ANNOTATION-RESIDENCY interests and other concerns are elsewhere, it

will take a very credulous judge to find that the

At different times in the past, the issue has been
raised against one or the other candidate that he
or she does not fulfill the residency requirement
of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has resolved the meaning of
"resident" for purposes of complying with the
constitutional requirement. A resident is a
domiciliary; and therefore, for purposes of
complying with the requirements of the
Constitution, one must be domiciled in the
Philippines for the period that the constitution
requires.
place of the resthouse is one's domicile!
When Butz Aquino ran as Representative of the
newly created City of Makati, he was rebuffed by
the Supreme Court that remained unconvinced
that the condo unit he had purchased in Makati
satisfied the residence requirement. On the
other hand, ruling on the very same day, the
Supreme Court found that Mrs. Imelda Marcos,
no matter her long absence from Leyte,
remained domiciled there because there were
several manifestations of her intention to return
there!

Domicile has a fixed meaning: habitual residence
coupled with the intention to remain -- what is
technically called animus manendi. In Conflict of
Laws, also known as Private International Law,
domicile requires physical presence and the
intention to remain (for good).
If I pack all my bags, sell all I have in the
Philippines, announce to all and sundry my
intention to relocate to the to the icy heart of
Greenland, and there, spend the rest of my days,
but die before I board the plane on the first leg
of my journey away from the civilized world, I
shall die as a domiciliary of the Philippines
because the requirement of physical presence in
the wastelands of Greenland has not been
fulfilled.
"There is a difference between domicile and
residence. Residence is used to indicate a place
of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence
generally is his place of domicile, but is not by
any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile."

By contrast, even if one is sentenced to suffer life

imprisonment, Muntinlupa does not become
one's domicile because one always hopes for
executive clemency, and maintains the intention
to return to his home.

So, is absence consistent with domicile? Yes, as

long as there is the animus revertendi. When
one leaves his domicile with the intention to
return, no matter how long the absence,
domicile will not be lost.

So, when the Constitution requires "residence of

at least one year," then what is required is
physical presence for at least one year with
intention to remain in the Philippines, or in that
congressional district or locality, for one year.

Intentions are tricky business, but there are

verifiable facts consistent with an intention to
remain, as well as facts evincing a lack of such an
intention. When all that one has in a
congressional district is a resthouse which one
only occasionally visits, while family, business

LIGOT V. MATHAY
FACTS:
Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member
of the House of Representatives for three
consecutive four-year terms from December 30,
1957 to December 30, 1969.
On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials
of the national government" increasing the
salary of the members of Congress from P7,200
to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the
increases "shall take effect in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution."
When Ligot was elected for his third four-year
term, he was not entitled to the salary increase
by virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in
Philconsa v. Mathay:
"that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30,
1969 when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House
that approved it on June 20, 1964 will
have expired" by virtue of the
constitutional mandate in Section 14,
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution...”
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim
for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968
which provided for retirement gratuity.
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives
issued a treasury warrant in the sum of
P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement
gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00
per annum of members of Congress.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not
sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by
the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by
former Representative Melanio T. Singson,
whose term as Congressman also expired on
December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco
formally requested petitioner to return the
warrant and its supporting papers for a
recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue
of the Auditor- General’s adverse decision to
Singson’s claim
On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General
through Velasco denied Ligot’s request for
reconsideration.
Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing
the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that
at the time of his retirement, the salary for
members of CongRess “as provided by law” was
already P32,000 per annum, so, he should
receive his retirement gratuity based on that
salary increase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement
benefits based on the salary increase of the
member of Congress.
HELD:
NO. The petition was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a
retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth
Act 186, secrtion 12 as amended by RA4968. The
issue is whether or not he can claim in based on
the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of
Congress. The Court decided that to grant
retirement gratuity to members of Congress
whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving
during their term of office) would be to pay them
more than what is constitutionally allowed.
Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
provides that: “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.”