Quita v. CA, G.R. No.

124862, December 22, 1988

Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941 but were not blessed with children. Along the way, the relationship
soured. Eventually, Fe sued Arturo for divorce in California, USA. In a private writing
she evidenced their agreement to live separately and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. She obtained a final judgment of divorce on July 23, 1954. Three weeks later
she married a certain Felix Tupaz which also ended in divorce. Still in the USA, she
married for the third time.
On April 16, 1972, Arturo Padlan died intestate. Lino Inciong filed a petition with
the RTC for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor
of the Philippine Trust Company.
On April 30, 1973, respondent Blandina Padlan, alleged surviving spouse of
Arturo and their children, submitted certified photocopies of the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Arturo’s brother, Ruperto intervened.
Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the
distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private
respondent, (6) Padlan children, and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On
the same day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for
resolution, in which they failed to submit the required documents in the prescribed.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval. On the other hand, it opined that there was
no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, it was not
shown that the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his
children with her. Only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor
of the two intestate heirs.
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and her children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children had
been made in their respective records of birth. Thus, partial reconsideration was granted
declaring the Padlan children, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of
Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. Respondent was not declared an heir
for it was clearly void since it was celebrated on April 22, 1947 during the existing of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to CA, which sustained the appeal and directed the remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not Quita was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering
she had secured a divorce in the USA

Ruling:
We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of
their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's
citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a
Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked
the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private
respondent. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that
she was since 1954. Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce,
a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan
as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED.
Llorente v. CA, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000

Facts:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the US. On February
22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente ("Paula") were married. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in
the conjugal home in Camarines Sur.
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization was issued in his favor by the United States District Court.
In 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife. He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that all support for Paula from the
allowances allotted by the US Navy will be suspended; marital union will be dissolved in
accordance with judicial proceedings; a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life will be made; and Lorenzo would not
prosecute since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully.
Lorenzo returned to the US and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce in California.
Paula was represented by a counsel, and actively participated in the proceedings. On
November 27, 1951, the Superior Court found all factual allegations to be true and on
December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia F. Llorente January 16, 1958 in
Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in
the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. They lived
together as husband and wife for 25 years and were blessed with 3 children.
Lorenzo executed his last will where he bequeathed all his properties to Alicia and their
children. He also designated Alicia as the sole executor of his will. Later he filed a
petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament where he moved
that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. However, before the
proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed in same court a petition for letters of administration
over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor contending that she was the surviving spouse,
properties were acquired during their marriage and Lorenzo’s will encroached on her
legitime and share in the conjugal property. On December 1985, Alicia filed in the
testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters of testamentary.
Trial court gave due course to Paula’s petition. RTC issued a joint decision declaring
that the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo was void and inapplicable in the
Philippines hence his marriage with Alicia was void and she is not entitled to receive
any share from the estate. Paula filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Respondent appealed to CA however, CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Lorenzo was valid
Ruling:
YES. The fact that the late Lorenzo became an American citizen long before and
at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will;
and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven
that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from
petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very
well lose her right to inherit" from him.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.
Garcia-Recio v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
Facts: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
On 1989, a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian
family court.
On 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as "single" and "Filipino." Starting 1995, petitioner and
respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the
two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on 1996.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned
of respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Respondent averred that, since 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage
and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in 1989;
thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
About five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia.
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. After
submitting their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision in favor of the validity of the
divorce decree.
Issues: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner
Ruling:
(1) NO. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the
Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.
 A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof
are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. The
divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is
not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.

(2) No. Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
" A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by

respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the
paucity of evidence on this matter.
Republic vs Orbecido GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24,
1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They
had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In
1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained
a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the
trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be
interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under
Philippine law.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian,
married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their
wedding due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005
only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.
Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the
Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian
divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn
still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.
Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of
foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party
and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail
the remedy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of
recognition of the foreign divorce decree
HELD:
The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor
of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the
clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse.
However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce
decree as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of
foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's national law.
The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the
foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the
registration is still deemed to be void.
Llave v Republic G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]
FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice –
initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City
and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano s civil status was indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has
been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and
upon his death, his widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano
(Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and
in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. The
complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under
civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous.
HELD:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force
governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike
was the Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage
can exist at any given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code,
divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394
which was not availed of during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda
has been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified
Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly,
Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim
and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in
any part of the Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-

06-26
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara
void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2)
that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and

Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on
the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.[60] Article
15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment... affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully... consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.