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Law Assignment
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LAW ASSIGNMENT 2
Question # 01
In the Charter v. Canada case, the corresponding sections 241(b) and Section 14 are challenged.
The court found S.241(b) of the criminal code, anyone who aids a person in committing suicide
commits an indictable offense, and S.14, no person many consents to death being inflicted on
them, violates S.7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedom. The objective of S.241 (b) and S.14,
combined, prohibits physician-assisted dying. The judge considered the vulnerabilities of those
who cannot speak on their behalf, the consequences of legalizing physician-assisted suicide and
society view physician-assisted death as ethically immoral because of the idea of ending
someone’s life. On the other side of this ethical argument, physician-assisted dying is ethically
moral because it is wicked to let someone live in intolerable pain; their sanctity of life is
compromised.
Section 7 of the Charter guarantees fundamental justices: the right to life, liberty, and security of
persons. The judge found that the prohibition on physician-assisted dying violates S.7 of the
Charter. First, the prohibition deprives individuals of autonomy and the rights to liberty. The
prohibition denies people, in a situation of intolerable pain, the right to make their own decisions
that concern their own body and medical care. Second, prohibiting violates the security of the
person. By banning physician-assisted suicide, those who seek such assistance, because of
intolerable pain, is left enduring the pain and medical costs until death, therefore infringing on
their security of the person. Lastly, the prohibition severely breaches the right to life, in both
LAW ASSIGNMENT 3
direct and indirect ways. Directly violates persons' right to life by allowing the suffering from
painful diseases, or paralysis, to continue. Those who want to make their own decision of ending
their life will bring them happiness, as it decreases their pain or suffering. The prohibition
indirectly imposes death, or increases risk of death, on a person because individuals fear the
probation will affect the future. The conclusion found in the first case functions as a base for the
conclusion of this case; because both cases are similar, the foundation is kept in tack; therefore, it
is unfair and unjust to find the infringement under S.1 of the charter without revisiting the case of
Rodriguez.
protecting vulnerability in times of weakness; thus prohibiting an activity that poses certain risks
S. 241(b) and S.14 of the Criminal Code infringes individuals to their right to life, liberty, and
Constitutional law
Charter of Rights: Right to life, liberty, and security of person; fundamental justice
2) S. 241(b) of the criminal code: anyone who aids a person in committing suicide
I believe that the courts made the right conclusion by both claims of infringements. The judge
found that the prohibition of physician-assisted death violates Section 7 of the charter.
Prohibiting those who are in excruciating pain from assisted suicide is a violation of one’s rights
and sanity of life. The security of the person restricts an individual’s right to make decisions
about the individual’s body, and section 241(b) constitutes a limit on personal autonomy. A
person’s autonomy is an important concept, and the ban on physician-assisted death imposes a
limit on an individual for controlling the end of his or her life. The principle of autonomy gives
individuals rights to end their life. The principle of independence provides the individual with
the right ultimate personal liberty. Independence gives individuals freedom from external
3. Administrative law is based on the purposes of maintaining and legalizing government activity
and implemented laws are fair to all individuals. In this Charter v. Canada case, the court
deferred the rewrite of the legislature to parliament and provincial legislature; this is an
ensure that the actions and decisions of government are authorized by parliament or by the
provincial legislature. The courts made a ruling and implemented a constitutional change of the
legislature. Therefore the rewrite of the legislature needs authorization from parliament. The
Question # 02
On September 28, 2010, Justice Susan Himmel of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice gave her
verdict in the case of Bedford v Canada, 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford]. Justice Himmel’s
decision, which essentially has the effect of decriminalizing prostitution in Canada, drew a
LAW ASSIGNMENT 5
pointed and fierce reaction. Commentators across various disciplines were quick to articulate
their position on the emanations of the judgment, and even federal politicians waded into the
controversy. For instance, Winnipeg Tory MP Joy Smith has stated that, with the Bedford ruling,
Given the subject matter of the judgment, the discussion – and, in some cases, the hysteria –
surrounding Bedford is understandable: Justice Himmel finding that three Criminal Code, RSC,
1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code] provisions under scrutiny violated the Charter rights of the three
applicants, and could not be upheld under s. 1, could have a massive impact on a notoriously
controversial subject.
The three applicants – Terri Jean Bedford, Amy Leibovitch, and Valerie Scott – argued that the
impugned provisions of the Criminal Code undermined their ability to work in safe conditions,
out of fear that safeguards would leave them vulnerable to prosecution. They alleged that
s. 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which makes it illegal for anyone to communicate to engage
in prostitution, violated their s. 2(b) Charter rights to freedom of expression. They also argued
that ss. 210, 212(1)(f), and 213(1)(c) – the provisions on bawdy houses, living on the avails of a
prostitute, and communication, respectively – violated their right to life, liberty, and security
Conversely, the Attorney General of Canada argued that the prostitution laws should be upheld,
noting that Parliament “has decided to criminalize the most harmful and public emanations of
prostitution.” They presented the applicants’ argument under s. Seven was based on the “false
premise” that there is a constitutional right to engage in prostitution. They also maintained that
prostitution is often linked to other harmful and criminal activities such as drug addiction and
human trafficking.
LAW ASSIGNMENT 6
JusticeHimmel’sjudgment in Bedford comes in at more than 130 pages. This remarkable show of
verbosity seems at least justified. Upon a close reading, it is evident that the esteemed judge was
well aware that the case would be subject to extensive appellate scrutiny. The polemical nature
of the case also suggests that the careful and measured consideration of the evidentiary record
included also makes sense. Moreover, given that there were “over 25,000 pages of evidence in
88 volumes, amassed over two and a half years” for the court’s consideration, a shorter judgment
may have failed to provide a sufficiently nuanced articulation of the issues at stake.
Although the judgment provides an incredibly detailed and nuanced account of the parties’
positions, in this case, the applicants' view can be summed up as follows. They argued that the
three Criminal Code provisions essentially forced sex workers into compromising and unsafe
The Crown presented sex workers as victims, people who turned to prostitution as a career
option due to poverty, homelessness, or addiction. The evidence put forward by the responded
also argued: "distinctions between indoor and outdoor prostitution are not meaningful." In
addition to pointing to the essential moral objectives that are surveyed by the current laws, the
show that it may not be the best approach for the social management of prostitution.
Justice Himel quickly concludes that the s. Seven liberty interest of the applicants are engaged,
In considering the security interest, the applicants submit that the provisions “materially
contribute” to the harm faced by prostitutes, while the respondent relied on Blencoe v British
Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 SCR 307, to argue that there needs to be a
direct causal connection between the harm alleged and the state action.
In rejecting the respondent’s demand for a causal connection, Justice Himel relies on Suresh v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 3, and Canada (Prime
Minister) v Khadr, [2010] 1 SCR 44, which do not demand that the government’s action be a
“necessary precondition” of the harm in question, but rather that the “government need only
contribute…in a way the Court finds to be sufficient.” Although a connection “sufficient” for the
Court is an undesirably vague standard that allows for almost unlimited judicial discretion,
analysis of the expert evidence put forward by both parties, Justice Himel concludes that the
The court then considers whether the deprivations are by the principles of fundamental justice,
on four grounds: arbitrariness, overbreadth, grossly disproportionate of the harmful effects, and
Justice Himel then considers the freedom of expression argument put forward by the applicant
under s. 2(b) of the Charter. She notes that the Supreme Court of Canada found the law to be
a prima facie violation of the Charter in the Prostitution Reference, and immediately proceeds
In pursuing its legislative objective, the communicating provision so severely trenches upon the
rights of prostitutes that its pressing and substantial purpose is outweighed by the resulting
LAW ASSIGNMENT 8
infringement of rights. This rights infringement is even more severe, given the evidence
demonstrating the law's general ineffectiveness in achieving its purpose. By increasing the risk
of harm to street prostitutes, the communicating law is too high a price to pay for the alleviation
of a social nuisance.
Looking Forward
At the appellate level, it will be interesting to see how the courts view
JusticeHimmel’sinterpretation of Suresh and Khadr, and her conclusion that the applicant need
only show that there is a “sufficient connection” between the impugned provisions and the
deprivation of security. Although the court grounded its reasoning in multiple Supreme Court of
Canada cases, higher courts may feel the utilization of a standard set in a case involving alleged
terrorism and repatriation from a foreign military prison is inappropriate in a prostitution case
and sets the bar too low for the security interest to be engaged.
Given the deeply political nature of the political debate, the evidentiary record could frankly be
read either way, and the appellate courts have an incredibly arduous task ahead of them.
International jurisdictions have created licensing provisions for prostitutes. If the cost of entry for
licensing is too high – a distinct possibility if the aim is to discourage entry into sex work – the
provisions may have the effect of creating a new form of “illegal” prostitution. If that is where
we end up, all of this legal wrangling will have been for naught.