This much is certain: that through the I I always think oC6 an absolute

but logical unity (simplicity) of the subject; but not that I cognize through
it the actual simplicity of myself as subject. We saw that the proposition,
I am substance, signifies nothing but the pure category, of which I can make
no use in concreto (empirical use). I am similarly permitted to say, I am a
simple substance, i.e., one the presentation of which never contains a synthesis of
the manifold. But this concept-or, for that matter, this
proposition-teaches us nothing whatever regarding myself as an object of
experience. For the concept of substance is itself used only as a function
of synthesis, without an underlying77 intuition and hence without an object, and
holds only of the condition of our cognition, but does not hold of
any object that one can indicate. Let us perform an experiment concerning
the supposed usefulness of this proposition.78
Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul
has any value only insofar as I can thereby distinguish this subject from
all matter, and consequently can exempt it from the decay to which matter
is always subjected. Indeed, the above proposition is intended quite specifically
for this use, and this is why it is usually also expressed thus: The
soul is not corporeal. Now suppose that I could show that even if this cardinal
proposition79 of rational psychology, in the pure signification of a
mere judgment of reason (made from pure categories), is granted all objective
validity (Everything that thinks is simple substance), we nonetheless cannot make
the least use of this proposition in deciding whether the
soul is heterogeneous from or akin to matter. If I can show this, then this
will be tantamount to my having relegated this supposed psychological insight to
the realm of mere ideas, which lack the reality needed for objective use.