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G.R. No.

L-12541 August 28, 1959

ROSARIO U. YULO, assisted by her husband JOSE C. YULO,​ plaintiffs-appellants, On October 27, 1950, Mrs. Yulo demanded from Yang Chiao Seng her share in the profits of the business.
vs. Yang answered the letter saying that upon the advice of his counsel he had to suspend the payment (of the
YANG CHIAO SENG,​ defendant-appellee. rentals) because of the pendency of the ejectment suit by the owners of the land against Mrs. Yulo. In this
letter Yang alleges that inasmuch as he is a sublessee and inasmuch as Mrs. Yulo has not paid to the
Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, presiding, lessors the rentals from August, 1949, he was retaining the rentals to make good to the landowners the
dismissing plaintiff's complaint as well as defendant's counterclaim. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff. rentals due from Mrs. Yulo in arrears (Exh. "E").
The record discloses that on June 17, 1945, defendant Yang Chiao Seng wrote a letter to the plaintiff Mrs.
Rosario U. Yulo, proposing the formation of a partnership between them to run and operate a theatre on the In view of the refusal of Yang to pay her the amount agreed upon, Mrs. Yulo instituted this action on May 26,
premises occupied by former Cine Oro at Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila. The principal conditions of the offer are 1954, alleging the existence of a partnership between them and that the defendant Yang Chiao Seng has
(1) that Yang Chiao Seng guarantees Mrs. Yulo a monthly participation of P3,000 payable quarterly in refused to pay her share from December, 1949 to December, 1950; that after December 31, 1950 the
advance within the first 15 days of each quarter, (2) that the partnership shall be for a period of two years partnership between Mrs. Yulo and Yang terminated, as a result of which, plaintiff became the absolute
and six months, starting from July 1, 1945 to December 31, 1947, with the condition that if the land is owner of the building occupied by the Cine Astor; that the reasonable rental that the defendant should pay
expropriated or rendered impracticable for the business, or if the owner constructs a permanent building therefor from January, 1951 is P5,000; that the defendant has acted maliciously and refuses to pay the
thereon, or Mrs. Yulo's right of lease is terminated by the owner, then the partnership shall be terminated participation of the plaintiff in the profits of the business amounting to P35,000 from November, 1949 to
even if the period for which the partnership was agreed to be established has not yet expired; (3) that Mrs. October, 1950, and that as a result of such bad faith and malice on the part of the defendant, Mrs. Yulo has
Yulo is authorized personally to conduct such business in the lobby of the building as is ordinarily carried on suffered damages in the amount of P160,000 and exemplary damages to the extent of P5,000. The prayer
in lobbies of theatres in operation, provided the said business may not obstruct the free ingress and agrees includes a demand for the payment of the above sums plus the sum of P10,000 for the attorney's fees.
of patrons of the theatre; (4) that after December 31, 1947, all improvements placed by the partnership shall
belong to Mrs. Yulo, but if the partnership agreement is terminated before the lapse of one and a half years In answer to the complaint, defendant alleges that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the
period under any of the causes mentioned in paragraph (2), then Yang Chiao Seng shall have the right to defendant was one of lease and not of partnership; that the partnership was adopted as a subterfuge to get
remove and take away all improvements that the partnership may place in the premises. around the prohibition contained in the contract of lease between the owners and the plaintiff against the
sublease of the said property. As to the other claims, he denies the same and alleges that the fair rental
Pursuant to the above offer, which plaintiff evidently accepted, the parties executed a partnership agreement value of the land is only P1,100. By way of counterclaim he alleges that by reason of an attachment issued
establishing the "Yang & Company, Limited," which was to exist from July 1, 1945 to December 31, 1947. It against the properties of the defendant the latter has suffered damages amounting to P100,000.
states that it will conduct and carry on the business of operating a theatre for the exhibition of motion and
talking pictures. The capital is fixed at P100,000, P80,000 of which is to be furnished by Yang Chiao Seng The first hearing was had on April 19, 1955, at which time only the plaintiff appeared. The court heard
and P20,000, by Mrs. Yulo. All gains and profits are to be distributed among the partners in the same evidence of the plaintiff in the absence of the defendant and thereafter rendered judgment ordering the
proportion as their capital contribution and the liability of Mrs. Yulo, in case of loss, shall be limited to her defendant to pay to the plaintiff P41,000 for her participation in the business up to December, 1950; P5,000
capital contribution (Exh. "B"). as monthly rental for the use and occupation of the building from January 1, 1951 until defendant vacates
the same, and P3,000 for the use and occupation of the lobby from July 1, 1945 until defendant vacates the
In June , 1946, they executed a supplementary agreement, extending the partnership for a period of three property. This decision, however, was set aside on a motion for reconsideration. In said motion it is claimed
years beginning January 1, 1948 to December 31, 1950. The benefits are to be divided between them at the that defendant failed to appear at the hearing because of his honest belief that a joint petition for
rate of 50-50 and after December 31, 1950, the showhouse building shall belong exclusively to the second postponement filed by both parties, in view of a possible amicable settlement, would be granted; that in view
party, Mrs. Yulo. of the decision of the Court of Appeals in two previous cases between the owners of the land and the plaintiff
Rosario Yulo, the plaintiff has no right to claim the alleged participation in the profit of the business, etc. The
The land on which the theatre was constructed was leased by plaintiff Mrs. Yulo from Emilia Carrion Santa court, finding the above motion, well-founded, set aside its decision and a new trial was held. After trial the
Marina and Maria Carrion Santa Marina. In the contract of lease it was stipulated that the lease shall court rendered the decision making the following findings: that it is not true that a partnership was created
continue for an indefinite period of time, but that after one year the lease may be cancelled by either party by between the plaintiff and the defendant because defendant has not actually contributed the sum mentioned
written notice to the other party at least 90 days before the date of cancellation. The last contract was in the Articles of Partnership, or any other amount; that the real agreement between the plaintiff and the
executed between the owners and Mrs. Yulo on April 5, 1948. But on April 12, 1949, the attorney for the defendant is not of the partnership but one of the lease for the reason that under the agreement the plaintiff
owners notified Mrs. Yulo of the owner's desire to cancel the contract of lease on July 31, 1949. In view of did not share either in the profits or in the losses of the business as required by Article 1769 of the Civil
the above notice, Mrs. Yulo and her husband brought a civil action to the Court of First Instance of Manila on Code; and that the fact that plaintiff was granted a "guaranteed participation" in the profits also belies the
July 3, 1949 to declare the lease of the premises. On February 9, 1950, the Municipal Court of Manila supposed existence of a partnership between them. It. therefore, denied plaintiff's claim for damages or
rendered judgment ordering the ejectment of Mrs. Yulo and Mr. Yang. The judgment was appealed. In the supposed participation in the profits.
Court of First Instance, the two cases were afterwards heard jointly, and judgment was rendered dismissing As to her claim for damages for the refusal of the defendant to allow the use of the supposed lobby of the
the complaint of Mrs. Yulo and her husband, and declaring the contract of lease of the premises terminated theatre, the court after ocular inspection found that the said lobby was very narrow space leading to the
as of July 31, 1949, and fixing the reasonable monthly rentals of said premises at P100. Both parties balcony of the theatre which could not be used for business purposes under existing ordinances of the City
appealed from said decision and the Court of Appeals, on April 30, 1955, affirmed the judgment. of Manila because it would constitute a hazard and danger to the patrons of the theatre. The court, therefore,
dismissed the complaint; so did it dismiss the defendant's counterclaim, on the ground that the defendant J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by it Managing PARTNER, GREGORIA ARANETA, INC.,
failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the same. It is against this decision that the appeal has been plaintiff-appellee,
prosecuted by plaintiff to this Court. vs.
QUIRINO BOLAÑOS,​ defendant-appellant.
The first assignment of error imputed to the trial court is its order setting aside its former decision and
allowing a new trial. This assignment of error is without merit. As that parties agreed to postpone the trial This is an action originally brought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to recover
because of a probable amicable settlement, the plaintiff could not take advantage of defendant's absence at possession of registered land situated in barrio Tatalon, Quezon City.
the time fixed for the hearing. The lower court, therefore, did not err in setting aside its former judgment. The
final result of the hearing shown by the decision indicates that the setting aside of the previous decision was Plaintiff's complaint was amended three times with respect to the extent and description of the land sought to
in the interest of justice. be recovered. The original complaint described the land as a portion of a lot registered in plaintiff's name
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37686 of the land record of Rizal Province and as containing an area
In the second assignment of error plaintiff-appellant claims that the lower court erred in not striking out the of 13 hectares more or less. But the complaint was amended by reducing the area of 6 hectares, more or
evidence offered by the defendant-appellee to prove that the relation between him and the plaintiff is one of less, after the defendant had indicated the plaintiff's surveyors the portion of land claimed and occupied by
the sublease and not of partnership. The action of the lower court in admitting evidence is justified by the him. The second amendment became necessary and was allowed following the testimony of plaintiff's
express allegation in the defendant's answer that the agreement set forth in the complaint was one of lease surveyors that a portion of the area was embraced in another certificate of title, which was plaintiff's Transfer
and not of partnership, and that the partnership formed was adopted in view of a prohibition contained in Certificate of Title No. 37677. And still later, in the course of trial, after defendant's surveyor and witness,
plaintiff's lease against a sublease of the property. Quirino Feria, had testified that the area occupied and claimed by defendant was about 13 hectares, as
shown in his Exhibit 1, plaintiff again, with the leave of court, amended its complaint to make its allegations
The most important issue raised in the appeal is that contained in the fourth assignment of error, to the effect conform to the evidence.
that the lower court erred in holding that the written contracts, Exhs. "A", "B", and "C, between plaintiff and
defendant, are one of lease and not of partnership. We have gone over the evidence and we fully agree with Defendant, in his answer, sets up prescription and title in himself thru "open, continuous, exclusive and
the conclusion of the trial court that the agreement was a sublease, not a partnership. The following are the public and notorious possession (of land in dispute) under claim of ownership, adverse to the entire world by
requisites of partnership: (1) two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute money, property, or defendant and his predecessor in interest" from "time in-memorial". The answer further alleges that
industry to a common fund; (2) intention on the part of the partners to divide the profits among themselves. registration of the land in dispute was obtained by plaintiff or its predecessors in interest thru "fraud or error
(Art. 1767, Civil Code.). and without knowledge (of) or interest either personal or thru publication to defendant and/or predecessors in
interest." The answer therefore prays that the complaint be dismissed with costs and plaintiff required to
In the first place, plaintiff did not furnish the supposed P20,000 capital. In the second place, she did not reconvey the land to defendant or pay its value.
furnish any help or intervention in the management of the theatre. In the third place, it does not appear that
she has ever demanded from defendant any accounting of the expenses and earnings of the business. Were After trial, the lower court rendered judgment for plaintiff, declaring defendant to be without any right to the
she really a partner, her first concern should have been to find out how the business was progressing, land in question and ordering him to restore possession thereof to plaintiff and to pay the latter a monthly
whether the expenses were legitimate, whether the earnings were correct, etc. She was absolutely silent rent of P132.62 from January, 1940, until he vacates the land, and also to pay the costs.
with respect to any of the acts that a partner should have done; all that she did was to receive her share of
P3,000 a month, which can not be interpreted in any manner than a payment for the use of the premises Appealing directly to this court because of the value of the property involved, defendant makes the following
which she had leased from the owners. Clearly, plaintiff had always acted in accordance with the original assignment or errors:
letter of defendant of June 17, 1945 (Exh. "A"), which shows that both parties considered this offer as the
real contract between them. I. The trial court erred in not dismissing the case on the ground that the case was not brought by the real
property in interest.
Plaintiff claims the sum of P41,000 as representing her share or participation in the business from II. The trial court erred in admitting the third amended complaint.
December, 1949. But the original letter of the defendant, Exh. "A", expressly states that the agreement III. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to strike.
between the plaintiff and the defendant was to end upon the termination of the right of the plaintiff to the IV. The trial court erred in including in its decision land not involved in the litigation.
lease. Plaintiff's right having terminated in July, 1949 as found by the Court of Appeals, the partnership V. The trial court erred in holding that the land in dispute is covered by transfer certificates of Title Nos.
agreement or the agreement for her to receive a participation of P3,000 automatically ceased as of said 37686 and 37677.
date. Vl. The trial court erred in not finding that the defendant is the true and lawful owner of the land.
VII. The trial court erred in finding that the defendant is liable to pay the plaintiff the amount of P132.62
We find no error in the judgment of the court below and we affirm it ​in toto​, with costs against monthly from January, 1940, until he vacates the premises.
plaintiff-appellant. VIII. The trial court erred in not ordering the plaintiff to reconvey the land in litigation to the defendant.

As to the first assigned error, there is nothing to the contention that the present action is not brought by the
G.R. No. L-4935 May 28, 1954 real party in interest, that is, by J. M. Tuason and Co., Inc. What the Rules of Court require is that an action
be brought ​in the name of, but not necessarily ​by,​ the real party in interest. (Section 2, Rule 2.) In fact the Magno Faustino, witnesses for plaintiff, and the identity of the portion thereof claimed by defendant was
practice is for an attorney-at-law to bring the action, that is to file the complaint, in the name of the plaintiff. established by the testimony of his own witness, Quirico Feria. The combined testimony of these three
That practice appears to have been followed in this case, since the complaint is signed by the law firm of witnesses clearly shows that the portion claimed by defendant is made up of a part of lot 4-B-3-C and major
Araneta and Araneta, "counsel for plaintiff" and commences with the statement "comes now plaintiff, through on portion of lot 4-B-4, and is well within the area covered by the two transfer certificates of title already
its undersigned counsel." It is true that the complaint also states that the plaintiff is "represented herein by its mentioned. This fact also appears admitted in defendant's answer to the third amended complaint.
Managing Partner Gregorio Araneta, Inc.", another corporation, but there is nothing against one corporation
being represented by another person, natural or juridical, in a suit in court. The contention that Gregorio As the land in dispute is covered by plaintiff's Torrens certificate of title and was registered in 1914, the
Araneta, Inc. can not act as managing partner for plaintiff on the theory that it is illegal for two corporations to decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error or lack of notice to defendant,
enter into a partnership is without merit, for the true rule is that "though a corporation has no power to enter as more than one year has already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the decree. Neither court the
into a partnership, it may nevertheless enter into a joint venture with another where the nature of that venture decree be collaterally attacked by any person claiming title to, or interest in, the land prior to the registration
is in line with the business authorized by its charter." (Wyoming-Indiana Oil Gas Co. ​vs​. Weston, 80 A. L. R., proceedings. (Soroñgon ​vs​. Makalintal,​1 45 Off. Gaz., 3819.) Nor could title to that land in derogation of that
1043, citing 2 Fletcher Cyc. of Corp., 1082.) There is nothing in the record to indicate that the venture in of plaintiff, the registered owner, be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 46, Act No.
which plaintiff is represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc. as "its managing partner" is not in line with the 496.) Adverse, notorious and continuous possession under claim of ownership for the period fixed by law is
corporate business of either of them. ineffective against a Torrens title. (Valiente ​vs.​ Judge of CFI of Tarlac,​2 etc., 45 Off. Gaz., Supp. 9, p. 43.)
And it is likewise settled that the right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not
Errors II, III, and IV, referring to the admission of the third amended complaint, may be answered by mere prescribed. (Francisco vs. Cruz, 43 Off. Gaz., 5105, 5109-5110.) A recent decision of this Court on this point
reference to section 4 of Rule 17, Rules of Court, which sanctions such amendment. It reads: is that rendered in the case of Jose Alcantara et al., vs. Mariano et al.​ , 92 Phil., 796. This disposes of the
alleged errors V and VI.
Sec. 4. ​Amendment to conform to evidence​. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the As to error VII, it is claimed that `there was no evidence to sustain the finding that defendant should be
pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the sentenced to pay plaintiff P132.62 monthly from January, 1940, until he vacates the premises.' But it
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at my time, even of the trial of appears from the record that that reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, as
these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the stipulated at the hearing was P10 a month for each hectare and that the area occupied by defendant was
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall be so freely when the presentation of 13.2619 hectares. The total rent to be paid for the area occupied should therefore be P132.62 a month. It is
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the appears from the testimony of J. A. Araneta and witness Emigdio Tanjuatco that as early as 1939 an action
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The of ejectment had already been filed against defendant. And it cannot be supposed that defendant has been
court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. paying rents, for he has been asserting all along that the premises in question 'have always been since time
immemorial in open, continuous, exclusive and public and notorious possession and under claim of
Under this provision amendment is not even necessary for the purpose of rendering judgment on issues ownership adverse to the entire world by defendant and his predecessors in interest.' This assignment of
proved though not alleged. Thus, commenting on the provision, Chief Justice Moran says in this Rules of error is thus clearly without merit.
Under this section, American courts have, under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled that where Error No. VIII is but a consequence of the other errors alleged and needs for further consideration.
the facts shown entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the complaint is
necessary, especially where defendant has himself raised the point on which recovery is based, and that the During the pendency of this case in this Court appellant, thru other counsel, has filed a motion to dismiss
appellate court treat the pleadings as amended to conform to the evidence, although the pleadings were not alleging that there is pending before the Court of First Instance of Rizal another action between the same
actually amended. (I Moran, Rules of Court, 1952 ed., 389-390.) parties and for the same cause and seeking to sustain that allegation with a copy of the complaint filed in
said action. But an examination of that complaint reveals that appellant's allegation is not correct, for the
Our conclusion therefore is that specification of error II, III, and IV are without merit.. pretended identity of parties and cause of action in the two suits does not appear. That other case is one for
recovery of ownership, while the present one is for recovery of possession. And while appellant claims that
Let us now pass on the errors V and VI. Admitting, though his attorney, at the early stage of the trial, that the he is also involved in that order action because it is a class suit, the complaint does not show that such is
land in dispute "is that described or represented in Exhibit A and in Exhibit B enclosed in red pencil with the really the case. On the contrary, it appears that the action seeks relief for each individual plaintiff and not
name Quirino Bolaños," defendant later changed his lawyer and also his theory and tried to prove that the relief for and on behalf of others. The motion for dismissal is clearly without merit.
land in dispute was not covered by plaintiff's certificate of title. The evidence, however, is against defendant,
for it clearly establishes that plaintiff is the registered owner of lot No. 4-B-3-C, situate in barrio Tatalon, Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff.
Quezon City, with an area of 5,297,429.3 square meters, more or less, covered by transfer certificate of title
No. 37686 of the land records of Rizal province, and of lot No. 4-B-4, situated in the same barrio, having an
area of 74,789 square meters, more or less, covered by transfer certificate of title No. 37677 of the land G.R. Nos. L-32347-53 December 26, 1973
records of the same province, both lots having been originally registered on July 8, 1914 under original AGUSTIN ABONG, ​petitioner,
certificate of title No. 735. The identity of the lots was established by the testimony of Antonio Manahan and vs.
MANUEL LAHAO-LAHAO, CONCHITA MONTEROYO, SHIRLEY LOZADA and ROSARIO ALOVA, Wherefore, under the law, the claimants are entitled to compensation and respondent is hereby ordered:
respondents. 1. To pay to claimant, ANACORITA DAHIL-DAHIL the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00), plus
50% penalty in the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00), plus the further sum of TWO
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE HUNDRED PESOS as burial expenses, through this Office;
Appeal by ​certiorari from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, awarding 2. To pay to claimant, NELLY BALLARES, the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) plus 50%
compensation to private respondents. penalty in the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) or the total sum of NINE THOUSAND
PESOS (P9,000.00) plus the further sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), as burial expenses through
II. FACTS OF THE CASE this Office;
The undisputed facts as borne out by the record are follows: 3. To pay to claimant, MANUEL LAHAO-LAHAO, the sum of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
Aladino Dionson, Filomeno Umbria, Noel Lahao-lahao, Juanita Monteroyo and Wilfredo Monteroyo and (P2,600.00) plus 50% penalty in the sum of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,300.00), or
Demetrio Escoreal, all decent were members of a fishing outfit, the "IWAG" or more popularly called the the total sum of THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,900.00), plus burial expenses in the sum
"ALEX", owned by petitioner herein, Dr. Agustino R. Abong. of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00), through this Office;
On May 15, 1966, this fishing outfit set out to sea somewhat off the coast of Northern Negros. The (P5,120.00) plus 50% penalty in the sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY PESOS (P2,560.00)
decedents were among the 70 crew members who were loaded on two big bancas, 8 small fishing boats or the total sum of SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P7,680.00), plus burial expenses
locally known as "lawagan" and one towing motorboat. While they were, thus, fishing, typhoon "IRMA" of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) through this Office;
passed along their way, scattering the boats and blowing them far out into the open sea. The tragedy netted 5. To pay to claimant, ROSARIO ALOVA, the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) plus 50%
eight (8) dead while some sixty (60) men survived the disaster.​1 penalty in the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) or the total sum of NINE THOUSAND
PESOS (P9,000.00), plus the further sum of TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) for burial expenses,
As a consequence of the incident seven (7) notices and claims for death compensation were filed with the through this Office;
Bacolod Sub-Regional Office (or Regional Office No. VII) of the Department of Labor by herein private 6. To pay to claimant, CONCHITA MONTEROYO, the sum of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) plus
respondents on June 1, 1966. A copy of the notices and claims were sent to petitioner Dr. Agustino R. 50% penalty in the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) representing compensation for the
Abong by registered mail at his place of business, but the envelopes containing said notices and claims were death of her husband, Juanito; and TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P2,600.00) plus 50%
returned unclaimed, although petitioner was personally notified thrice. Thereafter, counsel for private penalty in the sum of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P1,300.00) or the total sum of THREE
respondents on July 6, 1966, and July 14, 1966, respectively, filed an ​ex-parte motion with the Bacolod THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,900.00) representing compensation for the death of her son,
Sub-Regional Office of the Workmen's Compensation Commission to declare petitioner in default, which Wilfredo; plus the further sum of FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P400.00) for burial expenses of Juanito and
motion was granted. Thereupon, claimants were allowed to present their evidence. Finding the claims of the Wilfredo Monteroyo; or a grand total for these two cases of THIRTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
private respondents to be allied in nature, the cases were consolidated.​2 PESOS (P13,300.00), through this Office;
7. To pay to counsel for claimants, Atty. Angel F. Lobaton, Sr. the sum of TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
After due hearing before Acting Referee, Bertito D. Dadivas, he rendered on August 1, 1966, a decision FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P2,644.00) as attorney's fees; and
granting the claims, the pertinent portions of which are quoted as follows: 8. To pay to the Workmen's Compensation Fund, through this Office, the sum of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
In the light of the testimonies of herein claimants and their principal witness, Filomeno Pason, who is a PESOS (P520.00), pursuant to Section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended."​3
survivor of that unfortunate tragedy and who personally witnessed the deaths of all eight (8) deceased
workers of respondent, there is no doubt at all that their deaths arose out of and in the course of their On September 14, 1966, herein petitioner filed a (1) motion to set aside the order declaring him in default
employment as "washing" or helpers and light tenders of respondent Dr. Agustino R. Abong. Under Sections and a (2) separate motion to set aside the Decision of the Acting Referee, to which seasonable oppositions
2 and 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, the deaths of above deceased persons are, were interposed by private respondents on September 26, 1966.​4
therefore, compensable.
On October 25, 1966, Acting Referee Bertito D. Dadivas issued an Order denying both motions of petitioner.​5
In granting this award — it should be considered that two of the eight deceased workers — Noel A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner on November 4, 1966, raising, ​inter alia​, the
Lahao-lahao and Wilfredo Monteroyo — were minors at the time of employment. Respondent herein has fundamental question of jurisdiction and denial of due process.​6 An opposition thereto was interposed by
also failed to submit a report of this accident "as soon as possible after the occurence of an injury resulting in private respondents on November 10, 1966.​7
absence from work for a day or more"; nor registered himself or his business enterprise in accordance with
Sections 37 and 56 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 3428. On March 23, 1970, Associate (Medical) Commissioner Herminia Castelo-Sotto, M.D., of the Workmen
Compensation Commission rendered a decision affirming the earlier decision of the referee.​8
Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for payment of an additional compensation equal
to fifty per centum of the compensation to be awarded, in case of failure of the employer to comply with any On April 17, 1970, petitioner sought the review of the decision of Associate (Medical) Commission
order, rule or regulation of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the event of the death of the employee or Castelo-Sotto by the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission sitting ​en banc,​ but the latter
employees concerned.
however affirmed the decision with the modification that the 50% additional compensation earlier imposed as relationship with the respondent as employees of the latter. The intervention of Simplicio Panganiban, in this
penalty was eliminated, in its resolution of July 7, 1970.​9 case, is merely that of an agent or intermediary between the owner of the fishing boat and the members of
its crew. In short, Panganiban is merely the person charged by Dr. Abong to recruit the said fishermen to
Dissatisfied with the verdict, petitioner came to this Court for reversal of the adverse decision against him. work for and for the enforcement of the business venture of herein respondent.

III. ISSUES OF THE CASE The proposition, on the other hand, of the respondent's counsel, that Dr. Abong was not the employer of the
In his brief before this Court the petitioner imputes five errors committed by respondent Workmen's decedents, simply because of an alleged partnership agreement, executed on March 23, 1962, between the
Compensation Commission, viz: respondent, Dr. Agustino R. Abong, as "Financier" and Simplicio Panganiban, as his "Team leader", is
intended certainly as a very clever device designed primarily to exempt the employer from answering any
1. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION liability under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
PETITIONER AND THE DECEASED CREW MEMBERS OF THE "IWAG" FISHING OUTFIT. The said contract of partnership while it may be considered as valid and lawful, between the signatories
2. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION thereto, the respondent Dr. Abong and his "partner" or agent, Simplicio Panganiban, nowhere in that said
IN NOT DECLARING ITSELF WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS FOR DEATH BENEFITS. agreement did the decedents or their heirs in interests take any participation or manifested their conformity
3. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION to the said covenant. Thus, even if we consider this contract as valid and enforceable between them, it
IN FINDING THAT THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED CREW MEMBER IS COMPENSABLE UNDER THE cannot bind the non-signatories thereto, like the deceased fishermen.
PAYMENT OF SUCH COMPENSATION. The case invoked by the respondent (Pajarillo, et al., vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. L-21930, August
4. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION 31, 1966) can not be legally applied in the instant case, for the simple reason that the facts in that aforesaid
IN DENYING PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO BE HEARD. case are not the same as those in the case at bar. Moreover, we are of the view, that the said Pajarillo case
5. THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ERRED AND/OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, may be good only as far as the Social Security System, for purposes of membership thereat, is concerned
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN GRANTING EXCESSIVE AWARDS TO THE CLAIMANTS. and is not readily applicable to cases involving Workmen's Compensation claims as the one at bar. For here,
the contract of partnership, if valid, only binds the parties thereto, and the decedents in this case, as the
The pivotal issue requiring determination is who is the statutory employer of the decedents and who should records will show, were never a party signatory thereto. How then can we tie them to that partnership
be liable for their death compensation. Nevertheless, We take up the merits of the points raised ​ad seriatim.​ agreement when it only holds the two-party, Abong and Panganiban, as the sole partners in that agreement?

IV. DISCUSSION Furthermore, even if Panganiban will be considered as an independent contractor, which he is not, his
As regards the first three interrelated assigned errors, there is a faint attempt by petitioner Agustino R. position as such will not relieve the employer, respondent Abong, from his liability under the Act. It is
Abong to evade liability by advancing the theory that he had absolutely no voice or intervention in the choice, well-defined in the Act, that an employer includes every person or association of persons, incorporated or
hiring, dismissing, control, supervision and compensation of the fishermen-crew members, and that these not, public or private, and the legal representatives of the deceased employer. It includes the owner or
matters, which are the essence of employer-employee relationship, are the sole responsibility of the team manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for the reason that there
leader, Simplicio Panganiban, and the team-members or crew pursuant to their Agreement (Exhibit "G"). 10 ​ is an independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers
employed there. (Section 39, paragraph[s], Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended).
The contention of petitioner is devoid of merit. It should be pointed out that this case is an appeal from the xxx xxx xxx 12​
decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. And in this class of proceedings, only questions of As pointed out by the Commission's findings, the fundamental bases showing that petitioner, Dr. Agustino R.
law should be raised, the findings of facts made by the Commission being conclusive and binding upon this Abong, is the employer, are present, namely, the selection and engagement of the employee; the payment of
​ Although this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts, it only does so when the conclusions
Court. 11 wages; the power of dismissal and the employer's power to control the employees' conduct. 13 ​ These powers
therefrom are not supported by the evidence. In the case at bar, however, this Court finds the findings of fact were lodged in petitioner Abong, thru his agent, Simplicio Panganiban, whom he alleges to be his "partner".
made by Associate (Medical) Commissioner Herminia Castelo-Sotto, M.D., and concurred in by the On this score alone, the petitioner for review must fail. It is well-settled that employer-employee relationship
Commission en banc to be fully supported by the evidence on record which clearly points out that petitioner involves findings of fact which are conclusive and binding and not subject to review by this Court. 14 ​
Agustino R. Abong is the statutory employer of the decedents. In ruling for the deceased workers, the Petitioner also argues that he was denied his right to heard. 15​ It is contended that petitioner was not properly
Commission said: notified of the proceedings against him.
The assigned error merits scant consideration. Proper notices and claims for compensation together with a
... After a careful review of the evidence and the records, We are inclined to agree with the proposition, formal letter to accomplish WCC Form No. 3 — Employer's Report Accident or Sickness — were duly served
advanced by the claimant's counsel that there existed an employer-employee relationship between the upon petitioner at his place of business in Sagay, Negros Occidental. 16 ​ His failure to claim his mail and to
respondent and the decedents. Not only that the said deceased workers worked for and in the interest of the answer the claims or controvert the same and to accomplish WCC Form No. 3, are fatal errors which cannot
business of the herein respondent. But that they were subject to the control, supervision, and dismissal of be repaired at this time. It needs no argument to show that service by registered mail is deemed completed
the respondent, thru its agent, Simplicio Panganiban, the alleged "partner" of herein respondent. And while upon petitioner's failure to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the first notice sent by
these workers were paid in kind, or by "pakiao basis" still that fact did not alter the character of their
​ The further contention that the "notices" should have been sent his place of residence in
the postmaster. 17
Bacolod City is of no moment either. Section 26 of Republic Act No. 3428, as amended, provides:

Member's shares............................ 97,263.70

SEC. 26. Delivery of notice and claim ... . The notices shall be served by personal delivery or by sending it
by registered letter addressed to the employer at his last known residence or ​at his place of business​.
Credits paid................................ 6,196.55
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, there was no error in sending petitioner's mails to his place of business at Sagay, Negros
Interest received........................... 4,569.45
And now We come to the last point. It is contended that respondent Commission erred in granting excessive
Miscellaneous............................... 1,891.00
awards the claimants.
We find this contention incorrect. The Commission's findings relative to the wages of the decedents are P109,620.70
findings facts which are not open to review by this Court as the same are supported by substantial evidence
​ We, therefore, find no cogent reason to disturb the Commission's findings on this point.
on record. 18​ Expenses:

Under the circumstances, private respondents' claim should be upheld not only because they are supported Premiums to members....................... 68,146.25
by the evidence on record, but also because the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation
designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident in the pursuit of his Loans on real-estate....................... 9,827.00
employment, and the law must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted. 19 ​
Moreover, this Tribunal finds no reason in this case to depart from the rule which limits its appellate Loans on promissory notes.............. 4,258.55
jurisdiction to the review of errors of law only, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which in this case are supported by substantial evidence. Salaries.................................... 1,095.00

Miscellaneous............................... 1,686.10
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision is hereby fully affirmed.

G.R. No. 31057 September 7, 1929 Cash on hand........................................ 24,607.80

ADRIANO ARBES, ET AL.,​ plaintiffs-appellees,
VICENTE POLISTICO, ET AL.,​ defendants-appellants. The defendants objected to the commissioner's report, but the trial court, having examined the reasons for
the objection, found the same sufficiently explained in the report and the evidence, and accepting it,
This is an action to bring about liquidation of the funds and property of the association called "Turnuhan rendered judgment, holding that the association "Turnuhan Polistico & Co." is unlawful, and sentencing the
Polistico & Co." The plaintiffs were members or shareholders, and the defendants were designated as defendants jointly and severally to return the amount of P24,607.80, as well as the documents showing the
president-treasurer, directors and secretary of said association. uncollected credits of the association, to the plaintiffs in this case, and to the rest of the members of the said
association represented by said plaintiffs, with costs against the defendants.
It is well to remember that this case is now brought before the consideration of this court for the second time.
The first one was when the same plaintiffs appeared from the order of the court below sustaining the The defendants assigned several errors as grounds for their appeal, but we believe they can all be reduced
defendant's demurrer, and requiring the former to amend their complaint within a period, so as to include all to two points, to wit: (1) That not all persons having an interest in this association are included as plaintiffs or
the members of "Turnuhan Polistico & Co.," either as plaintiffs or as a defendants. This court held then that defendants; (2) that the objection to the commissioner's report should have been admitted by the court
in an action against the officers of a voluntary association to wind up its affairs and enforce an accounting for below.
money and property in their possessions, it is not necessary that all members of the association be made
parties to the action. (Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil., 345.) The case having been remanded to the court of As to the first point, the decision on the case of Borlasa vs. Polistico, ​supra,​ must be followed.
origin, both parties amend, respectively, their complaint and their answer, and by agreement of the parties,
the court appointed Amadeo R. Quintos, of the Insular Auditor's Office, commissioner to examine all the With regard to the second point, despite the praiseworthy efforts of the attorney of the defendants, we are of
books, documents, and accounts of "Turnuhan Polistico & Co.," and to receive whatever evidence the opinion that, the trial court having examined all the evidence touching the grounds for the objection and
parties might desire to present. having found that they had been explained away in the commissioner's report, the conclusion reached by the
court below, accepting and adopting the findings of fact contained in said report, and especially those
The commissioner rendered his report, which is attached to the record, with the following resume: referring to the disposition of the association's money, should not be disturbed.
In Tan Dianseng Tan Siu Pic vs. Echauz Tan Siuco (5 Phil., 516), it was held that the findings of facts made The authors discuss this point at great length, but Ricci decides the matter quite clearly, dispelling all doubts
by a referee appointed under the provisions of section 135 of the Code of Civil Procedure stand upon the thereon. He holds that the partner who limits himself to demanding only the amount contributed by him need
same basis, when approved by the Court, as findings made by the judge himself. And in Kriedt vs. E. C. not resort to the partnership contract on which to base his action. And he adds in explanation that the partner
McCullogh & Co.(37 Phil., 474), the court held: "Under section 140 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is made makes his contribution, which passes to the managing partner for the purpose of carrying on the business or
the duty of the court to render judgment in accordance with the report of the referee unless the court shall industry which is the object of the partnership; or in other words, to breathe the breath of life into a
unless for cause shown set aside the report or recommit it to the referee. This provision places upon the partnership contract with an objection forbidden by law. And as said contrast does not exist in the eyes of the
litigant parties of the duty of discovering and exhibiting to the court any error that may be contained therein." law, ​the purpose from which the contribution was made has not come into existence, and the administrator of
The appellants stated the grounds for their objection. The trial examined the evidence and the the partnership holding said contribution retains what belongs to others, ​without any consideration;​ for which
commissioner's report, and accepted the findings of fact made in the report. We find no convincing reason he is not bound to return it and he who has paid in his share is entitled to recover it.
arguments on the appellant's brief to justify a reversal of the trial court's conclusion admitting the
commissioner's findings. But this is not the case with regard to profits earned in the course of the partnership, because they do not
constitute or represent the partner's contribution but are the result of the industry, business or speculation
There is no question that "Turnuhan Polistico & Co." is an unlawful partnership (U.S. vs. Baguio, 39 Phil., which is the object of the partnership, and therefor, in order to demand the proportional part of the said
962), but the appellants allege that because it is so, some charitable institution to whom the partnership profits, the partner would have to base his action on the contract which is null and void, since this partition or
funds may be ordered to be turned over, should be included, as a party defendant. The appellants refer to distribution of the profits is one of the juridical effects thereof. Wherefore considering this contract as
article 1666 of the Civil Code, which provides: non-existent​, by reason of its illicit object, it cannot give rise to the necessary action, which must be the basis
of the judicial complaint. Furthermore, it would be immoral and unjust for the law to permit a profit from an
A partnership must have a lawful object, and must be established for the common benefit of the partners. industry prohibited by it.

When the dissolution of an unlawful partnership is decreed, the profits shall be given to charitable institutions Hence the distinction made in the second paragraph of this article of this Code, providing that the profits
of the domicile of the partnership, or, in default of such, to those of the province. obtained by unlawful means shall not enrich the partners, but shall upon the dissolution of the partnership,
be given to the charitable institutions of the domicile of the partnership, or, in default of such, to those of the
Appellant's contention on this point is untenable. According to said article, no charitable institution is a province.
necessary party in the present case of determination of the rights of the parties. The action which may arise
from said article, in the case of unlawful partnership, is that for the recovery of the amounts paid by the This is a new rule, unprecedented by our law, introduced to supply an obvious deficiency of the former law,
member from those in charge of the administration of said partnership, and it is not necessary for the said which did not describe the purpose to which those profits denied the partners were to be applied, nor state
parties to base their action to the existence of the partnership, but on the fact that of having contributed what to be done with them.
some money to the partnership capital. And hence, the charitable institution of the domicile of the
partnership, and in the default thereof, those of the province are not necessary parties in this case. The The profits are so applied, and not the contributions, because this would be an excessive and unjust
article cited above permits no action for the purpose of obtaining the earnings made by the unlawful sanction for, as we have seen, there is no reason, in such a case, for depriving the partner of the portion of
partnership, during its existence as result of the business in which it was engaged, because for the purpose, the capital that he contributed, the circumstances of the two cases being entirely different.
as Manresa remarks, the partner will have to base his action upon the partnership contract, which is to annul
and without legal existence by reason of its unlawful object; and it is self evident that what does not exist Our Code does not state whether, upon the dissolution of the unlawful partnership, the amounts contributed
cannot be a cause of action. Hence, paragraph 2 of the same article provides that when the dissolution of are to be returned by the partners, because it only deals with the disposition of the profits; but the fact that
the unlawful partnership is decreed, the profits cannot inure to the benefit of the partners, but must be given said contributions are not included in the disposal prescribed profits, shows that in consequences of said
to some charitable institution. exclusion, the general law must be followed, and hence the partners should reimburse the amount of their
respective contributions. Any other solution is immoral, and the law will not consent to the latter remaining in
We deem in pertinent to quote Manresa's commentaries on article 1666 at length, as a clear explanation of the possession of the manager or administrator who has refused to return them, by denying to the partners
the scope and spirit of the provision of the Civil Code which we are concerned. Commenting on said article the action to demand them. (Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, vol. XI, pp. 262-264)
Manresa, among other things says:
The judgment appealed from, being in accordance with law, should be, as it is hereby, affirmed with costs
When the subscriptions of the members have been paid to the management of the partnership, and against the appellants; provided, however, the defendants shall pay the legal interest on the sum of
employed by the latter in transactions consistent with the purposes of the partnership may the former P24,607.80 from the date of the decision of the court, and provided, further, that the defendants shall deposit
demand the return of the reimbursement thereof from the manager or administrator withholding them? this sum of money and other documents evidencing uncollected credits in the office of the clerk of the trial
Apropos of this, it is asserted: If the partnership has no valid existence, if it is considered juridically court, in order that said court may distribute them among the members of said association, upon being duly
non-existent, the contract entered into can have no legal effect; and in that case, how can it give rise to an identified in the manner that it may deem proper. So ordered.
action in favor of the partners to judicially demand from the manager or the administrator of the partnership
capital, each one's contribution?