A. WHEN DO LAWS TAKE EFFECT?
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
1. [G.R. No. 63915. April 24, 1985.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON.
JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P.
DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
ARTICLE 2 CIVIL CODE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PUBLICATION
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE EVEN IF THE LAW ITSELF PROVIDES
FOR DATE OF ITS EFFECTIVITY. — That publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates is correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the
issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.
PUBLICATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES "OF A PUBLIC
NATURE" OR "OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY," A REQUIREMENT
OF DUE PROCESS; UNPUBLISHED PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES
WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT. — The publication of all
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons such as administrative and executive
orders need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY OF UNPUBLISHED
PRESIDENTIAL DECREES DOES NOT AFFECT THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN ENFORCED OR IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THEIR
PUBLICATION. — The implementation/enforcement of
presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official
Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration . .
.that an all inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would
have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition since there is no showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question.
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they
need not show any specific interest for their petition to be
given due course.
ISSUE:
WON said laws need to be published?
RULING:
YES.
The right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land.
Respondents further contend that publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for
their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2
of the Civil Code:
"Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, . . ."
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with
this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date —
for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication — but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of the above quoted provision is to give
the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would
be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need
not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Issue 2: What is the effect of laws which has been enforced
prior to the declaration of their invalidity?
Ruling:
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
"The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the
Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination
of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects — with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both
of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult
of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter
vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is
"an operative fact which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration . . . that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."
In this case, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been
so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
2. [G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.]
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION,
INC.,APOLINARIO M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and
ROMEO BULAWIN, petitioners,vs.MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA,
JR.,in his capacity as Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in
her capacity as Municipal Engineer and Building Official-
Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis
Occidental, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation,
Inc. (PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded
by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the
protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and
livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. 5 In line with
its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of
indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square
meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in
2001 6 which it rented out to the public and became the
source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, 7 among whom are
petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents
Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building
Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of
Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for
a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096, 8otherwise
known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines,"
ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas
Island.
On July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez
Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of
2002 10 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among
others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation
or organization inside the sanctuaries; 11 and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary,
on the premises, except if authorized by the local
government. 12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the
subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP),
which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter.
Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas,
including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as
government property and prohibiting ingress and egress
thereto. 13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was
served upon PETAL.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction
and damages 15 against respondents. Moreover, PETAL
assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the
following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public
consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province as required by Republic
Act No. 7160, 16 otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC); and (c) it was not
approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should
be enjoined. 17
RTC- ordinance invalid since it was not duly approved by
the SP, not published in a newspaper of general circulation
nor posted in public places
CA- the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon
failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days
after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of
the LGC. CA also ruled that the Municipality of Lopez
Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to
pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447
in relation to Section 16 of the LGC. 28
Issue: Whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners?
Ruling: YES
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56.Review of Component City and Municipal
Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. — (a) Within three (3) days after approval,
the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances
and the resolutions approving the local development
plans and public investment programs formulated by the
local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the
provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his
comments or recommendations, which may be
considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making
its decision. aDSIHc
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an
ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred
upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or
resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall
advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of
the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of
such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be
presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject
ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the
mere passage of time considering that the same is still
pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources of the SP. 35 It, however, bears to note that
more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the
said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by
the SB; 36 hence, it should be deemed approved and
valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above.
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners'
contentions that the subject ordinance was not published
nor posted in accordance with the provisions of
theLGC. 38 It is noteworthy that petitioners' own evidence
reveals that a public hearing 39 was conducted prior to
the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover,
other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to
present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast,
Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the
publication and posting requirements. 40 While it is true
that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence
thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or
legality should be upheld in the absence of any
controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by
law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise,
petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation,
which they, however, failed to do.
3. [G.R. No. 187587. June 5, 2013.]
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC., petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES —
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondent.
[G.R. No. 187654. June 5, 2013.]
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors,
petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES — PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondent.
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423,
President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of
Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later
on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of
Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The
excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein
respondent Military Shrine Services — Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open
for disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos.
(R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. — This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos" 2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette 3 on 3 February
1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No.
172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476,
as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation
No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and
occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions
of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General
Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating
Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further
unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of
illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) praying, among others, the reclassification of
the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-
298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476.
On 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a
Resolution 6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable. It
held that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was
therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could
not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of
others. Further, considering that Proclamation No.
2476 was done while the former President was exercising
legislative powers, it could not be amended, repealed or
superseded, by a mere executive enactment.
Thus, Proclamation No. 172could not have superseded
much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter
was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino's
legislative power had ceased.
Issue: WON the addendum has the force and effect of law?
Should be considered as part of the law despite its non-
publication?
Ruling: NO.
It is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of
whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article
2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication
is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law
itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than
after fifteen days following the completion of the law's
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that
the requirement of publication may be dispensed with.
The Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not
part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without
publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "[t]he publication of any law,
resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority."
Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include
Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative.
Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
appearing in the law. 17 This Court cannot rule that a word
appears in the law when, evidently, there is none.
In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that
"[u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code, '[j]udicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does
not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts
exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow
otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation
of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to
apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps
or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it
will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend
the law to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
B. LEGAL PERIODS
1. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V.
PARCERO in his official capacity as Revenue District Officer
of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati), Petitioners, vs.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DOCTRINE: A calendar month is "a month designated in
the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain." It is the "period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next
month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the
next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month."
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11,
1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which Primetown
paid in 1997. He explained that he is not liable for income
tax due to increase in the cost of labor and materials and
difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting
receivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.
Respondent suffered losses amounting to ₱71,879,228 for
the first quarter of 1997. Thus, claimed for tax refund for his
payment of quarterly income tax amounting to
₱26,318,398.32
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required
Primetown to submit additional documents to which
Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not
acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review
in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was
filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally
Collected. -- No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in
any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue
tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to
have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully
collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding
may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or
sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after
the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of
the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause
that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor, refund
or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon
which payment was made, such payment appears clearly
to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis supplied)
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730
days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC.
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days,
of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14,
1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was
filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return.
Hence, beyond the reglementary period. Primetown
appealed to CA.
CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition was filed within the two-year
period.
HELD: Yes. The Petition was filed within the two-year period.
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be
twelve calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it
refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall
be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis
supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain." It is
the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain
numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a
sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and
including the last day of that month." To illustrate, one
calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from
January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month
from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1, 2008 until
February 29, 2008
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter
VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter — the computation of legal periods.
Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is
irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the
manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code
and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we
hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period reckoned from the time respondent
filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998.
2. [G.R. No. 183449 : March 12, 2012]
ALFREDO JACA MONTAJES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the
Resolutions dated September 21, 2007[1] and May 19,
2008 [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00410 which dismissed the petition for review filed by
petitioner Alfredo Jaca Montajes for being filed out of
time, and denied reconsideration thereof, respectively.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Direct Assault
before the MTC. The MTC issuedits Judgment finding
petitioner guilty. The RTC affirmed the judgment of the
MTC. Petitioner filed with the CA a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review, praying for an extended
period of 15 days from May 21, or until June 5, within which
to file his petition. Petitioner subsequently filed his petition
for review on June 5. The CA dismissed the petition for
being filed out of time. Petitioner argues that pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, “If the last day of
the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day.”
Issue: Whether or not the period of extension commenced
on May 19 (the original due date).
Held: Yes. The Court clarified the above-quoted provision
when it issued A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC, which states that in
case a motion for extension is granted, the due date for
the extended period shall be counted from the original
due date, not from the next working day on which the
motion for extension was filed. The extension granted by
the court should be tacked to the original period and
commences immediately after the expiration of such
period.
In this case, the original period for filing the petition for
review with the CA was on May 19, a Saturday. Petitioner's
filing of his motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review on May 21, the next working day which followed
the last day for filing which fell on a Saturday, was
therefore on time. However, petitioner prayed in his motion
for extension that he be granted 15 days from May 21 or
up to June 5 within which to file his petition.
Petitioner here should have reckoned the 15-day
extension from May 19, 2007 and not from May 21, 2007.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the petition for review was filed out of
time pursuant to A.M. No. 00-2-14-SC-that the 15-day
extension period prayed by petitioner should be tacked to
the original period and commences immediately after the
expiration of such period. Thus, counting 15 days from the
expiration of the period which was on May 19, 2007, the
petition filed on June 5, 2007 was already two days late.
3. [G.R. NO. 174238 : July 7, 2009]
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and
TESSIE SY, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before
the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses
William and Tessie Sy (Criminal Case No. 98-969952 against
Tessie Sy and Criminal Case No. 98-969953 against William
Sy) for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC)
Check Nos. 171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in
payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored
upon presentment for having been drawn against a
closed account.
On March 16, 2004, the RTC, Branch 7, Manila dismissed the
estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime.νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents
before the RTC, Branch 18, Manila, a complaint6 for
collection of a sum of money with damages (Civil Case
No. 05-112452) based on the same loaned amount
of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks previously
subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed
on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not
apply, as it must be given only prospective application.
She further contends that her case falls within the following
exceptions to the rule that the civil action correspondent
to the criminal action is deemed instituted with the latter.
ISSUE:
WON Rules on Criminal Procedure may be retroactively
apply
RULING:
YES. Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed
her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules
of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the
time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights does not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as
a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws.18
C. WAIVER OF RIGHTS
1. Famanila v. Court of Appeals 500 SCRA 76
FACTS:
NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC. (NFD) hired
Roberto Famanila as messman for Hansa Riga, a vessel
registered and owned by its principal and co-respondent,
Barbership Management Limited. Famanila complained of
headache; while assisting in the loading operations when
Hansa Riga was decked at the port of Eureka, CA, USA,
Famanila experienced dizziness and subsequently
collapsed. He was diagnosed of cerebral hemorrhage
from a ruptured cerebral aneurysm. Thereafter he
underwent a brain surgery.
Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines due to his
condition and thereafter examined by Dr. Patricia
Abesamis who declared that he cannot go back to sea
duty and has been observed for 120 days, declared
permanently, totally disabled.
Authorized representatives convinced him to settle his
claim by accepting the amount of US $13,200. Petitioner
accepted the offer as evidenced by his signature in the
receipt Feb. 20,1991 release. His wife Gloria and one
Richard Famanila acted as witness in the signing of the
release.
Petitioner filed a complaint praying for an award of
disability benefits.
NCRC DISMISSED the complaint due to PRESCRIPTION; CA
DISMISSED the complaint for LACK OF MERIT
Petitioner claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
Release voluntarily or freely because he was permanently
disabled and in financial constraints. These factors
allegedly vitiated his consent which makes the Receipt
and Release void and unenforceable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is void and unenforceable
due to vitiated consent.
RULING:
NO. there is no proof on record that his consent was
vitiated in account of his disabilities. A vitiated consent
does not make a contract void and unenforceable - A
vitiated consent only gives rise to a voidable agreement.
Under the civil code, the vices of consent are mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influences or fraud. If
consent is given through any of the aforementioned vices
of consent, the contract is voidable. Disability is not among
the factors that may vitiate consent.
Petitioner contends that his permanent and total disability
vitiated his consent to the receipt and release thereby
rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability is
not among the factor that may vitiate consent. Besides
same petitioners self-serving allegation there is no proof on
record that his consent was vitiated an account of his
disability. In the absence of such proof of vitiated consent,
the validations of the receipt and release must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
2. Herrera v. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23,
1987
FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an
illegitimate son of the deceased, by incorporating a
Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest
of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished
to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is
without force and effect because there can be no
effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been
a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who
intend to transfer the same.
ISSUE:
WON a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed
without a valid acceptance from the heirs in question.
RULING:
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary
rights is that “the properties included in an existing
inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law
continue the personality of the former. The heirs succeed
the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time
may elapse from the moment of the death of the
deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event
retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with
article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although
conditioned upon the adjudication of the corresponding
hereditary portion.
D. CONFLICT OF LAWS
1. Rayray vs. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. 18176,
October 26, 1966
FACTS:
Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in 1952 in Pusan,
Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able
to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in
Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955.
Rayray however later found out that Lee had previously
lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by
saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have
more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for
them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to
her marriage with Rayray. Eventually they pursued their
separate way.
Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage
to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's
whereabouts is unknown; summons was served by
publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter,
plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she
not having filed an answer, and that a date be set for the
reception of his evidence.
In due course, thereafter, the lower court decision was
rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint, without costs,
upon the ground: (1) that the court could not nullify a
marriage contracted abroad; and (2) that the facts
proven do not warrant the relief prayed for. A
reconsideration of this decision having been denied,
plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the case to the Supreme Court, the jurisdiction of the lower
court being in issue in the appeal.
The court a quo found that it had no jurisdiction to pass
upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it
having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea. Said conclusion is
erroneous. In order that a given case could be validly
decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over
(1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the
parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem,
the res.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject was subject to the jurisdiction
before Philippine trial courts?
RULING:
Yes. The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has
jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of
marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled
in, or a national of, the forum. Since plaintiff is a Filipino,
domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court
had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it
could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage
between the parties herein.
The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of
plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the
jurisdiction of our courts of first instance, and, in Manila, of
its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.
The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his
submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the
complaint herein.4 Defendant was placed under the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by
publication.
This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the
parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole word.
The res in the present case is the relation between said
parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same
depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties,
not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus
celebrationis. Plaintiff here is a citizen of the Philippines,
domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our
jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and
— under plaintiff's — theory still is a non-resident alien. But,
this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.
2. ATCI Overseas Corp vs. Echin, G.R. No. 178551, Oct. 11,
2010
FACTS:
Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas
Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of
medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a MOA. Under the MOA, all newly-hired
employees undergo a probationary period of one year.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she
not having allegedly passed the probationary period.
Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal against ATCI as the local recruitment agency,
represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the
foreign principal. The Labor Arbiter held that respondent
was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners
to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three
months unexpired portion of her contract. The
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Petitioners
appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the
Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune
from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them;
and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to
meet the performance rating within the one-year period
as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. The CA
affirmed the NLRC Resolution
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner established its claim upon
invoking the application of a foreign law.
RULING:
NO. It is hornbook principle, however, that the party
invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual
presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to
discharge. The employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern
matters not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific
causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.).
Being the law intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones)
to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern
all matters relating to the termination of the employment
of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of
fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or
labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.
He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the
presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus,
we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues
presented before us. The Philippines does not take judicial
notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the
party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply
with the Rules of Court. These documents submitted by
petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was
validly terminated as a probationary employee under
Kuwaiti civil service laws. The imposition of joint and
solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to
protect and alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily,
to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit
of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principals liability before
petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and
solidary liability inutile.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot
evade responsibility for the money claims of OFWs which it
deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that
its foreign principal is a government agency clothed with
immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability
must first be established before it, as agent, can be held
jointly and solidarily liable. As to petitioners contentions
that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment
are not applicable since it was expressly provided in
respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily
entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and
Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such
rules, customs and practices of the host country, the same
was not substantiated.
3. Tuna Processing v Phi. Kingford, GR 185582, February 29,
2012
FACTS:
Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford) is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
while Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Due to
circumstances not mentioned in the case, Kingford
withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly, reneged
on their obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for
arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution in the State of California, United States and won
the case against respondent. To enforce the award,
petitioner TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition,
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC
of Makati City. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue in
the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in
the Philippines, but which collects royalties from entities in
the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign arbitral
award?
HELD:
YES. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall
apply in this case as the Act, as its title - An Act to
Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution
System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes -
would suggest, is a law especially enacted to actively
promote party autonomy in the resolution of disputes or
the freedom of the party to make their own arrangements
to resolve their disputes. It specifically provides exclusive
grounds available to the party opposing an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. The
Corporation Code is the general law providing for the
formation, organization and regulation of private
corporations. As between a general and special law, the
latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non derogant.
The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution provides that any party to a foreign arbitration
may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign
arbitral award. Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that
in the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the losing
party can not avail of the rule that bars foreign
corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines
from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a party enters
into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause
and, as in this case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it
becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and
by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the
capacity of the other party to enter into the contract,
participate in the arbitration and cause the
implementation of the result.
3. Amos v Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
FACTS:
Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with
his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate
children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3
illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis
executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable
estate should be divided in trust in the following order and
manner: (a.) $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; (b.)
P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; and,
(c.) The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his
1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio,
Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the
Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an
executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported,
inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by
the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her,
and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the
amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the
project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate
into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7
legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages. Among
the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma
Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimates as illegitimate children. The lower court denied
their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether Texan Law or Philippine Law must apply.
RULING:
TEXAN LAW. It is not disputed that the decedent was both
a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of
law rule providing that the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still
refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule
adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from our appellants,
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a
citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights has to be
determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on
legitimates cannot be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
4. G.R. No. L-23145, November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased.
RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee, vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC.
Doctrine: Probate court has authority to issue the order
enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is
in the Philippines.
FACTS: Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died
in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates
issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled
in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take
possession of these stock certificates but County Trust
Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator,
refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the
Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock
certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to
issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares.
Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that
the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence
and currently in the possession of County Trust Company
of New York.
ISSUE: Whether or not the domiciary administrator in New
York is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question.
RULING: No.
Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain
control and possession of all assets of the decedent within
the jurisdiction of the Philippines.
It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary
administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice
Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one
administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate
owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in
a foreign country, administration is had in both countries.
That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last
domicile is termed the principal administration, while any
other administration is termed the ancillary administration.
The reason for the latter is because a grant of
administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted.
Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has
no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration
is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country
other than that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable
for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the
ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when
the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court
to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock
certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated,
Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance
and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts.
Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any
wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of
Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the
actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the
corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the
above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is
insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do
so even if it were so minded.
5. G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., Petitioners, vs. MINORU KITAMURA,
Respondent.
Doctrine: Under the “state of the most significant
relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a
dispute, the court should determine which state has the
most substantial connection to the occurrence and the
parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should
consider where the contract was made, was negotiated,
was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business,
or place of incorporation of the parties.
FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a
Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects
national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend
professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned
Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern
Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the STAR
project was near completion, DPWH engaged the
consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed
engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-
Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. Kitamaru was
named as the project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International
Division, informed Kitamaru that the company had no
more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to
the substantial completion of the STAR Project.
Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a
fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific
performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon
filed a MTD.
Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in
Japan & executed by & between Japanese nationals.
Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for
improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be
heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following
the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA ruled that
the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to
the case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the
validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that
the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci
celebrationis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and
resolve the civil case for specific performance and
damages filed by the respondent.
RULING: Yes. In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems,
3 consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive
law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not
automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori
will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for one do not
always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be
applied to a transaction is different from the question of
whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter
a judgment.
In this case, only the 1st phase is at issue—jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a court to
validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it
must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner, over the
defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the
issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the
res or the thing which is the subject of the litigation. In
assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein, Nippon is
actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial
proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority which
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law
and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for
the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that
the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter submitted
to it because no law grants it the power to adjudicate the
claims.
In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that
the RTC is not properly vested by law w/ jurisdiction to hear
the subject controversy for a civil case for specific
performance & damages is one not capable of pecuniary
estimation & is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City.
What they rather raise as grounds to question subject
matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci celebrationis
and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant
relationship rule.” The Court finds the invocation of these
grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the
ceremony” or the law of the place where a contract is
made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus
means the “law of the place where a contract is executed
or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction,
and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law
voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended
by them either expressly or implicitly. Under the “state of
the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what
state law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine
which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract,
the court should consider where the contract was made,
was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile,
place of business, or place of incorporation of the parties.
This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these 3 principles in conflict of laws make reference
to the law applicable to a dispute, they are rules proper
for the 2nd phase, the choice of law. They determine
which state's law is to be applied in resolving the
substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as
the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-
law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called
for.
Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law
rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet pointed
out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours.
Before determining which law should apply, 1st there
should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law
of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules
for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must
be pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one
involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the
latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case, either because
of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over
the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply
the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over
the case and take into account or apply the law of some
other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and
controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations,
the court is not limited by foreign sovereign law short of
treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters
regarding rights provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non
conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.
1st, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because
Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as
a ground. 2nd, whether a suit should be entertained or
dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine depends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to
the sound discretion of the RTC. In this case, the RTC
decided to assume jurisdiction. 3rd, the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle requires a factual
determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more
properly considered a matter of defense.
Accordingly, since the RTC is vested by law with the power
to entertain and hear the civil case filed by respondent
and the grounds raised by petitioners to assail that
jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate
courts correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
6. G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. STOCKTON
W. ROUZIE, JR., respondent.
Doctrine: That the subject contract included a stipulation
that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State
of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts,
or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action.
FACTS: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation
duly organized & existing under the laws of Connecticut,
&Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract
BMSI hired Rouzie as its representative to negotiate the sale
of services in several government projects in thePhilippines
for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.
Rouzie secured a service contract w/ the Rep. of Phil. on
behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the
Mt.Pinatubo eruption & mudflows.
Rouzie filed before the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust
International (Rust) for alleged nonpayment of
commissions, illegal termination, & breach of employment
contract.
The Labor Arbiter ordered BMSI & Rust to pay Rouzie’s
money claims. Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed &
dismissed Rouzie’s complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Rouzie filed an action for damages before the RTC of La
Union (where he was a resident) against Raytheon
International. He reiterated that he was not paid the
commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project
w/c hesecured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also
averred that BMSI, RUST and Raytheon had combined &
functioned as 1 company.
Raytheon sought the dismissal of the complaint on the
grounds of failure to state a cause of action & forum non
conveniens & prayed for damages by way of compulsory
Counterclaim. The RTC denied Raytheon’s motion. The CA
affirmed.
Raytheon’s contention: The written contract between
Rouzie & BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that
is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of
foreign elements in the dispute, namely that the parties &
witnesses involved are American corporations & citizens &
the evidence to be presented is located outside the
Philippines, that renders our local courts inconvenient
forums. The foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the
immediate application of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction.
b) Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed
on the ground of forum non conveniens.
RULING:
a. YES. On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws
problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and
where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the
case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the
convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is
an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where
the case is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an
action is conferred by the Constitution and the law & by
the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
w/n the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein. The case file was an action
for damages arising from an alleged breach of contract.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the amount of
damages prayed are w/in the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the RTC acquired
jurisdiction over Rouzi upon the filing of the complaint. On
the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of Raytheon
was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the
same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or
any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded
from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction & choice of law are 2 distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive
law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The choice of law stipulation will be come
relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant
case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds
before the trial court.
b. NO. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a
court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on
its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere. Raytheon’s averments of the
foreign elements are not sufficient to oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the
principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a
matter of defense. While it is w/c the discretion of the trial
court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground,
it should do so only after vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances require the
court’s desistance.
7. ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, Petitioner, v. HON. RODOLFO A.
ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, HAJA
PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction when it
comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws.
FACTS:
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano
(Tamano) married private respondent Haja Putri Zorayda
A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage
supposedly remained valid and subsisting until his death on
18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993,
Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano
(Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined
by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita
on the ground that it was bigamous. They contended that
Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves
as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the
entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City was without jurisdiction over the
subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a
party to the marriage" could file an action for annulment
of marriage against the other spouse,1 hence, it was only
Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their
marriage. Petitioner likewise contended that since
Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in
Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case
was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
ISSUE:
WON the provisions of the Civil Code will apply and is within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.
RULING:
YES.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil Code. Hence,
contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is
applicable in the instant case. Assuming that indeed
petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim
laws, the same would still fall under the general original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation
where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim
rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with
original and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to
marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of
their general original jurisdiction under Sec. 19, par. (6) of
BP Blg. 129 which provides -
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions x x x x
8. SAMSON R. PACASUM, SR., Petitioner vs Atty. MARIETTA
D. ZAMORANOS, Respondent
DOCTRINE: The Muslim Code recognizes divorce in
marriages between Muslims, and mixed marriages wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or the Muslim
Code in any part of the Philippines.14 At present, this is the
only law in the Philippines that allows domestic divorce.
FACTS:
Petitioner Samson R. Pacasum (Pacasum) and respondent
Atty. Marietta D. Zamoranos (Zamoranos) were married on
December 28, 1992.3 However, Pacasum discovered that
Zamoranos was previously married to one Jesus De
Guzman (De Guzman) on July 30, 1982.4 On December 14,
2004, Pacasum filed an administrative complaint for
disgraceful and immoral conduct against Zamoranos on
the ground that she had contracted a bigamous
marriage.5
In her answer to the complaint, Zamoranos raised as a
defense the dissolution of her previous marriage under the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (the
Muslim Code).6 Prior to her marriage with De Guzman, she
had converted to Islam. In 1983, however, she and De
Guzman divorced, as evidenced by the Decree of
Divorce7issued by Presiding Judge Kaudri L. Jainul of
the Shari'a Circuit Court of Isabela, Basilan in Case No. 407-
92.8
The CSC dismissed the complaint because Pacasum failed
to assail the existence, much less validity, of the Decree of
Divorce.1awp++i1 The CSC ruled that since Zamoranos'
supposedly subsisting marriage with De Guzman is the sole
basis for Pacasum's charge of immorality, the existence of
the Decree of Divorce is fatal to Pacasum's
complaint.9Pacasum moved for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the CSC.
ISSUE:
WON the Sharia Court can dissolve the first marriage of de
Guzman.
RULING:
Yes.
With respect to the divorce between Zamoranos and De
Guzman, the Decree of Divorce was issued on June 18,
1992 by Judge Kaudri L. Jainul, who was the presiding
judge of the Shari 'a Circuit Court, Third Shari'a District,
Isabela, Basilan.34 It states that both Zamoranos and De
Guzman appeared when the case was called for hearing.
It further recites that both parties converted to the faith of
Islam prior to their Muslim wedding, and that it was
Zamoranos who sought divorce by tafwid, with De
Guzman having previously delegated his authority to
exercise talaq.35 Thus, on its face, the divorce appears
valid, having been issued for a cause recognized under
the applicable law by a competent court having
jurisdiction over the parties. And, as neither party
interposed an appeal, the divorce has attained finality.
we have already passed upon the same Decree of
Divorce in the earlier consolidated cases also involving
Pacasum and Zamoranos.1âwphi1 In Zamoranos v.
People,41 which involved a criminal charge for bigamy
filed by Pacasum against Zamoranos based on her earlier
marriage to De Guzman, we granted Zamoranos' motion
to quash the criminal information for bigamy. We held that,
based on the case records, "[i]t stands to reason therefore
that Zamoranos' divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed
by an Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the [Shari'a] Circuit
Court, and attested to by Judge Usman, was valid, and,
thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum x x x."42 Following the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the parties are
now bound by this earlier finding.
Here, Pacasum's administrative complaint is wholly
dependent on the continuing validity of the marriage
between Zamoranos and De Guzman. However, we have
already recognized that this marriage was dissolved in
accordance with the Muslim Code in the case
of Zamoranos v. People, which also involved the herein
parties. Following the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, the parties are already bound by our previous
ruling on that specific issue, that is, Zamoranos' divorce
from De Guzman was valid which enabled her to contract
the subsequent marriage with Pacasum. As a result,
Pacasum's complaint for immorality based on Zamoranos'
alleged bigamy has no leg to stand on.
F. HUMAN RELATIONS
1. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
DOCTRINE: Surely this is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
FACTS:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it.
Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why
— That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED
RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from
again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and
was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence
before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29,
1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and
the costs.
ISSUE:
WON there was in fact a breach of promise to marry was
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, and public
policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the NCC.
RULING:
YES. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to
which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
defendant applied for a license to contract marriage,
which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for
the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And
then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant,
who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother
opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao,
and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to
marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the above-described preparation and
publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
2. G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Civil Law – The New Civil Code – Human Relations
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The case under Article 21, cited as an example by the
Code Commission, refers to tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction that in
law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or mere breach
of promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the
woman has yielded.
FACTS:
From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO
courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of
legal age. Tanjanco expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated
such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of marriage in mind,
Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge
sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal
access to Santos which eventually led to Santos getting
pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to
resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In
her state of unemployment Santos became unable to
support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did
not fulfill his promise of marriage she suffered mental
anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the
court that Tanjanco be compelled to recognize the
unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support and
damages.
Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted
for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals and the latter decided the
case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel
recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a
cause of action was present for damages, under Article 21
of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision
pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are
not permissible in this jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos
for breach of his promise to marry her.
HELD: NO
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the
Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil
Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum,
Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced. Seduction connotes
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not
consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal
age, and granted carnal access to Tanjanco and had
sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than
being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to
Tanjanco which is incompatible with the premise behind
the idea of seduction.
Hence, no case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli
was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with appellant with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly,
there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived she would not have again
yielded to his embraces much less for one year without
exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage
and she would have cut all relationship upon finding that
the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One
cannot be held liable for a breach of promise to marry.
3. G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
DOCTRINE: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
FACTS:
Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22 year old Filipino, single and of
good moral character and reputation, duly respected in
her community filed a complaint on October 27, 1987,
against Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian citizen, and an
exchange student taking up a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. The
complaint for damages is due to Baksh’s violation of their
agreement to get married.
Prior to the filing of complaint, Gashem courted Marilou
and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the
condition that they will get married. They agreed to get
married at the end of the semester, which was October of
that year. They also visited Marilou’s parents in Pangasinan
to secure their approval to the marriage.
Shortly thereafter, Gashem forced the petitioner to live
with him in Guilig, Dagupan City. It should be noted that
she was a virgin before she lived with him and not a
woman of loose morals. A few weeks after she begun
living with him, Gashem started to maltreat her, which
result to injuries. A confrontation with the barangay
captain of Guilig ensued and Gashem repudiated their
marriage agreement and said that he is already married
to a girl in Bacolod City.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court applied Article 21 of
the New Civil Code in its decision favoring Marilou
Gonzales and ordered Gashem Baksh to pay PhP 20,000
moral damges, PhP 3,000.00 in attorney’s fees and PhP
2,000.00 for the litigation expenses.
Hence, Baksh filed an appeal with the Supreme Court
seeking for the review of the decision of the Regional Trial
Court in Pangasinan and to set aside the said decision
which was also affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an
actionable wrong.
2. Whether or not Art. 21 of the Civil Code applies to
this case.
3. Whether or not pari delicto applies in t his case.
HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong.
This, notwithstanding, Art. 21 is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdictions by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute
books.
Art. 21 defines quasi-delict:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict and is governed by the (Civil Code).
It is clear that petitioner harbors a condescending if not
sarcastic regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter’s ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. From the beginning, obviously, he was not
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Thus,
his profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer
of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated
the Filipino concept of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can
even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the
Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith in the exercise of his right and in the performance of
his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery
of our laws, customs and traditions.
She is not in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delicto means in equal fault. At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interfered for the relief of the less
guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been
brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally
rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured by fraud.
4. A.M. No. P-11-2922 April 4, 2011
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1778-P)
MARY JANE ABANAG, Complainant, vs.NICOLAS B.
MABUTE, Court Stenographer I, Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Paranas, Samar,Respondent.
DOCTRINE: Mere sexual relations between two unmarried
and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. The Court has
repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man
and a woman who are not married, where both are not
under any impediment to marry and where no deceit
exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that
would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.
FACTS:
Abanag filed a complaint against Mabute for Disgraceful
and Immoral Conduct with the OCA, alleging that the
latter courted her and professed his undying love for her.
Relying on his promise that he would marry her, she agreed
to live with him. She got pregnant, and Mabute tried to
have her get an abortion. When Abanag did not agree,
Mabute grew cold and eventually left her. Her depression
resulted in a miscarriage.
Mabute filed his answer to the complaint, denying the
allegations and claimed that the charges were baseless,
false, and fabricated. He insisted that the complaint was
filed by Norma Tordesillas in order to harass him because
Mabute would chastise her for her arrogant behavior and
undesirable work attitude. Abanag averred that she wrote
the complaint herself.
The letter-complaint was referred to RTC in Samar for
investigation, report and recommendation. Mabute
sought for the inhibition of the judge originally assigned to
the case for his biased relationship with Abanag. It was
then reshuffled to another judge.
Complainant testified that she met Mabute while she was
a member of SFC. They started dating and eventually lived
together. Mabute avers that he did force her to get an
abortion, and that he even proposed marriage, but
Abanag’s mother did not like him. They parted ways since
then, but he pledged his undying love for her.
RTC Ruling: Recommended the dismissal of the complaint,
reporting that the personal affairs of a court employee has
nothing to do with his public employment. Abanag was
not forced to live with Mabute. She freely acceded to
cohabit with him. The situation thus, does not give rise to
administrative sanction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mabute can be administratively
sanctioned on the grounds of breach of promise to marry?
HELD:
NO. The immoral conduct is defined as conduct that is
willful, flagrant, and shameless, and that shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. This is an act so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or an act so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.
Mabute’s acts complained of cannot be considered as
disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct. SC finds that the
sexual relations between the parties were consensual.
Mere sexual relations between two unmarried and
consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior. Voluntary
intimacy between a man and a women who are not
marred, where both are not under any impediment to
marry, and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor
an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or
disciplinary action.
It is not within the SC’s authority to decide on matters
touching on employee’s personal lives.
5. Hermosisima V. CA 103 Phil 629
DOCTRINE: That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De
Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
FACTS:
An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad
Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complainant, filed with
the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said
petitioner, as well as for support of said child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise to marry.
Petitioner admitted the paternity of the child and
expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant
Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917, since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost
ten years younger than her used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he made no
promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up
teaching and became a life insurance underwriter where
intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since
one evening in 1953 when after coming from the movies;
they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV
Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice
pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she
was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her.
However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our
laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD:
It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s
seductive prowess, plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her
love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age
and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to
say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten years younger but also
because the CFI found that complainant surrendered
herself to the petitioner because overwhelmed by her love
for him she wanted to bind him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
6. [G.R. No. 57227. May 14, 1992.]
AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the
latter represented herein by the former, his mother and
natural guardian, petitioners, vs. IVAN MENDEZ and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; AS A GENERAL RULE, MERE SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE IS NOT BY ITSELF A BASIS FOR RECOVERY;
EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — As regards Amelita's claim for
damages which is based on Article 19 & 21 of the Civil
Code on the theory that through Ivan's promise of
marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot but
agree with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual
intercourse is not by itself a basis for recovery. Damages
could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a
product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time she
met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28
years old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan
(TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83). Her attraction to Ivan is the
reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she
been induced or deceived because of a promise of
marriage, she could have immediately severed her
relation with Ivan when she was informed after their first
sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a
married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated
their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not
the alleged promise of marriage was the moving force
that made her submit herself to Ivan.
FACTS:
On June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an
action for acknowledgment, support and damages
against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was
filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and
docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In her complaint,
Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that
sometime in the month of August, 1974, she met
Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz,
Manila, where she worked as a waitress; that the day
following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine
with him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while
dining, Ivan professed his love and courted Amelita; that
Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that
at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Amelita asked Ivan
to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the
pretext of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside
his hotel room and through a promise of marriage
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter;
that after the sexual contact, Ivan confessed to Amelita
that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual
contact in the months of September and November, 1974,
whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which Amelita got
pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf
ears; that Amelita had no sexual relations with any other
man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be
born at the time of the filing of the complaint; that
because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to leave
her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous
businessman of Davao City with a monthly income of
P5,000 to P8,000.00. As relief, Amelita prayed for the
recognition of the unborn child, the payment of actual,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus
costs. LLjur
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he
met Amelita at Tony's Cocktail Lounge but denied having
sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action.
By way of counterclaim, he further prayed for the payment
of exemplary damages and litigation expense including
attorney's fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion
for leave to amend the complaint impleading as co-
plaintiff her son MichaelConstantino who was born on
August 3, 1975. In its order dated September 4, 1975, the
trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to
the amended complaint reiterating his previous answer
denying that MichaelConstantino is his illegitimate son.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the breach of promise to marry maybe a
basis for recovery of damages?
RULING:
No, as regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based
on Articles 19 & 21 of the Civil Code on the theory that
through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her
virginity, we cannot but agree with the Court of Appeals
that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis for
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse is not a product of voluntariness and mutual
desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant,
Amelita was already 28 years old and she admitted that
she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 83).
Her attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered
her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived
because of a promise of marriage, she could have
immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was
informed after their first sexual contact sometime in
August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration
that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates
that passion and not the alleged promise of marriage was
the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
G. ABUSE OF RIGHTS
1. [G.R. No. 175822. October 23, 2013.]
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S.
YBAÑEZ, petitioners, vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, respondent.
FACTS:
On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a
Reservation Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu
Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the
second floor of Robinson's Department Store (Robinson's)
in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and
a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth
P2,098.00. 4 Respondent allegedly paid to the cashier
evidenced by a receipt 5issued by the store. 6 While she
was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson's
and Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading
next, a Guess employee approached and informed her
that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however,
insisted that she paid and showed the employee the
receipt issued in her favor. 7 She then suggested that they
talk about it at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the
basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury then met
the Guess employees as agreed upon.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess
employees allegedly subjected her to humiliation in front
of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly demanded
payment for the black jeans. 9 They supposedly even
searched her wallet to check how much money she had,
followed by another argument. Respondent, thereafter,
went home. 10
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a
letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the
incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not
concern the office and the same took place while
respondent was off duty. 11 Another letter was allegedly
prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu
Pacific Office in Robinson's, but the latter again refused to
receive it. 12 Respondent also claimed that the Human
Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson's was furnished
said letter and the latter in fact conducted an
investigation for purposes of canceling respondent's
Robinson's credit card. Respondent further claimed that
she was not given a copy of said damaging letter. 13 With
the above experience, respondent claimed to have
suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental anguish,
fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral
shock and social humiliation. 14 She thus filed the
Complaint for Damages 15 before the RTC against
petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California Clothing),
Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon
(Hawayon) and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of
moral, nominal, and exemplary damages, plus attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty of abuse of right
entitling respondent to collect moral damages and
attorney's fees?
RULING:
Yes, there is an abuse of right.
Respondent's complaint against petitioners stemmed from
the principle of abuse of rights provided for in the Civil
Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent
cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her
when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans
she purchased from their shop despite the evidence of
payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop.
The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners
had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed
made payment if they had reason to believe that she did
not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in
the performance of duty causing damage or injury to
another is actionable under the Civil Code. The Court's
pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte 31 is noteworthy:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of
a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to
obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of
equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience and which are meant to
serve as guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as
"abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil Code.It
provides that "Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." . .
.
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 33
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the
Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or
duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead
acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another. 34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is
manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It
consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. 35 Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies
a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act
for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. 36 DSHcTC
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking
respondent whether she paid or not. The Guess employees
were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office.
The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour
when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly held by
both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural
consequence of two parties with conflicting views insisting
on their respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
respondent was in possession of the item purchased from
the shop, together with the official receipt of payment
issued by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such
payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation.
Their claim should have been proven by substantial
evidence in the proper forum.
Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she fail
to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she
deliberately took the same without paying for it and later
hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These
accusations were made despite the issuance of the
receipt of payment and the release of the item
purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that
respondent had the intention to evade payment. Contrary
to petitioners' claim, respondent was not in a rush in
leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact
that the Guess employees did not have a hard time
looking for her when they realized the supposed non-
payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the
demand letter to respondent's employer, petitioners
intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the
disputed amount but to tarnish respondent's reputation in
the eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without
substantial evidence and despite the latter's possession of
enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to
liability. 38 The exercise of a right must be in accordance
with the purpose for which it was established and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh. 39 In this case, petitioners
obviously abused their rights.
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which
read: 40
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals or good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award
of moral damages and attorney's fees.
2. [G.R. No. 199601. November 23, 2015.]
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (now BDO
UNIBANK, INC.), petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ,
respondent.
FACTS:
Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the
Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin
R. Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6
with said branch in January 1985.
The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine
bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of
New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57
payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft was in
the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R.
Harrington."
The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a certain
Sophia La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who
presented the bank drafts for deposit.
Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her
immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts
payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable
for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When
Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from
the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine
Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts,
Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the
deposits were duly entered in Harrington's savings
account.
On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual
representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of
P45,000.00 and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank
discovered that the person who made the withdrawals
was an impostor. Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington
P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in
his name. AcSCaI
The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits.
Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not
yet fully oriented with the various aspects of the job. She
further alleged that she had asked the approval of her
immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.
On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of
P423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the PCIB
to ask why the deduction was made.
After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued
another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent
and liable for performing acts in violation of established
operating procedures. The memorandum required
Josephine to pay the amount of P50,600.00 through
deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit
sharing until the amount is fully paid.
Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings
that she was grossly negligent and liable to pay the
amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the
PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB, however,
alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and
explained that she was afforded due process and the
deductions made prior to January 15, 1986, were merely a
withholding pending the investigation.
The PCIB also admitted that as early as January 15, 1986, it
had started to deduct the amount of P200.00 from
Josephine's salary as well as 50% of her bonuses and profit
sharing.
On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for
damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused
its right by gradually deducting from her salary the amount
the bank had to pay Harrington.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an abuse of right by PCIB?
RULING:
Yes, Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied
in this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of
right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this
fundamental principle are found in Articles 20 9 and
21 10 of the Civil Code.We explained how these two
provisions correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v.
Valenzona: CADacT
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred
to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. 11 [emphasis
supplied]
Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were
in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and held
the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to
penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right must
not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case,
the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary even if
the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB
issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent
and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor. When Josephine
asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of
negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover, the
PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary,
allowances, and bonuses.
The trial court and the CA also noted that while Josephine
was penalized, other employees of the bank involved in
the subject transactions were not. It was Josephine who
was made solely responsible for the loss without giving any
basis therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit
could not have been received by the bank and entered
in Harrington's savings account without the participation of
the other bank employees. The PCIB could have exercised
prudence before taking oppressive actions against
Josephine.
All told, we find nothing in the record which would warrant
the reversal of the position held by the RTC and the CA.
Based on the above discussion, we find the award of moral
damages and attorney's fees in Josephine's favor proper.
3. G.R. No. 179736 June 26, 2013
SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, vs.
ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
Respondents.
DOCTRINE: "The concept of liberty would be emasculated
if it does not likewise compel respect for one's personality
as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and non-
interference demands respect."1
FACTS:
On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria
Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
City a Complaint5 for Injunction and Damages with prayer
for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed
as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan
Choachuy.
Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of
a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay
Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;6 that respondents are the
owners of Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo)
located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property
of petitioners;7 that respondents constructed an auto-
repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-
C; that in April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners
for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction/TRO, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;8
that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
said construction would destroy the wall of its building,
which is adjacent to petitioners’ property;9 that the court,
in that case, denied Aldo’s application for preliminary
injunction for failure to substantiate its allegations;10 that,
in order to get evidence to support the said case,
respondents on June 13, 2005 illegally set-up and installed
on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video
surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property;11 that
respondents, through their employees and without the
consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on-
going construction;12 and that the acts of respondents
violate petitioners’ right to privacy.13 Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video
surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surveillance.14
In their Answer with Counterclaim,15 respondents claimed
that they did not install the video surveillance cameras,16
nor did they order their employees to take pictures of
petitioners’ construction.17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court. RTC issued an Order19
granting the application for a TRO.
They are hereby directed to immediately remove the
revolving camera that they installed at the left side of their
building overlooking the side of petitioners’ lot
Ruling of the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of
discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.27 The CA
explained that the right to privacy of residence under
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not violated since the
property subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.28 The CA alsosaid that since respondents are
not the owners of the building, they could not have
installed video surveillance cameras.29 They are mere
stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical
personality.30 Thus, they are not the proper parties.
ISSUE: (1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to
privacy. YES.
(2) whether respondents are the proper parties to
this suit. YES.
Petitioners’ Arguments. Petitioners cite Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code, which enjoins persons from prying into the
private lives of others.35 Although the said provision
pertains to the privacy of another’s residence, petitioners
opine that it includes business offices, citing Professor
Arturo M. Tolentino.
Our Ruling. The Petition is meritorious.
The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.
The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution44 and
in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion
into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."45 It is the
right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted
publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by
the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned."46 Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right
to be let alone."47
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to privacy
and protects them against the State’s abuse of power. In
this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to
be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State,
except "in case of overriding social need and then only
under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb
them in the privacy of their homes.48
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
covers business offices where the public are excluded
therefrom and only certain individuals are allowed to
enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects
an individual’s right to privacy and provides a legal
remedy against abuses that may be committed against
him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may
not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence; x x x x
This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle,
where his right to privacy cannot be denied or even
restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into,
peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of
another without the consent of the latter."49
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence,"
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers as private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in
limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the Civil Code
only to residences.
The "reasonable expectation of privacy" test is used to
determine whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to
privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the
expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v. Torres,52 we
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that
society recognizes as reasonable."
In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are
installed practically everywhere for the protection and
safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of
the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected,
was obtained.
Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands
why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the
revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the
on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor
showed only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If
the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the
back is to secure the building and factory premises, then
the camera should revolve only towards their properties at
the back. Respondents’ camera cannot be made to
extend the view to petitioners’ lot. To allow the
respondents to do that over the objection of the
petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property
owners. "The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."55
The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a residence
and that the installation of video surveillance cameras
directly facing petitioners’ property or covering a
significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear
violation of their right to privacy.
This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are
the proper parties to this suit.
A real party defendant is one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant's act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Parties-in-interest. — A real party-in-interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party-in-interest.
A real party defendant is "one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former."57
In ruling that respondents are not the proper parties, the
CA reasoned that since they do not own the building, they
could not have installed the video surveillance cameras.58
Such reasoning, however, is erroneous. The fact that
respondents are not the registered owners of the building
does not automatically mean that they did not cause the
installation of the video surveillance cameras.
Quite telling is the fact that respondents, notwithstanding
their claim that they are not owners of the building,
allowed the court to enter the compound of Aldo and
conduct an ocular inspection. The counsel for respondents
even toured Judge Marilyn Lagura-Yap inside the building
and answered all her questions regarding the set-up and
installation of the video surveillance cameras.64 And when
respondents moved for reconsideration of the Order
dated October 18, 2005 of the RTC, one of the arguments
they raised is that Aldo would suffer damages if the video
surveillance cameras are removed and transferred.65
Noticeably, in these instances, the personalities of
respondents and Aldo seem to merge.
All these taken together lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that respondents are merely using the
corporate fiction of Aldo as a shield to protect themselves
from this suit. In view of the foregoing, we find that
respondents are the proper parties to this suit.
4. G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI),Petitioner, vs. ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-
INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE, ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-
CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents.
FACTS: On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez
(Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital
due to an ailment. On even date, her daughter Grace
Verchez-Infante (Grace) immediately hied to the
Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to
send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
(Zenaida) who was residing at 18 Legal St., GSIS Village,
Quezon City1 reading: "Send check money Mommy
hospital." For RCPI’s services, Grace paid P10.502 for which
she was issued a receipt.3
As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the
telegram to Zenaida no response was received from her,
Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery
Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial
aid.
Immediately after she received Grace’s letter, Zenaida,
along with her husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January
26, 1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she
disclaimed having received any telegram.
The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later
or on February 15, 1991.4 On inquiry from RCPI why it took
that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he
had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was
another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver
the same but the address could not be located, hence,
the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the
second messenger finally found the address on February
15, 1991.
On April 17, 1992, Editha died.
On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters
Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a
complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the delay in delivering the
telegram contributed to the early demise of the late Editha
to their damage and prejudice,8 for which they prayed for
the award of moral and exemplary damages9 and
attorney’s fees.10
The trial court, observing that "although the delayed
delivery of the questioned telegram was not apparently
the proximate cause of the death of Editha," ruled out the
presence of force majeure. Respecting the clause in the
telegram relied upon by RCPI, the trial court held that it
partakes of the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to
dispatch the telegram to the addressee at the earliest
possible time but that it did not in view of the negligence
of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and the
concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on time, the
trial court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being at fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the
obligor as the "omission of the diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place."
In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to
deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent
nature. Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to
the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its
employees, the defendant failed to discharge of its
obligation on time making it liable for damages under
Article 2176.
The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer.17
RTC rendered judgment against RCPI.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of February
27, 2004,19 affirmed the trial court’s decision.
RCPI insists that respondents failed to prove any causal
connection between its delay in transmitting the telegram
and Editha’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of rights? YES.
In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram
within the shortest possible time. It took 25 days, however,
for RCPI to deliver it.
RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio
noise and interferences which adversely affected the
transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message.
Additionally, its messenger claimed he could not locate
the address of Zenaida and it was only on the third attempt
that he was able to deliver the telegram.
For the defense of force majeure to prosper,
x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act
of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have
concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate
or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When
the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s
participation – whether by active intervention, neglect or
failure to act – the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances
prevented RCPI from delivering the telegram at the
soonest possible time, it should have at least informed
Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that
she could have taken steps to remedy the situation. But it
did not. There lies the fault or negligence.
As far as the respondent court’s award for moral damages
is concerned, the same has no basis whatsoever since
private respondent Alfonso Verchez did not accompany
his late wife when the latter went to Manila by bus. He
stayed behind in Sorsogon for almost 1 week before he
proceeded to Manila.
For breach of contract then, RCPI is liable to Grace for
damages.
And for quasi-delict, RCPI is liable to Grace’s co-
respondents following Article 2176 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)
RCPI’s liability as an employer could of course be avoided
if it could prove that it observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. Article 2180 of the
Civil Code so provides:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Respecting the assailed award of moral damages, a
determination of the presence of the following requisites
to justify the award is in order:
x x x firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually
established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of damages
sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is
predicated on any of the instances expressed or
envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.34
Respecting the first requisite, evidence of suffering by the
plaintiffs-herein respondents was correctly appreciated by
the CA in this wise:
The failure of RCPI to deliver the telegram containing the
message of appellees on time, disturbed their filial
tranquillity. Family members blamed each other for failing
to respond swiftly to an emergency that involved the life
of the late Mrs. Verchez, who suffered from diabetes.35
As reflected in the foregoing discussions, the second and
third requisites are present.
On the fourth requisite, Article 2220 of the Civil Code
provides:
Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that,
under the circumstances, such damages are justly due.
The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
After RCPI’s first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it
did not inform Grace of the non-delivery thereof and
waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing
– as it should know – that time is of the essence in the
delivery of telegrams. When its second long-delayed
attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again,
waited for another 12 days before making a third attempt.
Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation
indicates gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The
fourth requisite is thus also present.
In applying the above-quoted Article 2220, this Court has
awarded moral damages in cases of breach of contract
where the defendant was guilty of gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation.36
As for RCPI’s tort-based liability, Article 2219 of the Civil
Code provides:
Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
x x x x (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute
a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief:
x x x x (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another. (Emphasis supplied)
RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation
undoubtedly disturbed the peace of mind not only of
Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the
appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquillity" among
them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond
swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions
complained of in this case are, therefore, analogous to
acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which
are among the instances of quasi-delict when courts may
award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.
In fine, the award to the plaintiffs-herein respondents of
moral damages is in order, as is the award of attorney’s
fees, respondents having been compelled to litigate to
protect their rights.
RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion.
Neither the readability of the stipulations nor their physical
location in the contract determines whether it is one of
adhesion.
A contract of adhesion is defined as one in which one of
the parties imposes a ready-made form of contract, which
the other party may accept or reject, but which the latter
cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the
contract, while the other party merely affixes his signature
or his "adhesion" thereto, giving no room for negotiation
and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.3
While a contract of adhesion is not necessarily void and
unenforceable, since it is construed strictly against the
party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity therein,
it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive
of public policy when the weaker party is imposed upon in
dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is
reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on
equal footing.39
This Court holds that the Court of Appeals’ finding that the
parties’ contract is one of adhesion which is void is, given
the facts and circumstances of the case, thus well-taken.
5. G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE
TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
The complaint filed by respondent sought to recover
damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights
arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the
Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the
manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among
which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No.
7654 (RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to
its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and
"More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad
valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993,
or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued
RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as
locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand
subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy
Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy
of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to
no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco
received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but
was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter
assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency
amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of
RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from
receipt thereof.8 the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is
defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further
enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this
Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has
fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative
issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a
complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private
capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should
be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1)
respondent has no cause of action against her because
she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official
function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the
Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for
her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for
lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the
certification against forum shopping was signed by
respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the
plaintiff or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of
petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of
the case without allowing the parties to present evidence.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was
dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil
Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act
with malice or bad faith.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse
contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in
the performance of her functions as a public officer,
hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code
which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will
attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the
Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general
law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book
I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior
public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the
instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross
negligence, the same is dismissible for failure to state a
cause of action. As to the defect of the certification
against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly
construe the rules and to dismiss the complaint.
Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon,14 respondent
alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer should
have acted with malice or in bad faith.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge
of the functions of his/her office? YES.
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code should
govern in determining whether the instant complaint
states a cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply
with the rule on certification against forum shopping?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is
not liable for damages which a person may suffer arising
from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks.
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative
Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public
officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil
liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s
act is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus –
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer
shall not be civilly liable for acts done in the performance
of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad
faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No
subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly liable for
acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his
duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public
policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,18 that a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly
sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even
if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may
be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of the office,
where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith,
or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed
by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general law and a special law on the same subject are
statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read
together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving
effect to both.
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or
after the general act does not change the principle.
Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an
exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act;
and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless
repealed expressly or by necessary implication.21
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar.
Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private
individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
x x x x (6) The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
x x x x (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; x x
xx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean
Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights,
Attorney Cirilo Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so
amended as to make a public official liable for violation of
another person’s constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code
Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil
or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should
be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would
defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past
have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of their duties.
Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort.
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not
only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable
for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the
Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there
is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27
A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.
, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid
down the rule on the civil liability of superior and
subordinate public officers for acts done in the
performance of their duties. For both superior and
subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith,
malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make
them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions
deal in particular with the liability of government officials,
the subject thereof is general, i.e., "acts" done in the
performance of official duties, without specifying the
action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against
the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and
unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act" that may
give rise to an action for damages against a public officer,
and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties.
Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public
officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are
governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative
Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on
Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular
class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public
officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the
Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability
arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32
of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be
applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages
for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under
Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith and
malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32
of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same
will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The
courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action,
since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a
constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against
forum shopping, the subsequent submission of the
secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and
execute the certification against forum shopping cured
the defect of respondent’s complaint.
I. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
1. G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR.,
being the Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City,
respondents.
DOCTRINE:
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.21 The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
FACTS:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage
and four children,2 petitioner filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5
under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's
Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16,
1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an
Information against them.
Petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for
his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in
the Order.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings
in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari,
questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and
December 9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an
Order9 dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of
Makati denied the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed
against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two
conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for
concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might
declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might
acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his
marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner submits that the possible conflict of the courts'
ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if
the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on
the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is
declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then
by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject
petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the
criminal case because he was never before a married
man.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
No. The pendency of a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage does not pose a prejudicial question to a
prosecution for concubinage.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension
of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution
of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he
who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court
therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
2. G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA
CHOA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa
were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did
not live together after the marriage although they would
meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner
stopped visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private
respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second
marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private
respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned
about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information
charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9,
1990.
On July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City
an action for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her.
He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage
and that she was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her essential marital obligations.
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with
the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an
administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the
revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living
together and subsequently marrying each other despite
their knowledge that at the time of their marriage,
petitioner was already married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he
committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage
contract with Santella that he was still single.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1)
exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by
denying petitioner’s [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same;
(3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court;
and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused.
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of
the PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for
the revocation of his engineering license was pending, a
motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage
to private respondent and criminal case for bigamy. The
board denied said motion. Petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals another petition for certiorari.
The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since
they arose from the same set of facts.
The Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed
decision in the consolidated petitions.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was
denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a
prejudicial question and had to be resolved first before
criminal and administrative case be rendered judgment?
RULING:
The petition has no merit.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed
by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the
criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case
is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.23 Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in
the civil case before the criminal proceedings could
continue, because a declaration that their marriage was
void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal
liability, is untenable.
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity
of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption of
marriage exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the
law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment
necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above,
the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously ruled that there is no
prejudicial question where one case is administrative and
the other is civil.
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in
the courts or an administrative case in another judicial
body against an examinee or registered professional
involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed
or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor
bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall
proceed independently with the investigation of the case
and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for
the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
H. CAPACITY TO ACT
1. PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY
G.R. No. 159567 July 31, 2007
CORAZON CATALAN, LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM, EULOGIO
CATALAN, MILA CATALAN-MILAN, ZENAIDA CATALAN,
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY CATALAN, FLORIDA CATALAN and
GEMMA CATALAN, Heirs of the late FELICIANO CATALAN,
Petitioners, vs. JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA, LAURETA BASA,
DELIA BASA, JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA BASA, Heirs of the
late MERCEDES CATALAN, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Donation like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts
presupposes the following requisites:
i. it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the
matter to which it refers;
ii. it should be free; and
iii. it should be spontaneous.
The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of
a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.
Burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person
who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity will be presumed. In this case,
petitioners failed to prove incapacity of Feliciano.
FACTS:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was
discharged from active military service. The Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs
found that he was unfit to render military service due to his
"schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which
incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and
affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech."1
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon
Cerezo.2
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled
"Absolute Deed of Donation,"3 wherein Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-
half of the real property.
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax
Declaration No. 180804 to Mercedes for the 400.50 square
meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property
remained in Feliciano’s name.
Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of
their property, registered under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.
Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children
Delia and Jesus Basa.10 The Deed of Absolute Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on
February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was
issued in the name of respondents.
Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the
aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920
to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and
Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and
Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the
same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.
BPI, acting as Feliciano’s guardian, filed a case for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership,13 as well as damages against
the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of
Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as
Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In
addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly
intended to give the property to her, the donation would
still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it
claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void
ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia
and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes
Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI
raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale,
saying that its registration long after the death of
Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought
remuneration for incurred damages and litigation
expenses.
The trial court found that the evidence presented by the
complainants was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at
the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of
Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the
presumption of sanity or competency not having been
duly impugned, the presumption of due execution of the
donation in question must be upheld.
Petitioners challenged the trial court’s decision before the
Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court.16 The appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Feliciano has the capacity to execute the
donation.
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.22 Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the
following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an
exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should
be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.23 The parties'
intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.24
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial
is the donor’s capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that
insanity impinges on consent freely given.25 However, the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person
who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity will be presumed.26
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar
indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the
petitioners was insufficient to overcome the presumption
that Feliciano was competent when he donated the
property in question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much
ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been
found to be suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of
Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By
itself, however, the allegation cannot prove the
incompetence of Feliciano.
2. Restrictions on capacity to act
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961
Doctrine: It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that
same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". In the present
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant
(Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948-- thru her aunt. In
1950, she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. During to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, she had herself aborted by
def. After the marriage w/ the plaintiff., she again became
pregnant. As she was employed in the COMELEC and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by def. in Oct 1953. Less than 2 years later,
she again became pregnant. On 2/21/55, she again
repaired to the defendant's clinic. Nita was again aborted
of a 2-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's
basis in filing this action and award of damages The CA
and the trial court predicated the award of damages
upon the provisions of the initial par. of Art. 2206 of the
NCC.
ISSUE:
Whether an unborn child covered with personality so that
if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover
damages from the ones who caused the damage to the
unborn child?
RULING:
No. This award, we believe, to be error for the said art., in
fixing an award for the death of a person, does not cover
the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed w/
personality.
RATIO: Parents of unborn fetus cannot sue for damages on
its behalf. A husband of a woman who
voluntarily procured her abortion could not recover
damages from the physician who caused the same. (1)
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no
such right of action could derivatively accrue to the
parents or heirs of an unborn child. In fact, even if a cause
of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from one that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity, as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Cod, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following
article." In the present case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
(2) This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to
collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from
the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right
to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot
expect either help, support or services from an unborn
child, they would normally be limited to moral damages
for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
hominis that was the fetus, i.e., on account of distress and
anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Art. 2217, CC), as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant
them (Art. 2230, CC). But in this case, there is no basis for
an award of moral damages, evidently because the
husband's indifference to the previous abortions clearly
indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental hopes and affection.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intrauterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from
the maternal womb.
Tolentino: Separation from Mother.-- This is produced by
the cutting of the umbilical cord, whether the removal
takes place naturally or by surgical operation.
Alive at Birth.-- The duration of extra-uterine life is
immaterial; for acquisition of juridical personality, it is
enough that the child lives even for an instant.
Test of Life.-- The general opinion is that independent life
required for juridical personality can be shown only by
complete respiration. The cry of the child, although it is not
a necessary sign of life, is evidence that it has acquired
complete respiration. Another indication of complete
respiration is the floating of the lungs when placed in
water; this means that air has penetrated into the lungs by
breathing.
Viability Not Required.-- Viability means that the child is
capable of living, and this is determined by the extent of
the development of its organs.
Premature Birth.-- In this case, if the child does not live 24
hours completely separated from the mother's womb, it
does not acquire juridical personality. This is an absolute
requirement for feotuses w/c have an intrauterine life of
less than 7 mos. (Balane quoting Manresa and JBL.)
"The aborted creature does not reach the category of a
natural person and consequently is not born in the
contemplation of law." (Geluz v. CA, supra.)
This is so, even if the child is killed before the period lapses
and it can be proved that it could have survived that
period if it had not been prevented by the willful act of
another. On the other hand, juridical personality is
acquired even if the survival for 24 hours is caused only by
medical or scientific means w/o w/c the child would have
died before the lapse of that period.
(a) Minority.
1. Mercado and Mercado VS. Espiritu 37 Phil. 215
DOCTRINE: The courts, in their interpretation of the law,
have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made
by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact
they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations
contracted by them, or to have them annulled in
pursuance of the provisions of Law 6, title 19, of the 6th
Partida; and the judgment that holds such a sale to be
valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed
against him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of
minors' property, nor the juridical rules established in
consonance therewith.
FACTS:
The case was about the contract made by Luis Espiritu
(father of Jose Espiritu, the defendant) and the heirs of his
sister Margarita Mercado; Domingo and Josepha
Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their
consent into the contract of sale of the land they inherited
from their deceased mother Margarita Mercado (sister of
Luis Mercado). The siblings Domingo et. al., sought for the
annulment of contract asserting that Domingo and
Josepha were minors during the perfection of contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors
presented themselves that they were of legal age.
HELD:
Yes. The court declared that the contract of sale
was VALID, even if it were made and entered into by
minors, who pretended to be of legal age. The court
stated that they will not be permitted to excuse themselves
from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
or to have them annulled.
The ruling was in accordance with the provisions on law on
estoppel and Rule 123, Section 6 paragraph A which state
that “whenever a party has, by its own declaration, act or
omission, intentionally and deliberately led another party
to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, cannot be permitted to falsify it.
2. G.R. No. 173822 October 13, 2010
SALVADOR ATIZADO and SALVADORMONREAL, Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DOCTRINE: The age of a child may be determined from the
child’s birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved
in his/her favor.
FACTS:
Petitioners Atixado and Monreal are accused of killing and
murdering one Rogelio Llonaon April 1994. It was said that
both petitioners barged in on the house of one Desder,
where the victim was a guest and suddenly shot at Llona
with their guns. After the shooting, they fled.
For their defense, the petitioners interposed that they were
at their family residence and drinking. The RTC convicted
Atizado and Monreal for the crime of murder and
sentenced them with reclusion perpetua. On appeal to
the CA, the court affirmed the conviction in 2005.It is
important to note that Salvador Monreal was a minor at
the time of the commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in finding the
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder.
What is the penalty to be imposed on Monreal, aminor
during the time of the commission?
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, conviction affirmed. However, the penalty imposed
on Monreal is suspended. The witness positive
identification of the petitioners as the killers, and her
declarations on what each of the petitioners did when
they mounted their sudden deadly assault against Llona
left no doubt whatsoever that they had conspired to kill
and had done so with treachery. Under Article 248 of the
RPC, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
There being no modifying circumstances, the CA correctly
imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua on
Atizado. But reclusion perpetua was not the correct
penalty for Monreal due to his being a minor over15 but
under 18 years of age.
The RTC and the CA did not appreciate Monreal’s minority
at the time of the commission of the murder probably
because his birth certificate was not presented at the trial.
Yet, it cannot be doubted that Monreal was a minor below
18 years of age when the crime was committed on April
18, 1994.His counter-affidavit, the police blotter and trial
records show that Monreal was a minor at the time of the
commission. Monreal’s minority was legally sufficient, for it
conformed with the norms subsequently set under Section
7 of Republic Act No. 9344: Section 7. Determination of
Age. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of
a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years old or older. In all proceedings, law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other
government officials concerned shall exert all efforts at
determining the age of the child in conflict with the law.
Monreal has been detained for over 16 years, that is, from
the time of his arrest on May 18, 1994 until the present.
Given that the entire period of Monreal’s detention should
be credited in the service of his sentence, pursuant to
Section 41 of Republic Act No. 9344, the revision of the
penalty warranted his immediate release from the
penitentiary.
(b) Insanity
1. Hernandez vs Santos, G.R. No. 169217, August 7, 2009
FACTS:
Lulu inherited a considerable amount of property from her
maternal uncle as well as from her mother. She was not
able to finish elementary and she lived with her father and
step brothers and step sisters. Also, her father and step
siblings administered her properties from 1969 to 1993.
During the said period, a considerable portion of her
properties were fraudulently disposed of. When Lulu
discovered that her properties were dissipating, she asked
the assistance of her maternal first cousin, Jovita. Jovita
was appalled as Lulu was severely overweight, unkempt
and smelled of urine and upon medical examination it was
found out that the latter was suffering from tuberculosis,
rheumatism, and diabetes from which she was suffering
from several complications. Jovita, the respondent herein
filed a petition for guardianship and alleged that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and managing her
estate because she was of weak mind. The petition was
granted. The petitioners questioned the order granting the
petition for guardianship claiming that the opinions of
Lulu’s attending physicians regarding her mental state
were inadmissible in evidence as they were not experts in
psychiatry.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition for guardianship should be granted?
- YES
HELD:
Under Section 50, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, an
ordinary witness may give his opinion on the mental sanity
of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Lulu's
attending physicians spoke and interacted with her. Such
occasions allowed them to thoroughly observe her
behavior and conclude that her intelligence level was
below average and her mental stage below normal. Their
opinions were admissible in evidence.
Furthermore, where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
opinion is not necessary. The observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of
mental sanity will suffice. Here, the trial judge was given
ample opportunity to observe Lulu personally when she
testified before the RTC.
Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court, persons who,
though of sound mind but by reason of age, disease, weak
mind or other similar causes are incapable of taking care
of themselves and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be placed
under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both found that
Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her
properties without outside aid due to her ailments and
weak mind. Thus, since determining whether or not Lulu is
in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of
the evidence presented in the courts a quo, it
undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, this Court only resolves questions of law
in a petition for review. We only take cognizance of
questions of fact in exceptional circumstances, none of
which is present in this case. We thus adopt the factual
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.
2. People v Bulagao, GR 184757, Oct. 5, 2011
DOCTRINE: Only when there was complete deprivation of
intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime
should the exempting circumstance of insanity be
considered.
FACTS:
While in the care of the DSWD, AAA testified that she was
raped by her step brother Aniceto Bulagao on two
separate occasions. Later on after she was released from
the custody of the DSWD, she recanted her testimony and
claimed that she only made up the stories because she
was angry with her step brother. Before the recantation,
Bulagao in his defense claimed that he was suffering from
mental retardation based on the mental examination
conducted upon him which yielded a result of an IQ below
50. Bulagao was convicted hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the conviction of Bulagao was proper? – YES
HELD:
Recantations are frowned upon by this Court as this can
easily be obtained through intimidation or monetary
consideration. Thus both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared and
juxtaposed. Insanity presupposes that the accused was
completely deprived of reason or discernment and
freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime.
Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence
at the time of the commission of the crime should the
exempting circumstances of insanity be considered.
Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and
convincing evidence. In this case, neither the acts nor the
answers of the accused in his testimonies show complete
deprivation of intelligence of free will.
3. Oropesa v Oropesa, GR 184528, April 25, 2012
DOCTRINE: Where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert
opinion is no necessary and that the observations of the
trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person’s
state of mental sanity will suffice.
FACTS:
Nilo Oropesa, the son of General Cirilio Oropesa, filed a
petition for guardianship over the properties of his father
alleging that the latter was afflicted with several maladies
and has been sickly for 10 years and that his judgment and
memory was impaired which made him an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particulary
by her voluptuous chikababe girlfriend. Gen. Oropesa
opposed the petition for guardianship. The petition was
denied and affirmed by the CA hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether General Oropesa is considered an
“Incompetent” who should be placed under
guardianship? – NO
HELD:
A finding that a person is incompetent should be
anchored on clear, positive, and definite evidence. Where
the sanity of a person is at issue, experet opinion is not
necessary and that the observations of the trial judge
coupled with evidence establishing the person’s state of
mental sanity will suffice. In this case, it is the observation of
the court that the oppositor is still sharp, alert, and able.
4. Crewlink v Teringtering, GR 166803, October 14, 2012
FACTS:
On two occasions, Jacinto Teringtering jumped off the
vessel where he was employed as an Oiler. On the first
occasion, he was saved by a co-employee. But on the
second, he successfully achieved his goal of committing
suicide. His wife now comes to the LA to ask that the
company where her husband worked be ordered to pay
her a total of USD 58,000 for death compensation, burial
expenses, among others. She claimed that the reason her
husband jumped off was because the latter suffered from
a psychotic disorder or Mood disorder Bipolar Type and
that it was enough that he died during the term of his
contract and while still on board the vessel. The company
claimed that Teringtering was not entitled to the benefits
because her husband committed suicide. The LA ruled in
favor of the company which was affirmed by the NLRC but
was later on reversed by the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in awarding Mrs. Teringtering the
USD 58,000? – YES
HELD:
The company was able to substantially prove that
Jacinto’s death was attributable to his deliberate act of
killing himself by jumping into the sea. Meanwhile,
respondent, other than her bare allegation that her
husband was suffering from mental disorder, no evidence,
witness, or any medical report was given to support her
claim of Jacinto’s insanity. The record does not even show
when the alleged insanity of Jacinto did start.
Homesickness and/or family problems may result to
depression, but the same does not necessarily equate to
mental disorder. The issue of insanity is a question of fact;
for insanity is a condition of the mind not susceptible of the
usual means of proof. As no man would know what goes
on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a
person’s mind can only be measured and judged by his
behavior. Establishing the insanity of an accused requires
opinion testimony which may be given by a witness who is
intimately acquainted with the person claimed to be
insane, or who has rational basis to conclude that a person
was insane based on the witness’ own perception of the
person, or who is qualified as an expert, such as a
psychiatrist. No such evidence was presented to support
respondent's claim.
The Court commiserates with the respondent, but absent
substantial evidence from which reasonable basis for the
grant of benefits prayed for can be drawn, the Court is left
with no choice but to deny her petition, lest an injustice be
caused to the employer. Otherwise slated, while it is true
that labor contracts are impressed with public interest and
the provisions of the POEA-SEC must be construed logically
and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their
employment on board ocean-going vessels, still the rule is
that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be
dispensed with in the light of established facts, the
applicable law, and existing jurisprudence.
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee, vs.
MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINA, Accused-Appellant.
FACTS:
Two criminal cases were filed against Boaquina for the
crime of rape wherein said accused, with lewd design
using force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with his niece [AAA], a 20[-]year[-]old mental retardate
whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age, against her will,
to her damage and prejudice.
At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, the Accused-
Appellant brought AAA to a house, which she described
to have many rooms. Thereat, the Accused-Appellant
undressed her and himself, laid on top of her, and inserted
his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her
organ. She resisted the Accused-Appellant’s ravage acts
by kicking him several times, but was overcome with fear
because he had a knife about five (5) inches long. After
an hour or so, or at about 9:00 or 10:00 o’clock in the same
evening, the Accused-Appellant again raped her by
undressing her and inserting his penis into her vagina.
Again, she felt pain in her vagina. Thereafter, the Accused-
Appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone about
the incident.
AAA also testified, among others, that the Accused-
Appellant took her away from their house in one (1)
evening of February 2002 when her parents were then
already asleep. They walked the streets and later rode a
Palces bus in which no other passengers were on board as
it was already nighttime.
BBB, mother of AAA, stated in open court that the
Accused-Appellant, who had been staying in their house,
is AAA’s uncle because the Accused-Appellant and her
husband, CCC, are first cousins. Preliminarily, BBB testified
that AAA, who was born on April 16, 1982, attained an
educational level of Grade 6 only because of her low
comprehension and that she cannot even be relied upon
to run errands as she can only follow simple instructions or
tasks if well-explained to her. AAA is unlike any normal child
because she cries and scampers away when there are
visitors around; she has never attended any party, dance
events, or any social gathering; and had poor grades in
school.
Dr. Escuadra, a Medical Specialist conducted psychiatric
and psychological tests on AAA. Dr. Escuadra testified that
AAA suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She
also diagnosed AAA with mild mental retardation because
of her intellectual quotient (IQ) of only 55, which meant
that her mental age is equivalent to that of nine (9) to ten
(10) – year old child. Dr. Escuadra elaborated that the
psychiatric tests and psychological tests performed on
AAA are different from each other because the former
refers to the examination of the patient’s mental capacity
while the latter refers to the evaluation of the patient’s
intelligence quotient. She also averred that AAA was poor
in arithmetic and economics; that it took her some time to
answer even simple questions; that her answers were short
and monosyllabic; and that AAA cooperated during the
sessions only when BBB is present. Finally, Dr. Escuadra
testified that AAA disclosed to her the events that
transpired during the rape incident in February 2002.
The Accused-Appellant denied forcing AAA into a
relationship with him and added that during his stay with
CCC’s family, he courted a female neighbor with whom
AAA later quarreled because [AAA] had feelings for him.
He dissuaded her at first, but AAA threatened to commit
suicide if they do not become sweethearts. Also, on one
occasion, AAA went inside his bedroom and suggested
that they should leave the place since her parents will not
approve of their relationship.
RTC - found accused-appellant guilty of rape
ISSUE: WON the prosecution failed to establish the mental
state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he raped
a woman who is of the legal age but otherwise deprived
of reason.
RULING: NO.
It is settled in jurisprudence that carnal knowledge of a
woman with a mental deficiency is considered rape
because such a person is not capable of giving consent to
a sexual act.8 In a recent case, we had declared that in
cases of rape involving a victim suffering from mental
retardation, proof of force or intimidation is not necessary,
it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the sexual
congress between the accused and the victim, and (2)
the mental retardation of the victim.9
Previously in People v. Dalandas, the SC described in detail
the nature of mental retardation as well as its different
degrees as defined in the modern and the old intelligence
quotient (IQ) scales:
Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth
or early childhood and characterized by impaired
intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It
manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily
demands of the individual’s own social environment.
Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of
maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as
impaired learning capacity.
Although "mental retardation" is often used
interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term
is usually reserved for those without recognizable brain
pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according
to their level of intellectual function are illustrated, thus:
The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those
degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ
of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life
equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b)
imbecile by an IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual
function in adult life equivalent to that of the average
seven-year old child; (c) moron or feebleminded, having
an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in
adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old
child. Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the term
"borderline" intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89.
In People v. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape
when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was
suffering from a "borderline mental deficiency."11
In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr.
Imelda Escuadra who personally conducted the
psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established that the victim
is afflicted with mild mental retardation. She further
testified that AAA was also suffering from post traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55
with a mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-
year-old person.
In an attempt to discredit Dr. Escuadra’s testimony,
appellant argued that Dr. Escuadra admitted that the
psychological test result was only furnished to her by the
psychologist who conducted AAA’s psychological exam
and that the said psychologist was not presented in court.3
We find this argument unmeritorious. What was clear from
Dr. Escuadra’s testimony was that her psychiatric
evaluation yielded the same diagnosis as the
psychological examination with respect to the victim’s
mental retardation.14 The presentation of the psychologist
who conducted the psychological examination could be
dispensed with as the same would have merely been
corroborative.
In any event, notwithstanding the fact that the
determination of mental retardation is deeply rooted in
medical psychology, we had previously ruled that
evidence other than a psychometric evaluation can
prove mental retardation or abnormality.1 Furthermore,
we held that mental retardation can be proved by
evidence other than medical or clinical evidence, such as
the testimony of witnesses and even the observation of the
trial court.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument that the
mental retardation of the victim was not proven, we
likewise uphold the appellate court in finding that AAA’s
testimony adequately showed how appellant utilized
force and intimidation to succeed in having carnal
knowledge with her.
While it is true that the credibility of one who is a mental
retardate may be difficult to determine, still, it can be
ascertained by deducing from the manner she testifies in
court as to the surrounding facts of the crime committed.
For as long as her testimony is straightforward, candid and
unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its
material points, and her demeanor is consistent with one
who has been a victim of rape, bolsters her credibility with
the verity born[e] out of human nature and experience,
thus, must be given full faith and credit.
Moreover, mental retardation per se does not affect
credibility. A mentally retarded [person] may be a credible
witness. The acceptance of her testimony depends on the
quality of her perceptions and the manner she can make
them known to the court.20
(e) Civil Interdiction
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010
elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino
filed on 6 December 2009 a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino
asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he
declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of
Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his
certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been
convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to
prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC)
of Cebu City. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet
served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but
stated that he had already been granted probation.
Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos
refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order
dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly
complied with the order of probation.
ISSUE:
WON Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for
Mayor of Dapitan City.
RULING:
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos
arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a
material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground
for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the
start since he was not eligible to run for any public office
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos
was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate
of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only
qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Mayor.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false
material representation which is a ground for a petition
under Section 78 of the same Code.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in
his certificate of candidacy "that he is eligible for said
office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the
public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible
because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case
from running for public office, and he still states under oath
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition
under Section 78.
A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground
for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the
eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under
either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases
here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who
have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to
avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent,
or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided
shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence
had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The
duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to
twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall
be that of the principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall
produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments
which the offender may have held, even if conferred by
popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification
as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall
last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for
any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification. — The penalties of perpetual or
temporary special disqualification for public office,
profession or calling shall produce the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or
calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or
employments either perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage shall
deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the
sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the
right to vote in any popular election for any public office
or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his disqualification.
Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The
penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it that of temporary
absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage which the
offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it,
by operation of law,15 the accessory penalties of
temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal
Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the
effect of "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for
any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office." The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty.
On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal
Code perpetual special disqualification means that "the
offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his disqualification," which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to
hold elective public office. A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office,
and commits a false material representation if he states in
his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he
stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor?
The COMELEC and the dissenting opinions all found that
Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The
COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos made a false material
representation that is a ground for a petition under Section
78. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however,
concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification which is a ground for a petition under
Section 68 and not under Section 78. The dissenting opinion
of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is
a disqualification that is not a ground under Section 78
without, however, saying under what specific provision of
law a petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his
certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material
representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. However, since the false material
representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión
mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can
also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether
to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple
remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to the petitioner.
NATURAL PERSONS
Geluz v. CA 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz
which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of. Husband
filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art. 2206 which CA
sustained.
ISSUE:
WON husband can claim damages for the death of the
unborn fetus?
HELD:
No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil
personality. According to Article 40, birth determines
personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a
personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus.
The child should be born before the parents can seek any
recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on
account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to
the one injured. There could be no action for such
damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical
personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn
child can recover are limited to moral damages, in
this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also
be recovered because the wife willingly sought the
abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on
the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did
not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against theappellant, but was more
concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money
payment.
2. Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No. 182836, October
13, 2009
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel,
filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and
Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the CBA. The claim was for Hortillano’s unborn child who
died. Hortillano’s wife had a premature delivery while she
was on her 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died
during the labor. The company granted Hortillano’s claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the
provision in CBS did not specifically state that the
dependent should have first been born alive or must have
acquired juridical personality.
Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not
contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without
legal personality. They also claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and
2) status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in
Hortillano’s case. They further contend that the only one
with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil
Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child
never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus
had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived.
Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiter’s
decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N only one with juridical personality can die.
HELD:
No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and
42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The
issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42
do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not
synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in
fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.
ISSUE:
W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent.
HELD:
Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
The fetus would have not reached 38-39 weeks without
depending upon its mother.
3. Quimiging v Icao, 34 SCRA 134
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the
defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close
and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was
married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with
plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and
without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant
despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop
studying. She then claimed for monthly support (P120.00),
damages and attorney’s fees.
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio
and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of
Zamboanga CFI, which dismissed her complaint for
support and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in
light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child
had been born in her complaint. The lower court dismissed
the case and subsequently denied further amendment to
the complaint, ruling that no amendment was allowed for
failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.
Issue:
Is a conceived child entitled to support?
Held:
Yes. Petition granted.
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law
a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40
of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors.
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291
of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate
support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere
appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered
born for all purposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother's womb).
4. De Jesus v. Syquia
G.R. No. L-39110, November 28, 1933
FACTS:
Cesar Syquia was 23 years old and an unmarried scion of
the prominent family in Manila possessing a considerable
property in his own right. His brother-in-law, Vicente
Mendoza is the owner of a barber shop in Tondo, where
the defendant was accustomed to go for tonsorial
attention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, 20 year
old unmarried girl was taken on as cashier in this barber
shop. Syquia was not long in making her acquaintance
and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of
which Antonia was gotten with child and a baby boy was
born on June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant
was a constant visitor and he even wrote a letter to a rev.
father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his
name to be given to the child. Though he was out of the
country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake.
The defendant asks his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the
birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in
Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at
a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived
together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of
second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
he was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child,
the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of
the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be
given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the note to the padre with the other letters
written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy
proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco
had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself,
and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco.
RULING:
The recognition can be made out by putting together the
admissions of more than one document, supplementing
the admission made in one letter by an admission or
admissions made in another. In the case before us the
admission of paternity is contained in the note to the
padre and the other letters suffice to connect that
admission with the child then being carried by Antonia L.
de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the writing
shall be addressed to one, or any particular individual. It is
merely required that the writing shall be indubitable.
It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon
being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and
capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact
that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of
rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of
unborn child is really not different from that presented in
the ordinary case of the recognition of a child already
born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and
resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to
a living child requires oral evidence to connect the
particular individual intended with the name used.
It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the
defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in which
they lived together with the defendant. This situation
continued for about a year, and until Antonia became
enceinte a second time, when the idea entered the
defendant’s head of abandoning her. The law fixes no
period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period
in this case was long enough to evince the father’s
resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he
abandoned the mother and child shortly before this action
was started is unimportant. The word “continuous” in
subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does not mean
that the concession of status shall continue forever, but
only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues.
The trial court was right in refusing to give damages to the
plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise
to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved, and we
may add that the action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise. This case exhibits none of the
features necessary to maintain such an action.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment
could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco.
5. Limjoco vs. Estate of Fragrante
FACTS:
Pedro Fragrante, a Filipino citizen, applied for a certificate
of public convenience to install and maintain an ice plant
in San Juan, Rizal. Fragrante dies while his application was
still pending.  At the time of his death, his intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of
public convenience to the intestate estate of the
deceased through authorizing the said intestate estate
with its special or judicial administrator, appointed by the
Court, to maintain and operate the plant.
Limjoco (petitioner) argues that the intestate estate
of Fragrante cannot be substituted as the applicant for
the deceased and is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial
judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial
judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the
evidence of record, would have obtained from the
commission the certificate for which he was applying. The
situation has not changed except for his death, and the
economic ability of his estate to appropriately and
adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice
plant was the same that it received from the decedent
himself.
It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the
mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent,
directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and
obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for
this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person
is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial
or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such
legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is
indulged.
The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial
or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, include the exercise
during the judicial administration of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived
after his death.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like
his pending application at the commission.
6. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics
G.R. No. L-27956, 30 April 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February
28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria,
Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality
Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from
November 1958 before its decision became final or else
Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit
given. Oria’s land, which was covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and
six-tenths hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff
at public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has
given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June
13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria’s death.
The summons and copies of complaint was personally
served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven
which the latter acknowledged and signed in his own
behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed
Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria’s duly probated
will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for
the annulment of the judgment against Oria and the
execution against his land (T-873). Dionisio also sued in his
capacity as administrator of Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE:
Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his
land be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical
capacity.
RULING:
Yes. The lower court’s decision in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction.
The execution sale of Oria’s land covered by OCT No.
28732 is also void. Quality Plastics upon receiving the
summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already dead
prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumlaos agreed in their
stipulation that indeed Quality Plastics was unaware of
Oria’s death and that they acted in good faith in joining
Oria as a co-defendant.
Pertinent provisins of the Civil Code state that:
Article 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment
against him is a patent nullity. He had no more civil
personality and his juridical capacity which is the fitness to
be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.
7. G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M.
VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR.,
Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan
de Oro City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in
Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA
VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON.
ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS,
NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS,
LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by
death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations
of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by
will.
BP Blg. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations.”
Article 294: “The claim for support, when proper and two
or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in the
following order: Among descendants and ascendants the
order in which they are called to the intestate succession
of the person who has a right to claim support shall be
observed.”
FACTS:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana
Vargas, her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private
respondents filed on 27 September 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana
was forcibly taken from her residence sometime in 1987
and confined by petitioner in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape,
Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any
legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was
alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and
living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The RTC in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the
writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was returned
unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of
Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the
subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial
permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of
the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August
1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30
September 1988 were then issued by respondent court,
directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral
parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas
corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the
petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court
over the nature of the action. A special proceeding
for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to
a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only
on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged
that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way
related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their
(Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of
the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next
of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the
dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
and held that the ultimate facts show that if the person of
Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is
being prayed to declare the Vargases as the persons
entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the
body of said deceased. The Court, considering the
circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on
August 28, 1988 but only revealed to the Court on
September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this case
because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in
the body of the petition on the determination as to who is
entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late
Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial or interment thereof,
for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the RTC
then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the
dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the
basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse,
ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law
spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another
woman.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC had jurisdiction over such proceedings
and/or had authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the
deceased/recovery of the dead. YES, Court did
not lose jurisdiction over the nature and matter of
the case because it could entertain the case
through allegations of the petition as to who
should be given the custody of the deceased’s
body by virtue of Batas Pambansa Bld. 129.
2. W/N custody of the deceased’s body should be
given to the deceased’s siblings. YES, Article 294
used as basis; Since the deceased had no
surviving spouse, children, or ascendants, custody
 of the body fell onto her siblings because
Philippine law does not recognize common law
marriages.
RULING:
1.) Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court,
the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary
rule of procedure that what controls is not the caption of
the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein
determine the nature of the action, and even without the
prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may
nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged
in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant.
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the
court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead
or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not
issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to
appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as,
in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the
writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the
petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should
issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements
and its averments make a prima facie case for relief.
However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition
for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction.
The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause of
commitment or detention will enable him to correct any
errors or defects in the petition.
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the
petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition
for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid
multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are
generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far
as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to
expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such
as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to
amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty, but the issue of custody remained,
which the court a quo had to resolve.
2. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not
being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian
of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend
otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally
mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact
that such relationships are present in our society, and that
they produce a community of properties and interests
which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to
the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman,
a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation
for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and
another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this
view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar.
We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when
referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-
wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the
Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The
immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense
thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or
a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve
upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults
and within the Philippines and in possession of sufficient
means to defray the necessary expenses.
8. G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953
RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C.
NAVARRO, respondent.
TUASON, J.:
Doctrine: Evidence of the survivorship need not be direct;
it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where
there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step
in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
FACTS: (From CA’s findings) On February 6, 1945, while the
battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with
their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad,
and their son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife,
Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the
building known as the German Club, at the corner of San
Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay,
the building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding around, and the Club was set on fire.
Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the
people inside the building, especially those who were
trying to escape. The three daughters were hit and fell of
the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a
safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin
who refused to join them; and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela
Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco
Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came
out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in the head by a
Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay
flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid
the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire,
collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably
including Angela Joaquin.
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and
Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter
nearby, the stayed there about three days, until February
10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter
because the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St.
Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but
unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the
refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-
law.
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was
aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old;
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or
three years older than her brother; while the other sisters,
Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were
between 23 and 25."
These finding were all taken from the testimony of
Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust,
and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as
between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain
and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
applied. The reasoning of the CA for its conclusion is that
the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the
living the German Club in the company of his father and
the witness, and that the burning edified entirely collapsed
minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a
scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which
we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin,
during the appreciable interval from the instant his son
turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he
died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Angela
Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from
the German Club; but she could have died almost
immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might
have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed
by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by
the fumes, or fatally struck by splinters from the exploding
shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available
on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive
after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when
she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support
a finding that she died later than her son, and we are thus
compelled to fall back upon the statutory presumption.
Indeed, it could be said that the purpose of the
presumption of survivorship would be precisely to afford a
solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have survived
his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60
years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
The main question represented in the RTC and CA related
to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his
wife, and their children. The trial court found the deaths of
this persons to have occurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro
girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd.
Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and
4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela
Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter
was declared to have survived his mother.
It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is
now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of
the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died
before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact
that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon
Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an
acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and
adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C.
Navarro, respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first
marriage.
It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that
on the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as
the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be held to
have died at the same time.
ISSUE: WON Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother
Angela Joaquin. YES, based on the testimony of Francisco
Lopez, a fair inference can be arrived at that Joaquin
Navarro Jr. died before his mother. The presumption that
Angela Joaquin died before her son was based on
speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of
preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are
decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of
survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect(3) circumstantial
or (4) inferential.
RULING: Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of
Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity,
such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not
(1) shown who died first, and there are no (2)
particular circumstances from when it can be
inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and ages
of the sexes, according to the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first
to die to the two or more persons who would
inherent one from the other, the persons who
alleges the prior death of either must prove the
allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same
time, and no transmission of rights from one to the
other shall take place.
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are
intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference
to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it present
is one in which the facts are not only unknown but
unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence
as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no
evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are
unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of
fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that
arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123
and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence of
the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts, known
or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be
made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.
It is our opinion that the testimony of Francisco Lopez
contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the
case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions
painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be
arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before
his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son
cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational
deduction from proven facts that it was the other way
around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed,
while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German
Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated
that distance in five seconds or less, and so died within that
interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now,
when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started
to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and
unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and son tried
hard to have her come along. She could have perished
within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the
probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people
in the building were also killed but these, according to
Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away
from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very
likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to
escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her
husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
themselves to gun fire.
This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where
she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the
moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It
strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her,
the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And
it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse
of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin
Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead,
and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela
Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between
Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the
edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five
seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs.
Angela Joaquin was still alive when her son expired.
The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides
the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could
have been killed. All these are speculative, and the
probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against
them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as
evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living
members of her family, she could not have kept away from
protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire
trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the
Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who
tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely
to have been killed by falling beams because the building
was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than
not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause
instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space
of five seconds between her son's departure and his
death.
It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are
not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require
that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption
therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred"
that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of
evidence. In speaking of inference the rule cannot mean
beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may
be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's
Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New
York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co.,
80 N.Y.). 622.)
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de
Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation
in the evidence. The opposite theory — that the mother
outlived her son — is deduced from established facts
which, weighed by common experience, engender the
inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the
doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil
cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail.
ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER
1. G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his
capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
City, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: Rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of
a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
FACTS: Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino
(Dominique) and petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz
(Jenie) were living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage. Jenie got pregnant but
unfortunately, Dominique died 2 months before Jenie
gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian
Dela Cruz "Aquino".
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using
Dominique’s surname Aquino, with the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she
submitted the child’s Certificate of Live Birth,2 Affidavit to
Use the Surname of the Father 3 (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment
executed by Dominique’s father Domingo Butch
Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the
lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged
his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document
entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his
lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent
portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19
YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31,
2005.5 I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY.
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE YOUNGEST IN
OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED JOSEPH
BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME
IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ.
WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA
RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE
FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER, THEN WE BECAME
GOOD COUPLES. AND AS OF NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR
 HOUSE NOW. THAT’S ALL.6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
By letter,7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald
Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application
for registration of the child’s name because he was born
out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to
his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal
Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the
Father).
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint9 for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA
Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof.
The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of
registration of the child’s name is a violation of his right to
use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9255,10 which provides that an illegitimate children
may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. They maintained that the
Autobiography executed by Dominique constitutes an
admission of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument"
within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of
law.
The trial court dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of
action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of
R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document"
through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate
child as follows: 2.2 Private handwritten instrument – an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child. The trial court held that even if
Dominique was the author of the handwritten
Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.1avvphi1Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly require that the private
handwritten instrument containing the putative father’s
admission of paternity must be signed by him. They add
that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though
unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the
above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative
Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly
signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the
earlier-quoted provision of Article 176 of the Family Code.16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not
finding that Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography
contains a "clear and unmistakable" recognition of the
child’s paternity.17 The OSG, in its comment, submits that
Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged
Jenie’s pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the
deceased father of minor Christian Dela Cruz can be
considered as a recognition of paternity in a "private
handwritten instrument" within the contemplation of Article
176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. NO. 9255,
which entitles the said minor to use his father’s surname.
YES.
RULING: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by
R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname
of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized
him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission
made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The
recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child’s
paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval
is necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not,
indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must be
signed by the putative father. This provision must, however,
be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family
Code which require that recognition by the father must
bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children. x x x x
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
XXX
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child
through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code.
Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely
articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand"
the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist
to hold that Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned
by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s
birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to
the facts culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie
proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father
Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother Joseph
Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected
by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s
paternity of the child give life to his statements in his
Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE
FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier
quoted statements in Dominique’s Autobiography have
been made and written by him. Taken together with the
other relevant facts extant herein – that Dominique, during
his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law
spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in
Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant
when Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about
two months after his death, Jenie gave birth to the child –
they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominique’s.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court
sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate
or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
 there should be strict compliance with the requirement
that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
"paramount consideration" in resolving questions affecting
him.22 It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code
to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity
and filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children x
x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears
the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best
interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now
deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth certificate.
2. G.R. No. 181174 December 4, 2009
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and
JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA, Petitioners, vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA,
represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE
C. TITULAR,Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr.
were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident.
During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son,
Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves
as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made
inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth
certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros
Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of
Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13,
1997; and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the
subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was
changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise
obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that
Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate
children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record
of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that
Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because
said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and
subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in
Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the
name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use
of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and
Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor
Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his
paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate
and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the
trial court, dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court under
the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to
annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the
legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to
a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in
an ordinary adversarial action. Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration having been denied, they filed the
present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon
the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy even
in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar.
Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even
12
substantial errors, such as those sought to be corrected in
the present case, can be the subject of a petition under
Rule 108.14
ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage
and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries
in the civil registrar? NO
RULING: In a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil
Code15 charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding
contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a
correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial
or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are
impleaded and due process is properly observed.16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court
clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with
which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected
to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is
for the correction of Patrick’s birth records17 and that the
rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is
actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s
legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003, and Art. 17118 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages
as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño was an action filed by a second wife
against the first wife for the return of one-half of the death
benefits received by the first after the death of the
husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage with
the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was
still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity of the two
marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is
rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to
the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn
legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as
stated in their records of birth but to establish that they are
not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to
impugn as there was no blood relation at all between the
petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court
ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok Cheng
as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with
"Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother. Thus, the
collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as
adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who
sought the correction of the entries in their respective birth
records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their
citizenship is "Filipino," not Chinese, because their parents
were never legally married. Again, considering that the
changes sought to be made were substantial and not
merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings
under Rule 108 to be adversarial in nature, upheld the
lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are
vastly different from those obtaining in the present case.
3. G.R. No. 170645 July 9, 2010
NIEVES ESTARES BALDOS, substituted by FRANCISCO
BALDOS and MARTIN BALDOS, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REYNALDO PILLAZAR a.k.a.
REYNALDO ESTARES BALDOS, Respondents.
DOCTRINE
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a
rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are
considered public documents and are prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. As a
public document, a registered certificate of live birth
enjoys the presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to
prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for
petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its
alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus,
the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly denied
for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late registration
of Reynaldo’s birth.
FACTS
Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30
October 1948. However, his birth was not registered in the
office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later
or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live birth5indicated
Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his
father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on
the certificate of live birth.
On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a complaint,6 docketed as Civil
Case No. 79-0-95, for cancellation of the late registration
of Reynaldo’s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not
really her son.
RTC OLONGAPO’s Decision
In its 16 August 1999 Order,7 the trial court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned as follows:
A thorough examination of the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff vis-a-vis the evidence of the defendant shows that
apart from the scornful denial of plaintiff that defendant is
her son, all documentary evidence available points to the
contrary. The declaration of two disinterested persons,
who were neighbors of the petitioner and his deceased
husband, has never been refuted.
No one was presented by plaintiff to corroborate her
stand.
Undeterred, Nieves appealed to the Court of Appeals. She
insisted that the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth was
contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 (P.D. No. 651).
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 8 August 2005 Decision,9 the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s Order. The appellate court held
that P.D. No. 651 did not proscribe the late registration of
births of persons born before 1 January 1974. The Court of
Appeals explained that the purpose of the decree was to
encourage registration of births as well as deaths.
ISSUE
Whether or not the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth is
valid.
RULING
YES.
Since Reynaldo was born on October 30, 1948, the late
registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of P.D. No.
651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo's birth
falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil
Registry Law, which took effect on February 27, 1931. As a
general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all
births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as amended,
occurring from February 27, 1931 onwards. Considering
that the late registration of Reynaldo's birth took place in
1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO)
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the
implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be
registered in the office of the local civil registrar within 30
days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made
beyond the reglementary period is considered delayed.
The local civil registrar, upon receiving an application for
delayed registration of birth, is required to publicly post for
at least ten days a notice of the pending application for
delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the
registration and the local civil registrar is convinced
beyond doubt that the birth should be registered, he
should register the same.
Reynaldo's certificate of live birth, as a duly registered
public document, is presumed to have gone through the
process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It
was only on March 8, 1995, after the lapse of ten long years
from the approval on February 11, 1985 of the application
for delayed registration of Reynaldo's birth, that Nieves
registered her opposition. She should have done so within
the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that
no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar
of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for
delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo
was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly registered
public document and the flip-flopping statements of
Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former.
Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a
rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are
considered public documents and are prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. As a public
document, a registered birth certificate enjoys the
presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the
facts stated in his birth certificate, but for petitioners who
are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court
and the CA correctly denied for lack of merit the petition
to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo's birth.
Petition is DENIED. Resolution of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Notes:
Presidential Decree No. 651, otherwise known as An Act
Requiring the Registration of Births and Deaths in the
Philippines which Occurred from 1 January 1974 and
thereafter, provides:
Sec. 1. Registration of births. — All babies born in hospitals,
maternity clinics, private homes, or elsewhere within the
period starting from January 1, 1974 up to the date when
this decree becomes effective, irrespective of the
nationality, race, culture, religion or belief of their parents,
whether the mother is a permanent resident or transient in
the Philippines, and whose births have not yet been
registered must be reported for registration in the office of
the local civil registrar of the place of birth by the
physician, nurse, midwife, hilot, or hospital or clinic
administrator who attended the birth or in default thereof,
by either parent or a responsible member of the family or
a relative, or any person who has knowledge of the birth
of the individual child. The report referred to above shall
be accompanied with an affidavit describing the
circumstances surrounding the delayed registration.
Sec. 2. Period of registration of births. — The registration of
the birth of babies referred to in the preceding section must
be done within sixty (60) days from the date of effectivity
of this decree without fine or fee of any kind. Babies born
after the effectivity of this decree must be registered in the
office of the local civil registrar of the place of birth within
thirty (30) days after birth, by the attending physician,
nurse, midwife, hilot or hospitals or clinic administrator or, in
default of the same, by either parent or a responsible
member of the family or any person who has knowledge
of the birth.
The parents or the responsible member of the family and
the attendant at birth or the hospital or clinic administrator
referred to above shall be jointly liable in case they fail to
register the new born child. If there was no attendant at
birth, or if the child was not born in a hospital or maternity
clinic, then the parents or the responsible member of the
family alone shall be primarily liable in case of failure to
register the new born child.
4. G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
DOCTRINE
Registration of the foreign divorce decree should be done
with judicial recognition of the foreign judgment. For being
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.
FACTS
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization
on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in
Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that
his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and
has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading
but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be
considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to
Gerbert’s.
RTC LAOAG’s Ruling
The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the
legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was
enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES (related to the topic of ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER)
1. Whether or not the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
acted out of line in registering the foreign decree
of divorce.
RULING
 1. YES!
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity
and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
that must be recorded.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree
in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and
without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the
registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.1a
ISSUE (Persons and Family Relations)
2. Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
2. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in
the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.”
The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse,
by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and
the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the
applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code;
the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
5. G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG), Respondent.
DOCTRINE
When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is mandated.
FACTS:
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally
married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his
name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled
"IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its]
National Indices of Marriage."2 Respondent also submitted
his academic records from elementary up to
college3 showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng,"
and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng"
appears as his surname.4 In the 1998, 2001 and 2004
Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of
Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City
RTC,6 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under
Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20,
2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues
of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008,
and November 14-20, 2008.8 And a copy of the notice was
furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order
of general default was entered by the trial court which
then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted
respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar
of Makati City to:
 1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for
"DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in
herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for

the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";

3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for

Middle Name of the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr."

in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]…
(emphasis and underscoring supplied;
capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by
Order of July 2, 2009,11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the
present petition for review to the Court on pure question of
law.

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on

the date and place of marriage of respondent’s parents
from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil
status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change
in civil status of a person must be effected through an
appropriate adversary proceeding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for change of name involving

change of civil status should be made through
appropriate adversarial proceedings.

RULING:

YES.

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate

to illegitimate are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings. Since respondents
desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and not Rule 103. Rule 108
clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry
is sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati in
the present case, and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby should be made
parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was

filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered
but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of
the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and
mother were made parties thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had

simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied
with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from
improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of
Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry

in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is mandated