Doubt Truth to be a Liar

GRAHAM PRIEST

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD


9 unproblernaríc. Sorne states of affairs are certainly observable (such as me coloue of an
Consistency and the Empirical Sciences
9.1 INTROOUCTION
What role does, or should, inconsistency play in me empirical sciences? This is me
question that is to be addressed in mis chapter. The question is hardlya new one,
bur me development of modern formal paraconsistent logies has a profound irnpact
on me subjecr. Paraconsistent logicians have realized that their subjecr has important
implications for me empirical sciences and the philosophy thereof, [ but discussions of
me applications of paraconsistent logic have focused largely on non-ernpirical areas,
such as semanties and metaphysics. Ir rherefore seems appropriate to address me
question direccly.
I will first address the issue of the specificiry of me empirical sciences: observation.
Next, we willlook at me role that inconsistency has played in science (henceforth in this
chapter, I will often take me qualifier 'empirical' for granted), and the relation of this
to paraconsistent logic. This wiIl raise the question of how inconsistent information
ought to be treated in science: what criteria, for example, may lead us to accepting an
inconsistent theory? And should such an acceptance ever be more than provisional?
These topies wiIl be addressed in me next secrions. An outcome of mis discussion
will be that, in me light of developments in paraconsistent logic, we may well have
to change our attitude to inconsistencies of certain kinds; such a change would open
whole new possibilities in science itself
9.2 INCONSISTENCY ANO OBSERVATION
Before we can address me issue of me role of inconsistency in empirical sciences, it will
be imporrant to discuss how such sciences differ from similar inquiries (which are often
intricarely connecred with thern), such as rnathematics and meraphysics, The standard
answer to mis question is that in me empirical sciences, but not the others, observation
plays a role. In me more developed sciences such observations are obtained through
acrive experimentation. The observations serve to provide me ultimare explananda
for science, as weIl as providing important inputs into me evaluation of scientiíic
theories, This standard answer is not entirely unproblematic: me role of empirical
data in science has often been overrared, and its role in areas such as philosophy
[ See, e.g. Priest and Routley (1989a),367-79, and Priest and Routley (1989b),494 tI
Consistency and the Empirical Sciences 143
underrated-for example, by posirivists and empiricists. However, that it plays a
much more central role in science than in other in quiries can hardly be denied.
The disrinccion between what is observable and what is not, is not, itself entirely
insect) and sorne are certainly not (such as rhe colour of a quark). But it is impossible
to draw a sharp boundary between what is, and what is notoWhat is observable may
depend on what aids to perception (such as a microscope) are used; or on how we
interprer our sensory input in me light of accepted theories (such as theories rhat tell us
that when we witness me tracks in a bubble chamber, we are seeing the tracks of charged
particles). However, as with all vague or context-dependant distinctions, me facr that
it is impossible ro drawa neat line berween its two sides does not mean thar mere is not
an importanr distinction to be drawn. (Compare: being a child and being an adult.)
Let us now revisit me discussion of observation in secrion 3.5 with mis new context
in mind. What can one see?2For a start, seeing, in me sense relevant to explanation
and confirrnation, is propositional. We see that something is me case. We see that
me stars appear to be in a certain position and ask for an explanation, or use mis
against a theory according to which they should appear somewhere else. As we noted
in section 3.5, sorne have thought that one cannot see that something is not me case.
We always see that sornething is me case, and then infer that something else is not me
case. For example, we see that something is red and infer that it is not black. Whilst
one may certainly do this, one need not: one can see directly thar sornerhing is not the
case. Try a thought experimento I show you an ordinary apple and ask: is this black?
You compare its colour with a mental paradigm of blackness, and it does not match;
you say no.' Or again, you enter a room; me whole room is visible from where you
stand; mere is no one mere. You can see that Pierre is not in me room. You do not
have to say: me things in the room are a chair, atable ... ; Pierre is not a chair, Pierre
is not atable ... ; therefore, etc." The very distincrion between seeing what is me case
and what is not me case is a false one. Sorne seeings are both, When talking of actual
physical objects, to be transparent is not to be opaque and vice versa. But you can see
that something is transparent and you can see thar something is opaque.
Ir should be remembered that seeing is not simply a matter of light rays hirring
me retina. Certainly, me eyes are involved in seeing, bur one needs more than eyes
to see. If what one sees is to playa role in one's cognitive functioning, one must
also understand one's visual input. Hence, me categories of me understanding play
a role. To see is ro interpret ones visual stimuli, by applying mese categories, either
consciously or preconsciously; and mere is no reason why truth funcrions such as
negation or disjuncrion should not enter into me process of interpretation direcrly.
For exarnple, I can see that mis is a photograph of either Ned or Ted, idenrical twins
such that I cannot tell me difference, without seeing that it is a photograph of Ned,
and inferring me disjuncrion.
2 In what follows, I will restrict myself to discussing vision, since mis is by far me most important
sensory modality in science; bur similar comments apply to me other senses.
, 1 am not suggesting mar all vision is paradigm-based in mis way, as should become clear in a
momento " The example comes from Sartre (1943), ch. 1, sect. 2.
144 Rationality
Now, suppose that a and f3 are states of affairs observable at me same time and
place, from me same perspective, etc., as I discussed in section 3.5; then, as argued
rhere, so is rheir conjunction. We can see rhat something is a unicorn; we can see that it
is green. Hence, we can see that it is a green unicorn. Thus, if a and ....,a are observable
states of affairs, so is a 1\ =a, Of course, this is not to say that the conjunction is
observed; merely that ir is observable-mat is, it is of a kind such that if it were ro be
me case, it could be seen.
In reply to me suggestion that it might be impossible to see inconsistent states of
affairs because our perceptual apparatus imposes sorne "consistency Iilrer", it suffices
to note, as we saw in section 3.5, that we perceive impossible situations in various
visual illusions. Thus, there are many well-known impossible figures (of the kind, for
example, employed by Escher in his drawings); there are perceptual sets where people
report seeing things as simultaneously red and green; there are situations where things
appear ro be moving and not moving. Let me just remind the reader of one of these,
me last." This is commonly known as me waterfall illusion. After conditioning the
visual field by showing it constant motion of a certain kind, saya spinning spiral, one
then looks at a stationary scene. The scene appears to move in the opposite direction,
but nothing in the scene changes its position, for example, an object at the top of
the visual field does not move round to the bottom. W'hat we see appears to be both
moving and stationary; this is the natural way of describing ones visual sensations. Of
course, perception in the cases I have described is not veridical:" mese are illusions, and
things are not really mus; but that is how they would appear if things were mus. There
is therefore nothing about our visual system that requires perception to be consistent.
9.3 TYPES OF INCONSISTENCY
Let us now turn to the issue ofinconsistency in science. The inconsistencies in question
here are inconsistencies in what are accepted scientific beliefs. Many historians and
philosophers of science have observed that there are such inconsistencies-indeed
that they are common---even in contemporary science.' If we distinguish between
observation and theory (what cannot be observed), rhen three different rypes of contra-
diction are particularly noteworthy for our purposes: between theory and observation,
between theory and theory, and internal to a theory itselt." Let us look at mese three
in more detail.
Inconsistency between theory and observation is me most obvious example. We
have a well-received theory, T, with a certain observable consequence, a. We then run
s Details of examples such as this can be found in most books on vision and visual illusions, e.g.
Robinson (1972). Examples of mis kind are further discussed in Feyerabend (1975), 258 fE
6 Which is not ro say that a perception of a contradictory state of affairs cannot be veridical. But
as we saw in sect. 3.5, mere are good reasons ro suppose rhat those 1 have described are nor.
7 For example, Lakatos (1970), Feyerabend (1975), ch. 5, which can be consulted for details of
many of me following examples.
8 A good general discussion of kinds of problem situations in science, including those involving
various kinds of contradictions, can be found in Laudan (1977), chs. 1,2.
Consistency and the Empirical Sciences 145
an experiment and observe that --.a. Simple-rninded falsificationists would suggest
that this shows that T is wrong and is to be ditched, But many philosophers of
science have pointed out that this does not necessarily happen.? The contradiction
may be treated as the site of an anomaly: both T and --.a may be accepted pro temo
T will not be jettisoned until we have a better alternative; --.a will not be jettisoned
until we have an explanation of why our observation was incorrecto Examples of this
kind in me history of science are many. The precession of the perihelion of Mercury,
at odds with received facts about the heavenly bodies and Newtonian dynamics, was
known for a long time before the rejection ofNewtonian dynamics in favour of special
relativiry. Prout's hypothesis was widely accepted by many chemists even though it was
known to be at odds with empirical data (much of which was subsequently rejected).
And so on.!?
The second kind of inconsistency, between theory and theory, is less frequently
noted, but cerrainly occurs. This is when we have two well-accepted theories, TI and
T2, which have inconsistent consequences. Again, though this may be noted as the
sire of a problem, both TI and T2 are retained until a suitable replacement theory
for one or both is found. An example of this concerns the age of the earth in late
nineteenth-century science. According to evolutionary theory (which was, by that
time, well accepted), the age of the earth had to be hundreds of millions of years;
bur according to received thermodynamics, the sun-and so the earth-could not
possibly be that old. (The issue was resolved only in the twentieth century with the
discovery of radioactiviry, a hitherto unsuspected form of heat-generation.) Another,
contemporary, example: the theories of relativity and quantum theory are known to
be mutually inconsistent."
The third example of an inconsistency is when a theory is self-inconsistent. This
could arise because a theory has inconsistent observational consequences, though
1know of no interesting cases of this in the history of science. W'hat there cerrainly have
been are inconsistent theories where the inconsistencies are located internally, away
from observational consequences. For example, for over a hundred years Newtonian
dynamics was based on the old calculus, in which infinitesimals had inconsistent prop-
erties (being both non-zero, at one point in computations, and zero at others). Another,
particularly striking, example is Bohr's theory of the atom, which included both clas-
sical electrodynamic principIes and quantum principIes that were quite inconsistent
with them. Though the theory was cerrainly considered as problematic, irs empirica!
9 e.g. Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1970), Feyerabend (1975). This Iiterarure is quite old now, and
many aspectsof the philosophy ofKuhn, Feyerabed, et al. have been subject to telling criticismoMuch
of the brunt of the criricim has fallen on the Kuhn/Feyerabend claims about incommensurabiliry.
This is irrelevant to the present manero
la In such situations, scientists may well, of course, have ideas about how to resolve the contra-
diction. But investigating possible ways of making a belief revision is not the same thing as making a
revision. Revisions in accepted wisdom are not made until one of these ways looks as though it will
work.
11 This is not to say that individual scientists will endorse things of the form el and -.a, much less
el /\ -.a. As I will we note in a minute, scientific knowledge is chunked, the chunks often belonging
ro different experts. el may well belong to one chunk, and -.a to another.
 146 Rationality
predications were so much better than those of any other theory at the time that it
had no real competitor.'?
9.4 HANDLING INCONSISTENCY
As we have seen, the corpus of scientific beliefs may, oc is even likely to be, inconsistent
at any time. Bur from things accepted, scientists infer other things ro be accepted,
and they do not infer arbitrary condusions. Ir follows that the inference proced-
ure employed here must be a paraconsisrent one (where an arbitrary tx and -,ct do
~ot en~ail an arbitrary {J). What paraconsistent inference procedure is employed in
inconsistent cases is another question; there is no a priori reason to suppose that it
must be one of the standard rnonotonic paraconsistent logics, or even that it musr
be monotonic at all. Nor should one suppose that ir must be the same in every case.
What is guaranteed is that there rnust be sorne systematic procedure for drawing
conclusions, and which does not permit drawing an arbitrary conclusion from a con-
tradiction. What procedure is or was employed in any given case is a matter for detailed
investigation.
I do not inrend to discuss detailed examples here; but for what follows, it will be
important for us ro distinguish between two different kinds of paraconsistent logic:
adjuncrive and non-adjunctive. In adjunctive paraconsistent logics, such as standard
relevant logics and da Costas C systems, the rule of adjunction, a, {J f- ct A {J, is
valido In non-adjunctive systems, such as discussive logics, ir is noto Non-adjunctive
paraconsisrent logics often employ sorne chunking procedure. Because of rhe failure of
adjunction, one cannot simply put arbirrary premises together and draw condusions.
If the inference procedure is not to be impoverished, it is usually necessary to be able
to put sorne premises together (into a chunk). A simple procedure is ro put together
any bunch of premises that are murually consistent; but there are more sophisticared
ones."
?ne th.ing t~t is dear .fro~ a fairly cursory consideration of the scienrific handling
of mconsistent information IS that the inference procedure employed is ofien of a
non-adjunctive, chunking, variery, For example, given the dispute about me age of
the earth at the end of the nineteenth century; no one conjoined the views that the
earth was hundreds of millions of years old, and that it was not, lO infer that the earth
12 Ir.might. be su~ested that in the situations rnentioned the scienrific cornmuniry did nor really
accep~lll.consIStenCles ..Rather, they had degrees of belief in various propositions, and their degrees
of belief III the conrradictory a and -'a were lessthan l. Now, it may well be the case that there are
de~rees of ~lief,. and that acceptance is to be understood as having a sufficienclyhigh degree; but
this suggestlOnWlll.re~ly help. For example, given the inconsistency berween the theory of evolution
an~ th~rmodynamlcs, It would follow that one or both of these theories was believed to degree ':::;0.5,
whlch ISto say that one or both of these was not accepted at all, which is untrue. Or if both were
accepted to degree 0.5, and one sets the leve! of acceptance at this figure, then inconsistencies were
accepted, as claimed.
13 For ~ general account of para.consi~ent logic, see Priest (2002b). On non-adjunctive srraregies,
s~, espeClally,sect. ~.2. A non-adJuncuve strategy which seems particularly apt for handling many
hlstoncal examples ISdescribed in Brown and Priesr (2004).
Consistencyand tbe Empirical Sciences 147
really had a contradiccory age." Similarly, in rhe Bohr theory of the atom, the drawing
of conclusions was restricted to well-defined consistent chunks, possibly in accord-
ance wirh sorne pragmatically determined-but srill dererminate=-considerations."
A conclusion dtawn may then have been fed into another consistent chunk which
contained information inconsistent with that in the first chunk.16Whether adjunctive
paraconsistent logics have, hisrorically, ever been used in handling inconsistencies is
a different matter, and is rather doubtful. At any rare, I know of no examples where
this is clearly the case.
9.5 ACCEPTING INCONSISTENT INFORMATION
We have seen that inconsistent information has sometimes been accepted in che hisrory
of science; we have also seen, at least in outline, why this does not lead to disaster.
None of this shows that rhe inconsistent information ought ro have been accepted (even
provisionally). But the situation seems ro have arisen so frequenrly that ir is implausible
ro level at the scientific community charges ofblatant and frequent irrationaliry, This,
rherefore, raises the question of the conditions under which it is reasonable ro accept
an inconsistent theory or other body of information.
The question of what makes it reasonable to accept any theory is a familiar one
in contemporary philosophy of science, and a very difficult one. Neither do 1 inrend
to advance a detailed answer to that question here. But let us recall the account of
rational belief developed in the previous two chapters.
The doxastic goodness of a theory may be evaluated under a number of orthogonal
criteria. A major criterio n is empirical adequacy. For any observational consequence,
a, that a theory entails, if a is observed, this is a good mark. Ifit is not, this is a black
mark. Empirical adequacy is, perhaps, the most important criterio n in science. Ir is,
at least, the one that mainly distinguishes the empirical sciences from similar invest-
igations. But it is certainly not the only one; nor can ir be. Ir is at least rheorerically
possible ro have different theories that are both empirically adequate; more commonly,
it happens that no theory in me field is entirely empirically adequate. Hence other
criteria have also ro be employed. There is a multitude of these;" philosophers may
disagree both about what they are, and about how, exactly, ro understand thern, but
rhe following have certainly been suggesred, and are very plausible. Good-making fea-
tures indude: simplicity, ontologicalleanness (Occam's razor), explanatory power, a
low degree of ad hocness, unity, fruitfulness, The converse features are bad: complexiry,
14 Which is not to say that people did not notice thar the theories together entail something of
the form a /\ -.a. and so conclude that there was a problem here; merely chat the corpus of accepted
beliefswas nor closed under an adjunctive logic.
15 Many non-monotonic (paraconsistent) logics incorporare pragmatic features of chis kind; for
example. in che ordering relation with respect ro which minimization is defined. See sect. 11.10.
16 For a more decailed discussion. see Smich (1988). Brown (1990) and, especially,Brown (1993)
and Brown and Priest (2004).
17 See. e.g. Quine and Ullian (1970). ch. 5. Kuhn (1977). Lycan (1988). ch. 7.
148 Rationality
ontological extravagance, explanatory poveny, much ad hocness, fragmentation,
barrenness."
The exact number of, and details concerning, criteria of these kinds, though a
highly important and interesting question, need not detain us here. The important
points are Ca)that there is a multitude, and (b) that the criteria do not necessarily
hang together. One theory, say Bohr's theory of the atorn, may have a high degree
of empirical adequacy, be very fruitful, but inconsistent. Another may be consistent,
have a lesser degree of empirical adequacy, and be rather ad hoc.As I have argued in the
previous rwo chapters, one theory is rationally preferable 10 another if it is sufficiencly
better on a sufficient number of criteria.
This account, rough as it may be, is sufficient to demonstrate a number of things.
It shows why theory choice is a messy business: there is no simple algorithm. It shows
why, within certain limirs, mere may be room ro disagree over which theory is better:
if no theory is overall best, people may reasonably disagree. AlI this is familiar from
standard philosophy of science. As we noted in previous chapters, it shows two further
things. First, it shows how and when it may be rational to accept an inconsistent theory:
when, despite its inconsistency, it is markedly better than its rivals on sufficiencly many
other criteria. Secondly, it shows when it may be right to reject an inconsistent theory,
even when inconsistency may be rationally tolerable: when a rival theory scores higher
on sufficiencly many criteria. That is, it shows how theories may be "falsified", even if
inconsistencies are sometimes tolerable.
9.6 INCONSISTENCY ANO TRUTH
But should an inconsistent corpus of belief be accepted only provisionally, until a
better one can be found; or can it be accepted as a candidate for the final truth?
Several comments are peninent here. First, there is no such thing as certainty about
anything in science. Any rheory or set of theories, whether consistent or inconsistent,
should be endorsed fallibly. All theories go beyond me data-which is itself, in any
case, "theory laden". In mis sense, the acceptance of anything is only ever provisional.
But is there something special about inconsistency in this regard? Here, it seems to
me, me nature of the inconsistency is relevant. Note, first, that if a theory is empirically
inadequate, however acceptable it is, the received information is not a candidate for
me truth, at least as things stand. If a theory entails an observable consequence a, and
a is not perceived, sornerhing is wrong, either with our theory or with our perceptions;
sornething needs to be fixed. In particular, then, if a theory entails fJ " -'fJ, where fJ is
sorne observation staternent, then if such a contradiction is not observed, something
is wrong. As I have already argued, fJ " -'fJ is a perfeccly observable state of affairs. 19
Moreover, if the inconsistency in me scientific corpus is berween a theory and an
18 The question of whether consistencylinconsistency should be on these lists is not as obvious as
it might seem. See sect. 7.4.
19 Thus, even if one suggested that one contradictory perceptually occluded the other, as discussed
in sect. 3.5, we would need sorne (presumably psychological) explanation of why this is the case.
Consistency and the Empirical Sciences 149
observation, something needs to be revised. For if theory T entails a, but -.a is
observed, not a, we again have an empirical inadequacy. It may be retorted that if
inconsistencies are acceptable, maybe a r.-.a is true after all. But again, since a r.-.a
is an observable state of affairs, and one that is not observed in the situation described,
we have an empirical inadequacy: if a r. -.a were true, so would a be, and this is
precisely what is not observed.
What if a conrradiction is one berween theory and theory, or internal to a theory,
not spilling over into observation? Here, the situation is more complicated. Suppose,
first, that one is an insrrumentalist: then all one caces about is the empirical adequacy
of a theory; if a contradiction is located deep in the heart of theory, this is of no
momento But if, as I think correct-though I shall not argue it here-one should,
in general, be a realist about scientific theories, the matter is different, and depends
crucially on how this inconsistency is handled. If it is handled by a chunking strategy,
then the theory is not a candidate for the truth. If a is true and -.a is true, then so
is their conjunction. If a theory refuses to allow this move then the theory cannot be
correct, and we know this."
If, on the other hand, the inconsistency is handled with an adjunctive paraconsistent
logic, there is no reason, as far as I can see, why we should not suppose the theory or
theories in question to be correcto In particular, then, a theoretical inconsistency that
is handled adjunctively is not, in itself a reason to suppose that the theory cannot, in
the long run, be allowed to stand. Any argurnent to the effect that such inconsistencies
are ulrirnately unacceptable must be a quite general and apriori defence of the Law of
Non-Contradiction in the appropriate form: any contradiction is known, in advance,
to rule a theory out as a candidate for the truth. I know of no such argurnent that
works. AlI fail, usually by simply begging the question in sorne way." Thus, if we are
realists, we will let our best theory, provided that ir is not ruled out as a candidate
fOI truth on other grounds, inform us as 10 what reality is like; and if our theory is
inconsistent, there is no reason to suppose that the theory does not get ir right: reality
itself is inconsistent. In other words, inconsistencies of this kind in science do not
mandare that the acceptance of the theory or theories in question be provisional in
any special way."
9.7 INCONSISTENT MATHEMATICS
It is here that me impact of paraconsistent logic is revisionary-indeed, revolutionary.
The Law of Non-Contradiction has been well entrenched in Western thought-and
20 More generally, if the inconsistency is handled with an inference mechanism that does not
respect truth-preservation, such as that of Brown and Priest (2004), the same condusion follows.
21 The major arguments are those advanced or inspired by Aristole in Metaphysics r. We sawwhy
these fail in Chapter l.
22 This raises the following question. Suppose that we have a theory based on a non-adjunctive
logic. This, as 1 have argued, is not an ultimately acceptable theory. Why can we not turn it into
one, simply by changing the underlying logic to an adjunctive (uuth-tracking) one? This may be a
possibiliry,though not if changing the logic results in the theory being empirically inadequate-which
is normally why a non-adjunctive procedure is used in the first place.
 . ,~
150 Rationality Consistencyand tbe Empírica! Sciences 151
so science-since the canonization of Arisrotle, whose defence of the law has rarely Such an understanding is bound to reflecr into our understanding of the rarionality
been challenged. Hence, scientists and philosophers have not been prepared to brook of theory-choice, in the ways that I have indicated. Perhaps most importanrly of all,
rhe thought rhat an inconsistent theory of any kind might be true. But subscribing to paraconsistency may open the gate to important new kinds of theory within science
the l.aw is not rationally mandatory, as I argued in Chapter 7, and as the development itself. Where this will alllead, one cannot even begin to speculate.
of paraconsisrent logics has played a large role in showing. Once this fact is digested, One branch of science-though perhaps not empirical science-as traditionally
scientists may well-justifiably-take a different attitude to inconsistent theories of conceived, is logic. The nature of chis brings us to the fourth part of the book. And
the appropriate kind. Indeed, they may even develop inconsistent theories, if these about the nature oflogic, one can do a lot more than speculate,
have the right empirical consequences, just as paraconsistent logicians have articulated
inconsistent theories of sernantics to handle rhe paradoxes of self-reference.
In modern science, the inferentially sophisticated part is nearly always marhern-
atical. An appropriate rnathernatical theory is found, and its theorems are applied.
Hence, a Iikely way for an inconsistent theory to arise now in science is via the applic-
ation of an inconsistent rnathematical theory. Though the construction ofinconsistent
mathernatical theories (based on adjunctive paraconsistent logics) is relarively new,
there are already a number: inconsistent number theories, linear algebras, category
theories; and it is clear that there is much more scope in this area." These theories
have not been developed with an eye to their applicability in science-just as classical
group theory was noto But once the paraconsistent revolution has been digested, it
is by no means implausible ro suppose that these theories, or ones like them, may
find physical application-just as group theory did. For example, we might determine
that certain physical magnitudes appear to be governed by the laws of sorne incon-
sistent arithmetic, where, for example, if n and m are magnitudes no smaller than
sorne constant k, n m + = +
k (as well as its being the case that n m :f: k)Y There
are, after all, plenty of episodes in the history of science in which we carne to accept
that certain physical magnitudes have somewhat surprising mathematical properties
(being imaginary, non-commuting, etc.), Why not inconsistencyr"

9.8 CONCLUSION

I believe that the developrnent of modern formal paraconsistent logics is one of the
most significant intellectual developments of the rwentieth century. In challenging
entrenched Western attitudes to inconsistency that are over 2,000 years old, it has
the potenrial to ricochet through all of our intellectual life-and empirical science
wears no buller-proof vest. As we have seen, empirical scientists have always rolerated,
and operared within, inconsistency in certain ways. One of the liberating effects of
paraconsistency should be to allow us to understand berter exactly how chis proceeded.

23 For inconsistent arithmeric, see Priest (1997 a) and (2000c). On inconsistent mathematics in
general, see Mortensen (1995).
24 I will returo to this idea in sect. 10.7. There iseven one place where an inconsistent mathematics
might possibly find an application already. In the rwo-slit experiment in quantum mechanics, the
causal anomoly can be resolved by supposing that the photon does the impossible, going through
the two slits simultaneously, and handling this with an adjunctive paraconsistenr probabiliry theory.
For details, see Priest and Routley (1989a), 377 f.
25 Which is not to say that an inconsisrenr mathematical theory must be inrerprered realistically.
Such theories may have instrumental uses, jusr as much as consisrent theories.