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G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-
appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial,
resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision
rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following
pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery
with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P
2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been
represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages,
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been
represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p.
48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano
Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two
deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing
the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis
Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and
the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in
the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of
the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto
Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant
was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his
house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the
fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would
be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of
his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we
will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased
Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased
Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go
ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got
his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell
down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a
gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him
(pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense transcript). Both Fleischer and
Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza
I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the
long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co.,
Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer
and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one
hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was
appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had
been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-
R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-
26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following
antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and
central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in
Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate
municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence
therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among
those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to
order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and
nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for
distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by
George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros
Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937
over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by
Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land
surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the survey report
was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the
second world war. According to the survey, only 300
hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176
Kiamba, were set aside for Sales Application No. 21983,
while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares
each to be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R.
No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of
Fleischer and Company was declared open for disposition,
appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public
auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and
Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of
protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its
favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent
by the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty.
Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an
amicable settlement signed by the representative of the
settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by
the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report
of Atty. Gozon, approved the same and ordered the formal
award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company.
The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in
favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then consisted only
of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which
affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the
contested land to the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost
that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had
repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit,
misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of
the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16,
1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of
the company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the
Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966, from the
land which they had been occupying for about 30 years.
Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid
trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a
cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other
house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The
second house is not far from the site of the dismantled
house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June
Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also
transferred his store from his former residence to the house
near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice

mill located about 15 meters east of the house and a
concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house,
which is used for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on
whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil
Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato,
Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of
award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the
pendency of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967
entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby
he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140
square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1,
Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00
monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although
the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to
avoid trouble, until the question of ownership could be
decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he
alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was considered
payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him
a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc.
for that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are
located as per agreement executed on February 21, 1967.
You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of
collection made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the
agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our
agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill,
bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers
& Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December
31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed
within the six- month period, the company shall cause their
immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their
laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo
posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some
posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant,
thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228,
t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just adjacent to appellant's
house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished,
would have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to
appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the
door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing
continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the
installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking
a nap after working on his farm all morning, was awakened
by some noise as if the wall of his house was being
chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found
that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling
the wall of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6),
while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and
deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep
used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The rest
of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-
quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter,
bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot
two persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction,
assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in
convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted
in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred
in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in
defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not
disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them from the
window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered
to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so
in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he
should be exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying
circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following
requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as
amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry
utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words:
"Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request
addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he
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said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano
ang mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction
to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house
being chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the
two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the
appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp.
225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks
caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and
unknowingly I took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also
I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer"
(p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant
testified:
When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and
upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and
when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep
and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking
that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p.
132, supra, Emphasis supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never
controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however, that
the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of
ownership over the land in question, when they did the
fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne
by the evidence reveals that five persons, consisting of the
deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing
and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence
they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which
were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers.
Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal
weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter,
pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it
was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to
the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there
was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the
appellant woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls,
his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw
the damage being done to his house, compounded by the
fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the
highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore
appealed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what
they were doing and to talk things over with him. But
deceased Fleischer answered angrily with 'gademit' and
directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the
continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further
chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the
closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-

which were not only imminent but were actually in progress.
There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression
on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia
was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed
aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his
property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did
the victims have a right to fence off the contested property,
to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and
egress to his residence and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every
owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968,
Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of award to
Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that
the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident
on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23,
1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in
1950 for the annulment of the award to the company,
between the same parties, which the company won by virtue
of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent
repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement;
and that such 1970 dismissal also carried the dismissal of
the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the
Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent
and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to
the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had
no authority to conduct the sale due to his failure to comply
with the mandatory requirements for publication. The
dismissal of the government's supplemental petition was
premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28,
1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and
arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-
plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed
hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed
on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of
lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This
was explained by him during cross-examination on January
21, 1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we
better rent the place because even though we do not know
who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid
trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at
that time, it was not known who is the right owner of the
place. So we decided until things will clear up and determine
who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169,
t.s.n., Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31,
1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate
the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful
enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of
chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's
entrance and exit to the highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines
are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536
and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had
no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house,
nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was
pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The
assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least
threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People
vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of
appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant
to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the
right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement
of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of
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one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal
Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window,
killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate to
the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of
property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of appellant who was defending his property. As a
matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part,
since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the
noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for
the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with
him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was
not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are
present. He should therefore be held responsible for the
death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to
paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The
qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated
in this case because of the presence of provocation on the
part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs.
Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden
unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
was deliberately chosen with a special view to the
accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from
any defense that the party assailed might have made. This
cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted
instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of
evident premeditation not sufficiently established. The only
evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the
testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident
of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and
Company, which may be summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about
7:00 A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and
Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South
Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs.
Narvaez asked him to help them, as he was working in the
hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their
house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez
added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer
because there will be nobody who will break his head but I

will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but
the latter told him not to believe as they were only Idle
threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-
303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation
of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As
WE have consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of
the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not
enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts
evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs.
Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a
"showing" that the accused premeditated the killing; that the
culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there
was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the
execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect upon the
consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a
laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his
credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the
planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that the
accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his
premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the
presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant
pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying
his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it
appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon
after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the
commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his
house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as
well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his
house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in
danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway.
These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his
first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his
only remaining house, must have so aggravated his
obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him
to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of
his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case,
where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-
called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative
prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at
the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going
unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he
should be credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide
only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor
aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the
presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims
and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty
for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article
69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the
lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same.
Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense
of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two
degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5
of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one
degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the
case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways (43 SCRA
397), the award for moral damages was reduced because
the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction.
In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but they
actually provoked the attack by damaging appellant's
properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in
the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the
victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate
him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his
wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these
two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of
evidence linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a
defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated
October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816),
but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of
Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on
the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its extensive
landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its
accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of
Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-
to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers,
who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to
take advantage of the government's resettlement program,
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but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners, were
the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering
of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil
liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires
a person convicted of prision correccional or arrests
mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his
civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate
of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made
the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to
reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of
consequential damages and costs of proceedings.
Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the
accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given
retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES,
MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS
WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND
OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED
TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS
OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF
HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA
IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS,
WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT
ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER
DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW
SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST
22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY
ORDERED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De
Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Aquino, J., is on leave.
Plana, J., in the result.
 Page 5 of 196

imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and
attorney's fees.
Separate Opinions
Considering that appellant has been under detention for
almost fourteen (14) years now since August 22, 1968, he
has served the penalty and should be released.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
maximum the sentence the appellant should have served
was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of
heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of
Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
imprisonment, but without any award for moral damages and
attorney's fees.

I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers Considering that appellant has been under detention for
to unlawful aggression on persons, not property Plana, J., in almost fourteen (14) years now since August 22, 1968, he
Separate Opinions
the result. has served the penalty and should be released.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

I dissent. The self-defense of the Revised Penal Code refers

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am
constrained to dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil
Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal
possessor of a thing may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the
person defending his property is an indispensable element
where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically
defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to
life and defense of property can only be invoked when it is
coupled with some form of attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. The defense of property,
whether complete or incomplete, to be available in
prosecutions for murder or homicide must be coupled with
an attack by the one getting the property on the person
defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence
that an attack was attempted, much less made upon the
person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit
proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which
entitles appellant to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the
majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any
privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) homicides, mitigated by the two generic
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance,
maximum the sentence the appellant should have served
was prision mayor plus the indemnification to each group of
heirs of Davis Fleischer and of Flamiano Rubia of the sum of
Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary
to unlawful aggression on persons, not property Plana, J., in
the result.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
While I agree with the order to release the appellant, I am
constrained to dissent in part. It is true that Art. 429, Civil
Code of the Philippines, provides that the owner or legal
possessor of a thing may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. It seems to me, however, that an attack on the
person defending his property is an indispensable element
where an accused pleads self-defense but what is basically
defended is only property.
Defense of property is not of such importance as the right to
life and defense of property can only be invoked when it is
coupled with some form of attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property. The defense of property,
whether complete or incomplete, to be available in
prosecutions for murder or homicide must be coupled with
an attack by the one getting the property on the person
defending it.
In the case now before Us, there is absolutely no evidence
that an attack was attempted, much less made upon the
person of appellant. The mere utterance "No, gademit
proceed, go ahead" is not the unlawful aggression which
entitles appellant to the pela of self-defense. I agree with the
majority opinion that the crime is homicide but without any
privileged mitigating circumstance.
Therefore, since the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) homicides, mitigated by the two generic
mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
obfuscation, without any aggravating circumstance,

Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
XXX
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon
the woman or her child resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically
defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.
XXX
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. –
Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal
and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the Revised Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who
was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of
the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by
expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
[ G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.
MARIVIC GENOSA, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her
prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the “battered woman
syndrome” (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-
defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not
entitled to complete exoneration because there was no
unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack
on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted
on appellant constituted a form of cumulative provocation
that broke down her psychological resistance and self-
control. This “psychological paralysis” she suffered
diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the
mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of
the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the
extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse
so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night
in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that
she was eight months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and
mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her
to vindicate her life and her unborn child’s.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating
circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and
be released from custody on parole, because she has
already served the minimum period of her penalty while
under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25,
1998 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding
Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly
considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y
Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding
treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none
of mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused
with the penalty of DEATH.
“The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of
the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages.”[2]
Page 6 of 196
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as
follows:
“That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at
Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the
use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had
provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following
wounds, to wit:
‘Cadaveric spasm.
‘Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
‘Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem
lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly
protrudes out of the mouth.
‘Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital
bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
‘Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest,
trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.
‘Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.’
which caused his death.”[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not
guilty during her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due
course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the
prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:
“Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on
November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City. Thereafter, they lived
with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a
time, Ben’s younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with

them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant and Ben
rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children,
namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
“On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a
cockfight after receiving their salary. They each had two (2)
bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass
Ben’s house before reaching his. When they arrived at the
house of Ben, he found out that appellant had gone to
Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house,
while Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the
evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did not
see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas’ rented house, he heard her say ‘I won’t
hesitate to kill you’ to which Ben replied ‘Why kill me when I
am innocent?’ That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas’ rented
house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
“On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog,
her close friend and neighbor living about fifty (50) meters
from her house, to look after her pig because she was going
to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked
Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie
Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
“That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida
was waiting for a bus going to Ormoc when he saw appellant
going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to
the waiting area where he was. Joseph lived about fifty (50)
meters behind the Genosas’ rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to
Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
“On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga
told him about the foul odor emanating from his house being
rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out
the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the
inside. Since he did not have a duplicate key with him,
Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but
only after destroying a window to reach a hook that locked
it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where
the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the
lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with
a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back
of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and
sent word to the mother of Ben about his son’s
misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of
Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
“Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo
Acodesin, then assigned at the police station at Isabel,
Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the
Genosas’ rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares,
SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin
proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where
they found the dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped
with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who
only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner
at the side of an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters
from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe
measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a
diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end
without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The
bedroom was not in disarray.
“About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben,
because of its stench, had to be taken outside at the back of
the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A
municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been
dead for two to three days and his body was already
decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo
yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide
later filed against appellant. She concluded that the cause
of Ben’s death was ‘cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to
severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture
of the occipital [bone].’
“Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going
home after work on November 15, 1995, she got worried that
her husband who was not home yet might have gone
gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel
Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the marketplace and
taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They
found Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas’
house. Ecel went home despite appellant’s request for her
to sleep in their house.
“Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him,
even challenging her to a fight. She allegedly ignored him
and instead attended to their children who were doing their
homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben
switched off the light and, with the use of a chopping knife,
cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching
television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack
her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold of her hands
Page 7 of 196
and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and
screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed
his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing his
packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into
a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a
drawer holding her by the neck, and told her ‘You might as
well be killed so nobody would nag me.’ Appellant testified
that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer
but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch
long blade cutter from his wallet. She however, ‘smashed’
the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade
and his wallet. Appellant then ‘smashed’ Ben at his nape
with the pipe as he was about to pick up the blade and his
wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
“Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her
husband by shooting him. She supposedly ‘distorted’ the
drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on
the spot, though, but in the bedroom.”[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
“1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on
November 19, 1983. Prior to her marriage, Marivic had
graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was
working, at the time of her husband’s death, as a Secretary
to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three
(3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
“2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary
school; they were neighbors in Bilwang; they were
classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets
of parents were against their relationship, but Ben was
persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting
her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant
partner at fiestas.
“3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben’s
parents, together with Ben’s brother, Alex, in Isabel,
Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben ‘lived
happily’. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would
quarrel often and their fights would become violent.
“4. Ben’s brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he
could not remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said
that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben
would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on

him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw Marivic
holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his
left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but
after a week, she returned apparently having asked for Ben’s
forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early
morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Ben’s aid
again and saw blood from Ben’s forehead and Marivic
holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after
Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben’s forgiveness.
“Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic’s mother-in-law, testified
too, saying that Ben and Marivic married in ‘1986 or 1985
more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.’ She said as the
marriage went along, Marivic became ‘already very
demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after the birth
of Marivic’s two sons, there were ‘three (3)
misunderstandings.’ The first was when Marivic stabbed
Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second
incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck
Ben on the forehead ‘using a sharp instrument until the eye
was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear’ and her
husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in
1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house
in Bilwang and she saw that Ben’s hand was plastered as
‘the bone cracked.’
“Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar
clinic for medical intervention.
“5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on
November 15, 1995 ‘After we collected our salary, we went
to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.’ They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to ‘Uniloks’ and drank
beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles each. After drinking
they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking
with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait ‘for the
runner and the usher of the masiao game because during
that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I
was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place
my bet.’ On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he
heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling
loudly. Outside their house was one ‘Fredo’ who is used by
Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas’ testimony on the
root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying ‘I will never hesitate to kill you’, whilst Ben
replied ‘Why kill me when I am innocent.’ Basobas thought
they were joking.
“He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the
road from the Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he
and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and
Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben ‘before when he
was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa’ that he should
leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she
would leave him ‘so many times’.
“Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but
it was a long time that they had been quarreling. He said
Ben ‘even had a wound’ on the right forehead. He had
known the couple for only one (1) year.
“6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben
became cruel to her and was a habitual drinker. She said he
provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin
her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
“These incidents happened several times and she would
often run home to her parents, but Ben would follow her and
seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would
seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra.
Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon
her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat
her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at least
three times a week.
“7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely
related to Marivic, testified as to the abuse and violence she
received at the hands of Ben.
‘7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor]
of the Genosas, testified that on November 15, 1995, he
overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was
shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the
spouses ‘grappling with each other’. Ben had Marivic in a
choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come
voluntarily to testify. (Please note this was the same night
as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
‘7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother
of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified that he heard his neighbor
Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He
peeped through the window of his hut which is located
beside the Genosa house and saw ‘the spouses grappling
with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa’. He said
after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and enter
the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as
he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the
next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
Page 8 of 196
‘7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the
Genosas while they were living in Isabel, Leyte. His house
was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his
niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14
years. He said the couple was always quarreling. Marivic
confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would
use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house
and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but would be
pacified ‘if somebody would come.’ He testified that while
Ben was alive ‘he used to gamble and when he became
drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, ‘Teody’
because that was what he used to call me, ‘mokimas ta,’
which means ‘let’s go and look for a whore.’ Mr. Sarabia
further testified that Ben ‘would box his wife and I would see
bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the
witness pointed to his right breast) as according to her a
knife was stricken to her.’ Mr. Sarabia also said that once he
saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily
testified only that morning.
‘7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a
cousin of Marivic, testified that in the afternoon of November
15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to
look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several
taverns and some other places, but could not find him. She
accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep
with her in the Genosa house ‘because she might be
battered by her husband.’ When they got to the Genosa
house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that ‘her
husband was already there and was drunk.’ Miss Arano
knew he was drunk ‘because of his staggering walking and I
can also detect his face.’ Marivic entered the house and she
heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is
the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss
Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had
asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid
every time her husband would come home drunk. At one
time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in
the evening when Ben arrived because the couple ‘were
very noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken
like a vase.’ She said Marivic ran into her room and they
locked the door. When Ben couldn’t get in he got a chair
and a knife and ‘showed us the knife through the window grill
and he scared us.’ She said that Marivic shouted for help,
but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when
she left Marivic’s house on November 15, 1995, the couple
were still quarreling.
‘7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic
were co-employees at PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic

was his patient ‘many times’ and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from
July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995, there were six (6)
episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These
injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the
PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.’
xxx xxx xxx
‘Dr. Caing’s clinical history of the tension headache and
hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three (23) separate
occasions was marked at Exhibits ‘2’ and ‘2-B.’ The OPD
Chart of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the
consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents of
physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit ‘3.’
“On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a
psychiatrist, he could not say whether the injuries were
directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological
make-up of the patient, ‘whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.’
‘7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place
where the Genosas resided, testified that about two (2)
months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00
in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the
Genosa couple who were experiencing ‘family troubles’. He
told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from
her again and assumed ‘that they might have settled with
each other or they might have forgiven with each other.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night it was her husband who began the
provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her
husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be
admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was
suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby
was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
“Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to
leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that
the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her
that night was because ‘he was crazy about his recent
girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.’
“On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a
gun; she said that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels
could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas
lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day,
November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field
researcher under the alias ‘Marvelous Isidro’; she did not tell
anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have
a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San
Pablo, Laguna.
‘Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she
threw the gun away; that she did not know what happened to
the pipe she used to ‘smash him once’; that she was
wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2)
hours after she was ‘whirled’ by Ben, he kicked her ‘ass’ and
dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had
packed his things.’
“9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18,
1995 after an investigation was made of the foul odor
emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified
to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense
witnesses during the trial.
“10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal
Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and
among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers
and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic
pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and
passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the
Genosa residence and when she got there, she saw ‘some
police officer and neighbor around.’ She saw Ben Genosa,
covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his
back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Cerillo said that ‘there is only one injury and that is the
injury involving the skeletal area of the head’ which she
described as a ‘fracture’. And that based on her
examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo
did not testify as to what caused his death.
“Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
“11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed
against Marivic Genosa charged her with the crime of
Page 9 of 196
PARRICIDE committed ‘with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate
husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.’
“12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997,
21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November
1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
“13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the
day of the last trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’
of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
“14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon
automatic review and, under date of 24 January 2000,
Marivic’s trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellant’s Briefs
he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.
“The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Tabucanon and permitted the entry of appearance of
undersigned counsel.
“15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa
wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice,
coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip,
Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office,
wherein she submitted her ‘Brief without counsels’ to the
Court.
“This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4
February 2000.
“16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and
stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 19 February
2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the
cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa
by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her
state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally,
to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

“Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter
of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only qualified forensic
pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of
the death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings,
Exhibit ‘A’) is more akin to a gunshot wound than a beating
with a lead pipe.
“17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the
Honorable Court partly granted Marivic’s URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case ‘to the trial
court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the ‘battered woman syndrome’ plea,
within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to
forthwith report to this Court the proceedings taken, together
with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary
evidence, if any, submitted.’
“18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared
and testified before the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-
Branch 35, Ormoc City.
“Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a
quo asked if she had interviewed Marivic Genosa. Dra.
Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the
Penal Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and
psychological assessment were done at her clinic.
“Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical
psychologist for twenty (20) years with her own private clinic
and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology
Department of the Assumption College; a member of the
faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and
St. Joseph’s College; and was the counseling psychologist
of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master
of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo,
and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the
Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a
member of the American Psychological Association. She is
the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists
from about 68 countries; a member of the Forensic
Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the
Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the socio-
demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the
Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled ‘Energy Global
Psychology’ (together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan
Page 10 of 196
Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has
testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first xxx xxx xxx
case of that nature.
“Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on “Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the
the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families violence: some leave the house, or lock themselves in
involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering
at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and ‘physical violence on both of them.’ She said that in a
discovered that ‘there are lots of variables that cause all of ‘normal marital relationship,’ abuses also happen, but these
this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to are ‘not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in
psychiatric disorder.’ [and] day out.’ In an ‘abnormal marital relationship,’ the
abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and ‘even
“Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of ‘a would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on
lot of incidents of psychological abuse, verbal abuse, and the victim.’
emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.’
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
“Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of
psychological tests she administered, it was her opinion that
Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because ‘inspite
“Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, ‘the battered woman
of her feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has a self-
defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a
usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the
broken person. And at the same time she still has the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke
imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the
it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they
past.’
provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even
sexually abusive to them.’ Dra. Dayan said that usually a
battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from
xxx xxx xxx
‘broken homes.’
“Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered “Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife
woman, ‘also has a very low opinion of himself. But then and did not even consider filing for nullity or legal separation
emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance for
frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like
gambling, drinking and drugs. And they become xxx xxx xxx
violent.’ The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes
“19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician,
them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how
who has since passed away, appeared and testified before
their parents abused each other so ‘there is a lot of modeling
RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
of aggression in the family.’
“Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of
“Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a
Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry
battered woman does not leave her husband: poverty, self-
and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He
blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle
was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38)
itself which makes her hope her husband will change, the
years. Prior to being in private practice, he was connected
belief in her obligations to keep the family intact at all costs
with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained
for the sake of the children.
his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was

called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26)
years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he
obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained his
medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was
also a member of the World Association of Military
Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan
Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
“He authored ‘The Comparative Analysis of Nervous
Breakdown in the Philippine Military Academy from the
Period 1954 – 1978’ which was presented twice in
international congresses. He also authored ‘The Mental
Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000’, which
was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a
medical textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a
Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline),
on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the
drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the
functional disorder of the mind and neurology deals with the
ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology,
on the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate
degree; while one has to finish medicine to become a
specialist in psychiatry.
“Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical
Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already encountered a suit involving
violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes
abound, and he has seen probably ten to twenty thousand
cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was
reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered
Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
“As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, where there is physical abuse:
such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the
woman is sometimes confined. The affliction of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder ‘depends on the vulnerability of
the victim.’ Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very
healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce the
disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, ‘it will take
more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic
stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.’
“In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is
incorporated under the ‘anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxcietism.’ It is produced by ‘overwhelming brutality,
trauma.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo explained that with ‘neurotic anxiety’, the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she
is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks ‘of
nothing but the suffering.’
xxx xxx xxx
“A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become
neurotic, her emotional tone is unstable, and she is irritable
and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her ‘self-world’ is
damaged.
“Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background
relates to an individual’s illness, such as the deprivation of
the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the
batterer, he normally ‘internalizes what is around him within
the environment.’ And it becomes his own personality. He
is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so
macho; he shows his strong façade ‘but in it there are doubts
in himself and prone to act without thinking.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that ‘even though without the
presence of the precipator (sic) or the one who administered
the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred
(sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just
come up in her mind or in his mind.’
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic
stress disorder try to defend themselves, and ‘primarily with
knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x
because that abound in the household.’ He said a victim
resorts to weapons when she has ‘reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her
but to act decisively.’
Page 11 of 196
xxx xxx xxx
“Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his
office in an interview he conducted for two (2) hours and
seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22
January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
“On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr.
Pajarillo said that at the time she killed her husband
Marivic’c mental condition was that she was ‘re-experiencing
the trauma.’ He said ‘that we are trying to explain
scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and
probably at that point in time that things happened when the
re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.’ At the
time he interviewed Marivic ‘she was more subdued, she
was not super alert anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic)
because of the predicament she is involved.’
xxx xxx xxx
“20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by
either the private or the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord
with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of
the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.”[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the
RTC gave credence to the prosecution evidence that
appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben
Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed --
lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at
the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was
elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus

Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of
Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the
inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the
case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the
alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court
to admit the experts’ testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution
granting in part appellant’s Motion, remanding the case to
the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea;
and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
the proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the
TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court’s Resolution, the trial judge authorized
the examination of Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs.
Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo Pajarillo,[11] supposedly
experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with
their documentary evidence, were then presented to and
admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to
this Court to form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial
court for this Court’s consideration:
“1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously
hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as
to self-defense.
“2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben
and Marivic Genosa were legally married and that she was
therefore liable for parricide.
“3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to
be by beating with a pipe.
“4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding
evidence adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses
that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and
wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben
Genosa was a battered husband.
“5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony
from the children of Marivic Genosa.
“6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic’s
flight to Manila and her subsequent apologies were indicia of
guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn
child.
“7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was
an aggravating circumstance of treachery.
“8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the
traditional elements in determining the existence of self-
defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of
death.”[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1)
whether appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of
her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of
Ben Genosa.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in
nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the principal
issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the
trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances
of weight and substance that could affect the outcome of the
case.[14]
In appellant’s first six assigned items, we find no grave
abuse of discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of
material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court’s
disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly
dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated “an
obviously hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence
adduced as to self-defense.” We note that in his 17-page
Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the
Page 12 of 196
testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation,
findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse
assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with
the trial judge’s conclusions, we cannot peremptorily
conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to
reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been
made in an “obviously hasty” manner. The Information had
been filed with the lower court on November 14,
1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months
from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That
he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch
should not be taken against him, much less used to
condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch
with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any
case, we find his actions in substantial compliance with his
constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that
Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally married, despite
the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v.
Malabago,[16] this Court held:
“The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse,
the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a
marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of
marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is
not objected to.”
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and
the brother of appellant’s deceased spouse -- attested in
court that Ben had been married to Marivic.[17] The defense
raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during
her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial
admission of her marriage to Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule
that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making
it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the
admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2) no
admission was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking
the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense
offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in
court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was
made through a palpable mistake.

Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or
direct cause of Ben’s death -- whether by a gunshot or by
beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the
Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution,
“[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of
killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a
metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the
Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not
immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually caused
the victim’s death.” Determining which of these admitted
acts caused the death is not dispositive of the guilt or
defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully
appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for
automatic review, appellant had not raised the novel defense
of “battered woman syndrome,” for which such evidence
may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was
then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be
discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with
the surrounding facts that led to the death of the
victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past
behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring
testimony from appellant’s children. As correctly elucidated
by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in
whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and
evidence are necessary to present.[20] As the former further
points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as
witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower court for
not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of
whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her subsequent
apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are
attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible
error as to the trial court’s appreciation of these
circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution of the
case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal
liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense of her unborn
child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is
incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.[21] Well-
settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and
similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the
burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.[22]
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of
the battered woman syndrome. While new in Philippine
jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign
jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least,
incomplete self-defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a
victim or defendant is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign
courts convey their “understanding of the justifiably fearful
state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused
and controlled over a period of time.”[24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form
of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may
find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she
is defined as a battered woman.”[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as
low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the
family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon
the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for
the batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship
will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”[27]which
has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the
acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -
- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form
of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by
simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that
she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are
Page 13 of 196
comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the
escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This
wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
“placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he
has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort
to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal
and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the
imminent loss of control and the growing tension and
despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered
woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer
becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some
unpredictable point, the violence “spirals out of control” and
leads to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The
battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet
also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only
the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can
be as unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are
his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually
realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance
would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack
and the terrible pain, although she may later clearly
remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of
acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows
from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight
back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and
out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors
are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the
acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period,
the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the
batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards
his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and
promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the
battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will change
for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is
the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole
anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his

isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-
being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very
slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after
she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful
reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched
in a battered woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her
batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other --
she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of “tension,
violence and forgiveness,” each partner may believe that it is
better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really
feel independent, capable of functioning without the other.[31]
History of Abuse
in the Present Case
To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the
defense presented several witnesses. She herself described
her heart-rending experience as follows:
“ATTY. TABUCANON
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben
Genosa?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the
subsequent year he was cruel to me and a behavior of
habitual drinker.
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage,
your husband was abusive to you and cruel. In what
way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap
me and sometimes he pinned me down on the bed
and sometimes beat me.
Q How many times did this happen?
A Several times already.
Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and
we separate each other.
Page 14 of 196
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you A Three times a week.
leaving home?
Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes
Q What will happen when he follow you? he will just quarrel me.”[32]
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I Referring to his “Out-Patient Chart”[33] on Marivic Genosa at
was convinced and after that I go to him and he said the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her
‘sorry’. foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such “Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents
cruelty and abusive behavior by your husband, were which are found in the chart of your clinic?
you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
Q Who are these doctors?
A I did.
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero
and Dra. Cerillo. Q Will you please read the physical findings together with
the dates for the record.
xxx xxx xxx
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows:
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness of
injuries? eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
A Yes, sir. 2. March 10, 1992 -Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower
arbital area, pain and contusion (R)
Q Who inflicted these injuries? breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
A Of course my husband. 3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
Q You mean Ben Genosa? 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to
trauma. Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
A Yes, sir.
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R)
xxx xxx xxx
Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
[Court] /to the witness
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said? contusion Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr.
Canora.
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the wherein you were the attending physician, is that
infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred, after your correct?
marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the
occurrence? A Yes, sir.
A Everytime he got drunk. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a A Yes, sir.
month or in a week?
 Page 15 of 196

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the
one who attended the patient. What do you mean by
abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in
contact with something rough substance if force is
applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an
inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is
tenderness pain.
Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this
Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of
pregnancy was she?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of
pregnancy?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it
an examination about her pregnancy or for some other
findings?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was
refractory to our treatment. She does not response
when the medication was given to her, because
tension headache is more or less stress related and
emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you
said is emotional in nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical
examination of the patient is the family history in line of
giving the root cause of what is causing this
disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient
all comes from the domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.

Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure,
which complicates her pregnancy.
Doctor?
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can
Q Were you able to talk with the patient?
A Yes, sir. cause increases in hypertension which is unfortunately
A Yes, sir. does not response to the medication.
Q For how many days?
Q What did she tell you? Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you
A One day. take the blood pressure of the accused?
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the
cause of these injuries. And she told me that it was Q Where? A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure
done to her by her husband. was 180/120.
A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa? Q Is this considered hypertension?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic
xxx xxx xxx Genosa. You said that you were able to examine her Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you
personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 mean this is dangerous level of blood pressure?
ATTY. TABUCANON: months pregnant.
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus.” [34]
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine What is this all about?
the accused sometime in the month of November, Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former
1995 when this incident happened? A Because she has this problem of tension headache neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified that he
secondary to hypertension and I think I have a record had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on
A As per record, yes. here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises,
had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times. confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Q What was the date?
Q For what? Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she
A It was on November 6, 1995.
had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house,
A Tension headache.
Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk
Q Can we say that specially during the latter and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she
A Yes, sir. consultation, that the patient had hypertension? was awakened about ten o’clock at night, because the
couple “were very noisy … and I heard something was
broken like a vase.” Then Marivic came running into Ecel’s

room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window
grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again
asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they were
unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they
found him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt
her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his
state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard
the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben
Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or heard the
couple quarreling.[37] Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of
him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty
towards her:
“ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in
November 15, 1995 in the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office
working then after office hours, I boarded the service
bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I
immediately asked my son, where was his father, then
my second child said, ‘he was not home yet’. I was
worried because that was payday, I was anticipating
that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, my
eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for
my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel
looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence
situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your
residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 o’clock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I
requested to sleep with me at that time because I had
fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that
he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to
sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears
that the same thing will happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to
sleep with you?
A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father
would not allow her because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you
pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q What’s the name of the baby you were carrying at that
time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your
husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
Page 16 of 196
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his
usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly
behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and
yelling at you? What else did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me
to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at
you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him,
looking for him. I was just worried he might be overly
drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he
do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore
him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will
beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed
because I just ignore him of his provocation and he
switch off the light and I said to him, ‘why did you
switch off the light when the children were there.’ At
that time I was also attending to my children who were
doing their assignments. He was angry with me for
not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen
and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me
from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching
T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting
because they were scared and he was already holding
the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else
happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he
whirled me and I fell to the bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the
bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where
he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were
their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got
angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged
me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something
and then he kept on shouting at me that ‘you might as
well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about
to open the drawer but he could not open it because
he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was
to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
Page 17 of 196
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will
you please describe this blade about 3 inches long,
how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It’s a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both
edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate
me.”[38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to
testify as an expert witness to assist it in understanding the
psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic
Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen
hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the
latter’s ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
“Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a
battered wife? Could you in layman’s term describe to
this Court what her life was like as said to you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more
than ten years, that she was suffering emotional
anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to
emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical
abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she
was the one who was practically the bread earner of
the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices,
going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing
being involved in cockfight and going home very angry
and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also

had the experience a lot of taunting from the husband
for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she
was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry,
she was at the same time very depressed because
she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory or
even hell when it was happening day in and day
out.”[39]
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not
merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put forward,
additional supporting evidence as shown below:
“Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in
1999, where you talked to her about three hours, what
was the most relevant information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that
happened. The most important information were
escalating abuses that she had experienced during her
marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we
presume that you already knew of the facts of the case
or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts
of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know
whether I can consider them as substantial.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the
side of her husband they were fond of battering their
wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the
relatives of her husband that were fond of battering
their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her
husband who are also battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that
she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where her husband
followed her and battered [her] several times in that
room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was
battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no
problem about being battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not
complete on saying this matter. I think that is the first
time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your
opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in
this kind happened, it was really a self-defense. I also
believe that there had been provocation and I also
believe that she became a disordered person. She
had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the
battering that happened and so she became an
abnormal person who had lost she’s not during the
time and that is why it happened because of all the
physical battering, emotional battering, all the
psychological abuses that she had experienced from
her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she
extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated
as follows:
“Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective
personality test, what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical
Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that test is to find
out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me
the truth, or is she someone who can exaggerate or x
x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this
objective personality test?
Page 18 of 196
A She was a person who passed the honesty
test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust. That
the data that I’m gathering from her are the truth.”[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr.
Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which
was based on his interview and examination of Marivic
Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of
her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the
atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until “Ben started
to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time
Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.”
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he
showed toward his family, particularly to his wife. The
Report continued: “At first, it was verbal and emotional
abuses but as time passed, he became physically
abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her
husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a
painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she
suspected that her husband went for a drinking
[spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and
practically more than eight years, she was battered and
maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk.”
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts
were in vain. Further quoting from the Report, “[s]he also
sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-
meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was
happening to her. But incessant battering became more and
more frequent and more severe. x x x.”[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no
doubt in the Court’s mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was
a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by
the abused woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In
determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the
judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is
evaluating the events immediately surrounding the
incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert
evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives
and common law partners are both relevant and necessary.
“How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated
without it? The average member of the public may
ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of

treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a
man? How could she love a partner who beat her to the
point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life
for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person
confronted with the so-called ‘battered wife syndrome.’”[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one’s
viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an ordinary,
reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person
who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may
not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who
have not been through a similar experience. Expert opinion
is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as
her research on domestic violence, has had a significant
impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the
treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered
woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The
psychologist explains that the cyclical nature of the violence
inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latter’s
“ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel
trapped in the relationship with no means of escape.”[46] In
her years of research, Dr. Walker found that “the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are
in greater danger of dying then.”[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that
“the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen,
they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the
one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d]
their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them.”[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a
battered woman does not readily leave an abusive partner --
poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter’s belief
that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to
keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children,
and that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also
helpful. He had previously testified in suits involving violent
family relations, having evaluated “probably ten to twenty
thousand” violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result
of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became
a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon
City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of
severe domestic violence, in which the physical abuse on
the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of
consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that “overwhelming brutality, trauma”
could result in posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of
“anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism.”[51] After being
repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons “may
believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to
change their situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can
have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim’s ability
to muster an active response to try to escape further
trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that
anything she can do will have a predictable positive
effect.”[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at
the University of Pennsylvania, found that “even if a person
has control over a situation, but believes that she does not,
she will be more likely to respond to that situation with
coping responses rather than trying to escape.” He said that
it was the cognitive aspect -- the individual’s thoughts -- that
proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as
“learned helplessness.” “[T]he truth or facts of a situation
turn out to be less important than the individual’s set of
beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered
women don’t attempt to leave the battering situation, even
when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible,
because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe
that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances.”[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is
somehow responsible for the violent behavior of her partner,
she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that
there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer
from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the
relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with
her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means
of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves
she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for
specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the
repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a
long period of time, became afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient
Page 19 of 196
evidence that would support such a conclusion. More
specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would
confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the
“cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship
of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the
fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic
perfectly described the tension-building phase of the
cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident
does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other
words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering
episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or
build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic normally
respond to Ben’s relatively minor abuses? What means did
she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing
into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned that she
would usually run away to her mother’s or father’s
house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his
words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents
between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was
the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole
support of his emotional stability and well-
being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did
she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both
of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her
factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and fully
demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert
witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to explain
fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the
personality of the battered woman usually evolved or
deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings
inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse. They
corroborated each other’s testimonies, which were culled
from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them

-- if at all --based on which they concluded that she had
BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a
modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the
battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the
case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship
does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill
her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in
the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court
reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is the state
of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense[60] -
- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her
batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order
to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one
who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s
life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent
and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised
Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of
self-defense:[62]
“Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not
incur any criminal liability:
“1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights,
provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.”
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-
defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected
attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety
of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to
the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her
fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the
imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of
their children’s bedroom -- and based on past violent
incidents, there was a great probability that he would still
have pursued her and inflicted graver harm --then, the
imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have
ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering
from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the
time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic
battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before
she can defend her life “would amount to sentencing her to
‘murder by installment.’”[65] Still, impending danger (based on
the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior
to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be
shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy
the required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may
be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous,
does not warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such
aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivic’s
killing of Ben was not completely justified under the
circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not
raise any other modifying circumstances that would alter her
penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her
favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a
hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it
wholly for review on any issue, including that which has not
been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to
Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological Evaluation Report
dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
“This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The
repeated battering Marivic experienced with her husband
constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke
down her psychological resistance and natural self-
control. It is very clear that she developed heightened
Page 20 of 196
sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her
abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which can
only be ended by an act of violence on her part.” [70]
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He
explained that the effect of “repetitious pain taking,
repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment” as well
as the severity and the prolonged administration of the
battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.[71] Expounding
thereon, he said:
“Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious
battering. Second, the severity of the battering. Third,
the prolonged administration of battering or the
prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim
and another one is the public and social support
available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the
more she will go to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the
qualifications in terms of severity of the postraumatic
stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to
trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to
the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually
the very very severe stimulus that precipitate this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating
the victim like holding a pillow on the face,
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual,
and boxing the individual. In this situation therefore,
the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for
example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible
because the woman will not only protect herself, she is
also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened
to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness,
how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or
delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you
called delayed or [atypical]?

A The acute is the one that usually require only one
battering and the individual will manifest now a severe
emotional instability, higher irritability remorse,
restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute]
cases the first thing will be happened to the individual
will be thinking of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering,
repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is longer
than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to
six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become
chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after
six (6) months is chronic. The [a]typical one is the
repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal
and then become normal. This is how you get
neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder.” [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the
expert witness clarified further:
“Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered
woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his or her
mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her
rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.”[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence
inflicted upon appellant resulted in “cumulative provocation
which broke down her psychological resistance and natural
self-control,” “psychological paralysis,” and “difficulty in
concentrating or impairment of memory.”
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such
manifestations were analogous to an illness that diminished
the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however,
depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus,
a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence
or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be
taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful
as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It
has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime
Page 21 of 196
is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.[77] To paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should exercise of her will power without depriving her of
concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to consciousness of her acts.
produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from
considerable length of time, during which the accused might the violent aggression he had inflicted on her prior to the
recover her normal equanimity.[78] killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight
months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their
the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being killed by unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion
Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging and obfuscation on her part.
her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a
gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months
Second Legal Issue:
pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on
Treachery
that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an
aggression which was directed at the lives of both Marivic
and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in
able to retreat to a separate room, her emotional and mental
the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
state continued. According to her, she felt her blood
defense that the offended party might make.[81] In order to
pressure rise; she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of
qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked
fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of
must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; they
indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben
cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures,
kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
which have no place in the appreciation of
him.
evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion
itself.[83]
that there was no considerable period of time within which
Marivic could have recovered her normal
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo’s testimony[80]that with
trial court imposed the penalty of death upon appellant. It
“neurotic anxiety” -- a psychological effect on a victim of
inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact
“overwhelming brutality [or] trauma” -- the victim relives the
that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with
beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not
an “open, depressed, circular” fracture located at the back of
actually being beaten at the time. She cannot control “re-
his head. As to exactly how and when he had been fatally
experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
trauma that she suffered.” She thinks “of nothing but the
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads
suffering.” Such reliving which is beyond the control of a
us to the events surrounding his death:
person under similar circumstances, must have been what
Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and “Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
prevented her from recovering her normal dragged you? How did he drag you?
equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. COURT:
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
did not arise from the same set of facts.
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the
cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the

ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something
and then he kept on shouting at me that ‘you might as
well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me’
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about
to open the drawer but he could not open it because
he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which
contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room,
and on that very moment everything on my mind was
to pity on myself, then the feeling I had on that very
moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will
you please describe this blade about 3 inches long,
how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A It’s a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both
edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate
me.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up
the pipe and I smashed him and I ran to the other
room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like
what happened before when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my
blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was
about to die because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and
smashed him, the witness at the same time pointed at
the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I’ve been
through with him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was
Page 22 of 196
about to die also because of my blood pressure and
the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.”[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence
of treachery. There is no showing of the victim’s position
relative to appellant’s at the time of the shooting. Besides,
equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded
by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of
assault adopted by the aggressor must have been
consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose
of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.[86] There
is no showing, though, that the present appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any
retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her
only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her
batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that
she consciously and deliberately employed the method by
which she committed the crime in order to ensure its
execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by
one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5[88] of
the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period is imposable, considering that two mitigating
circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the
penalty by one degree, and no other modifying
circumstances were shown to have attended the commission
of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that

which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the
maximum shall be within the range of the medium period of
reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we
deem it just and proper to impose the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day
in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as
maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the
minimum period, she may now apply for and be released
from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered
woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple to analyze
and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present
case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a
modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal
manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis of
existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven
facts. To give a just and proper resolution of the case, it
endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted here
and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the
syndrome and the distinct personality of the chronically
abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellant’s counsel, Atty.
Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered
persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent
them. Neither can we amend the Revised Penal
Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-
defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We
now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of
the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized
at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering
episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at
the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable
-- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case,
however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa
for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being
two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her
penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the
minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her
from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful
cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., join Justice Santiago in her dissent.
Ynares-Santiago J., see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, and Quisumbing JJ., in the result.
DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide, our
esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
found that there was no factual basis to conclude that
Marivic was suffering from “Battered Woman Syndrome”
(BWS) at the time she took the life of her husband. With due
respect, I register my dissent.
The novel theory of "Battered Woman Syndrome" is
recognized in foreign jurisprudence as a form of self-
defense. It operates upon the premise that a woman who
has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of
time develops a fearful state of mind. Living in constant
danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are
almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her
intimate knowledge of the violent nature of her batterer
makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming,
and when it will seriously threaten her survival. Trapped in a
cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she
Page 23 of 196
would succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive
possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill
her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or
impending lethal aggression and thus would have no
opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts and to
choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.[1]
As exhaustively discussed in the ponencia, the "Battered
Woman Syndrome" has three phases, to wit: (1) the tension-
building phase, where minor batterings in the form of verbal
or slight physical abuse occurs. Here, the woman tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing
behavior; or by simply staying out of his way; (2) the acute
battering incident phase which is characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and sometimes, death. The battered woman
usually realizes that she cannot reason with him and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition; and (3) the
tranquil period, where the couple experience a compound
relief and the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner.
Contrary to the findings in the ponencia, the defense was
able to establish the occurrence on more than one occasion
of the "tension-building phase" of the cycle. The various
testimonies of appellant's witnesses clearly reveal that she
knew exactly when she would once again be subjected to
acute battery. Her cousin, Ecel Arano, testified that she often
asked the latter to sleep in her house as she was afraid
every time her husband came home drunk. Clearly,
whenever appellant requested for Arano's company, she
was experiencing a tension-building phase. The barangay
captain, Panfilo Tero, also testified that appellant sought his
help two months before she killed her husband, again
demonstrating that she was in the tension-building phase
and was attempting to prevent another incident of acute
battery. Appellant presented evidence to prove that the
tension-building phase would occur whenever her husband
would go out looking for other women, would lose at
cockfights or would come home drunk. She often tried to
ignore her husband's attitude or, as testified to by some
witnesses for the prosecution, even shouted back, fought off
or even injured her husband during the tension-building
phase, if only to prevent the onset of acute battery.
Appellant was able to perfectly describe the tension-building
phase of the cycle immediately prior to the death of her
husband, i.e., when she knew or felt that she was going to
be killed by the deceased. She could not possibly have
testified with clarity as to prior tension-building phases in the
cycle as she had never tried to kill her husband before this
time.

It was shown by the testimonies of appellant and even
witnesses for the prosecution that appellant would seek
shelter in her mother's or her father's house after an acute
battering incident, after which would begin the process of
begging for forgiveness, promises of change in behavior and
return to the conjugal home, only for the same cycle to begin
all over again.
To require appellant to prove the state of mind of the
deceased, as seems to be required in the ponencia, would
mean that no person would ever be able to prove self-
defense in a battered woman case. Appellant could not
possibly prove whether the deceased felt provoked into
battering by any act or omission of appellant. She cannot
possibly prove that she felt herself to be the sole support of
the deceased's emotional stability and well-being.
Nevertheless, appellant felt trapped and helpless in the
relationship as, in the end, she resorted to killing her
husband as no one could or did help her, whether out of fear
or insensitivity, during the violent marriage she endured.
The "acute battering incident stage" was well demonstrated
by the severe beatings suffered by Marivic in the hands of
the deceased as well as the threats to kill her using a bolo or
a cutter.[2] The physical abuses occurred at least 3 times a
week in the 11 miserable years of their marriage,[3] six
incidents of which were documented by the 1990-1995
medical records of Marivic. They included, among others,
hematoma, contusion, and pain on the breasts; multiple
contusions and trauma on the different parts of her body
even during her pregnancy in 1995.[4] The tranquil period
underwent by Marivic was shown by the repeated “kiss and
make-up” episodes of their relationship. On more than 5
occasions, Marivic ran to her parents’ house after violent
fights with the deceased only to forgive the latter every time
he would fetch her and promise to change.[5]
All these recurring phases of cycle of violence, repentance
and forgiveness developed a trauma in the mind of Marivic
making her believe that a forthcoming attack from the
deceased would cause her death. This state of mind of
Marivic was revealed in her testimony given way back in
1998, before she was examined by experts on BWS.
Unaware of the significance of her declarations, she candidly
narrated how she felt immediately before she killed the
deceased, thus -
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about
to open the drawer but he could not open it because
he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was pity
on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx[6]
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the room, I felt the same thing like what
happened before I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I
was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure has
raised. I was frightened I was about to die because of
my blood pressure.
xxx xxx xxx
A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been
through him, I took pity on myself and I felt I was about
to die also because of my blood pressure and the
baby, so I got the gun and shot him.[7]
It must be stressed that the defense of "Battered Woman
Syndrome" was not raised by Marivic before the lower court
but only here on automatic review. This makes the foregoing
testimony more worthy of great weight and credence
considering that the same could not have been cunningly
given to suit or conform to the profile of a battered woman.
Moreover, there was indeed basis for Marivic to fear death
because of her medical history. Dr. Dino Caing testified that
he treated Marivic for hypertension due to domestically
Page 24 of 196
related emotional stress on 23 separate occasions. The
latest one was on November 6, 1995 when she suffered
from severe hypertension and had a blood pressure of
180/120 on the 8th month of her pregnancy.[8]
Furthermore, Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, a clinical psychologist
and an expert on BWS who examined Marivic, assessed the
effects of the repeated violence on the latter as follows:
A What I remember ... was it was more than ten years
that she was suffering from emotional anguish. There
were a lot of instance of abuses, ... emotional
abuse...verbal abuse and... physical abuse. The
husband had very meager income, she was the one
who was practically the bread earner of the family.
The husband was involved in a lot of vices, going out
with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing, being
involved in cockfighting and in going home very angry
which... triggered a lot of physical abuse. She also had
the experience of taunting from the husband for the
reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she
was carrying was not his own. So she was very angry,
she was at the same time very depressed because
she .. .[felt] almost like living in purgatory or even in
hell when it was happening day in and day out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what was it that triggered ... that tragedy in your
opinion?
A I think for several weeks, she was already having all
those tensions, all those anxieties, they were not
enough, that the husband was even going to
cockfighting x x x
A[9] She was angry with him, he was angry with her and I
think he dragged her and even spun her around. She
tried to fight him so there was a lot of fight and when
she was able to escape, she went to another room
and she locked herself with the children. And when the
husband was for a while very angry he calms down
then and then (sic). But I remember before that the
husband was looking for the gun and I think he was
not able to open the cabinet because she had the key.
So during that time, I remember, that she was very
much afraid of him, so when the husband calmed
down and he was asleep, all she was concerned was
to end up her misery, to save her child which she was
 Page 25 of 196

carrying and to save her two children. I believe that
somehow she's not rational.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. TRUYA
Q Mrs. Witness, being an expert witness, giving more
the facts and circumstances on this case that the
books you studied in the expertise in line and in the 77
hour contact with appellant Mrs. Genosa, could you
say that this is not ordinary self-defense but a survival
on her part?
A Yes, sir.
Q To what she did to her husband (sic)?
A Yes, sir this is not an ordinary self-defense, but this [is]
a need to survive, a need to survive with her two sons
and [the] child she's bringing.
Q Had she not able to kill her husband, would she still be
in the very short moment with the victim (sic)?
A If she did not do that she believes that she will be the
one who would be killed.[10]
There is no doubt therefore that Marivic was afflicted with the
"Battered Woman Syndrome" and that it was an
apprehension of death and the instinct to defend her and her
unborn child's life that drove her to kill her husband.
The ponente further refused to sustain the self-defense
proffered by Marivic because there was allegedly no
aggression or danger posed on her life by the victim at the
time she attacked the latter. Again, I beg to disagree.
Traditionally, in order that self-defense may be appreciated,
the unlawful aggression or the attack must be imminent and
actually in existence. This interpretation must, however, be
re-evaluated vis-á-vis the recognized inherent characteristic
of the psyche of a person afflicted with the "Battered Woman
Syndrome." As previously discussed, women afflicted by this
syndrome live in constant fear for their life and thus respond
in self-defense. Once BWS and an impending danger based
on the conduct of the deceased in previous battering
episodes are established, actual occurrence of an assault is
no longer a condition sine qua non before self defense may
be upheld. Threatening behavior or communication can
satisfy the required imminence of danger. As stated in the
ponencia, to require the battered person to await an obvious
deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount
to sentencing her to murder by installment. Q You said the children were scared, what else
happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?
In the case at bar, the cycle of violence perpetrated by the
deceased, which culminated in the physical assaults and an A He was about to attack me so I ran to the room.
attempt to shoot Marivic when she was 8 months pregnant,
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
took the place of unlawful aggression, thus entitling her to a
complete self defense even if there was A When I attempted] to run he held my hands and he
no actual employment of violence by the deceased at the whirled me and I fell [on] the bedside.[11]
time of the killing. Marivic had every reason to believe that
the deceased would kill her that night not only because the xxx xxx xxx
latter was verbally threatening to kill her while attempting to
get a gun from the drawer, but more importantly because the COURT
deceased wounded her on the wrist with a bolo, and
To the witness
because of the deceased's previous conduct of threatening
to cut her throat with a cutter which he kept in his wallet. xxx xxx xxx
Quoted hereunder are the relevant testimonies of Marivic -
Q The bolo that you said which Ben was holding at that
time, [was] it a bolo or a knife?
A When I arrived home, he was already in his usual
behavior. A Bolo.
xxx xxx xxx Q Were you wounded or were there inflictions on your
body when he was holding and trying to frighten you
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly [with] that bolo?
behavior.
A No, only here.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT INTERPRETER
A He was nagging ... me at that time and I just ignore[d]
him because I want to avoid trouble for fear that he will (The witness pointed to her wrist).
beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because
I just ignore[d] hi[s] provocation and he switch off the COURT
light and I said to him, "why did you switch off the light
To the witness
when the children were there." At that time I was also
attending to my children who were doing their Q You were demonstrating a motion, whirling, did your
assignments. He was angry with me for not answering husband really whirl you?
his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and g[o]t a
bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from A Yes, your Honor.
watching television.
Q How did he whirl you?
xxx xxx xxx
A Whirled around.
A He switch[ed] off the light and the children were
Q Just like spinning.
shouting because they were scared and he was
already holding a bolo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How do you describe this bolo?
Q Where did he whirl you, was it inside the bedroom or
A 1 1/2 feet. outside?
xxx xxx xxx A In our bedroom.
Q Then after the whirling what happened?

A He kicked my ass and then I screamed.[12]
xxx xxx xxx
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where
he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do...?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.[13]
xxx xxx xxx
A I was frightened that my husband would hurt me, so I
packed all his things then on the following day I will
leave, I was afraid and I want to make sure I would
deliver my baby safely.[14]
xxx xxx xxx
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and got
angry with me for packing his clothes, then he dragged
me again outside of the bedroom holding my neck.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he
dragged you? How did he drag... you?
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her
right hand flexed forcibly in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backwards.
ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something
and then he kept shouting at me that "you might as
well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened when you were brought to the
drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about
to open the drawer but he could not open it because
he did not have the key. [T]hen he pulled his wallet
which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was
aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his
arm and then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he
used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe about that
long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the room, and
on that very moment everything on my mind was pity
on myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment
was the same when I was admitted in PHILPHOS
Clinic, I was about to vomit.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will
you please
describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A It's a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both
edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes sir, that was the object used when he intimidate
me.[15]
RE-DIRECT BY ATTY. TABUCANON
Q In other words, there were two (2) incidents, the first
incident and then he left and then two (2) hours after
he came back?
Page 26 of 196
A Yes, sir.
Q And the whirling happened in the first incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the dragging with arms flexed in her neck and on
that blade
happened on the second incident (sic)?
A Ye, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
To the witness
Q Why, what is that blade about?
A A cutter about 3 inches long.
Q Who used that?
A Ben.
Q He used that on you?
A He scared me on that (sic).
xxx xxx xxx
Q But he did not hit you with that?
A Yes, because I managed to run every time he scared
(sic).[16]
There are many things which cannot be proved by direct
evidence. One of this is state of mind. In the case at bar,
there is more than sufficient physical evidence presented by
the appellant from which her mental state can be inferred.
The prosecution did not object to the presentation of these
physical and testimonial pieces of evidence, namely, the
medical records of 23 instances of domestic violence-related
injuries and the testimonies of neighbors, cousins and even
the barangay captain. Indeed, no person would endure 23
reported instances of beatings if she were planning to kill her
spouse in the first place. The majority need not worry that
women around the country will mastermind the killings of
their husbands and then use this Decision to bolster their
attempts to employ the BWS defense.
Moreover, as found in the ponencia, appellant should be
allowed the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation. This, at the very least, supports a finding that
 Page 27 of 196

the acts of violence and battery committed by the deceased
were illegal and unlawful and were committed immediately
before appellant could recover her natural equanimity. But
what is the natural equanimity of a battered woman?
Appellant was not a normal married woman. She can never
be in a state of natural equanimity as she was in a constant
state of alertness and hypersensitivity to the next phase of
acute battery. The esteemed ponente also correctly found
that the appellant acted with diminished will-power.
However, he failed to go further. In the case of People v.
Javier,[17] it was held:
fear. This would however be an empty victory if we
deliberately close our eyes to the antecedents of this case.
The facts are simple. Marivic was suffering from the
"Battered Woman Syndrome" and was defending herself
when she killed her husband. Her acquittal of the charge of
parricide is therefore in order.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to ACQUIT Marivic Genosa.

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing,

it is incumbent upon him to prove the claimed mitigating
circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the
testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when he
killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of the
killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of
accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and
conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown
that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which
diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the
killing.[18]

In the case at bar, appellant was allowed and did in fact

present clear and convincing evidence that she was a
battered woman for 13-14 years and that she suffered from
the "Battered Woman Syndrome". Expert testimony was
presented and admitted to this effect, such that
the ponente ably discussed the causes and effects of the
syndrome. To ignore the testimony and the evidence thus
presented is to make impossible the proof of mental state.
Evidence as to the mental state need not be also "beyond
reasonable doubt.”

Verily, the requirement of threatening behavioral pattern of

the batterer in previous violent episodes was sufficiently
satisfied in the present case. This, juxtaposed to Marivic's
affliction with BWS justified the killing of the deceased. The
danger posed or created in her mind by the latter's threats
using bladed weapons, bred a state of fear, where under the
circumstances, the natural response of the battered woman
would be to defend herself even at the cost of taking the life
of the batterer.

The ponencia's acknowledgement of "Battered Woman

Syndrome" as a valid form of self-defense, is a noble
recognition of the plight of, and a triumph for battered
women who are trapped in a culture of silence, shame, and

[ G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004 ]
VICKY C. TY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty (“Ty”) filed the instant Petition for
Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No.
20995, promulgated on 31 July 2001. The Decision affirmed
with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her
guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22[2] (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven
(7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the
RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal
Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465. The accusatory
portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465
reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila
Doctors’ Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha
L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712 dated May 30, 1993
payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount
of P30,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for “Account
Closed” and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the
amount of the check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice.
Contrary to law.[3]
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the
number of the checks and dates of issue. The data are
hereunder itemized as follows:
Page 28 of 196
Criminal Check Postdated Amount (7) Informations subject of the instant case.[10]
Case No. No.
For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks
93- 487710 30 March P30,000.00 because of “an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury.” She
130459 1993 averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain
release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and
93- 487711 30 April P30,000.00
harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
130460 1993
bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of
93- 487709 01 March P30,000.00 room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator
130461 1993 and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as
the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her
93- 487707 30 P30,000.00 mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s gown and
130462 December bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s suspending
1992 medical treatment of her mother. The “debasing treatment,”
she pointed out, so affected her mother’s mental,
93- 487706 30 P30,000.00 psychological and physical health that the latter
130463 November contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from
1992 the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to
comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled
93- 487708 30 January P30,000.00
to sign a promissory note, open an account
130464 1993
with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother’s
93- 487712 30 May P30,000.00[4] immediate discharge.[11]
130465 1993
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the
prosecution, the trial court found that Ty issued the checks
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her
arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty.[5] mother and rejected the theory of the defense.[12] Thus, on
21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and
Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’ sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of
Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June the Decision reads:
1992. Being the patient’s daughter, Ty signed the
“Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment” in the CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of
Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.[6] As of 4 issuing seven (7) checks in payment of a valid obligation,
June 1992, the Statement of Account[7] shows the total which turned unfounded on their respective dates of
liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Ty’s maturity, is found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of
sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced to suffer
May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a
amount of P418,410.55.[8] The total hospital bills of the two total of forty-two (42) months.
patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty
executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment SO ORDERED.[13]
of the obligation in installments.[9] To assure payment of the
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial
obligation, she drew several postdated checks against
court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated her
Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks,
defense that she issued the checks “under the impulse of an
each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a
on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the
greater evil or injury.” She also argued that the trial court
drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to
erred in finding her guilty when evidence showed there was
insufficiency of funds, with the “Account Closed”
absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the
advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent
checks and the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of
demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand
funds in the account. She protested that the trial court
letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven

should not have applied the law mechanically, without due
regard to the principles of justice and equity.[14]
In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It
set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced
Ty “to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00)
equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each
case.”[15]
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s
defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks
and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s
lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of
issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it
being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the
issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which
it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance.[16]
Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was
no valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks as
they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s
mother.[17]
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the
appellate court applied the case of Vaca v. Court of
Appeals[18] wherein this Court declared that in determining
the penalty imposed for violation of B.P. 22, the philosophy
underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be
observed, i.e., redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of
the social order.[19]
Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the
same issues raised before the Court of Appeals. More
specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based
on the following grounds:
A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED
TO OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE
ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE
IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF
A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A
GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY
SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OFTHE
SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE
OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE
LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS
WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT [,]
SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW
MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT DUE REGARD TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
[20]
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a check issued as
an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for
payment, has the same effect as an ordinary check; hence, it
falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check
is presented for payment, the drawee bank will generally
accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said
obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance of a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere
act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[21]
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly
sustain Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that
the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances
which would substantially affect the disposition of the
case.[22] Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from
the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors
of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose factual
findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
Page 29 of 196
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.[23]
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason
to reverse the factual findings arrived at by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks
subject of this case. She, however, claims that the issuance
of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or
injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was
no valuable consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable
fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a greater evil or
injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are
best determined by the trial court. And, as previously
intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of
the defense and rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments
unsuccessfully raised before the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions
already passed upon twice below, rather than questions of
law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised—whether the defense of
uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from
criminal liability—has to be resolved in the negative. For this
exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an
uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent;
and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal
to that committed.[24]
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable
fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man
would have succumbed to it.[25] It should be based on a real,
imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb.[26] A mere
threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be
speculative, fanciful, or remote.[27] A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not
only without will but against his will as well.[28] It must be of
such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for
escape.[29]
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was
not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to
issue the checks—a condition the hospital allegedly

demanded of her before her mother could be discharged—
for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further
due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her
mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is
not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness
was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the
hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would
induce a well-grounded apprehension of her
death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear
exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioner’s
flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other
words, the fear she invokes was not impending or
insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her
a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the
hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left
with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take
advantage of the many opportunities available to her to
avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted
that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the
discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated
checks or jewelry.[30] And if indeed she was coerced to open
an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all
the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the
issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of
B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not
to open a current account nor issue postdated checks
“because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big
problem.”[31] Besides, apart from petitioner’s bare assertion,
the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and
bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to
cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of
her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the
Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this
paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done
to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.[32]
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future,
this defense is not applicable.[33] Ty could have taken
advantage of an available option to avoid committing a
crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give
jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated
checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be
availing, the greater injury feared should not have been
brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so,
the willful inaction of the actor.[34] In this case, the issuance
of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own
failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of
liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been
able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was
done without her full volition. Under the circumstances,
however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor
avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance
of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial
court in the Civil Case[35] for damages filed by Ty’s mother
against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of
disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may
establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only
be supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not
necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to free Ty from
liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon
issuance of the checks, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the same was issued for valuable
consideration.[36] Section 24[37] of the Negotiable Instruments
Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument
acquired the same for a consideration[38] or for value.[39] In
alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks
were issued without consideration. She must present
convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to
discharge her burden of proof. “Valuable consideration may
in general terms, be said to consist either in some right,
interest, profit, or benefit accruing to the party who makes
the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or
undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined, valuable
Page 30 of 196
consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do
in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the
maker or indorser.”[40]
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services
and the facilities of the hospital. For the care given to her
kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by
virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her
signature on her mother’s Contract of Admission
acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills
was not her personal obligation because she was not the
patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the
checks, the case of Bridges v. Vann, et al.[41] tells us that “it
is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the
maker to say that there was no consideration which was
beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the
consideration was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or
a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of the
promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or
privilege or suffers some detriment and the release and
extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann,
Sr., for that of appellants meets the requirement. Appellee
accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid,
subsisting obligation for the note executed by the
appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for the
new notes.”
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a
bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.[42] B.P. 22
does not make any distinction as to whether the checks
within its contemplation are issued in payment of an
obligation or to merely guarantee the obligation.[43] The
thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks
and putting them into circulation.[44] As this Court held in Lim
v. People of the Philippines,[45] “what is primordial is that
such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its
worthlessness is known to the appellant at the time of their
issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22.”
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22
provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. -
The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of
which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient
funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within

ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not
been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of
the checks for insufficiency of funds.[46] If not rebutted, it
suffices to sustain a conviction.[47]
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the
fact that she did not have sufficient funds with the drawee
bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her
liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of
funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is immaterial as
deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by
B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a
bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof
is inconsequential.[48]
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of
Appeals[49] wherein this Court inquired into the true nature of
transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally
acquitted the accused, to persuade the Court that the
circumstances surrounding her case deserve special
attention and do not warrant a strict and mechanical
application of the law.
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material
operative facts therein obtaining are different from those
established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the
bounced checks were issued to cover a “warranty deposit” in
a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the
financier of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby
the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while
privately financing those in desperate need so they may be
accommodated. The maker of the check thus became an
unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a
lease-purchase agreement. The maker did not benefit at all
from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral
for an accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an
actual account or credit for value.
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the
receipt of an actual “account or for value.” Substantial
evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals,
has established that the checks were issued in payment of
Page 31 of 196
the hospital bills of Ty’s mother. subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance
with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors’
penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof that petitioner Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos
was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the
faith. Administrative Circular 12-2000,[50] adopting the dishonored checks. Costs against the petitioner.
rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[51] and Lim v.
People,[52] authorizes the non-imposition of the penalty of SO ORDERED.
imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain
conditions. However, the Court resolves to modify the Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,
penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-2001[53] which JJ., concur.
clarified Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein: Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No.
12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of
preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a
fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-
2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative
penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned
may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best
serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to
impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of
the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise
be contrary to the imperatives of justice; (3) should only a
fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine,
there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised
Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.[54]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 31 July
2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to
pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each
dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with

[ G.R. No. 184343, March 02, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. JESUS DOMINGO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511,
modifying the Decision[2] dated 13 November 2006 of Branch
13 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder in Criminal Cases No.
1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in
Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000,
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, and
frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
On 7 March 2003, six Informations[3] were filed before the
RTC charging appellant with the following offenses:
Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000 for Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and
screw driver and with intent to kill one Marvin G. Indon, with
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife
and screw driver said Marvin G. Indon, hitting him on his
body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly
caused his death."
Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000 for Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and
screw driver and with intent to kill one Melissa G. Indon, with
evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife
and screw driver said Melissa G. Indon, hitting her on
different parts of her body thereby inflicting thereon mortal
wounds which directly caused her death."
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with kitchen knife and screw
driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation and treachery attack, assault and
hit with the said screw driver one Michelle G. Indon, a minor
of 9 years old, hitting her on her back and buttocks, thereby
inflicting on her serious physical injuries which ordinarily
would have caused the death of the said Michelle G. Indon,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, this is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Michelle G. Indon."
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and
screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw
driver one Ronaldo Galvez, hitting him on different part of his
body, thereby inflicting on him serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of Ronaldo Galvez,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ronaldo Galvez."
Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife and
screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack,
assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw
driver one Raquel Gatpandan Indon, hitting her on the
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting on her serious
physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the
death of the said Raquel Gatpandan Indon, thus performing
all the acts of execution which should have produced the
crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that
Page 32 of 196
is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Raquel Gatpandan Indon."
Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000 for Attempted Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the
municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a kettle and with intent to
kill one Jeffer G. Indon, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and
treachery, commence the commission of murder directly by
overt acts, that is by attacking, assaulting, and hitting the
said Jeffer G. Indon, a 2 year old boy, with the kettle, hitting
the latter on his head, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries and if the accused was not able to accomplish his
purpose, that is to kill the said Jeffer G. Indon, it was not
because of his voluntary desistance but due to the timely
intervention of third persons."
On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, was arraigned and he entered separatepleas of
"Not Guilty" to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial
conference was held, and trial ensued accordingly.[4]
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of
complainants Raquel Indon, Jeffer Indon, and Michelle
Indon; Dr. Jacinto Caluag; Police Officer (PO) 3 Asher
Villegas and PO2 Rogelio Santos.
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m.
and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March 2000, she and her minor children
Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside
their house in Caingin, San Rafael, Bulacan, when she was
awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door
open. Raquel narrated that she immediately recognized the
accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Armed
with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord
of the mosquito net and repeatedly stabbed her, using the
six-inch screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She
screamed and was heard by her sister-in-law, whose house
was contiguous to theirs. When her sister-in-law asked her
for the identity of the assailant, she immediately identified
herein appellant as "Doser," a name by which he is known in
the community. Appellant was angered by her reply and
said, "Anong Doser?" and thereafter pulled a kitchen knife
from his right side and stabbed her on the stomach. When
she tried to escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin
rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards
the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down
and appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then

proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm
and twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a
result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant
returned back to the house, towards Raquel's two daughters
Michelle and Melissa. When Raquel pleaded that the
appellant spare her daughters' lives, he retorted: "Ngayon
pa, nagawa ko na." Melissa died because of the stab
wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle,
who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained
serious physical injuries. The appellant also attacked two-
year-old Jeffer by striking him on the head with the
screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of
Raquel's sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but
the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez,
came to their rescue and tried to subdue the
appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost consciousness. She also
relayed that she was later informed that a struggle ensued
between appellant and Galvez. Appellant inflicted wounds
on Galvez's upper left chest and arms, after which Galvez
was able to hit appellant with a piece of wood, which
rendered the latter unconscious. Raquel, Melissa, Marvin,
Jeffer, Galvez and the appellant were taken to the hospital.[5]
Raquel also testified that she spent P15,000.00 for the
casket of Melissa Indon, P27,000.00 for the burial expenses
of Melissa Indon and Marvin Indon, and approximately
P30,000.00 for the food served during their wake. She also
stated that because of her stab wounds, she spent
P90,000.00 for hospitalization expenses and
medicines. However, the receipts were lost except those
issued by Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial
Hospital.[6]
Jeffer Indon, who was five years old at the time he testified,
stated that the scar on his forehead was the result of the
stab wound inflicted by Doser. However, on cross-
examination, he admitted that he did not know who stabbed
him.[7]
Michelle Indon identified the appellant as the man who
stabbed her mother, her brother Marvin and her sister
Melissa. She testified that the appellant stabbed her in the
back once. Thereafter, she hid under the papag. She
related that she did not go to the hospital anymore, because
a certain Nanang Ella had already seen to her stab wound.[8]
Dr. Jacinto Caluag stated under oath that he treated Raquel
Indon for multiple stab wounds. He testified that he also
assisted in the operation on Raquel to repair her liver and
gallbladder, which were damaged. He also disclosed that
Raquel would have gone into shock and died had she not
been given medical attention.[9]
Police officers Asher Villegas and Rogelio Santos testified
that they proceeded to the scene of the crime after the
neighbors of the complainant reported the incident. When
they arrived at the crime scene, appellant was already tied
up. They took pictures of the victims, while the kitchen knife
and the screwdriver allegedly used by the appellant were
turned over to Police Officer Villegas. The complainants and
the appellant were then brought to the hospital. They
recorded the incident in the Police Blotter and prepared the
statements of the witnesses. After the accused was treated
for injuries, he was brought to the police station and
detained. When asked why he committed the crime,
accused denied knowledge of what happened.[10]
In an Order dated 10 July 2003, the trial court ordered that
Ronaldo Galvez's testimony during his direct examination be
stricken off the records due to his absences on the days he
was scheduled to be cross-examined.[11]
The documentary evidence offered by the prosecution
included the following: (1) the sketches of Raquel Indon's
house, to prove that the light from the kitchen allowed her to
identify the appellant, marked as Exhibits "A to A-6;" (2) the
Death Certificate of Marvin Indon marked as Exhibit "D;" (3)
the Medico-Legal Certificates of Raquel Indon, Marvin Indon,
Jeffer Indon, and Ronaldo Galvez marked as Exhibits "E,"
"F," "H," and "L," respectively; (4) the Birth Certificates of
Marvin Indon and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits "B" and
"N;" (5) pictures of Melissa Indon's lifeless body marked as
Exhibits "G" and "O;" (6) Sworn Statements of Ronaldo
Galvez and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits "K" and "M;"
(7) Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses incurred
by Raquel Indon, issued by Sagrada Familia Hospital in the
amount of P38,500.00, marked as Exhibit "I;" and (8)
Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by
Raquel Indon, issued by the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, in
the amount of P7,843.00, marked as Exhibit "J."[12]
In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he
was in good terms with the Indon family and that he had no
record of mental illness. However on 20 March 2000, he
went to East Avenue Medical Center for a medical check-up,
and he was advised to have an operation. He suffered from
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and
nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. He
averred that when he regained his memory, one week had
already passed since the incidents, and he was already
detained. He only came to know of the incidents from his
sister and his children who visited him. On cross-
Page 33 of 196
examination he admitted that when he regained his memory,
he did not even ask the police officers why he was
incarcerated.[13]
Dr. Regienald Afroilan, a witness for the defense, also
testified that appellant was first brought to the National
Center for Mental Health (Center) in August 2004 for a
psychiatric evaluation, psychological examination and final
testing to determine if he could stand trial. Dr. Afroilan
stated that based on his evaluation, appellant suffered from
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the
presence of delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized
speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low
frustration tolerance. He could not find out when the
appellant started to suffer this illness, but the symptoms of
Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient
indicated that he suffered from the illness six months before
the Center examined the appellant. On cross-examination,
he clarified that the evaluation finding that appellant suffered
from Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant
submitted himself to examination.[14]
In a Decision dated 13 November 2006, the RTC decreed
that the appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-00 and No. 1497-M-
00, frustrated homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1499-M-00
and No. 1500-M-00, and attempted homicide in Criminal
Cases No. 1498-M-00 and No. 1501-M-00. The RTC gave
credence to the principal eyewitness, Raquel Indon, whose
testimony was corroborated by Michelle Indon, regarding
appellant's attack on 29 March 2000. The trial court found
the appellant's defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what
was presented was proof of appellant's mental disorder that
existed five years after the incident, but not at the time the
crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial
that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to
Raquel Indon's pleas that her daughters be spared by
saying, "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na." It also noted that
based on the psychiatrist's findings, the appellant was
competent to stand trial. However, the trial court declared
that there were no qualifying circumstances to support the
charges of Murder, Frustrated Murder or Attempted
Murder.[15] The dispositive part of the Decision dated 13
November 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of:
a) In Crim. Case No. 1496-M-00, Homicide, for the death of
Marvin G. Indon, minor and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision

mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P75,000.00.
b) In Crim. Case No. 1497-M-00, Homicide, for the death of
Melissa Indon, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P75,000.00.
c) In Crim. Case No. 1498-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years
of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of P10,000.00.
d) In Crim. Case No. 1499-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify
the private complainant Ronaldo Galvez in the amount of
P30,000.00.
e) In Crim. Case No. 1500-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify
the private complainant Raquel Gatpandan Indon in the
amount of P30,000.00. Likewise, accused is further directed
to pay to the private complainant herein the sum of
P90,000.00 to cover hospitalization and medical expenses;
P42,000.00 to cover the casket and burial expenses for
Melissa and Marvin, and P30,000.00 for food expenses, all
by way of actual damages.
f) In Crim. Case No. 1501-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years
of prision correccional as maximum, and to indemnify the
private complainant in the amount of P10,000.00.[16]
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, wherein he faulted the
RTC for not taking note of the inconsistencies in Raquel
Indon's testimony and for not giving due weight to his
defense of insanity.[17] In a Decision dated 30 April 2008, the
appellate court adjudged that Raquel Indon's testimony was
credible, and that the inconsistency pointed out by
appellant—whether or not Raquel was standing up or lying
down when appellant stabbed her legs—referred to minor
details. Moreover, insanity exempts the accused only when
the finding of mental disorder refers to appellant's state of
mind immediately before or at the very moment of the
commission of the crime. This was not the case when
appellant was first medically examined more than four years
after the commission of the crimes. Appellant's response to
Raquel Indon's pleas also proved that his faculties of
reasoning were unimpaired at the time of the attack against
Raquel's children.[18]
The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTC's
Decision dated 13 November 2006 and declared that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, which was alleged in
the six Informations along with evident pre-meditation, was
adequately proven by the prosecution. Raquel Indon,
Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer
Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had
not even given the slightest provocation when appellant
attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the killing of
Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who could not
be expected to defend themselves against an adult, was
considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for
murder. The penalties imposed were adjusted accordingly.
Appellant's conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal
Case No. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution
failed to prove appellant's treachery or evident premeditation
in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the
scene of the crime to subdue the appellant.[19]
The Court of Appeals also modified the trial court's award of
damages. It reduced the civil indemnity of P75,000.00
awarded by the trial court, occasioned by the deaths of
Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, to P50,000.00 and
awarded the heirs of each murder victim moral damages in
the amount of P50,000.00. The awards for funeral expenses
of P42,000.00 and food expenses of P30,000.00 were
deleted by the appellate court for lack of sufficient evidence
to support the same. The appellate court awarded Raquel
Indon civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages of
P25,000.00, but reduced the actual damages of P90,000.00
awarded by the RTC to P46,343.00, in accordance with the
Statement of Accounts from Sagrada Familia Hospital and
Bulacan Provincial Hospital. It affirmed the trial court's
award for moral damages of P10,000.00 in favor of Michelle
Indon and P10,000.00 in favor of Jeffer Indon. Moral
damages of P25,000.00 were also awarded by the appellate
court in favor of Ronaldo Galvez.[20]
In the Decision dated 30 April 2008, the fallo reads:
Page 34 of 196
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 13,
2006 of the trial court is modified as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jesus Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marvin Indon the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. The trial court's award of funeral and food
expenses of P42,000.00 and P30,000.00 respectively, are
hereby deleted.
2) In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jesus Domingo is convicted of the crime of murder and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Melissa Indon the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of attempted murder
and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
ten (10) years of prision mayormedium, as the maximum
penalty and to pay Michelle Indon P10,000.00 as moral
damages.
4) In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of frustrated
homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay Ronaldo
Galvez P25,000.00 as moral damages.
5) In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of frustrated murder
and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay
Raquel Indon the amount of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P46, 343.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
6) In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, accused-appellant
Jose Domingo is convicted of the crime of attempted murder
and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to
ten (10) years of prision mayormedium, as the maximum
penalty and to pay Jefferson (sic) Indon P10,000.00 as
moral damages.[21]

Hence, the present petition where the appellant reiterates
the assignment of errors that were raised before the Court of
Appeals, to wit:
I positively testified that she was carrying her son Marvin
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT; and
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT EXEMPTING HIM
FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN VIEW OF HIS INSANITY
AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME.[22]
This Court affirms the judgment of conviction.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution,
Raquel Indon, is assailed by appellant for not being credible
due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of
conformity with the experience of ordinary men.
Appellant refers to Raquel's testimony during cross-
examination wherein she narrated that after the appellant
entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who
lived next door, responded by asking Raquel who her
assailant was, and the latter identified the
appellant. Appellant claims that the conversation between
Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary
course of things, and that the initial reaction of people in
such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in
order to save those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel
also testified during cross-examination that the appellant
stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also
argued that the appellant could not have stabbed the front of
her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when
she fell down.
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with,
there was nothing out of the ordinary as regards Raquel's
testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing
unusual about the sister-in-law's query as to who was
attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely
consisted of this question and the reply to it, it would not
even be accurate to refer to it as a
"conversation." Secondly, it was not impossible for the
appellant to stab the front of Raquel's legs, had her legs
been positioned sideways when she fell. But more
importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the
substantial aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and
when she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the
appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter proceeded to stab
Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony
was supported by the Medico-Legal Reports marked as
Exhibits "E" and "F." Any inconsistencies in such peripheral
details would not exculpate the appellant.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely
deprived of intelligence during the commission of the alleged
crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal
liability in accordance with Article 12, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Penal Code.[23] However, this claim is not
supported by evidence.
Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only
proof that he was insane at the time he committed the crime.
He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he
suffered from lack of appetite, sleeplessness, and
anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him
to kill bad people. He claims that he does not remember
anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the crimes
were committed, and that he was already detained when he
became conscious of his surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound
mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are
done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of a crime
who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the
burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that he or she
was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime
was committed.[24]
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when the accused
is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or
there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially
if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of
the mental faculties and is manifested in language and
conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequences of his or her
acts.[25]
Page 35 of 196
Even assuming that appellant's testimony is credible, his
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness and his hearing
imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental
condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will
or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of
mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular
conception of the word "crazy" is used to describe a person
or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a
person acted in a crazy or deranged manner days before the
commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he
is legally insane and will not grant him or her absolution.[26]
Raquel Indon's narration of the events presents evidence
that is more revealing of appellant's mental state at the time
the crime was committed. Appellant's reply to her pleas that
her daughters' lives be spared, "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na,"
was a positive sign that he was aware of what he was doing,
and that his reasoning faculties were unimpaired.
The trial court found the testimony of Raquel Indon more
credible than that of the accused, and its findings were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the
trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding
upon this Court. This Court does not generally disturb the
findings of fact of the trial court because it is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the stand. Unless
there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and
circumstances that might alter the result of the case, the
findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and
even accorded finality by this Court.[27]
It is also remarkable that appellant's testimony is not
supported by his family's or intimate friends' accounts of his
purported insanity. Appellant testified that he had been
suffering from symptoms of insanity nine days before the
incident. Insanity may be shown by the surrounding
circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such as
evidence of the allegedly deranged person's general conduct
and appearance, his conduct consistent with his previous
character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, as well
as his improvident bargains.[28] It is difficult to believe that
appellant's behavior, conduct and appearance, which would
denote mental disturbance, escaped the notice of his family
and friends.
Appellant draws attention to the results of the medical
examination conducted by Dr. Regienald Afroilan in 2004,
showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. It should
be noted however that the examination was taken four years

after the crimes were committed, and that Dr. Afroilan
admitted that his findings did not include the mental state of
petitioner four years before. The alleged insanity of an
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at
the very moment the felony is committed, not at any time
thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder, referring to a
period after the time the crime was committed, will not
exempt him from criminal liability.[29]
Appellant emphasizes the fact that he was a friend of the
Indon family and would not have committed such atrocities
against them, unless he was totally deprived of
reason. In People v. Madarang,[30] this Court ruled that the
fact that the accused had no quarrel with his victim prior to
the killing does not prove the unstable mental condition of
the accused. Jurisprudence is replete with cases in which
lives have been terminated for the flimsiest reasons.
This Court will now discuss the imposition of penalties and
modify those imposed by the Court of Appeals. Appellant is
guilty of Murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No.
1497-M-2000. The penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period, or reclusion
perpetua.[31] Thus, for the murder of Marvin Indon and
Melissa Indon, the penalty imposed on appellant is two
sentences of reclusion perpetua.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages
may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delictofor the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.[32]
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the
victim without need of proof other than the commission of the
crime.[33] Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in
order.[34] Thus, P50,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Marvin
Indon and P50,000.00 to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
The heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are not entitled
to actual damages, because said damages were not
adequately proved. The party seeking actual damages must
produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable,
such as receipts, to justify an award therefor.[35] The funeral
expenses, to which Raquel Indon referred in her testimony,
were not supported by receipts. Nevertheless, the award of
P25,000.00 in temperate damages for homicide or murder
cases is proper when no evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in the trial court.[36] Under Article
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not
proved.[37] Thus, the heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa
Indon are entitled to temperate damages of P25,000.00 for
each death.
In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral
damages is mandatory, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.[38] The award of
P50,000.00 as moral damages is in order for the death for
Marvin Indon, and likewise for that of Melissa Indon.
Exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should also be awarded,
since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly
established.[39] Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were both
minors when they were killed by the appellant. The killing by
an adult of a minor child is treacherous.[40] Moreover, the
victims in this case were asleep when appellant barged into
their house and attacked their family. The attack was clearly
unprovoked, and they were defenseless against him.
In Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000,
appellant is guilty of the Attempted Murder of Michelle Indon
and Jeffer Indon. The penalty for Attempted Murder
is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Thus, the penalty imposed on the appellant
is two sentences of six years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten years of prision mayor medium, as
maximum, for the attempted murder of Michelle Indon and
Jeffer Indon. In addition to the moral damages of
P10,000.00 for each victim, which the Court of Appeals
imposed, appellant is also ordered to pay civil indemnity of
P20,000.00[41] and exemplary damages of P25,000.00.[42]
In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, appellant is convicted of
the crime of frustrated homicide of Ronaldo Galvez. The
penalty for frustrated homicide, there being no other
mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the same,
is five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight
years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. Moral
damages in the amount of P25,000.00, awarded by
the Court of Appeals, are affirmed.
Appellant is guilty of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No.
1500-M-2000. The penalty for Frustrated Murder
is reclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its medium
period, considering that there were neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances that were proven in this case.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should
Page 36 of 196
be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months
of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty. This
Court affirms the award by the Court of Appeals of (1) Civil
Indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00;[43] (2) actual
damages of P46,343.00 for medical expenses, which are
supported by receipts marked as Exhibits "I" and "J"; and (3)
moral damages of P25,000.00. Appellant is also ordered to
pay exemplary damages of P25,000.00 based on the finding
that the assault against Raquel Indon was attended by
treachery.[44] The essence of treachery is that the attack is
deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and
unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape.[45] At the
time Raquel was attacked, she was in her home, unarmed
and sleeping with her children. She was undoubtedly
unprepared and defenseless to resist appellant's attack on
her and her young children.
All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs
will accrue a 6% interest from the time of this Decision until
fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
No. 30511 is MODIFIED in accordance with the hereinabove
discussion on penalties and award of damages, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, this Court
additionally awards P25,000.00 as temperate
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of Marvin Indon.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, this Court
additionally awards P25,000.00 as temperate
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
3. In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, the Court
additionally awards civil indemnity of P20,000.00
and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to
Michelle Indon.
4. In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, the appellant
is sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of
five years of prision correccional as minimum to
eight years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum.
5. In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, this Court
additionally awards exemplary damages of
P25,000.00 to Raquel Indon.
 Page 37 of 196

6. In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, this Court

additionally awards civil indemnity of P20,000.00
and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to Jeffer
Indon.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing,* Carpio,** Carpio-Morales,*** and Nachura, JJ.,

concur.

Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM, CREATING THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
TITLE I
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 1
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be known
as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006."It shall
cover the different stages involving children at risk and
children in conflict with the law from prevention to
rehabilitation and reintegration.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State
policies shall be observed at all times:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of children and youth
in nation building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the child
through measures that will ensure the observance of
international standards of child protection, especially those
to which the Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
authority shall be conducted in the best interest of the child
and in a manner which allows the child to participate and to
express himself/herself freely. The participation of children in
the program and policy formulation and implementation
related to juvenile justice and welfare shall be ensured by
the concerned government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the State recognizes the right of
every child alleged as, accused of, adjudged, or recognized
as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner
consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity
and worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability
of promoting his/her reintegration. Whenever appropriate
and desirable, the State shall adopt measures for dealing
with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings,
providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully
respected. It shall ensure that children are dealt with in a
manner appropriate to their well-being by providing for,
among others, a variety of disposition measures such as
care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling,
probation, foster care, education and vocational training
programs and other alternatives to institutional care.
(e) The administration of the juvenile justice and welfare
system shall take into consideration the cultural and religious
perspectives of the Filipino people, particularly the
indigenous peoples and the Muslims, consistent with the
protection of the rights of children belonging to these
communities.
(f) The State shall apply the principles of restorative justice in
all its laws, policies and programs applicable to children in
conflict with the law.
SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of
doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act,
including its implementing rules and regulations (IRRs), shall
be construed liberally in favor of the child in conflict with the
law.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as used
in this Act shall be defined as follows:
(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the release of the
person in custody of the law, furnished by him/her or a
bondsman, to guarantee his/her appearance before any
court. Bail may be given in the form of corporate security,
property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the totality of the
circumstances and conditions which are most congenial to
the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child
and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological
and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth
and development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18)
years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is vulnerable to and
at the risk of committing criminal offenses because of
Page 38 of 196
personal, family and social circumstances, such as, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or any other means and the
parents or guardian refuse, are unwilling, or unable to
provide protection for the child;
(2) being exploited including sexually or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected, and after diligent search
and inquiry, the parent or guardian cannot be found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or broken family or without a
parent or guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high level of criminality or
drug abuse; and
(9) living in situations of armed conflict.
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a child who is
alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an
offense under Philippine laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the programs
provided in a community setting developed for purposes of
intervention and diversion, as well as rehabilitation of the
child in conflict with the law, for reintegration into his/her
family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places where there
are no family courts, any regional trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of detention or
imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in conflict with
the law in a public or private custodial setting, from which the
child in conflict with the law is not permitted to leave at will
by order of any judicial or administrative authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a
child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social,
cultural, economic, psychological or educational background
without resorting to formal court proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program that the child in
conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is

found responsible for an offense without resorting to formal
court proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the apprehension
or taking into custody of a child in conflict with the law by law
enforcement officers or private citizens. It includes the time
when the child alleged to be in conflict with the law receives
a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6(a)
or Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require
preliminary investigation or where there is no necessity to
place the child alleged to be in conflict with the law under
immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities which are
designed to address issues that caused the child to commit
an offense. It may take the form of an individualized
treatment program which may include counseling, skills
training, education, and other activities that will enhance
his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-
being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System" refers to a
system dealing with children at risk and children in conflict
with the law, which provides child-appropriate proceedings,
including programs and services for prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure their
normal growth and development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the person in
authority or his/her agent as defined in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, including a barangay tanod.
(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission whether
punishable under special laws or the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in lieu of a bond
assumed by a parent or custodian who shall be responsible
for the appearance in court of the child in conflict with the
law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a
process of resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement
of the victim, the offender and the community. It seeks to
obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of the offender,
the offended and the community; and reassurance to the
offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also
enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim
and the community in prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which discriminate
only against a child, while an adult does not suffer any
penalty for committing similar acts. These shall include
curfew violations; truancy, parental disobedience and the
like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour child-caring
institution managed by accredited local government units
(LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) providing short-term residential care
for children in conflict with the law who are awaiting court
disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction.
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-hour
residential care facility managed by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), LGUs, licensed and/or
accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD, which provides
care, treatment and rehabilitation services for children in
conflict with the law. Rehabilitation services are provided
under the guidance of a trained staff where residents are
cared for under a structured therapeutic environment with
the end view of reintegrating them into their families and
communities as socially functioning individuals. Physical
mobility of residents of said centers may be restricted
pending court disposition of the charges against them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where there is no
private offended party.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. -
Every child in conflict with the law shall have the following
rights, including but not limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of capital
punishment or life imprisonment, without the possibility of
release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or arbitrarily, of
his/her liberty; detention or imprisonment being a disposition
of last resort, and which shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and respect, for the
inherent dignity of the person, and in a manner which takes
into account the needs of a person of his/her age. In
particular, a child deprived of liberty shall be separated from
adult offenders at all times. No child shall be detained
Page 39 of 196
together with adult offenders. He/She shall be conveyed
separately to or from court. He/She shall await hearing of
his/her own case in a separate holding area. A child in
conflict with the law shall have the right to maintain contact
with his/her family through correspondence and visits, save
in exceptional circumstances;
(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate
assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of
the deprivation of his/her liberty before a court or other
competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a
prompt decision on such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in appropriate cases;
(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her own behalf
under the rule on examination of a child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected fully at all
stages of the proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and voluntarily
avails of the same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in proportion to the
gravity of the offense where his/her best interest, the rights
of the victim and the needs of society are all taken into
consideration by the court, under the principle of restorative
justice;
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her personal liberty
limited to the minimum, and where discretion is given by law
to the judge to determine whether to impose fine or
imprisonment, the imposition of fine being preferred as the
more appropriate penalty;
(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to imprisonment,
if qualified under the Probation Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury, concealment
or misrepresentation; and
(o) other rights as provided for under existing laws, rules and
regulations.
The State further adopts the provisions of the United Nations
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations Guidelines for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or the "Riyadh
Guidelines", and the United Nations Rules for the Protection
of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the
law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The
age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the
child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the
age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the
law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate
court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall
decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the
law and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall
file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same
court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the
said motion, proceedings on the main case shall be
suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges and other government officials concerned shall exert
all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with
the law.
TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). - A
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby
created and attached to the Department of Justice and
placed under its administrative supervision. The JJWC shall
be chaired by an undersecretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective
implementation of this Act and coordination among the
following agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG);
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and
intervention programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose
ranks shall not be lower than director, to be designated by
the concerned heads of the following departments or
agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Page 40 of 196
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to be
designated by the Secretary of Justice and the other to be
designated by the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the
effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Justice and the
Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall
determine the organizational structure and staffing pattern of
the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure
the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its
duties and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The JJWC
shall have the following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies
relating to juvenile justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and
redrafting of existing policies/regulations or in the formulation
of new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year
national juvenile intervention program, with the participation
of government agencies concerned, NGOs and youth
organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile
intervention programs and activities by national government
agencies and other activities which may have an important
bearing on the success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs relating to juvenile justice
and welfare shall be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in
consultation with children for the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and the administration of justice, as well as for
the treatment and rehabilitation of the children in conflict with
the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing
research and support evaluations and studies on all matters
relating to juvenile justice and welfare, such as but not
limited to:

(1) the performance and results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by activities of the local
government units and other government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the
improvement of the administration of juvenile justice and
welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children
are involved in research and policy development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with the
assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and
rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check compliance with the
standards provided herein and to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the
personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of
the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President on the
implementation of this Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile Justice
and Welfare. - All government agencies enumerated in
Section 8 shall, with the assistance of the JJWC and within
one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, draft policies and
procedures consistent with the standards set in the law.
These policies and procedures shall be modified accordingly
in consultation with the JJWC upon the completion of the
national juvenile intervention program as provided under
Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing Child
Rights Center of the Commission on Human Rights shall
ensure that the status, rights and interests of children are
upheld in accordance with the Constitution and international
instruments on human rights. The CHR shall strengthen the
monitoring of government compliance of all treaty
obligations, including the timely and regular submission of
reports before the treaty bodies, as well as the
implementation and dissemination of recommendations and
conclusions by government agencies as well as NGOs and
civil society.
TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible for
the primary nurturing and rearing of children which is critical
in delinquency prevention. As far as practicable and in
accordance with the procedures of this Act, a child in conflict
with the law shall be maintained in his/her family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational
institutions shall work together with families, community
organizations and agencies in the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and in the rehabilitation and reintegration of
child in conflict with the law. Schools shall provide adequate,
necessary and individualized educational schemes for
children manifesting difficult behavior and children in conflict
with the law. In cases where children in conflict with the law
are taken into custody or detained in rehabilitation centers,
they should be provided the opportunity to continue learning
under an alternative learning system with basic literacy
program or non- formal education accreditation equivalency
system.
SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass media
shall play an active role in the promotion of child rights, and
delinquency prevention by relaying consistent messages
through a balanced approach. Media practitioners shall,
therefore, have the duty to maintain the highest critical and
professional standards in reporting and covering cases of
children in conflict with the law. In all publicity concerning
children, the best interest of the child should be the
primordial and paramount concern. Any undue, inappropriate
and sensationalized publicity of any case involving a child in
conflict with the law is hereby declared a violation of the
child's rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local
Councils for the Protection of Children. - Local Councils
for the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be established in
all levels of local government, and where they have already
been established, they shall be strengthened within one (1)
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year from the effectivity of this Act. Membership in the LCPC
shall be chosen from among the responsible members of the
community, including a representative from the youth sector,
as well as representatives from government and private
agencies concerned with the welfare of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to
coordinate with and assist the LGU concerned for the
adoption of a comprehensive plan on delinquency
prevention, and to oversee its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of
barangays, municipalities and cities shall be allocated for the
strengthening and implementation of the programs of the
LCPC: Provided, That the disbursement of the fund shall be
made by the LGU concerned.
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and
Development Officer. - All LGUs shall appoint a duly
licensed social worker as its local social welfare and
development officer tasked to assist children in conflict with
the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) shall coordinate with the LCPC in the
formulation and implementation of juvenile intervention and
diversion programs in the community.
CHAPTER 2
COMPREHENSIVE JUVENILE INTERVENTION
PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile
Intervention Program. - A Comprehensive juvenile
intervention program covering at least a 3-year period shall
be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to the provincial
level.
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to
implement their respective juvenile intervention programs in
their annual budget.
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on all
sectors concerned, particularly the child-focused institutions,
NGOs, people's organizations, educational institutions and
government agencies involved in delinquency prevention to
participate in the planning process and implementation of
juvenile intervention programs. Such programs shall be
implemented consistent with the national program
formulated and designed by the JJWC. The implementation
of the comprehensive juvenile intervention program shall be
reviewed and assessed annually by the LGUs in
coordination with the LCPC. Results of the assessment shall

be submitted by the provincial and city governments to the
JJWC not later than March 30 of every year.
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile
Justice and Welfare. - Community-based programs on
juvenile justice and welfare shall be instituted by the LGUs
through the LCPC, school, youth organizations and other
concerned agencies. The LGUs shall provide community-
based services which respond to the special needs,
problems, interests and concerns of children and which offer
appropriate counseling and guidance to them and their
families. These programs shall consist of three levels:
(a) Primary intervention includes general measures to
promote social justice and equal opportunity, which tackle
perceived root causes of offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures to assist
children at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to avoid
unnecessary contact with the formal justice system and
other measures to prevent re-offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child has
the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of
his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the
child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the
local social welfare and development officer who will
determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the
child and to the person having custody over the child. If the
parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or
if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to
any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or
religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a
local social welfare and development officer; or when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused
by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not
comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise ,known as "The
Child and Youth Welfare Code".
TITLE V
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into Custody. -
From the moment a child is taken into custody, the law
enforcement officer shall:
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect
that he/she can understand why he/she is being placed
under custody and the offense that he/she allegedly
committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such custody and
advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a language
or dialect understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present proper
identification to the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from
sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual advances
on the child in conflict with the law;
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs
or other instruments of force or restraint, unless absolutely
necessary and only after all other methods of control have
been exhausted and have failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict with the law to
greater restraint than is necessary for his/her apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of
this Act;
(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours after
apprehension, turn over custody of the child to the Social
Welfare and Development Office or other accredited NGOs,
and notify the child's apprehension. The social welfare and
development officer shall explain to the child and the child's
parents/guardians the consequences of the child's act with a
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view towards counseling and rehabilitation, diversion from
the criminal justice system, and reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper medical and
health officer for a thorough physical and mental
examination. The examination results shall be kept
confidential unless otherwise ordered by the Family Court.
Whenever the medical treatment is required, steps shall be
immediately undertaken to provide the same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with
the law be necessary, the child shall be secured in quarters
separate from that of the opposite sex and adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial investigation:
1. Whether handcuffs or other instruments of restraint were
used, and if so, the reason for such;
2. That the parents or guardian of a child, the DSWD, and
the PA0 have been informed of the apprehension and the
details thereof; and
3. The exhaustion of measures to determine the age of a
child and the precise details of the physical and medical
examination or the failure to submit a child to such
examination; and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during
investigation shall be witnessed by the child's parents or
guardian, social worker, or legal counsel in attendance who
shall affix his/her signature to the said statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by a
law enforcement officer of the same gender and shall not be
locked up in a detention cell.
SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law
enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation, determine
where the case involving the child in conflict with the law
should be referred.
The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted in
the presence of the following: (1) child's counsel of choice or
in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's
Office; (2) the child's parents, guardian, or nearest relative,
as the case may be; and (3) the local social welfare and
development officer. In the absence of the child's parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social welfare and
development officer, the investigation shall be conducted in
the presence of a representative of an NGO, religious group,
or member of the BCPC.

After the initial investigation, the local social worker
conducting the same may do either of the following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is
fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years old, who acted without discernment; and
(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below
eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment, proceed to
diversion under the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2
DIVERSION
SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict with the
law shall undergo diversion programs without undergoing
court proceedings subject to the conditions herein provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committee is
not more than six (6) years imprisonment, the law
enforcement officer or Punong Barangay with the assistance
of the local social welfare and development officer or other
members of the LCPC shall conduct mediation, family
conferencing and conciliation and, where appropriate, adopt
indigenous modes of conflict resolution in accordance with
the best interest of the child with a view to accomplishing the
objectives of restorative justice and the formulation of a
diversion program. The child and his/her family shall be
present in these activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not
more than six (6) years imprisonment, the local social
welfare and development officer shall meet with the child
and his/her parents or guardians for the development of the
appropriate diversion and rehabilitation program, in
coordination with the BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed
exceeds six (6) years imprisonment, diversion measures
may be resorted to only by the court.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be Conducted. -
Diversion may be conducted at the Katarungang
Pambarangay, the police investigation or the inquest or
preliminary investigation stage and at all 1evels and phases
of the proceedings including judicial level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. - A
child in conflict with law may undergo conferencing,
mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice system
or prior to his entry into said system. A contract of diversion
may be entered into during such conferencing, mediation or
conciliation proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the
conferencing, mediation or conciliation, the child voluntarily
admits the commission of the act, a diversion program shall
be developed when appropriate and desirable as determined
under Section 30. Such admission shall not be used against
the child in any subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings. The diversion program shall be
effective and binding if accepted by the parties concerned.
The acceptance shall be in writing and signed by the parties
concerned and the appropriate authorities. The local social
welfare and development officer shall supervise the
implementation of the diversion program. The diversion
proceedings shall be completed within forty-five (45) days.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended
until the completion of the diversion proceedings but not to
exceed forty-five (45) days.
The child shall present himself/herself to the competent
authorities that imposed the diversion program at least once
a month for reporting and evaluation of the effectiveness of
the program.
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the
contract of diversion, as certified by the local social welfare
and development officer, shall give the offended party the
option to institute the appropriate legal action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be suspended
during the effectivity of the diversion program, but not
exceeding a period of two (2) years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There is
No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under Section
23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or guardian does
not consent to a diversion, the Punong Barangay handling
the case shall, within three (3) days from determination of
the absence of jurisdiction over the case or termination of
the diversion proceedings, as the case may be, forward the
records of the case of the child to the law enforcement
officer, prosecutor or the appropriate court, as the case may
be. Upon the issuance of the corresponding document,
certifying to the fact that no agreement has been reached by
the parties, the case shall be filed according to the regular
process.
SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When
There is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under
Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Women and
Children Protection Desk of the PNP, or other law
enforcement officer handling the case of the child under
custody, to the prosecutor or judge concerned for the
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conduct of inquest and/or preliminary investigation to
determine whether or not the child should remain under
custody and correspondingly charged in court. The
document transmitting said records shall display the word
"CHILD" in bold letters.
SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion Program. - In
determining whether diversion is appropriate and desirable,
the following factors shall be taken into consideration:
(a) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged;
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age, maturity,
intelligence, etc.);
(d) The influence of the family and environment on the
growth of the child;
(e) The reparation of injury to the victim;
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;
(g) The safety of the community; and
(h) The best interest of the child.
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In
formulating a diversion program, the individual
characteristics and the peculiar circumstances of the child in
conflict with the law shall be used to formulate an
individualized treatment.
The following factors shall be considered in formulating a
diversion program for the child:
(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the offense he/she
committed;
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to guide and
supervise the child;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the measures to
be imposed; and
(d) The availability of community-based programs for
rehabilitation and reintegration of the child.
SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The diversion
program shall include adequate socio-cultural and
psychological responses and services for the child. At the
different stages where diversion may be resorted to, the

following diversion programs may be agreed upon, such as,
but not limited to:
(a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:
(1) Restitution of property;
(2) Reparation of the damage caused;
(3) Indemnification for consequential damages;
(4) Written or oral apology;
(5) Care, guidance and supervision orders;
(6) Counseling for the child in conflict with the law and the
child's family;
(7)Attendance in trainings, seminars and lectures on:
(i) anger management skills;
(ii) problem solving and/or conflict resolution skills;
(iii) values formation; and
(iv) other skills which will aid the child in dealing with
situations which can lead to repetition of the offense;
(8) Participation in available community-based programs,
including community service; or
(9) Participation in education, vocation and life skills
programs.
(b) At the level of the law enforcement officer and the
prosecutor:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs (a)(1) to
(a)(9) herein; and
(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments
of the crime;
(c) At the level of the appropriate court:
(1) Diversion programs specified under paragraphs(a)and (b)
above;
(2) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(3) Fine:
(4) Payment of the cost of the proceedings; or
(5) Institutional care and custody.
CHAPTER 3
PROSECUTION
SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall be
a specially trained prosecutor to conduct inquest, preliminary
investigation and prosecution of cases involving a child in
conflict with the law. If there is an allegation of torture or ill-
treatment of a child in conflict with the law during arrest or
detention, it shall be the duty of the prosecutor to investigate
the same.
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of
Information. - The prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary
investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in
conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion: (b) when
the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree to
diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when
considering the assessment and recommendation of the
social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not
appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint,
the prosecutor shall notify the Public Attorney's Office of
such service, as well as the personal information, and place
of detention of the child in conflict with the law.
Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor, the
information against the child shall be filed before the Family
Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the
preliminary investigation.
CHAPTER 4
COURT PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the amount
of bail, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
shall be considered.
SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is
detained, the court shall order:
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to his/her
parents and other suitable person;
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the law on bail; or
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention home/youth
rehabilitation center.
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail
pending trial or hearing of his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. - Children
detained pending trial may be released on bail or
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recognizance as provided for under Sections 34 and 35
under this Act. In all other cases and whenever possible,
detention pending trial may be replaced by alternative
measures, such as close supervision, intensive care or
placement with a family or in an educational setting or home.
Institutionalization or detention of the child pending trial shall
be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
possible period of time.
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be
detained in youth detention homes established by local
governments, pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts
Act, in the city or municipality where the child resides.
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in
conflict with the law may be committed to the care of the
DSWD or a local rehabilitation center recognized by the
government in the province, city or municipality within the
jurisdiction of the court. The center or agency concerned
shall be responsible for the child's appearance in court
whenever required.
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum
penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the child
in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine
alone regardless of the amount, and before arraignment of
the child in conflict with the law, the court shall determine
whether or not diversion is appropriate.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various chcumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the
Law. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker who
has custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the case
against the child whose sentence has been suspended and

against whom disposition measures have been issued, and
shall order the final discharge of the child if it finds that the
objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall not
affect the civil liability resulting from the commission of the
offense, which shall be enforced in accordance with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law
have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in
conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of
his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. -
The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any
time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child.
For this purpose, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968,
otherwise known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby
amended accordingly.
CHAPTER 5
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and Proceedings. -
All records and proceedings involving children in conflict with
the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case
shall be considered privileged and confidential. The public
shall be excluded during the proceedings and the records
shall not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any
of the parties or the participants in the proceedings for any
purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child in
conflict with the law may have his/hes sentence suspended
or if he/she may be granted probation under the Probation
Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal
action.
The component authorities shall undertake all measures to
protect this confidentiality of proceedings, including non-
disclosure of records to the media, maintaining a separate
police blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the
law and adopting a system of coding to conceal material
information which will lead to the child's identity. Records of
a child in conflict with the law shall not be used in
subsequent proceedings for cases involving the same
offender as an adult, except when beneficial for the offender
and upon his/her written consent.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child
shall not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty of
perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact
related thereto in response to any inquiry made to him/her
for any purpose.
TITLE VI
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and Reintegration. -
The objective of rehabilitation and reintegration of children in
conflict with the law is to provide them with interventions,
approaches and strategies that will enable them to improve
their social functioning with the end goal of reintegration to
their families and as productive members of their
communities.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be
received in any rehabilitation or training facility without a
valid order issued by the court after a hearing for the
purpose. The details of this order shall be immediately
entered in a register exclusively for children in conflict with
the law. No child shall be admitted in any facility where there
is no such register.
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all
rehabilitation or training facilities, it shall be mandatory that
children shall be separated from adults unless they are
members of the same family. Under no other circumstance
shall a child in conflict with the law be placed in the same
confinement as adults.
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of children in
conflict with the law shall provide a home environment where
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children in conflict with the law can be provided with quality
counseling and treatment.
SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict with
the law placed in an institution shall be given special
attention as to their personal needs and problems. They
shall be handled by female doctors, correction officers and
social workers, and shall be accommodated separately from
male children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel of
rehabilitation and training facilities shall handle children in
conflict with the law without having undergone gender
sensitivity training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. - The
LGUs shall set aside an amount to build youth detention
homes as mandated by the Family Courts Act. Youth
detention homes may also be established by private and
NGOs licensed and accredited by the DSWD, in consultation
with the JJWC.
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict
with the Law. - The expenses for the care and maintenance
of a child in conflict with the law under institutional care shall
be borne by his/her parents or those persons liable to
support him/her: Provided, That in case his/her parents or
those persons liable to support him/her cannot pay all or part
of said expenses, the municipality where the offense was
committed shall pay one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part
thereof; the province to which the municipality belongs shall
pay one-third (1/3) and the remaining one-third (1/3) shall be
borne by the national government. Chartered cities shall pay
two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a chartered
city cannot pay said expenses, part of the internal revenue
allotments applicable to the unpaid portion shall be withheld
and applied to the settlement of said
obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that the child
in conflict with the law is not a resident of the
municipality/city where the offense was committed, the court,
upon its determination, may require the city/municipality
where the child in conflict with the law resides to shoulder
the cost.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for the
immediate establishment of local detention homes for
children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A
child

in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order
of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with the
Law. - Children in conflict with the law, whose sentences are
suspended may, upon order of the court, undergo any or a
combination of disposition measures best suited to the
rehabilitation and welfare of the child as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a child
in conflict with the law, he/she shall be released to parents,
guardians, relatives or any other responsible person in the
community. Under the supervision and guidance of the local
social welfare and development officer, and in coordination
with his/her parents/guardian, the child in conflict with the
law shall participate in community-based programs, which
shall include, but not limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.
In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict
with the law shall endeavor to actively participate in the
community-based rehabilitation.
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a final
report will be forwarded by the local social welfare and
development officer to the court for final disposition of the
case.
If the community-based programs are provided as diversion
measures under Chapter II, Title V, the programs
enumerated above shall be made available to the child in
conflict with the law.
Page 46 of 196
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth social reintegration, prevent re-offending and make the
rehabilitation center shall provide 24-hour group care, children productive members of the community.
treatment and rehabilitation services under the guidance of a
trained staff where residents are cared for under a structured
therapeutic environment with the end view of reintegrating
them in their families and communities as socially
TITLE VII
functioning individuals. A quarterly report shall be submitted
GENERAL PROVISIONS
by the center to the proper court on the progress of the
children in conflict with the law. Based on the progress of the CHAPTER 1
youth in the center, a final report will be forwarded to the EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
court for final disposition of the case. The DSWD shall
establish youth rehabilitation centers in each region of the SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not considered an
country. offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based Programs. - committed by a child.
The objectives of community-based programs are as follows:
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. - Persons
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or means of livelihood below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from
of the child in conflict with the law in case he/she is studying, prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and prostitution under
working or attending vocational learning institutions; Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy
under Presidential Decree No. 1563, and sniffing of rugby
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict with the law
under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being
from his/her parents/guardians to maintain the support
inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the
system fostered by their relationship and to create greater
Rights of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall
awareness of their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
undergo appropriate counseling and treatment program.
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and mainstreaming of the child
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death
in conflict with the law and encourage community support
Penalty. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
and involvement; and
amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the child in conflict Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other
special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty shall be
with the law by preventing jail detention.
imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. - Every
LGU shall establish community-based programs that will CHAPTER 2
focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration of the child. All PROHIBITED ACTS
programs shall meet the criteria to be established by the
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and Shaming. - In
JJWC which shall take into account the purpose of the
the conduct of the proceedings beginning from the initial
program, the need for the consent of the child and his/her
contact with the child, the competent authorities must refrain
parents or legal guardians, and the participation of the child-
from branding or labeling children as young criminals,
centered agencies whether public or private.
juvenile delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in any
SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in manner any other derogatory names. Likewise, no
Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict with the law discriminatory remarks and practices shall be allowed
particularly with respect to the child's class or ethnic origin.
whose cases have been dismissed by the proper court
because of good behavior as per recommendation of the
SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and any
DSWD social worker and/or any accredited NGO youth
other similar acts shall be considered prejudicial and
rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care services by
detrimental to the psychological, emotional, social, spiritual,
the local social welfare and development officer for a period
moral and physical health and well-being of the child in
of at least six (6) months. The service includes counseling
conflict with the law and therefore, prohibited:
and other community-based services designed to facilitate
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and nature;

(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and punitive measures
such as cursing, beating, stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end cruel forms of
punishment such as shaving the heads, pouring irritating,
corrosive or harmful substances over the body of the child in
conflict with the law, or forcing him/her to walk around the
community wearing signs which embarrass, humiliate, and
degrade his/her personality and dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary servitude in
any and all forms under any and all instances.
CHAPTER 3
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or Rules
or Regulations in General. - Any person who violates any
provision of this Act or any rule or regulation promulgated in
accordance thereof shall, upon conviction for each act or
omission, be punished by a fine of not less than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not
less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court, unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised
Penal Code or special laws. If the offender is a public officer
or employee, he/she shall, in addition to such fine and/or
imprisonment, be held administratively liable and shall suffer
the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
CHAPTER 4
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry
out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged to
the Office of the President. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall
be included in the succeeding General Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) for
the purpose of setting up the JJWC shall be taken from the
proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15)
Years Old and Below. - Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
Page 47 of 196
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and be immediately released if they are so qualified under this
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social Act or other applicable law.
welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon
thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer
the child to prevention programs as provided under this Act.
TITLE IX
Those with suspended sentences and undergoing
FINAL PROVISIONS
rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise
be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue the
child. IRRs for the implementation of the provisions of this act
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child is
detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also determine SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any
whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not, section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
determine appropriate alternatives for detention. invalid by the Supreme Court, the other sections or
provisions hereof not dfected by such declaration shall
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults,
remain in force and effect.
the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a
youth detention home. SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders,
decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
Children in Conflict with the Law. - The PNP, the BJMP
modified accordingly.
and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC,
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen
inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their (15) days from its publication in at least two (2) national
custody. newspapers of general circulation.
SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18)
Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. - If a
child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending
diversion and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion
authority in consultation with the local social welfare and
development officer or the Family Court in consultation with
the Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the
Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine the
appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court
executes the judgment of conviction, and unless the child in
conflict the law has already availed of probation under
Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child
may apply for probation if qualified under the provisions of
the Probation Law.
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been convicted and
are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the
time the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit
from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall be
entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall

A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC November 24, 2009
RULE ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW
RESOLUTION
Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson and
Members of the Subcommitee on Rules Procedure for
Family Courts submitting for this Court's consideration and
approval the proposed revised Rule on Children in Conflict
with the Law, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
This Resolution shall take effect on December 1, 2009
following its publication in two(2) newspapers general
circulation not later than November 27, 2009.
XXX
REVISED RULE ON CHILDREN IN CONFLICT WITH THE
LAW
Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. - This Rule shall apply to
all criminal cases involving children in conflict with law.
A child in conflict with the law is a person who at the time of
the commission of the offense is below eighteen (18) years
old but not less than fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old.
This Rule shall not apply to a person who at the time of the
initial contact as defined in Sec. 4 (q) of this Rule shall have
reached the age of eighteen (18) in which case, the regular
rules on criminal procedure shall apply without prejudice to
the rights granted under Secs. 53,54,55 and 56 of this Rule.
Section 2. Objective. - The objective of this Rule is to
ensure that the justice system treats every child in conflict
with the law in a manner that recognizes and upholds human
dignity and worth, and instills in the child respect for the
fundamental rights ad freedom of others. The Rule considers
the developmental age of the child and the desirability of the
child's reintegration in the assumption of a constructive role
in society in accordance with the principles of balanced and
restorative justice.
To attain this objective, the Rule seeks:
(a) To provide child-appropriate proceedings, including
programs and services for crime prevention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and aftercare to ensure the
normal growth and development of the child in conflict with
the law;
(b) To provide procedural rules dealing with children in
conflict with the law that take into account their distinct
circumstances, assure all parties of a fair hearing with each
party's constitutional and statutory rights recognized and
respected, and ensure that appropriate disposition measures
are implemented by law enforcers social services and the
courts;
(c) To divert from the formal justice system children in
conflict with the law who can be cared for or placed under
community continuum alternative programs of treatment,
training and rehabilitation in conformity with the principles of
balanced and restorative justice;
(d) To deal with the child in a family environment whenever
possible, and to separate the child from the parents only
when necessary for the child's welfare or in the interest of
public safety.
(e) To remove from children in conflict with the law the
stigma of criminality and criminal behavior;
(f) to promote, facilitate and implement in administrative and
judicial proceedings respect for the view of the child;
(g) To provide for the care, protection and wholesome moral,
mental, and physical development of children in conflict with
the law; and
(h) To promote and protect the rights and interest of children
as zones of peace in situations of armed conflict, but who
are alleged to be in conflict with the law. (a)
Section 3. Interpretation. - This Rule shall be interpreted
liberally to promote the best interest of the child in conformity
with Philippine laws, the United Nations' Convention on the
Rights of the Child and relevant international treaties and
protocols.
Section 4. Definitions. - As used in this Rule,
(a) Age of criminal responsibility is the age when a child,
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below
eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with
discernment.
(b) Bail refers to the security given for the release of the child
in custody of the law, furnished by the child, the child's
parent, guardian, or a bondsman, to guarantee the child's
appearance before the court. Bail may be posted in a form
such as corporate security, property bond or cash deposit.
(c) Balanced and Restorative Justice is a principle in juvenile
justice that requires a process of resolving conflicts with the
participation of the victim, the child in conflict with the law,
Page 48 of 196
and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the
victim; reconciliation to the victim, the child in conflict with
the law, and the community, and the reassurance that the
child in conflict with the law can be reintegrated into society.
It also enhances public safety by involving the victim, the
child in conflict with the law, and the community in
prevention strategies. (a)
(d) Best interest of the child refers to the totality of congenial
to the survival, protection and feelings of security of the child
and most encouraging to the child's physical, psychological
and emotional development. It also means the least
detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth
and development.
(e) Case study report is a written report on the social case
inquiry conducted by the social worker of the local
government unit or the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or by the social worker designated by the court
on the social, cultural, economic and legal status or condition
of the child in conflict in the law. It shall include, among other
matters, the child's development age; educational
attainment; family and social relationships; the quality of the
child's peer group; the strengths and weaknesses of the
family; parental control; the child's attitude towards the
offense ; the harm or damage done to others resulting from
the offenses, if any; and the attitude of the parents towards
the child's responsibility for the offense. The social worker
shall also include an initial determination of the child's
discernment in the commission of the offense. (a)
(f) Community continuum refers to the aftercare of a child in
conflict with the law and is a provides continuous guidance
and support to the child in conflict with the law upon release
from rehabilitation and subsequent reintegration into society.
Community continuum for the child includes timely release,
suitable residence, food, clothing, available employment and
sufficient means to facilitate successful reintegration in local
government unit and other appropriate agencies. (n)
(g) Corporal punishment is any kind of physical punishment
inflicted on the body as distinguished from pecuniary
punishment or fine.
(h) Court refers to a designated family court or in places
where there are no designated family courts, any regional
trial court hearing family and youth cases. (a)
(i) Deprivation of Liberty refers to any form of detention or
imprisonment, or to the placement of a child in conflict with
the law in a public or private custodial setting, from which the

child in conflict with the law is not permitted to leave at will
except by order of any judicial or administrative authority. (a)
(j) Discernment means the capacity of the child at the time of
the commission of the offense to understand the differences
between right and wrong and the consequences of the
wrongful act.
(k) Disposition conference is a meeting held by the court with
the social worker who prepared the case study report,
together with the child in conflict with the law and the parents
or guardian ad litem, and the child's counsel for the purpose
of determining the disposition measures appropriate to the
personal and special circumstances of the child.
(l) Diversion refers to an alternative child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a
child in conflict with the law on the basis of the child's social,
cultural, economic psychological or educational background
without resorting to formal court adjudication.
(m) Diversion programs refer to programs the child in conflict
the law is required to undergo in lieu of formal court
proceedings.
(n) Expedited Transfer of a Child is a process where a child
who commits an offense is immediately brought by the
apprehending officer or private individual to a social worker
for preliminary determination of discernment. (n)
(o) Guardian Ad Litem is a person appointed by the court to
protect the best interest of the child. (a)
(p) In conflict with the law means take into custody, detained,
or charged with the commission of an act defined and
punished as a crime or offense under the law, including
violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, and
ordinances of local government units. (a)
(q) Initial contact refers to apprehension or taking into
custody of a child in conflict with the law by law enforcement
officers or private citizens. It includes the time the child
alleged to be in conflict with the law receives a subpoena
under Section 3 (b) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure or summons under Section 6 (a) or
Section 9(b) of the same Rule in cases that do not require
preliminary investigation, or where there is no necessity to
place the child alleged to be in conflict with the law under
immediate custody. (n)
(r) Intake report is the initial written report containing the
personal and other circumstances of the child in conflict with
the law prepared by the social worker assigned to assist the
child entering the justice system.
(s) Intervention programs refer to a series of individualized
treatment activities or programs designed to address issues
that caused the child to commit an offense . These may
include counseling, skills, training, education, and other
activities that are aimed to improve and enhance the child's
psychological, emotional and psychosocial well being. (n)
(t) Law Enforcement Officer refers to the person in authority
or an agent as defined in Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code, including a barangay tanod. (n)
(u) Non-Serious Offense refers to an offense where the
imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than
six (6) years imprisonment. (n)
(v) Probation is an alternative disposition, ordered by the
court, under which a child in conflict with the law is released
after conviction and sentence and permitted to remain at
home or with an appropriate custodian, subject to certain
terms and conditions imposed by the court.
(w) Recognizance is an undertaking in lieu of a bond,
assumed by a mother or father, or appropriate guardian or
custodian, or in their absence, the nearest relative, or any
responsible member of the community to assume custody of
a child in conflict with the law and be responsible for the
appearance of the child in court whenever required during
the pendency of the case. (a)
(x) Segregation refers to the procedure where, upon initial
contact with a child alleged to have committed an offense,
the law enforcer places the child in a separate and different
area from adult detention prisoners, and ensures that female
children are separated from male children. (n)
(y) Serious offense refers to an offense where the imposable
penalty for the offense committed exceeds six (6) years
imprisonment. (a)
(z) Status offenses refers to offenses that discriminate only
against a child, such as curfew violations, truancy, parental
disobedience and the like. (n)
(aa) Suspended sentence is the holding in abeyance of the
service of the sentence imposed by the court upon a finding
of guilt of the child in conflict with the law, whereby the child
undergoes rehabilitation within a fixed period under such
terms and conditions as may be ordered by the court. (n)
Page 49 of 196
(bb) Victimless Crimes refer to offenses where there are no
private offended parties. (n)
(cc) Youth detention home refers to a 24-hour child-caring
institution managed by accredited local government units
and licensed and/or accredited non-government
organizations providing short-term residential care for
children in conflict with the law and where the child may be
physically restricted by order of any judicial, administrative or
other public authority, and from which the child is not
permitted to leave at will, pending court disposition of the
charge or transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction. (a)
(dd) Youth rehabilitation center refers to a 24-hour
residential care facility managed by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development, local government units, licensed
and/or accredited non-government organizations monitored
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. The
Center provides care, treatment and rehabilitation services
for children in conflict with the law under a structured
therapeutic environment through the guidance of a trained
staff, where the physical mobility of the children may be
restricted pending court disposition of their cases. (a)
Section 5. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with
the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority and shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until
proven to be eighteen years old or older at the time of the
commission of the offense. The age of the child shall be
determined according to the following rules:
(1) The best evidence to prove the age of a child is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth;
(2) In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificates and
school records or any pertinent document that shows the
date of birth of the child;
(3) In the absence of the documents under paragraphs 1 and
2 of this section due to loss, destruction or unavailability, the
testimony of the child, the testimony of a member of the
family related to the child by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the child pursuant to Sec.40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, the testimonies of the
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence, shall suffice.
Section 6. Burden of Proof of Age. - Any person alleging the
age of the child in conflict with the law has the burden of
proving the age of such child.

If the age of the child is contested prior to the filing of the
information in court, a case for determination of age under
summary proceeding may be filed before a court which shall
render its decision within 24 hours from receipt of the
appropriate pleadings of all the parties. (n)
In all cases involving a child, the court shall make a
categorical finding as to the age of the child.
Section 7. Exemption from Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program as
provided for in Republic Act No. 9344 when consented to by
the child and the parents. (a)
Exemption from criminal liability does not include exemption
from civil liability which shall be enforced in accordance with
the provisions of Article 221 of the Family Code in relation to
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. If the act or omission
of the child involves a quasi-delict, Article 2180 of the Civil
Code shall apply.
Section 8. Procedure for Handling Children Exempted from
Criminal Liability. - If it is determined at the initial contact that
the child is 15 years of age or below, the procedure provided
in Section 20, Republic Act No. 9344 shall be observed as
follows:
(a) The authority who had the initial contact with the child
shall immediately release the child to the custody of the
mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or
in their absence, the nearest relative.
(b) The authority shall immediately notify the local social
welfare and development officer of the taking of the child into
custody.
(c) The local social welfare and development officer shall,
with the consent of the child and the person having custody
over the child, determine the appropriate intervention
programs for the child.
(d) If the child's parents, guardians or nearest relatives
cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child
may be released to any of the following: a duly registered
nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay
official or a member of the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children; a local social welfare and
development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
(e) If the child has been found by the local social welfare and
development office to be abandoned, neglected or abused
by the parents, or if the parents and the child do not consent
to or do not comply with the prevention program, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office shall file before the
court a petition for involuntary commitment pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child
and Youth Welfare Code." (a)
Section 9. Procedure for Children Not Exempted from
Criminal Liability. - A child fifteen (15) years and one (1) day
old or above but below eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense shall, at the sound
discretion of the court and subject to its supervision, be
released on recognizance to the care of the willing and
responsible mother or father, or appropriate guardian or
custodian, or, in their absence, the nearest relative.
However, if the prosecution determines that the child acted
with discernment, the child shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Secs. 25 to 29 or, in case of diversion,
Secs. 31 to 38 of this Rule.
Section 10. Determination of Discernment. - Discernment is
preliminarily determined by a social worker and finally by the
court in the case of a child charged with a non-serious
offense. In all other cases, discernment is determined by the
court.
The determination of discernment shall take into account the
ability of a child to understand the moral and psychological
components of criminal responsibility and the consequences
of the wrongful act; and whether a child can be held
responsible for essentially antisocial behavior.
Section 11. Duties of a Person in Authority Taking a Child
into Custody. - Any person taking into custody a child in
conflict with the law shall:
(a) Assign an alias to the child;
(b) Ensure that the blotter details containing the true name of
the child, if any, are modified, to reflect the alias by which the
child shall be known throughout the proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child in simple language and in a dialect
that can be understood the reason for placing the child under
custody, and the offense allegedly committed;
(d) Advise the child of his/her constitutional rights in a
language or dialect understandable to the child;
(e) Present proper identification to the child;
Page 50 of 196
(f) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words and from
sexually harassing or abusing, or making sexual advances
on the child;
(g) Avoid displaying or using any firearm, weapon, handcuffs
or other instrument of force or restraint, unless absolutely
necessary and only after all methods of control have been
exhausted and have failed;
(h) Avoid violence or unnecessary force and refrain from
subjecting the child to greater restraint than is necessary for
apprehension and custody;
(i) Ensure that a body search of the child is done only by a
law enforcement officer of the same gender as that of the
child;
(j) Ensure expedited transfer of the child by immediately, or
not later than eight (8) hours after apprehension, turning
over custody of the child to the local social welfare and
development office or other accredited non-government
organizations;
(k) Notify the child's parents, guardians or custodians or in
their absence, the child's nearest relative and the Public
Attorney's Office of the child's apprehension;
(l) Ensure that the child is not locked up in a jail or detention
cell during the investigation;
(m) Bring the child immediately to an available government
medical or health officer for a thorough physical and mental
examination;
(n) Ensure that should detention of the child in conflict with
the law be necessary, the segregation of the child be
secured in quarters separate from that of the opposite sex
and adult offenders, except where a child is taken into
custody for reasons related to armed conflict, either as
combatant, courier, guide or spy, and families are
accommodated as family units in which case, the child shall
not be separated from the family;
(o) Record all the procedures undertaken in the initial
investigation including the following: whether handcuffs or
other instruments of restraint were used, and if so, the
reason for such use; that the parents or guardian of the
child, the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
and the Public Attorney's Office were informed of the taking
into custody of the child and the details thereof; the
measures that were undertaken to determine the age of
child, and the precise details of the physical and medical

examination or in case of failure to submit a child to such
examination, the reason therefore; and
(p) Ensure that all statements signed by the child during the
investigation are witnessed and signed by the child's parents
or guardian, social worker or legal counsel in attendance. (n)
Section 12. Rights of a Child Under Custody. - At the
custodial investigation, a child who has been taken into
custody shall have the following rights:
(a) At the police station, to be immediately assisted by a
lawyer and a social worker who shall make sure that the
child is effectively informed of his/her rights, as far as the
child's maturity and discernment allow;
(b) To demand that the questioning or interrogation take
place in conditions that respect the rights of the child and are
complaint with child-sensitive procedural rules;
(c) To have the child's family located and notified with
dispatch;
(d) To be informed, together with the parents, guardians or
custodians or nearest relatives, by the social welfare and
development officer of the local government unit or of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development of the
consequences of the offense alleged to have been
committed with a view towards counseling and rehabilitation,
diversion from criminal justice system and reparation if
appropriate;
(e) To have the results of the child's medical and dental
examination kept confidential unless otherwise ordered by
the court. Whenever medical treatment for any physical or
mental defect is necessary, to demand that steps must be
immediately taken by the medical officer to provide the child
with the necessary and proper treatment;
(f) To have the right of privacy respected and protected at all
times, including the utilization of all measures necessary to
promote this right, including the exclusion of the media; and
(g) While under investigation, not to be fingerprinted or
photographed in a humiliating and degrading manner.
Section 13. Taking Custody of a Child Without a Warrant. -
The law enforcement officer or a private person taking into
custody a child in conflict with the law without a warrant shall
observe the provisions in Sections 5, 8 and 9 of Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall forthwith
deliver the child to the nearest police station. The child shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Section 14. Conduct of Initial Investigation by the Police. -
The police officer conducting the initial investigation of a
child conflict with the law shall do so in the presence of
either or both of the parents, guardian or custodian, or in
their absence, the nearest relative of the child, the child's
counsel of choice, or a lawyer from the Public Attorney's
Office, and the local social welfare officer. A representative
of a non-government organization, religious group, or
member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children shall be allowed to be present at the investigation in
the absence of the parents, guardian, relative, or social
welfare officer. (a)
Section 15. Guidelines for Fingerprinting and Photographing
of the Child. - The following guidelines shall be observed
when fingerprinting or photographing the child:
(a) The child's fingerprint and photograph files shall be kept
separate from those of adults and shall be kept confidential.
They may be inspected by law enforcement officers only
when necessary for the effective discharge of their duties
and upon prior authority of the court; and
(b) The fingerprint and photograph shall be removed from
the files and destroyed: (1) if the case against the child is not
filed, or is dismissed; or (2) when the child reaches twenty-
one (21) years of age and there is no record that the child
committed an offense after reaching eighteen (18) years of
age.
Section 16. Intake Report by the Social Welfare Officer. -
Upon the taking into custody of a child in conflict with the
law, the social welfare officer assigned to the child shall
immediately undertake a preliminary background
investigation of the child and, should a case be filed in court,
submit to the court the corresponding intake report prior to
the arraignment.
Section 17. Filing of Criminal Action. - A criminal action may
be instituted against a child in conflict with the law by filing a
complaint with the prosecutor.
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor assigned to the court.
Petitions for confinement of a child drug dependent shall be
filed under Section 21 of the Rule on Children Charged
under Republic Act No. 9165. (n)
Page 51 of 196
Section 18. Prosecution of Civil Action. - When a criminal
action is instituted against a child in conflict with the law, the
action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be governed by Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Section 19. Preliminary Investigation. - As far as consistent
with this Rule, the preliminary investigation of a child conflict
with the law shall be governed by Section 3 of Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. A specially trained
prosecutor shall be assigned to conduct the inquest,
preliminary investigation and prosecution of the case
involving a child in conflict with the law. The child, on the
other hand, shall be assisted by a private lawyer or if none, a
lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. If there is an
allegation or evidence of torture or ill-treatment of a child in
conflict with the law during custody or detention, it shall be
the duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same. (n)
Section 20. Conduct of Preliminary Investigation. -
Preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following
instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the law does not
qualify for diversion; (b) when the child, the parents or
guardian do not agree to diversion as provided in Sections
27 and 28 of Republic Act No. 9344; or (c) when, after
considering the assessment and recommendation of the
social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not
appropriate for the child in conflict with the law. (n)
At the preliminary investigation, should there arise a need for
clarificatory questions to be propounded on the child, the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness shall apply.
Section 21. Filing of Information. - If the investigating
prosecutor finds probable cause to hold the child in conflict
with the law for trial, there being discernment, the
corresponding Resolution and Information shall be prepared
for the approval by the provincial or city prosecutor, a s the
case may be. The child and the mother or father, or
appropriate guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof,
the nearest relative, and the child's private counsel or lawyer
from the Public Attorney's Office shall be furnished forthwith
a copy of the approved resolution and the Information.
The Information shall be filed with the court within forty-five
(45) days from the start of the preliminary investigation. (n)
No Information shall be filed against a child for the
commission of the following:
(a) status offences;

(b) vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the
Revised Penal Code;
(c) mendicancy under Presidential Decree No. 1563; and
(d) sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619.
Children taken into custody for the foregoing shall, with their
consent and that of their parents, guardian or custodian,
instead undergo appropriate counseling and treatment
program. (n)
Section 22. Duties of the Clerk of Court Upon Receipt of
information. - The Clerk of Court, upon receipt of the
Information, shall:
(1) Maintain a separate case docket or logbook for cases
involving children in conflict with the law. Whenever possible,
the Clerk of Court shall use color coding or other method to
easily distinguish the records of children in conflict with the
law from the other case records;
(2) Determine whether the offense charged qualifies for
diversion, that is it punishable by imprisonment of not more
than twelve (12) years, regardless of fine, or fine alone
regardless of the amount;
(3) If the crime charged is punishable by such imprisonment,
immediately assign a temporary case number in accordance
with Sec. 23 of this Rule and raffle off the case to a court so
that its Diversion Committee can immediately undertake the
appropriate action under Section 33 of this Rule; and
(4) If the crime charged does not quality for diversion
because it is punishable by imprisonment of more than
twelve (12) years, the case shall be assigned a regular
criminal case docket number raffled off to a court for formal
proceedings. (n)
Section 23. Docketing of the Case - a case that qualifies for
diversion under paragraph 3 of the preceding Section shall
not be docketed as a regular criminal case but instead shall
be assigned a temporary case number as follows: CICL-(no.)
___- (year) ___ -D (which means diversion), before the
same is raffled off to the appropriate court.
Section 24. Venue - Subject to the provisions of Section 15,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, any
criminal or civil action involving a child in conflict with the law
shall be instituted and tried in the appropriate court nearest
the place where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential elements occurred.
Section 25. Released of Children on Recognizance to the
Parents, Guardian, Custodian or Nearest Relative. - The
release of a child from a custody during the pendency of the
case involving a non-serious offense as defined in Sec. 4 (u)
of this rule may be ordered by the court only after a hearing
for that purpose, and upon favorable recommendation of the
social worker assigned to the child, with the conformity of the
public prosecutor and the private complainant. The child
shall be released to the custody of a willing and responsible
mother or father, or appropriate guardian or custodian or in
their absence, the nearest relative, who shall be responsible
for the child's good behavior and appearance in court
whenever required.
No child shall be ordered detained in jail pending trial or
hearing of the child's case, subject to the provisions of this
Rule. (n)
Section 26. Commitment and transfer to a youth
Rehabilitation Center. - A child charged with non-serious
offense as defined in Section 4 (u) of this Rule, unless
released on bail or recognizance, may be transferred to a
youth detention home rehabilitation center or other
appropriate facility such as the Department of Social Welfare
and Development which shall ensure the appearance of the
child in court.
In the absence of a youth detention home established by the
local government pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts
Acts, in the city or municipality where the child resides or, a
local rehabilitation center recognized by the government in
the province, city or municipality within the jurisdiction of the
court, or the Department of Social Welfare and Development
or other appropriate local rehabilitation center, the youth
shall be placed under the care of a provincial, city or
municipality jail which shall ensure the appearance of the
child in court when so required. (a)
Section 27. Bail as a Matter of right. - All children in conflict
with the law shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right
before final conviction of an offense not punishable by
reclusion perpetua life imprisonment.
Section 28. When Bail Not a Matter of Right. - No child
charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong. In this case, the court shall commit the to a
youth detention home or youth rehabilitation center, or in the
absence thereof, to the care of a provincial, city or municipal
jail as provided for in Section 27 of this Rule, which shall be
responsible for the appearance of the child in court
whenever required.
Page 52 of 196
Section 29. Care of Child in Youth Detention Homes or
Rehabilitation Centers. - The child in conflict with the law
who has been transferred to a youth rehabilitation center or
youth detention home shall be provided with a healthy
environment. If the child is placed under the care of the
provincial, city or municipal jail, the child shall be provided
with adequate quarters separate from adults and prisoners
of the opposite sex depending on the age, sex, sexual
lifestyle, and such other circumstances and needs of the
child.
Section 30. Case Study Report. - After the institution of the
criminal action, the social worker assigned to the child shall
immediately undertake a social case inquiry of the child and
the child's family, the child's environment and such other
matters relevant to aid the court in the proper disposition of
the case. The report shall be submitted to the court
preferably before arraignment. If not available at that time,
the Report must be submitted to the court as soon as
possible.
Section 31. Diversion Committee - In each court, there shall
be organized a Diversion Committee composed of its Branch
Clerk of Court as chairperson; the prosecutor, a lawyer of
the Public Attorney's Office assigned to the court, and the
social worker assigned by the court to the child, as
members.
Section 32. Proceedings Before Arraignment - The
Diversion Committee shall determine if the child can be
diverted and referred to alternative measures or services.
Subject to pertinent provisions of this Rule and pending
determination of diversion by the Committee, the court shall
release the child on recognizance to the parents, guardian or
custodian, or nearest relative; or if this is not advisable,
commit the child to an appropriate youth detention home or
youth rehabilitation center which shall be responsible for the
presence of the child during the diversion proceedings.
If the Diversion Committee determines that diversion is not
proper, or when the child or the private complainant object to
the diversion, or when there is failure if the diversion
program if undertaken by the child, it shall submit a report to
the court recommending that the case be subjected to formal
criminal proceedings. The court in turn shall direct the
transmittal of the records of the case to the Office of the
Clerk of Court for the assignment of a regular criminal docket
number to the case as follows: CICL Crim. Case No.___-
___( year). The Office of the Clerk of Court shall thereafter
return the case to the court for arraignment and formal
proceedings.

Section 33. Proceeding Before the Diversion Committee. -
Upon receipt by the Committee of a case for diversion from
the Office of the Clerk of Court, the chairperson shall call for
a conference with notice to the child, the mother or father, or
appropriate guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the
nearest relative, the child's counsel, and the private
complainant and counsel to determine if the child can be
diverted to the community continuum instead of formal court
proceedings.
In determining whether diversion is appropriate for the child,
the Committee shall consider the following factors:
(a) The past records, if any, involving the child in conflict with
the law;
(b) The likelihood that the child will be an obvious threat to
himself/herself and the community;
(c) Whether the child has feeling of remorse for the offense
committed;
(d) If the child or the parent are indifferent or hostile; and
whether this will increase the possibility of delinquent
behavior; and
(f) If community-based programs for the rehabilitation and
reintegration of the child are available.
If the Committee finds that diversion is appropriate, it shall
design a diversion program in accordance with Section 34 of
this Rule for the consideration and approval of the court.
Should the Committee determine that diversion is not
appropriate, it shall make the corresponding report and
recommendation in accordance with Section 31 of this Rule.
The Committee cannot recommend diversion in case the
child or the private complainant objects.
Section 34. Diversion programs. -The Committee shall
design a diversion program talking into consideration the
individual characteristics and peculiar circumstances of the
child in conflict with the law. The program shall be for a
specific and definite period and may include any or a
combination of the following:
(a) Written or oral reprimand or citation;
(b) Written or oral apology;
(c) Payment of the damage caused;
(e) Payment of the cost of the proceedings;
(f) Return of the property;
(g) Guidance and supervision orders;
(h) Counseling for the child and his family;
(i) Training, seminar and lectures on (i) anger management
skills; (ii) problem-solving and/or conflict resolution skills; (iii)
values formation; and (iv) other skills that will aid the child to
properly deal with situations that can lead to a repetition of
the offense;
(j) Participation in available community-based programs;
(k) Work-detail program in the community; or
(l) Institutional care and custody.
The Committee shall also include in the program a plan that
will secure satisfaction of the civil liability of the child in
accordance with Sec. 2180 of the Civil Code. Inability to
satisfy the civil the liability shall not by itself be a ground to
discontinue the diversion program of a child. On the other
hand, consent to diversion by the child or payment of civil
indemnity shall not in any way be construed as admission of
guilt and used as evidence against the child in the event that
the case is later on returned to the court for arraignment and
conduct of formal proceedings.
The court shall act on the recommendation within five (5)
days from the termination of the hearing.
Section 36. Undertaking. - In all cases where a child in
conflict with the law is granted diversion by the court, the
child, together with the mother or father, or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in their absence, the nearest
relative, and the child's counsel shall sign an undertaking to
comply with their respective duties and obligation under the
terms and conditions of the express agreement by
complainant assisted by counsel to the diversion of the child,
shall be approved by and enforced under the supervision
and control of the court. It shall contain the following
minimum principal terms and conditions:
(a) The child shall appear before the social worker assigned
to the child by the Court that approved the diversion program
at least once a month for evaluation of its effectiveness.
(b) The child shall faithfully comply with the term and
conditions of the program. Should the child fail to do so, the
Committee shall report such failure to the court which shall
set a show- cause hearing with notice to the child and
private complainant. The court shall thereafter determine
Page 53 of 196
whether to allow the child to continue with the diversion
program, or to end the same and direct that the case now
undergo a formal proceeding.
Should the child be permitted by the court to reside in a
place under the jurisdiction of another court, control and
supervision over such child shall be transferred to the
appropriate court of that place. The diversion records of the
case such as the minutes of the diversion proceedings, copy
of the undertaking, the intake and case study reports and all
other pertinent documents shall be transmitted to the court to
which jurisdiction over the diverted child has been
transferred.
Section 37. Report of Social Worker. - The court social
worker shall conduct regular monthly visit to the child
undergoing diversion proceedings and shall submit the
corresponding reports about the status of the diverted child
to the committee. At any time before or at the end diversion
period, the committee shall file with trhe court of the report
recommending termination or extension of diveertion, as the
case may be. The report and recommendation shall be
heard by the court within fifteen (15) dyas form receipt, with
notice to the members of the Committee, the child, the
mother or father, or the appropriate guardian or custodian, or
in the absensce thereof, the nearest relative, the child's
councel, and the complainant and counsel.
The court shall thereafter determine whether the diversion
program has been full and satisfactorily complied with
Section 38. Closure Order. - On the basis of the report and
recommendation of the Committee, the court may:
(a) Issue a closure order terminating the case if it is
convinced that the child has complied satisfactorily with the
diversion program; or
(b) Extend the period of diversion if it is convinced that the
child may still be rehabilitated; or
(c) Order the case to undergo formal court proceedings if it
finds that the child has not complied with the diversion
program, is incorrigible, or that the program is not serving its
purpose.
In case of the judicially-approved transfer of residence of the
child in conflict with the law, the court to which supervision of
the diversion program was transferred shall make the proper
finding. IF it finds that diversion has been successful. It shall
order the closure of the case. However, if it determines that
diversion has failed it shall return the case to the original
court for formal criminal proceedings.

Section 39. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. - In
all criminal proceedings, the child in conflict with the law
shall have the following rights which shall be respected and
protected by the court:
(a) To be presumed innocent until guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt;
(b) To be informed promptly and directly of the nature and
cause of the charge and if appropriate, through the child's
mother, father, legal guardian, or appropriate custodian;
(c) To be present at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of judgement. The child may,
however, waive presence at the rial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in the bail bond, unless presence at the
trial is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the child without justifiable
cause at the trial of which there was due notice shall be
considered a waiver of the right of the child to be present.
Escape by the child under custody shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to be present in all subsequent hearings until
custody over such child is gained;
(d) To have legal and other appropriate assistance in the
preparation and presentation of the child's defense; in case
of a child arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, to
have immediate free legal assistance;
(e) If detained, to be released (I) on recognizance to the
willing and responsible mother or father or appropriate
guardian or custodian, or in the absence thereof, the nearest
relative; (ii) on bail; or (iii) by commitment to a youth
detention home or youth rehabilitation center, 1avvphi1
(f) Not to be detained in a jail or transferred to an adult
facility pending trial or hearing of the case, unless detention
is used as a last resort which must be done for the shortest
time possible, and only upon order by the court;
(g) In the case the child has been arrested for reasons
related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide
or spy:
(i) To be segregated and have separate detention quarters
from adults except where families ate accommodated as
family un its;
(ii) To immediate free legal assistance in the absence of
private counsel;
(iii) To immediate notice of such arrest to the parents,
guardians or custodians or nearest relatives of the child;
and;
(iv) To be released on recognizance within twenty-four (24)
hours to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development or any responsible member of the
community as determined by the court.
(h) To testify as a witness in his/her own behalf; and subject
to cross-examination only on matters covered by direct
examination. The child shall not be compelled to be a
witness against himself/herself and the child's silence shall
not in any manner prejudice him/her;
(i) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him/her;
(j) To have compulsory process issued to secure the
attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in
the child's behalf
(k) To have speedy and imparial trial, with legal or other
appropriate assistance and preferable in the presence of the
child's parents or legal guardian or custodian, unless such
presence is considred not to be in the best interest of the
child taking into account the latter's age or other peculiar
circumstances;
(l) To be accorded all the rights un der the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness;
(m) To have the child's privacy fully protected in all stages of
the proceedings; and
(n) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner
prescribed by law.
Section 40. Rights if Victims of Offences Committed by
Children in Conflict with the Law. - In any case involving a
child in conflict with the law, the victim has the following
rights:
(1) To be reasonably protected from the child in conflict with
the law;
(2) To timely notice of any public proceedings, or any parole
proceedings involving the crime or of any release or escape
of the child in conflict with the law;
(3) Not to be excluded from any public proceeding, unless
the court, after receiving any clear and convincing evidence,
determines that the testimony by the victim would be
Page 54 of 196
materially altered if the victim heard other testimony in that
proceeding.
(4) To be reasonably heard at any administrative or public
proceeding involving diversion, release, plea, suspension of
sentence and determination of disposition measures, or any
parole proceeding;
(5) To confer with the prosecutor in the case;
(6) To avail of legal assistance from the Public Attorney's
Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines. any other legal aid
office or any law practitioner.1avvphi1
(7) To be informed of the availability of compensation from
the Department of Justice Board of Claims in accordance
with the provisions of Rep Act. No.7309.
(8) To be entitled to support services from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development and local government
units;
(9) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as
provided for under the Family Code;
(10) To be informed of the rights and the services available
to victims of offenses including the right to apply for a
protection order;
(11) To full and timely restitution as provided in law;
(12) To proceedings that are free from unreasonable delay;
and
(13) To be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy.
Section 41. Responsibilities of the Court. - For the
protection of the rights of the child in the conflict with the law,
the court shall have the following responsibilities:
(1) To monitor the status of a child whose case is pending in
its court placed in a youth detention center or other
institution during the pendency of the child's case;
(2) To receive and investigate complaints concerning
violations of the rights of the child whose case is pending on
its court;
(3) To require all professionals working for the welfare of the
child, such as barangay captains, teachers, social workers,
medical professionals, and law enforcers, to render regular
monthly reports to the court.

(4) To order access to adequate services for rehabilitation,
counseling and other forms of reintegration for the child;
(5) To ensure that the child who is capable of forming his or
her own views has the right to express those views freely in
all matters affecting the child, and that such views be
accorded due weight in accordance with the developmental
age and maturity of the child;
(6) To ensure that the child, either directly or through a
representative , is provided the opportunity to be heard in all
proceedings affecting such child;
(7) To ensure communication at all times between the judge
and the child;
(8) To ensure that the child sits with close family members of
the child's choice during the court proceedings;
(9) To ensure that the child can communicate freely with
counsel at all times;
(10) To ensure that the child is informed in age-appropriate
language of all stages of the judicial proceeding affecting
such child;
(11) To ensure that a child placed in a Youth Detention
Home or Youth Rehabilitation Center or in any child facility
be given appropriate medical examination in order to
determine and put on record any evidence of ill-treatment; to
identify any physical or mental condition requiring medical
attention; and thereafter make sure that child is provided by
adequate treatment and medical attention;
(12) To insure that a child is informed as soon as possible of
the death, serious illness or injury of any immediate family
member and be allowed to visit the ill family member or
attend the funeral, when appropriate and advisable;
(13) To ensure if a child dies during the pendency of the
case or within six (6) months of release, an independent
inquiry is conducted on the circumstances of the death and a
report thereof, including the child's death certificate, be made
available to the child's mother or father , guardian, custodian
or nearest relative;
(14) When appropriate and advisable, to allow the child
temporarily leave the detention home or rehabilitation center
by means of an "out-on-pass" order to attend special family
occasions such as Christmas and New Year celebrations.
The "out-on-pass" order shall contain reasonable restrictions
to ensure safety, security and timely return to detention as
may be determined by the court;
(15) To allow at all times, and from the moment of initial
contact, any member of the family or the guardian of the
child to visit the child, unless prejudicial to the latter's best
interest;
(16) To allow the appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem if
available and advisable, to enable the child to raise concerns
and complaints without fear or retribution; and
(17) To undertake all other appropriate measures to ensure
the promotion of the best interest of the child and the child's
eventual reintegration in society.
Section 42. Determination of the Bests Interests of the
Child. - The following factors may be considered in
determining the best interests of a child in conflict with the
law: the child's age and sex, the child's mental and physical
health, the mental and physical health of the parents, their
lifestyle and other social factors; the emotional ties between
the parents and the child, the ability of the parents to provide
the child with food, shelter, clothing and medical care; the
established living pattern for the child concerning school,
home, community and religious institution, quality of
schooling, the existence of other relatives who may be in a
better position to be with the child and the child's relationship
with these relatives; the child's background, maturity and
level of understanding, sexual lifestyle and any other
characteristics and needs of the child that the court may
deem relevant.
Section 43. Arraignment and Plea. - The provisions of Rules
116 and 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
shall apply to the arraignment of the child in the conflict with
the law. The arraignment shall be scheduled within three (3)
days from the date of receipt of the complaint or information
by the court, unless a shorter period is provided for by law.
In case the child is not assisted by a private counsel, the
court shall immediately appoint its Public Attorney as the
child's counsel de oficio.
Arraignment shall be held in chambers and conducted by the
judge by furnishing the child and counsel a copy of the
complaint or information, reading the same in a language or
dialect known to and understand by the child, explaining the
nature and consequences of a plea of guilty or not guilty and
asking the child's plea.
Section 44. Pre-trial. - The provisions of Rule 118 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall govern the pre-
trial of the child in conflict with the law. Agreements or
admissions made during the pre-trial conference shall be in
Page 55 of 196
writing and signed by the child, the mother, the father or duly
appointed guardian, and counsel; otherwise, the agreements
or admissions shall not be admissible against the child.
Whenever possible and practicable, the court shall explore
all possibilities of settlement of the case, except its criminal
aspects. Plea bargaining shall be resorted to only as a last
measure when it shall serve the best interest of the child and
the demands of truth and restorative justice.
Section 45. Trial. - All hearings shall be conducted in am
manner conductive to the best interest of the child and in an
environment that will allow the child to participate fully and
freely in accordance with the Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness.
Section 46. Guiding Principles in Judging the Child. -
Subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and other special laws, the judgment against a
child in conflict with the law shall be guided by the following
principles:
(1) The judgment shall be in proportion to the gravity of the
offense, and shall consider the circumstances and the best
interest of the child, the rights of the victim, and the needs of
society in line with the demands of balanced and restorative
justice.
(2) Restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be
limited to the minimum. Where discretion is given by the law
to the judge whether the penalty to be imposed is fine or
imprisonment, the imposition of fine should be proffered as
the more appropriate penalty.
(3) No corporal punishment shall be imposed.
(4) In case of the presence of any exculpatory evidence or
doubt in the prosecution's evidence, the doubt shall be
resolved In favor of the child.
Section 47. Promulgation of Sentence. - If. After the trial, the
court should find the child in conflict with the law guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall
impose the proper penalty, including any civil liability which
the child may have incurred, and promulgate the sentence in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules if
Criminal Procedure.
Section 48. Automatic Suspension of Sentence and
Disposition Orders. - If the child is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court, instead of executing the judgments of
conviction, shall palce the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application.

Suspension of sentence can be availed of even if the child is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more but not above
twenty-one (21) years old, at the time of the pronouncement
of guilt, without prejudice to the child's availing of other
benefits such as probation, if qualified, or adjustment of
penalty, in interest of justice.
The benefits of the suspended sentence shall not apply to a
child in conflict with the law who has once enjoyed
suspension of sentence, but shall nonetheless apply to one
who is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty and in lieu thereof, reclusion perpetua, and after
application of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority.
If the child in conflict with the law reaches eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act 9344, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a maximum period of up to the time
the child reaches twenty-one (21) years of age, or to order
service of sentence.
Section 49. Disposition Conference. -In case of suspended
sentence, the court shall set the case for disposition
conference within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of
sentence with notice to the social worker of the court, the
child and the parents or guardian ad litem of the child and
the child's counsel , the victim and counsel. At the
conference, the court shall proceed to determine and issue
any or a combination of the following disposition measures
best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child:
(1) Care, guidance, and supervision of orders;
(2) Community service orders;
(3) Drug and alcohol treatment
(4) Participation in group counseling and similar activities;
and
(5) Commitment to the Youth Rehabilitation Center of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or other
centers for children in conflict with the law authorized by the
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
Section 50. Compliance with the Disposition Measures. -
The social worker assigned to the child shall monitor the
compliance by the child in conflict with the law with the
disposition measures and shall submit regularly to the court
a status and progress report on the matter. The court may
set a conference for the evaluation of such report in the
presence, if practicable, of the child, the parents or guardian,
counsel and other persons whose presence may be deemed
necessary.
Section 51. Discharge of Child Subject of Disposition
Measure. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker
assigned to the child, the court shall, after due notice to all
parties and hearing, dismiss the case against the child who
has been issued disposition measures, even before reaching
eighteen(18) years of age, and order a final discharge if it
finds that the child has been rehabilitated and has shown the
capability to be a useful member of the community.
If the court finds that the child (a) is incorrigible; or (b) has
not shown the capability of becoming a useful member of
society; or (c) has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of the disposition or rehabilitation program; (d) or
the child's continued stay in the training institution is not in
the child's best interest, the child shall be brought before the
court for execution of the judgment.
The final release of the child shall not extinguish the civil
liability. The parents and other persons exercising parental
authority over the child shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of the child
living in their company and under the parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Section 52. Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. -
The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
child in conflict with the law and upon application at any time,
place the child on probation if qualified, in lieu of service of
sentence taking into account the best interest of the child.
Section 53. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in
conflict with the law who has undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited in the service of the sentence
consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment, if
the child agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same or
similar disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
except in any of the following cases:
(1) When the child is a recidivist or has been convicted twice
or more times of any crime; or
(2) When upon being summoned for execution of sentence,
the child failed to surrender voluntarily.
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A child who does not agree to the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners shall be credited in the
service of the sentence with four-fifths of the time during
which the child has undergone preventive imprisonment.
Whenever the child has undergone preventive imprisonment
for a period equal to or more than the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which the child may
be sentenced and the case is not yet terminated, the child
shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of any on-going intervention program, and the
trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is
under review. In case the maximum penalty to which the
child may be sentenced is destierro, the child shall be
released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Any form of physical restraint imposed on the child in conflict
with the law, including community service and commitment
to a rehabilitation center, shall be considered preventive
imprisonment.
Section 54. Confidentiality of Proceedings and Record. - All
proceedings and records involving children in conflict with
the law from initial contact until final disposition of the case
by the court shall be considered privileged and confidential.
The public may be excluded from the proceedings and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, the records shall not be
disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the parties
or the participants in the proceeding for any purpose
whatsoever, except to determine if the child may have the
sentence suspended under Section 38 of this Rule or if the
child may be granted probation under the Probation Law, or
to enforce the civil liability imposed in the criminal action.
The court shall employ other measures to protect
confidentiality of proceedings including non-disclosure of
records to the media, the maintenance of a separate police
blotter for cases involving children in conflict with the law and
the adoption of a system of coding to conceal material
information, which lead to the child's identity. The records of
children in conflict with the law shall not be used in
subsequent proceedings or cases involving the same
offender as an adult.
Section 55. Non-liability for Perjury or Concealment or
Misrepresentation. - Any person who has been in conflict
with the law as a child shall not be held guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of failure to
acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry.
 Page 57 of 196

Section 56. Sealing of Records. - The court, motu proprio or

on application of a person who has been adjudge a child in
conflict with the law, or if still a minor, on motion of the
parents or legal guardian, shall, upon notice to the
prosecution and after hearing, order the sealing of the
records of the case if it finds that two (2) years have elapsed
since the final discharged of the child after suspension of
sentence or probation, or from the date of the closure order
and the child has no pending case of an offense or a crime
involving moral turpitude.

Upon entry of the order, the case shall be treated as if it

never occurred. All index references shall be deleted and in
case of inquiry, the court, prosecution, law enforcement
officers and all other offices and agencies that dealt with the
case shall reply that no record exist with respect to the child
concerned. Copies of the order shall be sent to these
officials and agencies named in the order. Inspection of the
sealed records thereafter may be permitted only by order of
the court upon petition of the child who is the subject of the
records or of other proper parties.

This procedure shall be without prejudice to the rule on

destruction of video or audio tapes under Section 31 of the
Rule on the Examination of Child Witness.

Section 57. Prohibition of Labeling. - In the conduct of

proceedings from initial contact with the child in conflict with
the law to the final disposition of the case, there shall be no
branding or labeling of the child as a young criminal, juvenile
delinquent, prostitute, vagrant, or attaching to the child in
any manner any derogatory description or name. Likewise,
no discriminatory statements, conduct and practices shall be
allowed, particularly with respect to the child's social or
economic status, physical or mental disability or ethnic
origin.

Section 58. Contempt Powers. - A person who directly or

indirectly disobeys any order of the court or obstruct or
interferes with its proceedings or the enforcement of its
orders issued under this Rule shall be liable for contempt of
court.

Section 59. Effectivity. - This Rule as revised shall take

effect on December 1, 2009 after its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation not later than November
27, 2009.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10630
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
ACT OF 2006" AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The Title of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows: "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
Creating the Juvenile justice and Welfare Council under the
Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
Section 2. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – The following terms as used
in this Act shall be defined as follows:
"x x x
"(s) ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ – refers to a 24-hour child-caring
institution established, funded and managed by local
government units (LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) providing short-term
residential care for children in conflict with the law who are
above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age who
are awaiting court disposition of their cases or transfer to
other agencies or jurisdiction.
"Part of the features of a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ is an intensive
juvenile intervention and support center. This will cater to
children in conflict with the law in accordance with Sections
20, 20-A and 20-B hereof.
"A multi-disciplinary team composed of a social worker, a
psychologist/mental health professional, a medical doctor,
an educational/guidance counselor and a Barangay Council
for the Protection of Children (BCPC) member shall operate
the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’. The team will work on the
individualized intervention plan with the child and the child’s
family.
"x x x."
Section 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
"A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day
of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
"A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
"The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws."
Section 4. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC). – A
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) is hereby
created and attached to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development and placed under its administrative
supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired by an
Undersecretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. It shall ensure the effective implementation of
this Act and coordination among the following agencies:
"(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(b) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
"(c) Department of Education (DepED);
"(d) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG);
"(e) Public Attorney’s Office (PAO);
"(f) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
"(g) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA);
"(h) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
"(i) Philippine National Police (PNP);
"(j) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP);
"(k) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
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"(l) Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA);
"(m) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
"(n) Other institutions focused on juvenile justice and
intervention programs.
"The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose
ranks shall not be lower than director, to be designated by
the concerned heads of the following departments or
agencies and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations:
"(1) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(2) Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD);
"(3) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
"(4) Department of Education (DepED);
"(5) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG);
"(6) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
"(7) National Youth Commission (NYC);
"(8) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, to be designated by
the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development, to be
selected based on the criteria established by the Council;
"(9) Department of Health (DOH); and
"(10) One (1) representative each from the League of
Provinces, League of Cities, League of Municipalities and
League of Barangays.
"There shall be a Regional Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Committee (RJJWC) in each region. The RJJWCs will be
under the administration and supervision of the JJWC. The
RJJWC shall be chaired by the director of the regional office
of the DSWD. It shall ensure the effective implementation of
this Act at the regional and LGU levels and the coordination
among its member agencies.
"The RJJWC will be composed of permanent representatives
who shall have a rank not lower than an assistant regional
director or its equivalent to be designated by the concerned
department heads from the following agencies and shall
receive emoluments as may be determined by the Council in

accordance with existing budget and accounting rules and
regulations:
"(i) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(ii) Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD);
"(iii) Department of Education (DepED);
"(iv) Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG);
"(v) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
"(vi) Department of Health (DOH);
"(vii) Two (2) representatives from NGOs operating within
the region selected by the RJJWC based on the criteria
established by the JJWC;
"(viii) One (1) sectoral representative from the children or
youth sector within the region; and
"(ix) One (1) representative from the League of Provinces/
Cities/ Municipalities/ Barangays of the Philippines.
"The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from the
effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development shall determine the organizational structure
and staffing pattern of the JJWC national secretariat and the
RJJWC secretariat.
"In the implementation of this Act, the JJWC shall consult
with the various leagues of local government officials.
"The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure
the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its
duties and functions, as herein provided."
Section5. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. – The JJWC
shall have the following duties and functions:
"(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
"(b) To advise the President on all matters and policies
relating to juvenile justice and welfare;
"(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the review and
redrafting of existing policies/regulations or in the formulation
of new ones in line with the provisions of this Act;
"(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3 to 5-year
national juvenile intervention program, with the participation
of government agencies concerned, NGOs and youth
organizations;
"(e) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile
intervention programs and activities by national government
agencies and other activities which may have an important
bearing on the success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs relating to juvenile justice
and welfare shall be adopted in consultation with the JJWC;
"(f) To consult with the various leagues of local government
officials in the formulation and recommendation of policies
and strategies for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and
the promotion of juvenile justice and welfare;
"(g) To formulate and recommend policies and strategies in
consultation with children for the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and the administration of justice, as well as for
the treatment and rehabilitation of the children in conflict with
the law;
"(h) To collect relevant information and conduct continuing
research and support evaluations and studies on all matters
relating to juvenile justice and welfare, such as, but not
limited to:
"(1) The performance and results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by activities of the local
government units and other government agencies;
"(2) The periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes; and
"(3) The particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody.
"The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC in the
improvement of the administration of juvenile justice and
welfare system.
"The JJWC shall submit an annual report to Congress on the
implementation of the provisions of this Act.
"The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure that children
are involved in research and policy development.
"(i) Through duly designated persons and with the
assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and
rehabilitation facilities and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check compliance with the
Page 59 of 196
standards provided herein and to make the necessary
recommendations to appropriate agencies;
"(j) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the
personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of
the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program;
"(k) To submit an annual report to the President on the
implementation of this Act; and
"(l) To perform such other functions as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act."
"SEC. 9-A. Duties and Functions of the RJJWC. – The
RJJWC shall have the following duties and functions:
"(a) To oversee and ensure the effective implementation of
this Act at the regional level and at the level of the LGUs;
"(b) To assist the concerned agencies in the implementation
and in compliance with the JJWC’s adopted
policies/regulations or provide substantial inputs to the JJWC
in the formulation of new ones in line with the provisions of
this Act;
"(c) To assist in the development of the comprehensive 3 to
5-year local juvenile intervention program, with the
participation of concerned LGUs, NGOs and youth
organizations within the region and monitor its
implementation;
"(d) To coordinate the implementation of the juvenile
intervention programs and activities by national government
agencies and other activities within the region;
"(e) To oversee the programs and operation of the intensive
juvenile intervention and support center established within
the region;
"(f) To collect relevant regional information and conduct
continuing research and support evaluations and studies on
all matters relating to juvenile justice and welfare within the
region, such as, but not limited to:
"(1) Performance and results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by activities of the LGUs and
other government agencies within the region;
"(2) The periodic trends, problems and causes of juvenile
delinquency and crimes from the LGU level to the regional
level; and

"(3) The particular needs of children in conflict with the law in
custody within their regional jurisdiction.
"The data gathered shall be forwarded by the RJJWC to the
JJWC on an annual basis and as may be deemed necessary
by the JJWC.
"(g) Through duly designated persons and with the
assistance of the agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections in detention and
rehabilitation facilities within the region and to undertake
spot inspections on their own initiative in order to check
compliance with the standards provided herein and to make
the necessary reports and recommendations to appropriate
agencies and to the JJWC;
"(h) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of trainings for the
personnel of the agencies involved in the administration of
the juvenile justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program within the region;
"(i) To submit an annual report to the JJWC on the
implementation of this Act; and
"(j) To perform such other functions as may be determined
by the JJWC to implement the provisions of this Act."
Section 6. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility.
– If it has been determined that the child taken into custody
is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will
have an initial contact with the child, in consultation with the
local social welfare and development officer, has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her
parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s
nearest relative. The child shall be subjected to a
community-based intervention program supervised by the
local social welfare and development officer, unless the best
interest of the child requires the referral of the child to a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed by LGUs or
licensed and/or accredited NGOs monitored by the DSWD.
"The local social welfare and development officer shall
determine the appropriate programs for the child who has
been released, in consultation with the child and the person
having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or
nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take
custody, the child may be released to any of the following:
"(a) A duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization;
"(b) A barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council
for the Protection of Children (BCPC);
"(c) A local social welfare and development officer; or, when
and where appropriate, the DSWD.
"If the child has been found by the local social welfare and
development officer to be dependent, abandoned, neglected
or abused by his/her parents and the best interest of the
child requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or
‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall
execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment
of the child: Provided, That if the child has no parents or
guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition
for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the
DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office
(LSWDO) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, otherwise known as ‘The Child and Youth Welfare
Code’ and the Supreme Court rule on commitment of
children: Provided, further, That the minimum age for
children committed to a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-
asa’ shall be twelve (12) years old."
"SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who
Are Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. – A child who is
above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of
age and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive
arson, rape, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is
killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable
by more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment, shall be
deemed a neglected child under Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, and shall be mandatorily placed in a
special facility within the youth care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-
asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support
Center (IJISC).
"In accordance with existing laws, rules, procedures and
guidelines, the proper petition for involuntary commitment
and placement under the IJISC shall be filed by the local
social welfare and development officer of the LGU where the
offense was committed, or by the DSWD social worker in the
local social welfare and development officer’s absence,
within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the receipt of a
report on the alleged commission of said child. The court,
where the petition for involuntary commitment has been filed
shall decide on the petition within seventy-two (72) hours
from the time the said petition has been filed by the
DSWD/LSWDO. The court will determine the initial period of
Page 60 of 196
placement of the child within the IJISC which shall not be
less than one (1) year. The multi-disciplinary team of the
IJISC will submit to the court a case study and progress
report, to include a psychiatric evaluation report and
recommend the reintegration of the child to his/her family or
the extension of the placement under the IJISC. The multi-
disciplinary team will also submit a report to the court on the
services extended to the parents and family of the child and
the compliance of the parents in the intervention program.
The court will decide whether the child has successfully
completed the center-based intervention program and is
already prepared to be reintegrated with his/her family or if
there is a need for the continuation of the center-based
rehabilitation of the child. The court will determine the next
period of assessment or hearing on the commitment of the
child."
"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above
twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and
who commits an offense for the second time or
oftener: Provided, That the child was previously subjected to
a community-based intervention program, shall be deemed a
neglected child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and shall undergo an intensive intervention
program supervised by the local social welfare and
development officer: Provided, further, That, if the best
interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth
care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or
guardians shall execute a written authorization for the
voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That if
the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail
to execute the written authorization for voluntary
commitment, the proper petition for involuntary commitment
shall be immediately filed by the DSWD or the LSWDO
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended."
"SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of
Crimes. – Any person who, in the commission of a crime,
makes use, takes advantage of, or profits from the use of
children, including any person who abuses his/her authority
over the child or who, with abuse of confidence, takes
advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce,
threaten or instigate the commission of the crime, shall be
imposed the penalty prescribed by law for the crime
committed in its maximum period."
"SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. – Based on the
recommendation of the multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC,
the LSWDO or the DSWD, the court may require the parents
of a child in conflict with the law to undergo counseling or

any other intervention that, in the opinion of the court, would
advance the welfare and best interest of the child.
"As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of the
following:
"(a) Biological parents of the child; or
"(b) Adoptive parents of the child; or
"(c) Individuals who have custody of the child.
"A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in conflict with the
law may require the attendance of one or both parents of the
child at the place where the proceedings are to be
conducted.
"The parents shall be liable for damages unless they prove,
to the satisfaction of the court, that they were exercising
reasonable supervision over the child at the time the child
committed the offense and exerted reasonable effort and
utmost diligence to prevent or discourage the child from
committing another offense."
"SEC. 20-E. Assistance to Victims of Offenses Committed by
Children. – The victim of the offense committed by a child
and the victim’s family shall be provided the appropriate
assistance and psychological intervention by the LSWDO,
the DSWD and other concerned agencies."
Section 7. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. – The law
enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation, determine
where the case involving the child in conflict with the law
should be referred.
"The taking of the statement of the child shall be conducted
in the presence of the following: (1) child’s counsel of choice
or in the absence thereof, a lawyer from the Public
Attorney’s Office; (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or nearest
relative, as the case may be; and (3) the local social welfare
and development officer. In the absence of the child’s
parents, guardian, or nearest relative, and the local social
welfare and development officer, the investigation shall be
conducted in the presence of a representative of an NGO,
religious group, or member of the BCPC.
"The social worker shall conduct an initial assessment to
determine the appropriate interventions and whether the
child acted with discernment, using the discernment
assessment tools developed by the DSWD. The initial
assessment shall be without prejudice to the preparation of a
more comprehensive case study report. The local social
worker shall do either of the following:
"(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if the child is
fifteen (15) years or below or above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years old, who acted without discernment; and
"(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but below
eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment, proceed to
diversion under the following chapter."
Section 8. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of
Information. – The prosecutor shall conduct a preliminary
investigation in the following instances: (a) when the child in
conflict with the law does not qualify for diversion; (b) when
the child, his/her parents or guardian does not agree to
diversion as specified in Sections 27 and 28; and (c) when
considering the assessment and recommendation of the
social worker, the prosecutor determines that diversion is not
appropriate for the child in conflict with the law.
"Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of complaint,
the prosecutor shall notify the Public Attorney’s Office of
such service, as well as the personal information, and place
of detention of the child in conflict with the law.
"Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor,
the information against the child shall be filed before the
Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of the
preliminary investigation. The information must allege that
the child acted with discernment."
Section 9. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 49. Establishment of ‘Bahay Pag-Asa’. – Each
province and highly-urbanized city (the LGUs) shall be
responsible for building, funding and operating a ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’ within their jurisdiction following the standards that
will be set by the DSWD and adopted by the JJWC.
"Every ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ will have a special facility called the
IJISC. This Center will be allocated for children in conflict
with the law in accordance with Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B
hereof. These children will be required to undergo a more
intensive multi-disciplinary intervention program. The JJWC
in partnership with, but not limited to, the DSWD, the DOH,
the DepED and the DILG, will develop and set the standards
for the implementation of the multi-disciplinary intervention
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program of the IJISC. Upon institutionalization of the IJISC
program, the JJWC will continue to monitor and provide
technical assistance to the multi-disciplinary teams operating
the said centers."
Section 10. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in Conflict with
the Law. – x x x
"The LGUs expected expenditures on the local juvenile
intervention program for children at risk and children in
conflict with the law shall be included in the LGUs annual
budget. Highly-urbanized cities and provincial governments
should include a separate budget for the construction and
maintenance of the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ including the operation
of the IJISC within the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’."
Section 11. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 57. Status Offenses. – Any conduct not considered an
offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be
considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child."
"SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. – Ordinances
enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status
offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors
against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination,
and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No
penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and
they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the
custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs
shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also
be recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict
with the law’. The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in
group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance
in parenting education seminars."
Section 12. Mandatory Registry of Children in Conflict with
the Law. – All duty-bearers, including barangay/BCPC
workers, law enforcers, teachers, guidance counselors,
social workers and prosecutors who will receive report,
 Page 62 of 196

handle or refer cases of children in conflict with the law, shall Section 17. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect
ensure a faithful recordation of all pertinent information, such fifteen (15) days after the completion of its publication in
as age, residence, gender, crime committed or accused of the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
and the details of the intervention or diversion, as the case newspapers of general circulation.
may be, under which they will undergo or has undergone, of
all children in conflict with the law to guarantee the correct
application of the provisions of this Act and other laws. The
JJWC shall lead in the establishment of a centralized People vs. Alcabao, C.A., 44 O.G. 5006
information management system on children in conflict with
The accused, 11 years old (disregard age: Case cited to
the law. This provision is however without prejudice to
illustrate discernment of a minor) shot the offended party,
Section 43 of this Act.
who had caught him shooting at the latter's mango fruits,
Section 13. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby with a slingshot hitting the latter in one of his eyes, and after
amended to read as follows: having done so said: "Putang ina mo, mabuti matikman mo."
It was held that the first part of the remark clearly manifested
"SEC. 63. Appropriations. – The amount necessary to carry the perverted character of the accused and the second part
out the provisions of this Act shall be charged against the reflected his satisfaction and elation upon the
current year’s appropriations of the JJWC under the budget accomplishment of his criminal act. These facts indicate
of the Department of Justice. Thereafter, such sums as may discernment on the part of the minor.
be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act
shall be included in the budget of the DSWD under the
annual General Appropriations Act: Provided, That the
amount of Four hundred million pesos (P400,000,000.00)
shall be appropriated for the construction of ‘Bahay Pag-asa’
rehabilitation centers in provinces or cities with high
incidence of children in conflict with the law to be determined
and identified by the DSWD and the JJWC on a priority
basis: Provided, further, That the said amount shall be
coursed through the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) for its proper implementation.

"The LGUs concerned shall make available, from its own

resources or assets, their counterpart share equivalent to the
national government contribution of Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) per rehabilitation center.

"In addition, the Council may accept donations, grants and

contributions from various sources, in cash or in kind, for
purposes relevant to its functions, subject to the usual
government accounting and auditing rules and regulations."

Section 14. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The

JJWC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations
within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 15. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act

is held unconstitutional, other provisions not affected thereby
shall remain valid and binding.

Section 16. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees,

ordinances and rules inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.

[ G.R. NO. 166040, April 26, 2006 ]
NIEL F. LLAVE,PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962
affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal
Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner
(then only 12 years old) with rape was filed with the RTC of
Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL
LLAVE Y FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine
(9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting with
discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y
QUITALES, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against her will
and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of
Pasay City.[4] One of their children, Debbielyn, was born on
December 8, 1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade II student at
the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and
attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.[7]
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou
sold quail eggs at a nearby church.[8] Adjacent to their house
was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would
usually start selling at 6:30 p.m.[9]Next to Teofisto's
residence was a vacant house.[10]
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived
home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed her clothes and
proceeded to her mother's store. Marilou asked her daughter
to bring home the container with the unsold quail
eggs.[11] Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she
neared the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly
pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which was in front
of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp
post.[12] She resisted to no avail.[13] Petitioner ordered her to
lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed
her shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on
top of her.[14] She felt his penis being inserted into her
vagina. He kissed her.[15] She felt pain and cried.[16] She was
sure there were passersby on the street near the vacant
house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard
the girl's cries. He rushed to the place and saw petitioner on
top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto
shouted at petitioner, and the latter fled from the scene.
Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what
happened.[17] She told her father about the incident.[18] Her
parents later reported what happened to the police
authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a
bad boy because he was a rapist.[20]
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24,
2002, he went out of their house to get his barbecue grill. He
heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant
house.[21] He rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked
from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making pumping
motions on her anus.[22]The girl was crying. He shouted at
petitioner, "Hoy, bakit ginawa mo 'yan?"[23] Petitioner
hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.[24] Neighbors who had
heard Teofisto shouting arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto gave a
written statement to the police investigator regarding the
incident.[26]
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he
was inside their house. His daughter, Kimberly Rose,
suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the
vacant house by petitioner.[27] He rushed to the place and
found her daughter crying. When he asked her what
happened, she replied that she had been abused. He
brought Debbielyn to their house and then left.[28] He then
looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmother's
house. A barangay tanod brought petitioner to the barangay
hall.[29] On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter to
the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft
Avenue, Manila where she was examined by Dr. Mariella S.
Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a
physician at the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed
the victim who told her "Masakit ang pepe ko," "Ni-rape
ako."[30] Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on
the child, and found no injury on the hymen and perineum,
but found scanty yellowish discharge between the labia
minora.[31] There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal
skin at 1 o'clock position near the anal opening.[32] She
declared that the findings support the theory that blunt force
Page 63 of 196
or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any
other foreign body[33]) was applied to the perineal area[34] not
more than six or seven days before.[35] The abrasion could
have been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no
spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the external
genitalia;[36] neither did she find any other injury or abrasion
on the other parts of the victim's body.[37] She concluded that
her findings were consistent with the victim's claim that she
was sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that
on September 24, 2002, Marilou Santos arrived at
the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been
raped by petitioner who was then in his aunt's house at
Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante
ordered him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to
proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy into
custody, and they did as they were told.[38]
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as
witness. She declared that the abrasions in the perineal area
could have been caused while the offender was on top of the
victim.[39] She explained that the distance between the anus
and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.[40] The
abrasion was located at ¼ of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at
the Pasay City South High School.[41] He had been one of
the three outstanding students in grade school and received
awards such as Best in Mathematics.[42]He also finished a
computer course and received a Certificate of Completion
from the Philippine Air Force Management Information
Center.[43] He denied having raped the private complainant.
He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he
was outside of their house to buy rice in the carinderia[44] and
he saw her on his way back.[45] He also met his father, who
asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He was also
told that the victim's father was so angry that the latter
wanted to kill him.[46] He did not ask his father for the name
of the angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena
de Amor Street in going to his aunt's house. Petitioner also
declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunt's
house.[47] Later, Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge
Dominguez arrived at his aunt's house and brought him to
the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why
Debbielyn and her parents would charge him with rape.[48]
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with
Debbielyn.[49] While confined at the Pasay City Youth Home
during trial, he had a crush on "Issa," a young female
inmate. Using a piece of broken glass (bubog) about half-an-

inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg
and left arm.[50]
Nida Llave testified and identified her son's Certificate of Live
Birth, in which it appears that he was born on March 6,
1990.[51] She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. on September
24, 2000, Marilou Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their
house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son had
raped the private complainant. She went to their house to
look for her son and came across Domingo Santos who
threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded
to the house of his sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street
where petitioner had hidden for a while.[52]
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment
convicting Neil of the crime charged. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx Niel Llave y
Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the
complainant towards the vacant lot, laid on top of her and
had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will
and consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover,
he being a minor, he cannot be meted with the Death
penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict
with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating
circumstance of minority, this Court hereby sentences him
to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to
Eight (8) years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php50,000.00).[53]
The trial court declared that based on the evidence of the
prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim towards the
vacant house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted with
discernment. It also considered petitioner's declaration that
he had been a consistent honor student.[54]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he
averred the following in his Brief as appellant therein:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY
OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE
MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF
BLEEDING.
II
Page 64 of 196
thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE reprehensible.[59]
PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS
REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO AGAINST Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL the instant petition before this Court:
VENDETTA AGAINST THE LATTER'S
ISSUES
FAMILY/RELATIVES.
III
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE BY HAVING
CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.[55] II
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR
modification as to the penalty meted on him. ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AT
THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is
hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is III
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision PROCESS OF LAW.
mayor medium as the maximum. Additionally, the accused-
ARGUMENTS
appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the
amount of P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000
by way of exemplary damages.
I
SO ORDERED.[56]
Petitioner filed a Motion for the
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE
Reconsideration,[57]contending that the prosecution failed to
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THE
adduce proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he
MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the motion
in a Resolution[58] dated November 12, 2004 on the following II
finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
with discernment, his conduct during and after the "crime"
betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant III
does not have the mental faculty to grasp the propriety and
consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out
by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
the accused-appellant fled the scene and hid in his
grandmother's house intimates that he knew that he did IV
something that merits punishment.
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION
IS HEARSAY.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the V
accused-appellant is a recipient of several academic awards
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he
[is] possessed [of] intelligence well beyond his years and is VI

PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[60]
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be
summarized as follows: (1) whether he was deprived of his
right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal
knowledge of the private complainant, and if in the
affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in
perpetrating the crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by
the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable to
pay moral damages to the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of
his right to a preliminary investigation before the Information
against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal
knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is
inconsistent on material points. He points out that she
claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner
inserted his penis to the point that she cried; this, however,
is negated by Dr. Castillo's report stating that there was no
evidence of injury on the victim's external genitalia. Petitioner
maintains that as against the victim's testimony and that of
Dr. Castillo's report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ
will not suffice as factual basis of conviction for
consummated rape. Moreover, the victim's testimony lacks
credibility in view of her admission that, while she was being
allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the
street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused
by an invasion of the body through the protective covering of
the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove
the cause of the abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached
by her parents on her testimony before the trial court. Dr.
Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the
latter admitted to her that she did not understand the
meaning of the word "rape" and its Filipino
translation, "hinalay," and that the genital examination of the
girl was at the insistence of the latter's parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucud's testimony has no
probative weight because and had an ill-motive to testify
against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his
uncle, Boy, had the house rented by Teofisto demolished.
Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victim's
parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the
testimony of Police Investigator Milagros Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers
that petitioner was subjected to an inquest investigation
under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as gleaned from the Certification of the City
Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the
absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither is
it necessary that lacerations be found on the hymen of a
victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of
penetration within the vaginal surface. Corroborative
evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the
testimony of the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice
for conviction of consummated rape. When the victim
testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all
that is necessary to prove that rape was consummated.
Petitioner's evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of
Teofisto Bucud in testifying against him is at best flimsy.
Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents
would charge petitioner with rape solely on Teofisto's
proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment
before, during, and after the rape based on the undisputed
facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the
time of the alleged rape incident, he is presumed to have
acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. Under said provision, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with
discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there
was no evidence presented by the prosecution to show that
he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt
from criminal liability.
Petitioner's arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal
Code is defined as follows: "the discernment that constitutes
an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a
minor under fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who
commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong" (People
v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580 [1939]). For a minor above nine but
below fifteen years of age, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v.
Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal
Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that "discernment is more
than the mere understanding between right and wrong.
Rather, it means the mental capacity of a minor between 9
and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of
Page 65 of 196
his unlawful act" (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]).
Hence, in judging whether a minor accused acted with
discernment, his mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong, which may be known
and should be determined by considering all the
circumstances disclosed by the record of the case, his
appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also
after and even during the trial should be taken into
consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioner's actuations during and after
the rape incident, as well as his behavior during the trial
showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being
discovered by the prosecution's witness, Teofisto Bucud,
petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly
thereafter, when his parents became aware of the charges
against him and that private complainant's father was looking
for him, petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the
Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his grandmother's
house that petitioner came out in the open to face the
charges against him. His flight as well as his act of going into
hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the
moral depravity of his act and that he knew he committed
something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed innocent or if
he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his
acts, he would have immediately confronted private
complainant and her parents and denied having sexually
abused their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence
to show that he was a consistent honor student and has, in
fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation
further bolstered that he acted with discernment, with full
knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a
recipient of several academic awards and was an honor
student further reinforces the finding that he was possessed
of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to
distinguish, better than other minors of his age could, which
conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence,
although appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age,
he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It cannot then
be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. This is important in
cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that
the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is
the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent on the part of the accused. In expounding on
intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme

Court has stated: "The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the
morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act,
no crime can exist, and because" the infant has no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability"
(Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476 [1989], at page
482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up
to the time the petitioner was being held for trial, sufficiently
satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment
before, during and after the rape incident. For a boy wanting
in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep
mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature
and illegality of his wrongful act. He should not, therefore, be
exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has
sufficiently proved that petitioner acted with discernment.[61]
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by
Dr. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin and not in the labia of
the hymen. He further insists that there can be no
consummated rape absent a slight penetration on the female
organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the
accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact
that he was an honor student is not enough evidence to
prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioner's contention that he was
deprived of his right to a regular preliminary investigation is
barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that
petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant. Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. -
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an
inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing
rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party
or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding
the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must
be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without
a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5)
days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his
defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification[62] of the City Prosecutor
which was incorporated in the Information, petitioner did not
execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code before the Information was filed. He
was arraigned with the assistance of counsel on October 10,
2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bail.[63] Petitioner's
failure to file a motion for a preliminary investigation within
five days from finding out that an Information had been filed
against him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to
such preliminary investigation.[64]
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows
that the prosecution adduced evidence to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the
private complainant as charged in the Information. In People
v. Morata[65] the Court ruled that penetration, no matter how
slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the
labia of the pudendum, constitutes carnal knowledge.
Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the
private complainant felt pains, points to the conclusion that
the rape was consummated.[66]
From the victim's testimony, it can be logically concluded
that petitioner's penis touched the middle part of her vagina
and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not
have had knowledge of the extent of the penetration;
however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape
passed the stage of consummation.[67] She testified that
petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks near
the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then
removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He then
mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 o'clock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was
Tuesday. Did you go to school from 12:00 o'clock noon up to
6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Page 66 of 196
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C
Carnation St., R. Higgins, Maricaban, Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of
my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your
mother where she was selling quail eggs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where
your mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00 p.m.?
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother
to bring home?
A: The things she used in selling.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring
home something?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
A: Totoy pulled me.
Q: Pulled you where?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited
house?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement.
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his
shorts.
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also
removed his shorts, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside
your vagina?
A: It was painful.
 Page 67 of 196

When questioned on cross-examination whether she could of Neil entered your vagina?
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what distinguish a vagina from an anus, the victim declared that A: Yes, Sir.
else did you do to you? she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated that
A: He kissed me on my lips. the penis of petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
consummating the crime charged: A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and
kissed you on your lips, what did you do? Atty. Baliad: Q: Where is your "pepe'"
A: I cried. A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your Q: Where is your anus?
his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips. vagina, do you recall that? A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
What happened next? A: Yes, Sir.
A: Somebody heard me crying. Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of accused in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not
Q: Who heard you crying? Neil entered your vagina? in your anus?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir. A: Yes, Sir. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody
heard you crying?
A: Totoy ran away.
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me
to tell the matter to my parents.
Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, Sir.[68]
On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her
declarations:
ATTY. BALIAD:
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by
Totoy when he inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: I was lying down.
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at
that time?
A: He placed on top of me.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you,
if any?
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis
inside my vagina.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your "pepe?"
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the
accused in this case penetrated only in your vagina and not
in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.[70]
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or
laceration in the private complainant's genitalia, such fact
does not negate the latter's testimony the petitioner had
carnal knowledge of her. The absence of abrasions and
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially
when the victim is a young girl as in this case.[71] According
to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is capable of
stretching and reverting to its original form. [72] The doctor
testified that her report is compatible with the victim's
testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused
neither by his penis touched any part of your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital
examination propounded on the report that the victim here,
Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the
evening of September 24, 2002, she was sexually abused
and that on the following day, September 25, you
interviewed her and stated to you that her genitalia was
hurting and in binocular (sic) "masakit ang pepe ko, ni-rape
ako," would your findings as contained in this Exh. B and C
be compatible with the allegation if the minor victim that she
was sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00
p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is
the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:

Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina? Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is
A: Yes, Sir. that it was the minor who made the complaint regarding the
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that
allegation.
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your the accused, Neil Llave or "Totoy" inserted his penis in your
vagina? vagina, do you recall that?
Fiscal Barrera:
A: Yes, Sir.[69] A: Yes, Sir.
The answer were provided"..
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis
Court:

The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is
compatible with the complaint of the minor. Overruled.
Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital
documents, the Provincial and Final Report mark[ed] in
evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two
exhibits there appears to be a signature above the
typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is
that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.[73]
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private
complainant's anal orifice could have been caused by
petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the
process of the male person inserting his erect penis inside
the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this
abrasion could have been caused while in the process of
inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the
anus where you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination,
that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-year-old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy
could cause an erection of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at
what age could a male person can have erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.[74]
Petitioner' s contention that the private complainant was
coached by her parents into testifying is barren of merit. It
bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a
straightforward and spontaneous manner and remained
steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination
by the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She
spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner as the
perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a
seven- year old Grade II pupil, could have woven an intricate
story of defloration unless her plaint was true.[75] The
Presiding Judge of the trial court observed and monitored
the private complainant at close range as she testified and
found her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration
by the trial court of the evidence on record and its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its
findings of facts and the conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless
facts and circumstances of substance were overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered would
merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held
that when the offended party is young and immature, from
the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give
credence to their account of what transpired, considering not
only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
to which they testified is not true.[76]
Neither do we lend credence to petitioner's claim that the
charge against him is but a fabrication and concoction of the
private complainant's parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in
no uncertain terms that the spouses had no ill-motive against
him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards
with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and you have no quarrel
or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any
reason why Lyn-lyn complaint (sic) against you for sexual
abuse?
A: I don't know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or
misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn's parents, spouses Domingo
Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any reason
as to why they would file a complaint against you for
molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint
against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.[77]
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party
coached their daughter before she testified. No mother or
father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the
tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing
that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not
true.[78]
On the other hand, when the parents learned that their
daughter had been assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to
locate the offender and when he failed, he and his wife
Page 68 of 196
reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This
manifested their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and
punished for his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street
where residents passed by does not negate the act of rape
committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and
place. The crime may be committed by the roadside and
even in occupied premises.[79] The presence of people
nearby does not deter rapists from committing the odious
act.[80] In this case, petitioner was so daring that he ravished
the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as
commuters passed by, impervious to the fact that a crime
was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the
only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the
offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent
a medical certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be
made the basis of conviction if such testimony is credible.
Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a
conviction of the perpetrator.[81] Thus, even without the
testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended
party and Dr. Castillo constitute evidence beyond reasonable
doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofisto's testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner
simply because his uncle caused the demolition of the house
where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears
stressing that Teofisto gave a sworn statement to the police
investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped
Debbielyn and narrated how he witnessed the crime being
committed by the petitioner.[82] In the absence of proof of
improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-
motive to so testify, hence, his testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.[83]
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with
discernment when he had carnal knowledge of the offended
party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial
court's ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that a person over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with
discernment. The basic reason behind the exempting
circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom
of action of the offender which is an essential element of a
felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the power
necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act.[84] On the other hand,
discernment is the mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment
 Page 69 of 196

by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages
not only before and during the commission of the act, but is DELETED.
also after and during the trial.[85] The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what SO ORDERED.
he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-
cunning and shrewdness. Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario., J., on official leave.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion,
dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks
near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be
able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was discovered
by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner hastily
fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of
his father and her mother, he hid in his grandmother's house
to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat
until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.

The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding

grade school student and even received awards. While in
Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic
subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee
contest.[86] At his the age of 12, he finished a computer
course.

In People v. Doqueña,[87] the Court held that the accused-

appellant therein acted with discernment in raping the victim
under the following facts:

Taking into account the fact that when the accused Valentin
Doqueña committed the crime in question, he was a
7th grade pupil in the intermediate school of the municipality
of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the
brightest in said school and was a captain of a company of
the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was studying
therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is
convinced that the accused, in committing the crime, acted
with discernment and was conscious of the nature and
consequences of his act, and so also has this court
observed at the time said accused was testifying in his
behalf during the trial of this case.[88]

The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral

damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. There is
no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under
Article 2231, of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances. In this case, no
aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information and
proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH

[ G.R. NO. 162052, January 13, 2005 ]
ALVIN JOSE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289
affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, convicting the
accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in
relation to Section 29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were
charged with the said crime in an Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of
Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, not being
licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person
METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (or shabu)
weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of
the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution
established the following:
… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the
Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received an information from
an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was
introduced to him by former Narcom P/Senior Inspector
Recomono. The information was that a big time group of
drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu
at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba,
Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was
assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2 William Manglo
and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the
team. SPO1 Guevarra was provided with marked money
consisting of a P1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-
believe “money bills” supposedly amounting to
P100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William
Manglo and Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi
Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant boarded an
L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at
about 11:00 in the morning. They positioned their cars at the
parking area where they had a commanding view of people
going in and out (TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN,
July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota
Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny Zarraga was
the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant
approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the
informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the
latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams
of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy
the shabu. Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra
if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited
bundle of “money bills.” Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin
Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio
Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, in turn, handed the
bundle of “money bills.”
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to
signify that the transaction was consummated (TSN, July 30,
1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and
Wilfredo Luna approached and introduced themselves as
Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin
Jose. The buy-bust bundle of “money bills” and
the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp
Vicente Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the
investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10
and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13). P/Senior Inspector
Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported
and testified that the specimen, indeed, was a second or low
grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 31-36).[4]
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to
establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November
13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic), Mandaluyong,
Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a
hand bag appeared and ordered them to handcuff
themselves. They were later able to identify three of these
people as Police Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel
Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was
parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another car
while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car with Alvin
Jose as passenger. They drove towards Greenhills. They
Page 70 of 196
were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one
of the men opened the gloves compartment of Sonny
Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance inside the
said compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny
Zarraga if he could come up with P1.5 Million peso
(sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny
Zarraga’s mother-in-law who was supposed to be a rich drug
pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside
the said room, Sonny Zarraga’s cellular phone rung. It was
a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky
Zarraga and asked her if she could pay P1.5 Million as
ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga
instead offered to withdraw money from the bank in the
amount of P75,000.00. The agreement was that in the bank,
Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to
Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny Zarraga’s release. The
agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky
Zarraga met inside the bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to
withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be
seen. There was a commotion inside the bank which
prompted the bank manager to call the police.
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose
who was left at the room and brought them to Camp Vicente
Lim. There, they were investigated.
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny
Zarraga’s jewelry, P85,000.00 in cash and Sonny Zarraga’s
car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even
able to withdraw the P2,000.00 using Sonny Zarraga’s ATM
card.[5]
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting both accused of the crime charged and
sentencing each of them to an indeterminate
penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny
Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for
violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of P2
million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment
undergone both by the accused shall be credited in their
favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is

hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the confiscated
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs
Board.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that
the trial court erred as follows:
I ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2) THE
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION OF
THESHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND,
WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT THE APPELLANTS
COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED
DRUGS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE
DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER
PENALTY AGAINST THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO
PAY A FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF P2 MILLION PESOS
(SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.[7]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed
from with modification. The appellate court reduced the
penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that
he was only thirteen (13) years old when he committed the
crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and to a reduction of the penalty by
two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to
allege that he acted with discernment when the crime was
committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same,
he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the
motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for
review on certiorari, alleging that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE FAILURE OF
THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT PETITIONER, WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS
OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
BY HIM IN CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY
ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT
THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT,
PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[8]
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime is exempt from criminal liability unless he acted with
discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as provided for in
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the
prosecution was burdened to allege in the Information and
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with
discernment, but that the prosecution failed to do so. The
petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding
that he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA made no such
finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts
that the allegation in the Information that the petitioner and
his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell
the shabu subject of the Information sufficiently avers that
the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no
need for the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the
Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that it is
not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an
express finding that the petitioner acted with discernment. It
is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show that he
acted knowingly and was sufficiently possessed with
judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over
nine years of age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal
liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such
minor is charged with a crime defined and penalized by a
special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor
to prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal
liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such
Page 71 of 196
age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime – the
capacity to know what is wrong as distinguished from what is
right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the
sense in which the term is used in moral wrong.[9] However,
such presumption is rebuttable.[10] For a minor at such an
age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened[11] to
prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial
evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he
knew what he was doing and that it was wrong.[12] Such
circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the
minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission
of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used
in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a
witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus
delicti.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was thirteen (13)
years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted
with discernment relative to the sale of shabu to the poseur-
buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the
petitioner is that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused
Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the poseur-
buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to
buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the affirmative, after
which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out
and hand over the shabu wrapped in plastic and white soft
paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing
the shabu to accused Zarraga, who handed the same to the
poseur-buyer:
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The two of them, Sir.
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car,
what did you tell them?
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q And what was your response?
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And what happened next?
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the
affirmative specifically…. I withdraw that.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford
to buy 100 grams tell us who asked you that question?
A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.
Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was
his response?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.

Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened to the shabu?
A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny
Zarraga.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
A He handed it to me, Sir.
Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened
next?
A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then
I handed to him the money, Sir.
Q When you say money, which money are you referring
to?
A The P1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what
happened next?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached
us and arrested them.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested
Sonny Zarraga?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us.
A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny
Zarraga was arrested by these police officers?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please tell us.
A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives,
Sir.
Q And after that, what happened?
A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir.[13]
… arrested?
Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you
by the accused?
A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir.
Q Who made the request for its examination?
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to
you. What did you do with the shabu?
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William
Manglo, Sir.
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the
accused, in what container was it contained?
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was
wrapped in a plastic and white soft paper, Sir.[14]
It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted
with the poseur-buyer relative to the sale of shabu. It was
also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the
poseur-buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the
plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat
inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in
the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the
poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew
what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and
at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed,
the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their
transactions for illegal drugs. We quote the testimony of the
poseur-buyer:
ATTY. VERANO:
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your
informant?
A No, Sir.
Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?
A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a
minor, Sir.
Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?
A I don’t know, Sir.
Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit,
you stated the age of the boy?
A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.
Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his
age, were you not surprised that a young boy like that would
be in a group selling drugs?
FISCAL:
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
Page 72 of 196
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate
why or how this very young boy (sic) selling 100 grams of
shabu.
COURT:
The witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are
being used by pushers.[15]
Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to
elicit from the petitioner facts and circumstances showing his
capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the
questions of the public prosecutor on cross-examination and
the petitioner’s answers thereto:
FISCAL:
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
COURT:
Please proceed.
FISCAL:
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on
November 13, 1995 and did I hear it right that you went to
Manuela at 5 o’clock in the afternoon?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from
Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Quezon City, at
12 o’clock?
A No, Sir.
Q What time did you leave?
A After lunch, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you
were in the custody of the police, you said that at one
occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with
your cousin in a [L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer
car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone on one of
the seats of the car, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity
to make a call to anybody since the day that you were
A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular
phone.
Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular

phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car?
A No, Sir.
Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said
that you were accosted by a male person at the workshop
and then you went out of Megamall and when you went
outside, this man saw the key of the car dangling at the
waist. At whose waist?
A From my cousin.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any
knowledge where your car was?
A No, Sir.
Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the
third level parking area of SM Megamall, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to
anybody?
A No, Sir.
Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of
Megamall, he had not made any call?
A No, Sir.
Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of
the Megamall, you claimed that there was already this group
which met you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this group were the policemen who are the
companions of the male person who arrested you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that
time?
A No, Sir.
Q These people do not know your car?
A No, Sir.
FISCAL:
No further question, Your Honor.
ATTY. VERANO:
No re-direct, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug
user nor have you seen any shabu. In support of your claim,
are you willing to submit yourself to an examination?
WITNESS:
Page 73 of 196
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this
Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.[16]
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove
that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to
sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the
capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is
untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between
two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to
such conspiracy to discern what is right from what is
wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be
concluded that he conspired with his co-accused. Indeed,
in People v. Estepano,[17] we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s
mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did
not, in any way, attempt to show his discernment. He was
merely asked about what he knew of the incident that
transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated
therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-
conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as
the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-
examination of Rene could have provided the prosecution a
good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his
capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government
miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.[18]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, is SET
ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
for insufficiency of evidence.[19]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
 Page 74 of 196

G.R. No. L-11979 January 25, 1917 not prove that the accused, in stabbing the deceased, acted correccional instead of five years. As so modified, the
with discernment, that is, with a full understanding of the judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, nature and consequences of his act. This argument is based
vs. upon the age of the accused and paragraph 3 of article 8 of Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
MAXIMO MARALIT, defendant-appellant. the Penal Code.

Claro M. Recto for appellant. The accused was less than 15 years of age at the time the
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee. crime was committed. The deceased was less than 16, the
certificate of death stating that his age was fifteen. The
MORELAND, J.: paragraph of article 8 referred to provides that a person over
9 years of age and under 15 is exempt from criminal liability
The appellant was convicted of homicide and sentenced to
"unless he has acted with discernment." That paragraph also
five (5) years of prision correccional, to the accessories
provides that "in order to impose a penalty upon such a
provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
person, . . . the court shall make an express finding upon this
the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs:
fact," that is, the fact that he acted with discernment.
We are satisfied that the defendant below, without
While counsel admits that the trial court found that the
justification, stabbed Florentino Luistro in the said with a
accused acted, in the commission of the crime, with
knife and caused his death.
complete discernment, he contends that there is no evidence
Counsel for appellant vigorously and ably attacks the in the record upon which that finding can be based, he
findings of fact of the trial court and attempts to show that he alleging that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove that
should have accepted the testimony of the defense rather fact by affirmative evidence.
than that of the prosecution as a basis for his conclusions. A
We are satisfied that the contention of counsel is not well
careful examination of the evidence, however, fails to furnish
grounded in this particular case. It is true, as counsel
sufficient reasons to reverse the trial court on the facts. Two
asserts, that it must appear from the evidence that the
witnesses testified to the occurrence on behalf of the
accused acted with knowledge of the nature of his acts and
prosecution and stated that they, with the deceased
of the results which would naturally follow therefrom; but to
Florentino, were walking along in single file each with a
establish that fact it is not necessary that some witness
bundle of zacate on his head, Florentino bringing up the
declare directly and in words that he acted with such
rear, when they met the defendant and a companion. As
knowledge. It is sufficient that, from the evidence as a whole,
they were passing each other they heard a sound similar to
it is a necessary inference that he so acted. The trial court
that made by the dropping of one of the bundles of zacate.
taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstance
They instantly turned and saw Florentino and the defendant
presented by the record, together with the appearance of the
fighting with their fists. They soon separated and Florentino,
accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the
returning to his bundle of zacate, stooped to pick it up when
the defendant ran to him quickly and stabbed him in the left conclusion that he was of sufficient intelligence and was
sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act
side with a knife. The defendant and his companion then ran
which he committed was wrong and that it was likely to
away. The witnesses and Florentino went home. Florentino
produce death. In pursuance of that conclusion the court
died a few days later as a result of the wound thus received.
made the finding that the accused in committing the act
The accused and his witness tell a different story, in which it complained of acted with discernment.
is claimed that Florentino made an attack upon the accused,
We are of the opinion, however, that the penalty imposed is
after some sharp words had passed between them, and
not correct. Article 85 of the Penal Code provides that —
struck him several times with a club; whereupon the
accused, in self-defense, made use of his dagger with the In the case of minor of less than fifteen and over nine years
effect already noted. of age, who is found by the court to have acted with
discernment, and, therefore, not being exempt from criminal
Upon this evidence the trial court found with the witnesses
liability, a discretional penalty shall be imposed, provided
for the prosecution. In spite of the insistent argument of
that the same shall always be less by two degrees, at least,
counsel for the appellant we must conclude on the record
than that prescribed by the law for the offense committed.
that there is no reason for a reversal of the trial court with
regard to its findings of fact. Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed
should have been two (2) years of prision
Counsel for appellant strenuously contends that the accused
should be acquitted on the ground that the prosecution did

[ G.R. No. 123140, September 23, 2003 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.
BERNARDO CORTEZANO AND JOEL CORTEZANO,
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch 56, in Criminal
Cases Nos. L-1679 and L-1680, convicting appellants
Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano with four counts of
rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count; and ordering each of them to pay
damages to the victim as follows: P200,000 as moral
damages and P200,000 as exemplary damages in all the
cases.
The Indictments
On November 22, 1994, two separate Informations for rape
were filed against the appellants. The first Information
docketed as Criminal Case No. L-1679 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1990, in the afternoon
at Bgy. (sic) Azucena, Municipality of Sipocot, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, taking advantage of their superior
strength with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully (sic), feloniously and
unlawfully have carnal knowledge one after the other with
Leah C. Cortizano (sic), 7 years old, minor, against her will
and the offended party suffered damages.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The second Information docketed as Criminal Case No. L-
1680 reads:
That on or about the 10th day of June, 1990, in the afternoon
at Bgy. (sic) Azucena, Municipality of Sipocot, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, taking advantage of their superior
strength with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge one after the other with
Leah C. Cortezano, 7 years old, minor, against her will and
the offended party suffered damages.
Page 75 of 196
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel
and Bernardo were doing to Leah. Joel and Bernardo
On arraignment, the accused entered their plea of not ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to box him if he
guilty. A consolidated trial of the two criminal cases then refused. Joel and Bernardo laughed as Boyet was having
ensued. his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo then called Leah Lou
and Lionel into the room, letting them see their sister naked.
The Case for the Prosecution
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of
the family if she told anyone about what happened to
Sometime in March 1990, Lourney Cortezano decided to
her. Joel, Bernardo and Boyet left the room together. Leah
take a leave of absence from her part-time job in Cubao,
went out of the room and washed her vagina.
Quezon City, to spend her vacation with her three children:
eight-year-old Leah, three-year-old Leah Lou, and Lionel,
Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what
who was barely a year old. Lourney decided to stay in the
happened to her. After that first harrowing incident, Joel and
house of her parents-in-law, Santiago and Nita Cortezano,
Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. After every
located at Barangay Azucena, Sipocot, Camarines
sexual intercourse they had with Leah, Joel and Bernardo
Sur. Lionel was also sick with asthma so Lourney could rely
would threaten to kill her and her family if she told anyone
on her mother-in-law to take care of him while she was at
what they had been doing to her.
work. Lourney's husband, Elmer, remained in their
residence in Caloocan City.
On June 10, 1990, Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah to
go to her grandparents' room. She did as she was told. Joel
The Cortezano residence was located at an isolated patch of
and Bernardo undressed her. Leah was told to lie down,
land. Nita and Santiago slept in a room separated from
and Joel and Bernardo again wet her vagina with their
the sala by a curtain. Their children, the accused Bernardo
saliva. Joel then laid on top of her, holding her hands and
(Butchoy) Cortezano, who was then twelve years old; the
pinning her legs with his, as he inserted his penis into her
accused Joel Cortezano, who was then only thirteen;
vagina. Bernardo stood by the window as a lookout. Leah
Tinggang, who was six years old, and Boyet Orcine, their
tried to fight Joel, but the latter was enraged. She was about
six-year-old nephew, also lived with the couple. At night,
to shout, but Joel told her that it would be futile to do so
Lourney and her children, as well as Joel, Bernardo and
because their neighbors were far away. Joel dismounted
Tinggang, slept beside each other in a room near the
and Bernardo had his turn, with Joel standing by the window
kitchen, beside the couple's room. By mid-April of 1990,
to see if anyone was coming. Joel and Bernardo again
Lourney returned to Caloocan City, leaving her children in
threatened to kill Leah if she told anyone about the incident.
the care of her parents-in-law.
The next day, June 11, 1990, was Lionel's birthday. Lourney
Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo
arrived at Brgy. Azucena and brought her children back to
ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their parents'
Caloocan City, in time for Leah's enrollment at the Kalayaan
room. Leah protested because it was hot in that room. Joel
Elementary School in Brgy. Silang, Caloocan City. Because
threatened to whip her if she refused. Leah had no choice;
of the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of her uncles,
she went to the room and slept. Leah suddenly awoke when
Leah felt pain in her lower abdomen (puson). Every now
she sensed pressure on her arms and legs. When she
and then, she would feel numbness on the left side of her
opened her eyes, she saw her uncles Joel and Bernardo;
body.
they were holding her hands and feet as she was being
undressed. Leah struggled but was easily overpowered by
Sometime in March 1993, Lionel and Leah Lou once again
her uncles. She threatened to shout, but she was told that
stayed with their grandparents in Brgy. Azucena. On May 21,
nobody would hear her. Joel and Bernardo wet her vagina
1993, Elmer arrived in Sipocot and stayed with his
with their saliva. Bernardo then held her hands as Joel
parents. Lourney followed her family to Sipocot on June 20,
mounted her. Joel inserted his penis into her vagina, while
1993. Leah remained in Caloocan City to continue her
Bernardo stood by the window to serve as a lookout. Leah
schooling. Her studies were financed by the Department of
felt something slippery inside her vagina. After Joel
Social Welfare and Development.
dismounted, Bernardo went on top of Leah and inserted his
penis into her vagina. It was Joel's turn to stand by the
On August 23, 1993, Elmer had a quarrel with his parents
window as a lookout. Leah once more felt something
and left Brgy. Azucena. Since then, Lourney did not hear
slippery in her vagina. Bernardo then stood up.
from her husband and did not know where he was. On

September 20, 1993, Lourney left Brgy. Azucena and
brought her children to Pili, Camarines Sur.
On May 27, 1994, Lourney learned from Boyet Orcine that
her daughter Leah had been sexually abused by Joel and
Bernardo way back in 1990. Boyet told Lourney that Leah
Lou had suffered the same fate as Leah.[4] Lourney
immediately contacted a certain Mrs. Monares, a social
worker at the DSWD of Pili, Camarines Sur, and inquired
whether the information relayed to her by Boyet Orcine could
be true. Mrs. Monares advised Lourney to ask Leah herself.
Lourney left Pili and arrived in Caloocan City on June 1,
1994. She asked Leah if she recalled anything that
happened to her while on vacation in Sipocot in 1990. Leah
told her mother that Joel and Bernardo had whipped her and
she did not want to return to Sipocot. When Lourney asked
her daughter, the latter replied that Joel and Bernardo had
raped her.
Lourney brought Leah to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp
Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra examined
Leah and submitted Medico-Legal Report No. M-0807-94,
with the following findings:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
child. Breasts are conical with pale brown areola and
nipples from which no secretions could be pressed
out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex
and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora
presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed
an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed lacerations at
3, 7 and 9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice offers strong
resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger.[5]
On June 16, 1994, Lourney and Leah arrived in the Criminal
Investigation Field Office in Naga City where they gave their
respective sworn statements to PO3 Elmer V. Caceres.[6]
The Case for the Accused
Bernardo was born on January 22, 1978. He denied the
charges. He admitted that he was charged with raping Leah
Lou on April 21, 1994 in People v. Bernardo
Cortezano,[7] filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pili,
Camarines Sur, and that he pleaded guilty on his
arraignment. He testified that on March 28, 1990, he arrived
in Bagadiong, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, to help his cousin,
Alvin Reoval, to plow and harrow his rice field and
plant palay. He had lost his school bag, and his father,
Santiago, had punished him for it. He had nowhere to go
except to his cousin's house. Barangay Bagadiong was
adjacent to Barangay Busak, and one would take four and
half-hours by carabao to traverse Busak from Bagadiong.
There were, however, many passenger jeepneys and buses
plying the Busak-Sipocot route. When Bernardo thought that
his parents were no longer mad at him, he returned to
Sipocot on April 5, 1993. He received P3,150 for his
services. He met his sister-in-law Lourney only in 1994,
when she charged him with the rape of Leah Lou.
Joel Cortezano testified that he was born on November 1,
1976. He and his mother arrived in Manila on May 6, 1990
and stayed in the house of his aunt Concordia Hernandez in
San Andres, Manila. On May 9, 1990, he went to the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of leukemia
and stayed there for three days. Thereafter, he was advised
by the doctor not to leave the hospital, as he needed blood
transfusion. Joel stayed in the hospital for one week. Joel
was discharged from the hospital and stayed in the house of
his aunt, Concordia Hernandez, in San Andres, Manila, for
about a month and helped the latter manage her
store. Every now and then, he returned to the hospital for
check-ups.
In August 1990, Joel's mother fetched him from San Andres
and brought him to Novaliches for two days. Thereafter, he
returned to Sipocot, Camarines Sur.
When asked about his medical certificate regarding his
treatment at the PGH during the period stated, Joel testified
that he lost the same during a typhoon. He claimed that
efforts to secure copies of the said medical certificates
proved futile, as the employees who released the certificates
were busy. Joel denied raping his niece Leah.
Nita Cortezano testified that she left Sipocot on May 6, 1990
for Manila to accompany her son Joel to the PGH, as the
latter was suffering from leukemia and needed blood
transfusion. They stayed in the hospital for about two
weeks. They did not immediately return to Sipocot as they
were ordered by the attending physician to stay in
Manila. On May 28, 1990, she and Joel went to Elmer's
house in Caloocan City where they saw Leah. It would have
thus been impossible for Leah to be in Sipocot on May 6,
1990 to June 10, 1990. Nita further testified that it was only
in 1991 when Leah and her siblings were first brought to
Sipocot by Lourney. The second instance was in 1992, but it
was their father Elmer who was with the children at the time.
Santiago Cortezano corroborated in part his wife's
testimony. He testified that between May 6 and June 10,
1990, Leah and her siblings indeed spent their vacation in
Page 76 of 196
Sipocot. However, during that time, Joel was brought to
Manila for a check-up at the PGH. Bernardo, on the other
hand, left the household in June 1990. Aside from this, his
daughters Melanie and Teresita, who were 16 years old and
10 years old, respectively, and his grandson Boyet (Bulilit)
stayed in his house. His son Elmer also arrived in Sipocot
during this time.
Sancho Cortezano testified that he went to the house of his
older brother Elmer in Caloocan City on May 10, 1990 to
inform the latter of his marriage. Elmer was not in his house
but Lourney and her children, including Leah, were
there. Sancho left on May 11, 1990 for Cebu where he got
married seven days later. On June 3, 1990, Sancho
returned to Manila and when he went to visit Elmer at his
house, only Lourney and the children were there.
Boyet Orcine testified that on May 6, 1990, he was in the
hills with his mother Emerlina Cortezano in Barangay Tulay,
which was very far from the house of the Cortezanos in
Barangay Azucena, Sipocot. He returned from the hills only
in 1993. He testified that he "did nothing" while he was
away.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two letters from Mrs.
Fe B. Baes, Chief of the Medical Records Division of the
PGH, that as an outpatient, Joel consulted the hospital on
August 16, 1989, November 2, 1989 and April 6, 1990, and
that he was never confined at the PGH in 1990. The said
letters read as follows:
In connection with the letter received by this office
requesting for a record of a certain Joel Cortezano, whether
or not he was hospitalized in this hospital way back 1989,
please be informed that as per hospital records, a certain
Joel Cortezano consulted on an outpatient basis sometime
on August 16, 1989, November 2, 1989 and April 6, 1990. [8]
...
In reply to your letter dated August 15, 1995 re: JOEL
CORTEZANO, may I inform you that he was never confined
in this hospital anytime in 1990. He only consulted on April
6, 1990 on an outpatient basis.[9]
After trial, the court rendered a decision convicting the
appellants of four counts of rape, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the aforecited considerations, this
Court finds the accused, JOEL CORTEZANO and
BERNARDO CORTEZANO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the two crimes of Rape as defined and punished
under Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as
 Page 77 of 196

amended. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of FOUR RECLUSION PERPETUA each, in both criminal
cases, considering that they acted in conspiracy in the
commission of the act, and to indemnify the offended party
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, as moral damages
in each criminal case, and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) each in each case, as exemplary damages,
and to pay the costs of this suit. The period of their
respective preventive detention is considered in the service
of their sentence.
SO ORDERED.[10]
province and competence of trial courts. The matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who,
unlike appellate magistrates, could weigh such testimony in
light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to
discriminate the truth against falsehood. Thus, appellate
courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by
the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be
clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or
disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstance of
significance.[13]
This Court ruled in People v. Dy[16] that the victim's act of
crying during her testimony bolsters the credibility of the rape
charge with the verity born out of human nature and
experience.
Indeed, as can be gleaned from Leah's testimony, she
recounted, with tears cascading from her eyes, the sordid
details on how the appellants ravished her and satiated their
bestial proclivities, thus:
Q: On May 6, 1990 to June 10, 1990, do you know any
unusual incident that took place involving that person?

Hence, this appeal.
Joel and Bernardo, now the appellants, note, citing People v.
Batis,[11] that there are three (3) settled principles to warrant
a conviction for rape, namely: (1) an accusation for rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in
view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3)
the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence of the defense.
The appellants assert that Leah's testimony is incredible;
hence, barren of probative weight. In her sworn statement to
the police authorities, she claimed that she was raped thirty-
six times, but her testimony in the trial court tends to show
that she claimed to have been raped only on May 6 and
June 10, 1990. Boyet's denial that he had sexual
intercourse with Leah belied the latter's testimony that she
was likewise raped by him. If Leah's claim that her sister
Leah Lou and her brother Lionel saw her naked had any ring
of truth to it, the two would surely have immediately reported
the matter to their parents. The fact that they did not do so
raises serious doubts as to the veracity of Leah's testimony.
The appellants also claim that although their defense of alibi
is inherently weak, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a
judgment of conviction could be rendered against
them. Considering the prosecution's evidence, tattered as it
is, their defense assumes importance and is even decisive of
the outcome of the case.
The Court finds the appeal without merit.
This Court in People v. Guanson,[12] ruled:
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that
assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the
In this case, the trial court gave credence and full probative A: Yes, Sir.
weight to the testimony of the victim, in tandem with those of
the other witnesses of the prosecution:
Q: Tell the Honorable Court, what is that all about?
Whatever inconsistencies or lapses there were, the same
relate to trivial matters and do not in any manner affect her
A: That occur[r]ence was done to me by my two Titos.
credibility and the veracity of her statements. Furthermore,
such "minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of humiliating experience which are
painful to recall." (Pp. V. Olivar, 215 SCRA 759) In fact, Q: What specific occur[r]ence?
though how lengthy and rigid the cross-examination was,
Leah's declarations remained consistent, firm and A: The raped (sic) that they did to me, Sir.
undisturbed. Leah's categorical, spontaneous, emphatic, ("Pagsasamantala")
and straightforward answers during the cross-examination
strengthened and explained whatever missing facts there
were on direct examination. The medico-legal findings,
Q: They, to whom are you referring to?
moreover, corroborated Leah's testimony that she was
indeed raped. Although there are no fresh hymenal A: My two uncles, Sir, Joel and Bernardo.
lacerations, the incident having happened three (3) years
before the examination, yet there are healed lacerations
evidencing the sexual attack. "A freshly broken hymen is
not an essential element of rape." (Pp. V. Cura, GR Q: What is the surname?
112529, January 18, 1995)[14]
A: Cortezano, Sir.
...
The bestial defloration was mirrored in Leah's being, as she Q: Can you possibly tell the Honorable Court, how this
raping incident was done to you?
cringed and trembled whenever she sees the
accused. During the trial, the Interpreter had to shield
A: Yes, Sir.
Leah's line of vision upon advice of the Presiding Judge, as
she was uncontrollably shaking and crying, when the
accused would come within her view. Her tears and
statements were not contrived but borne out of a genuine Q: Feel free to tell the Court.
feeling of bitterness. She sobbed bitterly as she narrated
her nauseating experience in the hands of her uncles and A: (Witness crying) That vacation mama left us at
Sipocot, because she was to go back to work in
even eloquently declared in a loud voice:
Manila. She told me, that she is to leave on May 5,
"hindi ko kailangan ang pera, ang 1990. The next day, after lunch, Joel and Bernardo
kailangan ko ay katarungan!" did something bad to me. After lunch, he told me to go
(p. 9, TSN dated January 27, 1995)[15] inside the room, when I refused, he held the broom
attempting to whip me. Because of fear, I went inside

the room, while complaining to them "why ask me to Q:
sleep in that room, when it is too hot in that room." He
told me to obey otherwise, he will whip me. I slept, A:
and when I woke up I noticed that they were doing
something bad to me. The first thing I saw was Tito
Joel was (sic) doing to me. I was crying the (sic), I
Q:
was strangling (sic), my two hands were being held
and my legs pinned down. I could not move because
they (sic) were two of them, one was watching outside.
They told me that if I shout it will be useless because A:
no one will hear me because the house was really far
from neighbors. Our house is situated in a secluded
place. Then, after that my grandmother arrive (sic),
and she asked if there was something bad
happened. I told her there was none. I was about to
relay to her the incident, but I just could not because Q:
the two of them were watching me. They stopped
doing this to me when my mother arrive[d] on June 10,
1990. A:
When we were about to leave, they were planning to
do something bad to me. They said, "let's do it in the Q:
grass land." They kicked me from where I was
standing, and I was thrown with my bottoms (sic)
hitting the mud first, I told them I don't like it anymore, A:
and I run (sic) and when they overtook me, they
stripped off my panties. They placed saliva in my
vagina and inserted their penis in my vagina. When my
mama asked me, what was the abrasions in my arms
all about, I told her that my arms was (sic) strucked Q:
(sic) by wire. (The witness showed the scratches that
A:
were already healed) When we reached Manila my
father asked me about what happened and we told
him, that they were whipping us.
(The witness cried.)[17] Q:
... A:
Q: Ms. Witness, as far as you can recall when was (sic)
Q:
this incident happened?
A: On May 6, 1990 until June 10, 1990.
A:
Q: How many times were you forced to lie with the
accused in this case from that period? Q:
A: Thirty six times.
A:
What time did this incident on May 6, 1990 took place?
After lunchtime.
Tell the Honorable Court what was the participation of
the accused Joel and Bernardo Cortezano in this
incident of May 6, 1990?
I was ordered to get inside the room together with my
brother and sister, and I was ordered to get inside the
room of my "lola."
On the basis of that instruction, what did you do, if
any?
I obeyed even if the room was hot.
What was the answer of Joel in relation to your
complain[t] that the room was hot?
I better obey, otherwise he will whip me with the broom
(walis-tingting).
And so what happened next?
I slept and when I woke up they were doing something
bad on (sic) me already.
When you said they, to whom are you referring to?
Joel Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano.
What is that bad you are referring to when you say that
the accused's (sic) in this case were doing bad things
to you when you woke up?
I was being raped, they undress me.
There are two accused in this case, who was the first
one to rape you?
Joel Cortezano.
Page 78 of 196
Q: When you say rape, just what do you mean, can you
possibly explain further to the Honorable Court how
was it done?
A:
When I woke up they were already undressing me,
they held my hand and my legs and I could not move
and Tito Joey[18] inserted his penis to my vagina and
Tito Butchoy[19] was standing by the window and
watching.
(Witness is crying).
Q: And so, what did you feel, if any?
A: I felt something slippery was left inside my vagina.
Q: And so, after the accused Joel Cortezano did this to
you, what happened next?
A: They left the house and were at the sampaloc tree.
Q: How old are (sic) you then during that incident as
related on May 6, 1990?
A: I was seven years old.
Q: What else happened, if any, with regards to Bernardo
Cortezano besides his watching in the window as you
say?
A: After Tito Joel did that to me, Bernardo Cortezano also
did it to me and after that, Boyet, a cousin of mine
when inside the room and ask what they were doing
and Tito Joel answered, you also have to do what we
are doing, otherwise we will hurt you, so Boyet did the
same thing to me.
Q: You testify (sic) that one of the accused's (sic),
Bernardo Cortezano, after Joel Cortezano did the
same thing to (sic), tell the Honorable Court what is
this thing that Bernardo Cortezano did to you, if any?

A: Tito Joel went beside the window and watch while
Bernardo Cortezano also inserted his penis to my
vagina.
Q: When Bernardo Cortezano inserted his penis into your
vagina, what did you feel, if any?
A: I feel that there was something slippery again was left
inside my vagina.
Q: And so, after Bernardo Cortezano did this to you, what
happened next, if any?
A: Boyet went inside the room followed by Tito Joel who
went inside again and told Boyet to do what they were
doing otherwise he will hurt Boyet and since Boyet
was frightened, he also did the same thing to me.
Q: What is that same thing Boyet did to you, if any?
A: He also held my arms and inserted his penis into my
vagina.
Q: And so after that, what happened next?
A: They laughed at me and then they called by brother
and sister and told them to peep at me and they saw
me naked.
Q: At the time when these accused Joel and Bernardo
Cortezano started making advances, did you not resist
their advances?
A: I fought back but they were too strong for me, one held
my arms and the other was on top of me while he
inserted his penis, I want to shout but Joel told me not
to because nobody can hear me.
Q: Now we come to the incident of June 10, 1990, as far
as you can recall, where were you on June 10, 1990.
A: I was at the house of my "lola."
Q: While you were at the house of your "Lola," what
incident took place, if any?
A: On June 10, 1990 it was the last time they did it to me.
Q: What time was that already?
A: It was after lunchtime, they warned me not to tell
anybody otherwise they will kill me and my family.
Q: When you say they, to whom are you referring to?
A: Joel and Bernardo Cortezano.
Q: If they are inside the courtroom, will you please point
to them?
A: (Witness pointing to a man wearing stripe[d] polo who
identify (sic) himself as Bernardo Cortezano and the
man wearing a gray polo who identify (sic) himself as
Joel Cortezano).
Q: Please tell the Honorable Court what is that same
thing you are referring to which was done to you by the
accused's in this case on June 10, 1990?
A: They remove (sic) my panty and they place saliva in
my vagina and then they held my arms and pinned my
legs and then kiss me on the lips.
Q: Who kissed you on the lips?
A: Joel Cortezano.
Q: And after kissing you on the lips, what happened next,
if any?
A: They left the room and went to the sampaloc tree and
they laughed at me, then I went out of the room and
wash my lips.[20]
Leah was brought by her mother to Sipocot to spend her
vacation with her grandparents, only to be waylaid and
enslaved by the appellants, her own uncles. Well-settled is
the rule that the testimonies of young victims deserve full
credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere
Page 79 of 196
fabrication.[21] As emphasized by this Court in People v.
Quezada:[22]
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts
and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial,
unless she is motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished. Considering that the
young victim had not been exposed to the ways of the world,
it is most improbable that she would impute a crime so
serious as rape to any man, if the charge were not true.[23]
In People v. De Guzman,[24] we held:
Well-established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims,
especially child victims, are given full weight and credit. It
bears emphasis that the victim was barely seven years old
when she was raped. In a litany of cases, we have applied
the well settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a
minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that
is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts
usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a
victim of sexual assault, especially a minor particularly in
cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be
willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame,
humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation
were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender
apprehended and punished.[25]
The barefaced fact that the public prosecutor opted to
charge the appellants with only four counts of rape on May 6
and June 10, 1990, but Leah, in her sworn statement to the
police authorities, stated that she had been raped by the
appellants on a daily basis and testified thereon, does not
render her testimony implausible. Even the municipal trial
court which conducted the preliminary investigation of the
cases found probable cause against the appellants for thirty-
six counts of rape:
From the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that
statutory rape was committed to victim Leah Cedilla
Cortezano for thirty six (36) times by accused Joel
Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano, and the rapes were
committed in the house of the paternal grandparents of
victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano located in Barangay Azucena,
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, from May 6, 1990, until June 10,
1990.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, it is
respectfully recommended that THIRTY-SIX (36) complaints
for rape should be filed in the Regional Trial Court against
accused JOEL CORTEZANO and BERNARDO
CORTEZANO.
Forward this case and its entire records to the Honorable

Senen C. Lirag, the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur,
Camarines Sur Hall of Justice, Naga City, for appropriate
action.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The provincial prosecutor may have opted to file only four
counts of rape instead of thirty-six counts of rape for reasons
other than the implausibility of Leah's testimony. Neither is
Leah's testimony enfeebled by her siblings' failure to report
to their parents or grandparents that they saw her naked on
May 6, 1990. At the time, Leah Lou was barely three, while
Lionel was only a year old. The children were too young to
realize the importance of reporting such an incident to their
parents or grandparents.
In the present recourse, the appellants' defense of alibi
deserves scant consideration. As consistently held by this
Court:
[A]libi is the weakest of all defenses. It is a settled rule that
for an alibi to prevail, the defense must establish by positive,
clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible
for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission, and not merely the accused was
somewhere else.[27]
For alibi to prosper, the following must be established with
clear and convincing evidence: (a) the presence of the
appellant in another place at the time of the commission of
the offense; and, (b) physical impossibility for him to be at
the scene of the crime.[28] Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive, straightforward and spontaneous testimony of the
victim identifying the appellants as the malefactors and how
they consummated the crimes charged.
Bernardo failed to show that it was physically impossible for
him to have been in Sipocot on May 6 and June 10,
1990. Bernardo even testified that it was possible for him to
have returned to Sipocot if he wanted to, as there were
passenger jeepneys and buses plying the route four times a
day.[29] There is no evidence that his running away from their
house was even reported to the police authorities. The
appellant merely relied on his testimony and that of his father
to prove his defense. He even failed to present his cousin
Alvin Reoval to corroborate his testimony.
Appellant Joel Cortezano likewise failed to substantiate his
alibi. He failed to prove that he was treated at the PGH and
was confined thereat on May 6 and June 10, 1990. When
asked to produce any certification to prove his claim, he
failed to produce any, on his incredible claim that the person
releasing the certification was very busy and could not issue
a certification. This was belied by the certifications issued by
the PGH that the appellant had consulted the PGH as an
outpatient only on August 16, 1989, November 2, 1989 and
April 6, 1990, but was never confined in the said hospital.[30]
Boyet Orcine's bare denial that he was forced by the
appellants to have sexual intercourse with Leah cannot
prevail over Leah's positive and categorical testimony. The
appellants failed to adduce a morsel of evidence to prove
that Leah had any ill motive to implicate her cousin Boyet.
The appellants' claim that the charges against them were
instigated by Lourney to hit back at her husband and his
family deserves scant consideration. No mother in her right
mind would subject her child, who is of tender age, to go
through the rigors of undergoing a rape case just to exact
revenge. In this light, this Court had the occasion to say:
Indeed, it is accused-appellant's claim that the rape charge
against him was merely fabricated by complainant's mother
in order to get back at him, which we find to be implausible.
As the trial court well-observed, it would be contrary to
human nature for a mother like Lucita to expose her
daughter of six years to the rigors of a trial of rape which
may leave her stigmatized for life, and, in addition, involve
another daughter as corroborative witness, just so she could
exact her pound of flesh against accused-appellant. In
several rape cases, this Court has uniformly rejected similar
defenses on the ground that it is unbelievable.[31]
This Court also held in People v. De Guzman[32] that:
All told, the proffered alibi of accused-appellant cannot stand
against the positive identification by the complainant that he
is the defiler of her womanhood. Indeed, the revelation of an
innocent girl not even into her teens whose chastity has
been abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of
complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the
trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony
of the truth of her complaint. In short, it is most improbable
for an innocent and guileless girl of seven years as herein-
offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as
rape to any man, let alone her uncle, if it were not true.[33]
The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when
they committed the offense. At the time, Joel was 13 years
and 6 months old, while Bernardo was 12 years and 4
months old. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from criminal
liability.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability.—The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
...
Page 80 of 196
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen,
unless he acted with discernment, in which case,
such minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this
Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years
old at the time of the commission of the crimes is exempt
from criminal liability only when the said minor acted without
discernment. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove that
a minor acted with discernment when he committed the
crime charged. In determining if such a minor acted with
discernment, the Court's pronouncement in Valentin v.
Duqueña[34] is instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by
law, is his mental capacity to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known
and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before
and during the commission of the act, but also after and
even during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that
the appellants acted with discernment when they raped the
victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victim's vagina before they
raped her; (b) one of them acted as a lookout while the other
was raping the victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if
she divulged to her parents what they did to her; (d) they
forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as Boyet
was raping the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel
to look at their sister naked after the appellants had raped
her.
The Proper Penalties
The imposable penalty for rape committed by two or more
persons under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion perpetua to death.[35] Since the appellants
were both minors at the time they committed the offenses,
they are entitled to the benefits of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age.—When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the
provisions of the paragraph next to the last of Article 80 of
this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of
age, who is not exempted from liability by reason
of the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be
imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least
than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
Two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death
is prision mayor, which has a range of 6 years and 1 day to
12 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall
be taken from the proper period of the said penalty,
depending upon the presence or absence of modifying
circumstances. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty, one degree
lower than prision mayor,prision correccional, which has a
range of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
In these cases, the crimes were not aggravated by abuse of
superior strength because the said circumstance is already
considered in the penalty imposed by the law for the crimes.
However, the crimes were aggravated by relationship,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 15 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.[36]The appellants are the
uncles of the victim. The crime charged in Criminal Case No.
L-1679 was aggravated by the appellants, adding ignominy
to the natural effects of the crime.[37] In People v.
Fuertes,[38] this Court ruled:
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order
which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. The clause "Which add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act" contemplates a situation where
the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended
party to shame. ...
Ignominy was attendant when the appellants forced Boyet
Orcine to rape the victim, and laughed as the latter was
being raped by Boyet, and when they ordered Leah Lou and
Lionel to look at their naked sister after the appellants had
raped her. However, the aforementioned modifying
circumstances cannot aggravate the crimes and the
penalties therefor because the same were not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the crimes
were committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, it shall
be applied retroactively because it is favorable to the
appellants.[39]
Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded P50,000 as moral damages and
P50,000 as exemplary damages to the victim in each
Page 81 of 196
case. The court did not award civil indemnity in both
cases. The decision of the trial court shall thus be modified.
The trial court convicted the appellants of two counts of rape
in each case. However, Leah is entitled to civil indemnity of
P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 for every crime
committed by the appellants.[40] The appellants are also
liable to the said victim for exemplary damages for each
count of rape in the amount of P25,000.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Branch
56, in Criminal Cases Nos. L-1679 and L-1680, finding the
appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel Cortezano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case No. L-1679, the appellants are sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment (two
counts) of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in
its medium period, as maximum, to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as
minimum. Each of the appellants is ordered to pay the
offended party Leah Cortezano P50,000 as civil indemnity;
P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape. Thus, each of the
appellants shall pay the offended party the total amount of
P100,000 as civil indemnity; P100,000 as moral damages;
and P50,000 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. L-1680, the appellants are sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate sentence (two counts) of nine (9)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period,
as maximum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum. Each of the
appellants is ordered to pay the offended party Leah
Cortezano P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral
damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape. Thus, each of the appellants shall pay the
offended party the total amount of P100,000 as civil
indemnity; P100,000 as moral damages; and P50,000 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez,
and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-4549 October 22, 1952
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIENVENIDO CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant.
Miguel F. Trias for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Esmeraldo
Umali for appellee.
JUGO, J.:
Bienvenido Capistrano was charged before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon province with the crime of treason on
four (4) counts. He was found guilty by said court and
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P10,000 and the costs.
The attorney de oficio of the appellant states in a petition
filed with this Court that after having read, reread, and
studied the evidence, he finds no substantial error committed
by the trial court and prays for the affirmance of the
judgment.
The evidence of the record establishes the following:
The accused Bienvenido Capistrano admitted being a
Filipino citizen.
Count No. I
Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that the
defendant was a so-called Yoin, which means an armed
soldier of the Japanese. Wearing a Japanese military
uniform, he rendered services to the Japanese army as a
guard of a Japanese garrison. To the same effect, the
witness Placer Canada testified.
The defendant argued at the trial court that there was no
evidence showing that he had been appointed a Yoin or that
he was a Makapili. While no written formal appointment was
introduced in evidence, yet it is clear that he was engaged in
the work of guarding the Japanese garrison, armed with a
gun and wearing a Japanese uniform and taking part in the
military drills of the Japanese army.
Count No. II
At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the
defendant with other Filipino members of the Yoin and
several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the house
of Carmen Verdera in Barrio Malay, Municipality of Lopez,
Province of Tayabas (now Quezon), and ordered the
inmates therein to open the door. The appellant and his
companions entered the house, raised the mosquito nets
and ordered the inmates to rise. The appellant and his
Page 82 of 196
companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera, Alejo
Enriquez Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio
Canada, Remedios Anastacio, Dolores Enriquez, Teodora
Zamora, Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a
rope which was used as a clothesline. The intruders then
searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez
Wong $1,000, U.S. currency, and P4,000, Philippine
currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to
the Japanese garrison at Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and
then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The motive for
the raid was that Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a
guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and Salvador Fortuna, son of
Graciano, was a soldier in the said organization. One night
during the detention of Placer and her companions in the
Yoin garrison, the appellant attempted to sexually abuse
Placer and her companions, but when the women cried and
the Japanese came, the defendant escaped. Placer and her
companions were released after one month when they paid
to the chief of the Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2,500
Japanese war notes. The charge was testified to by several
victims.
The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen
(15) years of age at the time that he committed the crime.
However, the court which had the opportunity to see and
hear the accused at the trial found that he acted with
discernment. It should be noted, furthermore, that he
appeared as the leader or commander of the raiding party.
Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal
responsibility for the reason that he acted with discernment,
yet it may be considered as a special mitigating
circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees.
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to
the accused because he was over eighteen (18) years old at
the time of the trial (People vs. Estefa, 47 Off Gaz. No. 11,
5652; 86 Phil. 104).
In view of the above special mitigating circumstances of
minority, the penalty imposed upon the accused is hereby
modified by imposing upon him four (4) years of prision
correccional, to pay a fine of P10,000 and to indemnify Alejo
Enriquez Wong in the sum of P6,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of the
fine and the indemnity, with costs.
It is so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo and
Labrador, JJ., concur

[ G.R. No. 173876, June 27, 2008 ]
VALCESAR ESTIOCA Y MACAMAY, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court,[1] petitioner Valcesar Estioca y Macamay
prays for the reversal of the Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 dated 30 June 2006,
affirming with modification the Decision[3] and Order[4] dated 5
April 2004 and 17 August 2004, respectively, of the Ozamiz
City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Criminal Case
No. 3054, finding him guilty of robbery under Article 299,
subdivision (a), number (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
On 31 July 2001, an Information[5] was filed before the RTC
charging petitioner, Marksale Bacus (Bacus), Kevin Boniao
(Boniao) and Emiliano Handoc (Handoc) with robbery, thus:
That on July 28, 2001, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning,
in the City of Ozamiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent of gain, did then and there helping one another,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously break, destroy, and
destroyed the padlock of the main door of the classroom of
MS. SELINA M. PANAL and once inside, the accused took,
stole and carried away the following:
A. One (1) Panasonic Colored TV 14 worth
P6,000.00;
B. One (1) Sharp Karaoke Tower Single Player color
black worth P6,000.00; and
C. One (1) 3D Rota Aire Stand Fan color brown worth
P3,000.00;
belonging to the Ozamiz City Central School represented
herein by MS. SELINA M. PANAL, all valued at P15,000.00,
to the damage and prejudice of the said school thereof, in
the aforementioned sum of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
When arraigned on separate dates with the assistance of
their counsels de oficio, petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge.[6] Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Nico Alforque
(Nico) and Mrs. Celina M. Panal (Mrs. Panal). Their
testimonies, woven together, bear the following:
On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in the morning,
Nico, then eleven years old and a Grade VI student of
Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark
Alforque (Mark), went to the OCCS and cleaned the
classroom of a teacher named Mrs. Myrna Pactolin (Mrs.
Pactolin). They received P30.00 each from Mrs. Pactolin for
the chore. Afterwards, Mark went home while Nico stayed
inside the OCCS because Mrs. Pactolin requested him to get
some "waya-waya" and "dapna" inside the OCCS's canal to
be used as fish food.[7]
While catching waya-waya and dapna inside the OCCS's
canal, Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter the OCCS's
premises by climbing over the OCCS's gate. Petitioner and
Bacus then proceeded to the classroom of another teacher,
Mrs. Panal, which was located near the OCCS's canal.
Thereupon, petitioner and Bacus destroyed the padlock of
the classroom's door using an iron bar and entered therein.
Subsequently, petitioner and Bacus walked out of the
classroom carrying a television, a karaoke and an electric
fan, and thereafter brought them to the school gate. They
went over the gate with the items and handed them over to
Boniao and Handoc who were positioned just outside the
OCCS's gate. The items were placed inside a tricycle. After
petitioner, Bacus and Boniao boarded the tricycle, Handoc
drove the same and they sped away.[8]
On the following day, 29 July 2001, Mrs. Panal went to the
OCCS for a dance practice with her students. She
proceeded to her classroom and discovered that it was
forcibly opened, and that the karaoke, television and electric
fan therein were missing. She immediately reported the
incident to the police. The OCCS principal informed her that
Nico witnessed the incident. Thereafter, petitioner, Bacus,
Boniao and Handoc were charged with robbery.[9]
The prosecution also submitted object evidence to buttress
the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) a T-shaped
slightly curved iron bar, which is 10 mm. by 12 inches in
size, used in destroying the padlock of Mrs. Panal's
classroom and marked as Exhibit A; and (2) a Yeti brand,
colored yellow, padlock used in Mrs. Panal's classroom,
marked as Exhibit B.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of
petitioner, Bacus, Rolly Agapay (Agapay), Boniao and
Handoc to refute the foregoing accusations. Petitioner and
his co-accused denied any involvement in the incident and
interposed the defense of alibi.
Petitioner Estioca testified that on 28 July 2001, he cleaned
Page 83 of 196
his house located at Laurel Street, Ozamiz City, from 8:00 in
the morning up to 10:00 in the morning. After cleaning the
house, he ate lunch and rested. At around 3:00 in the
afternoon of the same day, he went to the house of his
neighbor/friend, Junjun Ho (Junjun), to help the latter in
cleaning his houseyard. However, Junjun's father arrived,
and since the father and son had to discuss important things,
he decided to go home which was about past 3:00 in the
afternoon. Upon arriving home, his aunt, Myrna Macamay,
told him that some people had gone to the house looking for
him. Later, two unidentified persons, accompanied by
Boniao, came to his house and brought him to the City Hall
Police Station for investigation as regards the incident.[10]
During the interrogation inside the police station, a certain
Michael approached him and inquired as to where he sold
the television stolen from the OCCS. He told Michael not to
accuse him of stealing as it is not a good joke. Michael
called Bacus and Boniao who were then standing nearby,
and the two pointed to him as the one who sold the
television. Afterwards, one of the police officers therein told
him to approach a certain Colonel Bation who was also
inside the police station. Upon approaching Colonel Bation,
the latter punched him in the stomach causing him to kneel
down in pain. Colonel Bation asked him where he sold the
television but he told him he had nothing to do with it.
Colonel Bation took a whip and smacked him with it several
times on the body. An emergency hospital worker named
Dennis Fuentes, who was also present, stripped him naked
and burned his scrotum, chest and palm with lighter,
cigarette butts and matchsticks. Thereafter, he was jailed. [11]
Bacus, a resident of Barangay Lam-an, Ozamiz City,
declared that on the night of 27 July 2001, he slept at the
guardhouse of the Ozamiz City National High School
(OCNHS) which is located in front of the OCCS. On the
following day, 28 July 2001, at about 7:00 in the morning, he
woke up and helped his mother in selling bananas beside
their house which is situated in front of the OCNHS. At about
11:00 in the morning of the same day, while on his way to
Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, to buy chicken feed, a
certain Michael Panal and an unidentified companion
blocked his path and asked him if he was the one who
robbed the OCCS. He told the two that he had nothing to do
with the incident. The two then brought him to the nearby
seashore where they were met by a group of persons
headed by a certain Maning. Thereupon, they tortured and
beat him for refusing to admit involvement in the incident.
Subsequently, he was taken to the Ozamiz City Hall for
investigation.[12]
Agapay, an OCNHS working student and a resident of the
said school, narrated that he knows Bacus because the
latter resided in a house located just in front of the OCNHS;

that he and Bacus usually slept at the guardhouse of the
OCNHS; that on the night of 27 July 2001, he and Bacus
slept at the guardhouse of the OCNHS; and that Bacus woke
up on the following day, 28 July 2001, at about 8:30 in the
morning.[13]
Boniao, 14 years old and resident of Barangay Tinago,
Ozamiz City, testified that on 28 July 2001, at 8:00 in the
morning, he cleaned his parents' house and thereafter
watched television. On 30 July 2001, at 7:00 in the morning,
he and Bacus went to the OCCS to pick up plastic bottles
scattered therein. After gathering some plastic bottles, he
and Bacus left the OCCS. While on their way home, a
certain Leoncio apprehended him and brought him to his
parents' house. Upon arriving home, his mother beat him
and forbade him to go out of the house. Subsequently,
several persons went to his parents' house and arrested him.
He was taken to a nearby port where he was asked to
identify the persons involved in the robbery of the OCCS.
When he could not say anything about the incident, he was
brought to the City Hall Police Station where he was jailed.[14]
Handoc, a pedicab driver residing at Barangay Tinago,
Ozamiz City, stated that he helped his brother-in-law in
quarrying gravel at Panay-ay Diot, Clarin, Misamis
Occidental, on the whole morning of 28 July 2001; that he
went back to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, at about 4:00 in
the afternoon of 28 July 2001; that Tomas Medina, the
former barangay captain, arrested him and took him to the
City Hall; that police officers in the City Hall inquired as to
where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS but he
replied that he had nothing to do with it; that he was
repeatedly beaten by police officers for denying any
involvement in the incident; and that he was detained at the
City Hall Jail.[15]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 April 2004
convicting petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc of robbery
under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4
of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court imposed on
petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since Boniao was a
minor (14 years old) when he participated in the heist, he
was sentenced to a lower prison term of six months
of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months
of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered
to pay P15,000.00 as civil liability. Nonetheless, the
sentence meted out to Boniao was suspended and his
commitment to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) was ordered pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 603.[16] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Valcesar Estioca y
Macamay alias "Bango," Marksale Bacus alias "Macoy,"
Emeliano Handoc y Bullares alias "Eming" and minor Kevin
Boniao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery defined and penalized under Article 299, subsection
(a), paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and upon
applying Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code
and Indeterminate Sentence Law and Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance of two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed
for by law (Art. 68, par. 1) unto Kevin Boniao, a minor, who
was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
this court hereby sentences them (a) Valcesar Estioca,
Marksale Bacus, Emeliano Handoc to suffer the
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and (b) Kevin Boniao (minor) to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional as
maximum and all of the accused to suffer the accessory
penalty provided for by law, to indemnify the civil liability of
P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.
With respect to Kevin Boniao, the sentence imposed upon
him is hereby suspended pursuant to PD 603 as amended
and he is therefore committed to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for reformation,
otherwise if he is incorrigible, then the sentence shall be
imposed upon him by the court. The DSWD is hereby
ordered to have close surveillance and supervision upon him
and to constantly observe the development of his behavior
and to submit to the court a report/recommendation on the
matter as prescribed for by law.
The Order of this court dated August 20, 2001 is hereby
cancelled and revoked.
The accused are entitled 4/5 of the time they were placed
under preventive imprisonment.
The cash bond in the amount of P24,000 posted by accused
Valcesar Estioca is hereby cancelled and the same is
ordered released and returned to the bondsman
concerned.[17]
Petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Decision arguing that there was
no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed
was erroneous.[18] On 17 August 2004, the RTC issued an
Order partially granting the motion.[19] The trial court lowered
the penalty imposed on them but affirmed its earlier finding
of conspiracy and conviction. It also ordered the DSWD to
release and turn over Boniao to his parents. It concluded:
Page 84 of 196
WHEREFORE, as herein modified, the imposable
indeterminate penalty meted to accused Valcesar Estioca,
Marksale Bacus and Emeliano Handoc being guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of he crime of Robbery, defined and
penalized under paragraph 4 of Art. 299 of the Revised
Penal Code upon applying Indeterminate Sentence Law with
paragraph 1 of Art. 64, Revised Penal Code, ranges from
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum with accessory penalty
provided for by law; and for minor accused Kevin Boniao, the
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor upon applying
the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code with Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the
same Code. All of the accused shall indemnify jointly the civil
liability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.
As aforestated, minor accuser Kevin Boniao is hereby
ordered released from DSWD and returned to the custody of
his parents.[20]
Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order
before the Court of Appeals.[21] Bacus, Boniao and Handoc
did not appeal their conviction anymore. On 30 June 2006,
the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming with
modification the RTC Decision and Order. The appellate
court held that Boniao is exempt from criminal liability but his
civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344
otherwise known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006, thus:
On a final note, considering that it is axiomatic that an
appeal opens the entire case for review and considering
further that any decision rendered in the appeal does not
bind those who did not appeal except if beneficial to them,
We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be
acquitted and his criminal liability extinguished pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which took effect on May
22, 2006. The pertinent provision thereof provides, thus:
"Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to Section 20
of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws."
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the assailed Decision and the August 17,

2004 Order are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that accused KEVIN BONIAO is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged pursuant to Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9344, without prejudice to his civil liability.[22]
On 21 August 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition on the
following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED ROBBERY WHICH
HAPPENED ON BROAD DAY LIGHT AND IN THE
PRESENCE OF ALLEGED TWO (2) EYEWITNESSES
UNDER HUMAN EXPERIENCE CAN POSSIBLY BE
PERPETUATED BY THE ACCUSED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGED LONE WITNESS NICO
ALFORQUE COULD HAVE POSSIBLY WITNESS[ED] THE
ALLEGED ROBBERY INCIDENT.[23]
Simply put, the Court is called upon to determine whether
the testimony of Nico is credible given the surrounding
circumstances of the incident.
Petitioner maintains that the testimony of Nico regarding the
fact that the robbery was committed in broad daylight (8:00
in the morning) and in full view of Nico is against human
nature. He asserts that no person would dare commit
robbery in broad daylight and in the presence of other
people because they would be easily identified. [24]
Petitioner further claims that it was impossible for Nico to
see petitioner and Bacus destroy the door of Mrs. Panal's
classroom because, according to Nico's own Affidavit, Nico
was inside the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin during the
incident. He insists that the walls of Mrs. Pactolin's
classroom prevented Nico from witnessing the incident.[25]
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the
witnesses, this Court is guided by the following well-settled
principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings
of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that may affect the
result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and even
finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their demeanor
when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness
who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner is a
credible witness.[26]
After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and
applying the foregoing parameters to this case, we find no
cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the RTC that
Nico's testimony is credible. As an eyewitness to the
incident, Nico positively identified petitioner, Bacus, Boniao
and Handoc as those who robbed the OCCS of an electric
fan, television and karaoke on the morning of 28 July 2001.
His direct account of how petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc helped one another in robbing the OCCS is candid
and convincing, thus:
Q: Now, on July 28, 2001 at about 8:00 o'clock in the
morning, could you be kind enough to tell us where
were you at that time?
A: We were cleaning the room of the school, sir.
Q: What particular school are you referring to?
A: At Ozamis Central School, sir.
Q: Would you be able to tell us the name of the teacher of
that particular classroom you were cleaning?
A: The classroom of Mrs. Pactolin, sir.
Why did you clean the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin,
Q:
were you being paid?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How much?
A: P30.00 sir.
Were you alone in cleaning the classroom of Mts.
Q:
Pactolin at that time?
A: We were two sir.
Would you be kind enough to tell this honorable court
Q:
who was your companion at that time?
A: My cousin Mark Alforque sir.
Q: Now, after cleaning the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin
together with Mark Alforque, what did you do next?
A: My cousin went home and I was left in the classroom
because I was requested by my teacher to get fish
food.
Q: What fish food are you talking about Mr. Witness?
A: Wayawaya and Dapna sir.
Page 85 of 196
Q: While getting the fishfood for your teacher, did you
observed (sic) anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this Court now what
did you observed (sic) that time when you were getting
the fishfood?
A: I saw somebody climbed the gate sir.
xxxx
Q: Where were you at that time Mr. Nico Alforque?
A: I was inside the school sir.
Q: What particular place are you referring?
A: Near the canal sir.
Q: And would you be able to tell us also how far were you
when you saw these persons climbing the gate?
A: I was a little bit farther sir.
Q: After you saw the two persons climbing the gate, what
happened after that?
A: I saw that the padlock was opened.
Q: What particular padlock are you referring to?
A: I saw a padlock made of iron.
Q: And what particular classroom or place were these
persons you saw that they were opening the padlock?
A: The classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal sir.
Q: Who is this Mrs. Celina Panal?
A: A teacher sir.
Q: Would you be able to tell us whose classroom these
persons you saw opening the padlock?
A: The classroom of Mrs. Panal sir.
Q: Would you be able to tell us how did they opened (sic)
the classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal?
A: The room was opened with the used (sic) of an iron
bar sir.
Q: I am showing to you this iron bar, what relation has
this iron bar to the one you said a while ago?
 Page 86 of 196

A: That is the one used by the persons to open the Q: These are the persons who destroyed the padlock of Q: Could you be able to tell us who was driving the
classroom sir. the classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal? tricycle?

TO COURT: A: Yes sir. The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.

We would like to request your honor that this iron bar Q: After destroying the padlock Mr. Nico Alforque, what Q: And after seeing these persons what did you observed
be marked as our Exh. "A." did you observed? (sic) after that?

COURT: A: I saw that they brought out the colored TV, the A: I did not see anything because I went away sir.
Karaoke and the Electric Fan.
Mark it. Q: You mean to say that all those persons went away
Q: You said that these persons after destroying the when you went away?
TO WITNESS: padlock, took the colored TV, the Karaoke and the
Electric Fan, where did they go? A: Yes sir.
Q: And what about the padlock, would you be able to
identify the padlock that was used (sic) by these A: After taking these things, they went out of the Q: They went together, is that what you mean?
persons? classroom sir.
A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir. Q: And after going out of the classroom where did they
go? Q: Are they walking or riding?
Q: I am showing to you this padlock, would you kindly tell
this Court what relation this padlock to the one you A: They went to the gate sir. A: They were riding in a tricycle sir.
stated a while ago?
COURT:
Q: And at the gate, what did you observed (sic) if any?
A: That is the padlock used (sic) by them sir.
A: I saw that there was another person sir. Q: Whose tricycle?
TO COURT:
Q: And what was this person doing at the gate? The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.[27]
For identification purposes your honor, May I
respectfully request that this padlock be marked as A: They passed on the things through the person at the
Exh. "B." gate sir. Mrs. Panal corroborated the foregoing testimony of Nico on
relevant points. [28]
COURT: Q: To whom did these persons passed these things at the
gate? The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the object
Mark it. evidence submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the
The witness is pointing to a man whose name is Kevin Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Nico and Mrs.
TO WITNESS: Boniao. Panal to be truthful and unequivocal and, as such, prevailed
over the denial and alibi of petitioner and his cohorts. Both
Q: Now Mr. Nico Alforque, you said that there were two Q: What else did you observed (sic) at the gate? courts also found no ill motive on the part of Nico and Mrs.
persons who opened the classroom of Mrs. Celina
Panal.
Panal, would you kindly identify these persons if you A: I saw that there is another person.
can see them now in court? It is not incredible or against human nature for petitioner and
Q: Who was that person?
his companions to have committed the robbery in broad
A: Yes sir.
The witness is pointing to accused Emeliano Handoc. daylight and in full view of Nico. There is no standard
Q: Would you kindly point to them if they are now here in behavior of criminals before, during and after the
court? Q: And what was Emeliano Handoc doing at the gate Mr. commission of a crime.[29] Some may be so bold and daring
Nico Alforque? in committing a crime in broad daylight and in full view of
The witness is pointing to a person whom when asked other persons. Others may be so cunning such that they
of his name declared that he is Valcesar Estioca. A: He was waiting at the gate sir. commit crime in the darkness of the night to avoid detection
and arrest by peace officers.[30]
A: And would you kindly tell us also the companion of Q: Now after you saw these persons, what were the two
Valcesar Estioca? accused doing at the gate when they passed the In People v. Toledo, Sr.,[31] we sustained the credibility of the
things to Kevin Boniao? eyewitness and upheld the conviction of the accused for
The witness is pointing to a person whose name is homicide despite the circumstances existing at the crime
Marksale Bacus. A: They were riding the tricycle sir.
scene -- broad daylight, full view of many persons inside the
school compound, and presence of inhabited houses. It was

also ruled that crimes may be committed in broad daylight
and that criminals are not expected to be logical or to act
normally in executing their felonious designs because
committing a crime itself is not logical or reasonable, viz :
Appellant [accused] also asserts that the testimony of
Ronnie [eyewitness] was inherently improbable. He insists
that the circumstances existing at the crime scene --
broad daylight, full view of many persons inside the
school compound, presence of inhabited housesaround
the purok -- were such that a crime could not be committed.
For a number of reasons, we find no merit in this contention.
First, appellant's premise that there were many persons in
the school compound is not supported by the evidence on
record. Second, crimes are known to have been
committed in broad daylight within the vicinity of
inhabited houses . Third, although it would be illogical
and unreasonable for normal persons in full control of
their faculties to commit a crime under such
circumstances, the same does not hold true for all,
especially those under the grip of criminal impulses. We
cannot expect the mind of such persons to work within
the parameters of what is normal, logical or reasonable,
as the commission of a crime is not normal, logical or
reasonable. Hence, the circumstances present in this
case do not rule out appellant's commission of the
crime.[32]
Besides, as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General,[33] it is not improbable for petitioner and his cohorts
to have committed the robbery as narrated by Nico because
it happened on a Saturday, a non-school day in the OCCS.
Apparently, petitioner and his companions expected that
none or only few persons would go to the OCCS on said
date.
A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that
Nico was in a canal located inside the OCCS catching waya-
waya and dapna when he saw the incident, and was not
inside the enclosed classroom of Mrs. Pactolin as alleged by
petitioner.[34] Nico declared that he clearly saw the incident
and that nothing blocked his vision.[35] Nico remained
steadfast and consistent in his foregoing testimony even on
cross examination, thus:
Q: From the place where you were gathering fishfood at
that time you cannot clearly see the room of Mrs.
Panal, am I right?
A: I can see it clearly sir.
Q: You have not seen what were those persons doing
inside the room of Mrs. Panal?
A: I saw them sir.
Q: You saw them taking away the Colored TV, Karaoke
and the Electric Fan?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Who among them took with him the TV?
The witness is pointing to Valcesar Estioca.
Q: Aside from the TV he also carry away with him the
Electric Fan and Karaoke?
A: It was his companion sir.
xxxx
Q: Now at the gate you saw how many persons aside
from that two who entered the room of Mrs. Panal?
A: I saw three persons sir.
Q: Was these three persons outside the gate or inside the
gate?
A: They were inside the gate sir.
Q: And that was the time you saw the TV, Karaoke and
Electric Fan turned over to those persons at the gate?
A: Yes sir.
Q: After that, those three persons left the place?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What about those two persons you saw entering the
room of Mrs. Panal where did they go?
A: They went out sir. [36]
The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and
his court testimony is inconsequential. Inconsistencies
between the sworn statement or affidavit and direct
testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit
the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is
oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior
to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice
can be taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial
are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in
sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate
for a variety of reasons, at times because of partial and
innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries.
Additionally, an extrajudicial statement or affidavit is
generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another
Page 87 of 196
who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statement;
hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are
not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses' direct and
categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to
their extrajudicial statements.[37]
Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the testimony of
eyewitness Nico is credible, then the judgment of conviction
against petitioner, Bacus, Boniao, and Handoc should be
affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a lone
eyewitness, such as Nico, is sufficient to support a
conviction.[38]
We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties
imposed on petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc.
Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for robbery
with use of force upon things where the value of the property
taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry
arms, as in this case, is prision mayor. Since no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance was alleged and proven in this
case, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its medium
period in accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the range of the penalty now is prision correccional in
any of its periods as minimum to prision mayor medium as
its maximum. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
correct in imposing on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc, a
prison term of four years, two months, and one day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor as maximum, because it is within the
aforesaid range of penalty.
With regard to Boniao, who was a minor (14 years old) at the
time he committed the robbery, Article 68, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code instructs that the penalty imposable on
him, which is prision mayor,shall be lowered by two degrees.
The RTC, therefore, acted accordingly in sentencing him to
four months of arresto mayor.
Nonetheless, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Boniao, who was barely 14 years of age at the time he
committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability
and should be released to the custody of his parents or
guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
 Page 88 of 196

intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
xxxx 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against petitioner.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be SO ORDERED.
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,
Sec. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. - Nachura, and Reyes., JJ., concur.
If it has been determined that the child taken into custody is
fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have
an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately
release the child to the custody of his/her parents or
guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest
relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social
welfare and development officer who will determine the
appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to
the person having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they
refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of
the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a
local social welfare and development officer; or, when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused
by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not
comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child
and Youth Welfare Code."

Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and

Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the
said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Boniao
who was not shown to be a habitual criminal.[39] This is
based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a

retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

However, as Boniao's civil liability is not extinguished

pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act
No. 9344, Boniao should be held jointly liable with petitioner,
Bacus, and Handoc for the payment of civil liability in the
amount of P15,000.00 representing the stolen items.

[ G.R. No. 182941, July 03, 2009 ]
ROBERT SIERRA Y CANEDA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda
(petitioner) for the review on certiorari[1] of the Decision[2]and
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA) that affirmed with
modification his conviction for the crime of qualified rape
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159,
Pasig City, in its decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA[5] was playing with her
friend BBB in the second floor of her family's house in
Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told
AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The
petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse
with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and
also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male
organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell
anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano
(her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a
classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to physical
examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen
consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of
the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was
charged with rape under the following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15
years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister,
AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter's will and
consent.
[6]
Contrary to law.
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the
defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling
cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed
that AAA only invented her story because she bore him a
grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties' mother
(CCC) supported the petitioner's story; she also stated that
AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son testified that
the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged
incident happened.[7]
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the
petitioner raped her; she confirmed the petitioner's claim that
AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of
qualified rape as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353
in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the
said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the
victim the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as
moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by
attacking AAA's credibility. He also invoked paragraph 1,
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act
of 2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability considering
that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was
committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner's conviction with
modification as to penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in
convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra
has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are
likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal
liability, the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that Robert is not exempt from liability. First, it was
not clearly established and proved by the defense that
Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the
commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to
present Robert's birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64
of Republic Act No. 9344. Neither is the suspension of
sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one
case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect
on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:
Page 89 of 196
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of
sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is
already 18 years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38
of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of
Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as
provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who
have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for
which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their
sentences suspended.[11]
The CA denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution's evidence
on his guilt of the crime charged; what he now assails is the
failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 6[12] of R.A.
No. 9344 under the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the petitioner's
exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was
incumbent for the defense to present the petitioner's
birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344
when the burden of proving his age lies with the
prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344;
and

(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling
in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton[13] thereby denying the
petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who
bears the burden of proof for purposes of determining
exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the
petitioner at the time the crime was committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on
the prosecution as the party who stands to lose the case if
no evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not
a 15-year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit
provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.[14] He additionally
claims that Sections 3,[15] 7,[16] and 68[17] of the law also
provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in
conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age
should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and
evidence on record - specifically: the allegation of the
Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that
the prosecution never objected to, and the findings of the
RTC - established that he was not more than 15 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime.
The People's Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), counters that the burden belongs to the
petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or
other documentary evidence proving that his age was 15
years or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner
is presumed to be a minor, he is disqualified to have his
sentence suspended following the ruling in Declarador v.
Hon. Gubaton.[18]
THE COURT'S RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecution's evidence and
the findings of the lower courts on the petitioner's guilt, since
the petition opens the whole case for review and the issues
before us are predicated on the petitioner's guilt of the crime
charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under
the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only
on the criminal, not on the civil, liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA
decision and the records of the case, to deviate from the
lower courts' findings of guilt. The records show that the
prosecution established all the elements of the crime
charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other
corroborating evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take
place as the information charged.[19] As against AAA's
testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of
denial and alibi - defenses that, in a long line of cases, we
have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear
and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to present this
required evidentiary support.[20] We have held, too, that as
negative defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
credible and positive testimony of the complainant.[21] We
sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we see
no compelling reason to doubt the validity of their
conclusions in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground - i.e.,
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 - that
implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way
swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is
entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it,
even inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense's
claim of exemption from liability was made for the first time in
its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an
essential change of theory that is usually disallowed on
appeal for reasons of fairness, [22] no essential change is
really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not
incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the
lower courts' conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the
crime charged. An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused
is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused
committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable
therefor because of an exemption granted by law. In
admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not
unmindful, too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one
made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review, even
on questions that the parties did not raise.[23] By mandate of
the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every
circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the
accused.[24] It is with these considerations in mind and in
obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A.
No. 9344 on how the cases of children in conflict with the law
should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the
applicable law on exemption from liability compelling
because of the patent errors the CA committed in these
regards. Specifically, the CA's findings of fact on the issues
of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of
evidence, are contradicted by the evidence on record; it also
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[25]
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the
outset that the ages of both the petitioner and the
Page 90 of 196
complaining victim are material and are at issue. The age of
the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to
exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while
the age of the latter is material in characterizing the crime
committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that
R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and
took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and
protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child
at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children
are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being
through a variety of disposition measures such as care,
guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training programs and
other alternatives to institutional care.[26] More importantly in
the context of this case, this law modifies as well the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor
offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, previously
provided - i.e., from "under nine years of age" and "above
nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted without
discernment) - to "fifteen years old or under" and "above
fifteen but below 18" (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law - as the old paragraphs 2 and 3,
Article 12 of the RPC did - presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right
from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones
for which they cannot be held accountable.[27] The current
law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative
justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years
as formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance
to right their wrong through diversion and intervention
measures.[28]
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption
from criminal liability because he was not more than 15
years old at the time the rape took place. The CA
disbelieved this claim for the petitioner's failure to present his
birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No.
9344.[29] The CA also found him disqualified to avail of a
suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for
the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on
Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to present evidence
on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or
defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish
the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has

the duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime.
The prosecution completes its case as soon as it has
presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the
required elements. At this point, the burden of evidence
shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has
shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the
circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the
crime charged or cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In
the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence
and had done everything that the law requires it to do. The
burden of evidence has now shifted to the defense which
now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused,
even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability
because of his age when he committed the crime. The
defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or
less when he committed the rape charged.[30]
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that
minority and age are not elements of the crime of rape; the
prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these
circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the
prosecution would make minority and age integral elements
of the crime when clearly they are not. [31] If the prosecution
has a burden related to age, this burden relates to proof of
the age of the victim as a circumstance that qualifies the
crime of rape.[32]
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accused's Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence
showing that the petitioner was only 15 years old at the time
he committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344
expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the
law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.[Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A.
No. 9344 provides the implementing details of this provision
by enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a
law enforcement officer to ascertain the child's age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child's age,
such as
(a) Child's birth certificate;
(b) Child's baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not
limited to the child's school records, dental
records, or travel papers.
(2) xxx
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or
pending receipt of such documents, the law
enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to
determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information
that indicate age (e.g. date of birthday, grade
level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge
that indicate[s] age of the child (e.g. relatives,
neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height,
built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having
been passed only in 2006), does not depart from the
jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may
be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accused's minority
and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted
testimonial evidence to prove the minority and age of the
accused in the absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was
followed by U.S. v. Roxas[34] where the defendant's
statement about his age was considered sufficient, even
without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a
minor of 16 years at the time he committed the offense
charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the Court
appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the
basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense in the absence of any
contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the
prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the
testimony of the accused that he was less than 15 years old
sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta
in the cases of People v. Morial[37] and David v. Court of
Appeals,[38] and ruled that the allegations of minority and age
by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the
prosecution's failure to disprove the claim by contrary
Page 91 of 196
evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial
evidence on the accused's minority and age upon the
concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of
any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate,
baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove
the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and
minority of the accused at the time of the complained
incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution;
and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the
accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies are untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the
petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his minority and
age when the rape was committed.[39] Second, the records
before us show that these pieces of testimonial evidence
were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the
prosecution did not present any contrary evidence to prove
that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime
was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age of the child
must be resolved in his favor.[40] Hence, any doubt in this
case regarding the petitioner's age at the time he committed
the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words, the
testimony that the petitioner as 15 years old when the crime
took place should be read to mean that he was not more
than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that
R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its
implementing rules, and established jurisprudence in accord
with the latest statutory developments, the CA therefore
cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving
evidentiary value to the petitioner's and CCC's testimonies
relating to the former's age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344
took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was already
20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from
enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 grants.[41] As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344[42] in the recent case of
Ortega v. People:[43]
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social

welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption
from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age
at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the
CICL's age at the time of the commission of the
offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years
old. [Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified
under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended, which provides
that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual
criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the
petitioner is a habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides
that the accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his
exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is
civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal
liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime
he would have been liable for had he not been found to be
exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B
of the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner is guilty of
qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA within the
second civil degree of consanguinity and the latter's
minority.[44] Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability
corresponding to qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings,
does not appear to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC,
declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her
children. The prosecution and the defense likewise
stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship
exists. We find, however, that AAA's minority, though alleged
in the Information, had not been sufficiently
proven.[45] People v. Pruna[46] laid down these guidelines in
appreciating the age of the complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered
by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following
guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document
is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of
the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's
age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of
proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not
be taken against him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of
AAA. They do not likewise show that the petitioner ever
expressly and clearly admitted AAA's age at the time of the
rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to object to
AAA's testimony be taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would
upgrade the crime to qualified rape - i.e., relationship within
the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim -
does not exist. The crime for which the petitioner should
have been found criminally liable should therefore only be
Page 92 of 196
simple rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not
qualified rape. The civil liability that can be imposed on the
petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the
attendant circumstances.
Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of
P50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary damages
P30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[47] Moral damages are automatically awarded
to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law
assumes that the victim suffered moral injuries entitling her
to this award.[48] Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the
award of exemplary damages because of the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of relationship between AAA
and petitioner and dwelling.[49] As discussed above, the
relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We
appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based
on AAA's testimony that the rape was committed in their
house.[50] While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance
was not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence
holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for
the award of exemplary damages.[51]
We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to
P50,000.00, the latter being the civil indemnity appropriate
for simple rape[52] on the finding that rape had been
committed.[53]
In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see
no need to discuss the petition's third assignment of error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 29, 2008 and
Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No.
120292-H for rape filed against petitioner Robert
Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner
is REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer who shall proceed in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 9344. Petitioner
is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner's continued
detention, we hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE
RELEASE under the above terms.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
 Page 93 of 196

directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of

this Decision the action he has taken.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile

Justice and Welfare Council.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Chico-

Nazario, and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 180380, August 04, 2009 ]
RAYMUND MADALI AND RODEL MADALI,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioners Raymund Madali (Raymund) and
Rodel Madali (Rodel) seek the reversal of the 29 August
2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
27757; and its 23 October 2007 Resolution,[2] affirming with
modifications the 28 July 2003 Decision[3] of the Romblon,
Romblon, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, in Criminal
Case No. 2179, finding petitioners guilty of homicide.
For the death of AAA,[4] Raymund, Rodel and a certain
Bernardino "Jojo" Maestro (Bernardino) were charged before
the RTC with the crime of Murder. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 1999, at around 11:00
o'clock in the evening, in the Barangay XXX, Municipality of
Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
each other, did then and there by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and
"llave inglesa" and strangle with a dog chain, one AAA,
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of
his body which caused his untimely death.[5]
During the arraignment on 31 May 2000, the three accused,
with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.[6]
On trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely:
(1) Jovencio Musa (Jovencio), 16 years old, the victim's
cousin and the alleged lone eyewitness to the killing; (2)
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Rogelio Madali, the
designated Deputy Chief of Police of the Romblon Police
Station; (3) Police Officer (PO) 3 Nicolas Molo, the police
investigator assigned to the case; (4) BBB, the mother of the
deceased victim; (5) Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado, Chief of
the Romblon District Hospital, the physician who issued the
death certificate of AAA; (6) Emerson de Asis, the alleged
companion of witness Jovencio on the night in question, who
later became a hostile witness; (7) Michael Manasan, also a
companion of witness Jovencio before the killing of the
victim occurred; (8) Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a forensic expert
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, who
conducted the examination of the corpse of the victim after
the same was exhumed.
As documentary and object evidence, the prosecution
offered the following: (1) Exhibit "A" - Affidavit of Jovencio
executed on 22 April 1999, detailing the circumstances prior
to, during and after the killing of the victim perpetrated by
Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (2) Exhibit "B"
- Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jovencio dated 8 May 1999, a
recantation of the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (3) Exhibit "C" -
Amended Affidavit of Jovencio dated 28 May 1999, which
was substantially the same on material points as the 22 April
1999 Affidavit; (4) Exhibit "D" - Undated Reply Affidavit of
Jovencio insisting that the death of the victim was authored
by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (5) Exhibit "E" - Joint
Affidavit of prosecution witnesses SPO3 Rogelio Madali and
a certain SPO2 Teresito M. Sumadsad; (6) Exhibit "F" - the
coconut frond recovered by the police officers from the
scene of the incident; (7) Exhibit "G" - a dog chain used as
part of a strap that was tied to the victim's neck while he was
hanging from a tree; (8) Exhibit "H" - the handkerchief that
was tied around the victim's neck; (9) Exhibit "I" - empty
bottles of gin; (10) Exhibit "J" - cellophanes with rugby; (10)
Exhibit "K" - pictures taken from the crime scene including
the picture of the body of the victim tied to a tree; (11) Exhibit
"L" - Letter of Request for the NBI to conduct an examination
of the body of the victim; (12) Exhibits "M" to "O" - NBI
routing slips; (14) Exhibit "P" - Death Certificate issued by
Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado; (15) Exhibit "Q" - Exhumation
Report issued by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (16) Exhibit "R"
- the Autopsy Report submitted by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala,
Jr.; (17) Exhibit "S" - Sketch of the head of the victim
showing the injuries thereon; and (18) Exhibit "T" -
handwritten draft of the exhumation report.
Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution
shows that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of 13 April 1999,
BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships
docked at the Romblon Pier, and who was constantly
assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on a ship plying
her wares. AAA, together with Jovencio and Raymund, was
there helping his mother.[7] Sometime later, Raymund and
AAA left the ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.[8]
At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another
friend named Michael Manasan sat beside the Rizal
monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between
the Roman Catholic Church and Lover's Inn. Michael had
just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino and the
victim AAA arrived. After meandering around, the group
proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which was the
reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The
victim, AAA, ascended first; behind him were Rodel,
Raymund, Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as
Page 94 of 196
they reached the reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with
the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted
out, "Join the rugby boys." AAA replied, "That's enough."
Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard
coconut frond. AAA lost his balance and was made to stand
up by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino. Raymund took his
turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same
coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he
received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who
was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too
much, as AAA lost consciousness.
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the
neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog chain. With the
contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.
Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio
could only muster a faint voice saying "Enough" every
single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who
seemed to suggest finishing off the victim, remarked, "Since
we're all here, let's get on with it." Before leaving the scene,
the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the
incident to anyone, or he would be next.
Tormented and torn between the desire to come clean and
the fear for his life, Jovencio hardly slept that night. He did
not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days.
BBB, the victim's mother, was worried when her son did not
come home. She started asking relatives whether they had
seen her son, but their reply was always in the negative.
It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto
reported to the police authorities about a dead man found in
Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School.
When the policemen went there, they found the cadaver
emitting a foul odor, with maggots crawling all over, hanging
from a tree with a handkerchief tied around the neck and a
dog chain fastened to the handkerchief. Also found in the
area were paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, as well as empty
bottles of gin and a coconut frond.
The provincial hospital refused to conduct an autopsy, since
AAA's corpse was already decomposing and stank so badly.
It was through the intercession of the NBI that the body was
eventually exhumed and examined by medico-legal experts.
Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who conducted the examination,
opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not to
asphyxiation by hanging. He declared that the victim was
already dead when he was tied to the tree, and that the
variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be attributed
to more than one assailant.
Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and
pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the

perpetrators of the crime. Thereafter, Jovencio executed his
first affidavit, which was dated 22 April 1999. Because of the
threat made on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of
Raymund and Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit
dated 8 May 1999, repudiating his first affidavit. On 28 May
1999, Jovencio made his third sworn statement substantially
reverting to his first affidavit.
The accused, on the other hand, advanced the defense of
denial and alibi. They claimed they had nothing to do with
the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near
the locus criminis when the killing occurred.
According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father
Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend named Noel Mindoro,
located more or less 14 kilometers from the place where the
victim was slain where they spent the whole evening until the
following morning. Rodel's testimony was corroborated by
his father and Noel Mindoro.
On their part, Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino
declared that they were in their respective houses on the
night in question. Raymund's place was allegedly five
kilometers away from the scene of the crime, while
Bernardino's was one kilometer away. Bernardino's
testimony was supported by his father Bernardino Maestro,
Sr. and by his neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymund's friend,
Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed up the former's alibi.
Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC
rendered a guilty verdict against the three accused. On
account of the prosecution's failure to prove the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, they
were only convicted of homicide. The RTC observed that the
incident was a sort of initiation, in which the victim voluntarily
went along with the perpetrators, not totally unaware that he
would be beaten. The RTC also appreciated the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of the three
accused. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused BERNARDO (sic) Jojo
MAESTRO, JR., RODEL MADALI AND RAYMUND MADALI
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide,
they are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years and to indemnify the heirs of AAA jointly and
severally the amount of PhP 50,000.00.[9]
On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus,
only Raymund and Rodel elevated their convictions to the
Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the RTC that Rodel and Raymund
killed the victim. However, pursuant to Section 64 of
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," which exempts from
criminal liability a minor fifteen (15) years or below at the
time of the commission of the offense, Raymund's case was
dismissed. Rodel's conviction was sustained, and he was
sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, but
the imposition of said penalty was suspended pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2003, rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon (Branch
81) is Criminal Case No. 2179, is affirmed with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from
criminal liability and the case, insofar as he is concerned is
hereby DISMISSED pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.
2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the
proper penalty for which is fixed at six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor. Imposition of this penalty should,
however, be SUSPENDED, also pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.
3) In addition to the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court
in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) is hereby awarded in favor of the heirs of the
victim, AAA.
4) x x x x
5) Finally, this case is referred to the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DWSD) for further proceedings in
accordance with R.A. No. 9344.[10]
Hence, the instant case.
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals' findings, which gave weight and credence
to the account of the incident given by prosecution witness
Jovencio, whose testimony according to them was replete
with patent and substantial inconsistencies. First, petitioners
set their sights on the conflicting affidavits executed by
Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three accused in
the death of AAA, which was controverted by the second
affidavit where Jovencio denied having seen the three
accused butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated
the material points in the first affidavit. Petitioners also
pointed out the discrepancy between the first and the third
Page 95 of 196
affidavits, as the former stated that Jovencio was not seen
by the three accused when they executed the victim;
whereas in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with
the three when the killing took place. Second, petitioners
assert that the testimony of Jovencio relating to the alleged
fact that his companions, Michael Manasan and Emerson de
Asis, saw the three accused and the deceased during the
night in question was debunked by the very testimonies of
Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis wherein they
declared otherwise.
Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals erred in disbelieving the defense of alibi
they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed to
muster the required quantum of proof, and that said defense
was corroborated by testimonies of the other defense
witnesses.
The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the
parties and their witnesses.
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning
values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of
the declarant's demeanor, conduct and position to
discriminate between truth and falsehood.[11] This is
especially true when the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it
be manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked or
disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of
significance in the case.[12]
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any
significant facts in the case.
This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on
the evidence on records has diligently pored over the
transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like the
RTC, finds the testimony of Jovencio credible. Subjected to
the grueling examinations on the witness stand, Jovencio
steadfastly pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as
the persons who slaughtered the victim. He testified as
follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April 13,
1999?
xxxx
A: I was at the Rizal standing by.
xxxx
 Page 96 of 196

hagdan near the high school? Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next?
PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:
A: In the middle. A: Then [Bernardino] told him "Join the rugby boys!"
Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the evening,
[who was your companion]? Q: Did you climb the stairs? Q: Did AAA make any reply?

A: Only Michael. A: Yes, sir. A: AAA said "That's enough."

Q: And what were you doing with Michael? Q: Who was ahead? Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the rugby
boys?
A: Only standing by there. A: AAA.
A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.
Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by with Q: And who came next?
Michael? Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?
A: Rodel.
A: None, sir. A: [Bernardino].
Q: Then, after Rodel, who?
Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there? Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three (3)
A: Raymund. times with the coconut fronds?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then? A: He was made to stand.
Q: Who?
A: [Bernardino]. Q: After standing, what happened next?
A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA, then
Rodel. Q: [Bernardino] who? A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond byRaymund.

Q: And what happened when they arrived? A: Maestro. Q: Was AAA hit?

A: They were also standing by there. Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to Bernardino A: Yes, sir.
Maestro you pointed a while ago?
Q: How long did they stand by in that place? Q: Where?
A: That Jojo is his alias.
A: I do not know how many hours? A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of his
Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs? right thigh).
Q: Then, what happened next?
A: Yes, sir. Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the coconut
A: Around 10:30 o'clock we went there. frond?
Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, if
Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as your any? A: As if he became weak.
companions?
A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA. Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any?
A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.
Q: With what? A: He boxed the body and the head.
Q: What happened to Michael?
A: Handkerchief. Q: Of whom?
A: He went home.
Q: Where did he get that handkerchief? A: Of Rodel.
Q: When you said you went there, to which place are you
referring? A: From Raymund. Q: Who was boxed by Rodel?

A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan. Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA? A: AAA.

Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of A: AAA. Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what is
Romblon, which street did you take in going to hagdan- this llave inglesa?

A: Lead llave inglesa.
Q: And how does it look like?
A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle.
Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in different
parts of his body with a llave inglesacausing him to fall to the
ground, how did Rodel use this llave inglesa?
A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and
motioning the left as if wearing something in his right hand),
then punched him.
Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body by
Rodel using llave inglesa, what happened to AAA?
A: He lost consciousness.
Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino
Maestro, Raymund Madali and Rodel Madali do, if any?
A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of my
cousin.
Q: Who is this cousin of yours?
A: AAA.
Q: What is the family name?
A: AAA.
COURT:
How about Bernardino as part of the question?
PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:
Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?
A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.
COURT:
How about Rodel?
A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and
hooked the tie to the tree.
Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made of?
A: The chain.
Q: Referring to the dog chain?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While all these things were happening, what was
Jovencio Musa doing who is a cousin of AAA?
A: I got shock upon seeing it.
Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?
A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said "Enough!"
(Tama na!).
Q: How many times did you say that is enough?
A: Twice.
Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying "Tama na,
tama na!"?
A: "It is already here so we will proceed."
COURT:
Translate that.
A: "Yari na ini, idiretso na."
xxxx
Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened
next?
A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I would be
the next to be killed.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: No more, we went home already.[13]
Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding
before his very eyes as he was there when it happened. He
was in the company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus,
the incident could not have escaped his attention. The
prosecution adequately established in graphic detail, through
the eyewitness, the circumstances that transpired before,
during and after the killing of AAA. At around 11:30 p.m. of
13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with the victim, as well as
with Rodel, Raymund and Bernardino, went to a place near
the Romblon National High School. Jovencio's earlier
Page 97 of 196
companion, Michael Manasan, did not go with the group, as
he had already left a little earlier. As they reached their
destination, the group ascended the stairs leading to a
reservoir near the said school. AAA was ahead, followed by
Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and Jovencio. Upon reaching
the top, Bernardino blindfolded the victim with a
handkerchief and told the latter, "Join the rugby boys!" The
victim responded, "That's enough!" Bernardino then hit the
victim thrice, using a green and hard coconut frond. Unable
to withstand the beatings, the victim hit the ground and was
lifted to his feet by Bernardino, Raymund and Rodel. With
the same coconut frond, Raymund hit the victim on his right
thigh. Rodel followed by punching the body and the head of
the victim with a brass knuckle (llave inglesa) wrapped
around the former's right fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio
shouted "Tama na! Tama na!" Bernardino responded, "Yari
na ini, ideretso na," (We have come this far, we have to
finish it.) The victim's strength was no match to the injuries
he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied a
handkerchief around the victim's neck, fastened a dog chain
to the ends of the said handkerchief and, with the aid of
Raymund and Rodel, hoisted the victim's body to and
hanged it from a nearby tree. Shocked at what was
happening, Jovencio just watched the whole incident, failing
to muster enough courage to help his dying cousin.
The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone
what he saw, or he would be the next victim. Then they all
left the place, leaving the victim's body hanging from a tree.
The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical
findings indicating that the victim was hit in the head by hard
blows, causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such as
the coconut frond, the dog chain and the handkerchief found
in the scene also supported Jovencio's account.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution,
petitioners Raymund and Rodel could only muster mere
denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too
flaccid to stay firm against the weighty evidence for the
prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence
that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters.[14] Between the self-
serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive
identification by the eyewitness, the latter deserves greater
credence.[15]
Petitioners' alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of
close relatives and friends, cannot overcome the convincing
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative
testimonies of relatives and friends are viewed with
suspicion and skepticism by the Court.[16]

Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur:
(a) the accused was in another place at the time the crime
was committed; and (b) it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed.
In the case under consideration, Raymund was within a 5-
kilometer distance from the scene, while Rodel was within a
14-kilometer distance. Even assuming arguendo that
Raymund and Rodel's defense were true, still, it was not
physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene and
to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not difficult
for them to travel from where they allegedly were and arrive
at the scene during the killing episode.
Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation
repudiating the earlier one laying the blame on them. The
affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial
cannot prevail over the testimony made during the
trial.[17] Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the
affidavit of recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice
to overturn the trial court's finding of guilt, which was based
on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown
trial. As held by this Court, an affidavit of recantation, being
usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the
testimony given in open court.[18] A recantation is
exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from
a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or
for monetary consideration.[19] Considering the age, the
social standing and the economic status of witness Jovencio,
it is not far-fetched that the combination of these factors
impelled him to affix his signature to the recanting affidavit.
Besides, Jovencio explained why he executed the second
affidavit or the affidavit of recantation, which supposedly
exonerated petitioners. He had been threatened by a certain
Wilson, who was a relative of petitioners. Jovencio testified:
Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned that,
you said that somebody fetched me in the evening of May 7,
1999 who told me that Rey Andrade wanted to talk to me
regarding the incident, who was that somebody who fetched
you in the house?
A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.
xxxx
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with Andrade?
A: About the Nephew of Wilson.
xxxx
Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?
A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.
Q: Did Wilson say anything?
A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be paid
and if he wins I will be the next.[20]
Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged
contradiction between Jovencio's narrative -- which claimed
that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim
in the company of the malefactors immediately prior to the
killing -- and the testimonies of these two witnesses denying
such allegation.
Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The
common narration of Emerson de Asis and Michael
Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the
victim prior to the killing are too insignificant, since their
narration did not directly relate to the act of killing itself. Said
inconsistency does not dilute the declarations of Jovencio.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its
incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given
incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the
declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative
value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant
details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and
significant point bearing on the very act of accused-
appellants.[21] As long as the testimonies of the witnesses
corroborate one another on material points, minor
inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the
integrity of a prosecution witness.[22] The minor
inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest to the
truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had not
been coached or rehearsed.[23]
The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see
the petitioners together with Jovencio and the victim
immediately prior the incident -- does not help a bit the
cause of petitioners. As the Court of Appeals correctly
pointed out, Michael could not have seen the malefactors in
the company of the victim because according to Jovencio,
Michael had gone home earlier that evening.
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court,
which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, there being no
cogent reason to veer away from such findings.
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14
years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be
exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the
Page 98 of 196
custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6
and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -- A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility.
-- If it has been determined that the child taken into custody
is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will
have an initial contact with the child has the duty to
immediately release the child to the custody of his/her
parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's
nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local
social welfare and development officer who will determine
the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and
to the person having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they
refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of
the following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a
local social welfare and development officer; or, when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein
has been found by the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused
by his parents, or in the event that the parents will not
comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the
Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child
and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and
Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May 2006, the
said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of
Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This
is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. -- Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of

the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil
liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph
of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.
As to Rodel's situation, it must be borne in mind that he was
16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. A
determination of whether he acted with or without
discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[24]Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded
by the records in each case.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate
when it opined that Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel,
together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their
hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel
knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and
should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the
consequences of his unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to
be imposed upon a person under 18 but above 15 shall be
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but
always in the proper period.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the
maximum penalty should be within prision mayor, which is a
degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum
penalty should be in the medium period of prision mayor or 8
years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the
penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision correccional.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals,
which is 6 months and one day of prision correccional to 8
Page 99 of 196
years and one day of prision mayor, is in order. However,
the sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be
suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344,
which states:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the
law under suspended sentence, without need of
application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
The Court of Appeals awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and another P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the
heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund are
ordered to pay P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of
the actual damages for funeral expenses, which the
prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to support by
receipts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 August 2007 in CA-G.R. No.
27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is
hereby AFFIRMED. With respect to Rodel Madali, being a
child in conflict with the law, this Court suspends the
pronouncement of his sentence and REMANDS his case to
the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. However, with respect
to the civil liabilities, Rodel Madali and Raymund Madali are
solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago,(Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and Peralta, JJ.

[ G.R. No. 151085, August 20, 2008 ]
JOEMAR ORTEGA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated
October 26, 2000 which affirmed in toto the Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50,
dated May 13, 1999, convicting petitioner Joemar
Ortega[4] (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,[5] was charged with the
crime of Rape in two separate informations both dated April
20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA,[6] then about eight (8)
years of age. The accusatory portions thereof respectively
state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX,
Province of YYY, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic)
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had carnal
knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a
minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the
Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic)
had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the
said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[9] Thus, trial on the
merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions
arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and
MMM.[10] Among her siblings CCC, BBB, DDD, EEE and
GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these
disturbing events, AAA's family members were close friends
of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good
neighbors. However, BBB caught petitioner raping his
younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked
AAA.[11] There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her
three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996.
MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old and son BBB,
then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda
Ortega[12] (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner, for two (2)
nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to
her other son who was sick.[13] During the first night at
petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where
AAA slept together with Luzviminda and her daughter.
Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There
petitioner raped AAA. The second occasion occurred the
following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing
that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their
comfort room and raped her there. AAA testified that
petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain.
In all of these instances, petitioner warned AAA not to tell
her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.[14] AAA did not
tell her parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of
December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house of AAA and
joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered
television. At that time, Luzviminda was conversing with
MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching,
petitioner called AAA to come to the room of CCC and BBB.
AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted
by a kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door,
removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's shorts and
panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the
vagina of AAA.[15] AAA described petitioner's penis as about
five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She,
likewise, narrated that she saw pubic hair on the base of his
penis.[16]
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony.
When BBB was about to drink water in their kitchen, as he
was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner
and AAA both naked from their waist down in the act of
sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and
making a pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner
to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter, BBB
Page 100 of 196
reported the incident to his mother, MMM.[17]
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB
saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and his
penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the
only incident that petitioner molested AAA as there were two
previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not
report her ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would
spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the matter
to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house.
After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to sleep, MMM, with a
heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that
the same was reddish and a whitish fluid was coming out
from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that
night. The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM
called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their house.
MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her
daughter, and consequently, she demanded that AAA should
be brought to a doctor for examination.[18]
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree
Katalbas[19] (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the
locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she
was molested.[20] Refusing to accept such findings, on
December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr.
Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office.
Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report[21] showing that
there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia
minora and a small laceration at the posterior fourchette."
She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's
genitals were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were
superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to 4 days.
Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her
findings required the confirmation of the Municipal Health
Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement [22] was reached
between the two families through the DAWN Foundation, an
organization that helps abused women and children. Part of
the settlement required petitioner to depart from their house
to avoid contact with AAA. [23] As such, petitioner stayed with
a certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later,
petitioner went home for brief visits and in order to bring his
dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's
father FFF was infuriated and confrontations occurred. At
this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3)
counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only filed
the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto
(Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. [24] He is the second child of

three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister.
Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He
testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good
friends; when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of
his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room together with
BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and
his younger sister; he never touched or raped AAA or
showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten
AAA in any instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's
comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped AAA
clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the
process of washing, he may have accidentally touched
AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with
his parents, went to AAA's house; [25] they were dancing and
playing together with all the other children at the time; while
they were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a
playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and reported
the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda,
saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse;[26] petitioner explained to MMM that they were
only playing, and that he could not have done to AAA what
he was accused of doing, as they were together with her
brothers, and he treated AAA like a younger sister;[27] BBB
was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at
him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his
parents peacefully left AAA's house at about nine o'clock in
the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning,
petitioner and his parents were summoned by MMM to go to
the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being
maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one
who molested her; and MMM and Luzviminda agreed to
bring AAA to a doctor for examination.[28]
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She
testified that: her son was a minor at the time of the incident;
CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first
marriage, while AAA and the rest of her siblings were of the
second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA;
when MMM entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime
in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her youngest
daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1,
1996, she was at AAA's house watching television and
conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a
drinking spree in the kitchen; from where they were seated,
she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and
AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not
hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while they were
conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and
AAA were having sexual intercourse; upon hearing such
statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and
looked for them, but both mothers did not find anything
unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the
dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's
statement; the parents of AAA, at that time, did not examine
her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry
at petitioner or at them; and they peacefully left AAA's
house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda
up, saying that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA
was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who
molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling
FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring AAA to a doctor
for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr.
Katalbas who found no indication that AAA was molested.
She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the
results of the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they
went to the police and at this instance only did Luzviminda
learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner
vehemently denied to Luzviminda that he raped AAA.
Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer
who recommended that they should seek advice from the
Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed on an
amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from
AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a certain priest in the
locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday,
petitioner would come home to visit his parents and to bring
his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came
home, FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist.
Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted wherein
FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's
parents filed the instant cases.[29]
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of
denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB,
who testified with honesty and credibility. Moreover, the RTC
opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family
to impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering
the close relations of both families. Thus, the RTC disposed
of this case in this wise:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused
Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of
RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-
19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two
(2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be
imprisoned for each case for a period of Six (6) years and
One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15)
years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is
condemned to pay the offended party AAA, the sum of
P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the
Page 101 of 196
CA.[30]
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon
posting of the corresponding bail bond for his provisional
liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the
petitioner's release pending appeal.[31]
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of
the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense of denial could
not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by
the victim AAA and her brother BBB, which were categorical,
consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA
also held that the respective medical examinations
conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the
female organ consummates rape; thus, hymenal laceration
is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that
petitioner acted with discernment as shown by his covert
acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to
the factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation
of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration[32] of the
assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution[33] dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF SUBSTANCE AND
VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE
RESULT OF THE CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY
THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT PETITIONER-
APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF
COMMITTING THE ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE
RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE PRESENT IS
 Page 102 of 196

IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
EXPERIENCE. these stories.[35] the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon
IV. On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines thorough assessment of the child, shall determine whether to
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends release the child to the custody of his/her parents, or refer
that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN reiterations of his disquisitions before the CA; the RTC, as Those with suspended sentences and undergoing
UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH BY THE ALLEGED affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise
VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES doctors since despite the absence of abrasions, rape is be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the
ATTENDING THE COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips child.
AUGUST 1996.[34] of the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the
reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her in August SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. -- If the child
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings
and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also
of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we are not prevented
was committed considering AAA's age at that time; as such, determine whether or not continued detention is necessary
from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly
AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives for detention.
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which if
is established that the crime of rape could be committed If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with adults,
considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner
even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a
stresses that from the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be
OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a youth detention home.
deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
trial court is accorded the highest respect as it had the
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are
opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained
true that petitioner inserted his fingers and his penis into her
and to determine whether said witness was telling the truth Children in Conflict with the Law. -- The PNP, the BJMP and
vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions,
or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC,
wounds and/or lacerations on the genitalia of AAA, taking
discernment when he committed the said crime, as within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act, an
into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of
manifested in his covert acts.[36] inventory of all children in conflict with the law under their
petitioner's penis. However, such allegation is completely
custody.
belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,[37] or the Juvenile
after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted into law on SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18)
AAA and found that there were no signs or indications that
April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.[38] The law Years Pending Diversion and Court Proceedings. -- If a child
AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA
establishes a comprehensive system to manage children in reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion
committed a grave error when it disregarded such medical
conflict with the law[39] (CICL) and children at risk[40] with and court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in
report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of
child-appropriate procedures and comprehensive programs consultation with the local social welfare and development
rape and, consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its
and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion, officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social
case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme
petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA,
towards their development. In order to ensure its Court, as the case may be, shall determine the appropriate
petitioner is also a child of the barrio who is innocent,
implementation, the law, particularly Section 8[41] thereof, has disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the
unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is
created the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict with
incredible and contrary to human reason that a 13- year-old
and vested it with certain duties and functions[42] such as the the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA,
formulation of policies and strategies to prevent juvenile Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for
whose reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be
delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile probation if qualified under the provisions of the Probation
controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was
justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the Law.
MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to
CICL. The law also provides for the immediate dismissal of
extort money from the parents of the petitioner. Petitioner
cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are
points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that
R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.[43] Serving Sentences. -- Persons who have been convicted
the abrasions that were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were
and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this
relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide: Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the
the time of the commission of the offense for which they
medical examination on December 12, 1996, or after the Title VIII were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape,
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall
and that AAA's parents only filed the instant case after Transitory Provisions be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this
almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case
Act and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They
of slander by deed against FFF, it is not inconceivable that
shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under
MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) this Act or other applicable laws.
and to depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was Years Old and Below. -- Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of
actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner submits that children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the

Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this
case is whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the
CA. However, with the advent of R.A. No. 9344 while
petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue
arises, namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No.
9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at the time
he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime
of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If
the complainant's testimony meets the test of credibility, the
accused can be convicted solely on that basis.[44] The RTC,
as affirmed by the CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and
found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor.
Both courts also accorded respect to BBB's testimony that
he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger
sister. While petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough
motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such
assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would
stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations
and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a
traumatic experience would damage their daughter's psyche
and mar her life if the charge is not true.[45] We find
petitioner's claim that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by
Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money
from petitioner's parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be
noted that in most cases of rape committed against young
girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total
penetration of the victim's organ is improbable due to the
small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual
penetration of the victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is
not required.[46] Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction
that the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration,
because the slightest touching of the lips of the female organ
or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.[47]
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting
circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the
complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute
free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability
arises.[48] Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no
criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v.
Almodovar,[49] we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment
of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of
the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part
of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second
element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this
power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts
(him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age
and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.
In its Comment [50] dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited
that petitioner is no longer covered by the provisions of
Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999,
petitioner was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was
affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into
law in 2006, and with the petitioner now approximately 25
years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by
R.A. No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old
as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof. The OSG
also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the
provisions of Section 38 [51] of R.A. No. 9344 providing for
automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty.
Lastly, the OSG argued that while it is a recognized principle
that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive
application, such principle does not apply if the law itself
provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. -- A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that
cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
Page 103 of 196
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time
of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of
R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been
raised from 9 to 15 years old. [52]
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that
this Court accord retroactive application to the aforequoted
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused
are given retroactive effect. [53] This principle is embodied in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. -- Penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has
been given expanded application in certain instances
involving special laws. [54] R.A. No. 9344 should be no
exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity
is even patent from the deliberations on the bill in the
Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory
Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly propose that we
should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
UNDER THIS LAW PENDING THE CREATION OF THE
OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION
(OJWR) AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A YEAR,
SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD
INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD SHALL UNDERTAKE
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE
YOUNGER CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND
THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough
facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC,
the DSWD does not have the capability at the moment. It will
take time to develop the capacity.

Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be
transferred whenever the facilities are ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification.
When we speak here of children who do not have criminal
liability under this law, we are referring here to those who
currently have criminal liability, but because of the
retroactive effect of this measure, will now be exempt. It is
quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released
either to their parents or through a diversion program, Mr.
President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to
be a process of sifting before that. That is why I was
proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will
conduct the sifting process, except that apparently, the
DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no
argument. We will now have to just craft it to ensure that the
input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the
capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals.
Likewise, the issue should also be incorporated in the
amendment.
The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment
this law becomes effective, all those children in conflict with
the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code, for
example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under
this law, will be immediately released. Is that the
understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr.
President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available,
what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has
not yet been settled . . . . . provides, for example, for
conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies,
censure, et cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do
not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it
will still require some sort of infrastructure, meaning,
manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to
address the counseling. So, there must be a transition in
terms of building the capacity and absorbing those who will
benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically
provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence]
[55]
There being none, the Santiago amendment is accepted.
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr.
President, in their application, I would like to suggest to the
Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory
provision that would make this law apply also to those who
might already have been convicted but are awaiting, let us
say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in fact, they
are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a
provision under the Transitory Provisions wherein we
address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically,
Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases
of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and
the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer." So that would be giving
retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been
prosecuted? I was trying to cite the instance of juvenile
offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting
execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include
that as an additional amendment, subject to style.
Page 104 of 196
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because
that is a reality that we have to address, otherwise injustice
will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also
include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if,
in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time of the
commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he
should be given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that
proposed amendment. [56]
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is
the dominant factor in interpreting a statute. Significantly,
this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is
the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to
have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a
statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose
of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life
to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper
course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature.[57]
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused.[58] In this case, the plain meaning of R.A. No.
9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear
lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to herein petitioner. No
other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the
new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the
CICL.
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at
the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was
duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own
testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
petitioner's age was never assailed in any of the proceedings
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the
 Page 105 of 196

time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of
age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal
liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed against
AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no
concomitant exemption from civil liability. Accordingly, this
Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the
CA, that petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a
conviction for rape.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral
damages, distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the
rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article
2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional
pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages
are granted in recognition of the victim's injury necessarily
resulting from the odious crime of rape.[59]
and one who deserves the law's greater protection.
However, this consequence is inevitable because of the
language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not
subject to review by this Court.[61] Any perception that the
result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be
addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion
to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the law. Our task is
constitutionally confined only to applying the law and
jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in
this case.[62]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos.
98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against petitioner Joemar F.
Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred
to the local social welfare and development officer of the
locality for the appropriate intervention program.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral
damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00). No costs.

A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation
in the fact that a law intended to protect our children from the
harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the
growing number of CICL and children at risk in our country,
has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not
escaped us that major concerns have been raised on the
effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
it was found that:
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of
Congress and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC).
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-
Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile

Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of criminal
irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has
compounded the problem of employment of children in the
drug trade several times over. Law enforcement
authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most
particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become
more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as
couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that
Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them ineffective in the
faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed
from taking into custody children 15 years old or below who
openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of
illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from
criminal liability under the new law.[60]

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant

case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a heinous
crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the
tender age of six (6) when she was raped by the petitioner,

[ G.R. No. 184874, October 09, 2009 ]
ROBERT REMIENDO Y SIBLAWAN, PETITIONER, VS.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[2] dated November
16, 2007 and the Resolution[3] dated October 3, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29316
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert Remiendo y
Siblawan."
The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations,
both dated March 10, 2008, against petitioner Robert
Remiendo y Siblawan (Remiendo), that read—
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999
That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan,
Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below
12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000
That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan,
Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below
12 years of age.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled "not guilty" to both
charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad,
Benguet. Both the prosecution and the defense presented
their respective evidence, summarized by the CA in its
Decision, to wit:
The prosecution presented the following version of facts:
The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At
the time of the commission of the offense, she was a minor
below 12 years of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert
Remiendo as he was residing near the house where her
family used to stay. Sometime in March 1997, she was
sexually assaulted by accused-appellant inside said house.
On that day, her parents and brother left for work after
breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-
appellant came in, pushed her into the room, and threatened
to kill her if she reported what happened. He undressed
himself and the complainant. The latter was standing and
refused to remove her panty but she obliged when accused-
appellant insisted. Then he made her lie on the bed and
placed his penis in her vagina. The complainant struggled,
moved, and pushed accused-appellant. She felt pain when
accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She
cried until accused-appellant left, but she did not shout
because accused-appellant warned her not to, or else he
would kick her. She put on her clothes after accused-
appellant left. Her parents arrived in the afternoon but she
did not tell them what happened to her because her mother
might whip her.
Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted
by accused-appellant, which took place in the house of the
latter. At that time, she was on her way to see her mother at
her workplace after she had lunch. When she passed by the
house of accused-appellant, the latter pulled her into his
house and brought her into his room. She cried and shouted
but accused-appellant told her to keep quiet. She struggled
but was helpless because accused-appellant was stronger.
They were alone in the room. Accused-appellant removed
his clothes and told her to remove her panty. Afraid, she
removed her panty and was made to lie on the bed.
Accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and she
felt pain. She kept on moving but she could not push away
accused-appellant. She moved her shoulders and pushed
accused-appellant with both hands but he was stronger.
Afterwards, accused-appellant moved away and threatened
to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded
that she would not tell anyone. Later, she executed a sworn
statement and identified accused-appellant as the person
who raped her.
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera Administrative
Region, physically examined the complainant on 2 January
1998. Said medico-legal officer testified that [AAA] was
thirteen (13) years old and a Grade III pupil at Badiwan
Tuba, Benguet at the time of the examination. She was four
feet and eleven inches (4'11") tall, weighed 78 pounds, fairly
nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious,
coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory and had no
extra-genital injuries. Upon examination of her genital area,
he found old lacerations of the hymen at 5:00 and 7:00
o'clock positions, which meant that her hymen was altered
by a hard rigid instrument. The lacerations were done more
Page 106 of 196
than three (3) months prior to the examination. To determine
the approximate size of the object that the hymenal opening
could accommodate, he inserted a test tube. The 2.5-
centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by
the hymenal orifice. He noted that the vaginal walls were lax
and the ridges inside were smothered. The complainant told
him that accused-appellant raped her. He presented a
written report of his findings.
On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted
an examination of the mental condition of the complainant.
The latter was also scheduled for psychological examination
to be conducted by Elma Buadken. The result of the
examination showed that [AAA] is suffering from psychosis
and organicity. She has a below average intelligence
quotient of 88, but not on the level of mental retardation. She
can perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her
studies, she can hardly comprehend what is being taught to
her. Having psychosis means that her brain is afflicted with a
disease. Her medical history showed that she suffered head
and body injuries brought about by being sideswiped by a
motor vehicle sometime in 1996. She was confined in the
hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries substantially
contributed to her present condition. Organicity, on the other
hand, means that the complainant suffers from a cloud of
memory, upward rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the
extremities, loss of consciousness, and epileptic seizures.
Her psychosis occurs after seizure. She is not, however,
insane. During a seizure, she does not know what is going
on, but afterwards she returns to her level of consciousness.
With regular medication, her seizures will be greatly
minimized. During her interview, the complainant had a
seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her
consciousness level returned. The complainant then
revealed that accused-appellant and a certain Reynoso Cera
raped her. The psychiatrist opined that during the rape, she
did not have a seizure because if she had, she would not
have remembered what had happened. The fact that she
was able to narrate what happened and who raped her
suggested that she was on her conscious level at such time.
A written report of the foregoing findings was submitted in
court.
The defense presented the following version of facts:
Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she
was a friend, playmate, and neighbor of the complainant.
She testified that she and [AAA] played together and talked
about their "crushes." The complainant told Lea Chiwayan
that she had a crush on accused-appellant. Sometime in
April or May 1997, the complainant said that her brother had
molested her, and that he and his father had sexual
intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy, Tuba.
Sometime in August 1997, the complainant confided that

Reynoso Cera raped her in his house. She told Lea
Chiwayan that she did not feel anything because she was
used to having sexual intercourse with brother and father.
One Saturday afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant
were playing when they saw accused-appellant going to the
basketball court near the church. They followed him and
watched a basketball game. After the game, Lea Chiwayan
went home with the others while the complainant stayed
behind. A few seconds after they left, the complainant ran
after them and told them that something happened between
her and accused-appellant. She said that accused-appellant
pulled her towards the back of the church and had sexual
intercourse with her. The complainant later took back what
she said because she was only joking. She then asked Lea
Chiwayan not to tell the accused-appellant. However, Lea
Chiwayan told accused-appellant what the complainant told
them. Accused-appellant confronted the complainant. He
flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He
said, "what are you saying, why did I do that, if I like and I do
it, I'll not do it with you, you should be ashamed of yourself."
He then borrowed the vehicle of a certain Junie, started the
engine, and stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the
exhaust pipe were directed at the complainant. Later, Lea
Chiwayan learned that [AAA] filed a case against accused-
appellant.
Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school
year 1997-1998, testified that the latter was unruly and a liar.
The complainant would pick fights and steal money from her
classmates. However, the witness admitted that there was
no written record in school that she reprimanded
complainant for her behavior. She knew that the complainant
had an accident before.
Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-
appellant was one of his drivers. He described accused-
appellant as a hardworking and industrious person. When he
learned that Robert Remiendo was accused of rape, he was
outraged because he knew the daily activities of accused-
appellant. The latter could not have done such act under his
strict supervision.
Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as
she was a townmate of his mother. In September 1996, he
and his parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the
complainant figured in an accident at that time, he was the
one who informed her parents. The first time he saw the
complainant was during the time when he was doing some
repairs on his jitney. He saw the complainant and her
playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to alight from
the vehicle. Sometime in June 1997, he again saw the
complainant and her sister playing inside the jitney. He told
them to alight as they were disturbing him. On the day he
was playing basketball at the church grounds in Badiwan,
Lea and Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if
it was true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the latter
was and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the
vehicle of Junie, started the engine, directed the exhaust
pipe at the complainant, and revved the engine so the
smoke would go straight to her. He slapped her and said "if I
would like someone, it would not be you because there are a
lot of girls better than you." During the Christmas party in
Badiwan, he again saw the complainant roaming around the
dance area. He told her to get out as she irritated the people
dancing. The complainant said nothing and left the dance
floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and
smiling. He learned that he was charged with two (2) counts
of rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.[6]
In its Joint Judgment[7] dated October 27, 2004, the RTC
found Remiendo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of statutory rape. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds
ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as charged in the
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999 and
in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-
3000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum for each count of rape.
He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of civil
indemnity, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
by way of moral damages, and the sum of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court
Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet
Province is directed to immediately transfer the said
accused, Robert Remiendo, to the custody of the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the
expiration of fifteen (15) days from date of promulgation
unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail
Warden of Benguet Province for his information, guidance
and compliance.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA.
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC, modifying
only the civil liability imposed upon Remiendo. The fallo of
the CA Decision reads—
Page 107 of 196
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27 October 2004
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on
the civil liability of accused-appellant. He is ordered to pay
the complainant, for each count of rape, the sum of (a)
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007
Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its October 3,
2008 Resolution; hence, this petition alleging that—
(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
CONVICTING PETITIONER OF STATUTORY RAPE
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE
THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE BENEFIT
ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC ACT 9344
KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.[10]
Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite
the purported absence of competent proof that AAA was
below 12 years old at the time of the alleged commission of
the crimes. According to him, the Certificate of Live Birth of
AAA offered by the prosecution during its formal offer of
exhibits was not admitted by the RTC in its Order[11] dated
September 14, 1999 because "it was neither identified by
any witness, nor marked as exhibit during the trial though
reserved for marking during the pretrial." He further posits
that, on the basis of the testimonies of the defense
witnesses and the Elementary School Permanent
Record,[12] AAA was more than 12 years old in March and
May 1997.
Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age,
Remiendo then questions her credibility as a witness,
claiming that she was smiling during her testimony; and that
her failure to flee from the situation, even taking off her
panties herself, belies her charges of statutory rape against
him.
We disagree.
As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old is
statutory rape. Its two elements are: (1) that the accused has

carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is
below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12
years old is always rape.[13]
As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim, the
Court, in People v. Pruna,[14] laid down the following
guidelines:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the
offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar
authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of
the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document
is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and
credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient under the
following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12
years of age and what is sought to be
proved is that she is less than 18 years
old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,
authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's
age, the complainant's testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving
the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical
finding as to the age of the victim.[15]
In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a certified
true copy of AAA's Certificate of Live Birth[16] as part of the
testimonies of AAA and her mother that AAA was born on
February 21, 1986. It was reserved for marking as part of the
exhibits for the prosecution, as shown in the Pretrial
Order[17] dated November 16, 1998. During the trial, in order
to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties agreed to stipulate
on the testimony of AAA's mother, specifically on the
following facts:
1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the
victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases Nos. 98-
CR-2999 and 98-CR-3000;
2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an
affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her
daughter which she subscribed before NBI agent
Atty. Dave Alunan; and
3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement
against Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo is
the alleged statutory rape against [AAA].[18]
And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement
that AAA was born on February 21, 1986.[19]
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of
entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil
Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer (Civil Registrar). As such, it is prima facie evidence of
the fact of birth of a child,[20] and it does not need
authentication. It can only be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, despite the
September 14, 1999 Order, the RTC correctly appreciated
the same in its Joint Judgment.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live
Birth was not appreciated by the RTC, the prosecution was
able to establish that AAA was below 12 years old during the
two occasions of rape per the guidelines laid down in Pruna.
It is significant to note that both AAA and BBB testified that
AAA was born on February 21, 1986. This fact was neither
denied nor objected to by the defense. The argument of
Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial
that AAA's birthday was February 21, 1984 cannot stand. As
quoted by Remiendo in his petition—
Court:
Page 108 of 196
Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date
of [AAA] was February 21, 1983. Do you agree that
that is an entry there?
Pros. Suanding:
Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.[21]
This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the
birth date of AAA. A judicial admission is an admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case and it dispenses with proof
with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[22] In
this case, what was only admitted was that the entry of
AAA's date of birth appearing in her school record is
February 21, 1983. There was no such admission that the
said date was the correct birthday of AAA. And as between
the school record and the testimonies of AAA and her
mother BBB, the latter must prevail.
As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence
instructs us that the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted
with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the
full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment
and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence
properly.[23]
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature
deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young woman,
especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and
thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a public
trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain
justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to
the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[24]
What is more, AAA's testimony of rape was corroborated by
the NBI medico-legal examination showing healed
lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether
healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration.
When the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim
is consistent with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to
warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established. When there is no
evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely

implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical
conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.[25] In this case, Remiendo failed to convince us to
rule otherwise.
Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the
mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, otherwise known
as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads -
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall be likewise exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she acted with discernment, in which case,
such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.[26]
Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish that
he acted with discernment in the commission of the crimes
charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from
criminal liability.
We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong. The prosecution is
burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment
by evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment
not only before and during the commission of the act, but
also after and during the trial. The surrounding
circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance
includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor's
cunning and shrewdness.[27]
Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that
Remiendo acted with discernment, being able to distinguish
between right and wrong and knowing fully well the
consequences of his acts against AAA. During the rape that
occurred in March 1997, Remiendo waited for AAA to be left
alone at her house before he came, and, while doing his
dastardly act, threatened to kick her should she shout for
help. In May 1997, Remiendo again ravished AAA in the
room of his house when the latter passed by and, thereafter,
threatened to kill her if she told anybody about what had just
Page 109 of 196
happened. Per his own testimony, he knew that committing
rape was wrong because he claimed to have been enraged
when he was asked by AAA's playmates if he indeed raped
AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving up the engine
of a jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe
towards her.
Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the
time of the rape,[28] and having acted with discernment, but
having already reached 21 years of age at the time of the
imposition of his sentence by the trial court, his claim for the
benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is rendered moot and academic in
view of Section 40[29]thereof which provides -
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law
have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.[30]
Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint
Judgment was promulgated on October 27, 2004. Thus, at
the time of the imposition of his sentence, Remiendo was
already 22 years old and could no longer be considered a
child for the purposes of the application of R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision
dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution dated October
3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Carpio Morales*, Velasco,
Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.[1] For it to prosper, the court must be convinced that
there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to
have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.[2]
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose
judgment of conviction has become final and executory only
after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of
suspended sentence on the ground that he/she has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation, and
reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive
Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of
Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,[3] appellant
Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the reversal of the
judgment of his conviction.[4]
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 2003[5] filed with the
Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal Case No.
1679-13-141[1],[6] appellant was accused of the crime of
RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening more or less, at barangay xxx,
municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [Hermie M. Jacinto], with
lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had carnal knowledge with one AAA, a five-year
old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating
circumstance of minority, the victim being only five years
old.[7]
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.[8] During pre-trial,[9] the defense admitted the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of
AAA, showing that she was born on 3 December 1997; (2)
police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical
certificate, upon presentation of the original or upon
identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense
presenting witnesses to prove their respective versions of
the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,[10] her father FFF,[11] and rebuttal
witness Julito Apiki [Julito][12] may be summarized in the
following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were
born. FFF's house is along the road. That of appellant lies at
the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the
road, appellant has to pass by FFF's house, the frequency of
which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every
hour." Also, appellant often visits FFF because they were
close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to
the incident.[13]
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls
him kuya. She sees him all the time - playing at the
basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing
by her house on his way to the road. She and appellant
used to be friends until the incident.[14]
At about past 6 o'clock in the evening of 28 January 2003,
FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to the store of
Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When
CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not alarmed. He
thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt
Rita Lingcay [Rita].[15]
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening
to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.[16] At the store, he saw
appellant place AAA on his lap.[17] He was wearing
sleeveless shirt and a pair of short pants.[18] All of them left
the store at the same time.[19] Julito proceeded to the house
of Rita to watch television, while appellant, who held the
hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area
or place."[20]
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando)
and a pair of short pants[21] when he held her hand while on
the road near the store.[22] They walked towards the rice field
Page 110 of 196
near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho
[the Perochos].[23] There he made her lie down on harrowed
ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the
chest.[24] Already half-naked from waist down,[25] he mounted
her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement.[26] She
felt pain and cried.[27] Afterwards, appellant left and
proceeded to the Perochos.[28] She, in turn, went straight
home crying.[29]
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from
downstairs.[30] She was without slippers.[31] He found her
face greasy.[32] There was mud on her head and blood was
oozing from the back of her head.[33] He checked for any
injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already
turning black.[34] She had no underwear on and he saw
white substance and mud on her vagina.[35] AAA told him
that appellant brought her from the store[36] to the grassy
area at the back of the house of the Perochos;[37] that he
threw away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked
her and boxed her breast;[38] and that he proceeded
thereafter to the Perochos.[39]
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the
Perochos.[40] He asked the appellant what he did to
AAA.[41] Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at
the store and that AAA followed him.[42] FFF went home to
check on his daughter,[43] afterwhich, he went back to
appellant, asked again,[44] and boxed him.[45]
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito
was still watching television at the house of Rita.[46] AAA and
her mother MMM arrived.[47] AAA was crying.[48] Julito pitied
her, embraced her, and asked what happened to her, to
which she replied that appellant raped her.[49] Julito left and
found appellant at the Perochos.[50] Julito asked appellant,
"Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of [MMM]?"
but the latter ignored his question.[51] Appellant's aunt, Gloria,
told appellant that the policemen were coming to which the
appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the
dirt of my elbow (sic) and my knees."[52] Julito did found the
elbows and knees of appellant with dirt.[53]
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the
police station to have the incident blottered.[54] FFF also had
AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health
center.[55] Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health
Physician, issued a medical certificate[56] dated 29 January
2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.

3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall,
midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish
mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o'clock and 9 o'clock
position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,[57] AAA submitted
herself to another examination at the provincial hospital on
the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical
Officer III of the provincial hospital, attended to her and
issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January
2003,[58] the pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar
findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no bleeding in this time
of examination. (sic)[59]
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different
version of the story. To corroborate his testimony, Luzvilla
Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand
to affirm that he was at the Perochos at the time of the
commission of the crime.[60] Luzvilla even went further to
state that she actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA
on the road.[61] In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia],
sister-in-law of appellant's aunt, Gloria,[62] testified on the
behavior of Julito after the rape incident was revealed.[63]
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his
parents whose house stands at the back of FFF's
house.[64] He denied that there was a need to pass by the
house of FFF in order to access the road or to fetch
water.[65] He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked
for FFF,[66] and whenever he was asked to buy something
from the store, AAA always approached him.[67]
At about 8 o'clock in the morning of 28 January 2003,
appellant went to the Perochos to attend a birthday party. At
6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant
and his uncle Alejandro Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered
together in a drinking session, appellant's uncle sent him to
the store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about
20 meters from the house, he was able to return after three
(3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a
watch .[68]
Appellant's aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed
that he was in her house attending the birthday party; and
that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to
buy a bottle of Tanduay from the store. She recalled that
appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also
observed that appellant's white shorts and white sleeveless
shirt were clean.[69]
At 6:30 in the evening,[70] Luzvilla, who was also at the party,
saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink with his uncle
Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.[71] She went out to
relieve herself at the side of the tree beside the road next to
the house of the Perochos.[72] From where she was, she
saw Julito, who was wearing black short pants and black T-
shirt, carry AAA.[73] AAA's face was covered and she was
wiggling.[74] This did not alarm her because she thought it
was just a game.[75] Meanwhile, appellant was still in the
kitchen when she returned.[76] Around three (3) minutes
later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a white T-shirt,[77] running
towards the house of Rita.[78] AAA was slowly following
behind.[79] Luzvilla followed them.[80] Just outside the house,
Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.[81] The child did not answer.[82]
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed
the punching incident and testified that appellant was twice
boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left
shoulder of the appellant, boxed him, and left. FFF came in
the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he
had a bolo pointed at appellant. Appellant's uncle Alejandro,
a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary
Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.[83]
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o'clock in the
evening, she was watching the television along with other
people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was
wearing only a pair of black short pants without a shirt on,
entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10
minutes, AAA came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA
and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon
Antonia's advice, Julito released her and went out of the
house.[84]
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o'clock in the
evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him, brandished a
bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but
returned at around 8 o'clock in the evening. This time, he
boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his
daughter.[85]
Page 111 of 196
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision,[86] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed upon a 5-year
old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to
pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as rape indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages. With costs[87]
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly
discovered evidence stating that appellant was apparently
born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17)
years old when the crime was committed on 28 January
2003.[88] The trial court appreciated the evidence and
reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua.[89] Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death
penalty upon the accused is amended in order to consider
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The
penalty impos[a]ble upon the accused, therefore[,] is
reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court
of Appeals for its disposition in view of the ruling in People v.
Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals of cases
where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment.[90]
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the
decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to
indemnify the victim in the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.[91]
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due
course to the appellant's Notice of Appeal.[92] This Court
required the parties to simultaneously file their respective
supplemental briefs.[93] Both parties manifested that they
have exhaustively discussed their positions in their
respective briefs and would no longer file any supplement.[94]
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE

COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE"[95] by invoking the
principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more reasonable explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and
the other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the
test of moral certainty and will not suffice to support a
conviction."[96]
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person
accused of rape, we consider the three well-entrenched
principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[97]
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony
of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused.[98] More so, when the testimony is supported by
the medico-legal findings of the examining physician.[99]
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim's
positive identification of the perpetrator of the
crime,[100] except when it is established that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the locus
criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.[101]
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child
under twelve (12) years of age even in the absence of any of
the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority.[102]
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The
vivid narration of the acts culminating in the insertion of
appellant's organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and
the medical findings of the physicians sufficiently proved
such fact.
AAA testified:
PROS. OMANDAM:
xxxx
Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed
your panty and boxed you, what else did he do to you?
A He mounted me.
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you?
A Yes.
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move?
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull
movement.
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were
your legs positioned?
A They were apart.
Q Who pushed them apart?
A Hermie.
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
A Yes.
Q What was that?
A His penis.
Q Where did he push his penis?
A To my vagina.
Q Was it painful?
A Yes.
Q What was painful?
A My vagina.
Q Did you cry?
A Yes.[103]
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions,
which were phrased and re-phrased in order to test that AAA
well understood the information elicited from her, said it all -
she had been raped. When a woman, more so a minor,
says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that
rape was committed.[104] Significantly, youth and immaturity
are normally badges of truth and honesty.[105]
Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr.
Micabalo[106] revealed that the hymenal lacerations at 5
o'clock and 9 o'clock positions could have been caused by
the penetration of an object; that the redness of the introitus
could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the
object;" and that such object could have been an erect male
organ.[107]
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the
physician's finding of penetration conclusively established
the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[108]
II
Page 112 of 196
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the
appellant at the time of the commission of the crime are now
in dispute.
The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who
defiled AAA, and that appellant was elsewhere when the
crime was committed.[109]
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of
rape could readily identify her assailant, especially when he
is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a
good look at him during the commission of the
crime.[110] AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover,
appellant and AAA even walked together from the road near
the store to the situs criminus[111] that it would be impossible
for the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and
led her all the way to the rice field.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on
the unwavering testimony of AAA.
The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so
young, that it was accused, whom she called "kuya" and who
used to play basketball and fetch water near their house,
and who was wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts at the
time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The
defense attempted to impute the crime to someone else -
one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was steadfast and
did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is
younger, and not Julito, who is older, who molested her.[112]
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that
the determination by the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that
it has "the opportunity to observe the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the
scant or full realization of their oath,"[113] unless it is shown
that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted."[114]
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness' attempt to throw the court off the
track by imputing the crime to someone else is xxx a vain
exercise in view of the private complainant's positive
identification of accused and other corroborative
circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same
evening, Julito Apiki, the supposed real culprit, asked
him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the
latter's testimony that he confronted accused after hearing of
the incident from the child."[115]

On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that
the trial court erred in finding his denial and alibi weak
despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. Glaring inconsistencies were all over their
respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of
the appellant's very testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho
who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he gave the
bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking
long before he bought Tanduay at the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria,
wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-examination, she
revealed that her husband was not around before, during,
and after the rape incident because he was then at
work.[116] He arrived from work only after FFF came to their
house for the second time and boxed appellant.[117] It was
actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked
appellant to buy Tanduay.[118] Further, the drinking session
started only after the appellant's errand to the store.[119]
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to
deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the
drinking session. This is contrary to Gloria's statement that
her husband was at work.
Luzvilla's testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-
rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia recalled that
Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla's claim
that Julito wore a white shirt on his way to the house of
Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to
by AAA and Julito, and the defense, as testified to by Gloria,
were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless
shirt, Luzvilla's recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt
(colored black and later changed to white), and, thus, a
short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla's story that she saw AAA walking
towards Rita's house three (3) minutes after she returned to
the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that
AAA arrived at the house of Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we
find the trial court's appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went
straight home, crying, to tell her father that Hermie had
raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita
Lingkay to cry among strangers who were watching TV, as
Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the
child was seen at the house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki
and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been
brought there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay
could take a look at her ? just as Julito Apiki said.[120]
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the
corroboration is credible, the same having been offered
preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed
thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify as such, "they being
related or were one way or another linked to each other."[121]
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider
the corroborations on his whereabouts, still, the defense of
alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be
convinced that it would be physically impossible for the
accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.[122]
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of
access between the situs criminis and the location of the
accused when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have
been physically present at the scene of the crime and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[123]
In People v. Paraiso,[124] the distance of two thousand meters
from the place of the commission of the crime was
considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an
hour even by foot.[125] Inasmuch as it would take the
accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this
Court disregarded the testimony of the defense witness
attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to
gather bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She
could have merely presumed that the accused slept all
throughout.[126]
In People v. Antivola,[127] the testimonies of relatives and
friends corroborating that of the appellant that he was in their
company at the time of the commission of the crime were
likewise disregarded by this Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant's part-time employer, and
Marites Capalad, the appellant's sister-in-law and co-worker,
in unison, vouched for the appellant's physical presence in
the fishpond at the time Rachel was raped. It is, however, an
established fact that the appellant's house where the rape
occurred, was a stone's throw away from the
fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left their
sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is
unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites to have kept an
eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified
that she, too, was very much occupied with her task of
counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise,
Page 113 of 196
Mr. Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the
fishpond, could not have focused his entire attention solely
on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the
appellant easily sneaked out unnoticed, and along the
way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house
and ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he
never left.[128] (Emphasis supplied.)
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense
witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save from the
5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human
experience. Moreover, considering that the farmland where
the crime was committed is just behind the house of the
Perochos, it would take appellant only a few minutes to bring
AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down
the farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could have
committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and
immediately returned to his uncle's house.[129] Unfortunately,
the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even
bolstered the fact that he was within the immediate vicinity of
the scene of the crime.[130]
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for appellant to have been at the time and place
of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently
established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable
doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No.
9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the
commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the
rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:[131]
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344][132] allows the retroactive
application of the Act to those who have been convicted and
are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said
Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of
the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the
lower court is still under review.[133] (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above
fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from
criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with
discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in
accordance with the Act shall be observed.[134]
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act.[135] Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by taking
into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded
by the records in each case.[136]
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that
the minor knew what he was doing and that it was
wrong.[137] Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature
of the crime and the minor's cunning and shrewdness.[138]
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
"(1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the
crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to
weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17)
year-old appellant's mental capacity to fully understand the
consequences of his unlawful action.[139]
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should
be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA[140] shows that she was born on 3
December 1997. Considering that she was only five (5)
years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003,
the law prescribing the death penalty when rape is
committed against a child below seven (7) years
old[141] applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty:
(1) the prohibition against the imposition of the penalty of
death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346;[142] and (2)
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the
appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one
degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code.[143]
Relying on People v. Bon,[144] the Court of Appeals excluded
death from the graduation of penalties provided in Article 71
of the Revised Penal Code.[145] Consequently, in its
appreciation of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree
from reclusion perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.[146]
We differ.
In a more recent case,[147] the Court En Banc, through the
Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the
offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
the proper period. However, for purposes of determining
the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua.[148] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity
is the heinous character of the crime committed, which
would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is
reduced to reclusion perpetua.[149]
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the
time he committed the crime has no bearing on the gravity
and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her
family.[150] The respective awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each are, therefore,
proper.[151]
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority which effectively lowered the
penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by
the Court of Appeals in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. And,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence,[152] the amount of
exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00
to P30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate
Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of Suspension of
Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence
of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that he/she
Page 114 of 196
has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of
conviction is pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the
child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,[153] which was promulgated
on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals held that,
consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended,[154] the aforestated provision does not apply to
one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.[155]
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated
the decision in Sarcia,[156] overturning the ruling in Gubaton.
Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of
the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law,
unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said
P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit
of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict
with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the
Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a
capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and
should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child
in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.[157]
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate
deliberations[158] on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further
strengthened the new position of this Court to cover heinous
crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic
 Page 115 of 196

suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law. supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads: with the DSWD.

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old

is charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious
offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for
the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago's] proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare
and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should
still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in
heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child's
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied in Sarcia.)[159]
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated
the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with the Law,which
reflected the same position.[160]
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,[165] the case shall be
remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's
confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00213 finding
appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed
on the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2)
appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The case is hereby REMANDED to
the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance
with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.

These developments notwithstanding, we find that the Corona,C.J., (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply to Castro, and Del Castillo, JJ., concur.
appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.[161] Section 40[162] of the law and
Section 48[163] of the Rule are clear on the matter.
Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of

the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with
the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the
age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she
committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in
order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The age of
the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material.
What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or

any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.[164]

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural

Camps and Other Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be
made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained,

[ G.R. No. 176102, November 26, 2014 ]
ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the
best interest of the child in conflict with the law through
measures that will ensure the observance of international
standards of child protection,[1] and to apply the principles of
restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs
applicable to children in conflict with the law.[2] The mandate
notwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose
the penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child
in conflict with the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur
charged the petitioner with homicide under the following
information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30
P.M., in Barangay Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and without any
justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON
ESPINOLA Y BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter
mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly causing his death,
per Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and
made an integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice of
the deceased's heirs in such amount as may be proven in
court.
Acts Contrary to Law.[3]
The CA summarized the facts established by the
Prosecution and the Defense as follows:
Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening
or so of March 30, 2000, he, together with
his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon
Elementary School watching the graduation ceremony of the
high school students. While watching, his cousin Jason
Espinola, herein victim, arrived. Later, however, appellant
approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to
demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the
victim, this witness demonstrated that with the appellant's left
arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the
victim using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his
feet and later brought him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito's companion at the time of
the incident, corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all
material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that
her son was stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and
later brought to the Bicol Medical Center. She stated that her
son stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter,
her son was discharged. Later, however, when her son went
back to the hospital for a check-up, it was discovered that
her son's stab wound had a complication. Her son was
subjected to another operation, but died the day after.
She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported
to the police authorities. She, likewise, stated the amounts
she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the
cause of death of the victim, as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-
admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming
infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of
death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of
facts in this manner:
He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March
30, 2000, he was at the Dalupaon High School campus
watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven,
while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on
his way home, he was ganged up by a group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he
felt dizzy and fell to the ground. He was not able to see or
even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home.
Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met
somebody whom he thought was one of the four men who
ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he
was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession
of a knife, he stated that he used it in preparing food for his
friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that day. He
went home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him
and brought him to the barangay hall, and later to the
Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to
Page 116 of 196
know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He
felt sad after hearing it.[4]
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for four
years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and
to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as actual
damages for medical and funeral expenses, and P50,000.00
as moral damages.[5]
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
petitioner's conviction but modified the penalty and the civil
liability through the decision promulgated on July 19,
2006,[6] disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal
Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y
Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is,
hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants
(sic) sentence is reduced to six months and one day to six
years of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and
one day to twelve years of prision mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award
of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04,
representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of
Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim
Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA
promulgated its amended decision on December 7, 2006,
decreeing as follows:[7]
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our decision promulgated on
July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is,
hereby AMENDEDsuch that the judgment shall now read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 20, in Criminal
Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal Hubilla y
Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is,
hereby, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months
and one day of prison correctional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award
of actual damages in the amount of Php 81,890.04,
representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in the amount of
Php 50,000.00, is awarded to the legal heirs of the victim
Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Naga, Branch 20, for appropriate action on the
application for probation of, herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to
the CA for not correctly imposing the penalty, and for not
suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the law
pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine,
he no longer assails the findings of fact by the lower courts
as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the
following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed
the correct penalty imposable on him taking into
consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
9344, the Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103
(Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he was
entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of
sentence under Republic Act No. 9344; and (3) whether or
not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international
agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty
of reclusion temporal for homicide. Considering that the
petitioner was then a minor at the time of the commission of
the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old
when he committed the homicide on March 30, 2000,[8] such
minority was a privileged mitigating circumstance that
lowered the penalty to prision mayor.[9]
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty next
lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision
correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For
the maximum of the indeterminate sentence, prision
mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10
years -was proper because there were no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances present. Accordingly, the CA
imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his
indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prison
mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision
correccional to enable him to apply for probation under
Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither
the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any
other relevant law or rules support or justify the further
reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To
yield to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty,
and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[10] (Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the trial and
judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One
of them is that found in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with
Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal liberty
of the child shall be limited to the minimum.[11] Consistent
with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed
the ultimate minimums of the indeterminate penalty for
homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On its part,
Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate
courts the discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further,
even for the sake of enabling the child in conflict with the law
to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree
968,[12] which disqualifies from probation an offender
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for
probation. For this reason, we annul the directive of the CA
to remand the case to the trial court to determine if he was
qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the
suspension of the sentence of a child in conflict with the law
adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available
only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant
to Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Page 117 of 196
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. -If the court finds that the objective of the disposition
measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law
have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has wilfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court
shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance
with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until
the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years.
We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at
the time of his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July
19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no
longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison
would be in violation of his rights as a child in conflict with
the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and
international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals,
however, that imprisonment of children in conflict with the
law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of
Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with
the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of
their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case
is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the
imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the
detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest
appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate
courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No.
9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the
petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last
recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation
and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the
law.
A survey of relevant international agreements[13] supports the
course of action taken herein. The United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice
(Beijing Guidelines),[14] the United Nations Guidelines for the
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh Guidelines) and
the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles
Deprived of Liberty[15] are consistent in recognizing that
 Page 118 of 196

imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided it is

imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary
period.

Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the

petitioner, although he has to serve his sentence, may serve
it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the Department
of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent
with the offender child's best interest. Such service of
sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal
institution.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari; AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated
on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295,
but DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial
court for implementation; and DIRECTS the Bureau of
Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his
sentence in an agricultural camp or other training facilities
under its control, supervision and management, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, *Villarama,

Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE
DELIOLA," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435, affirming the
22 December 2005 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, in Criminal Case
Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant
Joery Deliola y Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of
Statutory Rape. The accusatory portions of the Informations
narrate:
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the
Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, 15 years old, with the use
of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation,
with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of
relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of
herein victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM],[3] a minor, 11 years old,
against her will, to the damage and prejudice.[4]
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality
of Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, 15 years old, with the use of a bladed
weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the
attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances of
relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of
herein victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old,
against her will, to the damage and prejudice.[5]
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY.[6] At the joint pre-trial[7] of the cases, the following
stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has
jurisdiction over the case (2) the identity of accused-
appellant as the accused in the two criminal cases; (3) that
accused-appellant is the uncle of MMM; (4) that MMM, was
11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the present
criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the
time of the incidents on June and 1 July 2002, accused-
appellant and MMM were neighbors; (6) that MMM was then
a grade school pupil; and (7) that accused-appellant was not
attending school at the time of the submitted incidents giving
rise to these criminal actions. Trial on the merits ensued
afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years
old,[8] while the accused-appellant, MMM's uncle,[9] was 15
years old.[10] The prosecution submits that sometime in the
first week of June 2002, at about three o'clock in the
afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but
before she was able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with
a knife, suddenly appeared. He approached MMM, poked a
knife at her neck, ordered h bend over, and took off her
shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the
orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but
accused-appellant was still able to force his penis inside
MMM's vaginal MMM felt pain and cried. After satisfying his
lust, accused-appellant put on his briefs and shorts then left.
When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and
noticed bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accused-
appellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum and did not
disclose to anyone the tragedy that happened to her that
day.[11]
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa
plantation again when accused-appellant suddenly arrived.
He poked MMM's back with a knife and threatened to stab
her unless she followed accused appellant's orders. MMM
was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit to
accused-appellant's commands. She was directed to bend
over and to lower down her shorts and underwear. While
MMM was bending over and half naked, accused-appellant
held the victim's waist and inserted his penis into MMM's
private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before
leaving, he again threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal
happened between them.[12]
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about
two weeks after the second rape, MMM's grandmother
noticed that there was something unusual in the way MMM
Page 119 of 196
was walking. This prompted her to confront MMM.[13] Upon
learning of what happened to MMM, the vie aunt, brought
the former to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros
Occidental for examination,[14] and thereafter to the police
authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn
statement.[15]
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer
who conducted a physical and internal examination upon
MMM, testified as an expert witness for the prosecution. Dr.
Jayme's internal findings showed that the victim had positive
hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and swelling
around the area, which may have been caused by a blunt
object such as the finger of the human being or an erect
penis. The victim was also found to have a positive
incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and 7:00 positions,
which was similarly caused by a blunt object such as the
finger of the human being or an erect penis.[16] According to
Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may have been inflicted within
two weeks prior to the examination since the lacerations
were fresh.[17] Dr. Jayme also found that the victim's vagina
could admit two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual for an
11-year old.[18] A Medical Certificate[19] dated 12 July 2002
was issued by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied
raping the victim and claimed that he was fishing with his
grandfather during the times MMM was raped.[20] He testified
that he is MMM's uncle and that he was only fifteen years old
when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, this Court finds accused,
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA",
Guilty of the crimes of Rape, as defined in Article 266-A in
relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, sub-paragraph 1, of
Republic Act No. 8353, as his guilts had been established by
the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority, this Court, in Criminal Case No.
5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a.
Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the
same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused,
Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, further,
ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral
Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as Exemplary
Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences
accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be
served by him at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City,
Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y
Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this
Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine
Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is
remanded to the custody of the Jail Warden of the Provincial
Jail of Negros Occidental, until he is finally committed to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this
Court, accused named shall be given full credit for the entire
period of his detention pending trial.[21]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June
2011, affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant Joery
B. Deliola of the two crimes of rape in Criminal Cases No.
5214-69 and 5215-69 is AFFIRMED. However, as accused-
appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict with the
law, the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby
SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, for appropriate disposition in accordance with
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is
CONDEMNED to pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case
No. 5214-69, the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 for moral damages, and P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No. 5215-69,
the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000 for
moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages.[22]
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a
Resolution[23] dated 27 February 2012, we required the
parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs.
However, both parties manifested[24] that they dispensing
with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting
respective briefs as supplemental briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353,[25] define and
punish Statutory Rape as follows:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is
committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x
x x:
xxxx
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves
that: (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2)
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless
of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether
the offended party was deprived of reason or consciousness;
or whether it was done through fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the
victim is proven: and that there was sexual intercourse.[26]
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age
of MMM was uncontested. In her Birth
Certificate,[27] presented and admitted in open court,[28] it was
Page 120 of 196
indicated that she was born on 5 March 1991 and, thus, only
eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only
controversy left before us is whether or not accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM's credibility by
pointing out several inconsistencies in her testimony. He
argued that the victim testified that on the alleged second
incident of rape, on 1 July 2002, she felt no and her vagina
did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such
statement is inconsistent with MMM's grandmother's claim
that MMM was walking with great difficulty and pain.
Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the tender age
of the victim, she could have felt pain, if not suffered
bleeding, even on the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding,
which is essential to consummate rape.[29] It is also possible
for physiological manifestations of rape, such as pain, to
appear only after the incident, more importantly, the
testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on
the victim's manner of walking. It is baseless and
unreasonable to put the victim's and the grandmother's
testimonies side by side and claim them to be inconsistent.
Moreover, as consistently held by this Court, discrepancies
and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to
minor details and not in actuality touching upon the central
fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at all, they
serve as proof that the witness is not coached or
rehearsed.[30]
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings
are not conclusive and that the non-intact hymen of the
victim could be congenital.
This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in
the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony, not
necessarily the medical findings. Assuming arguendo that
the non-intact hymen of the victim is congenital, this Court
has consistently held that the absence of laceration in the
hymen does not negate rape.[31] Apart from the findings of
Dr. Jayme, MMM was steadfast in testifying that accused-
appellant raped her twice. When a rape victim's testimony is
straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination,
it deserves full faith and confidence.[32] The victim's
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[33]
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim
that she was penetrated from behind is contrary to human
experience. We are not persuaded. As correctly cited by the
Court of Appeals, the animal in man may come out when he
commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in the process of

his immersion and transformation into another character, he
would prefer to mate in the way lower creatures do.[34]
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the victim
did not attempt to escape from her captor or even shout or
call for help, and that she did not report the alleged rape to
anyone after its occurrence. However, as held in the case
of People v. Rosales:[35]
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every
witness to or victim of a crime can be expected to act
reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone. People may react differently to the same situation.
One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive,
response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be
aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it
can never be successfully argued that the latter are any less
sexual victims than the former.[36]
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural,
and convincing testimony of the victim alone may be
sufficient to convict the accused, more so, when the
testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the
examining physician.[37]
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as
the person who raped her is believable. We uphold the ruling
of the trial court on the credibility of MMM and the
truthfulness of her testimonies, to wit:
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time
she took the stand, demonstrated to this Court her capacity
of observation, recollection, and communication. She
showed that she can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known her perception to this Court as she clearly and
capably related the details of her sad and horrible
experiences at the hands of the accused. She withstood a
thorough and exhaustive examination. There is no doubt that
she is a competent witness. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
349 SCRA 451, G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People
vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 136304, January 25,
2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward, spontaneous,
frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive and credible
account she presented before this Court. There was not a
motive ascribed or, in the very least, suggested by the
defense that might have raised doubt on her credibility and
on the credibility of the statements she made before this
Court.[38]
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of
MMM's testimony. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is
the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his
unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied
appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.[39]
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full
weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was indeed committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[40] No
young woman would admit that she was raped, make public
the offense and allow the examination of her private parts,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and
endure the ordeal of testifying to all the gory details, if she
had not in fact been raped.[41]
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical
testimony identification of her assailant, accused-appellant's
bare denial and alibi could not prevail. This Court has
consistently held that: "denial is an intrinsically weak defense
which must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal
law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove
and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to
prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two
elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti at the time the
offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene at the time of its commission.[42]"
Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements. His
claim that at the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea
fishing with his grandfather was uncorroborated. For some
reason, he did not even present his grandfather Clemente
Gabayeron to testify in court. As. opposed to MMM's
convincing recital of facts, accused-appellant's denial and
alibi will not stand.
Time of commission not an essential element to
establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the
Information[43] stating that the first crime of rape was
committed "sometime in the month of June 2002" is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him of the date
on which the criminal act was alleged to have been
committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly
held that it is not incumbent upon the victim to establish the
date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the
perpetrator.[44] The date of commission is not an essential
element of the crime of rape; what is material is its
occurrence. Thus, there is no need to prove the exact date
Page 121 of 196
of commission; an approximation thereof will suffice.[45]
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-
appellant's belated objection to the Information cannot
prosper, to wit:
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in
the trial by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on
the particular dates and circumstances of the two offenses of
rape as alleged in the informations without prior objection to
the validity or propriety of the informations. It is now too late
in the day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the
Informations was defective. Objections relating to the form of
the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time
on appeal. If the appellant had found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either
for a bill of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the
exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the
Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the
prescribed form.[46]
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the
pertinent law on the matter. According to R.A. No.
9344,[47] as amended:[48]
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day
of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of
age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth
date. In A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC[49] dated November 24, 2009,
the Supreme Court likewise defined the: age of criminal
responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and;
one, (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18) years of
age, commits an offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April
1987,[50] making him 15 years and 2 months old when the
crime was committed. We are now left with the question of
whether or not accused-appellant acted with discernment.
 Page 122 of 196

In People v. Jacinto,[51] we explained that discernment is the
mental capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences
of his act, known and determined by taking into account all
the facts and circumstances presented by the records in
each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he
raped the victim is demonstrated by the following
surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless
minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the consummation of
the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by
penetrating the victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the
victim not to report what happened. Taking all these facts
into consideration, accused-appellant clearly knew that what
he did was wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were alleged and proven during trial,[52] accused-
appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified
Statutory Rape. However, given that accused-appellant was
only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was
committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.[53] In
accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on the
matter,[54] for purposes of determining the proper penalty
because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be
reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower courts
and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
of damages of the lower courts. Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to indemnify MMM, the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each count of rape, P75,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of rape, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. The damages
awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.[61]
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y
BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
Qualified Statutory Rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
Appellant is ORDERED to indemnify MMM the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape,
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annumfrom the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,
Silay City, Branch 69 for its appropriate action in accordance
with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Reyes,
and Caguioa,* JJ., concur.

Although it is acknowledged that accused-appellant was

qualified for suspension of sentence when he committed the
crime, Section 40 of R.A. 9344[55] provides that the same
extends only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old.
Nevertheless, in extending the application of RA No. 9344 to
give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we
ruled in People v. Jacinto,[56] as cited in People v.
Ancajas,[57] that the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age lirr it of twenty-one (21) years, so long as
he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child.
The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be
given the chance to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community.[58] Thus, accused-
appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities, in accordance with Section
51[59] of R.A. 9344.

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[60] we modify the award


[ G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. MILAN ROXAS Y AGUILUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011,
which affirmed with modification the Judgment[2] of Branch
94, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated
December 11, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-
00-91971 finding accused-appellant Milan Roxas y Aguiluz
guilty of five counts of rape against AAA,[3] a minor who was
9 years old at the time of the first rape and 10 years old at
the time of the succeeding four rapes.
Five Informations were filed against accused-appellant
Roxas, charging him as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967:
That on or about the 9th day of August 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon
the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there blindfolding her, then removed her shorts
and underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her
vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against
her will and without her consent.[4]
2. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968:
That on or about the 28th day of July 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon
the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there blindfolding her and removing her shorts
and underwear and inserting his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will and
without her consent.[5]
3. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969:
That on or about the 16th day of September 1997 in Quezon
City, Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon
the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 9 years of age by
then and there laying her on the chairs inside the bathroom,
then blindfolded her and then removed her shorts and
underwear then accused inserted his penis inside her vagina
and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her against her will
and without her consent.[6]
4. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970:
That on or about the 20th day of March 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon
the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there laying her down on a bed inside his
grandparents’ room then blindfolded her, then removed her
shorts and underwear, then accused inserted his penis
inside her vagina and thereafter had carnal knowledge of her
against her will and without her consent.[7]
5. Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971:
That on or about the 11th day of May 1998 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused with force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of sexual assault at knifepoint upon
the person of [AAA] his own niece a minor 10 years of age
by then and there removing her shorts and underwear and
inserting his penis inside her vagina and thereafter had
carnal knowledge of her against her will and without her
consent.[8]
Accused-appellant Roxas entered a plea of Not Guilty to all
the crimes charged.[9]
The prosecution’s factual account based on the testimony of
AAA was concisely stated by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its Appellee’s Brief, as follows:
On 16 September 1997, [AAA], who was then 9 years of
age, was at her grandmother [CCC]’s house located on
[XXX], Quezon City. In the morning of said date, she was at
the dirty kitchen with her aunt [ZZZ] who was then washing
clothes. Her aunt asked her if she had already taken a bath,
she replied in the negative.
Her uncle, accused-appellant, overheard their conversation
so he volunteered to give [AAA] a bath. Subsequently, he
brought her upstairs to the bathroom.
While inside the bathroom, accused-appellant told [AAA] to
turn around. After she complied with his directive, he
blindfolded her. [AAA] started to wonder what the accused-
appellant was doing so she told him that he was supposed to
give her a bath. Accused-appellant told her that they would
Page 123 of 196
play first for a while.
He turned her around three (3) times and then, removed her
shorts and underwear. After that, he sat on a chair, which
was inside the bathroom, and raised both of her legs.
Thereafter, she felt him on top of her. She also felt accused-
appellant’s penis enter her vagina which she found painful.
She cried and shouted the name of her aunt, but accused-
appellant got angry and poked a sharp instrument on her
neck. [AAA] did not report the incident because accused-
appellant threatened to cut her tongue and to kill her and her
mother.
[AAA] was raped again on 20 March 1998 while she was at
the same house of her paternal grandparents. She was on
the terrace on the second floor of the house when accused-
appellant, who was in her grandparents’ bedroom at that
time, called her. She hesitated to go near him because she
was afraid that he might rape her again.
Accused-appellant then went to the terrace and dragged her
to the bedroom of her grandparents. She could not run
anymore nor shout for help because aside from the fact that
there was nobody else in the room, accused-appellant was
holding a pointed weapon.
While [AAA] and accused-appellant were inside the room, he
blindfolded her, removed her shorts and underwear, and
then laid her down the bed. Thereafter, he moved on top of
her and inserted his penis in her vagina. Again, she did not
report the incident because of accused-appellant’s threats
should she report the incident to anybody.
Another incident of rape took place on 11 May 1998 while
[AAA] was again at her paternal grandparents’ house. On
the said date, she was alone in the living room on the
second floor of the house when accused-appellant called
her. She did not accede to his bidding because she was
scared of him. Thereafter, he shouted at her and demanded
that she come near him, so she went to him.
He brought her inside her grandmother’s bedroom and upon
reaching the room, he immediately blindfolded her and
poked a bladed weapon on her neck. He turned her around
three (3) times, removed her shorts and underwear, laid her
down the bed, moved on top of her, and inserted his penis in
her vagina. Again, the accused-appellant threatened her so
she did not report what had happened.
[AAA]’s ordeal did not stop there. She was raped for the
fourth time on 28 July 1998 at her paternal grandparents’
house. She and the accused were incidentally alone in the

living room on the second floor of the house. He asked her
to go with him inside the bedroom of her grandparents, but
she did not get up from her seat. So accused-appellant
pulled her toward the bedroom. She tried to free herself, but
he poked a pointed instrument at her.
Accused-appellant committed the same acts he had
perpetrated on [AAA] during her three [previous] rape
incidents: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her on
the bed, moved on top of her and thereafter, inserted his
penis in her vagina. She was again threatened by the
accused-appellant not to tell anybody about the incident or
else he would cut her tongue and kill her and her mother.
The fifth and last incident of rape happened on 09 August
1998. At that time, [AAA] was at the terrace on the second
floor of her paternal grandparents’ house; and accused-
appellant also happened to be there. He pulled her and
brought her inside the room, blindfolded her, and turned her
around three (3) times. He employed the same method in
raping her: he removed her shorts and underwear, laid her
on the bed and moved on top of her. She tried to push him
and raise her shorts and panty, but she did not succeed
because he poked a pointed instrument on her
neck. Thereafter, he inserted his penis in her vagina. Again,
she did not report the incident to anyone because she was
scared of his threats.[10] (Emphases supplied, citations
omitted.)
In contrast, the defense presented four witnesses: AAA’s
mother (BBB), AAA’s two brothers (DDD and EEE), and Dr.
Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology. The defense’s statement of the
antecedent facts as contained in the Appellant’s Brief is
reproduced here:
Accused Milan Roxas denied having raped [AAA] on all the
five (5) counts of rape.
[DDD], brother of herein private complainant, testified that
his aunt in the maternal side, [Tita YYY], induced him by
giving toys if he would tell his father that the accused was
raping his sister, [AAA]. Upon prodding of his maternal aunt,
[DDD], who was only eight (8) years old then, told his father
that he saw the accused rape his sister. His father ran
amuck which led to the filing of the instant case.
On subsequent days, while [DDD] and [AAA] were in a
grocery store buying something, their [Tito XXX], [Tito
WWW] and [Tita YYY] arrived on board an FX vehicle. [Tita
YYY] told [DDD] that they will be going to buy toys. [DDD]
said that he will first ask permission from his grandfather, but
[Tita YYY] said that it would only take a few minutes and
they will bring them home afterwards. [AAA] was brought to
SSDD, a place under the administration of the DSWD, while
[DDD] was brought to Caloocan. On the following day, he
was brought to Muñoz, in a rented house of his [Tita YYY]
and her husband. [DDD] stayed there for almost a year. He
was forbidden to go outside as the door was always
locked. When [his Tita VVV] arrived from Japan they went to
Tarlac where his paternal grandmother fetched him.
[EEE], brother of herein private complainant, likewise
testified that when [his Tita VVV] arrived, they went to North
Olympus, Quezon City where [his] maternal relatives
reside. On one occasion, he saw his sister, [AAA] and his
maternal uncle [Tito XXX] entered one of the bedrooms. He
tried to open the door to see what the duo were doing, but it
was locked. [EEE] looked for a wire and was able to open
the door. He saw private complainant on top of his [Tito
XXX], both naked. When the duo saw him, private
complainant and his [Tito XXX] stood up. The latter
threatened him not to tell anybody or he will cut off his
tongue.
On November 26, 1999, [BBB], mother of the private
complainant testified that her two (2) children, [AAA] and
[DDD], were missing. She looked for them, but to no
avail. So she went to the police station to have it
blottered. Later did she know when she called her sister
who resides in Project 6, Quezon City that [DDD] was
brought to Ilocos and [AAA] at the SSDD in Kamuning by her
3 brothers and sister. She filed a case of kidnapping against
his brother [Tito WWW]. [Tito WWW], however, promised to
return her children if she will have the said case dismissed
which she did.
She denied the allegations that [her] brother-in-law, herein
accused, raped her daughter, [AAA]. In fact, before the filing
of the present rape cases there was one rape case filed on
September 22, 1999 which was dismissed because [AAA]
retracted her statements. As told to [BBB] by her daughter
[AAA], she was not raped by herein accused. She told a lie
and made the false accusation against the accused,
because she does not want to put the blame on any of her
maternal relatives. [AAA] was greatly indebted to her
maternal grandmother and her maternal uncles and aunts
because they had taken care of her since she was three (3)
years old.
Dr. Agnes Aglipay, Regional Psychiatrist of the Bureau of
Jail Management and Penology testified that based on her
examination of the accused, she concluded that he is
suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of
nine (9) to ten (10) years old. She observed that the subject
was aware that he was being accused of rape, but he had
Page 124 of 196
consistently denied the allegations against him.[11] (Citations
omitted.)
The RTC of Quezon City rendered its Judgment on
December 11, 2007, finding accused-appellant Roxas guilty
as charged in each of the five Informations filed against
him. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused GUILTYbeyond reasonable
doubt in all five (5) counts of rape as recited in the
information[s] and sentences accused MILAN ROXAS:
1) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91967 – to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
2) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91968 – to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
3) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91969 – to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs;
4) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91970 – to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs; and
5) In Crim. Case No. Q-00-91971 – to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the offended party [AAA]
the sum of Php75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum
of Php50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
To credit in favor of the herein accused the full period of his
detention in accordance with law.
Resultantly, all pending incidents are deemed moot and
academic.[12]
The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt
from criminal responsibility on the ground that he cannot be
considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since
Dr. Aglipay merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old
with a mental development comparable to that of children
between nine to ten years old. The RTC found the testimony
of AAA credible, and found the testimonies of the defense
witnesses to be “flimsy.”

Accused-appellant Roxas elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03473. Accused-appellant Roxas submitted the
following Assignment of Errors in the appellate court:
I testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[13]
On August 16, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the
assailed Decision, modifying the Judgment of the RTC as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated
11 December 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 94, in the case entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Milan Roxas y Aguiluz”, docketed therein as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91967 to Q-00-91971,
is AFFIRMED with modification that accused-appellant is
ordered to pay private complainant on each count civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in
the amount of P75,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape.[14]
Hence, accused-appellant Roxas interposed this appeal,
where he, in his Supplemental Brief, presented an Additional
Assignment of Error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S
TESTIMONY.[15]
Accused-appellant Roxas claims that the testimony of AAA
is replete with inconsistencies and narrations that are
contrary to common experience, human nature and the
natural course of things.[16] Accused-appellant Roxas
likewise points out that under Republic Act No. 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, minors fifteen (15)
years old and below are exempt from criminal
responsibility. Accused-appellant Roxas claims that since
he has a mental age of nine years old, he should also be
“exempt from criminal liability although his chronological age
at the time of the commission of the crime was already
eighteen years old.”[17]
In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344[18] is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child
fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the
day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability
and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall
be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance
with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the age as determined by
the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age
as argued by accused-appellant Roxas. When the law is
clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or
construe its true intent.[19]
On the matter of the credibility of AAA, we carefully
examined AAA’s testimony and found ourselves in
agreement with the assessment of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals. As observed by the appellate court:
We note that she recounted her ordeal in a logical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, without any
artificialities or pretensions that would tarnish the veracity of
her testimony. She recalled the tragic experience and
positively identified accused-appellant as the one who
ravished her on five occasions. Her testimony was
unshaken by a grueling cross-examination and there is no
impression whatsoever that the same is a mere
fabrication. For her to come out in the open and publicly
describe her harrowing experience at a trial can only be
Page 125 of 196
taken as a badge of her sincerity and the truth of her
claims.[20]
We further underscore that AAA was merely 14 years old at
the time she testified.[21] We have repeatedly held that
and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she is a minor,
says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been
committed. When the offended party is of tender age and
immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of
what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not
true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.[22]
It is likewise axiomatic that when it comes to evaluating the
credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, great respect
is accorded to the findings of the trial judge who is in a better
position to observe the demeanor, facial expression, and
manner of testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among
them is telling the truth.[23] As the trial court further observed,
the defense witnesses were not eyewitnesses. A witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except as provided in the Rules of
Court.[24] AAA’s mother and brothers were not present when
the five rapes allegedly occurred, and therefore any
testimony on their part as to whether or not the complained
acts actually happened is hearsay.
We shall now discuss the criminal liability of accused-
appellant Roxas. As stated above, the trial court imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
The first rape incident was committed in July 1997, and
therefore the law applicable is Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 which
provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
The succeeding counts of rape were committed after the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 8353 on October 22, 1997,
which transported the rape provision of the Revised Penal
Code to Title 8 under Crimes against Persons, and amended
the same to its present wording:
Article 266-A. Rape, When And How Committed. — Rape is
committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
Page 126 of 196
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was
is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying within the third civil degree. Hence, accused-appellant can
circumstances: only be convicted of simple rape on two counts, for which the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.[25]
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the appellant Roxas’s “niece” in each Information is therefore
victim[.] insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying
circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon, for
While it appears that the circumstance of minority under which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
Article 335 (old rape provision) and Article 266-B was there was no other aggravating circumstance alleged in the
sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty
AAA and accused-appellant Roxas is considered insufficient of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless
under present jurisprudence. This Court has thus held: proper even as we overturn the lower courts’ appreciation
of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.
However, as regards the allegation in the Information that
appellant is an uncle of the victim, we agree with the Court of For consistency with prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the
Appeals that the same did not sufficiently satisfy the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to P50,000.00
requirements of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., it each, for each count of rape. The award of exemplary
must be succinctly stated that appellant is a relative within damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count, on the
the 3rd civil degree by consanguinity or affinity. It is other hand, is in line with recent jurisprudence.[26]
immaterial that appellant admitted that the victim is his niece.
In the same manner, it is irrelevant that “AAA” testified that WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
appellant is her uncle. We held in People v. Velasquez: G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03473 dated August 16, 2011 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty amount of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded to the
on accused-appellant, applying Section 11 of Republic Act complainant are reduced to P50,000.00 each, for each count
No. 7659. We have consistently held that the circumstances of rape, plus legal interest upon the amounts of indemnity
under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. and damages awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the
7659, the attendance of which could mandate the imposition date of finality of this judgment.
of the single indivisible penalty of death, are in the nature of
qualifying circumstances which cannot be proved as such SO ORDERED.
unless alleged in the information. Even in cases where such
circumstances are proved, the death penalty cannot be Sereno, CJ., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,
imposed where the information failed to allege them. To and Reyes, JJ., concur.
impose the death penalty on the basis of a qualifying
circumstance which has not been alleged in the information
would violate the accused's constitutional and statutory right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
While the informations in this case alleged that accused-
appellant is the uncle of the two victims, they did not state
that he is their relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. The testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant's wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters is
immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a
relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the
case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the
uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the
special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was

[ G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017 ]
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN
(SPARK),[*] JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN
NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK
LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS,
MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER
FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., PETITIONERS, V.
QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND
NAVOTAS CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN
REY TIANGCO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition[1] assails the
constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by the local
governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be
issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph
Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist
from implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending
resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of
Manila's ordinance as ultra viresfor being contrary to
Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,[2] or the "Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors
to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."[3]
Among those local governments that implemented curfew
ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas City,
through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,[4] dated August
26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan
na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan
ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,[5] dated June 6,
2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through
Ordinance No. 8046[6] entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the
Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as
'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below
Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor;
and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No.
SP-2301,[7] Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for
a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from
10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other
Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).[8]
Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors[10] - filed this present petition,
arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness
doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours;
(c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel
without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of
their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.[11] In addition, petitioners assert
that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.[12]
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew
Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and
properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.[13] They further argue that the law enforcer's
apprehension depends only on his physical assessment,
and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's
visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.[14]
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances
contain provisions indicating the activities exempted from the
operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
students or students with evening class, they contend that
the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be
out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.[15]
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a)
are unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to
liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process;[16] and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not
being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear
no reasonable relation to their purpose.[17] They argue that
the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will
not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare
of children of the community.[18]
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance,
particularly Section 4[19] thereof, contravenes Section 57-
Page 127 of 196
A[20] of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew
provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment,
reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition
of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that
no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.[21]
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State
interest to impose curfews contrary to the parents'
prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural
and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if
a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are
available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest
massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs
(closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular
visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They
further opine that the government can impose more
reasonable sanctions,i.e., mandatory parental counseling
and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons
behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a
penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out
during curfew hours.[22]
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is
whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues
raised in this case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the
petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners'
direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts
doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and standing
to warrant judicial review.[23]
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."[24] Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentalitv of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has
"expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then
was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable
and enforceable."[25]
In Araullo v. Aquino III,[26] it was held that petitions
for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court "are the
remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under
the Constitution."[27] It was explained that "[w]ith respect to
the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation,
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution cited above]."[28]
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc.
v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,[29] it
was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural
rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for
review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions
invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"[30]
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City,
Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated
legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances
violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining
to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear
their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344,
as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias."[31] In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies ofcertiorari and prohibition,
although these governmental actions were not made
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as
remedies to assail the constitutionality of legislative and
executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is
justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse
must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals
[(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation
of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition[.]"[32] This Court is tasked
to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people,"[33] as in
this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is
justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no
question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case."[34] In this case, respondents assail
the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
Page 128 of 196
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the
traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence of an
actual case or controversy."[35] "[A]n actual case or
controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence."'[36]According to recent jurisprudence, in the
Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987
Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the assailed governmental act."[37]
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He
must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of."[38]
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an
actual justiciable controversy in this case given the evident
clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents'
constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes
against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their
asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case
of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this
Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is
likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew
Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued
the TRO[39] enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat
or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on
the determination of whether those assailing the
governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the
matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show
that they have a personal and substantial interest in the
case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate

danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged
governmental act."[40] "'[I]nterest' in the question involved
must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be
affected by the official act — as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."[41]
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously
affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."[42]
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged
breach of two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of
minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and
(2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related
to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce
Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue
affecting the minor's right to travel,[43] because: (a) she was
still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this
Court,[44] and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew
Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent
danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances.
On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John
Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and
Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition
that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the
ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of
the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct
injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of
whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to
rear their children as they have not shown that they stand
before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be
noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian
Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental
right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew
Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he
only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and,
consequently, has no legal personality to bring an action in
court.[45] Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was
authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew
Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the
required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the
alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the
alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the
standing requirement insofar as all the petitioners are
concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this
Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of
legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official
act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its
sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may
do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that
they have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act."[46]
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality
of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review.
Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these
issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and
the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in
the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among
others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive
aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors
to travel and of parents to rear their children, this Court must
first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances
are void for not containing sufficient enforcement
parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with
unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim
that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led
to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even
though they were already of legal age. They maintain that
the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
Page 129 of 196
offenders based only on their physical appearances and,
thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded
that the Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to
determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere
does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.[47]
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
(2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."[48]
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness
doctrine is improper, considering that they do not properly
identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances,
which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair
warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or
required so that one may act accordingly.[49] The void for
vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim.
In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional
uncertainty," which may involve "procedural due process
uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases
where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to
give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as
well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a
definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with
the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there
is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that
are "void-for-vagueness."[50]
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement
parameters to guide the local authorities in the proper
apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not
assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the
ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew
Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left
for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily,
the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole
consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled

enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law
that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this
regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due
process because agents of the government cannot
reasonably decipher what conduct the law permits and/or
forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,[51] it was
ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and
subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.[52]
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any
ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew
Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus,
without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the
Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are
no sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators.
While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly
state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still
bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory
law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344,
as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child
may be determined from the child's birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents.
In the absence of these documents, age may be based
on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA
9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory
law.[53] Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by
RA 10630,[54] minors caught in violation of curfew
ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by
its provisions.[55] It is a long-standing principle that
"[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites
for the validity of a municipal ordinance."[56] Hence, by
necessary implication, ordinances should be read and
implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners
Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor
violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond
the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply
presenting any competent proof of identification establishing
their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual
assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state -
should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules,
the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the
erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances
invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances
as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this
right includes the right to determine whether minors will be
required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to
stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's
interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.[57]
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the
State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of
their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life
and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of
children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency
and the development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but also as
parental duties. This means that parents are not only given
the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority
conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a
reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that
the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and
well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during
childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations
Page 130 of 196
to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these
[obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship."[58] "This affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to
the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."[59]
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a
substantial measure of authority over one's
children."[60] In Ginsberg v. New York,[61] the Supreme Court
of the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional
interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."[62] As in our Constitution, the right and duty of
parents to rear their children is not only described as
"natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier "primary"
connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.[63] The rationale for the State's
deference to parental control over their children was
explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti),[64] as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The
State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by
requiring parental consent to or involvement in important
decisions by minors. But an additional and more
important justification for state deference to parental
control over children is that "the child is not [a] mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should
be stressed that "when actions concerning the child have
a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the
child, the [S]tate may act to promote these legitimate
interests."[66] Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the
physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their
children."[67]
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and
duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v.
Lorenzo,[68] this Court acknowledged the State's role
as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz.:

[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual who because of age or incapacity
are in an unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them,
they have the political community to look after their welfare.
This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the
United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State,
x x x."[69] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and
duty to aid parents in the moral development of their
children,[70] and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents
to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation
in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that
parents and others, teachers for example, who have the
primary responsibility for children's well-being are
entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."[71]
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal
restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of promoting
their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at
greater length, these ordinances further compelling State
interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and
the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their
children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and
lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the
night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as minor
children are prone to making detrimental decisions during
this time.[72]
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew
Ordinances apply only when the minors are not - whether
actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit
recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered
authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours
when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours.[73] In this
respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor
force parents to abdicate their authority to influence or
control their minors' activities.[74] As such, the Curfew
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew
Ordinances positively influence children to spend more time
at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with
better opportunities to take a more active role in their
children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle
(Schleifer),[75] the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal
curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to
protect their children from the perils of the street but are
unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children."[76] Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who
prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on
the streets."[77] Reason dictates that these realities observed
in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context.
Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact
of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared
unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to rear their
children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances based on the minors' right to travel. They claim
that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny
test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile
crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's
interest.[78] In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances
suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.[79]
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not
claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or
any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism
Council (Southern Hemisphere),[80] this Court explained that
"the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"[81] viz.:
Page 131 of 196
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to
necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to
plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always
under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly
swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is
that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims
that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if
the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute
on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit.
The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties.[82] (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n
restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,
the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US
Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[83] and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,[84] it was
held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on
overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value
to all society of constitutionally protected expression."' [85]
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,
Jr.,[86] it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be
raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness.
Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates
to violations of due process rights, whereas facial

challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and
limited to the realm of freedom of expression."[87]
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed
curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under
the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a
fundamental right[88] under Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to
move freely from the Philippines to other countries or within
the Philippines.[89] It is a right embraced within the general
concept of liberty.[90] Liberty - a birthright of every person -
includes the power of locomotion[91] and the right of citizens
to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and
work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.[92]
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to
access and exercise their other rights, such as the rights to
education, free expression, assembly, association, and
religion.[93] The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of
Maquoketa v. Russell,[94] as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion,
speech, assembly, and association require one to move
about, such movement must necessarily be protected under
the First Amendment. Restricting movement in those
circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights
cannot be exercised without violating the law is
equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment to freedom of travel
and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or
drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If,
for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting
hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any
reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech
are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably
involved with freedoms set forth in the First
Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public
interest justify restrictions even if made against fundamental
rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.[95] As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State[96] may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.[97]
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically
the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity
during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the
probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our
legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's
duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA
7610,[98] as amended, RA 9775,[99] RA 9262,[100] RA
9851, [101] RA 9344,[102] RA 10364,[103] RA 9211,[104] RA
8980,[105] RA 9288,[106] and Presidential Decree (PD)
603,[107] as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603,
which explicitly authorizes local government units, through
their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal
councils may prescribe such curfew hours for children
as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to
enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or
guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact
curfew ordinances (as what respondents have done in this
case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as
required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise
of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply
solely to minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In
this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
and enjoy constitutional rights,[108]but the exercise of these
rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.[109] They are
always subject to the authority or custody of another, such
Page 132 of 196
as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.[110] As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a
certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights,
such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,[111] the
right to execute contracts,[112] and the right to engage in
gainful employment.[113] With respect to the right to travel,
minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they
can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a
person other than their parents.[114] These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the
minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,[115] and
overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of
minors.[116] Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do
not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,[117] the US Supreme Court identified three (3)
justifications for the differential treatment of the minors'
constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar
vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed and mature manner;
and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:[118]
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children
generally are protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are
adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerability and their needs for
'concern, ...sympathy, and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded
[on] the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the
upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that
make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.[119] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,[120] the US Supreme
Court acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets
to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full
maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad
range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such
action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising
from other activities subject to all the diverse influences
of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the
state's police power, whether against the parent's claim to
control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate
contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people,
in the primary use of highways. But even in such use streets
afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in
other uses, whether in work or in other things, this
difference may be magnified.[121] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions
on the minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they
are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of
judicial scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of
classifications.[122] The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of
fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.[123] The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such
as in classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.[124] Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.[125]
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in
our legal system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the
strict scrutiny test[126] is the applicable test.[127] At this
juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the
same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State
has broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.[128] In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),[129] the
US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile
curfews implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the
parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no
less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the
analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the
State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the
activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors' rights
are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors
that, when applicable, warrant differential analysis of the
constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x
x. The Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower
level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in
the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether
the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest
in regulating minors differently than adults, we do not
believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate
to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the
ordinance. x x x.[130] (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a
consideration of the peculiar circumstances of minors as
enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens
patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the
compelling State interests justifying the assailed government
act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.[131] Thus, the government has the burden
of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to
achieve a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means
chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the
interest.[132]
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies.[133] This Court has ruled
that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as parens patriae constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by the
Page 133 of 196
State.[134] It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for
which some individual liberties must give way.[135] As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the
State has a compelling interest in imposing greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on
minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling
interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that
the ultimate objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the
Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal
curfews on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be
neglected of their proper care and guidance, education, and
moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-
school youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and
member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or
justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement
agencies reveal that minor children roaming around, loitering
or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national
laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to
regulate the movement of minor children during night time by
setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse
or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or
detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor
children, there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of
growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities
wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of
criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of
society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activities[.][136]

The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,[137] as regards
the information gathered by the City Council to support its
passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may
serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the present
case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the
entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a
safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when
left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that
its curfew would materially assist its first stated interest—that
of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council
acted on the basis of information from many sources,
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a
survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the United
States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and
police reports from other localities. On the basis of such
evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at
night will make for a safer community. The same streets
may have a more volatile and less wholesome character
at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially
life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use
narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into
membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often
lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those
who succumb to these criminal influences at an early
age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is
beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on
the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting
to reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to
come into contact with criminal influences, the City was
directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile
violence and crime.[138] (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local
governments of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical
data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
perpetrators, in their respective localities.[139]
Based on these findings, their city councils found it
necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to their
police power under the general welfare clause.[140] In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have
not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate
legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with
respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest
exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew
Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied,
the Court now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set
forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second requirement of the
strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from
the fundamental premise that citizens should not be
hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise
of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted,
the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent
necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's
compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts
with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly
drawn.[141]
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing
standard applies to regulations on minors as they are still
accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
whether it be social, religious, or civic.[142]Thus, in the
present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly
tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional
rights.[143]
In In Re Mosier,[144] a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn,
resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
freely exercise their religion and to free speech.[145] It
observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending
alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman
Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the
various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise
prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch
services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters
from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above
mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a
minor could not even attend the city council meetings if
they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his
views on the necessity to repeal the curfew
Page 134 of 196
ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn
ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was
very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional
muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First
Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and
returning home by a direct route from religious, school,
or voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective
provisions, this Court finds that only the Quezon City
Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from
the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied
by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian;
(b) those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students
and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in
the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and
(d) those working at night.[146]
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more
exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b) those
working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church
activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d)
those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e)
those running errands under the supervision of their parents,
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over
them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like.
It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve,
New Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the
day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy
Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter
Sunday.[147]
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not
narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are inadequate and
therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect
the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel
at night from school or work.[148]However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent,
the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited,
and thus, unduly trample upon protected liberties. The
Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless,
it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail
below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or
church activities, it hinders them from engaging in legitimate
non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to
and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in
legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or
church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not
exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose
the curfew during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it
effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional
religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.[149] This legitimate activity done pursuant to the
minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore
effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate
avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or attend city
council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance
to engage in these activities outside curfew hours, but the
Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in
these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such
proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest
to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night,
such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity.
These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the
Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the
Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not
narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be
completely stricken down since their exceptions, which are
essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of
the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some
provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence[150] of any separability clause.[151]
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the
first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the
minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following
exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the
following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-
curricular activities of their school or organization
wherein their attendance are required or otherwise
indispensable, or when such minors are out and
unable to go home early due to circumstances
beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency
situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter,
and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
employment activity, or going to or returning home from
the same place of employment activity without any
detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel
accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence
attending an official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, communitv or other similar
private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school, or other similar private civic/religious
organization/group (recognized by the community)
that supervises the activity or when the minor is
going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that
he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her
class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working
student.[152] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of
exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is more
narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
Page 135 of 196
association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably
assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of
exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official
and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The
rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are
also covered by these items given that the minors'
attendance in the official activities of civic or religious
organizations are allowed during the curfew hours.
Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon
City Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious
masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right
to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to
move to and from the places where these activities are
held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon
City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of
minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at
a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on
this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only
in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure
with the basic premise that State interference is not superior
but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as
the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear
their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in
passing judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the
welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable
of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In
one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk

of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its protection.[153]
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's
inherent lack of full rational capacity, and balancing the
same against the State's compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds
that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is
reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and
hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are
in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance
with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded
from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall,
passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it
proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the validity of its
penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the
parentis or guardian under Section 8 thereof,[154]does not
impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s
or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community
service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of
the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition
to the fine imposed therein.[155] Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor
based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or
youth violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished
as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the
sanction shall consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth
offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent,
guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under
Eighteen (18) years of age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the legal
impostitions in case of a third and subsequent
violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten
(10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND
PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion
of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint
shall be filed by the Punong Barangay with the
office of the City Prosecutor.[156] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments
could validly impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a)
community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine;
and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew
violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered
an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult
shall not be considered an offense and shall not be
punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances
enacted by local governments concerning juvenile
status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking
and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but
not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal,
harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of
children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for
said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to
be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at
risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The
ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such
as counseling, attendance in group activities for children,
and for the parents, attendance in parenting education
seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of
regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the
similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit
is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of
these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations
thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" [157] is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a
wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or
fine";[158] "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a
person who commits a deliberate or negligent
Page 136 of 196
act."[159] Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction -
such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right,
or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated
the law."[160]
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read
to mean that all the actions of the minor in violation of the
regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based
programs[161] recognized under Section 54[162] of the same
law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community
service is a valid form of intervention program that a local
government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare
of minors. For one, the community service programs provide
minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they promote
accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light,
these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance
with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give
them the opportunity to become productive members of
society and thereby promote their integration to and
solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is
likewise consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as
it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing
disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel
or warning against fault or oversight."[163] The Black's Law
Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued
warning or censure";[164] while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or
warning."[165] Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence
in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or
admonition shall not be considered a penalty."[166]
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-
based programs and admonition are clearly not penalties -
as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear,
their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor,
and for the latter to understand, what actions must be
avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the
City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined
as "a severe or formal reproof."[167] The Black's Law

Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that
does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";[168] while
the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and
formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person
in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It
is more than just a warning or admonition."[169] In other
words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement
made to denounce the error or violation committed, to
sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to
sternly warn the erring individual including the public against
repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly
subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the
RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that
reprimand is a penalty,[170] hence, prohibited by Section 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably
constitute penalties - as provided in our various criminal and
administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear,
categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty
shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of]
juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions
of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew
violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance
directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid.
On the other hand, the impositions of community service
programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they
do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew
Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny
test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict
scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which
provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this
interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides
for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely
exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed
curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the
State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e.,
"[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also
been construed to include parental permission as a
constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an
allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local
government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared
unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon
City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in
accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila
Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand and
fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that
ordinances should always conform with the law, these
provisions must be struck down as invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the
local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang
Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of
Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONALand,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series
of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City
is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should
have been struck down for failing to ground themselves on
demonstrated rational bases, for failing to adopt the least
restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to
show narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose
abuse by law enforcers. The doctrine of parens patriae fails
to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine enables state
intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not
transgress the constitutionally enshrined natural and primary
right of parents to rear their children.
However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance to the
effect that parental permission in any form for any minor is
also an exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring the
application of that curfew regulation.
The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02[1] was passed on August
26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 8046[2] was passed
on October 14, 2002. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-
2301[3] was passed on July 31, 2014.
Page 137 of 196
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict
implementation of these curfew ordinances as part of police
operations under the broad umbrella of "'Oplan Rody."
These operations were in fulfillment of President Rodrigo
Duterte's campaign promise for a nationwide implementation
of a curfew for minors.[4]
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an
association of youths and minors for "the protection of the
rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its members
Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos
Reyes), and Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Villegas) filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that
the ordinances are unconstitutional and in violation of
Republic Act No. 9344.[5]
I
Constitutional challenges against local legislation
Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge
against the assailed ordinances.
They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared
unconstitutional as the lack of expressed standards for the
identification of minors facilitates arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.[6]
Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly
restrict a minor's liberty, in general, and right to travel, in
particular.[7]
Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the
assailed ordinances intrude into or deprive parents of their
"natural and primary right"[8] to rear their children.
Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power"[9] in
that legislative power is delegated by the national legislature
to local government units. They are presumed constitutional
and, until judicially declared invalid, retain their binding
effect. In Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates:10]
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted
by local government units) enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short,
the conflict with the Constitution must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-founded,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain.[11]
The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect
that the judiciary must accord to the legislature. In Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan:[12]

This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings
on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the
government to encroach upon the duties and powers of
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate
branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation
may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature
is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint
and act with caution and forbearance.[13]
The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative
bodies, whose members are equally presumed to have
acted conscientiously and with full awareness of the
constitutional and statutory bounds within which they may
operate. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association v. City of Manila[14] explained:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The
presumption is all in favor of validity . . . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set
aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be
familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the
subject and necessitates action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . .
The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation."[15]
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be
challenged. Challenges, however, shall only be sustained
upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the bases for
invalidating a law. In Smart Communications v. Municipality
of Malvar:[16]
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation,
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful,
breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency
of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must
sustain legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on ...
baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of
the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which
approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such
a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the
Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.[17]
Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating
ordinances, Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholastica's
College,[18] outlined the test for determining the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.[19]
The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the
Constitution, as well as to the basic nature of ordinances as
products of a power that was merely delegated to local
government units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio:[20]
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when
they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The
Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass
muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should
be constitutional uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not
violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their
derivative legislative power, a delegation of legislative power
from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter.[21] (Citations omitted)
II
Appraising due process and equal protection challenges
At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that "[n]o
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."[22]There are two (2) dimensions to
this: first, is an enumeration of objects of protection—life,
liberty and property; second, is an identification and
delimitation of the legitimate mechanism for their modulation
or abnegation—due process and equal protection. The first
dimension lists specific objects whose bounds are
amorphous; the second dimension delineates action, and
therefore, requires precision.
Page 138 of 196
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail
ensuring biological subsistence. It is not just a proscription
against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and its protection
does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The
objects of the constitutional protection of due process are
better understood dynamically and from a frame of
consummate human dignity. They are likewise better
understood integrally, operating in a synergistic frame that
serves to secure a person's integrity.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations'
formulation of "life, liberty, and security of person"[23] and the
American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness."[24] As the American Declaration of Independence
postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which
"[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that they
may be secured.[25] Securing them denotes pursuing and
obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them. The
formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not merely
operating on factual givens but enabling the pursuit of ideals.
"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness
of human potential: not merely organic, physiological
existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled and
effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by
facilitating an empowering existence.[26] "Life and liberty,"
placed in the context of a constitutional aspiration, it then
becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this
empowering existence. This is not an inventively novel
understanding but one that has been at the bedrock of our
social and political conceptions. As Justice George Malcolm,
speaking for this Court in 1919, articulated:
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom
which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently
with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The
right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the
right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen,
but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities
including epoch-making decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, liberty includes the right of the citizen to be
free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live and work
where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to
pursue any avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion.
The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract,
the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and
the right of locomotion.[27]

It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects
of due process protection admits amorphous bounds. The
constitutional protection of life and liberty encompasses a
penumbra of cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves—
expanding liberty—alongside the contemporaneous reality in
which the Constitution operates. People v.
Hernandez[28] illustrated how the right to liberty is multi-
faceted and is not limited to its initial formulation in the due
process clause:
[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of
our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its
enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill
of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14),
(15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1)[29] to the
protection of several aspects of freedom.[30]
While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and
liberty is dynamic, evolving, and expanding with
contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for preserving
life and liberty is immutable: any intrusion into it must be with
due process of law and must not run afoul of the equal
protection of the laws.
Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to
the due process and equal protection clauses invokes three
(3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly as we do now
with the task of appraising local ordinances, White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila[31] discussed:
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on
substantive due process grounds is best tested when
assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote
4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the
judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a
discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or
infringement of a "fundamental right". Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny
for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and the rational basis standard of review
for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate
scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for
evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy.
Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed.
While the test may have first been articulated in equal
protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is
on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and
the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights
as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope
of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.[32] (Citations
omitted)
An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges
against government regulation must admit that the gravity of
interests invoked by the government and the personal
liberties or classification affected are not uniform. Hence, the
three (3) levels of analysis that demand careful calibration:
the rational basis test, intermediate review, and strict
scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual considerations of:
first, the interest invoked by the government; and second,
the means employed to achieve that interest.
The rational basis test requires only that there be a
legitimate government interest and that there is a reasonable
connection between it and the means employed to achieve
it.
Intermediate review requires an important government
interest. Here, it would suffice if government is able to
demonstrate substantial connection between its interest and
the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the
availability of less restrictive measures [must have
been] considered."[33] This demands a conscientious effort at
devising the least restrictive means for attaining its avowed
interest. It is enough that the means employed
is conceptually the least restrictive mechanism that the
government may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental
freedoms or what is involved are suspect classifications. It
requires that there be a compelling state interest and that the
means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually—
not only conceptually—being the least restrictive means for
effecting the invoked interest. Here, it does not suffice that
the government contemplated on the means available to it.
Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the
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inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to
not only explore all possible avenues but to even debunk the
viability of alternatives so as to ensure that its chosen course
of action is the sole effective means. To the extent
practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering
mechanisms.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas[34] further explained:
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial
restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial
of a fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice
against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak
and watered down view would call for the abdication of this
Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the
Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true whether
the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private
person or the government itself or one of its
instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the
actor.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation
of fundamental rights and the non-discrimination of protected
classes. Thus, in these cases, the burden falls upon the
government to prove that it was impelled by a compelling
state interest and that there is actually no other less
restrictive mechanism for realizing the interest that it
invokes:
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of
compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest
and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove
the same.[36]
III
The present Petition entails fundamental rights and
defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.
By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the
assailed ordinances, this restriction applies daily at specified
times and is directed at minors, who remain under the
authority of their parents.

Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present
Petition is the right to travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided
by law.
While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this
right is not absolute. The Constitution itself states that the
right may be "impaired" in consideration of: national security,
public safety, or public health.[37] The ponencia underscores
that the avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is "the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile
crime."[38] The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to find
justification as a valid exercise of the State's police power,
regulating—as opposed to completely negating—the right to
travel.
Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of
parents, equally at stake is the right that parents hold in the
rearing of their children.
There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v.
Torres[39] identified the right of persons to be secure "in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects,"[40] the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures,[41]liberty of
abode,[42] the right to form associations,[43] and the right
against selfincrimination[44] as among these facets.
While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, the rights of parents with respect to
the family is no less a fundamental right and an integral
aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12
characterizes the right of parents in the rearing of the youth
to be ''natural and primary."[45] It adds that it is a right, which
shall "receive the support of the Government."[46]
Imbong v. Ochoa,[47] affirms the natural and primary rights of
parents in the rearing of children as a facet of the right to
privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to
exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well
affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family.[48]
[49]
This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light unequivocally
characterized the right to privacy as a fundamental right.
Thus, alleged . statutory intrusion into it warrants strict
scrutiny.[50]
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should
be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at
bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by
the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would
warrant the application of the most deferential standard - the
rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional
rights of their patrons - those persons who would be
deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to
the lodging establishments in question.
....
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental
rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights,
thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to
be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot
be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the
person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare.'' .. . In accordance with
this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any
avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty
...
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the
ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City
asserts before this Court that the subject establishments
"have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and
fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and
thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-
seekers"'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual
behavior among consenting married or consenting single
adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as
well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein
retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect ...
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was
recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified
Page 140 of 196
by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to
the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions
into the personal life of the citizen.[51] (Citations omitted)
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not
sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons'
privacy rights, this Court weighed the State's need for the
"promotion of public morality" as against the individual
patrons' "liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality
among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the
judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights
this Court is sworn to protect ...
....
[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen
not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but
also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the
enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is
distinguished from non-free societies not with any more
extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and
immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to
make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the
State.[52] (Citation omitted)
Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed
ordinances define status offenses. They identify and restrict
offenders, not purely on the basis of prohibited acts or
omissions, but on the basis of their inherent personal
condition. Altogether and to the restriction of all other
persons, minors are exclusively classified as potential
offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive
basis, as the commission of an offense relies merely on
presence in public places at given times and not on the
doing of a conclusively noxious act.
The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation
concern a prejudicial classification. The assailed ordinances
are demonstrably incongruent with the Constitution's
unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose
mandate is to "promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being."[53]
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,
which takes great pains at a nuanced approach to children.
Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously defines a "child at risk"
and a "child in conflict with the law" and distinguishes them
from the generic identification of a "child" as any "person
under the age of eighteen (18) years."[54] These concepts
were adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical reduction
 Page 141 of 196

to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with prohibition, a substantial number of barangays reported not to have been a well-informed effort as to these data's
the protection that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The having CICLs for the entire year. As to prevalence that processing, interpretation, and correlation with avowed
assailed ordinances' broad and sweeping determination of stretches across the relative maturity of all who may be policy objectives.
presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as against
warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of adolescents), there was also no data showing the average With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local
the carefully calibrated attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and age of these CICLs. government units' justifications of reducing crime and
the protection that the Constitution mandates. For these, a sweeping averments of "peace and order" hardly sustain a
strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is equally The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too rational basis for the restriction of minors' movement during
proper. conflicting to be authoritative. The data reports of the Manila curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions
Police Department, as summarized in the ponencia,[57] state: ipso facto equate to the reduction of CICLs appears to be a
IV gratuitous conclusion. It is more sentimental than logical.
NUMBER Lacking in even a rational basis, it follows that there is no
The apparent factual bases for the YEAR support for the more arduous requirement of demonstrating
OF CICL
assailed ordinances are tenuous at best. that the assailed ordinances support a compelling state
interest.
To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances, 2014 74
respondents City of Manila and Quezon City provide V
statistical data on the number of Children in Conflict with the 2015 30
Law (CICL).[55] Quezon City's data is summarized as It has not been demonstrated that the curfews
follows:[56] January effected by the assailed ordinances are the least
to June 75 restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.
Yea No. of Barangay Barangays No. of Tot 2016
r Baranga with without Baranga al The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged
ys submissio submissio ys with no. law be narrowly tailored in order to achieve compelling
The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the governmental interests, it also requires that the mechanisms
ns ns Zero of City of Manila has vastly different numbers. As summarized
CICL CIC it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to
in the ponencia:[58] achieve its ends:
L
NUMBER Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include
201 142 102 40 Not 267 YEAR the right of procreation, the right to marry, the right to
OF CICL
3 (January to (January to provided 7 exercise. First Amendment freedoms such as free speech,
June) June) political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
2015 845
44 (July to 98 (July to to travel, and the right to vote.
December) December)
January Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either
to June 524 classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic
201 142 119 23 32 293
2016 or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the
4 (January to (January to (January 7
June) June) to June) presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such
82 (July to 60 (July to 25 (July The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for legislation is assumed to be unconstitutional until the
December) December) to January to August 2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as government demonstrates otherwise. The government must
Decembe part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.[59] Of the 480 show that the statute is supported by a compelling
r) minors, 210 minors were apprehended for curfew violations, governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish
not for petty crimes.[60] Again, the data fails to account for the that interest are narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains
percentage of CICLs as against the total number of minors in as follows:
201 142 142 0 51 477
Manila.
5 8 ... The intensive review associated with the new equal
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,[61] a protection imposed two demands a demand not only as to
The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that United States Court of Appeals case, as basis for examining means but also as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict
the city is so overrun by juvenile crime that it may as well be the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro Manila. Far from scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and
totally rid of the public presence of children at specified supporting the validity of the assailed statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility
times. While there is a perceptively raised number of CICLs ordinances, Shleifer discounts it. Shleifer relies on traditionally tolerated by the old equal protection: means had
in Quezon City, the data fails to specify the rate of these unequivocally demonstrated scientific and empirical data on to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not
figures in relation to the total number of minors and, thus, the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on juvenile safety merely "reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection
fails to establish the extent to which CICLs dominate the city. during curfew hours in Charlottesville, Virginia. Here, while became a source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the
As to geographical prevalence that may justify a city-wide local government units adduced data, there does not appear areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by

"compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum of
"legitimate" state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least
burdensome or least drastic means available for achieving
the governmental objective.[62] (Citations omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only be
reasonable. They must be compelling. Certainly, the
promotion of public safety is compelling enough to restrict
certain freedoms. It does not, however, suffice to make a
generic, sweeping averment of public safety.
To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to
prove that an imposition of curfew lessens the number of
CICLs. Respondents further fail to provide data on the
frequency of crimes against unattended minors during
curfew hours. Without this data, it cannot be concluded that
the safety of minors is better achieved if they are not allowed
out on the streets during curfew hours.
While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila
Ordinances tend to restrict minors' fundamental rights, it
found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly tailored to
achieve its objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance's
statement of its objectives reads:
WHEREAS ... the children, particularly the minors, appear to
be neglected of their proper care and guidance, education,
and moral development, which led them into exploitation,
drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
....
WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children
become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay,
roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or
other public places, whether singly or in groups, without
lawful purpose or justification;
WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and
supervision of the barangay officials and other authorities,
these misguided minor children preferred to converge or
flock together during the night time until the wee hours of the
morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other public
places, illegal drug use and sometimes drug peddling,
engaging in troubles and other criminal activities which often
resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;
WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law
enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming
around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city
ordinances and national laws;
WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and
safety to regulate the movement of minor children during
night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from
neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on
these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint on the
tendency of a growing number of the youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements in society are not provided with potent avenues for
furthering their nefarious activities[.][63]
In order to achieve these objectives,[64] the ponencia cites
the ordinances' exemptions, which it found to be "sufficiently
safeguard[ing] the minors' constitutional rights":[65]
SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the
following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or
when such minors are out and unable to go home early
due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency
situation such as conflagration, earthquake,
hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter,
and similar incidents;
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
employment activity, or going to or returning home from
the same place of employment activity, without any
detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel
accompanied by an adult in no violation of this
Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an
official school, religious, recreational, educational,
social, community or other similar private activity
sponsored by the city, barangay, school or other similar
private civic/religious organization/group (recognized by
the community) that supervises the activity or when the
Page 142 of 196
minor is going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that
he/she is a student and was dismissed from his/her
class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working
student.[66]
The ponencia states:
[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits
unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-
being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality
at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.[67]
The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization.
It generalizes unattended minors out in the streets during
curfew hours as potentially, if not actually, engaging in
criminal activities, merely on the basis that they are not
within the bounds of the stated exemptions. It is evident,
however, that the exemptions are hardly exhaustive.
Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when
she goes out at night to buy food from a convenience store
because the rest of her family is already asleep.[68] As a
Quezon City resident, she violates the curfew merely for
wanting to buy food when she gets home from school.
It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told
to make a purchase at a nearby sari-sari store. None of
these is within the context of a "party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their
school and organization" or part of an "official school,
religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity." Still, these activities are not
criminal or nefarious. To the contrary, socializing with
friends, unsavorily portrayed as mere loafing or loitering as it
may be, contributes to a person's social and psychological
development. Doing one's chores is within the scope of
respecting one's elders.
Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that
it can keep them safe from crime is not the least restrictive
means to achieve this objective. Petitioners suggest street
lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street comers,
and visible police patrol.[69] Public safety is better achieved
by effective police work, not by clearing streets of children en
masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in broad
daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an
environment. Efficient law enforcement, more than
sweeping, generalized measures, ensures that children will
be safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.

The assailed ordinances' deficiencies only serve to highlight
their most disturbing aspect: the imposition of a curfew only
burdens minors who are living in poverty.
For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who
are not traditionally employed as the exemptions require that
the minor be engaged in "an authorized employment
activity." Curfew violators could include minors who scour
garbage at night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development of Manila
reports that for 2016, 2,194 minors were turned over as part
of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.[70] The greater
likelihood that most, if not all, curfew violators will be street
children—who have no place to even come home to—than
actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating the ordinance
will most likely have no parent or guardian to fetch them from
barangay halls.
An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs
show that for most of the crimes committed, the motive is
poverty, not a drive for nocturnal escapades.[71] Thus, to
lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must
first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty
alleviation programs, not curfews, are the least restrictive
means of preventing indigent children from turning to a life of
criminality.
VI
The assailed ordinances give
unbridled discretion to law enforcers.
The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to
provide the least restrictive means for achieving their
avowed ends but also in failing to articulate safeguards and
define limitations that foreclose abuses.
In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying
minor, petitioners invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.[72]
The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:[73]
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.'' It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[74]
While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of
vagueness is permitted only in cases involving alleged
transgressions against the right to free speech, penal laws
may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness "as applied."
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:[75]
[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be
made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is
that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons
or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth
challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."
Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this
Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its
entirety.[76]
The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied
challenge is settled. As explained in Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism Council:[77]
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers
only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is
an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[78] (Citation omitted)
Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the
assailed ordinances, as-applied parties must assert actual
violations of their rights and not prospective violations of the
rights of third persons. In Imbong v. Ochoa:[79]
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of
his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the
constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the
rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also
known as the prohibition against third-party standing.[80]
The ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void
for vagueness doctrine is improper. It reasons that
petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous provision in the
assailed ordinances.[81] It then proceeds to examine the
provisions of the ordinances, vis-a-vis their alleged defects,
while discussing how these defects may affect minors and
parents who are not parties to this case. In effect, the
Page 143 of 196
ponencia engaged in a facial examination of the assailed
ordinances. This facial examination is an improper exercise
for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do
not ostensibly involve the right to free speech.
The more appropriate stance would have been to examine
the assailed ordinances, not in isolation, but in the context of
the specific cases pleaded by petitioners. Contrary to the
ponencia's position, the lack of specific provisions in the
assailed ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so
that actual transgressions into petitioner's rights were made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do
not state any guidelines on how law enforcement agencies
may determine if a person apprehended is a minor.
For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance
provides:
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of
this Act;[82]
However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on
the identification of age. It merely states that any member of
the community may call the attention of barangay officials if
they see minors during curfew hours:
SECTION 7. COMMUNITY
INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION - Any person who has
personal knowledge of the existence of any minor during the
wee hours as provided under Section 3 hereof, must
immediately call the attention of the barangay.[83]
The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section
7[84] addresses the lacunae as it articulates measures for
determining age. However, none of the assailed ordinances
actually refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their actions
and prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the
assailed ordinances' express provisions or by implied
invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its
prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by
silence reduces these prescriptions to mere suggestions, at
best, or to mere afterthoughts of a justification, at worst.
Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers
"unbridled discretion in carrying out [the assailed
ordinances'] provisions."[85] The present Petition illustrates
how this has engendered abusive and even absurd
situations.
Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-
old—no longer a minor—student, recalled that when he was
apprehended for violating the curfew, he showed the
barangay tanod his registration card. Despite his
presentation of an official document, the barangay tanod
refused to believe him. Delos Reyes had to resort to showing

the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to let him
go.[86]
Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends
were apprehended by 10 barangay tanods for violating
curfew even though he was already 19 years old at that time.
He alleged that he and his friends were told to perform 200
squats and if they refused, they would be framed up for a
crime. They were released only when the aunt of one (1) of
his friends arrived.[87]
These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by
enforcing the assailed ordinances have not been resolved by
"simply presenting any competent proof of
identification"[88] considering that precisely, the assailed
ordinances state no mandate for law enforcers to check
proof of age before apprehension. Clear and explicit
guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose
further violations of petitioners' due process rights. In the
interim, the assailed statutes must be invalidated on account
of their vagueness.
VII
The doctrine of parens patriae
does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions
into parental prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances.
The State acts as parens patriae in the protection of minors
only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children
are to be reared, supplanting its own wisdom to that of
parents.
The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American,
common law origin. It was understood to have "emanate[d]
from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects
who were unable to protect themselves."[89] It was the King's
"royal prerogative"[90] to "take responsibility for those without
capacity to look after themselves."[91] At its outset, parens
patriae contemplated situations where vulnerable persons
had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this, it
was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the
people, to safeguard its citizens' welfare.
The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even
as it gained independence and developed its own legal
tradition. In Late Corporation of Church of Jesus Christ v.
United States,[92] the United States Supreme Court
explained parens patriae as a beneficent state power and
not an arbitrary royal prerogative:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal
person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to those
arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarch to the great detriment of the people
and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a
most beneficent function, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves.[93] (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that the exercise of parens patriae applies "to
the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable of
vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the
sovereign authority."[94] It is from this reliance and
expectation of the people that a state stands as "parent of
the nation."[95]
American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal
traditions that it entailed facilitated our own jurisdiction's
adoption of the doctrine of parens patriae.[96] Originally, the
doctrine was understood as "the inherent power and
authority of the state to provide protection of the person and
property of a person non sui juris."[97]
However, significant developments have smce calibrated our
own understanding and application of the doctrine.
Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides:
Section 12.... The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the qualifier
"primary." The present Article II, Section 12's counterpart
provision in the 1973 Constitution merely referred to "[t]he
natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4.... The natural right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development
of moral character shall receive the aid and support of the
Government.[98]
As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also
merely spoke of"[t]he natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4. . . . The natural right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency should receive the aid
and support of the government.[99]
The addition of the qualifier "primary" unequivocally attests
to the constitutional intent to afford primacy and
preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly stated,
the Constitution now recognizes the superiority of parental
Page 144 of 196
prerogative. It follows, then, that state interventions, which
are tantamount to deviations from the preeminent and
superior rights of parents, are permitted only in instances
where the parents themselves have failed or have become
incapable of performing their duties.
Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize Nery v.
Lorenzo,[100] the authority cited by ponencia in explaining the
State's role in the upbringing of children.[101] In Nery, this
Court alluded to the State's supreme authority to
exercise parens patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when
the 1935 Constitution was in operation.[102] It stated:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens
patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the rights of
persons or individual[s] who because of age or incapacity
are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable
as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they
have the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to
such a trust.[103]
This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the
1978 case of Vasco v. Court of Appeals,[104] where, without
moderation or qualification, this Court asserted that "the
State is considered the parens patriae of minors.''[105]
In contrast, Imbong v. Ochoa,[106] a cased decided by this
Court in 2014, unequivocally characterized parents' rights as
being "superior" to the state:
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the
invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become
productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary, " that
is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior
to that of the State.[107] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents
cannot fulfill their role, as in cases of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation:
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the
State safeguards them from everyone, even their own
parents, to the end that their eventual development as
 Page 145 of 196

responsible citizens and members of society shall not be principles. Thus, in the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.[108] Bernabe:

As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere
substitute or supplement to parents' authority over their
children. It operates only when parental authority is
established to be absent or grossly deficient. The wisdom
underlying this doctrine considers the existence of
harm and the subsequent inability of the person to protect
himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of
parents and/or legal guardians to protect a child.
To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost
absolute power to the State; to allow the Government to
arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power might as well
render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile.
More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this position.
In these instances where the State exercised its powers over
minors on account of parens patriae, it was only because the
children were prejudiced and it waswithout subverting the
authority of the parents themselves when they have not
acted in manifest offense against the rights of their children.
Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,[109] parens patriae was exercised
in order to give the minor his day in court. This is a matter
beyond the conventional capacities of parents, and
therefore, it was necessary for the State to intervene in order
to protect the interests of the child.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly
authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful errands or
engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by
Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on
this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only
in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure
with the basic premise that State interference is not superior
but only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as
the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear
their children is not only natural but primary.
Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter
review in a factual case whose factual ambient will be
different. Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in the
result.

In People v. Baylon[110] and other rape cases,[111] this Court

held that a rigorous application of the penal law is in order,
since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is under the obligation
to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves
fully."[112] In these criminal cases where minor children were
victims, this Court, acting as the representative of the State
exercising its parens patriae power, was firm in imposing the
appropriate penalties for the crimes—no matter how
severe—precisely because it was the only way to mitigate
further harm to minors. Parens patriae is also the reason
why "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse,"
as this Court held in People v. Malto.[113] Again, these State
actions are well outside the conventional capabilities of the
parents and in no way encroach on the latter's authority.

Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.

VIII

In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section

4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance will sufficiently
narrowly tailor its application so as to save it from its
otherwise apparent breach of fundamental constitutional

G.R. No. 45186 September 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.
Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the corresponding
accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina
Bandian appealed from said sentence alleging that the trial
court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged
admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that she had thrown away her
newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable
doubt, and in sentencing her to reclusion perpetua, with
costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936,
Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant
go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house,
apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was
there that the people of the place used to go for that
purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from
the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the
front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not
being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and, having
noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and
helped her go up to her house and placed her in her own
bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her
house, what happened to her, the appellant merely
answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone
with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and
later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the
hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom
had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body
of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket where
the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to
the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the baby
which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the
appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of
the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to
the appellant's house and found her lying in bed still
bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it,
directly under the bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion
upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that
after giving birth she threw her child into the thicket to kill it
for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man,
Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living
maritally, because the child was not his but of another man
with whom she had previously had amorous relations. To
give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant
had admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he
went to her house at the time and on the date above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute
credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose testimony was not
corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the
very witnesses for the prosecution and by the appellant, as
will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower
court furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide.
The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree with both.
On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be
guilty only of abandoning a minor under subsection 2 of
article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment
having resulted in the death of the minor allegedly
abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence
showing how the child in question died. Dr. Nepomuceno
himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the
child were not caused by the hand of man but by bites
animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket
where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,
must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must
be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission.
Even in cases where said crimes are committed through
mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental
faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he
may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in
causing her child's death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or
imprudently. She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to
expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover,
which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took
place three years before the incident; her married life with
Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her
his wife — began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed
from the beginning, affirming such belief when he testified at
Page 146 of 196
the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb
was his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly
waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had
no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the
witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom that the
child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to
the appellant's house after the appellant had left the place,
staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very
dizzy, to the extent of having to be as in fact she was helped
to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly appear
how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation
and conclusions. Also add to all these the fact that the
appellant denied having made any admission to said
physician and that from the time she became pregnant she
continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility
undoubtedly caused by her long illness as well as the
hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with
the circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23
years of age, and therefore inexperienced as to childbirth
and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending
such event; and the fact that she, like her lover Luis Kirol —
a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is
uneducated and could supplant with what she had read or
learned from books what experience itself could teach her,
undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her
childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was
unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may
be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the seventh
exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to
take her child from the thicket where she had given it birth,
so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger
of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in
question, by going into the thicket, according to her, to
respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she
had fever for a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so
she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that
same place and later abandoning it, not because of
imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome
by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be
blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident,
from liability any person who so acts and behaves under
such circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal
Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and
considerations, and granting that the appellant was aware of
her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later
failed to take her child therefrom, having been so prevented
by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it
should be held that the alleged errors attributed to the lower

court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under
such circumstances said appellant has the fourth and
seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is hereby
acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and
convicted, with costs de oficio, and she is actually confined
in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be
released immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., concurring:
I concur in the acquittal of the accused Josefina Bandian not
on the ground that she is exempt from criminal liability but
because she has committed no criminal act or omission.
The evidence conclusively shows that on the day in question
the accused Josefina Bandian had spent a year of marital
life with her lover Luis Kirol by whom she was begotten with
a child for the first time. Her said lover knew that she was
pregnant and both were waiting for the arrival of the happy
day when the fruit of their love should be born. Since she
became pregnant she continuously had fever, was weak and
dizzy. On January 31, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, she
went down from her house and entered a thicket about four
or five brazas away, where the residents of said place
responded to the call of nature. After some minutes the
accused emerged from the thicket staggering and apparently
unable to support herself. Her neighbor Valentin Aguilar,
who saw her enter the thicket and emerged therefrom, ran to
help her, supported her and aided her in going up to her
house and to bed. Asked by Aguilar what happened to her,
she merely answered that she was very dizzy. Thinking that
he alone was unable to attend to her, Valentin Aguilar called
Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, and requested him to
take bamboo leaves to stop the appellant's hemorrhage.
Adriano had scarcely gone about five brazas, when he saw
the body of a newborn child near the path adjoining the
thicket where the accused had been a few moments before.
Upon being informed of the discovery, Valentin Aguilar told
Adriano Comcom to bring the child into the appellant's
house. Upon being asked whether or not the child shown to
her was hers, the appellant answered in the affirmative. After
an autopsy had been made of the body, it was found that the
child was born alive.
Unconscious, precipitate or sudden deliveries are well
known in legal medicine among young primiparæ who, by
reason of their ignorance of the symptoms of parturition and
of the process of expulsion of fetus, are not aware that they
are giving birth when they are responding to an urgent call of
nature (Dr. A. Lacassagne, Precis de Medicine Legale,
pages, 799-781; Annales de Medicine Legale, December
1926, page 530; Vibert, Manual de Medicina Legal y
Toxicologia, vol. I, pages 512-514). There is no doubt that
the accused, in her feverish, weak and dizzy condition when
she went into the thicket to defecate and being a primipara
with no experience in childbirth, was not aware that upon
defecating she was also expelling the child she was carrying
in her womb. Believing that she did nothing more to respond
to an urgent call of nature which brought her there, she
returned home staggering for lack of strength to support
herself and for being dizzy, without suspecting that she was
leaving a newborn child behind her, and she only knew that
she had given birth when she was shown the already dead
child with wounds on the body produced by the bites of pigs.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that acts and
omissions punishable by law are felonies, which may be
committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa); there being deceit when the act is
performed with deliberate intent, and fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill.
As the herein accused was not aware that she had delivered
and that the child had been exposed to the rough weather
and to the cruelty of animals, it cannot be held that she
deceitfully committed the crime of infanticide or that of
abandonment of a minor, because according to the above-
cited legal provision there is deceit when the act punishable
by law is performed with deliberate intent. Suffering from
fever and from dizziness, the appellant under the
circumstances was not aware that she had given birth and,
consequently, she could not have deliberately intended to
leave her child, of whose existence she was ignorant, to
perish at the mercy of the elements and of the animals.
Neither can it be held that she faultily committed it because,
as already stated, not knowing for lack of experience in
childbirth that in defecating — a perfectly lawful physiological
act, being natural — she might expel the child she carried in
her womb, she cannot be considered imprudent, a
psychological defect of a person who fails to use his
reasoning power to foresee the pernicious consequences of
his willful act. Having had no knowledge of the fact of her
delivery, the accused could not think that by leaving the child
in the thicket, it would die as a consequence of the rough
weather or of the cruelty of animals. Neither can she be
considered negligent because negligence is the omission to
do what the law or morals obliges one to do, which implies
knowledge of the thing which is the subject matter of the
compliance with the obligation. Inasmuch as the accused
was not aware of her delivery, her mind cannot contemplate
complying with her legal and moral duty to protect the life of
Page 147 of 196
her child. Neither can it be held that the appellant lacked
foresight because, having been absolutely ignorant of her
delivery, she could not foresee that by abandoning her child
in a thicket it would die. Neither can it be held that her act
was the result of lack of skill because she did not know that
to defecate in a state of pregnancy might precipitate her
delivery, and as defecation is a natural physiological
function, she could not refrain from satisfying it.
We cannot apply to the accused fourth exempting
circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads: "Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it," because although the lawful act of
satisfying a natural physiological necessity accidentally
provoked the delivery, the delivery itself was not an injury,
but the exposure of the child at the mercy of the elements
and of the animals which cased its death. As the child was
born alive, if the accused had been aware of her delivery
and she had deliberately abandoned the child, her accidental
delivery would not exempt her from criminal liability because
then the death of said child no longer would have been
accidental. Neither can we consider the seventh exempting
circumstance of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code
consisting in the failure to perform an act required by law,
when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause,
because this exempting circumstance implies knowledge of
the precept of the law to be complied with but is prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause, that is by some motive
which has lawfully, morally or physically prevented one to do
what the law commands. In the present case, what the law
requires of the accused-appellant, with respect to the child,
is that she care for, protect and not abandon it. Had she
been aware of her delivery and of the existence of the child,
neither her debility nor her dizziness resulting from the fever
which consumed her, being in the full enjoyment of her
mental faculties and her illness not being of such gravity as
to prevent her from asking for help, would constitute the
lawful or insuperable impediment required by law. Having
been ignorant of her delivery and of the existence of the
child, to her there was subjectively no cause for the law to
impose a duty for her to comply with.
Having had no knowledge of the expulsion of her fetus, the
death thereof resulting from its exposure to the rough
weather and to the cruelty of the animals cannot be imputed
to the accused, because she had neither deceitfully nor
faultily committed any act or omission punishable by law with
regard to the child.
Imperial and Laurel, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-5418 February 12, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of
murder committed, as alleged in the information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the
said accused, with the intention of killing Feliciano Sanchez,
invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the
forest, with premeditation shot him in the breast with a
shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said
Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried
the body of the deceased in a well. The motive is unknown.
The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared
his plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him,
so that no one could see it, and to bury him afterwards
secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of
First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and sentenced to
fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, accessories, indemnification and costs. The
defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact
no dispute at all as to the important facts. The accused was
a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909,
he, with Bernardino Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano
Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or
dam on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and
a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he
had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers
an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a
stream to see how the alteration which he had made in
the malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on
the other side of the stream. He carried his shotgun with him
across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met
the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been
living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-
harvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the
deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt
wild chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior
of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a young man
about 20 years of age, was working at something under a
manga tree a short distance from the shack. Although the
accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the
shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out
in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of
which stood the shack. There is some contradiction between
the testimony of the accused and the Government witnesses
just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the
boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild
chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation. The
accused, however, testified that he did not invite the
deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased
go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree
"trying something." At any rate the accused went into the
forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to
anybody except the accused. Upon that subject he testified
as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me,
that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I
proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill
some wild chickens we would have something to eat on that
day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chickens
and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human
cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I
heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a man I
went back toward the malecon, where my companions were
working, running back, and when I arrived there I left my
shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my
companions were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa
to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I told of that
occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was
a relative of the deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this
he and myself went together to see the dead body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was
killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found in
considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was
shot and where the accident occurred. The defendant within
a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to
the malecon where he had left his laborers at work, carrying
the dead chicken with him. The accused called Bernardino
Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they
disappeared for some time. Tagampa says that they went a
little way toward the woods and came back. The accused
says that they went to the place where the body of the
deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass
where it would not be easily observed. It is certain, however,
that the body was concealed in the cogon grass. During the
afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow
laborers were working, probably to hunt for a place in which
to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness
Yumul take the chicken which had been killed by the
accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who
testified that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it
had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening the
accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body
finally. They took it from the cogon grass where it lay
Page 148 of 196
concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen
hundred meters from the place where it had originally fallen,
and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth
and burning straw on top of the well for the purpose of
concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused
dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although
he admits that the accused in no way threatened or sought
to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial
denied all knowledge of the death of the deceased or the
whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he
confessed his participation in the death of the deceased and
told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior
relations between the accused and the deceased had been
normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a
relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no
unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to
show any. There appears to have been no motive whatever
for the commission of the crime. The Government has not
attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the
accused could have for killing the deceased would be found
in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the
hunt. That idea is wholly negative by the fact that the chicken
and the man were shot at the same time, there having been
only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions
punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to
be voluntary unless the contrary shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes
some injury by mere accident without liability or intention of
causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a
reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he
shall be entitled to an acquittal.
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is
uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident
while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due
care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal
liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23
Ia., 154, 92 Am. Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap.,
160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U.
 Page 149 of 196

S. vs. Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed.
Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S., 1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence
upon the part of the accused. Neither is there any question
that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when
the accident occurred. Neither is there any evidence of the
intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased.
The only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of
the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said
(p.1165):
CARSON, J., concurring:
I concur.
I am in entire agreement with the conclusions of the majority
in this case. I think it proper to estate, nevertheless, that the
doctrine laid down in the somewhat loosely worded West
Virginia case of State vs. Legg, cited in the majority opinion,
and in the citation from 3 L. R. A., N. S., can not be said to
be in conformity with the general doctrine in this jurisdiction,
as laid down in the decisions of this court, without
considerable modification and restriction limiting its scope to
cases wherein it is properly applicable.

Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the

accused is not required to prove such a defense by a
preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of
intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show
that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the
evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But
where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits
the killing but denies that it was intentional. Therefore, the
State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error
to instruct the jury that the defendant must show that it was
an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and
instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be
erroneous.

In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:

Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in

a prosecution for homicide, which must be submitted to the
jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal
intent (or its equivalent) which constitutes an essential
element in criminal homicide, to warrant a conviction it must
be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.

In support of such contention the author cites a number of

cases.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to

support the judgment of conviction.

The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the

defendant acquitted, and his discharge from custody
ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

[ G.R. No. 137347, March 04, 2004 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. PO3
FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, APPELLANT.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting appellant PO3
Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of
eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was
flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo sentenced
the appellant to suffer the death penalty.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the
appellant with murder reads:
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill,
by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior
strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y
MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11) years of age, by then and
there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with
the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
Case for the Prosecution[3]
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of
Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family lived at Sitio
Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon
City. Vincent, nicknamed “Hataw,” was a grade three pupil
whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato,
an American couple, through an educational foundation.[4]
The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police
detailed in the Traffic Management Group (TMG) based in
Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service
with the Motorcycle Unit of the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA).
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked
permission from his mother Felicisima if he could play
outside. She agreed.[5] Together with his playmate Whilcon
“Buddha” Rodriguez, Vincent played with his kite on top of
the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio
Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderia was a
basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo Salvo and
his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were
playing backan, a game of basketball.
Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming
from the main road across the basketball court. He was
nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the
motorcycle and recognized the appellant. Ricardo knew that
the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of
the carinderia and berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong
had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on
the roof.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from
the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent and Whilcon, the
former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, “Putang
inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsibaba d’yan!” After
hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately
jumped down from the roof.[6] Vincent, meanwhile, was lying
on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he heard
the appellant’s shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the
latter. Vincent turned his back, ready to get down from the
roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber
pistol[7] towards the direction of Vincent and fired a
shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from
the roof, lying prostrate near the canal beside the
abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.[8]
Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he
saw blood on the latter’s head. Whilcon retreated and left
his friend.[9] The appellant approached Vincent and carried
the latter’s hapless body in a waiting tricycle and brought him
to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was
pronounced dead on arrival.
Meantime, word reached Vincent’s parents that their son
was shot and brought to the hospital. They rushed to the
hospital, only to see their son’s already lifeless body. The
appellant was nowhere to be found.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
autopsy where he made the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-
lateral aspect.
Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest
Page 150 of 196
wall, right side.
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid,
with irregular edges, abrasion collar widest postero-inferiorly,
located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and
8.0 cms. behind the left external auditory meatus, directed
forward upward and from left to right, involving the scalp,
fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the
left and right cerebral hemispheres of the brain, fracturing
the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating the scalp,
making an Exit wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted
and irregular edges, 12.0 cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of
the right external auditory meatus.
Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid,
extensive, bilateral.
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
Visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food
particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.[10]
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single
gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left
upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left
ear)[11] and exited to the right side.[12] Dr. Baluyot signed
Vincent’s certificate of death.[13]
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector
Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the scene of the shooting
but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They
proceeded to the Quezon City General Hospital where they
heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime
scene and recovered an empty shell from a .45 caliber
gun.[14]
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the
MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the appellant was assigned
on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police
Station that the appellant had not reported for duty.[15] At
2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior
Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional Director of
the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the appellant to the
Sangandaan Police Station together with his .45 caliber
pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-38701.[16]
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was
brought to the Department of Justice where he was enrolled
under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn
statement to NBI Special Agent Roberto Divinagracia on
September 29, 1998.[17] On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo
Aquino wrote the Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory

Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination of
the .45 caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the
empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the scene of the
shooting.[18]Before noon on September 30, 1998,
Divinagracia arrived at the station and turned over two
witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also
turned over the witnesses’ sworn statements.[19] On October
2, 1998, on orders of the police station
commander,[20] Pajarillo took pictures of the crime scene,
including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole as part
of the office filing.[21] He did not inform the prosecution that
he took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies
thereof. However, the appellant’s counsel learned of the
existence of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms
Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen
marked “FAP” revealed the same individual characteristics
with cartridge cases fired from the above-mentioned firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked “FAP” was fired from the above-
mentioned caliber .45 Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol with
serial number AOC-38701.[22]
Vincent’s family suffered mental anguish as a result of his
death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent P49,174 for the
funeral.[23]
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at
about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Macario Ortiz, a
resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police
assistance; Macario’s brother-in-law was drunk and armed
with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The
appellant’s house was located along a narrow alley (eskinita)
perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away
from Macario’s house.[24] Responding to the call, the
appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the
safety lock in place and tucked the gun at his right
waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the garage
and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main
road. Macario, who was waiting for him at the main road,
called his attention to his revolver which was about to fall off
from his waist. The appellant got distracted and brought his
motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the
abandoned carinderia where he stopped. As he stepped his
right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the
appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At this
point, the revolver fell to the ground near his foot and
suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted, “Ano yon, ano yon,
mukhang may tinamaan.” He picked up his gun and
examined it. He put the safety latch back on and tucked it at
his right waistline. He then told Macario to wait for a while to
check if somebody was really hit. He went near the
abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the
ground. He picked up the bloodied child, boarded him on a
tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to
bring the boy to the hospital.[25] On board the tricycle were
Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his
mother’s house in Caloocan City but did not inform her of the
incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro
Suyo, at the Base 103, located at Roces Avenue, Quezon
City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an
accident; that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet
accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he
might not be able to report for work that day and the
following day. He assured his superior that he would
surrender later. He then went to Valenzuela City to the
house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam, who was a motorcycle
unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three days. He also
visited friends during that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo
and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol. Major Suyo
accompanied and turned over the appellant to the
commanding officer at Camp Crame, Quezon City. The
appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated
that the results of the drug test were negative. The appellant
was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for
investigation.[26] The pictures[27] of the crime scene were
given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket, shown in
one of the pictures pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant’s
testimony was corroborated in pari materia by Macario Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent’s thirteen-year-old playmate,
testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, he was
playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball
court along the road beside the chapel. With him were
Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of
the carinderia with Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the
ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the
chapel near the basketball court. He looked back towards
the basketball court and saw the appellant, about 15 meters
away from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied
Vincent. He did not see the appellant shoot Vincent. He did
not report what he saw to the police authorities. He was
ordered by his father to testify for the appellant. He also
testified that his mother was related to Daniel, the appellant’s
brother.
Page 151 of 196
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by treachery
and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court
did not appreciate in favor of the appellant the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in
and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view of the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage by the accused of his public position (par. 1, Art.
14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the amounts of P49,174.00, as
actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages;
P25,000.00, as exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as
death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. “R”) of the
accused, shall remain under the custody of the Court and
shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules
and regulations upon the finality of this decision.[28]
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO RELEVANT
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED
COULD HAVE ALTERED THE CONCLUSIONS
ARRIVED AT BY THE COURT AND THE
OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY
OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING AND
ADVOCACY, AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF
SPECULATION, PATENTLY DEMONSTRATING
BIAS AND PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF RICARDO
SALVO, ALLEGED PROSECUTION
EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS
WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS
CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE
OF MANKIND.

4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING EXCULPATORY
AND INCULPATORY FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD HAVE
BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY
SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED.[29]
The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate
in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the hole found on the
rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was
shot. The appellant contends that the picture[30] taken on
October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of
the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and the
pictures[31] showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a hole
on the roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the
shooting was accidental. The appellant maintains that his
service revolver fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as
the barrel of the gun was pointed to an oblique direction, it
fired, hitting the victim who was on the rooftop. The bullet hit
the back portion of the victim’s head, before exiting and
hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures
belie Ricardo’s testimony that he deliberately shot the victim,
and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot’s testimony that the
gunshot wound came from somewhere behind the victim,
somewhere lower than the point of entrance. The appellant
invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado’s testimony that if a gun hits the
ground in an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet
will exit in the same position as the gun, that is, also in an
oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that
the contention of the appellant is based on speculations and
surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having
been proven by competent and credible evidence. There is
no evidence on record that the hole shown in the
pictures[32] was caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber
pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod
Johnny Yaket, who was shown in the pictures, to testify on
the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any slug was
found on the rooftop or under the roof which came from the
appellant’s .45 caliber pistol. According to the Solicitor
General, the pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot
overcome the positive and straightforward testimony of the
young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether
or not the appellant is exempt from criminal liability is a
factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with
clear and convincing evidence, his affirmative defense that
the victim’s death was caused by his gun accidentally going
off, the bullet hitting the victim without his fault or intention of
causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
reads –
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
… undersigned to cast doubt on respondent’s allegations. The
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of
intent and negligence on the part of the accused. For the
accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either
with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.[33]
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a
person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4)
without any fault or intention of causing it.[34]An accident is
an occurrence that “happens outside the sway of our will,
and although it comes about through some act of our will,
lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences.” If the consequences are plainly
foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[35] this
Court held that an accident is a fortuitive circumstance,
event or happening; an event happening without any human
agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human
agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual
or unexpected by the person to whom it
happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person,
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand without which such other
person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are
intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the
other.[36] In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice.[37] The appellant must
rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution because by admitting having
caused the death of the victim, he can no longer be
acquitted.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and
Page 152 of 196
convincing evidence, his defense.
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the
Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the pictures showing
the hole on the roof of the carinderia[38] to prove that he shot
the victim accidentally. However, when the investigating
prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the
appellant relating to the pictures, the latter refused to
answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor, thus:
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent
but were refused to be answered. This certainly led the
defenses set forth by the respondent are evidentiary in
character and best appreciated in a full-blown trial; and that
the same is not sufficient to overcome probable cause.[39]
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit
the victim.[40] There is no evidence showing that the gun hit a
hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit
the ground and the position of the gun when it fell from the
appellant’s waist.
Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court,
the appellant testified that the chamber of his pistol was
loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his
right waistline.[41] He also testified that the gun’s safety lock
was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is
moved backward with the safety lock in place, and the
appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the trigger,
the gun would not fire:
Q: Is this your service firearm?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went
out of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that
time when you tucked the gun in your waistline?
A The hammer was cocked like this.
COURT:
 Page 153 of 196

Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved
backwards near the safety grip.
ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY:
Admitted, Your Honor.
ATTY. PEREZ:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel
of the gun and then the hammer is moved backwards
and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the
trigger, the bullet will fire because the hammer will move
forward and then hit the base of the bullet?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?
(witness did as instructed)
A It will not, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the parties)
Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused
pulled the trigger, the hammer did not move forward?
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
Admitted, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger
many times, a bullet will not come out from the muzzle of
the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?
The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not
touch the hammer even if the hammer is cocked.[42]
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant’s
counsel himself proved that the defense proffered by the
appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the
decision of the trial court:
3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it
as providential, when the counsel of the accused
was holding the gun in a cocked position and the
safety lock put in place, the gun accidentally
dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom
and the gun did not fire and neither was the safety
lock moved to its unlock position to cause the
hammer of the gun to move forward. The safety
lock of the gun remained in the same position as it
was when it dropped on the floor.[43]
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender
himself and his service firearm. He hid from the
investigating police officers and concealed himself in the
house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in Valenzuela City,
and transferred from one house to another for three days to
prevent his arrest:
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26,
1998?
A No, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?

Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of
your house? A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your
Honor.
A I safety (sic) it, sir. Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of
the gun is like this and therefore it is open but it is on a
safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which
is found below the hammer, there is a space, is it not? Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?
Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a
safety lock? A Yes, Your Honor. A Because at that time I was already confused and did not
know what to do, Your Honor.
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.

The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it demonstrate.
upwards. (to the witness) Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of
(witness did as instructed) You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if Valenzuela?
It is now on a safety locked (sic)? you want but do not remove the safety lock.
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
(witness did as instructed)
A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of
PO3 Lam for three days?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay
Toro?
A Because I am worried, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3
Lam?
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in
the evening, I go back to the house of PO3 Lam, Your
Honor.
Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27
or 28, 1998 and then returned to the house of PO3 Lam
in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to
your 103 Base?
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major
Suyo.
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame,
Quezon City?
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.
Q What is the connection of you having money to that of
informing your officer that you will surrender?
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already
be detained and that I will have no money to spend.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29,
1998, you did not even visit your family in Barangay
Bahay Toro?
A No, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?
A I was not able to do that, sir.
Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay
Toro?
A No sir, because I already brought the child to the
hospital.[44]
The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his
claim that the death of the victim was accidental and that he
was not negligent.
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial
court in its decision on this matter:
The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a
policeman, that the victim was accidentally shot was his
failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the
incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he
would choose to flee and keep himself out of sight for about
three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond
human comprehension that a policeman, who professes
innocence would come out into the open only three (3) days
from the incident and claim that the victim was accidentally
shot. Human behavior dictates, especially when the
accused is a policeman, that when one is innocent of some
acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but
causes injury to another without fault or negligence, he
would, at the first moment, surrender to the authorities and
give an account of the accident. His failure to do so would
invite suspicion and whatever account or statement he would
give later on becomes doubtful.
For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was
accidentally shot is odious, if not, an insult to human
intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a
fantasy than a reality. It was a deliberate and intentional act,
Page 154 of 196
contrary to accused’s claim, that it happened outside the
sway of his will.[45]
It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, its
assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the
probative weight of their testimonies are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the
trial judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor
and conduct of the witnesses as they testified.[46] We have
carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no
reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court.
The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo
deserves credence. He testified in a positive and
straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks
of truth and sincerity. Even as he was subjected to a
grueling cross-examination by the appellant’s counsel, he
never wavered in his testimony. He positively identified the
appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the
latter deliberately aimed his gun and shot the victim. The
relevant portions of his testimony are quoted:
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do
you remember of any unusual incident which took
place?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that unusual incident?
A: When Vincent was shot, sir.
Q: Who shot Vincent?
A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.
…
Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by
Fallorina?
A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.
Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
 Page 155 of 196

A: Yes, sir. A: He came from their house, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand 10 meters more or less?
you saw him and Fallorina shot him? Fallorina?

A: “Nakatalikod po siya.” A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your
Honor. …

…
… Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina
Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the before the incident?
figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and his
tricycle? Why did you include this drawing? A: More or less two years, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was
boarded to and brought to the hospital. Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was
(Witness referring to Exhibit O-11) Buddha still there? Q: Why do you know him?

A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir. A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar,
(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal especially on Sundays, sir.
Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle? already marked as Exhibit O-14).

A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir.

…
Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now
seated. Can you tell the Court how far where (sic)
Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting?
as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include the Q: How many shots did you hear?
motorcycle?
A: Only one, sir.
A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at COURT:
that time.
Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that
the distance pointed to by the witness is more or Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina?
less 7 meters.
COURT: (to the witness) A: Yes, sir.

Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the

motorcycle was moving? …
Q: What was that gun?
A: It was stationary, your Honor.
A: .45 cal., sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent,
Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?
Fallorina before you saw him shot the boy? can you tell that?
A: No, sir.

… COURT: (to the witness)

Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?
Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the
boy at that time the body (sic) was shot?

A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the
movies, sir.
Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for
two (2) years and you saw him shot Vincent on
September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the
afternoon. Please look around the courtroom now
and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand
Fallorina?
CT. INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a male person the one
seated at the back of the lady and wearing a yellow
shirt and maong pants and when asked of his
name, he stated his name as Ferdinand Fallorina.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard
utterances at that time that he shot the victim?
… Witness Protection Program of the Department of
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: “Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo
magsisibaba diyan!”
… Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw
Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof, what about
Fallorina, what did he do?
A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he
went at the back of the karinderia where Vincent
fell, Your Honor.
Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and
looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did he do?
A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.
Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
A: I do not know anymore.[47]
The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and
Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act was
deliberate and intentional.
It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the
Information as witnesses for the prosecution, only Ricardo
Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the
Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for
the prosecution, despite the fact that the appellant was a
policeman, was because he pitied the victim’s mother who
was always crying,[48] unable to obtain justice for her
son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify
against the appellant. It was only his purest intention of
ferreting out the truth in this incident and that justice be done
to the victim.[49] Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to
full faith and credence.
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed
out, Vincent was shot intentionally while his back was turned
against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his
kite and was ready to get down from the roof when the
appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part.[50] Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-year-old
boy. He could not possibly put up a defense against the
Page 156 of 196
appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is
not so much as to put emphasis on the age of the victim,
rather it is more of a description of the young victim’s state of
helplessness.[51] Minor children, who by reason of their
tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child,
treachery exists.[52] The abuse of superior strength as
alleged in the Information is already absorbed by treachery
and need not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance.[53]
We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position in this
case. We reverse the trial court on this score.
There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and
that he used his service firearm, the .45 caliber pistol, in
shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on
record that the appellant took advantage of his position as a
policeman when he shot the victim.[54] The shooting occurred
only when the appellant saw the victim on the rooftop playing
with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating abuse of
public position against the appellant.
The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the
appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when
it is done by the accused spontaneously and made in such a
manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble
and expense necessarily incurred in his search and
capture.[55]
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in
the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City, and even moved
from one house to another for three days. The appellant
was a policeman who swore to obey the law. He made it
difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate
their investigation. It was only after the lapse of three days
that the appellant gave himself up and surrendered his
service firearm.
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there is no
modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the
appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95,
is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3
Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found guilty beyond
 Page 157 of 196

reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of

the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is
also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent Jorojoro,
Jr. the amount of P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as
moral damages; P50,000 as civil indemnity; and P25,000 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., on leave.
Panganiban, J., on official leave.

[G.R. No. 29396. November 9, 1928.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. PRAXEDES AYAYA, Defendant-Appellant.
G. N. Trinidad for Appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; INJURY CAUSED BY
MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT FAULT OR INTENTION OF
CAUSING IT. — A married woman who, to free her son from
the imminent danger of being strangled by the door which
her husband was attempting to shut, thrust her umbrella in
the opening of said door and jabbed her husband with the
point thereof, thereby causing an injury to his left eye, which
is supposed to have been the cause of his death, is not
criminally liable, pursuant to article 8 of the Penal Code,
because the act performed by her does not involve any
criminal liability. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1888.)
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas upon the following
information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about January 15, 1928, in the municipality of
Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, with
the intent to kill her husband Benito de la Cruz, with whom
she was united in lawful marriage, with treachery and by
means of an umbrella, did voluntarily, unlawfully, and
feloniously assault and attack her said husband Benito de la
Cruz, inflicting a mortal wound in the upper left eyelid, as a
result of which said Benito de la Cruz died five (5) days
thereafter. In violation of article 402 of the Penal
Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
It appears from the record that at about 1 o’clock in the
morning of January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the chief of
police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman
that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and
vomiting in his house in said municipality. Said chief of police
went to the place and found Benito, the deceased, lying in
bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and unconscious, for he
did not answer the questions put to him. When his wife, the
defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as to the cause
of that wound, she replied that it was due to the fact that she
herself had jabbed her husband with an umbrella. Health
officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon
examining Benito, found he had a wound on the left upper
eyelid which was bleeding; that his pupils were dilated and,
from the odor of his breath and from his vomiting, it
appeared that Benito was drunk. In view of the wounded
man’s condition he was later taken to the provincial hospital
of Tayabas, where he died four days after the incident.
Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos Cuyugan, the
director of the provincial hospital of Tayabas, who treated
the wounded man, expressed different opinions as to the
cause of the death of Benito de la Cruz. Health officer
Litonjua believes that the deceased’s cerebral hemorrhage
was due to his alcoholic excesses, whereas Doctor
Cuyugan, who performed the autopsy, declared that the
wound was caused by some blunt instrument and that his
death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by
the wound he had received in the forehead, and that health
officer Litonjua’s statement as to said hemorrhage being due
to the alcohol is erroneous. The trial court found the
defendant guilty of the crime alleged in the information, and
taking into account that the defendant did not intend to inflict
so grave an injury as she did, and that there had been
provocation on the part of the offended party, sentenced her
to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P500 by way of indemnity,
plus the costs of the action.
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and her
attorney, in support of the petition that the judgment
appealed from be reversed and the appellant acquitted with
costs de oficio, assigns the following errors: (l) The trial court
erred in holding that the deceased’s wound on the left upper
eyelid was caused by the appellant; (2) supposing, without
admitting, that said wound was really caused by the herein
appellant, the lower court erred in concluding that said
wound was the immediate cause of the death of the
deceased and consequently, in convicting the appellant; and
(3) the lower court erred in not acquitting the appellant. at
least, for reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the
crime charged, consists of the following: Exhibit A, which is
the sworn statement filed by the accused with the justice of
Page 158 of 196
the peace of Pagbilao; Exhibit B, which is the umbrella used
by the defendant and with which she jabbed the deceased;
Exhibit C, which is the report of the autopsy of Benito de la
Cruz signed by Doctor Cuyugan; and Exhibit D, which is the
death certificate.
In the defendant’s sworn statement she states, among other
things, that at about 8 o’clock at night on January 15, 1928,
she, with her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio,
drank tuba in the store of one Felicidad Losloso; that
afterwards they went to a cinema; that while returning home
and without any warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave
her a blow which she dodged; that then her husband went
home, preceding her and her son and when they arrived at
the house they found the door closed; that she and her son
pushed the door and attempted to open it, but her husband,
who was inside, prevented it; that then the door gave way
somewhat and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head
between the opening of the door and the wall and;n order to
prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it; that
Benito then poked his head out of the opening of the door
and when she saw him, she jabbed him with the umbrella
she carried; that she does not know where she jabbed him
although she thinks it was in the body; and that when she
and her son finally succeeded in entering the house, they
found that Benito was already in bed with a wound in the
forehead. The accused herself, in her testimony in her own
behalf, substantially repeated what she had declared before
the justice of the peace of Pagbilao, stating, however, that
when the door was opened and her son put his head
between the opening of the door and the wall, in order to
prevent the door from crushing her son’s head, she jabbed
her husband with her umbrella with a downward motion,
though she could not tell if she touched him or not. She
stated, furthermore, that she did not know how the wound in
her husband’s forehead was caused. This point of the
defendant’s testimony has not been contradicted by any
evidence to the contrary; rather it has been corroborated by
her son Emilio de la Cruz who also testified at the trial.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the
defendant and of her son that the husband and wife did not
quarrel in the street while returning home on the night in
question, and, moreover, that during the marriage they lived
together in peace with no disagreements between them,
either on or before the date of the incident.
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act
herein prosecuted, with the exception of the defendant and
her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the
declaration of the defendant that she jabbed her husband
with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from closing
and crushing her son’s head which was inserted between
said door and the wall of the house. Said defendant,
 Page 159 of 196

explaining what took place, says in part: "When the door was
ajar my son went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I
saw that he was about to crush my son’s head, I jabbed my
husband with the point of the umbrella downwards to prevent
him from crushing my son’s head." We find nothing
improbable in this statement and if we add to this the
absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant
to injure her husband, we are compelled to conclude that in
thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door in question,
she did so to free her son from the imminent danger of
having his head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus
caused her husband’s injury, it was by a mere accident,
without any fault or intention to cause it. This being so, we
believe that she incurred no criminal liability in accordance
with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because, it being a
licit act to free her son from the grave danger threatening
him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her
husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her
umbrella, does not make her criminally liable. (Decision of
the Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888.)

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the

appellant Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she hereby is,
acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand,

Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 126171, March 11, 2004 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.
FEDERICO GENITA, JR. Y CULTURA, APPELLANT.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the Decision[1] dated June 14,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City in
Criminal Case No. 4954 finding Federico Genita, Jr.,
appellant herein, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion
perpetua for each count.
Appellant was charged in an Information which reads:
“That on or about the evening of December 17, 1991 in
Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a high
powered firearm one Jesus Bascon thereby hitting him on
both legs, and Reynaldo Timbal who was hit on his head
which caused their subsequent death.”[2]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” Forthwith,
trial ensued. The prosecution presented Danilo Timbal,
Vicente Olaco and Dr. Elsie Caballero as its witnesses.
Appellant took the witness stand for the defense.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 o’clock in the
evening, while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus
Bascon were loading firewood in a truck in Barangay
Bugsukan, Butuan City, appellant who was drunk and armed
with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas
gift. Reynaldo told him to just come back because they were
still loading firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long
after, he returned and fired his gun at Jesus’ feet, hitting his
left leg. He immediately jumped into the truck. Appellant
then went near its bumper and fired at the tire near the
chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun and
fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right
leg. Reynaldo ran away, his right hand covering his
head. Appellant chased him and fired at him, hitting his
nape and right hand. After the commotion, the victims’ co-
workers who were able to take refuge from the cascade of
bullets returned to the scene and found the dead body of
Reynaldo. Jesus was immediately brought to the Butuan
City General Hospital but died thereafter.[3]
Dr. Elsie Caballero, City Health Officer of Butuan City, who
conducted the post mortem examination of the body of
Reynaldo, found that he died of “shock, gunshot wound in
the neck with avulsion of brain tissues.”[4]On the other hand,
the Death Certificate[5] issued by Dr. Raul Monton, Medical
Specialist II of the Butuan City General Hospital, attributed
Jesus’ death to “compound fractures, (R) & (L) Legs, and
Hypovolemic Shock.”
Appellant, relying on the exempting circumstance of accident
as his defense, presented a different version. He testified
that he was a member of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) stationed at Bugsukan, Butuan
City, hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the
evening of December 17, 1991, while on his way to his
camp, he saw a truck parked at the right side of the road
with its rear lights on. While approaching the vehicle,
somebody grasped his neck. As a consequence, he
accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his
shoulder. The weapon automatically fired. At this instance,
his assailant set him free. Immediately he rushed to the
camp and reported the incident to Sgt. Montealto who placed
the camp on alert. Appellant stayed in the camp during the
entire evening. The following morning, he learned that two
persons were killed.[6]
On June 14, 1996, the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding accused FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y
CULTURA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of
the two (2) victims:
(1) He is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its
accessory penalties for the death of Reynaldo Timbal which
penalty entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years.
(2) For the death of Jesus Bascon, the said accused,
FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA is also sentenced to
another penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory
penalties which penalty entails another imprisonment of at
least thirty (30) years.
Both sentences shall be served by the accused successively
at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Panabo, Davao del
Norte.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify the Heirs of Reynaldo
Timbal the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos and
another Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the Heirs of
Jesus Bascon plus costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.”[7]
Hence, this appeal anchored on the following assignments of
error:
Page 160 of 196
“I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING
EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ACCIDENT INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT
“II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
ITS ATTENDANCE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
KILLING OF THE VICTIM WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL.”[8]
Appellant contends that he was performing a lawful act with
due care when the victims were killed. He was then on his
way to the CAFGU station to report for duty. He had no
intention to kill the victims. He accidentally pulled the trigger
of the rifle and the bullets hit the victims. Thus, he should
have been exempted from any criminal liability. Even
assuming that he is liable for the death of the victims, he
contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The Solicitor General maintains that considering the number
of gunshot wounds inflicted on the victims, the shooting
could not have been an accident. Nonetheless, the Solicitor
General agrees with appellant that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven,
stressing that the latter was drunk when he approached
Reynaldo. This should have put the victims on guard as it
was established during the hearing that appellant tends to be
cantankerous and out of control when he is drunk. Also, it
was not proven that he consciously adopted the means of
executing the crime.
Appellant’s version that he “accidentally shot” the two victims
is incredible. Accident is an exempting circumstance under
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. It must be stressed
that in raising this defense, appellant has the burden of the
evidence and it was incumbent upon him to establish that he
was exempt from criminal liability.[9] He must show with clear
and convincing proofs that: 1) he was performing a lawful act
with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident,
and 3) he had no fault or intention of causing the
injury. Considering appellant’s evidence, it is clear that the
requisites of accident as an exempting circumstance were
not proven. First, appellant’s manner of carrying his M-14
rifle negates his claim of “due care” in the performance of an
act. Knowing that his rifle was automatic, he should have
seen to it that its safety lock was intact. Worse, he admitted
that his finger was constantly on the trigger. With the safety

lock released and his finger on the trigger, how can we
conclude that he acted with due care? We cannot accept his
version that he was just following his trainer’s instruction to
release the safety lock while in a critical area.[10] For one, he
never presented his trainer to corroborate his statement; and
for another, he was not in a critical area. Second, the
number of wounds sustained by the victims shows that the
shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims sustained
more than one wound. While it could have been possible
that the first wound sustained by both victims was by
accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by
them in different parts of their bodies could not have been
similarly inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an
unmistakable intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his
rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus
had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when
another bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was already
running away when he was shot on his nape and right
hand. That appellant chased the victims and shot them
several times clearly show that he had the intent to kill
them.[11] His defense must necessarily fail.
Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant,
thus causing him to accidentally pull the trigger of his rifle,
then his natural reaction should have been to defend
himself. Instead, he rushed towards the
camp. Furthermore, he did not present any evidence to
support his allegation that the CAFGU was placed on
alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version of
accidental shooting, an indication that it is fabricated.
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses credible. We stamp our agreement to such
finding. Woven in the fabric of our jurisprudence is that the
findings of the trial court are accorded not only the highest
respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance
has been ignored or misunderstood but which could alter the
result and could affect the judgment to be rendered. Given
the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand,
the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess the
demeanor of the witnesses and determine if they were telling
the truth or not.[12] Here, the trial court keenly observed:
“The defense counsel attempted to force into the mouth of
the accused the answer counsel wanted accused to respond
to his questions. During the direct examination, for instance,
defense counsel propounded this question:
‘Atty. Dagani:
Q It appears from your testimony that while you were
walking from your house to the camp, you seemed to be
prepared for fight, do you agree with me on that?’
It is obvious that this leading question was propounded to
explain why the finger of the accused was on the trigger of
the weapon. The attempt of the defense counsel to elicit the
desired answer was apparently to support the theory that the
accused was on alert that evening with the safety lock of his
rifle released.
Pitted against the clear, positive and impressive account
narrated by the prosecution witnesses, the claim of
accidental shooting is exposed of what it is – a farce, an
invention of the imagination.”
Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecution
witnesses were not motivated by any ill desire to implicate
appellant with a serious charge. The absence of motive on
their part lends more credence to their testimonies.
However, we find that the trial court erred in finding that
treachery exists in the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Thus, for the
crime to be qualified by treachery the following elements
must be proved: (1) the means of execution employed gave
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.[13] Treachery cannot be presumed but
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself. Hence, where no particulars
are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the
victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be
established from mere suppositions, drawn solely from
circumstances prior to the killing.[14] In the instant case, it
appears from the record that the attack was not so swift so
as to render the victims off guarded. Contrary to the finding
of the trial court, appellant could not have managed to
“stealthily approach” and suddenly fire at the
victims. Therefore the means in executing the crime cannot
be considered deliberate. Besides, Jesus had the chance to
jump into the truck after he was hit at the left leg. Reynaldo,
on the other hand, was able to run away and take cover,
though unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, the other laborers
who were with the victims managed to evade the volley of
bullets. It cannot be said, therefore, that the victims were
unprepared to put up a defense.
Since the aggravating circumstance of treachery was not
proven, appellant can only be convicted of two separate
crimes of homicide punishable under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor General maintains that
he should be convicted of double homicide, a complex crime
Page 161 of 196
punishable under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single
act constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
The instant case does not fall under the above
provision. The finding of the trial court tells why, thus:
“Let it be noted, though, that herein accused killed both
deceased one after the other. As described by witness
Danilo Timbal accused Genita first fired at Jesus Bascon
who was in the truck. He then shot the front tire of the truck.
After reloading, he went back to Bascon and shot him again.
During this time Reynaldo Timbal was at the back of the
truck. When Reynaldo Timbal ran away, accused fired at him
hitting the deceased on the head and wounding the
deceased’s right hand which covered his head while he was
running. For each death, therefore, accused shall be held
criminally liable.”
Appellant, therefore, must be convicted of two separate
crimes of homicide.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of
the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
appellant can only be convicted of homicide punishable
by reclusion temporal.[15] There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of
the crime, the imposable penalty is the medium period
of reclusion temporal.[16] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, appellant should be meted out the
indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayormaximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum.
With regard to civil liability, no proof was presented as to the
actual or moral damages. The trial court, however, ordered
appellant to indemnify the heirs of each of the victims the
amount of P50,000.00, which we affirm. Unlike the award of
actual damages, the award of civil indemnity need no proof
other than the death of the victim.[17] In addition, temperate
damages may be recovered under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, as it cannot be denied that the heirs suffered some
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved
with certainty. Hence, an award of P25,000.00 by way of
temperate damages would be appropriate.[18] The heirs of
Reynaldo and Jesus are awarded P50,000.00 each as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED in
 Page 162 of 196

the sense that appellant is hereby found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of two crimes of homicide. He is
sentenced to suffer (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and
four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum,
for each crime of homicide.

The appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of each of the

victims, Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon, the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for their deaths and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.


[ G.R. NO. 157718, April 26, 2005 ]
ALVIN AMPLOYO Y EBALADA, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 72, and its Resolution[3] denying petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.
On 21 July 1997, petitioner was charged with violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, in an
Information worded as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of June, 1997, and on dates
prior thereto, at Brgy. Calapandayan, in the Municipality of
Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
lewd design, and by means of force, intimidation and threats,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
commit acts of lascivious conduct with one Kristine Joy
Mosquera, a minor of eight (8) years old, by then and there
touching, mashing and playing her breast, against her will
and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.[4]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded “NOT GUILTY.” Trial
on the merits ensued thereafter. The prosecution presented
as witnesses (1) the complainant herself, Kristine Joy
Mosquera; (2) complainant’s mother, Gnelida Gallardo
Mosquera; and (3) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) psychologist Lucrecia
Cruz. Petitioner, on the other hand, waived his right to
present evidence[5] after his demurrer to evidence[6]was
denied by the trial court.[7]
The facts, as appreciated by the trial court, are as follows:
Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June
1997,[8] having celebrated her eighth year the day before. A
grade III student, she was walking to school (which was just
a short distance from her house) at around seven o’clock in
the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged
from hiding from a nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy
were neighbors. Petitioner approached Kristine Joy,
touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it
then moved down to touch her breast several
times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine Joy not to report to
anybody what he did to her.
This was not the first time that the incident happened as
petitioner had done this several times in the past, even when
Kristine Joy was still in Grade II. However, it was only during
this last incident that Kristine Joy finally told somebody – her
grandmother, who immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera,
Kristine Joy’s mother.
Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who said that
petitioner would sometimes even insert his hand under her
shirt to caress her breast. Mother and child then reported
the matter to the barangay. From the barangay, the case
was referred to the DSWD then to the Police Department of
Subic, Zambales.
On 07 November 1997, Kristine Joy was seen by a
psychologist, witness Lucrecia Cruz, who reported that
Kristine Joy was a victim of sexual abuse and was showing
unusual behavior as a result thereof. Among other things,
Ms. Cruz detected in the eight-year old child feelings of
insecurity, anger, anxiety and depression. Guilt feelings
were also noted. All in all, Kristine Joy appeared on the
surface to be a child with normal behavior despite the
experience, but on a deeper level, she developed a fear of
going to school as petitioner might again be hiding in the
store waiting for her. She was deeply bothered during the
interview and even uttered “Nahihiya ako sa mga magulang
ko at uncle ko baka tuksuhin akong bobo na hindi ko agad
sinabi.”
Kristine Joy continued going to school, but this time
accompanied always by an adult relative.
On 22 September 1999, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
Court finds the accused Alvin Amployo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Child Abuse defined
under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act 7610 and hereby
sentences him to Reclusion Temporal in its medium period
or FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY TO SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and to pay the
costs.[9]
The Court of Appeals, as adverted to earlier, affirmed the
Decision of the trial court by dismissing petitioner’s appeal
for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court of Appeals modified its ruling relative to the penalty
imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED. However, the penalty is MODIFIED such that
accused-appellant is sentenced to imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
Page 163 of 196
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.[10]
Hence, the instant petition, the following issues having been
presented for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING HEREIN PETITIONER
OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO SEC.
(5) ARTICLE III OF RA NO. 7610 DESPITE THAT THE
FACTUAL MILIEU NEGATES THE SAME
II.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED ACT OF HEREIN PETITIONER
CONSTITUTES ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS AS
PENALIZED UNDER SEC (5) ARTICLE III OF RA NO. 7610
The first issue basically questions the sufficiency of the
evidence adduced to prove acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). According to
petitioner, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of said crime, particularly the element
of lewd design.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that even
assuming that the acts imputed to him amount to lascivious
conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC and not child abuse under
Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610 as the elements thereof
have not been proved.
Rep. Act No. 7610, the “Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,”
defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty
therefor in its Article III, Section 5:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following;
(a) . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a childexploited in prostitution

or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period; . . .
Thus, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused
can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious conduct
on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5
of Rep. Act No. 7610.
First Issue:
Article 336 of the RPC on Acts of Lasciviousness has for its
elements the following:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age;
and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either
sex.[11]
The presence of the second element is not in dispute, that is,
Kristine Joy was below 12 years old on the material date set
in the information. It is the presence of the first element
which petitioner challenges, claiming that lewd design has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent
or obscene;[12] it is characterized by or intended to excite
crude sexual desire.[13] That an accused is entertaining a
lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the
existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out
such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted
as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd
designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves
and the environmental circumstances.[14] What is or what is
not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed
into a precise definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez[15] we
had already lamented that –
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule
specifically establishing just what conduct makes one
amenable to the provisions of article 439[16] of the Penal
Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be
determined from the circumstances of each case. It may be
quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts
are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in
another case to say just where the line of demarcation lies
between such conduct and the amorous advances of an
ardent lover.
In herein case, petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be
inferred from his conduct firstly because the alleged act
occurred at around seven o’clock in the morning, in a street
very near the school where people abound, thus, he could
not have been prompted by lewd design as his hand merely
slipped and accidentally touched Kristine Joy’s
breast. Furthermore, he could not have been motivated by
lewd design as the breast of an eight year old is still very
much undeveloped, which means to say there was nothing
to entice him in the first place. Finally, assuming that he
indeed intentionally touch Kristine Joy’s breast, it was merely
to satisfy a silly whim following a Court of Appeals ruling.[17]
Petitioner’s arguments crumble under the weight of
overwhelming evidence against him. Well-settled is the rule
that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court
barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance[18] for which there are
none in this case. Besides, Kristine Joy’s testimony is
indeed worthy of full faith and credence as there is no proof
that she was motivated to falsely accuse petitioner. Thus,
we stress anew that no young and decent girl like Kristine
Joy would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself
to medical examination and undergo public trial, with
concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not impelled by
a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who
assaulted her.[19]
Clearly then, petitioner cannot take refuge in his version of
the story as he has conveniently left out details which
indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would
have been easy to entertain the possibility that what
happened was merely an accident if it only happened
once. Such is not the case, however, as the very same
petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in
the past.[20] Moreover, the incident could never be labeled as
Page 164 of 196
accidental as petitioner’s hand did not just slip from Kristine
Joy’s shoulder to her breast as there were times when he
would touch her breast from under her shirt.[21] Finally, the
theory that what happened was accidental is belied by
petitioner having threatened Kristine Joy to keep silent and
not tell on him.[22]
As to petitioner’s argument that human experience negates
the presence of lewd design as Kristine Joy had no
developed breasts with which to entice him, suffice it to say
that on the contrary, human experience has taught us
painfully well that sexual misconduct defies categorization
and what might be an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual
conduct for most might very well be the norm for some.
Finally, we dismiss for being atrocious the proposition that
petitioner was not compelled by lewd design as he was
merely satisfying a “silly whim.” Terrifying an eight-year old
school girl, taking advantage of her tender age with his sheer
size, invading her privacy and intimidating her into silence, in
our book, can never be in satisfaction of a mere silly whim.
Second Issue:
Petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty of lascivious
conduct, still he can only be convicted under the RPC since
his conduct does not amount to sexual abuse as defined
under Section 5(b), Article III of Rep. Act No. 7610.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of
Rep. Act No. 7610 that must be proven in addition to the
elements of acts of lasciviousness are the following:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.[23]
The first element obtains. Section 32, Article XIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 7610
defines lascivious conduct as follows:
(T)he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, based on the foregoing definition, petitioner’s
act of purposely touching Kristine Joy’s breasts (sometimes
under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed
in People v. Larin,[24] Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7610 does
not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for
profit, but also one in which a child engages in any lascivious
conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it,
intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible.[25] It is
sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party.[26] This is especially true in the case of
young, innocent and immature girls who could not be
expected to act with equanimity of disposition and with
nerves of steel.[27]Young girls cannot be expected to act like
adults under the same circumstances or to have the courage
and intelligence to disregard the threat.[28]
In this case, it is not hard to imagine eight-year old Kristine
Joy being intimidated by her neighbor, a full grown adult
male, who constantly accosted her while she was alone and
on her way to school and who consistently ordered her not to
report what he had been doing to her. That this child was
cowed into silence and submission and was traumatized in
the process is reflected in the psychological report[29] made
by the DSWD psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz, the latter stating
that:
BEHAVIOR OBSERVATION:
Subject appeared kemp, fair complexion, attractive, wearing
white T-shirt and maong short pants. She [was] observed to
be cooperative, attentive and expressive.
In an interview, subject disclosed that since she was in
Grade II a certain Alvin Amployo a.k.a. Tikboy who (sic)
sexually molested her. She narrated that her private part
was fondled for many times. The incident happened every
time she went to school in the morning, noontime and in the
afternoon. The abuser hide (sic) along the store way to
school. Then she was threatened not to reveal to anybody
especially to her parents.
TEST RESULT AND INTERPRETATION:
Test result revealed that subject manifest anger as she
quoted “gusto ko makulong si Tikboy ng matagal”. Indicate
strong fear, anxiety, poor concentration, nightmare, shame
and auditory hallucination. Implies low self-esteem as she
quoted “madumi na ang sarili ko, nahihiya ako sa magulang
ko at Uncle ko baka tuksuhin akong bobo na hindi ko agad
sinabi.”
Indicate that subject disturbed towards past as she quoted
“ang masidhing ala-ala ng aking kamusmusan ay yong
panghihipo ni Tikboy.” Thus, subject aiming that Tikboy be
put to jail.
CASE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION:
In summary, Kristine Joy Mosquera is a victim of sexual
molestation committed by a certain Alvin Amployo or
Tikboy. Subject was greatly affected psychologically and
emotionally. Thus, subject manifest from (sic) anger,
anxiety, poor concentration, nightmare, shame, auditory
hallucination and low self-esteem. She is deeply depressed
and suffer from traumatic sexualization. From
psychotherapeutic point of view subject needs constant
counseling to overcome her presented (sic) crisis. To assist
the subject to ventilate her ambivalent feeling. To restore
moral values, improve her self-esteem and enhance her
emotional and social functioning.
As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy
is a minor, as she was only eight years old at the time of the
incident in question.
Finally, we note that no award for moral damages was made
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals despite the
fact that the mental anguish suffered by Kristine Joy on
account of her harrowing experience is spread all over the
records of the case and has been well documented by the
psychologist who examined her as reflected in her report
quoted above. At the risk of being repetitive, proof of
Kristine Joy’s mental anguish, wounded feelings and social
humiliation finds an express outlet in her words: “madumi na
ang sarili ko, nahihiya ako sa magulang ko at Uncle ko baka
tuksuhin akong bobo na hindi ko agad sinabi” and “ang
masidhing ala-ala ng aking kamusmusan ay yong
panghihipo ni Tikboy.” We therefore modify the ruling of the
Court of Appeals by awarding moral damages to Kristine Joy
in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[30]
Additionally, we find relevant to discuss here the case
of People v. Solmoro[31] wherein we declared that upon a
finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages may be further
awarded to the victim in the same way that moral damages
are awarded to victims of rape even without need of proof
because it is assumed that they suffered moral
injury. Considering that the crime of acts of lasciviousness
or abusos dishonestos is necessarily included in rape[32] and
both cases involve sexual assault albeit in different degrees,
the rationale for foregoing with proof of moral damages in
rape cases applies with equal force to crimes of acts of
lasciviousness, the rationale being:
Page 165 of 196
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is
applicable to the present disposition. The Court has also
resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded
to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as
the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof
of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the
practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et
probate in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases
should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape
with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate
pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma
of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which
constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since
the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such
agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists
by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the
case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved
through a testimonial charade.[33]
It does not end there. In People v. Abadies,[34] and with
respect specifically to lascivious conduct amounting to child
abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610, we imposed
a fine of P30,000 for each count of lascivious conduct in
addition to the award of moral damages on the justification
that –
It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
7610 provides for the penalty of
imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section 31(f), Article XII
(Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the imposition of
a fine subject to the discretion of the court, provided that the
same is to be administered as a cash fund by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development and
disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child victim, or any
immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator
of the offense. This provision is in accord with Article 39 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the
Philippines became a party on August 21, 1990, which
stresses the duty of states parties to ensure the physical and
psychological recovery and social reintegration of abused
and exploited children in an environment which fosters their
self-respect and human dignity.
With the case of Abadies as guidepost, we impose a fine of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) on petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the
Court of Appeals modifying the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, finding accused-
petitioner ALVIN AMPLOYO y EBALADA alias “TIKBOY”
 Page 166 of 196

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act

No. 7610, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty
(20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby ordered to
pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) and
moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,

JJ., concur.

[ G.R. NO. 172695, June 29, 2007 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ISAIAS
CASTILLO Y COMPLETO, APPELLANT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information[1] dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias
Castillo y Completo was charged with the crime of parricide,
committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of
Cabuyao, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y Completo,
while conveniently armed with illegally possessed sling and
deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta
with whom he was united in lawful wedlock did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting
the latter on the right side of her neck causing the laceration
of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and
raffled to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on
April 15, 1994. Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta
Castillo, died violently in the evening of November 5, 1993.
The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due to
"laceration of the jugular vein of her neck". According to Dr.
Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba,
Laguna, who conducted the autopsy on the victim's body,
the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument like
a nail". There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot
with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife hitting her at the neck
and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written by
the accused from his detention cell addressed to his mother-
in-law, to his father-in-law, and lastly, the victim's sister,
speak so eloquently of someone who accepts the fault for
the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness from the
close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of
authorship of the fatal act.
In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack
of intent to do the fatal harm to his wife. This is the same
issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not the fatal
Page 167 of 196
injury sustained by the victim was accidental. damages.
xxxx SO ORDERED.[5]
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging
that in the evening of November 5, 1993, between 9:00 that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish his guilt
o'clock to 10:00 o'clock, the accused came home drunk and beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a Decision[6] dated
February 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals denied appellant's
was in an angry mood. The accused kicked the door and
table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, to wit:
upon by Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not
heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his sling and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated
arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them.
Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to the adjacent house of October 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24 of
Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo
heard the victim crying and, afterwards, shouting at the that accused-appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of
accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see
what was happening inside the house of Consorcia, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
SO ORDERED.[7]
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the
accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the hospital but
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
to no avail.
in a Resolution dated June 16, 2005.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal
Hence, this appeal.
injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a quarrel between
her and the accused. This spat negated the accused's
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence
version that he was practicing the use of the weapon when
on which his conviction was based did not sufficiently
Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the
prosecution's contention that the shooting was intentional.
prosecution failed to prove his motive in killing his wife; or
that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
x x x To sustain the accused's assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he
is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut
was the one who shot his wife with a deadly arrow
Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the accused was considering that at the time of the incident, he and his
keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.
drinking buddies were all engaged in target shooting using
the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of
It might be true that the accused was one of those who
them could have shot the victim. At any rate, even assuming
rushed the victim to the hospital and while on the way, he
that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was
sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified accidental and not intentional.
that while the victim was being attended to by the medical
personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime
hospital premises, then he disappeared. He was later on scene did not establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside the
His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining
comfort room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The
barangay, while his wife was being treated in the hospital,
accused's omission to surrender himself to the authorities is likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution
a clear indication of guilt.[3]
did not prove that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.
After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5,
1998, a decision,[4] the dispositive portion of which reads: Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law
and sister-in-law where he asked for forgiveness should not
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS be considered as admission of guilt.
CASTILLO Y COMPLETO GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby sentences him The petition lacks merit.
to a penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the

only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusions
and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences
are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as
to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will suffice in
a given case, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances
proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to
only one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.[8] Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof
excluding the possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind" is required.[9]
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, are present.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following
pieces of circumstantial evidence indubitably established
that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia
about the violent behavior of her (Consortia)
husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if
Consortia would not tell Leticia about the beatings,
the latter would see her face with black eyes as
evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant
arrived at their house drunk and displaying violent
behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and
practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard
crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying
Consortia, bloodied and unconscious, to be
brought to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia
sustained a punctured wound in the neck which
fatally lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the
wound was a pointed object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to
the parents and sister of Consortia asking for
forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellant's behavior immediately
after the incident. He disappeared and did not enter the clinic
where Consortia was rushed for treatment. And when
Consortia's sister later sought police assistance in searching
for accused-appellant, the latter was found by the police
hiding inside a toilet at a nearby barangay.[10]
There is no merit in appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove motive in killing his wife. Intent to
kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on
which his conviction rests.[11] Evidence to prove intent to kill
in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the
means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and
number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of
the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the
killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim
dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent
to kill is presumed.[12]
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily
established appellant's intent to kill his wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel
between the appellant and his wife. Leticia, the victim's
sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent
behavior of the appellant who would often lay hand on the
victim during their marital squabbles.
Guillermo, appellant's father-in-law, testified that on the night
of the incident, appellant arrived in their conjugal abode
drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table and
threw away the electric fan. Guillermo tried to prevail upon
appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and
arrow which he kept near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant's house and went to the house of his
daughter-in-law, Yolanda, located about four meters away;
but he could still hear the victim and appellant arguing and
shouting at each other. After a while, Guillermo requested
Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda
met the appellant carrying Consorcia soaked in blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are
primarily about human nature.[13] In the instant case,
appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to
the hospital. This is indeed contrary to human nature. A
husband is expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to
her last breath. In this case, however, appellant took flight. It
is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
Page 168 of 196
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained,
as in this case, is a circumstance from which an inference of
guilt may be drawn.[14]
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a
toilet at the adjoining barangay is not an indication of guilt
because the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately
hid in order to evade being arrested.[15]
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a
husband to leave his dying wife, more so if his absence is
unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for his
flight. In appellant's brief, he claimed that in "all probability, it
might have happened that he (appellant) was merely
answering the call of nature at the precise time when he was
arrested."[16] However, we find it is highly illogical for
appellant to go as far as the adjoining barangay to answer
the call of nature especially since he could do so inside the
premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he
was fearful of reprisal coming from the victim's relatives[17] is
contrary to his claim of innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise
proved appellant's intent to kill the victim. The autopsy report
revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the
neck, a vital organ, which fatally lacerated her jugular vein
causing massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical
injury inflicted on the deceased manifests appellant's
intention to extinguish life.[18]
Fourth: As regards appellant's act of carrying the body of his
wounded wife and bringing her to the hospital, the same
does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an
act of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant.[19]
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant's intent to
harm his wife.
There is likewise no merit in appellant's contention that he
was not the one who shot the deadly arrow because at the
time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all
playing and practicing target shooting with the use of the
sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically
testified that appellant was alone with his wife inside their
house when the incident happened. This completely
discounts the possibility that other than appellant, there
could be another person or persons who could have
perpetrated the crime. There is no paucity of evidence
because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the
victim up to the time Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were

all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of defense
witness Galang supports the prosecution's contention that
appellant was alone with his wife at the time of the incident.
As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left
his drinking buddies and headed home at about 9:00 p.m.,
as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he
saw that Consortia was being rushed to the hospital. Instead
of weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang's
testimony even supports the prosecution's version that
between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably
going home from that drinking session with his friends. x x
x[20]
There is likewise no merit in appellant's contention that
assuming he was the one who killed his wife, the same was
accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance
of accident is not applicable in the instant case. Article 12,
par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.
– The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with
due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is
burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence.[21] The defense miserably failed to discharge its
burden of proof. The essential requisites for this exempting
circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
[22]
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a
deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing a "lawful
act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant's defense of
accident must be struck down because he was performing
an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the
trial court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is
punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the legislator
took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for
no legal purpose, but to inflict injury, mostly fatal, upon other
Page 169 of 196
persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty
attain the standards as an instrument for archery of reclusion perpetua. Likewise, civil indemnity in the amount
competitions. To sustain the accused's assertion that he was of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident P50,000.00 were properly awarded by the courts below.
is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut
Guillermo Antiporta's testimony that the accused was WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.[23] Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005 which affirmed
with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, finding appellant Isaias Castillo y
appellant has the burden of proof of establishing the Completo guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the
presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the
responsibility, and to prove justification he must rely on the heirs of his victim P50,000.00 as moral damages and
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the With costs.
killing.[24] Other than his claim that the killing was accidental,
appellant failed to adduce any evidence to prove the same. SO ORDERED.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant's contention Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
that the letters he wrote to his parents-in-law and sister-in- Nachura, J., No part. Followed law office counsel de officio.
law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be
considered as an implied admission of guilt. He claimed that
he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened
was an accident and that he was to be blamed for it because
he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the sling and
arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be
settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise
by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for
forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong and a
plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise.[25] Under the present circumstances,
appellant's plea for forgiveness should be received as an
implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellant's
assertion, the killing of Consorcia was deliberate, and not by
accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart
now from the findings of the lower court as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. When the trial court's factual findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not
our function to analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all
over again except when there is serious ground to believe a
possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task
in an appeal via certiorari is limited, as a jurisdictional matter,
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by
the Court of Appeals.[26]
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court

[ G.R. No. 124392, February 07, 2003 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ “PEDING,” ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision[1] dated November 15,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D, finding accused-appellant
Federico Abrazaldo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
penalty of death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Delfin Guban the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and
P27,000.00 as actual damages, plus costs.
In the Information dated August 3, 1995 filed with the trial
court, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of
murder committed as follows:
“That on or about July 15, 1995 in the evening at barangay
Pogo, Municipality of Mangaldan, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused armed with a bolo, with
intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stabbed DELFIN GUBAN Y GUINTO inflicting upon him a
stab wound which caused his death to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
“CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659.”[2]
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not
guilty.[3] Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented as its witnesses Rosendo Fajardo,
SPO1 Ramie Petrache, SP02 Roberto Fernandez, Dr.
Alberto Gonzales and Gregorio Guban. Accused-appellant
and his sister, Marites Abrazaldo, took the witness stand for
the defense.
The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution
witnesses are as follows:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at
Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, accused-
appellant, then intoxicated,[4] attempted to hack his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the post of the latter’s
house.[5] The incident was reported to the barangay
authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr.,
Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod),
and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the
place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at his
uncle, “I will kill you!” Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant
coming out of Quinto’s house with blood oozing from his
forehead.[6] At that time, the place was well lighted by a
flourescent lamp. Guban tried to assist accused-appellant.
However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban
shouted at each other and grappled “face to face.” Accused-
appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the
abdomen[7] and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban,
the latter said, “I was stabbed by Feding
Abrazaldo.”[8] Fajardo, together with the other barangay
tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial
Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a
Medical Officer III. But after a few hours, Guban died. Dr.
Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the
cause of death was “stab wound, epigastrium, massive
hemothorax right.”[9]
Gregorio Guban, the victim’s father, testified that he was the
one who spent for his son’s funeral expenses. For the burial,
he spent P10,000.00;[10] for the 10-day funeral wake,
P10,000.00;[11] for the 9th day novena, P3,000.00;[12] and for
the hospitalization, P4,000.00,[13] or a total of P27,000.00.
On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by
accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in Salay,
Pangasinan. Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez,
Fajardo went to the house of Francisca Velasquez, accused-
appellant’s aunt, and recovered the knife. [14]
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a
different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the
evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay
Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.[15] His wife Lydia and
children Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him.
Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who was then drunk, went to his
house and shouted at him, saying, “Get out Feding I will kill
you!”[16] When accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him
with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house
and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife,
followed him and they grappled for its possession. In the
course thereof, both fell down.[17] It was then that the knife
held by Guban accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did
not know which part of Guban’s body was hit. Thereafter, he
got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.[18]
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his
brother.[19] On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in the evening,
accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in
a “drinking spree.”[20] At about 10:00 o’clock in that evening,
accused-appellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto.[21] He attempted to hack his uncle, but
instead hit the post of the latter’s house.[22] While running
away from his uncle’s place, he bumped an artesian well,
Page 170 of 196
causing a wound on his forehead.[23] Afterwards, accused-
appellant killed Guban.[24]
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
accused Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic 7659,
and in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances that the crime was committed while the public
authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties and
that the crime was committed at nighttime, which
aggravating circumstances are not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, accused Federico Abrazaldo is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death.
“Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban.
Accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Delfin Guban the total sum of P27,000.00 as actual
expenses, plus costs.
“SO ORDERED.”
In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances
under paragraphs (5) and (6) of Article 14,[25]Revised Penal
Code, the trial court held:
“We now come to the issue of whether or not evident
premeditation was present. The prosecution’s evidence is
wanting on this point. However, there is no question that
there was treachery as the accused embraced Delfin
Guban and suddenly stabbed him with a knife. The
victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time
of the attack. The deceased was stabbed without any
warning. He was given no chance to defend himself.
Treachery, therefore, qualifies the killing of the victim
and raises it to the category of murder.
“The prosecution has established thru the testimony of
Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident on July 15,
1995, the members of the barangay tanod, namely: Rosendo
Fajardo, Sr., Delfin Guban and Alfredo Laceste were
performing their duties as members of the barangay tanod.
(See p. 6 tsn September 18, 1995). This is an aggravating
circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. The members of the barangay
tanod who are public authorities were engaged in the
discharge of their duties at the time of the stabbing
incident. Besides, the incident was committed during
nighttime, that was 10:00 in the evening. Accused took

advantage of the darkness of the night for the successful
consummation of his plan to kill Delfin Guban.”
Accused-appellant, in his Appellant’s Brief, ascribes to the
trial court the following errors:
“I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE BY THE
ACCUSED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE
CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE ALLEGED WEAPON
USED IN STABBING VICTIM AT THE HOUSE OF THE
AUNT OF ACCUSED BOLSTERED THE CASE AGAINST
HIM DESPITE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
PROVE ITS VERACITY.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY EXTRACTED BY THE
PROSECUTION FROM DEFENSE WITNESS MARITESS
ABRAZALDO WHICH HAD NO SUFFICIENT BASIS AT
ALL.
IV
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE STABBING OF THE
VICTIM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROVE THE
SAME.
V
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK ADVANTAGE OF
NIGHTTIME IN CONSUMING THE ACT.
VI
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT
IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS
IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.”
Page 171 of 196
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee’s Brief, asserts that in Q And what did Delfin Guban shout at you?
pleading self-defense, accused-appellant admitted he killed
the victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his A He said, “Get out Feding I will kill you.”
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. Moreover, accused-appellant’s version of the
incident is completely contradicted by the testimony of his
sister. Also, the aggravating circumstance, under par. (5) of Q After this Delfin Guban shouted at you, what
Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was clearly established happened next?
because during the incident, Guban, as the Assistant Chief
A When I went out of the house, I was already there
Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of
infront of the house then he hit me, sir.
peace and order.
The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant
that there was no treachery. Evidence shows that he and Q You said Delfin Guban hit you, what instrument
Guban shouted at each other and struggled “face to face” did he use in hitting you?
before the stabbing incident. Thus, the assault was not
sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor General is convinced that A He hit me with a pipe , sir.
accused-appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek
nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the crime.
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is xxx xx
invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear x
and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful
aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his
part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and
repel an aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even Q After Delfin Guban hit you with that pipe, what
more difficult as the accused must show that the court below happened next?
committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence.[26]
A I ran towards my house inside, then got my two
children while Delfin Guban followed me inside my
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden.
house, sir.
To show that he was not the unlawful aggressor, he testified
that it was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill
him,[27] hit him with an iron pipe,[28]and attacked him with a
knife.[29] We quote accused-appellant’s testimony, thus: Q When Delfin Guban followed you inside your house,
what happened again?
“ATTY. CAMPOS:
A He was holding a knife and we grappled and during
that time both of us fell down, sir.
xxx xx
x
Q When you grappled with Delfin Guban, who was
holding a knife, what again happened?
Q You said a while ago that on July 15, 1995 at about
A We grappled for the possession of the knife then
10:00 in the evening you were in your house engaging
we fell down and the knife he was then holding
in fan making, do you know of any unusual incident
pointed towards him and hit him. x x x.[30]”
that happened during that time?
(Emphasis supplied)
A Delfin Guban came to my house and he was under
The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but
the influence of liquor and he shouted at me, sir.
also isolation. It is uncorroborated and even opposed by
Marites, accused-appellant’s own sister and lone witness.
Contrary to his testimony that Guban hit him on his forehead
with a pipe, Marites declared that accused-appellant

sustained the wound on his forehead when he accidentally
bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying her brother’s
defense, she virtually affirmed the prosecution’s story by
testifying that he created trouble in their compound,
attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and
killed Guban. [31]
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of
self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not
only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence
but in itself is extremely doubtful.[32] In the present case,
accused-appellant’s tendency to invoke a melange of
defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted
the commission of the crime in order to preserve his own life,
he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This
shows ambivalence. Accident presupposes lack of intention
to stab the victim, while self- defense presumes
voluntariness, induced only by necessity.[33] Indeed, if there
is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action was
to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to
the authorities. Certainly, the justifying circumstance of self-
defense[34] or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot
be appreciated considering accused-appellant’s flight from
the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of
the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife
to the authorities is inconsistent with a clean conscience
and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.[35]
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, accused-appellant
assails Fajardo’s testimony as tainted with inconsistencies
and is “contrary to the normal course.” Accused-appellant
cannot invoke these alleged weaknesses in view of the
principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution. Even if the prosecution’s evidence is
weak, it is still credible considering accused-appellant’s
admission that he killed the victim. It bears emphasis that
Fajardo’s testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. Not
only did he pull out his knife, stabbed Guban[36]and ran
away.[37] Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him,
i.e., “I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo.”[38]
As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to
divulge the truth on his demise had been lost, we cannot but
cast a quizzical glance on accused-appellant’s
uncorroborated testimony. More so, when such testimony
was contradicted by his own witness who happened to be
his sister. Standing alone against the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, accused-appellant’s own account of
the killing must necessarily fail. We hold that his guilt has
been established to a degree of moral certainty. The trial
court did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo, an
eyewitness. Time and again, we have said that we will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining
the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record
some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which
have been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. This is so because the trial court has the
advantage of observing the witnesses through the different
indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.[39]
However, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that
treachery attended the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from defense
which the offended party might make. Treachery cannot be
presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Fajardo
testified that accused-appellant and Guban were “grappling
with each other” and that prior to the stabbing, they were
shouting at each other. In this scenario, it cannot be said that
Guban was unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting
accused-appellant, or that the latter’s assault was sudden.
We quote in verbatim the testimony of Fajardo, thus:
“ATTY. CAMPOS:
Q They were not then fighting?
A They were grappling with each other and then he
stabbed Delfin Guban.
xxx xx
x
Q In fact, they were shouting each other?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they shouting against another?
A I could no longer understand because it was
already night.
Q But they were shouting loudly, am I correct?
Page 172 of 196
A Yes and there were many people.”[40] (Emphasis
supplied)
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For nocturnity to be
properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the
commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought for
by the offender. By and itself, nighttime is not an aggravating
circumstance.[41] In the instant case, no sufficient evidence
was offered to prove that accused-appellant deliberately
sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal
design. In fact, Fajardo testified that there was a fluorescent
lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of the crime.[42]
Neither can we sustain the trial court’s finding that the
aggravating circumstance under paragraph (5) of Article 14,
Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a
place where public authorities were engaged in the
discharge of their duties, is present. It must be pointed out
that this aggravating circumstance is based on the greater
perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the
commission of the crime, which must be respected.[43] In this
case, the crime was committed at the compound of the
accused-appellant where no public function was being held.
The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to
the trouble that had commenced prior to the stabbing
incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot
be considered. Moreover, under the present
Rules,[44] aggravating circumstances must be alleged,
otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. Being favorable to
the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive
effect.[45] Except treachery, the other aggravating
circumstances mentioned have not been alleged in the
Information.
In the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the
crime at bar to murder, accused-appellant can only be held
liable for homicide defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty
is reclusion temporal. Considering that there was neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in
its medium period, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the
range of prision mayor, or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.
The maximum thereof is within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period, which is 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. [46]
On the trial court’s award of actual damages in the amount
of P27,000.00, we find the same to be unsubstantiated. To
be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the
 Page 173 of 196

actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,

premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable to the injured party.[47] In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim
for expenses incurred.[48] Gregorio Guban, the father of the
victim, who shouldered the expenses for the wake and burial
failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such
expenses.[49] However, as the heirs of Guban did actually
incur funeral expenses, we are justified in awarding
P25,000.00, not for purposes of indemnification, but by way
of temperate damages.[50]

Thus, we now hold that where the amount of the actual

damages cannot be determined because of the absence of
receipts to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are
entitled thereto, temperate damages may be awarded. Such
temperate damages, taking into account the current
jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at P 50,000.00,
should be one-half thereof, or P25,000.00. This makes
temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary
damages, which is likewise fixed at P25,000.00 in cases
where its award is justified.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No.

95-01052-D is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Federico Abrazaldo is declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the heirs
of the late Delfin Guban P50,000.00 as indemnity and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio- Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on official leave.

[ G.R. No. 186128, June 23, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated April 23, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192
which affirmed the April 12, 2006 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting
appellant Susan Latosa y Chico of parricide.
Appellant was charged with parricide in an
information[3] which reads,
That, on or about the 5th of February 2002, in the
Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the legitimate wife of one Felixberto
Latosa y Jaudalso, armed with and using an unlicensed gun,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot her husband, Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso,
hitting him on the head, thereby causing the latter to sustain
gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on June 25, 2002, appellant, with the
assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.
The prosecution's evidence established the following
version:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon,
appellant and her husband Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr.
(Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae
Latosa (Sassymae) and Michael Latosa (Michael), were at
their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr. was then
asleep[4] when Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.'s
gun from the cabinet and leave. She asked her mother
where she was going and if she could come along, but
appellant refused.[5]
Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy
ice cream at the commissary. Appellant gave her money
and asked her to leave.[6] After Sassymae left, appellant
instructed Michael to follow his sister, but he refused as he
was hungry. Appellant insisted and further told Michael not
to make any noise as his father was sleeping. Nevertheless,
appellant went back inside the house and turned up the
volume of the television and the radio to full.[7] Shortly after
that, she came out again and gave Michael some money to
buy food at the grocery.
Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and
returned to the barracks located at the back of their house.
Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who
told him that he saw appellant running away from their
house. Michael did not pay any attention to his friend's
comment, and simply continued eating his ice
candy. Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and
asked if something had happened in their house. Michael
replied in the negative then entered their house. At that
point, he saw his father lying on the bed with a hole in the
left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos
about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told him that appellant
had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall
office.[8] Then, Sassymae arrived and saw her father with a
bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand.[9]
Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate sons of
appellant and the victim, also testified that sometime in
December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over
dinner about a threat to their lives by a certain Efren Sta.
Inez.[10]
Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, on the other hand
claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he asked her to
get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed.
As she was handing the pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting
Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down. Shocked, she ran
quickly to Felixberto, Sr.'s office and asked for help.[11] She
also claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. asked her for his gun,
she was on her way out of the house to follow her children
who left for the market on an errand she had earlier given
Sassymae. She claimed that she wanted to drive for them
because it was hot. She ran after them but after a few
minutes, when she realized that she did not have with her
the keys to their jeep, she went back to their
house. Felixberto, Sr. then asked again for his gun, and it
was then that it fired as she was handing it to him.[12]
Appellant further described herself as a good mother and a
good provider for their six (6) children whom she raised by
herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed
that they testified against her because they were
manipulated by her brother-in-law, Francisco Latosa.[13] She
denied that Sassymae saw her holding a gun when she
asked her to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and
Sassymae saw her holding the gun only when she placed it
inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital.[14]
Page 174 of 196
Appellant also denied her children's testimony[15] that she
was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren Sta. Inez (Sta.
Inez), a policeman. She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez
when her youngest brother was killed on June 6, 2001 by
unidentified men. Sta. Inez was the one (1) who assisted
her. She was alone at that time since her husband informed
her that he could not leave his post in Mindanao for he had
to rush some papers. She allegedly only saw Sta. Inez twice
but admitted that Sta. Inez went to the precinct when he
learned of the shooting incident.[16] She also denied that she
was terminated from her job at the Philippine Public Safety
College due to immorality for having said affair. She claimed
that she was terminated because she had incurred
numerous absences from her work as she grieved the death
of her youngest brother and had lost interest in her work
after his death.[17]
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
killing her husband Felixberto, Sr. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Art. 246 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 in rel. to
Sec. 1[,] 3rd par. PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294 and Sec.
5, RA 8294 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to further indemnify the
victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity[,] P50,000 as
moral damages and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The RTC held that the claim of accidental shooting was
inconsistent with the evidence considering the location of the
gunshot wound, which was at the left temple of Felixberto,
Sr., and the fact that the gun was found near Felixberto, Sr.'s
left hand despite his being right-handed. The trial court found
that appellant planned the killing by asking her two (2)
children to leave the house and, after the shooting, placing
the gun near the victim's left hand to suggest that the death
was suicide. But appellant overlooked the fact that
Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed. The trial court noted that
despite the grueling cross-examination of the defense
counsel, the Latosa children never wavered in their
testimonies about what they knew regarding the
circumstances surrounding the shooting incident. Their
testimonies bore the hallmarks of truth as they were
consistent on material points. The RTC found it
inconceivable that the children would testify against their
own mother or concoct a story of parricide unless they were
impelled by their passion to condemn an injustice done to
their father.[19]

The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the following
circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution: (1)
shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two (2)
children to do errands for her which were not usually asked
of them; (2) at the time of the shooting, only the appellant
and Felixberto, Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seen
running away from the house immediately after the shooting;
(4) when Michael went inside their house, he found his father
with a hole in the head and a gun in his left hand; (5) the
medico-legal report showed that the cause of death was
intracranial hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the
head with the point of entry at the left temporal region; (6)
the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant
fired two (2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed and
the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae testified
that she heard Sta. Inez tell appellant "bakit mo inamin.
Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok";
(9) appellant's children testified that they were informed by
Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of appellant's paramour,
Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa
presented a memorandum showing that appellant was
terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality.[20]
On appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA
held that since appellant admitted having killed her husband
albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving
the presence of the exempting circumstance of accident to
relieve herself of criminal responsibility. She must rely on
the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness
of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.[21]
The CA, however, found appellant's version of accidental
shooting not credible. Citing the case of People v.
Reyes,[22] the CA held that appellant's claim of accidental
shooting was negated by the following facts: (1) a revolver is
not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is
necessary to make the gun fire, cocked or uncocked; and (2)
when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is
never pointed to that person. In this case, appellant held the
gun in one (1) hand and extended it towards her husband
who was still lying in bed. Assuming that appellant was not
aware of the basic firearm safety rule that the firearm's
muzzle is never pointed to a person, she failed to explain
why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not have
fired unless there was pressure on the trigger. The location
of Felixberto, Sr.'s wound also showed that the shooting was
not accidental. Appellant did not dispute that Felixberto, Sr.
was lying down during the shooting and that after the
incident, the gun was found near his left hand. The CA found
that it was contrary to human nature that a newly awakened
military man would suddenly ask his wife, who was busy
doing other things, to bring his firearm, and patiently wait for
her to come back to their house, when the gun was just
inside an adjacent cabinet only two (2) meters away from his
bed.[23]
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in
Criminal Case No. 122621-H finding SUSAN LATOSA y
CHICO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering her to pay the heirs of Felixberto
Latosa the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Undaunted, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12,
2008.[25]
Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented
by the prosecution was insufficient to prove that she
intentionally killed her husband. She insists that the gun fired
accidentally while she was giving it to Felixberto, Sr. Since
she had no experience in handling firearms, she was not
able to foresee that it would fire accidentally and hit her
husband. After her husband was hit, she immediately rushed
to his office and asked for assistance.[26]
The only issue the Court has to resolve in this case is
whether the exempting circumstance of accident was
established by appellant.
The basis of appellant's defense of accidental shooting is
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.
- The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.
Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear
and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites
for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:
Page 175 of 196
1. She was performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.[27]
To prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of
her own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be
disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing.[28]
However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of
the gun towards her husband's head and pulling the trigger
be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As
correctly found by the CA, which we quote in full:
Appellant's version that she "accidentally shot" her husband
is not credible. Appellant's manner of carrying the caliber .45
pistol negates her claim of "due care" in the performance of
an act. The location of the wound sustained by the victim
shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. The
victim was lying down and the fact that the gun was found
near his left hand was not directly disputed by her. We find it
contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military
man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm, and even
patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said
firearm was just inside the cabinet which, according to
appellant, was just about two meters away from his bed.
xxxx
In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and
extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed.
Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how to
fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm over to the
deceased, the muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic
firearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to have
already known since she admitted, during trial, that she
sometimes handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming
further that she was not aware of this basic rule, it needed
explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it
should not, unless there was pressure on the trigger.[29]
There is no merit in appellant's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial evidence her
motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is
the essential element of the offense on which her conviction
rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the
malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors
before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the
victim, the circumstances under which the crime was

committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies
as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill
is presumed.[30]
In the instant case, the following circumstantial evidence
considered by the RTC and affirmed by the CA satisfactorily
established appellant's intent to kill her husband and
sustained her conviction for the crime, to wit:
The prosecution established the following circumstantial
evidence:
(1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do
errands for her. She first asked Sassymae to go to
Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael
to follow his sister at the Commissary which according to the
prosecution witnesses was not the usual thing the accused
would do;
(2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who
were left alone in the house;
(3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the
victim left and proceeded at the barracks located at the back
of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from
the house by Michael's friend named Macmac;
(4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the
room of their barracks and saw his father with sort of a hole
in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand
(TSN, May 5, 2003, pp. 7-8, 12-13);
(5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto Latosa was
intracranial hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the head
(per Medico-legal Report No. M-052-2002, Exh. P);
(6) Susan Latosa's paraffin test yielded positive result for the
presence of gunpowder nitrate in her right hand;
xxx
(8) The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the
victim was located at the left temporal region as evidenced
by Medico Legal Report No. M-052-2002 (Exhibit P);
(9) The victim was a right-handed and the gun was found on
the latter's left hand;
(10) Sassymae Latosa [testified] that she heard Col. Sta.
Inez [tell] her mother, ..."bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak
mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok." (TSN, May 19,
2002, p. 13); and
(11) The children testified that they were informed by the
Page 176 of 196
victim regarding the threat of Sta. Inez to the whole family
who alleged[ly] has an amorous relationship with their
mother. Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum that
accused was terminated from her teaching job by reason of
immorality.[31]
Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to review much
less depart now from the findings of the RTC as affirmed by
the CA that appellant's version is undeserving of
credence. It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the
truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the
trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to
believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will
not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect
the disposition of the case.[32] We find none in this case.
One last note. On the matter of damages, the CA awarded
exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00. We
increase the award to P30,000.00 in light of prevailing
jurisprudence[33] fixing the award of exemplary damages to
said amount.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico
is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The amount of exemplary
damages is increased to P30,000.00.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio Morales, (Chairperson), Brion,
Bersamin, and Abad,* JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-64 October 28, 1946
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIGUEL M. MORENO, defendant-appellant.
Santiago F. Alidio for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes, Assistant Solicitor
Cañizares and Solicitor Luciano for appellee.
FERIA, J.:
This is an appeal by the defendant Miguel M. Moreno from
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga,
which found him guilty of the crime charged with the
aggravating circumstances of premeditation and cruelty and
without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced the
defendant to death and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased.
The appellant was at the outbreak of the war a prisoner
serving sentence in the San Ramon Penal Colony Farm,
situated in the City of Zamboanga. During the Japanese
occupation, he befriended and gained the confidence of the
Japanese naval authorities, was released from prison, and
appointed Captain of a semi-military organization known as
Kaigun Jeutay, composed of Filipinos and sponsored by the
Japanese navy. On October 23, 1944, the defendant was
appointed by the Japanese naval authorities as section
commander of the San Ramon Penal Colony with plenary
powers of supervision and control over said colony and its
environs.
On November 23, 1944, a group of defendant's soldiers went
to the house of Paciano de los Santos, and took with them
two single young daughters of said Paciano, and on the next
day, when the deceased wet to San Ramon Penal Colony,
he was confined in a cell by order of the defendant.
On the night of December 1, 1944, defendant gathered all
the prison officials and employees of San Ramon Penal
Colony in a meeting in the house of P.D. Dellosa then
Assistant Superintendent of the institution, and in that
gathering the accused arrogantly announced that he was not
afraid to cut the head of anybody, ordered all those present
to witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos the
following day, and instructed Gregorio Magalit, a prisoner
employee of said institution to prepare the grave for said
Paciano and issue a formal memorandum to that effect. A
photostatic copy of which was presented as Exhibit D during
the trial.
And in the morning of December 2, 1944, Paciano de los
Santos was taken to a place known as Fishery Division of
the colony with both hands tied at the back, and there the
defendant ordered the victim Paciano to kneel down with the
head bent forward by the side of the grave already prepared
for him by order of the accused, and in that position the
accused with a Japanese sabre held in the handle by his
both hands, hacked the head of Paciano de los Santos, and
immediately kicked the prostrate body of the victim into the
grave.
The facts above stated were established beyond a per-
adventure of doubt by the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution, and are substantially admitted by the defendant
in his testimony during the trial. When the defendant was
asked whether he killed Paciano de los Santos in the form
and manner described by the witness for the prosecution, he
answered the following: "When I arrived at the place the
deceased Paciano de los Santos was already in the place
where I was to execute him, and was taken there by four
Japanese and several guards of San Ramon, and on the
way they have instructed me how should I kill him, I did kill
him in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for
the prosecution." (Pp. 49, 50, t.s.n.)
The attorney de oficio appointed by this court for the
defendant contends, in the four assignments of error
assigned in his brief, that the court below erred (1) in trying
the defendant in the same day on which he was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty, and not granting him two days to
prepare for trial as provided by law; (2) in trying and
convicting the accused without a preliminary investigation by
the municipal judge or Fiscal of Zamboanga City;(3) in not
compelling, by process of subpoena, the attendance of
witnesses in behalf of the defendant, and finding, despite
this failure, that the latter's testimony was not corroborated
by any witness; and (4) in finding the accused guilty of
murder with two aggravating circumstances and imposing
upon him the penalty of death.
(1) As to the first assigned error of the court below, it is true
that, according to section 7, Rule 114, the defendant after
arraignment is entitled to at least two days to prepare for
trial, except when the case is on appeal from the justice of
the peace. But this court in several cases, among them, the
case of People vs. Cruz (54 Phil., 24, 28), has already
construed said section and held that the said right may be
waived either expressly, or impliedly by not asking for time to
prepare for trial. In the present case, the defendant has
waived his right to have at least two days to prepare for trial,
by submitting himself and not objecting to the trial ordered by
the court on the same day in which he was arraigned. The
decision of this court in the case of People vs. Valte (43
Phil., 907), quoted by the attorney for the accused, does not
Page 177 of 196
support his contention, for in the said case the defendant did
not waive but exercised his right by demanding that he be
granted two days to prepare for trial.
Besides, taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
admitted having killed the victim in the form and manner
testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the only
defense he alleged is that he was ordered to do so by
Japanese naval authorities; that the defendant had in fact
been given time to prepare for his defense, because before
the trial had begun, the said attorney, after a conference with
the defendant, asked the court to issue subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to Nicanor Punsala and Timoteo
Almonte, employees in San Ramon Penal Colony, and to
Gregorio Magalit, a detainee in the stockade of Zamboanga,
and the subpoenas were issued and served on the same
date, August 6, upon them; and that after three of the
witnesses for the prosecution had testified, the trial was
adjourned and continued on August 7 and 8; it may be
concluded that had there been any error such an error is not
a reversible one, for it did not impair the substantial rights of
the defendant.
(2) With respect to the second assignment of error, the
record shows that the defendant has waived his right to a
preliminary investigation in a communication called a motion
of July 30, 1945, filed with the court, in which the said
defendant states that "he respectfully waives his right to a
preliminary investigation and request that this case be
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for
final decision."
Section 1 and 7, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court use the
words "preliminary investigation," but a cursory reading
thereof would clearly show that the investigation mentioned
therein is not the preliminary investigation proper in which
the defendant has the right to present his evidence. That is
the reason why said investigation made for the purpose of
issuing the warrant of arrest of a defendant if it appears that
his arrest is justified, is defined by section 1 as "a previous
inquiry or examination made before the arrest of the
defendant." Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued
without a probable cause, has nothing to do with the right of
the defendant to a preliminary investigation, and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal from a judgment in which
the defendant is found guilty of the offense charged beyond
a reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
The preliminary investigation proper to which the defendant
is entitled as apart of the due process of law in those cases
in which the statute provides for it, is that established by
section 11, of same Rule 108, and consist in the right of the
defendant, after his arrest, to "be informed of the complaint
or information filed against him . . . of the substance of the
testimony and evidence presented against him," and to be

allowed "to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his
favor." And the defendant has waived expressly his right to
that preliminary investigation, as above stated.
(3) In his third assignment of error, the attorney for the
defendant states that "the lower court erred in not compelling
by process of subpoena the attendance of witnesses in
behalf of the appellant as provided by the Philippine
Constitution, and finding, despite this failure, that the
testimony of the appellant was corroborated by any
witnesses."
This assignment of error is clearly without foundation;
because the same attorney admits in his brief that, the would
be witnesses for the defense Nicanor Punsalan, Timoteo
Almonte and Gregorio Magalit were, upon petition of his
attorney in the court below, served on August 6 with
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum issued by the court,
That "Nicanor Punsalan and Timoteo Almonte were not
examined or presented as witnesses in behalf of the
appellant," does not support the contention of dependant's
attorney that they have not been compelled by subpoena to
appear in court as witnesses. The presumption is that they
had appeared in compliance with the subpoena, there being
nothing in the record to show the contrary, and that if they
had not been presented as such by the attorney for the
defendant, it was because their testimonies were not
favorable to the latter; as evidenced by the testimony of said
Magalit, the other witness subpoenaed for the defense, who
was used by the prosecution as a rebuttal witness and
testified against the accused.
(4) The fourth or last assignment of error, is also without
merit. Because the defendant, testifying in his own behalf,
admitted having killed Paciano de los Santos on the date
and in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for
the prosecution, and the only defense that he executed or
killed the deceased in obedience to an order given him by
Japanese officers of the navy, by whom he was informed
that the deceased was one of those who were encountered
by the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanese
soldier, is not supported by any evidence in the record. And
because assuming that there was such an order, it would not
justify the crime committed by defendant and exempt him
from criminal liability.
That there was no such order, oral or written, is clearly
shown by the defendant's own incredible, contradictory and
unsupported testimony relating to his having been ordered
by the Japanese naval officer to kill the deceased, which
reads as follows:
P. declarando aqui los testigos de la acusacion todos dijeron
de que ejecucion de aquel Paciano de los Santos era por
orden de Vd, es cierto eso? — R, senor.
P. Tambien declararon aqui de que Vd. habia ordenado a n
tal Magalit, su assistant para que notificara al jefe y a los
empleado de la Colonia de San Ramon para que estuviera
presente en el dia y hora de ejecucion de Paciano de los
Santos, es cierto esto? —R. Eso era el diciembre 1.0.
P. Si? — R. Cuando el Capitan Susuki y el Commander
Tanigawa se fueron a mi oficina me ordeno para que
ejectura a Paciano de los Santos.
P. Y cual era objecto de Vd. al notificar a los oficiales y
empleados de la Colonia Penal de San Ramon para el que
estuviera presente al tiempo de la ejecucion de Paciano de
los Santos? — R. Para que durante la manana cuando me
estaban dando ordenes de que yo ejecute esa orden de
matar a Paciano de los Santos que ellos esten presentes,
porque yo estuve discutiendo con el Capitan Susuki, yo les
dije que no podia hacerlo.
P. Por que? — R. Por ellos insistian, y yo les dije que
realmente no podia hacerlo, pero entonces ellos me dijeron,
Tienes que obedecer porque esa ordende Major Susuki
tienes que cumplir, de lo contrario tines que venir con
nosotros.
P. Que mas? — R. Asi pues era la orden de Major Sasaki.
P. Que mas? — R. Y como yo no podia esquivarme de la
orden que ellos me daban, yo les pedi si voy a hacer la
ejecucion ellos tienen que presenciar tambien para que ellos
vean que yo lo hago contra mi propia voluntad. Entonces, el
Capitan Susuki me dijo que ellos no podian estar presentes
porque tenian que volver acquel mismo dia a Zamboanga.
(Pp. 48, 49, t.s.n.).
JUZGADO: P. Aquel suspuesto orden que recibio Vd. de los
oficiales del navy para la ejecucion de Paciano de los
Santos dada a Vd. por escrito o verbalmente? — R. Una
carta del Commander Tanigawa llevada alli a mi oficina y la
orden fue firmada por el Major Sasaki.
P. Aquella carta estaba dirigida a Vd? — R. Si, senor.
P. Y tiene Vd. en sur poder esa carta? — R. Tenia todo eso
en el record alli en San Ramon pero no se ahora no se
puede encontrar.
FISCAL ATILANO.
Q. you had office in San Ramon, as you say? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You had also a record clerk who kept all your papers? —
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this particular order you said that was given to you by
Major Sasaki was also delivered to your record clerk Mr.
Page 178 of 196
Magalit? — A. Si, senor, yo le he dado para que ponga al file
de cartas recibidas. (Pp. 58, 59, t.s.n.).
The above-quoted appellant's testimony is unsupported. And
it is not only unsupported, but contradicted by the witness for
the prosecution whose testimony about the order of the
appellant to witness the beheading of the victim we have
already stated above, and by Gregorio Magalit who testified
that he had not received or seen the alleged written order of
Major Sasaki.
It is also incredible and contradictory as a cursory reading of
the above would show. The appellant testified that he
ordered them to witness the execution of Paciano de los
Santos, so that "during the morning when they will give me
orders to execute the mandate to kill Paciano de los Santos,
they be present" (emphasis supplied); but in the same breath
he added: "as I could not refuse to comply with their order, I
asked that if I had to execute it, they should also be present
so that they would see that I do against my will. The Captain
Susuki told me that they could not be present because they
had to return that same day to Zamboanga." (P. 49, t.s.n.)
Upon being pressed to explain how could the mere act of his
beheading Paciano de los Santos inform those present that
he (the defendant) had acted against the order of the
Japanese authorities, he tried to give an explanation that
does not explain by saying that, on the night previous to the
execution, he informed the officers and employees of San
Ramon Penal Colony, gathered by his order in the house of
Mr. Dellosa, "that he had been ordered by Major Sasaki to
kill Paciano de los Santos, and asked their opinion about it."
This explanation does not explain, because, aside from
being contradicted by the witnesses for the prosecution (p.
68, t.s.n.), if it were true that he had already informed them
about it, why did he still require them to be present at the
execution of Paciano de los Santos, specially when,
according to his own testimony, the Japanese officers who
gave him the order could not be present because they had to
return the same day to Zamboanga?
But assuming that such an order was really given by Major
Sasaki, it could not exempt the defendant from criminal
liability, either under subsection 6, article 11, or subsections
5 and 6, article 12, of the Revised Penal Code.
Not under subsection 6 of article 11, because, in killing the
deceased, the defendant has not acted in obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. The
alleged order was not for lawful purpose, because the
deceased was to be killed without any previous trial or
hearing, and Commander Sasaki has no authority to give or
issue such an order. This court, in the case of United
States vs. Garcia (5 Phil., 58), held that it is not a defense to
a charge of homicide that it was committed under an illegal
order of an officer of the United States Army.

And not under subsections 5 and 6, article 12, of the same
Revised Penal Code, which exempt from criminal liability any
person "who acts under the compulsion of an irresistable
force," or "who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable
fear of an equal or greater injury." Because it is plain that
there was no compulsion of an irresistible force that
compelled the defendant to kill the victim against his will; nor
was there any threat of such a serious character and
imminence as to create in the mind of the defendant an
uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil or injury
would be inflicted upon him if he did not comply with the
alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part of the
defendant's testimony relating to a sort of a threat is the
following: "As they insisted and I informed them that I could
not do it, then Captain Susuki told me: You have to comply
with the order, he had to come along with them, is not such a
threat as contemplated by said provision of the Revised
Penal Code; especially, taking into consideration that the
defendant himself declared that the captain told him "that
they could not be present (at the execution of the deceased)
because they had to return that same day to Zamboanga."
(P. 49, t.s.n.)
At the oral argument, the appellant's attorney invited the
attention of this court to a letter received by him from the
defendant Moreno, where it is stated, among other things,
that his attorney de oficio in the court below, Atty. Timoteo
de los Santos, was a relative (kamaganak) of he deceased
Pacianode los Santos, and this court ordered that said letter
be attached to the record. Later on, the Solicitor General
presented to this court the affidavits of Timoteo de los
Santos and Maximo de los Santos, attorney in the lower
court and brother respectively, of the deceased Paciano de
los Santos, in which the affiants declare that the victim was
not related at all to said Timoteo de los Santos.lawphil.net
Although the attorney for the appellant in this court did not
impugn in his brief the manner of conducting the defense by
the attorney de oficio for the defendant in the court below, in
his memorandum of authorities submitted after the oral
argument he states that the letter above referred to
corraborates in part the statement of Attorney De los Santos
appearing in the stenographic transcript when he said,
among other things, "Por encima de micircunstancia
personal y de mi opinion personal entre el acusado, me veo
ahora obligado a aceptar el nombramiento y defender al
acusado." In view of the fact that the appellant is charged
with a capital offense and the penalty imposed upon him by
the court below is death, we suggested, during and after the
hearing of the case on appeal, that the appellant's attorney
file a formal motion for a new trial accompanied by evidence
or affidavit of merits of witnesses who could support the
appellant's defense of having acted in obedience to a lawful
order, so as to have some legal ground to grant a new trial
and thus give the appellant additional opportunity to
substantiate his defense.
We can not find a legal way of remanding this case to the
lower court for a new trial. In the first place, because from
the fact that about eight months having already elapsed
since the oral argument or hearing of this case, and no
formal motion for a new trial has been filed as suggested, it
may be inferred that the appellant has no other evidence to
support his defense; and because after examining carefully
the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court by the
attorney de oficio for defendant, we have come to the
conclusion that, though said attorney was somewhat
reluctant at first to act as attorney de oficio for the defendant,
he accepted the appointment although his personal opinion
is against the defendant, and performed faithfully his duties
as such. Atty. Timoteo de los Santos did not cross-examine
the rebuttal witness Magalit, whose testimony was limited to
deny having received or seen any order by Major Sasaki
commanding the appellant to execute Paciano de los
Santos, for it would have been useless to cross-examine him
on that point. He did not cross-examine the witness
Carmona because he merely denied the testimony of the
defendant that, during the meeting in the house of Dellosa,
he told the officials and employees of the San Roman Penal
Colony gathered there that he did not like to execute
Paciano de los Santos. And he did not cross-examine the
other witnesses, Faustino Triplett, Rosa Orquijo and Pedro
Herrera, who testified that in the arrest of civilians by the
defendant the latter was not being accompanied by a
Japanese, for whether or not he was accompanied by a
Japanese was not material to the present case.
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the judgment of the
lower court that finds the defendant guilty of the crime of
murder with the aggravating circumstances of premeditation
and cruelty and sentences him to death, is in conformity with
the facts and law, and should therefore be affirmed with
costs against the appellant. But in view of the fact that one of
the Justices dissents from this decision, the appellant
should, according to section 133 of Commonwealth Act No.
3, as amended by Executive Order No. 86 of the President
of the Philippines dated January 7, 1946, suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua instead of death. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and
Tuason, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice concurred in this
decision.
Separate Opinions
Page 179 of 196
PERFECTO, M., tutol:
Buhay at kamatayan ang siyang natataya sa usaping ito.
Ang mahalagang suliranin na kailangan lutasin ay kung
nararapat igawad namin ang kakilakilabot na hatol upang
kitilin ang buhay ng isang salarin. Dakila ang sagutin. Upang
mabagayan ang saguting iyan, sagutin na matutularan
lamang kadakilaan ng mga sandaling ang tao ay humaharap
sa kay Bathala upang hukuman, may tumpak, malaki at
mahigpit na tungkulin na kailangang tuparin upang kami
huwag maging taksil sa aming sariling budhi at mga
sinumpaan sapagtanggap ng isang luklukan sa
Kataastaasang Hukuman.
Ang kapalaran ng nasasakdal ay nasa aming mga kamay.
Ang timbangan ng katarungan ay aming hawak sa mga
sandaling ito. Ang kasalanan ng humahabol ay napatunayan
kaya sa ibabaw ng lahat ng matuwid na alinlangan? Upang
ang kasalanang iyan ay mapatunayan, kailangang gamitin
ang mga paraang itinakda ng Saligang Batas at iba pang
mga batas upang ang walang sala ay hindi mapagkamalan,
at maparusahan lamang siyang tunay na may sala.
Ano mang higpit ng pagsusuri ng record na ngayo'y nasa
aming harap, hindi makapagbibigay ng kapanatagang loob
ukol sa pagtupad ng mga paraan na iniutos ng batas at mga
palatuntunan upang ang kasalanan ng isang nasasakdal ay
tumpak na mapatunayan sagayon sa mga simulain ng
katuwira't katutuhanan, ngkarangala't katarungan.
Sa hinahaba-habang panahon ng pakikipagbaka ng mga
dakilang diwa upang maiwasan ng sino mang walang sala
ang maparusahan, isa na sa mga kailan man ay hindi
maitatakwil na kalasag na ang isang nasasakdal ay kailan
man ay hindi mapagkakailaan ng tulong ng isang
manananggol. Kahit sino iyang taong iyang nasasakdal,
kahit siya ay pinakaaba at mangmang, kahit siya ang
pinakasusuklamang salarin, kagaya nina Yamashita at
Homma at ng mga salaring Nazi na hinukuman sa
Nuremberg, kailangan siya ay magkaruon ng tulong ng isang
manananggol, upang kanyang mapakinabangan ang lahat
ng mga sandata at paraan na ipinagkaloob ng batas upang
sa paghuhukom ay walang ibang umiral kungdi ang
katutuhana't katarungan lamang.
Sa ngayon sa record, ang nasasakdal ay hinuli at piniit
simula pa nuong Hulyo 26, 1945, araw din nang igawad ang
warrant ng Hukom Martin A. Paulati ng hukumang municipal
at nuong araw ding yaon itinala ang pangunang paglilitis na
gaganapin sa Hulyo 30, 1945. Sa ngayon sa rekord, sa araw
ding iyon si Moreno ay binasahan ng sakdal laban sa kaniya
at sumagot ng hindi pagamin. Pagkatapus ay nagrenunsya
siya ng kanyang karapatan sa pangunang paglilitis at hiningi
niya na ang usapin ay ilipat sa hukumang Unang Dulugan ng

Zamboanga. Ang Hukom Paulati naman ay ginawa ang
paglilipat.
Kasing liwanag ng sikat ng araw na makikita sa record na,
sa lahat ng mga hakbang na ginawa sapul sa pagkakahuli
ng nasasakdal hanggang ang mga papel ng usapin ai
mailipat sa hukumang unang dulugan, kahit sa alin mang
sandali ay ang nasasakdal ay hindi nagkamit ng kahit
kaunting tulong ng isang manananggol. Itong kakulangang
ito ay isang maliwanag na paglabag sa Saligang Batas. Sa
ngayon sa rekord, iginawad ng Hukom Paulati ang warrant
sa pagdakipkay Moreno dahil sa ito magsimula pa ng Hulyo
26, 1945, ay nasasakdal na sakasalanang asesinato sa
usaping bilang 157, na nagsasaad sa isang sakdal
nainiharap ng Fiscal Jose T. Atilano nuon ding Hulyo 26,
bagaman sa itaas nagsakdal ay mayruong nasusulat na
"filed July 31-45, 2:50 p.m." Maliwanag na itong notang ito'y
hindi nababatay sa katutuhanan, at ang sakdal ay iniharap
nuong Julyo 26 pa, at kung hindi ay walang katuwirang
sabihin ng Hukom Paulatisa warrant na si Moreno ay
nasasakdal sa kasalanang asesinato.
Ang karapatan ng isang nasasakdal na ipagtanggol ng isang
manananggol ay dapat kamtan sa lahat at bawa't isa sa mga
hakbang ng paglilitis, sapul sa siya'y basahan ng sakdal
(sec. 1, Rule 111). Sa ngayon sa mga palatuntunan ng mga
hukuman, sa sandaling pagharap ng nasasakdal sa pagbasa
ng sakdal, pag ang nasasakdal ay humarap na walang
kasamang manananggol, tungkuling mahigpit ng hukuman
na tanungin ang nasakdal kung nais niyang siya'y tulungan
ng isang manananggol, at pag ang nasasakdal ay walang
kayang kumuha ng sariling manananggol, tungkulin ng
hukuman ang humirang ng isang manananggol, tungkulin ng
hukuman ang humirang ng isang manananggol de
oficio (section 3, Rule 112). Sa nasa ng Kataastaasang
Hukuman na ang karapatan na ating pinaguusapan ay
huwag matawaran kahit sa anong paraan, iniuutos tuloy na
pagkalooban ang isang nasasakdal ng isang manananggol
kahit hindi titulado sa mga pook na walang maapuhap na
kahit hindi isa mang may titulo, huwag lamang mangyari na
ang isang nasasakdal ay mawawalan ng mahusay na
katulong sa sakunang kaniyang hinaharap (Section 4, Rule
112.) Sangayon sa mga inihahayag ng rekord, ang mga
nabanggit na mga tungkulin ng hukuman ay hindi tinupad
samantalang ang usapin ay hindi pa nalilipat sa hukumang
unang dulugan.
Kung susuriin ang rekord ng mga nangyari sa hukumang
unang dulugan, bagaman tila ang nasasakdal ay
pinagkaloobang sunod-sunod ng tatlong manananggol de
oficio ikinalulungkot na aminin na sa buong paglilitis
hanggang sa ang nasasakdal ay hinatulan ay katulad din sa
walang sinumang manananggol ang nakialam upang
ipagmatuwid ang lahat niyang mga karapatan.
Ang sakdal sa hukumang unang dulugan ay iniharap nuong
ika 31 ng Hulyo, 1945. Nuong araw ding iyon ay ipinakalat
ang mga babala sa nasasakdal at sa mga saksi ng
pamamahalaan na itinakda sa Agosto 3, 1945, ang tuluyang
paglilitis ng sakdal. Nuong Agosto 2, 1945, bispera ng araw
ng paglilitis, ang Teniente J.b. Villanueva, nangangasiwa ng
kinapipiitan ni Moreno, ay nagpahayag ng itong walang
manananggol. At nuon ding araw na iyon ang Hukon
Florentino Saginay hinirang si Ramon V. Villaflor na maging
manananggol de oficio ng nasasakdal.
Sa araw na itinakda, Agosto 3, 1945, humarap si Villaflor
upang hingin sa hukuman na pahintulutan siyang huwag
magpatuloy sa paglilingkod sa nasasakdalsa dalawang
dahilan: una, sapagkat siya at ang nasasakdal ay hindi
magkasundo sa mga paraan ukol sa pagtatanggol; at
pangalawa, sapagkat nais niyang pumaroon sa Kabasalan,
upang iligtas niya ng kaniyang mga kasangkapan dahil duon
ay mayruon pang mga Hapones. Ang kahilingan ay
pinaunlakan ng hukuman at hinirang naman nito si Jaime
O'Hara, bilang manananggol de oficio na kahalili, at
ipinaliban ang paglilitis para sa Lunes, Agosto 6, 1945.
Nuong Agosto 4, 1945, si Jaime O'Hara ay tumanggi rin
upang maging manananggol de oficio ng nasasakdal, sa
pagñgañgatuwirang siya'y isang kagawad ng pamahalaan at
ang palatuntunan ng servisyo sivil ay naguutos na iukol niya
ang kaniyang buong panahon sa kaniyang mga tungkulin,
bukod pa sa pangyayari na siya ay kumpadre at matalik na
kaibigan ng mga sinasabing viktima ni Moreno at inakala
niya na dahil dito ay siya ay walang ganap na kalayaan
upang kaniyang mapaglingkuran ng buong tapat ang mga
pakay ng katarungan.
Nuong Agosto 6, 1945, araw din ng paglilitis, ay ginawad ng
Hukom Sagin ang isang kautusan na pinapayagan ang
kahiliñgan ni Jaime O'Hara, at sabay na hinarang na kahalili
ang manananggol T. de los Santos.
Sangayon sa rekord, nuon ding araw na iyon ai binasahan si
Moreno ng sakdal laban sa kaniya at kaniyang sinagot ng
hindi pagamin ng kasalanan.
Sangayon sa mga palatuntunan ang mga hukuman,
pagkatapus na sagutin ang sakdal, ang nasasakdal ay
mayruong karapatang pagkalooban ng panahong hindi
bababa sa dalawang araw upang makapaghanda sa
paglilitis (section 7, Rule 114). Gayon pa man, itong mahigpit
na kautusan ng tuntunin ay sadyang nilabag, at pagkaraan
ng mga ilang minuto lamang na mabasa ang sakdal,
sinimulan agad ang paglilitis sa ika siyam ng umaga ding
iyon. Ang mananaggol Timoteo de los Santos ay nagsimula
ng magpahayag na katatanggap pa lamang niyang kaniyang
pagkahirang na manananggol de oficio na "kung ako lamang
ang masusunod, sa tapatang pahayag, ay hindi ko
Page 180 of 196
tatanggapin ang usaping ito," at sapilitan lamang siyang
tumutupad sa kautusan ng hukuman, "sa ibabaw ng aking
kalagayang sarile at ng aking paniniwalang laban sa
nasasakdal." (T. 1, 2.).
Sa bandang tanghali ng araw ding iyon ang hukuman na rin
ang nagpahayag ng sumusunod: "Mr. De los Santos
informed the court this morning that he was not ready for trial
but because the court requested him to cooperate in
disposing of the testimony of some of the witnesses, he
willingly accommodated us."(T. 25.) Ang rekord ay pipi kung
bakit ang manananggol ay nagpaunlak agad salabag-batas
na mungkahi ng hukuman at kinapus ng tibay-loob upang
ipaglaban ang karapatan ng nasasakdal na bigyan ng
panahon sa paghahanda bago humarap sa paglilitis.
Sa makatuwid, maliwanag sa mga pangyayari na pinilit ng
hukuman na ang nasasakdal ay pumasok sa paglilitis ng
hindi nakahanda, ng ang kaniyang manananggol ay hindi rin
handa, ng niyurakan ang karapatan ng nasasakdal
napagkalooban ng hindi bababa sa dalawang araw upang
makapaghanda, ng ang kaniyang sariling manananggol ay
mayroong paniniwalang laban sa ipagtatanggol. Ang
kalagayan ng nasasakdal, sangayon sa mga inihahayag ng
rekord, ay higit ang sama kay sa walang manananggol de
oficio na humarap, sapagkat ang kaniyang inaasahang
magtatanggol sa kaniya ay kaniya palang kalaban sa
paniniwala.
Ang maraming mga pagkukulang na ginawa ng nabanggit na
manananggol de oficio ay napasagwa na hindi akalaing
gagawin ng kahit pinaka baguhang manananggol. Ang
pagkukulang na iyan ay nangyari lamang dahil sa nabanggit
na manananggol ay magsimula pa sa simula ay mayruon ng
matibay na paniniwalang laban sa kaniyang ipinagtatanggol.
Hindi na paniniwalan na ang naging sanhi ay ang kaniyang
kamangmangan ukol sa batas, sapagkat wala namang
tumatawad sa kanyang kaalaman at kabihasnan.
Ang pagwawalang bahala at pagwawalang malasakit ng
manananggol de oficio ay mapatutunayan, bukod sa mga
nasabi na sa una, sa pangyayari na pito sa mga saksi ng
pamahalaan ang hindi niya pinaraan sa baso at lagangan ng
kahit isang subling tanong, at kung mayroon man siyang
mga itinanong sa ilan sa mga saksi ay kakaunti at walang
halaga ang kaniyang tanong na ginawa, sa paraang walang
naidulot at naidudulot na anomang kabutihan sa
pagtatanggol ng nasasakdal.
Bukod sa mga pagkukulang na nabanggit, ang
manananggol de oficio ay gumawa ng is an kamaliang hindi
maaring patawarin. Alam niya na ang saksing si Gregorio
Magalit ng pamahalan ay labang-laban sa nasasakdal
(Abogado De los Santos: "Queremos hacer constar que el
testigo esta muy hostil a la defensa." T. 43.) Gayon pa man,
 Page 181 of 196

kahit hindi kailangan, ginawa niya ang nabanggit na taona
maging saksi din ng nasasakdal bagaman ang mga bagay
na kaniyang itinanongsa bagong hiram na saksi ay maari
ding usisain sa pamamagitan ng pagpapatuloy ng kaniyang
mga subling tanong. Tila sinadyang gawing saksi ng defensa
si Magalit, ang pinakamahigpit na saksi ng pamahalaan,
upang mapanganyaya at dikdikin ang kapalaran ng
nasasakdal.
Ipinapasiya namin na pawalang bisa ang hatol ng hukuman
unang dulugan at ibalik ang usapin sa nabaggit na hukuman
upang litisin ng panibago pagkatapusna pagkalooban ang
nasasakdal ng isang manananggol de oficio na tunay
namakapagsanggalang sa kaniya at igalang ng hukuman
ang lahat niyang mga karapatan sa buong paglilitis
hanggang igawad ang panibagong hatol.

Kung ating maalaala ang mahusay na alegato ng

manananggol de oficio na hinirang ng Kataastaasang
Hukuman, ang kaniyang pagsusumikap at pagmamalasakit
upang ihayag ang lahat ng matuwid sa ikabubuti ng
humahabol na nasasakdal, ay lalung-lalo ng mahahalata ang
mga pagkukulang at mga pagkakamali ng manananggol de
oficio na humawak ng usapin sa hukuman unang dulugan.

Dahil sa mga pangyayaring nasasaad sa itaas, ay aming

ipinalalagay na ang nasasakda; na si Moreno ay pinagkaitan
ng kaniyang karapatan na bigyan ng panahong hindi bababa
sa dalawang araw upang makapaghanda sa paglilitis at ng
kaniyang karapatang nasasalig sa Saligang Batas na
magkaruon ng tulong ng isang manananggol, at ito'y laban
sa mga subseksion 15 at 17 ng seksion 1, articulo III, ng
Saligang Batas.

(15) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law.

(17) In all criminal prosecution the accused shall be

presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsary process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Hindi namin masasangayunan ang isang hatol na mag-uutos

na putihin ang buhay ng isang tao sa ilalim ng mga
nabanggit na paglalabag sa batas. Tiyak na alam namin na
sa aming palagay na ito ay aming inililigtas ang buhay ng
isang taona marahil ay wala ng karapatan kahit kaunti upang
magpatuloy lasunin ng kaniyang hininga ang simoy na dapat
kamtan lamang ng mga taong hindi nagkakautang ng buhay
ng kapuwa; subalit bago ang isang hukom o mahistrado ay
pahintulutang ang kaniyang kamay ay matigmak ng dugo ng
kapuwa tao ay dapat niyang tiyakin ng walang ano mang
alinglangan, na sa mga mahigpit na kautusan ng batas at na
ganyak ng sariling budhi ay wala ng ibang paraan, at ang
tungkulin ay hindi maiiwasan, matataliwasan at
matatalikuran. Sa usaping ito ay kami ay hindi nasisiyahan
upang sangayunan ang pasiya ng aming mgakapatid sa
Kataastaasang Hukuman.

[ G.R. No. 196005, October 01, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, AND EDGAR
PIMENTEL, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated 22 October 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming
with modification the Joint Decision[2] dated 3 November
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-
10054, and U-10055.
The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Cornista
(Cornista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in
conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and
for carnapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE
LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO
DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN
PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the
BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation
and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with
one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm
JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him multiple fatal
gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter,
accused escaped from their detention, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.[3]
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE
LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO
DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a.
Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use
of unlicensed firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the
BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being detention prisoners armed with an unlicensed
firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation
and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring with
one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN
BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot
wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused
escaped from their detention, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.[4]
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE
FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR
PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of
carnapping committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP
Compound, Anonas Urdaneta, in order to expedite their
escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to gain,
conspiring with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one (1)
Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to
Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without the latter’s knowledge and
consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle.
CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended.[5]
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer
(JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon
Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto
Ganceña, Dionisio Badua, Police Senior Inspector Philip
Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes,
Page 182 of 196
SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres,
Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland
Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin
Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban,
SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9
March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1
Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada
(JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut searching area near
the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned
inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua
the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open
all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa
regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day.
While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the
telephone in the administration building rang. JO2 Niturada
ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to answer
the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the
basketball court. On his way there, he turned his head
towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the
shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and shoot the
latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor
for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1
Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to
fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1
Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from
JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada
returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2
Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After
seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gate
and returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and
Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number
CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’s
knowledge and consent. They picked up Federico Delim
(Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached
Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw
jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When they
reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned
turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a
cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and
arrested appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted an autopsy on the body of

JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the death was caused by
shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right
lung. Dr. Parayno also testified that based on the injuries
sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting
was preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body
of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the death was caused
by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that
damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldad’s Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2
Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and ordered him to
clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he
was told to fix a vehicle parked inside the jail compound. He
needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find
the jack handle. He went back to JO2 Gamboa, who was in
the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2
Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back
with Badua, JO2 Gamboa handed Badua the key of the jail
compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad
continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle,
Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the other inmates
playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and
Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa
hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired towards the nipa hut.
Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He
peeped through the windows and saw Mejia pointing a
firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard
the exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He
went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for
help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start,
and the people pushing it dispersed. Intending to return to
his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding
towards the main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a
gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he
needed the latter to go with him. Fieldad, along with other
inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a
Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal pointed a long firearm
toward Fieldad, and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle.
Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they
picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentel’s Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel
was allowed to go out of his cell. He proceeded to the
basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three
gunshots, but did not immediately mind it because he was
used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he
saw Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2
Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the jail compound.
He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange
of fire. Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and
motioned to the latter by pointing his armalite downward
several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him
to remove the stone blocking the tire of the jeep parked near
the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep
because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove
the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were.
Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered
everyone to alight from the jeep, and to board the other
vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornista’s Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00
and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning the jail compound.
He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid
gunfires followed by consecutive gunfires coming from the
direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal
and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2
Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards
lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened
main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail
compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and Pimentel board
the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if
he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the
jeep down and boarded. Chan also joined them along the
way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered
Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the
other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it
turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Joint Decision
reads:
Page 183 of 196
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius
Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00
as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual
damages and Php153,028.00 for loss of earning
capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico
Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben
Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius
Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are
also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the
amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00
as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the
actual damages, and Php178,500.00 for the loss
of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico
Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben
Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie
Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of CARNAPPING and each is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS
AND EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND
TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of
Php15,000.00 and moral damages of
Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan
and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[6]

Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and
Pimentel since Chan had died.[7] They assigned the
following errors:
I acted with discernment, being able to distinguish between
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE
ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND
JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE ACCUSED RYAN
CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE
COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’
TESTIMONIES.[8]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court
only with respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into
account the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the penalties of
imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case
Nos. U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the penalties
of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[9]
The appellate court held that “it is manifest that Cornista
right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of
his acts.”[10] The Court of Appeals enumerated the following
acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with
Bacolor and hitting the latter’s head clearly demonstrated his
discernment. He took advantage of the situation where
Fieldad was also grappling with JO1 Bacolor by striking the
head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would
weaken the latter’s defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the
keys from JO2 Gamboa which he used in opening the main
gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus
established discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted
with discernment may not be excused from criminal
liability.[11]
Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of
Appeals’ decision. In the interim, Cornista filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal[12] dated 15 June 2011, which the Court
granted in a Resolution[13] dated 15 August 2011. The case
became final and executory as to Cornista on 5 October
2011.[14] The instant appeal thus pertains to Fieldad and
Pimentel only.
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective
briefs[15] filed before the Court of Appeals as their
supplemental briefs in this case.[16]
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be no treachery since “the jail
guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves
from danger and to maintain peace and order within the
compound.”[17] This argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might
take.[18]
Page 184 of 196
In People v. Escote, Jr.,[19] where an armed off-duty police
officer was killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also
be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the
danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable
to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace.
In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the
mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder,
another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of
the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and
Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1
Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear
life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was
shot at close range, thus insuring his death.[20] (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,[21] treachery was
appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one of
whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and
order. They were attending an event where many armed
peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In
that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and
had no means of defending themselves against the sudden
attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers
were not afforded any chance of defending themselves.
Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the
defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the shoulder of JO2
Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-
up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to
knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and
shot JO1 Bacolor.
Fieldad’s Identity was Established
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him
as a participant in the killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2
Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not
established. However, contrary to his contention, Fieldad’s
identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was
proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the
testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and
recounted in detail his participation in the incident:
 Page 185 of 196

Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the BJMP WARDEN JACABAN Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
kubo?
Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your A Two (2) times, sir.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
A At the time when I brought water to the place where Honor.
(sic) the guards used to take a bath there
were persons grappling possession of the PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of
armalite, sir. witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken
How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom? by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
Q With whom? observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor,
A Yes, sir. conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[23] Positive
A Charlie and Cornista, sir. identification of the accused is entitled to greater weight than
Q Will you please point to him?
the bare denial and explanation by the accused.[24]
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and
brought the water to the place where (sic) the guards A (The witness is pointing to one of the accused who
when asked his name he answered Ryan Cornista). In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldad’s self-
used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and serving defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the
Cornista grappling with whom? weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and
Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of Jail to disprove.[25] True, the conviction of an accused must rest
A Bacolor, sir.
Guard Bacolor? not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO the prosecution evidence. Hence, when the prosecution
A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir. evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused beyond
You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor? reasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
A Yes, sir. Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
A Cornista, sir.
Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now?
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is
A Yes, sir. back of his head? corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A careful
examination of the record reveals that the following evidence
Q Will you please point to him, you step down? A Bacolor fell down, sir.
establish Fieldad’s active participation in the conspiracy to
xxx kill the jail guards:
A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic)
hand (sic) with accused and who when asked his x
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with
name he answered Felmer Fieldad). Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?
possession of the latter’s armalite gun, and JO1
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A He fell down, sir. Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him at
A Yes, sir. back of the head;[26]
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?
COURT 2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2
A They got his gun, sir. Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and
Do you know Charlie? used it to shoot JO1 Bacolor;[27]
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
A Yes, sir. 3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who
A Charlie, sir. conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor, testified
Q Is he in the courtroom? that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the
COURT
victim may have been preceded by a fight
A Yes, sir. between the victim and the shooter;[28]
What kind of firearm?
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there? 4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad
A 9 MM, sir.
confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut
A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused,
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO before heading out the main gate;[29]
Charlie Fieldad).
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from 5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal,
COURT
Gamboa? Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but moments
Warden what is the name? before the gun shots rang;[30]
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.

6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the
paraffin casts[31] of the hands of Fieldad;[32] and
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid
testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldad’s
hands was positive for the presence of gun
powder nitrates,[33] as contained in her report.[34]
In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence.
We note that Fieldad’s counsel manifested during trial that
the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance of
counsel, contrary to the right of the accused.[35] However, all
the exhibits offered by the prosecution, including the paraffin
casts and test results, were admitted in the Order dated 3
March 2000.[36]
To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the
right of the accused against self incrimination. In People v.
Gamboa,[37] we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected
to he raises the question, under the sixth assigned error, that
it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right
is afforded to any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense whose confession or admission
may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel of his
own choice. His right against self incrimination is not
violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands.
This constitutional right extends only to testimonial
compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the
paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a
gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the
prosecution.[38] (Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.[39] Conspiracy can be inferred from and
established by the acts of the accused themselves when
said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.[40] Once conspiracy is
shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before,
during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa
disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in
the commission of the felonies. The positive testimony of
Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence
that points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was
complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killings to murder and there
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed.
However, it must be stated that Fieldad is not eligible for
parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court
correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of each
deceased the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages; however, the amount of
exemplary damages must be increased to
P30,000.00.[41] Exemplary damages are recoverable due to
the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery in the commission of the crimes.[42]
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in
connection with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1
Bacolor in the amounts of P47,845.00 and P87,349.45,
respectively, are supported by receipts and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of P153,028.00 and
P178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor,
respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the
formula
Net earning {2/3 x [80 – age at the time of death] x [gross
capacity = annual income – reasonable and necessary
living expenses]}[43]
However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court
computed the net earning capacity using
the monthly income. Hence, we multiply the amounts by
twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of P1,836,336.00 for
JO2 Gamboa and P2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.[44] The elements of the crime of carnapping are
that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the
offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the
vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner
thereof, or it was committed by means of violence against or
Page 186 of 196
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.[45]
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both
appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and
drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin
Bauzon, testified that he did not consent to the taking of his
vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner,
Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for being hearsay
because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was
missing.
Appellants’ argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal
knowledge that when he arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep
was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he
had to retrieve it from Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw
jeep was parked what did you do?
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
xxx
x
COURT
What is the description of your tamaraw?
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?
A Red, sir.
Q Plate number?
A CDY 255, sir.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
A In my name, sir.
Q What did you do when you learned that your
tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I
went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
COURT

Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxx
x
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:[47]
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed
from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain.
The term “gain” is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but
also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived or expected from the act which is performed. Thus,
the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owner’s consent constitutes gain.[48]
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants
claim that Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to
facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is
exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.[49] For
such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear or
intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and
of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.[50] A
person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the
compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well.[51] It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-
defense in equal combat.[52]
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In
the first place, Leal was already armed when
Fieldad voluntarily followed him to the place where the
Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped three times:
to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to
transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants’
testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion
of the Court of Appeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them
who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily
overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to.
Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent
danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to
escape individually. By not availing of this chance to escape,
accused-appellants’ allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable.[53]
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstance.[54] The
circumstances under which appellants participated in the
commission of the carnapping would not justify in any way
their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the
circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in their flight
from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to
take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of its owner.
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section
Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less
than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping
is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more
than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not
less than fourteen years and eight months and not more
than seventeen years and four months. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense
Page 187 of 196
punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range
whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than
the minimum prescribed.[55] Hence, the penalty imposed by
the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight
months to sixteen years and two months is in order.
The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of
P15,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal
or moral damages may be adjudicated.[56]Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.[57] Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury.[58]
The trial court’s award of nominal damages is in order.
However, we delete the award of moral damages since there
was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced
any physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, or any similar injury.
Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder
cases and in the carnapping case, we also impose on all the
amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.[59]
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated
22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November
2008 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta
City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal
Case No. U-10053 is increased to P30,000.00;
3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal
Case No. U-10054 is increased to P30,000.00;
4. The amount of P153,028.00 for loss of earning
capacity awarded to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa in
 Page 188 of 196

Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to

P1,836,336.00;

5. The amount of P178,500.00 for loss of earning

capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor in
Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to
P2,142,000.00;

6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No.

U-10055 is deleted; and

7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at

the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Acting C.J., Chairperson,) Brion, Del Castillo,

Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 203961, July 29, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS. RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND
ROGELIO "NOEL" DELOS REYES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City convicting two of
herein accused appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and
Roberto Lara (Lara), of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
and sentencing them to death. The dispositive portion of this
Court's August 15, 2001 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 272, Marikina City finding accused-appellant
RODERICK LICAYAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
and sentencing each of them to death is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that each of the accused-appellants is
ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to each of
the complainants. The award of P20,000.00 as actual
damages made in favor of complainant Joseph Co is
deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art.
83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this
decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the President of the Philippines for the possible exercise
of the pardoning power.[1]
The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was
denied by this Court in a Resolution dated October 9, 2001.
The Decision became final and executory on November 9,
2001. On November 18, 2003, the trial court issued a Writ of
Execution ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on
January 30, 2004 at 3:00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution,
and with the torrent of initiatives sparked by the passionate
national debate on the morality of capital punishment, two of
their co-accused in the original Information were arrested.
On January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), a double
arm amputee and suspected mastermind of the kidnapping
of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay, was arrested at
Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay, Escalante City. On
January 12, 2004, Rogelio Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes) was
arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del Sur.
In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
filed with this Court on January 15, 2004 (which was 15 days
before the scheduled execution of Licayan and Lara) an
Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court.
Pending resolution of the Urgent Motion, this Court, by a
vote of 7-6, issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004
ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of
Licayan and Lara for a period of 30 calendar days.[2] On
February 17, 2004, this Court, voting 8-6, issued a
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to
GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent Motion to Re-Open the
Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the
Decision of this Court dated August 15, 2001 is suspended.
The records of the case are hereby REMANDED to the
lower court for further reception of evidence pursuant to
Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with
the trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro
Mabansag. In accordance with Section 6(b) and (c), Rule
121 of the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto
Lara and Roderick Licayan is concerned, the evidence
already taken shall stand and the additional evidence as
the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered with the
evidence already in record. Towards this end, the Court
directs Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272, to hear the
case of the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan,
and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the
Office of the President and the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections.[3]
On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally
arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in the
Informations under which their co-accused Lara and Licayan
were previously indicted. We quote the material portions of
said Informations here:
Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the
above named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA
MANAYSAY for the purpose of extorting ransom in the
amount of P10 million at Goodies Pares Mami House
located at Loyola cor. Constancia St., Sampaloc, Manila,
owned and managed by the aforementioned victim Co and
thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX
likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in
Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of
Page 189 of 196
this Honorable Court where they were kept under detention
against their will until they were able to escape the following
day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on August 11, 1998.[4]
Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK
That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal,
Parang, Marikina City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
handgun and with intent to gain, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping each other, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH TOMAS CO and
LINDA MANAYSAY of the following personal properties after
forcibly taking them as hostages for ransom, to wit:
1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy
of official receipt (OR), certificate of registration (CR) of his
two (2) L-300 vans;
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela
Branch;
3. Casio G-Shock watch;
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
5. P10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners
thereof against their will.[5]
Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other
co-accused in said Informations, namely Alex Placio, Jojo
Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag,
all of whom remain at-large.
On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at
the Marikina City Jail. The trial against Licayan, Lara and
Delos Reyes proceeded. On February 17, 2009, the RTC of
Marikina City rendered its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and
Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered finding accused RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO
LARA and ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in Criminal
Case No. 98-2605-MK, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua and each of
them is also ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages to each of the complainants.

The period during which the herein accused were in
detention during the pendency of this case shall be credited
to them in full provided that they agree to abide by and
comply with the rules of the City Jail of Marikina.
However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of
ROBBERY, for lack of sufficient evidence presented by the
Prosecution to prove the guilt of the said accused beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered
ACQUITTING them of the said offense charged in the
Information.
These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX
PLACIO @ "Tata Pandak," JOJO SAJORGO, ALLAN
PLACIO, DODONG ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who
remain at-large up to the present are ordered archived and
let an (sic) alias warrants of arrests be issued.[6]
The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which, on July 4, 2012, affirmed the conviction of Licayan,
Lara and Delos Reyes in toto.[7] Licayan, Lara and Delos
Reyes filed a Notice of Appeal,[8] thus allowing this Court
another hard look into the events surrounding the captivity of
Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on August 10-11,
1998.
In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting
accused appellants' Motion to Reopen the Case, we held
that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned,
the evidence already taken shall stand, although additional
evidence may be introduced to be taken and considered with
the evidence already in record. This Court summarized said
evidence in its August 15, 2001 Decision, thus:
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called
Goodies Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela,
Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him and
the other complainant, Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's
cashier and accounting officer, to make the rounds of the
three branches for inspection and collection of left-over food
and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the
evening and last until early in the morning of the next day.
The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998,
complainants went to the Goodies Valenzuela branch where
they stayed until midnight. From there, they proceeded to the
Cubao branch where they stayed until about 12:45 a.m.,
August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the Sampaloc
branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the
loading of left-over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX,
service vehicle, three men approached him from behind.
When Co saw the men, he asked what they wanted. The
men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .38
revolver. None of the men wore any mask.
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it
from the store. The men refused to get money from the
store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went off.
When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out and asked
the men what they wanted. She told them that they could get
money from the store, but they refused to do so. Instead,
complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw
FX. Two of the men's companions were already seated in
the front seat. The man in the driver's seat asked Co for the
key to the vehicle. The three other men also boarded the
vehicle with the complainants. Co identified accused-
appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five abductors.
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that
they were made to wear caps over their heads as the vehicle
reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. After 45 minutes,
Co said he felt the vehicle stop. The rear door was opened
and he heard the voices of people approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made
of light materials and which had no ceiling. They were made
to sit on the floor. Then, they were transferred to another
room where the covers of their eyes were removed and their
feet were tied. Manaysay testified that she saw accused-
appellants in the house after the masking tape was
removed from their eyes.Co's wallet which contained
P5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace
and earrings were taken from them. A person was left to
guard them inside the room, whom both complainants
identified as accused-appellant Roberto Lara.
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to
urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if Manaysay could go
outside to do it. The guard left and came back with a half-
gallon container which he gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard[9] and pleaded with him to let
them go. But the guard replied that he was just following
orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the
guard did not accept the money and instead threw it away.
[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan[10] who
was guarding them at that time] fell asleep and Co and
Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being
noticed by the look-out outside their room. After running for
several meters, complainants took refuge in a house. An old
woman living in the house allowed them to use the
telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters. The woman told them that they were in Kaolin
St., Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina. Two police
Page 190 of 196
officers from the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police
SWAT team. Complainants' case was later turned over to
the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) for investigation.
On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the
PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang,
Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held captive. A
man seen running away was arrested by SPO3 Ismael
Fajardo Jr. Upon being questioned, the man identified
himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SPO3 Fajardo
identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown
to him in court as the man he arrested. Lara pointed to
accused-appellant Licayan as one of his companions and
told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his
(Lara's) uncle's house at the back of the San Mateo Rizal
Municipal Hall. The PAOCTF members thereafter proceeded
to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant
Licayan.
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF
headquarters in Camp Crame where they were identified by
Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan,
and eight PAOCTF members.
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother,
testified that he was twice called in his office by unidentified
persons who demanded P10 million for the release of
complainants. The kidnappers were of course frustrated as
complainants were able to escape.
Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant
Licayan claimed that on August 11, 1998, at around 7:00
p.m., he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo
Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas Salvivia, a dump truck
driver; that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he was
arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having
drinks with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's
residence in Sta. Cecilia Village; and that when he was
arrested, he was not informed of the charges against him.
He said he only learned that he was arrested for the
kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to
Camp Crame.
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed
and made to stand in a police-line up. They were not
assisted by counsel. The complainants pointed to him and
Lara as part of the group who kidnapped complainants.
Licayan claimed he only saw complainant Co for the first
time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction
worker, testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August
10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo. At 7:00

a.m. of August 11, 1999, he went home to Novaliches,
stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in
Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of
his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's
belongings. However, before he could do so, he was
arrested by the Marikina Police at Greenheights.
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The
police beat him up and told him that they would go to
Salvivia's house.
He was made to board a van where his head was covered
with a plastic bag and he was again beaten up. The police
found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered
the two to drop to the ground. The police poked a gun to
Lara's head and told him to identify his companions,
otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according to Lara, he
pointed to Licayan.
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan
were identified by complainants in a police line-up, they were
forced to sign a statement. They were not informed of their
right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. Lara
denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, who appeared to
have assisted him in making his statement, actually assisted
him.[11]
In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as
rebuttal witness Confessor Sansano, the lawyer whom Lara
had claimed did not really assist him. Sansano testified that
as IBP governor and chairman, he gave free legal
assistance to all persons who could not afford the services of
a lawyer. On August 12, 1998, Police Chief Inspector
Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice Hall
of Quezon City. Sansano required the police agents to step
out of the room when he personally interviewed Lara for 10
minutes. He apprised Lara of his constitutional rights. He
was assured that Lara will tell the truth, and that Lara was
not harmed. He even examined the upper torso of Lara and
found no signs of maltreatment. He was present throughout
the investigation held in his office, until Lara affixed his
signature in the sworn statement. On cross-examination,
Sansano admitted that he cannot remember the number of
persons brought to him by Trampe for legal assistance. He
testified that he warned Lara about the implication of the
statement that he will give to the police.[12]
During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated
that the prosecution is adopting the direct testimony given by
the prosecution witnesses during the first trial. Co, however,
was recalled for additional direct examination on the alleged
participation of Delos Reyes.
Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of
the five men who abducted him and Manaysay. Delos Reyes
was the person who sat at the middle portion of the
Tamaraw FX at the back of the driver, while Co and
Manaysay were forced to sit in the rear portion of the
Tamaraw FX with two of their abductors, who later tied their
hands. Co identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not sure
whether Licayan was one of the five men who abducted
them. Delos Reyes, while seated at the middle portion of the
Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from him with a
forceful voice, "Nasaan ang susi?" and "Akina ang susi." He
did not notice any hint of Manileño or regional accent in the
voice of Delos Reyes and was not aware of said accents. He
did not immediately give the key to Delos Reyes, but the
latter repeated "Akina ang susi." The man beside him
pointed a gun at him, so he gave the key to Delos Reyes,
who then handed the key to the man seated at the driver's
seat.[13]
During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the
safehouse, Co identified Licayan and Lara on different
occasions but was not able to see Delos Reyes.[14] He
reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara to get the remaining
money inside his pocket but Lara said that he could not do it
because he will be killed. Co explained that he did not
identify Licayan and Lara by their feet. Even before he
pointed to their feet, he had already identified them by their
faces which he was positive about and he was just even
more assured of their identities when he saw their feet.[15]
The defense presented Radio Veritas reporter Corazon Zony
Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto
Olaguer, Lara's co-worker Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's
employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, and accused-
appellant Delos Reyes. Licayan was likewise recalled to the
witness stand.
Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was
able to interview Mabansag at the airport after he was
arrested. Mabansag told her that his nephew, Lara, had
nothing to do with the incident. Esguerra also interviewed
Delos Reyes at the PACER Office in Camp Crame around
two hours after he arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes told
her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila akong
tagabantay sa victim." According to Delos Reyes, the real
culprits are "Tata Placio and Allan Placio."[16]
New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer,
knowing that Licayan and Lara were scheduled for execution
in January 2004, told them before Christmas in December
2003 that he will personally attend to their case more
intensely. When he learned from Lara that his relatives did
not know the schedule of his execution, he told Lara that he
will personally inform his parents. On January 6, 2004, Lara
finally gave Msgr. Olaguer the address of his parents, but
Page 191 of 196
warned him about his uncle Pedro Mabansag: there was a
warrant for the arrest of Mabansag at the Marikina Police
Station. It occurred to Msgr. Olaguer that if Mabansag would
be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan may be
postponed. He immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando
of Marikina City and told her about the possibility of helping
him get a copy of the warrant. He was able to secure a copy
of the warrant at around 8:00 p.m. of January 7, 2004. He
called the station manager of Radio Veritas, who told him to
go to the station as he will contact the chief of the PAO. He
asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta if there is a possibility that the
lives of Lara and Licayan would be saved if Mabansag is
arrested, and she told him about the possibility of reopening
the case and suspending the execution.[17]
Before going to Bacolod, he told La about having secured
the warrant. Lara warned him that even though hiuncle
"Putol" (Mabansag) had both arms amputated, he can still
drive a car, fire a shotgun, and ride a horse. He relayed this
warning to Col. Avenido, who organized two to three teams
to arrest Mabansag.[18]
In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col. Avenido
and his group of around 20 men went to the house of Lara's
mother, and told her that her son will be executed on
January 30, 2004. He invited her to go to Manila and offered
to shoulder her travel costs. She told him that BOMBO
Radyo and ABS-CBN already offered to pay for her
expenses. During this time, the police were searching the
area and conducting interviews. The police told him that they
have to go to a certain sugar plantation to look for
Mabansag. They arrived at the sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m.
The people at the plantation, however, were not cooperative
and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag, except for a little
child who gave them a lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly
updated as regards the search for Mabansag. At around
2:00 a.m. the following day, January 9, 2004, Col. Inocentes
Capuno called him and said that they were able to
apprehend Mabansag.[19]
At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to
Mabansag. They were allowed to talk in private, wherein
Msgr. Olaguer told Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be
executed by lethal injection on January 30, 2004. Mabansag
cried and said many things in Ilonggo. Msgr. Olaguer asked
his companion to translate what Mabansag was saying. He
understood Mabansag saying "inosente man si Tungkoy,"
referring to Lara. When he informed Mabansag about
Licayan, Mabansag was so surprised and told him that he
had not seen Licayan for a long time. Mabansag said that he
knew that he was one of the accused in the case, but he was
innocent. Mabansag denied that the house where the kidnap
victims were brought was his, but clarified that it was his
daughter's house. The kidnappers offered money if he could

lend the house to them. He accepted because he needed
money at that time. Mabansag told him that he somehow
participated in the safekeeping of the victims.[20]
Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought
to the VIP room. When Mabansag was interviewed by
reporter Gus Abelgas, Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to hear
Mabansag say that he did not know anything about the
kidnapping. Mabansag also said that he was being
threatened by the police and the media people in Bacolod by
telling him "Ikaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."[21]
On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told
him exactly "Kung pupunta po kayo sa Nanay ko, mag-ingat
po kayo sa tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang dalawang
kamay niyan pero kaya pa na bumaril." Lara further told him
that Mabansag was one of the masterminds in the
kidnapping of Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer observed
that the people at the sugar plantation in Bacolod seemed to
be afraid of Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a
close connection with the rebels who were somehow
controlling the sugar plantation.[22]
Abelardo Ramirez testified that he had known Lara for five
years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang
Bakal, Bagong Silang, Parang, Marikina. Lara's house was
two houses away from his. Everytime he gets a job, he gets
Lara as his co-worker. Lara worked as a "piyon," who mixes
cement.[23]
On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at
6:00 a.m., waiting for Lara. At 7:00 a.m., Lara arrived. They
took two jeepney rides to their place of work in Antipolo
where they were constructing a residential house. They
arrived at the construction site at 8:00 a.m. and worked there
until 5:00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street because
Lara said he would go to his grandparent's house in
Novaliches. Ramirez arrived home at 6:30 p.m.[24]
On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past
8:00 a.m. They proceeded to the same construction site
where they worked until 5:00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00
p.m. and they parted ways at Kaolin.[25]
On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from
their employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador to prove that
during the kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the
certification in a small brown envelope and kept it for five
years. He retrieved the certification in 2003 when he saw on
television that Lara will be executed.[26]
Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom
she calls "Mang Bado," recommended Lara to work in the
construction of her house. On August 9, 1998, she
supervised the work of Ramirez and Lara, who both arrived
at 7:00 a.m. and worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On
August 10, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m.,
worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around 5:30
p.m. On August 11, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived past
8:00 a.m., worked until 5:00 p.m., and left at around 6:00
p.m.
On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was
arrested, and requested for a certification to prove the
whereabouts of Lara during the kidnapping incident.
Salvador executed such certification.[27]
PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the
execution of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Delos Reyes and
Mabansag. The latter was already deceased at the time of
Atty. Areza's testimony. Since Mabansag had no arms, he
stamped his right toe on the document.[28]
Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17
and 18 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated
that a TV reporter interviewed him upon arrival at the airport
in Manila. He said in the interview that Lara is not liable
("walang kasalanan") becaus Lara was working in a
construction in Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also
confirmed Mabansag's a swers in Question 30 and 31
wherein he stated that he drove away ("pinalayas") Joy,
Lara's wife, from Daang Bakal one week before August 10,
1998. Mabansag did not know whether Joy and Lara lived in
Novaliches after he drove Joy away.[29]
Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in
Questions 36 and 37 of the Sinumpaang Salaysaywherein
he stated that, on August 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag in the
safehouse. According to a certain TataAlex Placio,
Mabansag was the financier of the operation as he was the
owner of the house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the answers
of Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18 and 20 that Delos
Reyes was interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he
was in the PACER Office. He stated in said interview that
Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also
stated that he guarded the victims and did not report the
matter to the police because of his fear of Tata Alex Placio,
Allan Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie.[30]
Recalled to the witness stand, Roderick Licayan testified
that, in the police line-up, he was at first identified by Co by
pointing at his and Lara's feet. Co did not mention any
specific identifying mark on their feet. Licayan heard Co say
that whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he
looks at their feet. Licayan cannot recall how many of his
companions in the line-up were wearing shoes and how
many were wearing slippers. Licayan testified that a police
officer in civilian clothes instructed Co to point to his face. It
Page 192 of 196
took a few minutes before the victims pointed to their faces.
Co identified him and Lara from among several persons
(more than five; not sure if 10) who were in the line-up.[31]
At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew
Delos Reyes because the latter was his townmate. Delos
Reyes was not in the police line-up.[32]
Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was
arrested on January 12, 2004 in Barangay Bayang
Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and was taken to Camp Crame
where he was detained. Delos Reyes confirmed the radio
interview he had with Zony Esguerra, and that he said
therein that he was forced to guard the victims ("pinilit na
magbantay") by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing
a gun at him.[33]
Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to
the house of Mabansag to accompany a friend who wanted
to buy a fighting cock. He had previously met Mabansag at
the "manukan" sometime that same year, 1998. Delos
Reyes stated that he met Tata and Alex for the first time in
Mabansag's house. The sale of the two fighting cocks was
done outside Mabansag's house but, with Mabansag's
permission, he entered said house to drink water. Inside the
house, Tata and Jojo pointed a gun at him. He then saw a
man and a woman seated near the kitchen. The couple saw
him through the curtain. Mabansag told him,
"Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan na
mag-asawa." Tata, however, said "Dito ka lang, huwag kang
aalis." Delos Reyes answered that he will leave and that he
does not want to stay any longer.[34]
The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that
he mentioned Tata as if he knew him prior to the time he
entered the house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he
already knew Tata and Jojo two months before the incident
and that his earlier statement that he did not know Tata and
Jojo when he entered the house was not true.[35]
Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were
pointing a gun at him.[36] He saw the hands of the woman
were tied, and suspected that Tata and Jojo were engaged
in bad activities. He stayed in the place from 3:00 p.m. to
4:00 p.m. He did not help the victims because he was afraid
that Allan, Jojo, Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After
leaving the place, he stayed in the house of his godmother,
Emelita Alcober, in Concepcion for two weeks.[37]
Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara
in his residence every Sunday. Licayan was his neighbor in
the province. Delos Reyes affirmed his statement in
the Sinumpaang Salaysay that Licayan and Lara were not
liable ("walang kasalanan"). Lara was not in the safehouse,

while Licayan just happened to pass by. When Delos Reyes
entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told him that there
were kidnap victims inside.[38]
During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend
he accompanied to buy fighting. cocks was named Luisito.
He did not know Luisito's surname because he had known
him for only two weeks. He had known Tata for around two
months because Tata accompanied Mabansag when the
latter went to Delos Reyes's residence three times to bring
fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes learned from a neighbor
about Mabansag's trade of selling fighting cocks. Mabansag
usually brings the fighting cocks to Delos Reyes, at the
latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why
this changed on August 10, 1998, when Mabansag told him
to get the fighting cocks at the latter's house. When Delos
Reyes entered the safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had
already left to drive a tricycle; Delos Reyes will just give
Luisito the fighting cocks they bought at a later time.
Answering a query from the court, Delos Reyes affirmed that
after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito immediately
left.[39]
Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to
go inside the house. He did not ask permission from
Pedro Mabansag to go inside the house since he had
already gone to the place four times.[40] When asked by the
court for clarification, Delos Reyes said he did not ask for
permission from Benjie.[41] He asked Tata why he was
pointing a gun at him, to which Tata replied that he should
stay and that Tatawill kill him if he reports the matter to the
police.[42]
When Delos Reyes went near the kitchen, he saw a man
and a woman. He noticed that the woman's hands were tied,
but it did not occur to him that their captivity was the matter
that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos Reyes did
not consider it unusual to see a woman's hands
tied.[43] Despite what was happening, he stayed in the house
for one hour and merely sat on the floor near the door where
the man and the woman were kept. He was also allowed to
leave after one hour. He did not notice the persons inside
the room except for the man and the woman. Even
after Tata pointed a gun at him and he saw a woman tied, it
did not occur to him after he left the place that something
was wrong.[44]
In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos
Reyes reiterates his defense that the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case
while accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn
their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered
evidence presented during their retrial.
Whether or not the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes
Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was
found guilty at the conclusion of the retrial. The trial court
held:
With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute
the testimony of MR. CO that he was one (1) of his
abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the
Tamaraw FX and who demanded from him the key of said
vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro
Mabansag on August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend who
would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES,
after he asked permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered
his house to drink water, but he was met by a certain "TATA"
and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told
not to leave. He claimed that Tata Placio and his companion
after poking a gun at him threatened him that they would kill
him if he reports the matter to the police. He admitted that he
saw two (2) persons inside the house near the kitchen and
the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said
safehouse at 3:00 p.m., of August 10, 1998, he was allowed
to leave at 4:00 p.m., of said date. And after he left the
safehouse, he admitted that he feels not anymore being
threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he did not
report what he witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to
the police authorities.
Said accused also claimed that when "TATA" and "JOJO"
poked a gun at him and was told not to leave and not to
report to the police, he acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, hence, one of the exempting circumstances
under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court begs to disagree. DELOS REYES testified that
even before August 10, 1998, he knows already TATA and
JOJO because they went to the house of his Ninang
together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since
they all know each other, then the court cannot comprehend
why TATA and JOJO still need to poke a gun at DELOS
REYES and threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of
said accused to deny any participation in the conspiracy in
kidnapping the two (2) victims. As could clearly be gleaned
from the testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and
improbable statements. The Court also observed the
demeanor of said accused when he testified and he is
obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest falsehood and
discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony seriously impair
their probative value and cast serious doubts on their
credibility.[45]
The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the
testimony of Delos Reyes was self-serving and could not
Page 193 of 196
stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting
circumstance relied upon.[46] Before this Court, Delos Reyes
again pursues that he is exempt from criminal liability based
on Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible
force.
Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under
Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, because
he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible
force, specifically the fact that a co-accused, who is still at-
large up to this date, pointed a gun at him. Delos Reyes has
been invoking practically the same defense even before the
trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter Zony
Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that
he was merely forced to guard the victims.[47]
In People v. Dansal,[48] this Court held that a person invoking
the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible
force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act,
and must therefore prove the exempting circumstance by
clear and convincing evidence. Specifically:
He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a
mere instrument that acted not only without will but also
against his will. The compulsion must be of such character
as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or
to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature as
to induce a wellgrounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is
not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear
of future injury, is insufficient.[49]
The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine
that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by
the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the
various indicia available but not reflected on the record. It is
the trial judge that can capture the truth from the "forthright
answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the
angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere gaze, the
modest blush or the guilty blanch."[50] In the case at bar, the
trial court even expressly stated that it observed the
demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found that
he is obviously lying through his teeth.[51] This is in contrast

to the testimony of Co which the trial court described as very
clear, positive and straightforward.[52]
Even without the advantage of being able to observe the
demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination of
the transcript of his testimony convinces us of the hesitation
and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on
changing details and correcting himself even without
inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the
testimony was itself incredible. This Court finds it hard to
believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard
said victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate,
instead of conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the
regular meeting place, would invite a recent affiliate to the
place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did
not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part
of the plan to abduct and detain Co and Manaysay.
Whether or not Licayan and Lara should be acquitted
based on purportedly newly discovered evidence
The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15,
2004 allows this Court an unusual, though not
unprecedented,[53] task to revisit our own final and executory
Decision. It should be stressed that a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court
on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent
of the accused (a)t any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.[54]Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag
and Delos Reyes cannot be considered newly discovered in
that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were
already identified as such during the trial.[55] Nevertheless,
the Court, alluding to its power to suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it,[56] and noting the support of the
Office of the Solicitor General to Licayan and Lara's motion,
voted 8-6 to order the suspension of the Rules of Court itself
and remand the case to the trial court for further reception of
evidence.[57]
On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac
vice Resolution of this Court, Republic Act No. 9346[58] was
approved, irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the
severest and most permanent of penalties. In the meantime,
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unmoved by
the new evidence presented for the accused-appellants.
Thus, for the second time, Licayan and Lara were convicted
by the trial court and their appeals denied by the Court of
Appeals.
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution
expressly granted the effects of Rule 121, Section 6(b) of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. -
The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the
following:
xxxx
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall
stand and the newly discovered and such other evidence as
the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered together with the
evidence already in the record.
In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial
consists in (1) allegations that the identification of Licayan
and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2)
testimonies and affidavits of the recently apprehended
Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that
Licayan and Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3)
testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in
Antipolo during the kidnapping incident.
While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara
the opportunity to present newly-discovered evidence that
were not available during the first trial, the focus of their
defense was to show that the identification made by the
victims was unreliable. Licayan was recalled to the witness
stand to testify that in the police line-up, he was identified by
Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Licayan emphasizes
that Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their
feet, and that he heard Co say that whenever anybody
enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet.
Likewise, when Co was recalled to the witness stand to
testify as regards the participation of Delos Reyes in the
crime, the cross-examination concentrated on trying to
establish that Co was not certain about the identity of
Licayan and Lara. This Court observes that the defense was
not successful in doing so as borne out by the following
portions of the transcript:
ATTY AREZA
Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the
accused was to assure yourself about the footwear they
were wearing, that was the reason you were pointing to
their feet and not to their faces?
A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more
assured of their identities when I saw their feet.
COURT
Page 194 of 196
Q You already identified them through their faces?
A Yes, your honor.
Q You told the investigator?
A Yes, your honor.
Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their
feet?
A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day,
there was a time that they would come and enter the
room with their faces covered, but there are times that
they would forget to cover their faces so I was able to
identify them, that is the reason why I took an extra effort
in remembering their feet and what they were wearing.
Your Honor.
ATTY AREZA:
Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of
their identities and you were more assured by looking at
their feet?
PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:
Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness...
COURT
Witness may answer.
A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face
to face, sir. I was more assured when I saw their feet,
sir.[59]
Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and
Lara through their faces, prudence requires that he at least
check on the other details from his captivity to identify his
abductors. His certainty is not negated by his meticulosity.
The defense brings up several instances of supposed
inconsistencies in Co's testimony, apparently to prove that
Co's memory was unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to
whether or not Licayan was among the armed men who
abducted them; (2) that Co was inconsistent as to who
asked for the keys to his Tamaraw FX, which was used to
transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in his
affidavit what Mabansag looks like and omitted that he was a
double arm amputee; (4) that Co saw a family picture of Lara
in the safehouse which might have been the basis of his
identification of Lara; and (5) that Co corrected himself about
whether there was light in the room where he and Manaysay
were held captive.

We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in
testimonies concerning minor details and not actually
touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their
credibility. Instead of weakening the testimonies, these
inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because
they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.[60]
While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan
was among the armed men who abducted him and
Manaysay, he nevertheless positively identified Licayan as
the person with medium built, fair complexion and thin
hairline whom he talked with regarding the ransom, and who
fell asleep in the afternoon of August 11, 1998, allowing
them to escape.[61] Manaysay also identified Licayan as one
of the persons she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,[62] as
the person who removed the masking tape from her
eyes,[63] and the person guarding them who fell asleep,
allowing them to escape.[64]
Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to
believe that Co and Manaysay, the victims of a heinous
crime, would use the picture of Lara at the safehouse and
make up the following statements just to pin an innocent
person for an offense he did not commit. Co identified Lara
as the short, tiny black man who guarded them shortly after
they arrived at the safehouse and brought the plastic
container for Manaysay,[65]the guard with whom he tried to
plead with for their lives but who told them that he was just
following orders, and refused the money that Manaysay
managed to keep to herself during their
captivity.[66] Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons
she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,[67] and as the one
who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the
safehouse, who gave her a plastic container, and with whom
Co pleaded with to help them escape.[68]
It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several
opportunities to see the faces of Lara and Licayan. Co and
Manaysay each identified Lara and Licayan in both
the police line-up and the trial proper in open court. In the
line-up, they were chosen from a group of 10 persons, the
other members of which have appearances that do not offer
any clue that differentiate them from Lara and Licayan.[69]
As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in
his affidavit,[70] wherein he described Mabansag as
"matangkad at medyo matanda na ang tawag nila ay
Putol"[71] it was clear that Co was merely being asked to
describe in general the persons he saw during his captivity:
"Doon sa bahay na sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo
mayroon ka bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa
limang tao na tumangay sa inyo?"[72] We examined
Mabansag's picture in the records[73] and observe that even
in said picture, Mabansag's allegedly short stature and his
being an amputee was not immediately apparent because of
what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was
wearing similar clothes at the time Co saw him, it is very
possible that be simply did not notice Mabansag's handicap.
The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac
vice resolution to grant a new trial was supposed to be the
testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, who both denied that Licayan and Lara
participated in the crime. The statements of Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, however, would have been given more weight
had they personally admitted their own involvement in the
crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense,
Mabansag stated in his interview with Gus Abelgas that he
(Mabansag) does not know anything about the
kidnapping.[74] We cannot give weight to his denial that
Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if he, himself,
claims that he does not know anything about the kidnapping.
On the other hand, Delos Reyes swears that he was merely
forced at gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at the scene
of the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of August 10,
1998.[75] Delos Reyes claims that Lara was not in the
safehouse, while Licayan just happened to pass by.[76] Co
and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the
crime in the early morning of August 10, 1998,[77] making the
testimony as regards his absence from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00
p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand,
denies having been in the safehouse on August 10 and 11,
1999, and claims that he was at home in San Mateo,
Rizal.[78] The testimony of Delos Reyes that Licayan passed
by the safehouse sometime from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was
therefore even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.
Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker
Abelardo Ramirez and employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador,
their combined testimonies account for Lara's whereabouts
during the following dates and times:
August 9, 1998 (Sunday) from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 10, 1998 (Monday) - from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 11, 1998 (Tuesday) from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Co[79] and Manaysay,[80] however, testified that Lara was at
the scene of the crime during the early morning of August
10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1:30
a.m. of the same day. We have repeatedly held that for alibi
to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must
also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.[81] Ramirez's house, where he was fetched by
Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal,
Bagong Silang, Parang, Marikina - the very same area
where the safehouse was located. It was certainly not
Page 195 of 196
physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of
the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998 and still be
able to arrive, at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at
7:00 a.m. Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez
testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin Street,
which was the very same street Co and Manaysay ran to
when they escaped from the safehouse.[82]
In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara
not only failed to prove that either of them was in another
place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of
Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to discredit the positive
identification made by both Co and Manaysay.
Criminal and Civil Liability for Delos Reyes, Licayan and
Lara
The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom, having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, would have warranted the imposition of
the death penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346,
the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The
RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara.
Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to
be awarded to conform to recent jurisprudence. In the similar
case of People v. Gambao[83] for Kidnapping for Ransom, the
Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts
warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for
prohibition thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to wit: (1)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral
damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and
thus needs no proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages to set an example for the public good.
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally
liable for these amounts awarded in favor of each of the
victims. These amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of
the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4, 2012, which
affirmed in toto the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina in Criminal Case No. 98- 2605-MK and 98-2606-
MK dated February 17, 2009, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos
Reyes are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify each of the victims in the following
 Page 196 of 196

amounts:

(a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,

(2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
Court's Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta,** Bersamin, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.