HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL v. HON. STO.
TOMAS BLR, charter certificate issued by PIGLAS-KAMAO, and certificate of registration
July 23, 2013 | Peralta, J. | Supervisor/Rank and File Union Affiliation
Digester: Bathan, Maria Aurelia
SUMMARY: HCCS-TELU (Union) filed a petition for certification election. HCCS
opposed, contending that the members of the union do not belong to the same class
and is not only a mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees, but
also a combination of teaching and non-teaching personnel. The Union argued that DO
9 provided for specific instances in which a petition filed by a legitimate organization
shall be dismissed by the Med-Arbiter and that “mixture of employees” is not one of
those enumerated. The Med-Arbiter denied the PCE because the unit sought to be
represented is inappropriate. The SOLE reversed and ruled that although there are
differences in the nature of work, hours and conditions of work, etc., these are not
substantial enough to warrant the dismissal of the petition. “Inappropriateness of the
bargaining unit sought to be represented” is not a ground for dismissal of the petition.
Pursuant to the UP case, the SOLE ordered the conduct of two certification elections,
one for the teaching staff and another for the non-teaching staff. CA and SC affirmed.
The Court reviewed the history of the provisions pertaining to the mingling of
supervisory and rank-and-file employees. RA 6715 restored the prohibition against the
questioned mingling in one labor organization as provided in Sec. 18. Unfortunately,
just like R.A. No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation
of the prohibition would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization. The
invalidity of membership of one of the organizers does not make the union illegal,
where the requirements of the law for the organization thereof are, nevertheless,
satisfied and met.
DOCTRINE: While there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and
rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does not provide for
the effects thereof. After a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the
rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between
supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy
for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such
mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article
239 of the Labor Code.
FACTS:
 May 31, 2002 – Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child Catholic
School Teachers and Employees Labor Union – PIGLAS (HCCS-TELU/Union,
Private respondent), filed a petition for certification election alleging that PIGLAS
is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the DOLE representing the
Union. HCCS is a private educational institution and has approximately 120
teachers and employees comprising the proposed appropriate bargaining unit.
HCCS is unorganized and there is no CBA or a duly certified bargaining agent or a
labor organization certified as the SEBA of the proposed bargaining unit within 1
year prior to the filing of the petition.
 Among the documents submitted were the certificate of affiliation with PIGLAS-
Kristiyanong Alyansa ng Mabayang Obrero (PIGLAS-KAMAO) issued by the
of HCCS-TELU as a legitimate labor organization issued by the DOLE.
 HCCS (Petitioner) noted that it is a parochial school with the following employees:
98 teaching personnel, 25 non-teaching academic employees, 33 non-teaching
academic workers (156 in total). Of the employees who signed to support the
petition, 14 already resigned and 6 signed twice. Members of the union do not
belong to the same class and is not only a mixture of managerial,
supervisory, and rank-and-file employees (3 VPs, 1 Dept. Head/Supervisor, 11
Coordinators), but also a combination of teaching and non-teaching
personnel (27 are non-teaching personnel). For not being accord with Art. 245
(Ineligibility of Managerial Employees), the Union is an illegitimate labor
organization lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election, citing
Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. Labor Union, and that an
inappropriate bargaining unit for want of community or mutuality of interest as
held in DLSU Medical Center and College of Medicine v. Laguesma.
 Union: HCCS failed to substantiate its claims. Assuming it were true, Sec. 11 (II),
Rule XI of DO No. 9, Series of 1997, provided for specific instances in which a
petition filed by a legitimate organization shall be dismissed by the Med-Arbiter and
that “mixture of employees” is not one of those enumerated. Questions pertaining
to qualifications of employees may be threshed out in the inclusion-exclusion
proceedings prior to the conduct of the certification election pursuant to Sec. 2,
Rule XII of said DO. The will of the employees should be respected as they had
manifested their desire to be represented by only one bargaining unit. Even if the
teachers may receive additional pay for an advisory class and for additional loads,
HCCS’s academic and non-academic personnel have similar working conditions. It
cited Laguna College v. CIR and the case of a union in West negros College in
Bacolod City, which allegedly represented both academic and non-academic
employees.
 Med-Arbiter: Denied petition for certification election because the unit sought to
be represented is inappropriate.
o Applied the community or mutuality of interest test. The basic test is
whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. The test may result
in the formation of an employer unit or in the fragmentation of an employer
unit.
o Here, the employees may be categorized into 2 general classes: 1) the teaching
staff and 2) the non-teaching staff. It would seem obvious that the first would
find very little in common with the second as regards responsibilities and
function, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and interests, sills
and intellectual pursuits, etc. There are plain and patent realities which cannot
be ignored and dictate the separation of these two categories for purposes of
collective bargaining (citing UP v. Ferrer-Calleja).
 SOLE: Reversed. Although there are differences in the nature of work, hours and
conditions of work, etc., these are not substantial enough to warrant the dismissal
of the petition. “Inappropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be represented”
is not a ground for dismissal of the petition. In the cited UP case, the SC did not
 order the dismissal of the petition but ordered the conduct of a certification
election, limiting same among the non-academic personnel of UP. While the SC
ordered a separate bargaining unit for the UP Academic personnel, it did not order
them to organize a separate labor organization among themselves. Currently, the
All UP Workers Union continue to exist with a combined membership of academic
and non-academic personnel although separate bargaining agreements is sought for
the two bargaining units.
o The SOLE directed the conduct of two certification elections, one for each
category, subject to the usual pre-election conferences and inclusion-exclusion
proceedings, with the following choices:
 A. Certification Election Among Teaching Personnel: 1. Holy Child
Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union; and 2. No Union
 B. Certification Election Among Non-Teaching Personnel: 1. Holy Child
Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union; and 2. No Union.
 MR denied. HCCS filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction. A subsequent Motion for Immediate Issuance of a TRO
was also filed alleging that Hon. Dacanay of the Industrial Relations Division of the
DOLE was set to implement the SOLE decision. CA issued TRO. CA denied the
manifestation and motion for the immediate lifting of the injunction filed by the
Union.
 CA dismissed the petition and ruled that the Toyota ruling pertaining to Vice-
Principals, Department Heads, and Coordinators being neither supervisory nor
managerial employees is inapplicable. CA agreed that the nature of the work does
not coincide with each other. Nevertheless, the SOLE did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing the petition for certification election. MR denied.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether a petition for certification election is dismissible on the ground that the
labor organization’s membership allegedly consists of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees – NO.
 HCCS: The duties of the Vice-principals, department heads, and coordinators
include the evaluation and assessment of the effectiveness and capability of the
teachers under them and that such is made without the participation of the Higher
Administration (HA) of the school. The fact that the recommendation undergoes
the approval of the HA does not take away the independent nature of their
judgment. It would be difficult for such employees to objectively assess the
performances of teachers under them if they would be allowed to be members of
the same labor union.
 Union: Sec. 9 and 12 of RA 9481 was used to contend that HCCS has no standing
to oppose the petition for certification election aka the By-Stander Rule. An
Employer is not a party-in-interest in a certification election i.e. does not have the
requisite right to protect even by way of TRO or injunction.
 SC: Did not agree with Union. RA 9481 took effect only on June 14, 2007 and is
applicable only to labor representation cases filed on or after said date. The law and
rules in force at the time of filing of PCE May 2002 are RA 6715 and the Labor
Code and the IRR of RA 6715 as amended by DO. No. 9.
 In Republic v. Kawashima Textile, the Court discussed the applicability of the Toyota
ruling in the context of RA 6715 and DO 9.
o Nothing in RA 875 (particularly Sec. 3 regarding the segregation of unions of
supervisors and the employees under them) tells of how the questioned
mingling can affect the legitimacy of the labor organization. When the issue
came before the Court in Lopez v. Chronicle Publication Employees Association, the
Court ruled that the absence of any provision on the effect of the
disqualification of one of its organizers upon the legality of the union,
may be construed to confine the effect of such ineligibility only upon the
membership of the supervisors. In other words, the invalidity of
membership of one of the organizers does not make the union illegal,
where the requirements of the law for the organization thereof are,
nevertheless, satisfied and met.
o The labor Code was enacted without reproducing Sec. 3 of RA 875. Sec. 11 of
Rule II merely provides: Members of supervisory unions who do not fall
within the definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or
assist the rank and file organization. In Bulletin v. Sanchez, the Court ruled that
supervisory employees who do not fall under the category of managerial
employees may join or assist in the formation of a labor organization for
rank-and-file employees, but they may not form their own labor organization.
o EO 111 continued to recognize the right of supervisory employees, who do
not fall under the category of managerial employees, to join a rank-and-file
labor organization.
o RA 6715 restored the prohibition against the questioned mingling in one
labor organization as provided in Sec. 181. Unfortunately, just like R.A.
No. 875, R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect any violation
of the prohibition would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor
organization. It was the IRR of RA 6715 which supplied the deficiency by
introducing amendments to Rule II2 and Rule V, Sec 2(c)3. By that provision,
1 Sec. 18. Article 245 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory
employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
2 Sec. 1. Who may join unions.—x x x Supervisory employees and security guards shall not
be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may
join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own; Provided, that those
supervisory employees who are included in an existing rank-and-file bargaining unit, upon the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, shall remain in that unit x x x.
3 Sec. 2. Who may file.—Any legitimate labor organization or the employer, when requested to
bargain collectively, may file the petition.
The petition, when filed by a legitimate labor organization, shall contain, among others:
Xxxx (c) description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances
otherwise require; and provided further, that the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank-and-file
employees shall not include supervisory employees and/or security guards.
 any questioned mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly
registered labor organization from exercising its right to file a petition for
certification election.
o In Toyota, the Court held: an organization which carries a mixture of
rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a
legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for
certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes
necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a
certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization
whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of
Article 245 of the Labor Code.
o In Dunlop, in which the labor organization that filed a petition for certification
election was one for supervisory employees, but in which the membership
included rank-and-file employees, the Court reiterated that such labor
organization had no legal right to file a certification election to represent a
bargaining unit composed of supervisors for as long as it counted rank-and-file
employees among its members.
o However, the Court emphasized that the rules that applied in the Toyota
and Dunlop cases were the 1989 Rules (i.e. not yet amended by DO 9).
o On June 21, 1997, the Rules was amended by DO 9, specifically the
requirement under Sec. 2c: that the petition for certification election indicate
that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled with
supervisory employees—was removed. Instead, what it requires is a plain
description of the bargaining unit.
o In the Tagaytay case, the Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and
reverted to its pronouncement in Lopez that while there is a prohibition
against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. After a
labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and
privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory
and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for
that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such
mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
under Article 239 of the Labor Code.
o In SMC Mandaue, the Court explained that the Rules does not require a local or
chapter to provide a list of its members and it would be improper for the
DOLE to deny recognition on account of any question pertaining to its
individual members.
o In Air Philippines Corp. v. BLR, the Court held that that inclusion in a union of
disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such
is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud.
o Toyota and Dunlop no longer hold sway in the present altered state of
the law and the rules.
 In the case at bar, since the petition for certification election was filed in 2002, DO
9 is applicable. Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super,
petitioner cannot collaterally attack the legitimacy of the Union by prating for the
dismissal of the petition. Moreover, the determination of whether union
membership comprises managerial and/or supervisory employees is a factual issue
that is best left for resolution in the inclusion-exclusion proceedings, which has not
yet happened and is still premature to pass upon.
Whether the petition for certification election should have been dismissed on the
ground that the Union is not qualified to file such petition for its failure to
qualify as a legitimate labor organization – NO.
 In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper
procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for
cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor
Code, as amended. To reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a
certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
 In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would be
appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency, the Court, in the seminal case of
Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., mentioned several
factors that should be considered: (1) will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of employees’ interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and
probationary employees. However, the test of the grouping is community or
mutuality of interest, because “the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit’s
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.”
 The purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the
employees’ choice of an appropriate bargaining unit.
 The Court then stressed that as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule
45 petition.
CONCURRING OPINION: Brion, J.
 Discussed in passing the cited cases in the majority opinion and observed that the
law indeed has omitted to include mixed membership as a ground for the
cancellation of a labor organization’s registration. He also reiterated that the legal
personality of the union cannot be collaterally attacked. The SOLE and CA
correctly ruled that two collective bargaining units should represent the teaching
and non-teaching personnel. He also explained Rule 45 guidelines.
 The Labor Code does not specifically define an appropriate bargaining unit but
provides under Art. 2554 what an exclusive bargaining representative should be.
4Art. 255. Exclusive bargaining representation and workers’ participation in policy and
decision-making.— The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee
or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
 Section 1, Rule I, Book V of the Labor Code’s Implementing Rules states that a
bargaining unit “refers to a group of employees sharing mutual interests within a
given employer unit, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees in the employer unit or any specific occupational or geographical
grouping within such employer unit.”
 Cited a lot of cases. Bottom-line: Law and jurisprudence provide that the
commonality or mutuality of interest is the most fundamental standard of an
appropriate bargaining unit. This standard requires that the employees in an
asserted bargaining unit be similarly situated in their terms and conditions of
employment relations. This commonality or mutuality may be appreciated with
greater certainty if their areas of differences with other groups of employees are
considered.
 The adage that there is strength in numbers in a single collective bargaining unit is
significant when the employees are similarly situated, that is, they have the same or
similar areas of interests and differences from others in their employment relations.
However, strength in numbers as a consideration must take a back seat to the
ultimate standard of the employees’ right to self­organization based on
commonality or mutuality of interest; simply put, a collective bargaining unit whose
membership is characterized by diversity of interests cannot fully maximize the
exercise of its collective bargaining rights. The commonality and mutuality of
interest as a determining force of what constitutes a collective bargaining unit must
be understood along these lines, taking into account, of course, the facts established
in a particular case.
 While the 120 employees have similar working condition in some areas, substantial
dissimilarities are also present in their interests, in the work and duties they
performed, and in their working conditions. One obvious distinction is the nature
of the work and duties performed. The teaching personnel directly implement the
school’s curriculum and the school’s discipline to their students, while the
non-teaching personnel perform administrative, clerical, custodial, and maintenance
duties. The teaching personnel are more concerned with promoting and ensuring a
healthy learning environment for students, while non-teaching personnel are
involved in the management and running of the school.
 The foregoing considerations convinced the SOLE that because of the dominance
of the distinctions (appreciated as questions of facts based on her labor relations
expertise) – the collective bargaining interests of the employees would be best
served if two separate bargaining units would be recognized, namely, the teaching
and the non-teaching unites. Thus, the SOLE did not commit grave abuse of
discretion as the decision was based on the facts of the case and on the applicable
law and jurisprudence.