MEMO

NO CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON CANCELLED CONTRACT

ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL, INC., VS. THE PURE CANE MOLASSES

CO., INC., G. R. No. 40709, 01 August 1934

If, according to the judgment of this court in the former case, Exhibit A
grants the defendant the option to cancel the contract at any time, upon payment of
the sum of P6,000, and if the defendant demanded such cancellation offering to
pay said sum in good faith, the plaintiff in refusing to consent to such cancellation,
violated the contract. Such being the case, the plaintiff has no cause of action
against the defendant because it is based on the alleged obligation of the said
defendant to purchase its molasses during the period in which such obligation
would not have existed, had not the plaintiff, in violation of the contract, refused
the cancellation thereof. In such case, the plaintiff derives its cause of action from
its own violation thereof. To recognize the validity of such cause of action would
be to sanction and legalize such breach. On the other hand, such breach of contract
cannot be the source of rights. Had the contract been cancelled in January, 1931,
when the defendant demanded its cancellation, as it had a right to do, there would
have been no contract to be complied with by the defendant from that date and the
plaintiff's cause of action could not have been based on the cancelled contract.
Plaintiff's violation of that contract by refusing to cancel the same cannot now be
the basis of its cause of action.

NO INJUNCTION CAN BE GRANTED ON FAIT ACCOMPLI

SPOUSES CEFERINO C. LAUS and MONINA P. LAUS, and SPOUSES

ANTONIO O. KOH and ELISA T. KOH, vs. OPTIMUM SECURITY
SERVICES, INC., G.R. No. 208343, 3 February 2016

To reiterate, preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property

out of the possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other
party where such right is being disputed, as in this case. As earlier intimated,
preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy. Therefore, it should not create
new relations between the parties, but must only maintain the status quo until the
merits of the case is fully heard. Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein.
 Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued by the RTC no longer
serves any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject
properties since the Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already
expired. Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to
be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for preliminary injunction should
be denied. Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented by injunction or
prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or
prohibited. An injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act
already done.

SPOUSES NICASIO C. MARQUEZ AND ANITA J. MARQUEZ vs. SPOUSES

CARLITO ALINDOG AND CARMEN ALINDOG, G.R. No. 184045, 22
January 2014

It was improper for the RTC to have issued a writ of preliminary injunction
since the act sought to be enjoined, i.e., the implementation of the writ of
possession, had already been accomplished in the interim and thus, rendered the
matter moot. Case law instructs that injunction would not lie where the acts sought
to be enjoined had already become fait accompli (meaning, an accomplished or
consummated act). Hence, since the consummation of the act sought to be
restrained had rendered Sps. Alindog's injunction petition moot, the issuance of the
said injunctive writ was altogether improper.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JEREMIAS DOLINO, in his

capacity as Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Region VII Office vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 11, RTC, Cebu
City, and EMRO INTERNATIONAL, INC., G.R. No. 128010, 28 February 2000

Preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy intended to provide

protection to parties for the preservation of their rights or interests during the
pendency of the principal action. Conversely, if an action, by its nature, does not
require such protection or preservation, the remedy is unavailing and the relief
sought cannot be granted.

In this case, EMRO sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction

in connection with a petition for declaratory relief wherein the court is asked "to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a determination of [the party's] rights and duties thereunder."
Indeed, beyond the adjudication of legal rights which are the subject of controversy
between the parties, the court cannot issue in such cases an order of injunction,
execution or similar reliefs, for the simple reason that no right of petitioner has yet
been violated.

Put in another way, a party cannot act, then ask the courts to declare that its
action was not a violation of its agreement with another person and, at the same
time, seek to enjoin the other party from revoking or cancelling their agreement. In
this case, EMRO's doubts and fears cannot give rise to a cause of action to prevent
the mere possibility that its lease contract with the government will be cancelled or
revoked.

SPOUSES JAIME SEBASTIAN AND EVANGELINE SEBASTIAN vs. BPI

FAMILY BANK, INC., CARMELITA ITAPO AND BENJAMIN HAO, G.R. No.
160107, 22 October 2014

The foreclosure of a mortgage is but the necessary consequence of the non-

payment of an obligation secured by the mortgage. Where the parties have
stipulated in their agreement, mortgage contract and promissory note that the
mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the mortgage upon the mortgagor's default,
the mortgagee has a clear right to the foreclosure in case of the mortgagor's default.
Thereby, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of
the mortgagor to prevent the foreclosure will be improper. As such, the lower
courts did not err in dismissing the injunction complaint of the petitioners.