife);
o Ramon, Jr (legitimate children)
o herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and Ma. Ruby, all
surnamed Baylon
 The case with the RTC:
o Complaint for partition, accounting and damages against Florante,
Rita and Panfila.
o They alleged therein that Spouses Baylon, during their lifetime,
owned 43 parcels of land
o Rita took possession of the said parcels of land and appropriated
for herself the income from the same after her parents’ death.
o Using the income produced by the said parcels of land, Rita
allegedly purchased two parcels of land.
o The petitioners averred that Rita refused to effect a partition of the
said parcels of land.
o During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation
conveyed the two parcels of land she allegedly acquired through the
income of the co-owned properties to Florante.
 Ruling of the RTC:
o the RTC rescinded the donation inter vivos of the two parcels of
land.
 on the ground that it was entered into by the defendant Rita
Baylon without the knowledge and approval of the litigants
[or] of competent judicial authority. The subject parcels of
lands are involved in the case for which plaintiffs have
ask[ed] the Court to partition the same among the heirs of
Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas.
 Issues before the CA:
o Florante maintained that the two parcels of land should not be
included in the properties that should be partitioned among the
heirs of Rita. Thus, the deed of donation is valid.
 Ruling of the CA:
 o Reverse the RTC
o Reinstate the deed of donation of the two parcels of land; remand
to the trial court for ownership determination
 before the petitioners may file an action for rescission, they
must first obtain a favorable judicial ruling that Lot No. 4709
and half of Lot No. 4706 actually belonged to the estate of
Spouses Baylon and not to Rita. Until then, the CA asserted,
an action for rescission is premature.
 petitioners’ action for rescission cannot be joined with their
action for partition, accounting and damages through a mere
supplemental pleading.
 an action for rescission should be filed by the parties
concerned independent of the proceedings below. The
first cannot simply be lumped up with the second
through a mere supplemental pleading.
 Issue before the SC:
o Procedural matters by laxity or otherwise, were not raised by the
parties herein.
 Misjoinder of Causes of Action
 The complaint filed by the petitioners with the RTC
involves two separate, distinct and independent
actions – partition and rescission.
 Ruling- The actions of partition and rescission cannot
be joined in a single action. Nevertheless, while parties
to an action may assert in one pleading, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as
they may have against an opposing party, such
joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition,
inter alia, that the joinder shall not include special
civil actions governed by special rules.
 However, a misjoined cause of action, if not severed
upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte,
may be adjudicated by the court together with the
other causes of action.
o Under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of
causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court’s jurisdiction.
o It should be emphasized that the foregoing rule
only applies if the court trying the case has
jurisdiction over all of the causes of action
therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the
same. If the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action,
then such misjoined cause of action has to be
severed from the other causes of action, and if
not so severed, any adjudication rendered by
the court with respect to the same would be a
nullity.
 The action for rescission could not be lumped up with the
action for partition through a mere supplemental pleading.
  Ruling- A supplemental pleading may raise a new
cause of action as long as it has some relation to the
original cause of action set forth in the original
complaint.
 A supplemental pleading may properly allege
transactions, occurrences or events which had
transpired after the filing of the pleading sought to be
supplemented, even if the said supplemental facts
constitute another cause of action.
o Propriety of Rescission
 Florante asserts that before the petitioners may file an action
for rescission, they must first obtain a favorable judicial
ruling that Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 actually
belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon. Until then,
Florante avers that an action for rescission would be
premature.
 Ruling- this point is well taken. The petitioners’ right
to institute the action for rescission pursuant to
Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code is not preconditioned
upon the RTC’s determination as to the ownership of
the said parcels of land.
 Dispositive portion- Decision of the RTC, rescinding the deed of donation,
is reinstated.

11. SPS. VICTOR & MILAGROS PEREZ, et. al. vs. ANTONIO HERMANO

 Petitioners Cristina Agraviador Aviso and spouses Victor and Milagros Perez filed a civil case
for Enforcement of Contract and Damages against Zescon Land, Inc and others, including
herein respondent Hermano.
 Respondent Hermano filed a “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed
for Separate Trial” which was granted by the trial court. The order was received by petitioners
on 21 March 2000.
 Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on 25 May 2000 and
received by petitioners on 18 June 2000.
 On 17 August 2000, petitioners filed an original action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing the complaint
against respondent Hermano.
 Ruling of the CA:
o The Court of Appeals rendered the first assailed Resolution dismissing the petition for
certiorari “for having been filed beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended.”
 On June 18, 2000, petitioners received the denial of their motion for
reconsideration. When the instant petition was filed on August 17, 2000, a total
of 63 days had elapsed.
 Issue before the SC:
o According to petitioners, following the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC
to Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, their petition was filed on
the 60th day, thus, within the reglementary period.
  Ruling- We agree in the position taken by petitioners. “Procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent.”
 The old rule is “If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any
event, reckoned from notice of such denial.”
 However, this rule was amended anew by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which now
provides “In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether
such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from
notice of the denial of said motion.”
 Hence, there can be no doubt that the petition was filed within the reglementary
period for doing so and it was reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals
in not giving said petition due course.
o Disposition of the substantive issue raised: Petitioners assert that respondent Hermano
should not have been dismissed from the complaint because:
 (1) He did not file a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court and,
in fact, his “Motion with Leave to Dismiss the Complaint or Ordered Severed for
Separate Trial” was filed almost two years after he filed his Answer to the
complaint; (2) There was no misjoinder of causes of action in this case; and (3)
There was no misjoinder of parties.
 Ruling- Petitioners are correct. It is well to remember that the joinder of
causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the
joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question
of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same
transaction or series of transaction.
 From the above averments in the complaint, it becomes reasonably
apparent that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zescon
Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction
over the same properties.
o Dispositive portion- (1) Decision of the CA denying the petition for certiorari is reversed
and set aside; (2) the order of the RTC dismissing the civil case is annulled and set aside.

12. VIRGILIO C. BRIONES vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CASH ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION

 A complaint was filed by Virgilio C. Briones for Nullity of Mortgage Contract, Promissory Note,
Loan Agreement, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No.290846, and Damages against Cash Asia before the RTC.
o Petitioner’s sister informed him that his property had been foreclosed and a writ of
possession had already been issued in favor of Cash Asia.
o Briones claimed that he never contracted any loans from Cash Asia as he has been living
and working in Vietnam.
o He further claimed that he only went back to the Philippines on December 28, 2007
until January 3, 2008 to spend the holidays with his family, and that during his brief
stay in the Philippines, nobody informed him of any loan agreement entered into with
Cash Asia. Essentially, Briones assailed the validity of the foregoing contracts claiming
his signature to be forged.
 For Cash Asia,
o It filed a Motion to Dismiss praying for the outright dismissal of Briones’s complaint on
the ground of improper venue.
 o Cash Asia pointed out the venue stipulation in the subject contracts stating that “all
legal actions arising out of this notice in connection with the Real Estate Mortgage subject
hereof shall only be brought in or submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper court of Makati
City.”
o Briones’s complaint should be dismissed for having been filed in the City of Manila.
 Ruling of the RTC:
o The RTC denied Cash Asia’s motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
o RTC opined that the parties must be afforded the right to be heard in view of the
substance of Briones’s cause of action against Cash Asia as stated in the complaint.
 Ruling of the CA:
o CA annulled the RTC Orders
o Dismissed Briones’s complaint without prejudice to the filing of the same before the
proper court in Makati City.
 The subject contracts clearly provide that actions arising therefrom should be
exclusively filed before the courts of Makati City only.
 Issue before the SC:
o Is there a ground for dismissal on the basis of improper venue?
 Ruling- None. A complaint directly assailing the validity of the written instrument
itself should not be bound by the exclusive venue stipulation contained therein
and should be filed in accordance with the general rules on venue. Unlike in cases
where the complaint assails only the terms, conditions, and/or coverage of a
written instrument and not its validity, the exclusive venue stipulation contained
therein shall still be binding.
 In this case, the venue stipulation found in the subject contracts is indeed
restrictive in nature, considering that it effectively limits the venue of the actions
arising therefrom to the courts of Makati City. However, it must be emphasized
that Briones’s complaint directly assails the validity of the subject contracts,
claiming forgery in their execution. Given this circumstance, Briones cannot be
expected to comply with the aforesaid venue stipulation, as his compliance
therewith would mean an implicit recognition of their validity. Hence, pursuant
to the general rules on venue, Briones properly filed his complaint before a court
in the City of Manila where the subject property is located.
 The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof,
is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction
where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
 As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils. instructs that the
parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another venue where
actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said
actions in a certain exclusive venue.
 As regards restrictive stipulations on venue, jurisprudence instructs that it must
be shown that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, such as “exclusively,” “waiving for this purpose any other
venue,” “shall only” preceding the designation of venue, “to the exclusion of the
other courts,” or words of similar import, the stipulation should be deemed as
merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.

13. LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. MARVIN MEDEL SEDANO
 Petitioner filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages4 against respondent
Marvin Medel Sedano (respondent), doing business under the name and style "Lola Taha Lalo
Pata Palengke at Paluto sa Seaside," before the Valenzuela-RTC.
o Petitioner alleged that it leased a parcel of land located at Financial Center Area, Pasay
City from third-party defendant Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
o Petitioner subleased a portion thereof to respondent for a term often (10) years beginning
for a monthly rent of ₱1,174,780.00.
o Respondent allegedly failed to pay the rent due for the period August 2011 to December
2011, amounting to a total of P8,828,025.46, and despite demands, refused to settle his
obligations; hence, the complaint.
 Respondent countered that he religiously paid rent to petitioner until PNCC demanded that
the rent be paid directly to it, in view of the petitioner's eviction from the subject property by
virtue of a court order.
o Should he be found liable to petitioner, respondent maintained that the RTC should
hold PNCC liable to reimburse to him the amounts he paid as rentals; hence, the third-
party complaint.
 Respondent likewise pointed out that the venue was improperly laid.
o the lease contract provides that "[a]ll actions or case[s] filed in connection with this case
shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, exclusive of all others."
o In petitioner’s defense, it insisted that the provision under the lease contract is not a
stipulation as to venue, but a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. This is because
such stipulation deprives other courts, i.e., the Municipal Trial Courts, of jurisdiction
over cases which, under the law, are within its exclusive original jurisdiction, such as
an action for unlawful detainer.
 Ruling of Valenzuela-RTC:
o Granted respondent's motion and dismissed the complaint on the ground of improper
venue.
 The lease contract between petitioner and respondent is void insofar as it limits
the filing of cases with the R TC of Pasay City, even when the subject matter
jurisdiction over the case is with the Metropolitan Trial Courts.
 With respect to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the stipulation validly
limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay City. Since petitioner's complaint is one for
collection of sum of money in an amount that is within the jurisdiction of the R
TC, petitioner should have filed the case with the RTC of Pasay City.
 Issue before the SC:
o Is the venue was improperly laid as held by the Valenzuela-RTC?
 Ruling- Yes. The venue is improperly laid; the lower court is correct.
 The stipulation under the lease contract with respect to venue restriction is valid.
This stipulation generalizes that all actions or cases of the aforementioned kind
shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other courts, does
not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction
of all other courts.
 Since the lease contract already provided that all actions or cases involving the
breach thereof should be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, and that petitioner’s
complaint purporting the said breach fell within the RTC's exclusive original
jurisdiction, the latter should have then followed the contractual stipulation and
filed its complaint before the RTC of Pasay City.
 14. DOUGLAS F. ANAMA vs. CITIBANK

 In consideration for a loan obtained from respondent Citibank, petitioner Douglas F. Anama
executed a promissory note in the amount of ₱418,000.00 in favor of Citibank.
 To secure payment of the obligation, Anama also executed in favor of Citibank a chattel
mortgage over various industrial machineries and equipment.
 For Anama's failure to pay the monthly installments due on the promissory note, Citibank filed
a complaint for sum of money and replevin with the RTC.
 Ruling of the RTC:
o Upon proof of default of Anama in the payment of his loan, issued an Order of Replevin
over the machineries and equipment covered by the chattel mortgage.
o Subsequently, through respondent’s motion, a writ of seizure is issued.
 Ruling of the CA:
o Reverse RTC; nullify writs and order of replevin.
 Ruling of the SC:
o The Court promulgated a Decision dismissing Citibank's petition for lack of merit and
affirming the decision of the CA. An Entry of Judgment was subsequently issued on
April 12, 1999.
 Meanwhile during the pendency of case in the CA, the fourth floor of the Manila City Hall,
where Branch 11 of the R TC of Manila and its records, including the records of Civil Case No.
95991 were located, was destroyed by fire.
 Anama filed a petition for reconstruction of record and a revival of judgement of the CA granting
its petition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC.
o He argued that Citibank's failure to file an action for the reconstitution of the records in
the RTC in Civil Case No. 95991 constituted abandonment of its cause of action and
complaint.
o Citibank argued that the petition should be dismissed as an action for revival of
judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
 Ruling of the CA with respect to the revival of judgement:
o The CA denied the petition for lack of jurisdiction, hence this present petition.
o The petition should have been filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and/or all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function.
 Issue before the SC
o Petitioner- his petition for revival of judgment should be filed in the court that issued
the judgment sought to be revived, the CA in this case.
o Respondent- jurisdiction over actions for revival of judgments is with the RTC.
o Ruling- RTC has jurisdiction over the case, not CA.
o As an action for revival of judgment is a new action with a new cause of action, the rules
on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction. Its
jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition
does not necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.
 As an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a right
to have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment
enforced and does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that
jurisdiction over a petition to revive judgment is properly with the R TCs. Thus,
the CA is correct in holding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide
Anama's action for revival of judgment.
 15. SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA, et. al. vs. FRANCISCO LINDO, et. al.

 Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land.

 A few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents,
via a notarized deed of absolute sale.
 Three years after the sale, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before
the RTC.
 Respondents, in their Answer, raised lack of cause of action, estoppel, prescription, and laches,
as defenses.
 Respondents Francisco and Welhilmina Lindo later entered into a compromise agreement with
petitioners, whereby they agreed to cede to Epifania a three thousand two hundred and thirty
square meter (3,230 sq.m.)-portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, surrender,
and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. The compromise was approved
by the RTC.
 Other respondents, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss
o the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered.
o they asserted that the total selling price of all the properties is only sixteen thousand
five hundred pesos (PhP 16,500)
o Since Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, as amended, grants jurisdiction to the RTCs over
civil actions involving title to or possession of real property or interest therein where the
assessed value is more than PhP 20,000, then the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint in question since the property which Bautista seeks to repurchase is below
the PhP 20,000 jurisdictional ceiling.
 Ruling of the RTC
o Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
o The trial court found that Bautista failed to allege in his complaint that the value of the
subject property exceeds 20 thousand pesos. Considering that in real actions,
jurisdictional amount is determinative of whether it is the municipal trial court or the
RTC that has jurisdiction over the case.
 Issue before the SC:
o whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
 Petitioner- Repurchase is not a real action, but one incapable of pecuniary
estimation, it being founded on privity of contract between the parties.
 Respondents- repurchase is a real action capable of pecuniary estimation.
 Ruling- the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action
incapable of pecuniary estimation thus, RTC has proper jurisdiction.
 “in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs
would depend on the amount of the claim.” But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court
has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
  Settled jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable of pecuniary
estimation, viz:
 1. Actions for specific performance;
 2. Actions for support which will require the determination of the civil
status;
 3. The right to support of the plaintiff;
 4. Those for the annulment of decisions of lower courts;
 5. Those for the rescission or reformation of contracts;
 6. Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
 The action of petitioners is, in reality, incapable of pecuniary estimation, and the
reconveyance of the lot is merely the outcome of the performance of the obligation
to return the property conformably to the express provision of CA 141.

16. ALONA G. ROLDAN vs. SPOUSES CLARENCE I. BARRIOS, et. al.

 Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action3 for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against
respondents spouses Clarence I. Barrios.
o Defendants borrowed from plaintiff ₱250,000.00 payable within the period of one (1)
year from said date, with an interest thereon at the rate of 5% per month; executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel of land and
improvements.
o Defendants failed to pay, despite repeated demands.
 For the defense of respondents, they contend that the computation of their alleged loan
obligation was not accurate; that they had filed with the RTC a petition for rehabilitation of a
financially distressed individuals.
 Ruling of the RTC:
o It appearing from the complaint that the assessed value of the property mortgaged is
only ₱13,380.00 and the instant cases being a real action, the assessed value of the
property determines the jurisdiction.1âwphi1 The assessed value of the property
involved being below ₱20,000.00, it is the first level court that has jurisdiction over the
cases. Premises considered, for lack of jurisdiction, Civil Cases Nos. 9642 and 9811 are
ordered DISMISSED without prejudice.
o Motions for reconsideration were filed; DENIED
 Petitioner in her Motion argued that foreclosure of real estate mortgage is an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation and jurisdiction lies with the Regional
Trial Court.
 Issue before the SC:
o whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure
cases filed with it on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
 Ruling- No grave abuse of discretion. The foreclosure suit is a real action so far
as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt,
and an order for the sale of the res.
o direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of
strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.