People vs.

Larrañaga
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag,
Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy
Per curiam decision

FACTS:

On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan,
Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down.
Her face and neck were covered with masking tape, and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The
woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and
admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony
Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial
court: that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, who told
him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James
Andrew, who were in a red car. Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing, and were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen
handcuffed them jointly, that after stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group
thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white
van driven by the former. They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the South Bus
Terminal, that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later,
they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline, that Josman
instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine, and that they
made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being followed by the group while boarding the
van; and was beaten until she passed out.
In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for
Culinary Arts, that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics, that in the evening
of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R & R Bar and
Restaurant, Quezon City, that representatives of four airline companies plying the route of Manila-
Cebu-Manila presented proofs showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to
July 17, 1997, and that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the
security guard saw him in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997.

The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu City,
celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.

Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16, 1997,
accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only able to finish
the work at 10:00 the following morning.

Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of July 16,
1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM Bar, and went home
at 3:00 the following morning.

Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never
found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The
appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was
consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:

1) Whether there was conspiracy.

2) Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:

1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated,
or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses,
the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting
crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were
raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the
case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of
Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty
to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With
regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed.
Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing “two (2) reclusiones perpetua”.

NOTE SUMMARY:

The Chiong murder case (People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Juan Larrañaga et al.) was an incident
on July 16, 1997 in Cebu, in which sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong allegedly were kidnapped,
raped, and murdered.Francisco Juan "Paco" Larrañaga (b. 1977), a man of dual Filipino and Spanish
citizenship was, along with six others, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death by lethal injection
on February 3, 2004. Capital punishment in the Philippines has since been abolished.
Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

The requisites in establishing intent to kill.

Facts:

A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the
victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the
left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang
claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The
victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for
one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on
the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for
medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the
victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the
Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the
nature or gravity of the wound”.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

Held:

Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by
independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without
timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal
without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this
situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the words
uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative
factors.

Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of
illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla
is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil
and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently
reads: That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers,
being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as
such by reason of their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and confederating
with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer V
of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful
authority, apply for the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of
the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused,
Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty
and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special
disqualification imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court,
persistently pleas innocence of the crime charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is

present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on
Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant.
The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an
unlawful act. Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when
she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal
leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service laws. There
is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of
laborers working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high
priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as claims against the employers’ funds and
resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum
of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s
improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not save the day for the prosecution’s
deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from
the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal
intent, this Court has no basis to affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that
there is no particular appropriation for salary differentials of secondary school teachers
of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of technical
malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by
law, is therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for
payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance or
law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used
the remainder of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary
differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of
the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence,
as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment
of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

Linkwithin

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts:
On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for
direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or
about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province
of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ
force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman,
by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting
the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was
actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted
petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction
rendered by the trial court.

Held:
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the
more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with
a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and
again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will
not to be disturbed on appeal.

CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-

DEFENSE

Facts:
Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife
Aida, the latter having heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You
ought to be killed, you devil.” Romeo stood up and peeped to see who was outside.

When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road. Upon passing by a
coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot
long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado
whom he knew since the 1970’s and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon
illuminated the place.

Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in different parts of the body, including ears
and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also
hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he
had sustained 11 wounds.

Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense
and convicted him of frustrated homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held:
The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence
of the three essential requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or
prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the
petitioner thereby submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden
of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing all the requisites of his
affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not the
weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal
injuries on the victim. In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.

The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that
the said wounds or the victim were inflicted as they duel with each other. Witness for the
petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused
by bolo. Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had
injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend
himself. The petitioner did not do so.