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MERIDA V PEOPLE (Natural Resources) YES, DENR has jurisdiction.

MERIDA V PEOPLE (DEFINITION OF TIMBER, AUTHORITY OF FOREST


OFFICERS) [NOTE: This dispositive no longer applicable since the Rules of Procedure
G.R. No. 158182 for Environmental cases requires complaint to be filed first with the DENR,
June 12, 2008 but the preliminary investigation is done by the prosecutor]

FACTS: Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:

on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio Royo
(Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses
summoned petitioner to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer
during the meeting about the felled narra tree, petitioner admitted cutting or employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately
the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix be investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense
(Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from was allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed supporting the report or complaint.
to Royo Calix's written authorization signed by Calix's wife.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan, Romblon. of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development or any of the deputized officers or officials" who reported to
* DENR forester: ordered petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private
lumber. citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez
cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report."
converted the narra trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR
employees and enforcement officers, went to the Mayod Property and saw At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD
that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of lumber. 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial
Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
with Royo, and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal
portion of the felled tree remained at the Mayod Property. The DENR Case No. 2207 as the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction.
subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter. 2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended.
* RTC (upon complaint of Tansiongco): Petitioner was charged in the
Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial court) with YES.
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Before his trial, petitioner consistently represented to the authorities that
Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang, Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did so only with
complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco) claims ownership. Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the
tree in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's
* CA: affirmed trial court. extrajudicial admissions bind him.

ISSUES & RULINGS: 3) Is the narra tree timber?

1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 YES.
even though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a
DENR forest officer; and The closest this Court came to defining the term "timber" in Section 68 was
to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."
In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified o The complaint for injunction cannot stand it being only a
dimensions or certain "stand age" or "rotation age." In Mustang Lumber, provisional relief and not a principal remedy.
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court was faced with a similar task of having  PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss.
to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 - "lumber" - to determine whether  AJIC’s motion to dismiss was denied.
possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In ruling in the  AJIC filed a motion for reconsideration and the Court reconsidered
affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or and dismissed the case on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
common usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," to determine what are legal or illegal importations.

We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68  PTFI seeks to set aside the order of respondent court and prays for
cannot be taken in its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for the continuation of the hearing of the case contending that what was
or suitable for building or for carpentry or joinery." Indeed, tree saplings or brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction for the
tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts, panelling, beams, purpose of securing compliance with the provision of the RFC.
tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber.
ISSUE:
Undoubtedly, the narra tree petitioner felled and converted to lumber was Whether or not the Bureau of Customs holds jurisdiction in the matter
"timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or joinery" and thus falls under the of wood product importation.
ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. HELD:
The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood
Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction and wood products which is to be enforced by Bureau of Customs since it has
PROVIDENT TREE FARMS, INC. (PTFI) VS HON. BATARIO & AJ under the Tariff and Customs Code the exclusive original jurisdiction over
INTERNATIONL CORP. (AJIC) seizure and forfeiture cases. To allow the regular court to direct the
GR 92285 March 28, 1994 Commissioner is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
BOC.
DOCTRINE: PTFI’c correspondence with the BOC contesting the legality of match
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating importations may already take the nature of administrative proceedings the
the issues to a regular court in keeping with the exhaustion of administrative pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under
remedies. (primary jurisdiction) the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
FACTS:
 PTFI is a Phil corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 20 the
supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for production of court held that —
matches.
 There’s a state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in
. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of
industrial tree plantation under Revised Forestry Code which provides
primary
a set of incentives to corporations like PTFI and is a qualified ban
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a
against importation of wood.
controversy involving a question which is within the
 Respondent, AJIC, imported matches from Indonesia which the BOC
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
released which violates the Revised Forestry Code’s ban of importing
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
wood and wood-derivated products.
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of
RTC: the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
 PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential
damages with prayer for a TRO against Commissioner of Customs to to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
prohibit the latter from importing matches. administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
 AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
o The Commissioner of Customs and not the regular court has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality of an In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized
importation. administrative boards or commissions with the special
o The release of importations had rendered injunction moot knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
and academic. promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
o The prayer for damages has no basis as the Commissioner’s matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of
acts are in accordance with law. discretion, has become well indispensable . . . .
The court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin The Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator recommended
such act which is within its prerogative, except when in the exercise of its that a formal investigation be conducted. An excerpt from its Memorandum
authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, states:
we have no occasion to rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or
excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us. We find the explanation of respondent unsatisfactory. While
he is authorized to conduct preliminary investigation in all
Thus, the order of the RTC was affirmed and the petition for review cases of violations of P.D. 705, as amended, otherwise
was denied. known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Sec.
68-A thereof provides that it is the Department Head or his
MOMONGAN V OMIPON duly authorized representative who may order the
confiscation and disposition of the forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
At around 10:00 o'clock of November 14, 1992, police officers of the
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
Municipality of Hinunangan, Southern Leyte apprehended Dionisio Golpe
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
while he was driving his truck loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on
and logs were impounded. A complaint was filed against Basilio Cabig, the
the matter.
alleged owner of the logs. After conducting the preliminary investigation,
respondent Judge Rafael B. Omipon found that a prima facie case exists
against Mr. Cabig but he ordered the release of the truck inasmuch as the There may be some facts that are not extant in the records
owner/driver, Mr. Golpe, was not charged in the complaint. which can only come out during a formal investigation to
better establish clear culpability or exoneration over the
respondent.
Regional Director Augustus L. Momongan of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources filed the instant complaint against respondent Judge
alleging that his order releasing the truck used in the transport of illegally In view thereof, and to give respondent an opportunity to
cut forest products violated Presidential Decree 705, as amended by clear himself, it is respectfully recommended that this
Executive Order No. 277, Section 68 and 68-A1and Administrative Order matter be referred to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T.
No. 59, Series of 1990.2 Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte, for
authority to order the release of the truck despite the non-inclusion of Mr. investigation, report and recommendation within sixty days
Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the from receipt of the records.3
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan,
Southern Leyte for appropriate disposition as the same falls under the In the Resolution of November 8, 1993, the Court resolved to refer the case
administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and Natural to Acting Executive Judge Leandro T. Loyao, Jr., RTC, Branch 26, San Juan,
Resources Office. Southern Leyte, for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records.4
In his comment, respondent Judge explained that after conducting the
preliminary investigation, he found that Golpe, the owner of the truck, is During the first two hearing dates, complainant was unable to attend but
principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of sent his representatives, DENR lawyer Constantino Esber and legal assistant
hollow blocks. On his way home after delivering hollow blocks in Barangay Romeo Gulong. Respondent Judge appeared with his counsel. However, on
Sto. Niño II, he met his friend Cabig who requested him to load sliced the third hearing date, respondent Judge failed to appear as he suffered a
lumber and deliver the same at Brgy. Lungsod-daan, Hinundayan to be stroke and was hospitalized. Thereafter, DENR counsel Esber manifested
used for the construction of a barangay high school building. They were that their office has filed a motion for reinvestigation and for the turnover of
apprehended when the truck had a flat tire. After changing the tire, both the jeep to the PNP and subsequently, to the DENR. He also manifested
the lumber and the truck were ordered deposited at the police station of that the complainant is submitting the administrative matter for resolution
Hinunangan. and recommendation without adducing evidence against respondent.
Respondent's counsel did not object to complainant's manifestation. The
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the counsel of both complainant and respondent jointly agreed to submit the
crime of illegal logging and, being a mere accessory, he might be utilized by case for appropriate action.
the Acting Chief of Police as prosecution witness against Cabig. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent The Investigating Judge's confidential report, in part, states:
Judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion, ordered the release of the
truck owned by Golpe.
In view of this development in the course of an intended investigation or gathered forest products and all conveyances used in the commission of
this investigator could not elicit additional facts than are found in the the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws.
records, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. Respondent was given an However, as complainant himself likewise pointed out, this power is in
opportunity to explain the unfavorable circumstances against him but he relation to the administrative jurisdiction of the DENR.
was overtaken by a serious illness. So much was expected from the
complainant to supply the facts not extant in the records, but he lost We do not find that when respondent Judge released the truck after he
interest in substantiating his April 1993 report to the Supreme Court. In conducted the preliminary investigation and satisfied himself that there was
fact, he was submitting this administrative matter for resolution without no reason to continue keeping the truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705
adducing evidence against respondent. and Adm. Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not render nugatory
the administrative authority of the DENR Secretary. The confiscation
Except for the 21 January 1994 motion for reinvestigation of DENR proceedings under Adm. Order No. 596 is different from the confiscation
counsel Esber which sought for the inclusion of jeep owner and driver under the Revised Penal Code, which is an additional penalty imposed in the
Dionisio Golpe in the criminal information, there is nothing new that can event of conviction. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized
be added to the facts found by the Honorable Deputy Court again either by filing a motion for reinvestigation and motion to include the
Administrator as reflected in his Memorandum for the Honorable Chief truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done as
Justice dated 12 October 1993. manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59.
Section 12 thereof categorically states that "[t]he confiscation of the
There being no actual investigation conducted, no additional facts could conveyance under these regulations shall be without prejudice to any
be reported and consequently, there is no basis for a recommendation criminal action which shall be filed against the owner thereof or any person
on the basis of facts. who used the conveyance in the commission of the offense."

This investigator can only recommend appropriate action by the Petitioner is of the opinion that under the circumstances, respondent Judge
Supreme Court on the basis of the facts already extant in the records should have turned over the truck to the Community Environment and
with a prayer for consideration of respondent plight especially so since Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of San Juan, Southern Leyte for
on account of this investigation his health has deteriorated and may appropriate disposition. No doubt, this would have simplified matters and
affect his efficiency output as a judge. Perhaps, allowing him to bow out prevented the present situation from occurring wherein one government
of the service with honor and corresponding benefits.5 official files a complaint against another. Under Sec. 4 of Adm. Order No.
59, if the apprehension is not made by DENR field offices, deputized
military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending illegal logs
During the pendency of this case, respondent Judge filed for disability
and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the nearest
retirement. His application was approved but his pension was not released
DENR field offices and turn over said forest products and conveyances for
pending the outcome of this case.
proper action and disposition. A period of about two weeks lapsed from the
time the seizure was made before a complaint was filed. During this period,
We find respondent Judge's order to release the truck owned and driven by the apprehending policemen had enough time to turn over the logs and the
Mr. Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable, hence, he is not subject to any truck to the nearest DENR field office for proper action and disposition since
disciplinary sanction. the duty to turn over the truck to the nearest DENR field office rests on the
officials apprehending the illegal logs. There being no mandatory duty on
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45, first paragraph: "[E]very the part of respondent Judge to turn over the truck, he should not be
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the visited with disciplinary sanction when he did not refer the same to the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with DENR field office in San Juan, Southern Leyte.
which it was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds
and instruments or tools "be the property of a third person not liable for The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the National Police, the DENR,
offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut the prosecutors, and the members of the bench to coordinate with each
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be other for a successful campaign against illegal logging. It behooves all the
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not concerned agencies to seriously strive for the attainment of the
indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge not to constitutionally-declared policy to "protect and advance the right of the
release the truck. people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature"7 in order to preserve our natural resources for the
Complainant is correct in pointing out that based on Pres. Decree No. 705, benefit of the generations still to come.
Sec. 68-A and Adm. Order No. 59, the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED. 1) WoN Hardwood should pay forest charges due and payable under its
Timber License Agreement to UP or to the BIR?
INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER COMPANY OF THE 2) WoN UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed
PHILIPPINES, petitionerappellee, vs. UNIVERSITY OF THE personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the
PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., respondentsappellants Central Experiment Station area as described in Republic Act No.
G.R. No. 52518. August 13, 1991 3990, and to scale the timber thus felled and cut?
J. Davide, Jr.
RTC Ruling: Ruling in favor of Hardwood. The demands of UP have no legal
FACTS: basis. The cession in full ownership of the tract of land under RA 3990 was
Kind of action: a special civil action for declaratory relief with injunction expressly made ‘subject to any existing concessions.’ Inasmuch as at the
Effects of cession in full ownership of a land removed from public time of RA 3990, the Hardwood’s timber concession over the tract of land
domain was existing and would continue to exist until February 1, 1985, UP will
Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of acquire ‘full ownership’ and exclusive jurisdiction to control and administer
plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive the property only after February 1, 1985.
license for a period of 25 years expiring on February 1, 1985.
Sometime on September 25, 1961, during the effectivity of License Arguments of opposing sides before the SC:
Agreement President Garcia the issued EO No. 791 thereby withdrawing UP HARDWOOD
from sale or settlement and reserving for the College of Agriculture, A. Under RA 3990, UP may UP has not been granted by R.A.
University of the Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy collect forest charges because No. 3990 the authority to collect
Research and production studies of this College, a certain parcel of land of the Timber License forest charges or the authority to
the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and Pakil, Agreement does not supervise the operation by the
province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infanta, Province of expressly provide that the petitioner of the timber
Quezon, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to the condition that forest charges shall be paid to concession affected by said Act.
the disposition of timber and other forest products found therein shall be the BIR Legislative grants must be con-
subject to the forestry laws and regulations. strued strictly in favor of the
On or about June 18, 1964, during the effectivity of the License RA 3990 public and most strongly against
was enacted by the Congress and approved by the President, which provides the grantee, and nothing will be
for a Central Experiment Station for the University of the Philippines. Sec. 2 included in the grant except that
of the law provides; “the parcel of the public domain consisting of three which is granted expressly or by
thousand hectares, more or less, located in the Municipality of Paete, clear implication.
Province of Laguna, the precise boundaries of which are stated in EO 791, BIR- the duties incident to the
Series of 1961, is hereby ceded and transferred in full ownership to the measuring of forest products and
University of the Philippines, subject to any existing concessions, if the collection of the charges
any.” (Sec.262 of the Tax Code)
On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded verbally and in writing to Bureau of Forestry-collection of
Hardwood that (1) Hardwood shall pay the forest charges under the License reforestation fees
Agreement to UP and (2) UP Personnel shall perform the selling of any timber B. Having been vested with The cession in full ownership of
felled or cut by plaintiff within the boundaries of the Central Experiment administrative jurisdiction the land in question was expressly
Station. over and being the owner of made “subject to any concession,
The civil case was filed by petitioner Hardwood before the trial court on 28 the tract of land in question, if any”, Hardwood’s concession
June 1966. Petitioner Hardwood (1) seeks a declaration that respondent UP acquired full control and would continue until 1 February
University of the Philippines (UP) does not have the right to supervise and benefit of the timber and 1985;
regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products covered other resources within the UP then would acquire full
by the License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to the UP by RA. 3990; area ownership and exclusive
(2) asks that respondents be enjoined from committing the acts complained jurisdiction to control and
of; and (3) prays that respondents be required to pay petitioner the sum of administer the property only after
P100,000.00 as damages and costs of the suit. 1 February 1985. The position of
Both parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts and prayed that the Court UP is akin to that of a donee of a
grant relief on the following parcel of land subject to usufruct.
ISSUES: C. Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990
expressly provides: “any
incidental receipts or income wanting in any essential quality. The proviso regarding existing
therefrom shall pertain to the concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it
general fund of the University means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee
of the Philippines.” must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected.
D. R.A. No. 3990, UP is duty But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all
bound to operate and its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned,
maintain a central experiment ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above
station, since the law does transfer of full ownership. This is further borne out by Section 3
not provide for appropriations of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that “any incidental
for such purpose, it is clearly receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the
the legislative intention that University of the Philippines.”
the establishment and
maintenance thereof must be Having been effectively segregated and removed from the
financed by the earnings or public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted
income from the area into a registered private woodland, the authority and
E. Supervision of the License jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise
Agreement in favor of terminated.
petitioner by UP was intended
by R.A. No. 3990 Hardwood, as licensee or grantee of the concession, has been given
F. The two government agencies The rulings of the Commissioner the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded
affected by R.A. No. 3990 of Internal Revenue and the and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the
have issued specific rulings Acting Director of the Bureau of correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties,
recognizing the authority of Forestry are patently incorrect; to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the
UP to collect royalties or moreover, said agencies do not Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
charges and to supervise have the power to interpret the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal
petitioner’s logging law, which is primarily a function Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as
operations. of the judiciary aforestated. Consequently, even the Bureau of Internal
Revenue automatically lost its authority and jurisdiction to
measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
SC Ruling: forestry charges and other fees due thereon.
1. Hardwood shall pay forest charges to the University of the
Philippines. 2. Based on the nature of the transfer, it follows then that respondent
UP is entitled to supervise, through its duly appointed personnel, the
When R.A. No. 3990 which established a central experiment station logging, felling, and removal of timber within the area covered by
for the use of UP in connection with its research and extension R.A. No. 3990.
functions, the above “reserved” area was “ceded and transferred in
full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to any TABAO V LILAGAN
existing concessions, if any.”
FACT:
When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and,
On February 24, 1998, a water craft M/L Hadja, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was
more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber
docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a load of 100 tons of tanbark.
license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public
Robert Hernandez was the consignee to said cargo. While the cargo was being
forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and
unloaded, the NBI decided to verify the shipment's accompanying documents
relinquished and conveyed the same to UP; and made the
where it was found to be irregular and incomplete. Consequently, the NBI
latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. As a result, the tanbark, the
concession.
boat, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO 8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a
unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word “full” to describe it.
Criminal Complaint for the violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D.
Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not
705, The Forestry Code of the Philippines as amended, against the captain
and crew of the M/L Hadja, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. subject items, pending resolution of an urgent manifestation by the
Bautista, a forster, and Marcial A. Dalimot, a Community Environment and complainant. Respondent judges stresses that the writ of replevin was issued
Natural Resources Officer of the DENR. Bautista and Dalimot were also in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised
charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Rule of Court. He also pointed out that no apprehension report was issued by
Corrupt Practices Act, along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the NBI regarding the shipment and neither did the DENR issue a seizure
the CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98- report.
296 at the Prosecutor's Office of Tacloban City.
Respondent sheriff submits that he served the writ of replevin on the Coast
On March 10, 1998, DENR took possession of the cargo, the boat and the Guard to prevent the departure of subject vessel since he does not have the
three trucks, through the previous direction of the complainant. Due notice means to physically prevent the vessel from sailing. He further claimed that
were issued to the consignee, Robert Hernandez and the NBI Regional he verified the status of the cargo with DENR and that it came from a
Director. legitimate source except that the shipment documents were not in order.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the RTC of Leyte a case for replevin of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary.
to recover the items seized by the DENR and was docketed as Civil Case No.
98-03-42. The Office of the Court Administrator, in a report dated April 8, 1999,
recommended that the judge be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No. ignorance of the law and that the charges against respondent sheriff be
98-296 and on March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by dismissed for lack of merit.
the PENRO-Leyte, with both Hernandez and his counsel present.
ISSUE:
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ
of replevin and directed Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of Whether or not the respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the law and
the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the jurisprudence for issuing the writ of replevin.
expiration of five days. Respondent Sheriff served a copy of the writ to the
Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45 p.m. of March RULING:
19, 1998.
The complaint for replevin states that the shipment of tanbark and the vessel
Thus, the filing of this Administrative complaint against respondent via a on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting
letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao. documents. It also stated that the NBI turned over the seized items to the
DENR "for official disposition and appropriate action". These allegations would
Complainant avers that replevin is not available when properties sought to have been sufficient to alert the respondent judge that the DENR had custody
be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings. He also submits that of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already
respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or been commenced concerning the shipment.
purposely disregarded them.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot take cognizance
Complainant states that the respondent sheriff had the duty to safeguard M/L of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Also,
Hadja and to prevent it from leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the
served a writ of seizure therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. According to DENR had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him.
the complainant, on March 19, 1998, the vessel left the port of Tacloban City, Prudent thing for the respondent judge to do was to dismiss the replevin
either through respondent sheriff's gross negligence or his direct connivance outright.
with interested parties. Moreover, complainant pointed out that respondent
sheriff released the seized tanbark to Hernandez within the five day period Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ, thereby representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut,
effectively altering, suppressing, concealing or destroying the integrity of said gathered, removed, possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances
evidence. involved in the offense.

Respondent judge claim that the charge of gross ignorance of the law was It was declared by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals the that enforcement
premature since there is a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and
in the replevin case. Further, he claimed that he was unaware of the existence management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities
of I.S. No. 98-296 and upon learning of the same, he issued an order dated of the DENR. The DENR should be given free hand unperturbed by judicial
March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of possession of the intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The
court held that the assumption of the trial court of the replevin suit The NBI agents found the documents irregular and incomplete, and
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative consequently they ordered the unloading of the cargo stopped. The tanbark,
ageny's prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a the boat M/L Hadija, and three cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged within an administrative body of On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director Carlos S. Caabay filed a
special competence. criminal complaint for violation of Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. No.
705, 1 the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines (as amended), against the
The respondent judge's act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit captain and crew of the M/L Hadija, Robert Hernandez, Tandico Chion,
clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard Alejandro K. Bautista, and Marcial A. Dalimot. Bautista was a forester while
set forth in Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge Dalimot was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
must be an embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. To (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
measure up to this standard, justices are expected to keep abreast of all laws office in Tacloban City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with
and prevailing jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, Practices Act, 2 along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the
not even a judge. CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 98-296
at the Prosecutors Office of Tacloban City.
On the charges against respondent sheriff, the Court agreed with the OCA
that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his
In an order dated March 6, 1998, 3 complainant directed the seizure by the
material duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it
DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the three trucks pending preliminary
promptly in accordance with the mandates.
investigation of the case. DENR thus took possession of the aforesaid items
on March 10, 1998, with notice to the consignee Robert Hernandez and the
Respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan was found liable for gross ignorance of
NBI Regional Director.
the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a fine of 10,000. 00, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt more severely.
The complaint against respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is dismissed On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of Leyte a
for lack of merit. case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR. The case was
raffled off to Branch 34 of said court and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-
42.
FULL CASE

On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the respondents in I.S. No.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C. Tabao, Assistant City
98-296. On March 17, 1998, confiscation proceedings were conducted by the
Prosecutor of Tacloban, in his capacity as Regional Chairman of the Region 8
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)-Leyte, with
Special Task Force on Environment and Natural Resources, against (1) Judge
both Hernandez and his counsel present.
Frisco T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the Leyte Regional Trial Court, Branch
34, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of judicial authority, and
willful disobedience to settled jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V. On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ
Aguilar of the Leyte RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take
the performance of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits to a private possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez
individual, violation of Section 1(b) and (c) of P.D. No. 1829, and conduct after the expiration of five days. 4 Respondent sheriff served a copy of the
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban City at around 5:45
p.m. of March 19, 1998.
The records of this case reveal the following facts.
Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents via a
letter addressed to the Chief Justice and dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the name M/L Hadija,
from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the port area of Tacloban City with a
load of around 100 tons of tanbark. Due to previous irregular and illegal Complainant avers that replevin is not available where the properties sought
shipments of tanbark from Bongao, agents of the National Bureau of to be recovered are involved in criminal proceedings for illegal logging. He
Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the shipments points out that this is a well-settled issue and cites several decisions 5 of this
accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was unloading its cargo to its Court and the Court of Appeals on the matter. He argues that respondent
consignee, a certain Robert Hernandez. judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this issue,
particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial notice per Section 1,
Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant submits that respondent judge is either grossly ignorant of the dismiss. Respondent judge contends that complainant should have been
law and jurisprudence or purposely disregarded them. But he avers that it is prudent enough to wait for the resolution of the motion to dismiss before
respondent judges duty to keep abreast of developments in law and filing the instant administrative case.
jurisprudence.
Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the existence of I.S. No.
Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the 98-296. He only learned of the criminal case from an urgent manifestation
proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the following reasons: (1) the defendants dated March 20, 1998, filed by complainant. He argues that he issued an
in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should have alerted order dated March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of
respondent judge to the possibility that the items sought to be recovered possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the urgent
were being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and (2) the manifestation.
complaint for replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI
for verification of supporting documents, which should have made respondent Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was issued in strict
judge suspect that the same were being held by authority of law. compliance with the requirements laid down in Rule 60 of the Revised Rules
of Court. He also points out that said writ was issued provisionally and was
As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar, complainant states that it not intended to be the final disposition of the replevin case.
was incumbent upon Aguilar to safeguard the M/L Hadija and prevent it from
leaving the port of Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross ignorance of the law is
therefor on the Philippine Coast Guard. However, on March 19, 1998, the premature since he has not made a ruling yet on the motion to dismiss filed
vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent sheriffs gross in the replevin case. He contends that it was too much to ask from him to
negligence or his direct connivance with interested parties, according to take note of the fact that the defendants in said case were officials of DENR
complainant. As of the time of the filing of the complaint, according to and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover, respondent judge
complainant, the whereabouts of the vessel and its crew were unknown. submits that while the complaint alleged that the cargo of tanbark was
intercepted by the NBI, it also alleged that the consignee thereof produced
Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff released the seized documents to prove that the shipment was legal.
tanbark to Hernandez on March 20 and 21, 1998, or within the five-day period
that he was supposed to keep it under the terms of the writ. Complainant In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no apprehension report was
argues that the tanbark formed part of the peoples evidence in the criminal issued by the NBI regarding the shipment. Neither did the DENR issue a
complaint against Hernandez and the others. By his act, respondent sheriff seizure report. Respondent judge contends that the validity of the seizure of
effectively altered, suppressed, concealed, or destroyed the integrity of said the subject items by the DENR is a matter that will have to be resolved in
evidence. For this act, complainant contends that respondent sheriff may be relation to the motion to dismiss.
held liable under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction of
Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders. 6 Respondent sheriffs
For his part, respondent sheriff submits 8 that he served the writ of replevin
acts also constitute gross irregularity in the performance of his duty as a
on the Coast Guard precisely to prevent the departure of the subject vessel,
court employee.
since he does not have the means to physically prevent said vessel from
sailing. The Coast Guard commander should have examined the vessel and
Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent from his office from its crew after being served the writ, to determine whether or not they were
March 20 to March 24, 1998. This period included the dates he was supposed engaged in any illegal activity.
to have released the tanbark to Hernandez. Complainant contends that
respondent sheriff not only unlawfully released the tanbark, he also made it
Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board the vessel when he
appear that he was not physically present when such act was done.
served the writ on the Coast Guard. He verified the cargos status with DENR,
which furnished him a copy of a fax transmission stating that the tanbark
In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then Court came from legitimate sources except that the shipment documents were not
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred this administrative matter to both in order. 9cräläwvirtualibräry
respondents for comment.
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial duty to serve the writ
In his comment dated October 12, 1998, 7 respondent judge calls the of replevin, absent any instruction to the contrary. He argues further that
attention of the Office of the Court Administrator to a pending motion to since the items subject of the writ are in the custody of the court and could
dismiss filed by the defendants in the replevin case that effectively prevented be disposed of only through court order, there could not be any unwarranted
him from commenting on the issue. The discussions that would have to be benefit to a private individual as claimed by complainant.
included in the comment, he says, would also resolve the pending motion to
Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not covered by either an Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his
NBI apprehension report or a DENR seizure report, respondent sheriff authorized representatives may order the confiscation of forest products
contends that complainant should have taken steps to protect the integrity illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, including the
of the shipment instead of heaping blame upon others for his own negligence. conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his intention to obstruct the
apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, contrary to complainants In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:
claim.
the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
Respondent sheriff refutes complainants claim that he was absent from his development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and
office from March 20 to March 24, 1998, and alleges that it was complainant special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
who was absent from court hearings on several occasions, in violation of his Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a
duty as a prosecutor. free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which
is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of
Respondent submitted two supplemental comments dated October 30, the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
1998, 10 and May 3, 1999, 11 (1) reiterating his contention that the tanbark encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative.
seized by the DENR and subject of the replevin case had been found to come The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
from a legitimate source, per an order signed by the Regional Director itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
(Region 8) of the DENR, 12 and (2) informing the OCA that the main replevin initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
case was dismissed per an order of respondent judge dated November 27, xxx19cräläwvirtualibräry
1998. 13cräläwvirtualibräry
Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the subject replevin suit
As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24, 2001, the parties clearly demonstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard
herein separately manifested that they are willing to have the present case set forth in Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge
resolved based on the record on hand. must be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. To
measure up to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreast of all laws
We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA, after reviewing the and prevailing jurisprudence. 20 Judges are duty bound to have more than
case, recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of just a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow
P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. At the same time, the OCA basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no
recommended that the charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for one may be excused, not even a judge. 21cräläwvirtualibräry
lack of merit.
We find, however, that respondent judge had already vacated the Writ of
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for the amount of the Seizure he issued on March 19, 1998, in a subsequent Order dated November
fine to be imposed on said respondent judge. 27, 1998, dismissing the Civil Complaint for replevin filed by Robert
Hernandez against the Regional Director of the DENR and other officers. He
also directed in said order the sheriff to return to CENRO, Tacloban City, all
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well
the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ of Seizure.22cräläwvirtualibräry
as the vessel on which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification
of supporting documents. 14 It also states that the NBI turned over the seized
items to the DENR for official disposition and appropriate action. 15 A copy of Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of the Writ, dated
the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the complaint December 15, 1998, had already delivered to CENRO the 102 tons and 120
as Annex D. 16 To our mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to kilos of tanbark duly receipted by CENRO representative Marcial A. Dalimot
alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and on the same date. 23cräläwvirtualibräry
that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced
concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of P15,000.00. Under the circumstances, considering that this is the first
special competence. 17 Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who complaint against him, we deem a fine of P10,000.00 to be sufficient.
seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him. 18 The prudent thing for respondent Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA
judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright. that they should be dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his
ministerial duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to execute it
promptly in accordance with its mandates. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
WHEREFORE , respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is hereby found liable for 1.Yes. The timber license issued to the petitioner is void ab initio.
gross ignorance of the law and is accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without the
P10,000.00, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar authority of the by then Acting Director Estanislao Bernal of Forestry.
offense will be dealt with more severely. The complaint against respondent
Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of merit. At the time it was released, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more
authority to grant a license. The authority delegated to him was contained in General
SO ORDERED Memorandum Order No. 46 which was revoked by General Order No. 60 which removes
the authority of the Director of Forestry to grant license.
TAN VS DIR OF FORESTRY
2. No. Petitioner has not exhausted all his administrative remedies. Petitioner did not appeal
the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President
Facts:
of the Philippines who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from
On April 15, 1963, petitioner-appellant Wenceslao Vinzon Tan won the bididing for the
private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve.
license of logging operations on a public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales.
Considering the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin Gozon issued General
respondents, the failure of the petitioner to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust
Memorandum, Order No. 46 which states that “The Director of Forestry is hereby authorized
his administrative remedies.
to grant a new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more than
3,000 hectares each and that the extension of an ordinary timber license for areas not
3. Yes. Petitioner’s action is a suit against the State.
exceeding 5,000 hectares.”
Under the doctrine of State immunity, a suit against the State cannot prosper unless the
Thereafter Jose Y. Feliciano was appointed as Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
State has given its consent. Both the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Resources. Upon assumption of office on December 19,1963 he promulgated General
Director of Forestry acted in their capacity as officers of the State and representatives of the
Memorandum Order No. 46 which took effect on the same day. Such General Memorandum
sovereign authority discharging governmental powers. Petitioner’s action is an attempt to
is a revocation of General Memorandum No. 46 which states that “Issuance of new licenses,
circumvent the rule establishing State exemption from suit. The promotion of public welfare
including amendments shall be signed by the secretary of Agriculture and Natural
and the protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property, rights and interest
Resources.” On the same day the Acting Director of Forestry signed the timber license of
of the State. Accordingly, it may not be circumvented by directing the action against the
the petitioner without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
officer of the State instead of against the State itself.
and was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry on January 6, 1964.On February
19, 1964. Ravago Commercial wrote a letter to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
4.Yes. The revocation of the petitioner’s timber license by the respondent is a valid exercise
Resources praying that the license issued to petitioner be cancelled or revoked on the ground
of his power as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Forestry who
that the grant was irregular, anomalous and contrary to the existing forest rules, laws and
issued the timber license of the petitioner is under the supervision of the Head or Secretary
regulations. On March 9, 1964, Feliciano promulgated an order declaring Ordinary Timber
of the Agriculture and Natural Resources. The power and control of the Department Heads
License NO. 20-64 issued to petitioner by the Director of Forestry without authority is void
over bureaus and offices includes the power to modify, reverse or set aside acts of
ab initio. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order but Feliciano denied the motion.
subordinate officials. Accordingly, respondent as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
On the basis of the denial for his motion to reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant case
Resources has the authority to revoke, on valid grounds the timber license issued by the
before the court a quo, a petition for certiorari prohibiting and mandamus with preliminary
Director of Forestry.
prohibitory injunction. Petitioner claims that respondent unlawfully, illegally and arbitrarily
acted in excess of their jurisdiction with grave abuse
5.Yes. Petitioner’s timber license can still be revoked even if it is valid.
of discretion by revoking his license without a valid cause, by denying him of equal
Paragraph 27 of the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states that
protection of law, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process
the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change at the discretion of the Director
of law and by impairing the obligation of contract. The court a quo, from the evidence
of Forestry. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process of law
received, declared that the petition did not state a sufficient cause of action and dismissed
but a privilege which can be withdrawn whenever dictated by the public interest or welfare.
the same. Petitioner, having his motion for reconsideration denied, appealed directly to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
PEOPLE VS. QUE
1.Whether or not the timber license issued to the petitioner is void abinitio.
2.Whether or not petitioner has exhausted all his administrativeremedies.
Facts
3.Whether or not petitioner’s action is a suit against the State.
• SPO1 Corpus, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging
4.Whether or not the revocation of the petitioner’s timber license by the respondent is a
received an info that a 10-wheeler truck had illegally obtained lumbers. So
valid exercise of his power as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
together with his team went on a patrol. They followed the truck and
5.Whether or not petitioner’s timber license can still be revoked even if it is valid.
apprehended it
• 3 persons, including Que were inside the truck. The truck contained coconut
Ruling:
slabs qith sawn lumbers in between them
• Corpuz asked for the necessary evidences to prove the legality of the origin On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station
of the materials. But Que only showed a certification from CENRO III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying 4,000 board feet of narra lumber
(Community Environmental and Natural Resources Office as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver,
• Que was charges in RTC with violation og Sec 68 of PD 705 as amended by private respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the
EO 277 Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and Investigation
• Trial court found Que guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty.
also confiscated the seized lumbers Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID investigated them, and discovered the
discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.
Issue
• Whether there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of
certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products. the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the documents, the plate numbers of
• Whether the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492
that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, or NSN-267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881.
gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have been
accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber
Held and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin. The Log Sale Purchase Agreement
• The interpretation of the appellant with “existing forest laws and presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and
regulations” refer to laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and Bonamy Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco
regulations which were already in effect at the time of enactment of EO 277, Lumber Hardware.
would be strained and would render the law inutile. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No.
of timber or other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order 10 which requires possession or transportation of lumber to be supported by
provides that the movement of logs, lumber, non-timber forest products and the following documents:
woodbased or wood based shall be covered with the appropriate Certificates 1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued
of Origin. The transport of lumber shall be accompanied by CLO (Certificate only by the District Forester, or in his absence, the Assistant District
of Lumber Origin). o Therefore, the accused was given permit by DENR to Forester;
transport one (1) truckload of coconut slabs only between March 7 to 11, 2. Sales Invoice;
1994. The accused was apprehended on March 8, 1994 aboard his truck
3. Delivery Receipt; and
which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as
well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber 4. Tally Sheets.
were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were
placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed
• No, because there are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished under Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
Section 68 of P.D. 705 o There are 2 distinct and separate offenses punished 705 otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty.
under Sec 68 of PD 705 § Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra
or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or lumber and the six-wheeler truck.
disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and §
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of
required under existing forest laws and regulations. o In the first offense, one Environment and Natural Resources issued an order for the confiscation of
can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting, the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck
or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization
issued by DENR. Second, s=t is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the
collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession said order to the Office of the President. Consequently, the narra lumber and
of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later
Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because on advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.
E.O. 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the proper legal documents as malum prohibitum. On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the
issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction and/or temporary
FACTORAN VS CA restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the
panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.
FACTS:
On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals
from proceeding with the planned auction sale and setting the hearing for the believed that the same were sufficiently based on a written charge by private
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989. respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Release and Return of Goods and Documents (Replevin) supported by an foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in
Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.
Replevin Bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ
of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to deliver the xxx Hence this petition.
[n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the
custody of the plaintiffs and/or their representatives x x x". ISSUE:

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and
petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David G. Brodett of Branch the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition and lifting the preliminary
80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him injunction.
from removing the subject properties from the DENR compound and
transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police RULING:
Force. He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that
same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating their intention to file a Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director
counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved
writ of seizure and to post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory
trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy of the after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said
Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately decision unless appealed to the President. The decision of the Department
the required service and tendered the cash counterbond but it was refused, Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action
petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, for certiorari or prohibition.
1989.
It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the
On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to the Office of the President.
but was also denied for the same reason.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure. The trial court gave petitioners available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper
24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989. authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct
their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to annul the orders of the trial court It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the
dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989. enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest land fall within the primary and
On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief special responsibilities of the DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court
in the form of a temporary restraining order (TRO). of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction
On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
of preliminary injunction upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
of P180,000.00. administrative body of special competence.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-
injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that the complaint for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, it is deemed waived.
replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of
an affidavit and bond under Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.
Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.
First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the
applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court of Appeals has wrongly
put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the G.R. No. 104988 | June 18, 1996
requirements of Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot
justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the properties Facts: SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen to conduct
sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only surveillance in the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber. They saw the truck of
mechanistic averment thereof is offered, the writ should not be issued. petitioner loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and
dimensions. The team seized the truck including its cargo and impounded
In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the them at the DENR compound in Quezon City because the driver was not able
administrative authority of the Secretary as provided by Section 68-A of P.D. to provide the required invoices. They were not able to enter the lumberyard
No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ because of the owner’s refusal. The team secured a search warrant from
of replevin prayed for by the private respondents. Judge Osorio of RTC Valenzuela. By virtue thereof, they seized truckloads of
shorts, slabs and lumber from the lumberyard of Mustang Lumber. The other
Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the remaining stockpiles were placed under administrative seizure because the
subject properties of private respondents were held in custodia legis and petitioner failed to produce upon demand the required legal documents to
hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
process is deemed to be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it
found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of Civil Sec. Factoran ordered the suspension of Mustang Lumber lumber-dealer
Procedure. permit. He also ordered to confiscate in favor of the government to be
disposed of in accordance with law the seized lumber inside petitioner’s
Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under lumberyard.
SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and independent of the confiscation
of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. Mustang Lumber filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against DENR
705. Sec and SAID Chief with the RTC questioning the seizure without any search
and seizure order from the judge and the orders of the DENR Sec. for lack of
Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized prior notice and hearing (due process).
forest products within six (6) hours from the time of the seizure to the
appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations Trial Court decision (Civil Case): The warrantless search and seizure of
applies only to criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to the petitioner's truck was valid. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the
administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A. exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified. The seizure of
large volume of lumber was a continuation of that made the previous day
Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search warrant issued by Judge
their right to due process was violated as no investigation was conducted Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question. Even if the search
prior to confiscation of their properties. warrant did not specifically mention almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber and
shorts, their seizure was valid because it was contraband or prohibited
Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial articles.
court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus, disobedience thereto cannot
constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order Chief Robles filed with the DOJ a complaint against Ri Chuy Po, Mustang
thereby violated was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no Lumber’s President and General Manager. An Information was filed by DOJ
contempt of court could be committed. with the RTC charging Ri Chuy Po for violating Sec. 68 of PD No. 705

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated Ri Chuy Po defense in Criminal Case: lumber, as opposed to timber, is
March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May 18, 1990 were set aside. not penalized in Sec. 68 of PD No. 705. Even if lumber is included, it cannot
Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently be used against him because it was seized illegally. Also, the pending case in
enjoined from enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, CA regarding the legality of the seizure raises a prejudicial question.
1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said respondent judge was
directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private Prosecution’s opposition: Lumber is included in Sec. 68 of PD No. 705 and
respondents. Finally, the said respondent judge is hereby permanently possession of such without the required documents is penalized. Also,
enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private exclusion of lumber from 68 would defeat the purpose of the law which is to
respondents against petitioners. halt illegal logging

Trial Court decision (Criminal Case): Granted the motion to quash and
MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. V. CA; DENR Sec. Factoran; SAID Chief dismissed the case on the ground that possession of lumber without the
Robles | Davide, Jr., J required documents was not a crime.
People filed a petition for certiorari with the SC contending that respondent CASE and of 31 July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when she granted the motion to CIVIL CASE.
quash and dismissed the case. Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases.

CA decision: Dismissed the appeal of Mustang Lumber for lack of merit and SO ORDERED.
affirmed the trial court’s ruling. They were not able to show the required legal
documents for the possession of lumber. TAOPA v. PEOPLE

Held: The word lumber does not appear in Sec. 68 of PD No. 705 however FACTS:
lumber is included in the term timber. Lumber is a processed forest raw
material. The Revised Forestry Code uses the term lumber in its common the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Virac,
usage. Even Webster Dictionary defines lumber as a timber or logs after being Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber (113 pieces of
prepared for the market. Simply put lumber is a processed timber. Judge lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong species without any
Dizon-Capulong committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
criminal case regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.) and arrested its driver, Placido
Cuison. The lumber was covered with bundles of abaca fiber to prevent
The seizure the truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed to petitioner Amado Taopa and a
upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of the seized lumber.
by P.D. No. 1775. Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were charged with violating Section 68 of
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 as amended, in the RTC Virac,
determining the existence of probable cause. The other exceptions are (1) Catanduanes. Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on
search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, arraignment. After trial on the merits, RTC found them guilty as charged
(3) customs searches, and (4) consented warrantless search beyond reasonable doubt.

They are presumably trifling attempts to block the serious efforts of the DENR Only Taopa and Cuison appealed to CA, Cuison was acquitted but Taopa's
to enforce the decree, efforts which deserve the commendation of the public conviction was affirmed.4
in light of the urgent need to take firm and decisive action against despoilers The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
of our forests whose continuous destruction only ensures to the generations In this petition, Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against him
to come, if not the present, an inheritance of parched earth incapable of alleging that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the owners
sustaining life. The Government must not tire in its vigilance to protect the of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was seized.
environment by prosecuting without fear or favor any person who dares to
violate our laws for the utilization and protection of our forests. ISSUE: WON taopa is guilty of violating Section 68 of PD No. 705, as
amended?
Dispositive portion:
HELD: YES. Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed with modification.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered Petitioner Amado Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of
and ANNULLING, for having been rendered with grave abuse of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,
discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October with the accessory penalties provided for by law.
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172,
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. Both RTC and CA gave no consideration to Taopa's alibi because Cusion's
324-V-91, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po; (c) testimony proved Taopa's active participation in the transport of the seized
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) lumber
DIRECTING the respondent Judge on her successor to hear and
decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and RTC and CA found that the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopa's
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G. R. No. 123784 house and that Taopa and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by
for utter failure of the petitioner to show that the respondent Court Cuison up to where the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved
of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged decisions Taopa's (and Ogalesco's) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber
of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL loaded in the truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco)
constituted possession of timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.

The mere fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere sight of the
police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. Court is convinced that Taopa
and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, Court disagree with RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed on


Taopa. Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,7 refers to Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators.
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified theft.8

The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other
forest products without license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to
the felony of qualified theft.

Articles 309 and 310 read: Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft
shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis
supplied)

2. xxx Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was P67,630.9
Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable penalty should
be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or a period
ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus an
additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence10 imposable on Taopa


shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case,
the minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14
years and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.

The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the
medium period11 of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods
or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21 days
of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere
between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years,
two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.

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