Ancient Philosophy 11 (1991)

©Mathesis Publications 111

Tlpoa(pECJlS in Epictetus

Robert Dobbin

The following article enquires into the meaning of the term rrpoa(pEGlS' in
Epictetus, and the extent to which his use of the word is influenced by the philo-
sophical tradition of the word originating with Aristotle. Recent published works
have raised the issue, without coming to any definite conclusion. 1 Efforts to
establish a connection between these two authors, who are virtually alone in
making the word a central term of their ethics, have been vitiated by a failure to
consider an important intermediate influence, namely, the attacks on the Stoic
doctrine of fate made by Academics and neo-Aristotelians. In these rrpoa(pEGlS'
plays a significant part, as we shall see. Epictetus' adoption of the word, and the
commanding position he assigns it in his philosophy, thus acquires a special
point. It must be appreciated in the context of the anti-Stoic polemic of the Hel-
lenistic and early Roman eras.
As all commentators have realized, it is Aristotle who established the word as a
philosophical term, and he is largely responsible even for its later history.2 Gau-
thier and Jolif provide a useful digest of its use in authors roughly contemporary
with but independent of Aristotle. 3 It is not attested much before his time, and is
absent from Xenophon, Lysias, Andocides, Isaeus, and Dinarchus. It appears
once in Plato, four times in Isocrates, three times in Aeschines and Hyperides,
twice in Lycurgus, and more than twenty times in Demosthenes. 4 J.D. Denniston
(1959, 33) lists rrpOaCpEGlS' as one of the abstract nouns that came increasingly

1 cr. especially Inwood 1985, 240-242; Kahn 1988; and Sandbach 1985, 72n57. In addition, the

following works have been consulted for the meaning of TTpoalpEolS' in Epictetus: Bonhöffer 1890,
118-121 and 259-261; Pohlenz 1964, i 332-334; Hijmans 1959,23-27; Rist 1969,228-232; Voelke
1973, 130-160; Rist 1975, 105-106; Cassanmagnano 1977; Dragona-Monachou 1978-1979; Dihle
1982,60-61.
2 On TTpoa(pEolS' in Aristotle cf. especially the following works : Gauthier-lolif 1970, ii pt. 1,
189-190,195-206, and 209-212; Anscombe 1965; Hardie 1980, 160-182 and 379-386; Kenny 1979,
69-80; Chamberlain 1984; Sherman 1989,57-117.
3 Gauthier-lolif 1970, ii 189-190.

4 These figures, borrowed from Gauthier-lolif, do not take account of the related verb, TTpoalpov-

~al, which appears with some frequency before the noun does. This form, too, is important for the
development of the core idea. But even it hardly appears before the middle of the fourth century.
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into vogue among prose authors in the latter half of the fourth century. As Gau-
thier and Jolif point out, the most common use among these early writers is the
'objective' sense, to denote that which one chooses, the object of one's decision
or preference. For example, Demosthenes often links it with TToALTELa, to indicate
his or another' s political policy or programme. The subjective sense, on the other
hand, is marked in the phrases EK TTpoaLpECJEwS' or KaTo TTpoaLpECJLv, where the
act of choice or decision is underscored. Such formulas gradually replace the
phrase EK TTpovoLaS' and are applied to actions, particularly criminal actions, done
'of set purpose' , 'intentionally', or 'deliberately'. This raises an important ques-
tion. Was the emergence of the word and its increasing popularity motivated by
awareness of a new idea that required novel expression? It would seem that, at
least in the legal and forensic fields, it was. As degrees of culpability began to be
distinguished TTpoaLpECJLS' appears with greater regularity to reflect this height-
ened sensitivity.5 It helps nlark, too, the well-known transition from a shame cul-
ture to a guilt culture, from an ethics based primarily on actions and results to one
more attentive to character and underlying intention.
Aristotle' s use of TTpoaL pE CJL S' reflects this pattern. A complete survey of his
treatment of the word would not be in place here. Broadly speaking, however, it
derives its importance from three major areas. 6 It makes its first appearance in the
Nicolnachean Ethics in the context of the discussion of the voluntary and the
involuntary, book 3, chapters 1-5, where Aristotle distinguishes degrees of
responsibility for acts depending on the amount of constraint involved. Acts done
EK TTpoaLpECJE(JJS' are voluntary and ascribable to the agent in the least restricted
sense (cf. 111 1b6-1 0). The second area relates to his delineation of virtue. His
conclusion is that he alone is virtuous who does virtuous acts (a) ELbWS', (b)
TT po aLp () vIl EV 0 S', an d (c) ßE ßa ( (JJ S' Ka 1 ci Il ETa KLV ~ T üJ S' EXüJ V (1 105 a 30-33 ).
Finally, he uses it to assist in the explanation of clKpaCJLa, which he defines as
acting TTapa TTpoa( PECJL v (1151 a6). The implication in context is that such
'acratic' acts are less culpable than otherwise identical acts done EK npoaLpECJEwS'
(which would characterize an clKc)AaCJToS': cf. 1150a30). All these applications of
the word conform to the general trend in thought that the word uniquely reflects.
Where Aristotle is most original in his handling of TTpoaLpECJLS' is in EN iii 3,
where he connects it with ßOVAEUCJLS', deliberation. His analysis of deliberation is
unique, so the definition of npoalpECJLS' that results from it is also. According to
his account in iii 3 deliberation is a process of thinking, comparable to analysis in
geometry, which starts from a desired end and works back to the discovery of a
means by which it can be achieved. Thus a doctor deliberates about the best
means of restoring health, but not about the value of health itself. Tl poaLpECJLS' is
its outcome, for it too is concerned with the selection of means, not ends. rrö

5 CL, far cxarnple, Dernosthenes ii phi/. 16~ contra Midias 44, 66~ contra Leochares 57; Lycur-
gus, CO/ltrll Leocrates 148. For further material cf. Gernet 1917, 35ltT; Dover 1974, 145-152.
6 The following summary derives solely from the Nichomachean Ethics, because it offers the

most material and because the other ethical treatises do not greatly differ on this subjecL Other dis-
cussions 01' TTpO(llpEGlS' can be found at Elldemian Ethics ii 10, and Magna Mora/ia 17-19.
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npoaL pETOV is the same as the object fixed upon as the final result of a process of
deliberation, for it is identical with TO npoßEßoUAEU~EVOV (1112a15). Thus
npoa(pEoLS is defined as OpEeLS ßOUAEUTLK~ (1113a10-11); alternatively as
ÖPE~LS' 8LavollTLK~ T0:IV E<p' ~~LLV (1139a31, b4-5). It is the prelude to npa~LS' in
the strict sense, the complex of reason and desire that uniquely defines man as an
aPX~ KLV~OEWS'.7
Gauthier and Jolif (1970, ii 190) represent Aristotle' s role in the history of the
word as folIows: while it was still relatively rare and of doubtful meaning he
appropriated it and tumed it into a term of art, expressing a new concept unique
to hirn alone. This view needs to be qualified in part. First of all, he at least pre-
tends to appproach the word in iii 2 'dialectically', i.e., to get at its true meaning
by way of how it is already used. He does not arbitrarily impose an altogether
new interpretation on it. Second, granted that his analysis of the word at iii 2-3 is
original, later appearances of the word in the EN are not always consistent with
this earlier definition, and it is possible that this is due to the influence of the
already current, popular meaning of the word, which he could not, or would not,
altogether exclude. Finally, it should be noted that, despite Aristotle' s pioneering
effort of interpretation, the word remained somewhat vague and polyvalent. Aris-
totle did not forever determine the course of its semantic history . It continues to
resist univocal translation, even paraphrase. 8 This is a vexation for later scholars
like ourselves, but originally an opportunity for writers, and philosophers in par-
ticular, to try to put their personal stamp on a somewhat indeterminate idea. So it
was for Aristotle and so it was to be for Epictetus.
That Aristotle positions npoaLpEoLS' alongside ßOVAEUOLS', while original, is not
surprising. He wants to ground his ethics in practical reason, to proceed on the
premise that practical reason and moral reasoning are really one and the same. It
is part of his naturalistic approach, to base his ethics on characteristically human
modes of behavior. And for hirn, as it was to be for the Stoics like Epictetus, this
involved the exercise of reason. In popular thought ßOVAEUOLS' was already con-
fined to human beings and stood for the exercise of practical reason. 9 What Aris-
totle seems to have intended with his introduction of npoaLpEoLS' in this context
was to make use of a word that would ease the transition from the discussion of
practical reason (in the earlier books of the EN) to the analysis of virtue and vice
(in the later books). TIpoaLpEoLS' was chosen to hold the structure of his ethics

7 EN 1139a31; cf. 1112b32.

8 'Choice', 'intention', 'will', 'decision', 'purpose' , 'moral purpose' are all suggested, and possi-
ble translations, depending on the context, in Aristotle and every other writer. Efforts to hit upon a
single satisfactory translation always founder (e.g:, Chamberlain 1984, 155, 'commitment'). Drag-
ona-Monachou 1978-1979, 269-275 collects all the translations that have been essayed, including
such strained ones as 'habitus of using foresight' (Randall).
9 Cf. Isocrates, 10.58 and 13.1. An additional example to indicate that ßOVAEVCJlS' and its cog-

nates were already doing some of the work that Aristotle assigns to TTpoaLpECJlS' is furnished by the
famous lines in Euripides' Medea, 1078-79: Kat llav8civw IlE v Ol v 8puv IlE AAW KaKci/8v1lOS' 8E
KpELCJCJWV TWV EllwV ßOVAEVllclTwv. In Aristotle's terms Medea would be described as an 'acratic' act-
ing TTapa TTpoaL pE CJl V.
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together. Its associations were both intellectual and moral. Indeed Aristotle
stresses that it is composed of both reason and desire, so that it has both a strong
intellectual and ethical component. IO This made it attractive to Epictetus, also,
because, as a Stoic, he believed that our emotionallife is determined by, is in fact
identical with, our intellectual convictions. TI poa(pEolS' summarizes this view-
point in a word.
Thus Aristotle assigns TTpoa(pECJlS' a privileged position, one that it will con-
tinue to occupy in the philosophical tradition. To repeat, it is the complex of rea-
son and emotion that uniquely defines man as an ciPX~ KlV~CJEWS'. The structure
of the concept derives from the structure of man, who is compounded of reason
plus emotion. I I And TTpoa(pECJlS' preserves the correct structure, since 'in every
composite thing ... there is always found a ruling and a subject factor. .. [And in
this manner] the intelligence rules the appetites with a kind of political or royal
rule' .12 So the desire that inheres in TTpoa(pECJlS' is of the kind that 'listens to, or
obeys reason'~ is, in fact, 8laVOTlTlK~ ÖPE~lS', 'reasoned desire' . If desire gets the
upper hand then the individual is expressly described as acting TTapa TTpoa(pECJlv,
and not like a nlan, but a child or beast. And so, in a formulation full of signifi-
cance for later writers such as Epictetus, Aristotle states bluntly, 'Such an ciPX~
(i.e., TTpoa(pECJlS') is man' (1139b5). This will be echoed centuries later by
Epictetus' statement to his audience, 'You are TTpoa(pECJlS" (iii 1, 40; iv 5, 12; cf.
ii 10, 1). The term, then, becomes cardinal in what one might call the ancient tra-
dition of philosophical anthropology. However, its precise meaning varies. For
Aristotle it relates to man as source of action (TTpa~lS'): action in the strong sense,
executed in fuH freedom and consciousness and as a result of careful delibera-
tion. This is the only kind that for hirn qualifies as ethical action, where praise
and blame can be fully bestowed. And of course tied in with this is his unique
analysis of deliberation.
But this conception of TTpoa(pECJlS' did not command universal assent. Already
in his ethics there are inconsistencies that show the strain of his effort to equate
practical reason with moral behavior. It is plain, for instance, that deliberation is
not always appropriate, and may be downright inappropriate, in certain moral sit-
uations. 13 These include not only emergencies like the case of being in a position
to help a drowning child, but also such virtues as honesty, where this is construed
as a commitment to tell the truth in all situations without having to calculate
beforehand whether lying nlight not be better in this particular situation. Again,

10 Cf. EN I ] 13a I 0-1 I, I I 39a3 I, b4-5~ EE 1226b9~ De motu animo 700b23.

11 For TTpOGLpEGLS' as a kind of distillation of Aristotle's psychology, cf. Chamberlain 1984, 149-
151.
12 Pol. I 254a28-3 I , b6-7. Cf. 1333a 17ff. In the latter passage Aristotle goes on to di vide the rea-
soning faculty into the deliberative and the contemplative. Such a distinction, however, would be
irrelevant in the section of the EN discussing TTpOGLpEGLS' as the antecedent to TTpCi~LS', which involves
the deliberative part alone.
13 Cf. Sherman 1989, 82, and her statement on page 56: 'While there is no shortage of examples
of techtlical deliberation ... Aristotle lacks an adequate account of moral reasoning'.
 115

when introduced in the context of deliberation Aristotle teIls us that TTpoa(pEGLS'

is of means, not ends; 14 but in the analysis of virtue our 'choice' of moral ends
becomes cfUcial. 15 A final difficulty is that although TTpoa(pEGLS' at first appears
in very close conjunction with TTpa~LS' (1112b32, 1139a31), more and more it
tends to detach itself and acquire independent importance. Aristotle says, for
instance, that it 'is a better index of virtue and vice than actions' (1111 b6), that it
is, in fact, OLKELoTaTov TD apETD, 'the thing most related to virtue' (1111 b5-6).
When he comes to treat of aKpaG(a in book 7, TTpOalpEGLS' becomes completely
separated from actions, for he asserts that the TTpOalpEGLS' of the morally weak
man may be ETTLELK~S' though his actions be KaKal (1152a17).
Thus Aristotle does not altogether sustain his innovative approach to the word
that he sets forth in iii 2-5; and philosophers after hirn, probably for like consid-
erations, did not follow hirn in the specifics of his interpretation. Epictetus has
nothing to say about deliberation and very little to say about action. In fact the
process of according it status independent of action is virtually completed in his
writings. Why this should be so will be explored below. For now it is enough to
note that already in Aristotle, instead of adecision antecedent to a single act, the
word sometimes has a more general sense. It can mean something like 'moral
character' or 'personality'. Instead of a single act, it refers to the general pattern
of one' s acts, a developed tendency toward a certain kind of choice or decision.
In fact, it seems reasonable to suppose that Aristotle likes the word for its capac-
ity to combine a specific with a general sense. It is the particular that, to borrow
an idea from elsewhere in his writings, bElKVVGL Ta Ka8oAOV, is 'more philosoph-
ical' than the particular in isolation, and so brings us closer to real knowledge. 16
This is why it is a better index of character than individual acts. In Epictetus this
general sense predominates, but not to the exclusion of other, related senses.
11
Above it was suggested that one of the reasons the word recommended itself to
Epictetus was that it combined the mental and emotional into a single idea; and
that this psychological 'monism' was congenial to Stoicism. It is all the more sur-
prising that it does not appear to have been part of the vocabulary of other Stoics,
particularly of the early Stoics. 17 One does find it classified, in certain rather
scholastic Stoic forrnulations, as a species of practical impulse (6p~~ TTpaKTLK~);
and not very helpfully defined as a a~LpEGLS' TTpa aLpEGEwS' (Stob. ecl. 2.87 = SVF
iii 173). As B. Inwood remarks, 'This suggests an absurdly restricted use of the

14 EN Illlb27, 1112bll, 1113a2-4; cf. EE 1226b9; MM 1189a7.

15 Cf. EN 1097a21; Rhet. 1366a15, 1417a18. Aristotle's theory can possibly be rescued here by
invoking 'constitutive ends' (cf. Gauthier-lolif 1970, ii 195-196; 447-448).
16 Cf. De anima 417b23; Post. an. 86a3; Poet. 1451 b3. Here again the complex character of the
word can help explain its dual capacity . Reason and desire both have a role in ethical action, as
opposed, for example, to the arts. One n1ust take pleasure in virtuous acts to qualify as really virtuous.
Thus the choice (npOGLpECJLS') of a single virtuous act, if attended by pleasure, reveals the agent as
genuinely virtuous. 'TIPOGLPECJLS' is not without moral character' (EN 1139a33-34).
17 Of Epictetus' contemporaries, Marcus Aurelius makes but slight use of the word, and only in
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term in view of Aristotle's use of it.'18 Inwood's own explanation of the change
is too speculative, however: 'The older Stoics must have intended to "correct"
and so displace Aristotelian npoa( PECJLS'; by trivializing the central concept of
Aristotle' s analysis of rational action they made room for their own analysis ... '.
This is to credit the Stoics with more deviousness than they probably deserve in
this instance. F.H. Sandbach has a simpler explanation for the omission: the Sto-
ics failed to develop Aristotle' s lead in this particular because they were ignorant
of his ideas generally.19 Whether his overall thesis is valid is not really material;
the relevant question for determining its significance in Epictetus is if
npoa(pECJLS' played any significant role in early Stoic thought, whether in defer-
ence to Aristotle or independently of hirn. The view of most scholars is that it did
not. M. Pohlenz may be regarded as representing the majority view when he
wrote that 'Epictetus was the first [Stoic] to have developed npoa(pECJLS' as a
term with a completely distinct meaning and to have made it a key concept of his
ethics' (Pohlenz 1964, i 332). Hijmans likewise believes that 'herein [Epictetus]
differs from most other Stoics' (Hijmans 1959, 23). Following Pohlenz Hijmans
notes the appearance of the word in the surviving fragnlents of the 'middle Stoic'
philosopher Panaetius, but points out that the attribution to Panaetius is moot. In
any case his infl uence on Epictetus cannot be proved on the basis of a single
(doubtful) fragment. 20 1.M. Rist is confident that the Stoics before Epictetus
hardly ever used the word (Rist 1969, 5). A.A. Long, however, cautions against
this conclusion, pointing out that it is an argunlent ex silentio. He also makes the
point that, of the principal topics comprising Stoic ethics, inlpulse, or OP\l-~ is the
one about which we are least informed, and 'the early Stoic concept which corre-
sponds to npoa( PECJLS' in Aristotle, or the concept of choice, is undoubtedly
expressed by the word oP\l-~' (Long 1976, 79-80). It follows that npoa(pECJLS'
might figure more pronlinently in the testimony from the ear1y Stoa if a greater
context for discussions of 0P\l- ~ were preserved. In the most recent contribution
to the topic, however, C. Kahn states that 'this Aristotelian term apparently
played no significant role in early Stoic theory ... It seems clear that Epictetus has
used this rather old-fashioned term to express a fundamentally new idea' (Kahn
1988,252).
The evidence, insofar as it permits us to draw a conclusion, being of course
fragmentary, suggests that the word was not in fact a big part of the early Stoic
vocabulary. We can also endorse the view of the majority of scholars that, what-

patent imitation of Epictetus: cf. esp. xi 36; also viii 56; xii 3, 23, and 33. His familiarity with Epicte-
tus' writings is proved from i 7; and cf. the comment of the scholiast to book ii: 'Marcus plainly
epictetizes (avTLKpvS' ETTLKTllTL(El)'.
I g Inwood ]985, 241. He might have added that it also represents amisinterpretation of the tradi-

tion of the word. The prefix TTpO-, insofar as it was feit, referred to priority of choice, i.e., preference
of one thing over another another, rather than priority in time. Cf. Hardie 1980, 168.
19 Sandbach 1985, passim. On the particular question of TTpOGLpECJlS', 72n57.
20 The fragment is fr. 86a van Straaten (= Nemesius, De Natura Hominis, 26). The question of
whether it actually derives from Panaetius is discussed in van Straaten 1946, 267-268.
 117

ever its antecedents, TTpOaLpEGlS' was given fresh significance by Epictetus. How-
ever, it is not entirely absent from early Stoicism. We noted its inclusion in anal-
yses of practical impulse. Its other occurrences in the surviving testimonia give
valuable clues to the direction the word took after Aristotle. It also appears in a
passage of Stobaeus (ecl. 2.7, 11 g = SVF i 216) describing the Stoic man of
virtue (or sage) and all the practical advantages he enjoys. Here it is claimed that
he is 'great (~EyaS') because he can compass all the things available and in
accord with his TTpOaLpEGlS' (choice, preference)'. The use of the word here is
consistent with Aristotle' s, but in the absence of any reference to ßOUAEUGlS', his
influence cannot be assumed. It is also very close in sense to its use by Epictetus
at i 12,9: EAEU8EpOS' ycip EGTlV, 4l yLvETal TTcivTa KaTo TTpoa(pEGlV KaL ÖV
ouöELS' öuvaTal KWAUGaL. But Stobaeus is probably not quoting any Stoic source
directly and its appearance here cannot be regarded as evidence for old Stoic
usage.
More significant is SVF ii 966 (= Aetius, plac. i 29, 7). Here TTpoa(pEGlS' is
listed alongside civciYKll, EL ~ap~Evll, TUXll, and TO aUT6~aTov. The source
ascribes to the Stoics generally a view that recognized these as ciPxaL KlV~GEWS'.
The inspiration for this classification, as is weIl known, goes back to Plato (cf.
Laws 888e-889a; Tim. 46d f.). But it is Aristotle who fixed its precise terms and
is ultimately responsible for the later history of what we may call the ciPX~ tradi-
tion. 21 Theophrastus adopted it and it recurs in one form or another in many later
writers touched by the Aristotelian tradition. 22 The canonical list of ciPXaL ,in
Aristotle and his successors, is TTpOaLpEGlS', <pUGlS', civciYKll, and TUXll. Minor
variations are found. 23 I want to argue that this tradition of dividing up the causes
of causes in the world along lines laid down by Aristotle, and reserving
rrpoalpEalS' especially as the province of man, lies behind Epictetus' use of the
word. This classification of ciPxaL was a very important conduit for the tradition
of the word after Aristotle. Alongside this philosophical tradition there was an
independent, and growing popular tradition of the word. According to A. Dihle,
this alone can account for most of its appearances in Epictetus (Dihle 1982, 60-
61). I hope to show that this is untrue. According to Kahn (1988, 251-255), on
the other hand, Epictetus is reviving a moribund word, 'an old-fashioned term',
as he calls it, and giving it new life. But this view, like Dihle's, ignores the philo-
sophical tradition of the word in the period between Aristotle and Epictetus. And
as I hope to show, Epictetus' message cannot be precisely appreciated except in

21 Cf. Meta. 10 13a21, 10 18b25, 1048a 11; for TTpOU( pEO"lS' especially as an dpX~, cf. EN
1112a31-33, 1134a20. See further Gauthier-lolif 1970, ii 199. There existed another collection of
'principles' in later Platonism--divine mind, form, and matter-which should not be confused with
this one. Cf. Dillon 1977, 206.
22 For Theophrastus cf. Aetius plac. I, 29, 4 = Stob. ecl. I, 6, 17c, and Fortenbaugh 1984, 44 and
229-234.
23 Besides the SVF fragment, cf. Dihle 1982, 215n21 and n23 for examples of such minor vari-
ants; and add Boethius, de Consolatione Philosophiae, iv 6; Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 245
D; Augustine, De civ. dei v 9.
11-8

reference to this tradition.

"Whether the ascription of this ciPx~ doctrine to the early Stoa by Aetius is
dependable is not important. 24 Other Stoics were not the only infIuence on
Epictetus. His philosophical allegiances are in fact complex. The extent of his
debt to Plato can be gauged from the number of times he cites Socrates' words.
And iii 23 shows his partiality to Cynicism. 25 What the fragment shows is that
the ciPx~ tradition was alive in the Hellenistic period. And Epictetus, like many
of his contemporaries, exhibits traces of an eclectic tendency, a willingness to
borrow ideas from different philosophical traditions, as will become evident
below.
The strict identification of TTpOatpEGlS' with man in this tradition is almost
enough to account for its use in Epictetus, but its real significance is more subtle.
It lies in the precise relation that obtained among the various ciPXa(. This was a
source of disagreement among Stoics, Academics, and neo-Aristotelians. In fact,
their controversies tended to resolve into the question of the respective impor-
tance to be assigned to these four principles in the operation of the world and
man' s place in it. This trend is especially marked in the debate over determinism
and free will. In general, the Stoics were attacked for failing adequately to dis-
criminate <pUGlS' and civaYKTl (or EL~ap~EVTl); and (owing to their determinism)
for leaving no room at all for TTpoa(pEGlS'. Such criticisms are reported in Cicero,
and common in the writings of neo-Aristotelian philosophers like Alexander of
Aphrodisias. Epictetus' vigorous defense of human freedom, and his use of
TTpoaLpEalS' in precisely this connection, are, I want to argue, in direct response
to such attacks.
Before looking at Cicero and Alexander, however, a little background on the
controversy is in order. It is generally agreed by scholars that two stages must be
distinguished in the Stoic teaching on determinism and free will. 26 In the earliest
period of the Stoa, Zeno and Cleanthes developed the doctrine of EL~ap~EvTl that
was one of the hallmarks of the movement. However, as noted in Long-Sedley
(1987, i 392), 'There is no evidence that the first generation of Stoics feIt any ten-
sion between fate and morality.' This awareness was due to the criticisms of the
Academic Carneades. This, in turn, prompted the second stage in the Stoic teach-
ing, the defense by Chrysippus, which, if anything, strengthened Zeno' s original
insistence on the omnipotence of fate but sought to make it compatible with

24 If reliable, it would represent good evidence against Sandbach's view that the early Stoics
worked in isolation from Aristotle and his tradition, because here is a teaching that is demonstrably
his. But it is probably misguided. The doctrine as reported by Aetius is ascribed to Anaxagoras as
well as to the Stoics. It certainly cannot go back to Anaxagoras, except by a generous process of over-
reading; and the enlistment of the Stoics in the doctrine is most likely nlotivated by the same harmo-
nizing tendency.
25 For the intluence of Plato, cf. Jagu 1946. For the spell Socrates exercised on the Hellenistic
schools generally, Long 1988. For Epictetus' relation to Cynicism, Billerbeck 1978.
26 For a list of publications relating to the problem of free will within the context of Stoic deter-
minism, cf. Inwood 1985, 278n 132 and Long and Sedley 1987, ii 505, items 535-540 (§55) for fur-
ther bibliography.
 119

human responsibility in a way that salvaged morality. His solution is forever

linked with the famous image of the cylinder, and the distinction between proxi-
mate, or auxiliary, causes on the one hand, and perfect, or principal, causes on the
other. They are further identified as external and internal causes, respectively.27
That it is pushed is due to external causes, but that it rolls, and in a given direc-
tion at a given speed, is due more to its inherent shape and size; and these are the
perfect or proximate causes Chrysippus invoked to correspond to individual
human nature or character. In respect of human action, external causes include
phantasiae, [visa in the Latin of Cicero's Defato] , i.e., external impressions. The
conjunction of causes precipitates impulse and assent (or their opposites), which
lead directly to action. Cicero presents Chrysippus' position thus: 'If auxiliary or
proximate causes are not in our power ("in nostra potestate": =E<p' ~IlLV) it does
not follow that even impulse is not in our power... [He then makes a similar
point about assent:] Although assent cannot take place unless prompted by an
external impression, yet assent has this as its proximate, not principal cause'. He
then illustrates his point by way of the cylinder, 'which cannot begin to move
unless it is pushed or struck, but once this happened, continues to move of its
own nature ("suapte vi et natura")' (Cicero, De fato, §§41-42).
In Aulus Gellius vii 2 (SVF ii 1000) the same analogy is credited to Chrysip-
pus, and additional information is given. 'Although it is a fact', Chrysippus is
reported as saying, 'that all things are subject to a necessary and principal law
and are closely linked to fate, yet the actual dispositions of our minds are only
subject to fate according to their particular quality ("proinde ut proprietas eorum
est ipsa et qualitas")'. Later he says that 'the various categories of things in the
world and the beginnings of causes [= proximae causae in Cicero' s account] are
set in motion by the order, the law, and the necessity of fate. But the prompting of
our decisions and thoughts, and our actions, are controlled by each man's partic-
ular will and disposition (voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ingenia)' (vii 2,
10). The point to notice, is that what Aulus Gellius calls 'proprietas... et qualitas'
or voluntas cuiusque propria, and Cicero 'suapte vis et natura' corresponds to
what we would call a person's moral nature, or personality; and is in large part
what Epictetus means when he speaks of a person's npOG(pEUlS'. Moreover,
Epictetus consistently calls it E<p' ~IlLV and contrasts it with externals, which con-
front the agent in the aspect of <pGVTGUlGl; a contrast that reproduces the distinc-
tion between internal and external causes that is found in both the De fato and the
Aulus Gellius passages. Cf. i 22, 10: 'Some things are E<p' ~IlLV and some are not.
The former include npOGlpEUlS' KGl naVTG Ta npOGlpETlKa EPYG; but not E<p'
~ IlLv are the body, the parts of the body, possessions, parents, brothers, children,
country-in a word, all that with which we associate. '28 With npOGlpEUlS' he also
frequently associates man' s XP~UlS' TWV <pGVTGUlWV, i.e., his individual response

27 Cicero, De fato, §§39-45 (SVF ii 974); cf. Clement, Strom., viii 9 (= SVF ii 988); Plutarch
Mor. 1055F-l 056D (= SVF ii 994, 997).
28 For the contrast ofrrpouLpEOLS' (or Ta. rrpOULpETLKa.) and Ta. EKTOS' (or Ta. c1.rrpou(pETU), cf. also
i 4, 18; i 19,8; i 22,10; i 29, 2; ii 22, 19,26; iii 2, 13; iii 3, 8, 14f.; iv 4,23; iv 12, 15; iv 13, 14.
120

to external causes. Cf. iv 5, 23: 'Can anyone hurt your npoalpE<JLS or prevent you
from employing in a natural way the sense-impressions that come to you (TalS
npo<JnLnTou<JaLS <pavTa<JlaLS )?'; ii 1, 4: 'The essence of the good lies in the use
of sense-impressions (EV XP~<JEL <pavTa<JuDV), and of evil too, but the things
which lie outside npoalpE<JLS [Ta anpoalpETa] admit neither.'29 As in Cicero
(and Aristotle), npoalpE<JLS is closely tied to the category of the E<p' ~~lV (or En'
E~Ol; in Cicero, in nostra voluntate). Cf. ii 13, 10: 'If then Ta anpoalpETa are
neither good nor bad, but navTa Ta npoaLpETLKa are E<p' ~~lv ... what room is
there left for anxiety?' ii 5, 4: 'Distinguish matters and weigh them against one
another, and say to yourself: Ta ECW OUK En' E~Ol' npoalpE<JLS En' E~Ol' (cf. also
i 22, 10; ii 1, 12). Finally, one should note its connection with impulse (6p~~) and
assent (<JvyKaTa8E<JLS) in Epictetus, as these psychic functions are said to be in
nostra voluntate and products of internal causes in reports of Chrysippus' posi-
tion. Cf. i 17,20 f.: 'Man, you have a npoalpE<JLS free by nature from hindrances
and constraints ... I will prove this to you first in the sphere of assent. Can anyone
prevent you from assenting to truth? Can anyone force you to accept the false?
No one at all ... And in the sphere of desire and impulse (EnL TaU OpE KTL KaU KaL
6p~ llTL KaU Tonov) is it any different?' (cf. also i 4, 1; iii 6, 6-7; iii 18, 1 f.; iii 22,
104).
So it is clear that Epictetus' use of the word is consistent with Chrysippus'
defense of human responsibility within a determinist system and seems to corre-
spond to his perfect, or internal cause, which is E<p' rl~v (however we want to
interpret that).30 It translates voluntas in the Latin of Cicero and Aulus Gellius
and is shorthand for 'the will of the individual', and for the psychic powers like
assent and impulse that spring from it. This raises the obvious question: did
Chrysippus use the word npoalpE<JLS in his, original exposition of the theory to
signify this very thing? Is this the source of Epictetus' usage? The possibility
cannot be mIed out, but seems unlikely in view of the attacks of Peripatetics like
Alexander of Aphrodisias. They would have access to his writings; and yet they
emphasize that the Stoics omit reference to npoalpE<JLS on this very topiC. 31 The
virtual absence of the term in scholastic summaries of early Stoic doctrine also
points to Chrysippus' not having used it.
There may, in fact, be a special reason Epictetus used the word, while Chrysip-
pus did not. The latter' s compatabilist theory was criticized as unsatisfactory in
ways that Epictetus seems expressly concerned to avoid. Its shortcomings were
pointed out by the Peripatetics, and they brought npoalpE<JLS to bear on the sub-
ject as a foil to what they perceived as their opponents' shortsighted views.

29 Cf. also i 30, 4: rrpoaLpEaLS' o'(a 8EL Kat. XPTlCJLS' TWV craVTaCJLWV; iii 22, 103: örrov rrpoaLpECJLS'
Kat. XPTlaLS' TWV cravTaCJLwv. Also ii 22, 29; ii 23, 40. The association ofrrpoaLpEaLS', TO Ecr' rnüv, and
the quality of being KVpLOS' TTlS' cravTaCJLaS' goes back to Aristotle: cf. EN 1114 a29-b25.
30 See below, pp. 122-123.
31 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato, 180. 3-10. Alexander is not objecting here to its misuse
by the Stoics, but its absence altogether. He hirnself feels compelled to introduce it, of course, under
the influence of Aristotle. Cf. further below, p. 124.
 121

Epictetus wants to answer their objections, and his adoption of their pet term is
part of his strategy. The burden of their criticism is that, while our moral natures
may be primary causes and E<p' ~~v in the weak sense that they are ours, there is
no suggestion that the individual is ultimately responsible for his character, or
that it could be otherwise than it iso Ultimately it seems determined by fate, like
everything else in the Stoic scheme of things. Even refinements on this scheme
by Stoics after Chrysippus did not touch this basic difficulty.32 As Long-Sedley
remark (1987, i 394), '[In all versions of the theory] answerability for our
actions ... requires [only] a proper system for apportioning responsibility between
the relevant causal factors. For actions to be "in our power" [i.e., E<p' ~~v] is
simply for us to be their principal causes. Fate can be said to bring them about
through us'. But Epictetus is explicit that TTpoa(pEGlS' comprises responsibilty for
self in the strong sense. As Bonhöffer saw, 'Prohairesis signifies in Epictetus
nothing other than the possibilty of free, moral self-determination' (Bonhöffer
1890, 259-260). And Epictetus makes it clear that this is in fact the one area
which is immune from fate; where we, in other words, not Zeus, have fuU con-
trol. Cf. ii 15, 1: 'Tl poa(pEGlS' is naturally free and not subject to compulsion
(EAEVeEpOV Kat avavayKaGTov)'; i 1,23: 'Not even Zeus has power to overcome
my TTpoa(pEGlS"; iv 12, 12: 'God has entrusted me to myself, and he has sub-
jected my TTpoa(pEGlS' to me alone' .33 This appears to introduce a clear break in
the causal nexus dependent on Zeus and also caUed fate by the Stoics, and to seg-
regate TTpoa(pEGlS' in such a way that it is independent of ELJlapJlEvll.
Chrysippus, on the other hand, aUowed man and other animals only so much
autonomy as made their actions and character 'co-fated' with the operation of
Zeus and ELJlapJlEvll. Cf. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel, 6. 8. 25-26 (=
SVF ii 998 ): 'In book 1 of On Fate Chrysippus uses proofs of this [etymological]
kind; and in book 2 he tries to resolve the absurd apparent consequences of the
thesis that everything is necessitated, which we set out at the start-for example,
that it is instrumental in destroying our own self-motivated determination con-
cerning censures, commendations and encouragements, and everything that
seems to come about as a result of our own causation. Hence he says in book 2
that it is obvious that many things originate from us, but that these too are none
the less co-fated along with the government of the world.' Whereas Epictetus
writes: 'Nothing has power over TTpoa(pEGlS' except itself' (i 29, 12).34 But while
there is undeniably a contradiction on the verbal level, we cannot be so sure that
this departs in substance from the original, Chrysippean position that everything
is ultimately subject to Zeus (or fate, or providence)35 alone. Epictetus writes
from the internal perspective, in describing man' s unmistakable sense of personal

32 Sorabji 1980, 70-88 distinguishes eight different versions of Chrysippus' compatabilist thesis.
33 Cf. also i 17,21-28; i 19,7; ii 2, 2f.; ii 10, 1; ii 13, 10; ii 15, 1; iii 18,3; iii 22,105; iii 26, 24;
iv 1, 100; iv 5, 23; iv 7,8; iv 12,7; E 9.
34 Cf. also i 17, 24f.; i 19,7; ii 23,19; iii 19,2.
35 For the Stoic identification of god with fate cf. SVF i 160, ii 528, 580, 931, 937, 1076f.; for the
identification of god and TTpovola. cf. SVF i 176, ii 528, 937.
122

autonomy; yet Chrysippus, while acknowledging this, may have invoked a dou-
ble perspective whereby the first is reconciled with a cosmic, determinist dimen-
sion: our will is actually a portion of God's, and so the distinction disappears. 36
111
By now I hope to have shown that Epictetus' use of the word npoa(pEGLS' is
best viewed in the context of the debate over fate and free will which the Stoa did
most to incite. 37 We will now try to show that the word was already prominent in
this debate. For contemporary evidence we are forced back upon the Latin of
Cicero. In the De fato he writes, in a passage critical of the Stoics and Chrysippus
in particular: 'qui introducunt causarum seriem sempiternam, ei mentem hominis
voluntate libera spoliatam necessitate fati devinciunt'. There are good grounds
for regarding voluntas in this passage as a translation of npoa(pEGLS' (so Dihle
1982, 133). Evidence for this claim comes from Cicero's use of voluntas in De
natura deorum, ii 44, where he alludes to Aristotle and his teaching on the apxa(:
'Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus est in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut
natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate.' 38 Plainly, voluntas translates
npOaLpEGLS' here, as natura and vis translate <pVGLS' and avciYKTl respectively. For
other passages where Cicero appears to draw upon this Peripatetic tradition, see
defin. 2.65 and de rep. 3.23. 39
The revival of interest in Aristotle' s writings began in Cicero' s day, and his
citation of Aristotle in the De nato deorum shows that his analysis of the apxa(,
including rrpoa(pEaLSO, was exploited, at least by the Stoics' enemies, in the
debate about free will. They alleged that, with their determinism, the Stoics rec-
ognized only one apx~, namely civciYKTl, which they confused with <pVGLS'; and
they neglected TVXTl, and left no room for rrpoa(pEaLS'. Andronicus published his
new edition of Aristotle's works at Rome sometime toward the end of the first
century B.C. At about this time the tradition of writing commentaries on Aristo-
tle's works began; and some of the earliest commentary that survives is on the
EN.40 Hence his concept of rrpOaLpEGLS' would have been again current. But, to

36 Cf. Long 1971, 176 on 'bifocal' Stoicism, i.e., its unique effort to honor both the cosmic and
the first-person perspectives.
37 While it may be true that the problem made its first appearance with the Epicureans, as many
scholars believe, it is nevertheless plain that their fellow corporealists, and more committed determin-
ists, the Stoics, became the lightning rods of the libertarians' attacks. Cf. Long-Sedley 1987, ii 489
(§20) for bibliography on Epicurus' place in the history of the debate.
38 The passage is listed as fr. 24 in Ross' collection of the fragments of Aristotle.
39 Note too that in the De amicitia he defines friendship as voluntatum studiorum sententiarum
consensio, echoing Aristotle's pronouncement, that the best friendship is based on rrpoulpEOlS (EE
1243b9-10). His use of voluntas at de /in. v 36 translates Aristotle's cipETU't. rrpoulpETlKUl. Compare
also de off. i 28 with EN 1105a28-32. These references are mostly drawn from Pohlenz 1964, ii 139-
140. For the influence of Aristotle on Cicero see the collection of essays in Fortenbaugh and Stein-
metz edd. 1989.
40 This information is derived from Gottschalk 1990; and Sorabji 1990, 1-30. Cf. also Düring
1957, ch. 18 with bibliography; Lynch 1972, ch. 6. Also useful is the introduction to Todd 1976, 2-
15.
 123

repeat what was said above, Epictetus' usage does not reflect Aristotle's directly,
but the use to which the word was put in Hellenistic debate with the Stoics by
philosophers influenced by Aristotle.
Alexander of Aphrodisias is the best example. His book De fato is one of the
best known criticisms of Stoic determinism from the ethical viewpoint to survive
from antiquity.4l Alexander was a neo-Aristotelian, and in his attack on the Stoic
position he features the concept of TTpoa( pEULS' prominently: 'Deliberation is
done away with according to [the Stoics], and so clearly is TO E<p' ~~lV ... And
TTpoaLpEuLS', the peculiar activity of man, is concemed with the same things; for
TTpoaLpEuLS' is the impulse with desire (6p~~ ~ET' OpECEWS') towards what has
been preferred as a result of deliberation. And for this reason TTpoaLpEuLS' does
not apply to the things that come to be of necessity' .42 As Sharples notes (1983,
142), this definition of TTpoaLpEuLS' is based on Aristotle (cf. esp. the reference to
deliberation), but uses terminology borrowed from the Stoics. This applies par-
ticularly to the phrase 6p~~ ~ET' OpECEWS'. Both of these terms are prominent in
Epictetus and have intimate connection with TTpoa(pEuLS' (see above, pp. 120-
121; and below, p. 132). EIsewhere, in an even more Stoic formulation, he
defines it as deliberative assent. 43 This shows that Alexander endeavored to meet
and defeat the Stoics on their own ground, i.e., by demonstrating that even within
the limits set by themselves for human responsibility they fail to satisfy adequate
standards of freedom and free will. But if this is Alexander's strategy in adopting
their language, it seems plausible to suppose that Epictetus tumed around and did
the same thing to them: adopted their favorite word, owing to their allegiance to
Aristotle, the very word they held up as the standard the Stoics did not meet and
moreover did not (before Epictetus) even try to meet; and made it the key term of
his ethics within aStoie system. It follows that Epietetus' choice of terminology
reflects the controversy. That we in fact ought to regard his use of the word
within the context of the free will debate appears from how later writers use it as
well; for it had a long life in antiquity and was conducted in terms that remained
virtually the same over centuries. TTpoa(pEuLS' is often opposed to clvciYKTl, or acts
done EK TTpoaLpEuEwS' contrasted with ones 8L' clvciYKTlS'. Cf. Her~dian, 3. 4. 16:
Kai E'( TLVES' ov ~6vov EK TTpoaLpEuEwS', clAA<1 8L' clvciYKTlS' TTpOUE8EVTO aVT0.
Eusebius argues that advice would be otiose if all our actions were necessitated
by fate; and the distinction between good and bad actions would disappear. 'For
if he who set out on an expedition, did this not from his own TTpoa(pEuLS', but
from being driven by extemal necessity, so also evidently would the man who set
hirnself to robbery and plundering graves and all other practices ... ' .44 In criticiz-

41 Cf. Long 1970; and especially Sharples 1983, an edition with notes and commentary.
42 180.3-10 (with omissions) trans. based on Sharples.
43 Quaestio iii 13, 107. 18. For assent (CJVYKUTciOECJLS') as the primary focus of human responsi-
bility within the Stoic system, cf. Inwood 1985, 44ff., especially 55.
44 EL yap 6 ETT't. CJTPUTElUV 6p~wv OVK EK TTpOULpECJEWS' OLKELUS' TOlJT' ETTpUTTEV, EA.uvv6~EVOS'

8E UTTa T~S' E~WOEV dvaYKllS' ... (Praeparatio Evangelica, vi 6 (243c-d)). Eusebius contrasts
TTpOU(pECJLS' and avciYKll again at 244a and 245a.
124

ing the astrology of the philosophical schools, he says, 'See how they also
destroy our free-will, by referring not only external events and things indepen-
dent of us, but also our own npoaLpEoELS' to the course of the stars. '45 Gregory of
Nyssa's Contrafatum is organized around similar terms. He speaks, for instance,
of sinners who are ßAanTLKoL EK npoaLpEoEwS', contrasting that with the idea that
this comes about EK TLVOS' civaYKTlS' (Contra fatum, [Migne, Patrologia Graeca
45] col. 161).
The same applies to Epictetus' characteristic use of the phrase Ta E<p' ~~LV; this
too is given great play in the free-will debate. Cf. Alexander, Defato 205.15-16:
'For Ta E<p' ~~V is only present in those of the things that come to be according
to impulse that are activities in accordance with rational impulse. And rational
impulse is that which comes about in creatures endowed with deliberation and
npoaLpEoLS'; that is, the impulse of men, when it comes about in relation to delib-
eration and choice.' Compare Epictetus Ench. 1, 1-2: 'Some things are E<p' ~~v,
while others are not 'E<p' ~~LlV are conception, impulse, desire, aversion (uno-
ATltVLS', 6p~~, ÖPE~LS', EKKALOLS') and, in a word, everything that is our own doing.
Not E<p' TI~LV are our body, our property, reputation, office and, in a word, every-
thing that is not our own doing. Furthermore, the things E<p' ~~v are by nature
free, unhindered, and unimpeded; while the things not E<p' ~~v are weak, servile,
subject to hindrance, and not our own.' The cumulative evidence indicates that
directly or indirectly, Epictetus' language continually evokes, and tries to put
hirn on the right side of, the ongoing debate over free-will that Stoicism chiefly
provoked.
IV
Before proceeding we should anticipate some objections to our position. Sand-
bach believes that Epictetus' use of npoaLpEoLS' can be understood solely with
reference to its use in non-philosophical Hellenistic Greek generally, in authors
such as Polybius, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He writes: 'TlpoaLpEoLS' is a
common word in Epictetus... By it he means a general attitude to the moral prob-
lems of life, a basic choice of principle. This is not derived from Aristotle ...
TlpoaLpEoLS' was, like Ta npoKEL~EVOV, a word in general use and often indicated
purpose, plan, policy. It was a favorite with Demosthenes, and phrases like ~
npoaLpEOLS' ToD ßLOV (23. 41, cf. ps.-Demosthenes 48. 56) and EV npoaLpEoEL
XPTlOTlJ KaL ßL4l OW<PPOVL (Ep. 3. 18) offer precedents for Epictetus' usage'
(Sandbach 1985, 72n57). Dihle seems to agree. He claims that, by Cicero's time,
'npoaLpEoLS' had already become the term to denote the general moral attitude of
an individual' (Dihle 1982, 134). He adds that this state of affairs 'applies to later
Stoic terminology as well as to normal Hellenistic Greek' .46 By later Stoic termi-
nology he means primarily Epictetus (Dihle 1982,60). According to Kahn, on
the other hand, there is discontinuity between the use of the word in Aristotle and

45 8Ea 8' ws- KaI. TO E<p' rnl1v clvaLpOUCJlV, OV ~OVOV Ta EKTOS-, KaI. Ta OVK E<P' ~~LV ...clAAa TaS-
~~ETEpas- TTpoalpECJElS-. (Praeparation Evangelica, vi. 1 [237d-238a]).
46 Cf. Dihle 1982, 193n49 for references to its use by Polybius, Dionysius, et. al.
 125

its later reappearance in Epictetus. He speaks of Epictetus reviving an 'old-fash-

ioned term' to express 'a fundamentally new idea' (Kahn 1988, 252-253). Why
he feit compelled to use an old-fashioned word, or why he chose this particular
one are questions Kahn does not address. None of these scholars takes into
account the philosophical controversies that the Stoa was involved in from
Cameades onward: controversies still alive in Cicero' s time, in Epictetus', and
even in the early Christian church. 47 But, if I am right, this is where the word
acquires the sense particularly relevant for Epictetus.
Sandbach and Dihle might, nevertheless, at first glance appear justified in
invoking the popular tradition for his usage. Epictetus was, after all, a popular
writer, and his language is, for the most part, the KOlV~ of the common people
rather than the technical vocabulary of the philosophical schools. Moreover,
there is nowhere any reference to Aristotle, Aristotle' s commentators, or to any
of those who participated in the debate on free will. He prescinds from the debate
entirely and presents his doctrines as unquestioned truth. He evinces nothing but
contempt for scholastic leaming and controversy; and the debate on free-will was
characterized by the kind of hair-splitting that he deprecated. 48 In addition, the
traditional view has been that Epictetus was indifferent to or isolated from philo-
sophical movements of his day; and that at least part of his value for us today is
that he faithfully reflects the thought and vocabulary of the earliest Stoics (most
of whose own writing is of course lost). In his fundamental, pioneering studies on
Epictetus Bonhöffer proceeded on this assumption. Consequently TTpoa(pEGlS',
which as noted earlier figures but slightly in the surviving testimony of the early
Stoa, was something of an embarrassment for Bonhöffer, and he accords it corre-
spondingly short shrift. 49 In aperiod marked by a tendency toward eclecticism
among philosophers, including Stoics, Epictetus has traditionally been regarded
as fiercely, defiantly orthodox. 50 Of course this impression is largely created by
his determination to put up a 'unified front' in his presentation of Stoic doctrine;
and in particular his unyielding hostility to Epicurus, in comparison with the
more accomodating attitude of Seneca and Marcus. 51 Orthodox or not, I think his
decision to put TTpoa(pEGlS' at the center of his ethics does signal i~tercourse with
47 Of other commentators, 1 am dosest in agreement to Inwood 1985, 240-242, who also 10cates
Epictetus' use of the word within the philosophical tradition stemming from Aristotle. 1 disagree with
hirn, however, concerning the old Stoic attitude toward the word, where he needlessly posits a cam-
paign of wilfull neglecL And he does not mention the neo-Aristotelians as preparing the way for
Epictetus' treatment of the term.
48 Cf. i 4, 6ff.; i 29, 56; ii 17,3; ii 19, 14ff.; iv 4, 14-18; Ench. 49. Compare Marcus, ii. 2, with
Farquharson' s note ad ioc.: 'It is a characteristic note of Roman Stoicism, this reminder that conduct
is our concern, not theory' (Farquharson 1952, i 284).
49 A total of barely seven pages devoted to TTpoa(pECJlS in Bonhöffer 1890 (118-121; 259-261);
virtually nothing said about it in Bonhöffer 1894. Nevertheless Bonhöffer saw the true significance of
the word perfectly when he wrote: 'Epictet mit diesem Worte häufig das ganze geistige Wesen des
Menschen bezeichnet, insofern er daran hauptsächlich das Moment der Freiheit ins Auge fasst' (Bon-
höffer 1890, 259). Unfortunately he did not go on to define the precise content of that freedom.
50 Cf. Donini 1988, 28. Donini does not go on record as either endorsing or challenging this judgment.
51 Cf. ii 20, 6-20; ii 23, 20-22; iii 7; iii 24,38. Contrast Seneca Ep. 11. 8; 12. 11; De breve vif. 14.
126

philosophical movements more of his own day. What the reader of Epictetus
soon comes to appreciate is that his absolutism, his wilfull simplicity, and his
sneering attitude toward philosophical enquiry are largely poses designed to cre-
ate an ~eoS' in the rhetorical sense to complement the rigor of his teaching. He
was not as isolated from or ignorant of contemporary developments as he usually
appears. His dismissive attitude toward Ta AoyapLu ('the petty quibbles') of the
schools at least shows that he was familiar with them. And he is not always so
dismissive. He is in fact one of our best sources for information about the logical
problem known as the 'Master argument', which figured in the debate on fate and
responsibility.52 And it must be remembered that he spent nlost of his life in
Ronle, where the eclectic spirit of philosophy especially flourished.
Another objection to our interpretation relates to chronology. Epictetus' dates
are reckoned to be c. A.D. 55-135; whereas Alexander of Aphrodisias, whom we
mined for compararative material above and treated as a parallel to Epictetus,
actually wrote decades later. But Alexander represents for us an example of neo-
Aristotelian thought; we know that the movement was already at least a century
old by Epictetus' time, even though not much remains from this earliest period;53
and in any case there is evidence in Cicero of renewed awareness of Aristotle' s
doctrine of TIPOU(pEGLS', and its application to the debate on the compatibility of
ethics and (Stoic) determinism. The terms of the debate in writers as late as Euse-
bius and Gregory of Nyssa shows the conservatism in vocabulary that marked
this as other debates; so that it is not implausible to assurne that they were fixed
from the very start of the controversy, at least among Aristotelian opponents of
the Stoa. Whether Academic philosophers like Carneades also employed the term
is impossible to determine but does not seem unlikely in view of the freedom
with which rival philosophers appropriated ideas from their opponents. We saw
this in the case of Alexander's definition of TIPOUlpEGLS', which is tinged with
Stoic terminology. In turn, Epictetus' mentality is paradoxically influenced by
the very views he is. combatting, and this is reflected in his arguments no less
than his vocabulary. As is clear from Seneca, who is frank about his borrowings
from rival schools, there was a strong crosscurrent of ideas in the early Roman
period. This is the proper context in which to approach Epictetus' adoption of
TI POUl pE GLS'.

2; Marcus vii 64; xi 26. Hostility toward Epicureans was characteristic of the early Stoa: cf. SVF ii
1115, 1126.
52 Cf. ii 19 (= SVF ii 283); and Cherniss 1976,588-589 for background to the problem, with bib-
liography. The whole of essay ii 19 evinces the characteristic ambivalence of Epictetus toward prob-
lems of logic: he seems to acknowledge their role in moral training grudgingly (cf. esp §§ 8 ff.). For
this reason he is also reticent in underscoring the importance of the Master Argument to the problem
offree will.
53 Todd 1976, 12, writes, apropos of the revived interest in Aristotle' s writings prior to Alexan-
der of Aphrodisias: 'It is clear now that a strong tradition of scholarly exegesis was established before
hirn.'
 127

v
It was claimed earlier that the apx~ tradition was largely responsible for the
continued life of the word; that this was the context from which both Epictetus
and critics of the Stoics derived their use; and that much of the point of this tradi-
tion lay in exploring the relationship among the various apxaL.54 This trend con-
tinues in Epictetus, and is further evidence that his use of the word depends on
the continous philosophical tradition. The contrast of TTpOalpEGlS and <pUGls is
especially interesting. In Aristotle' s original analysis the two are similar in being
both teleological, i.e., directed toward an end; but dissimilar in that nature does
not deliberate, and represents unconscious teleology. They also have different
spheres of influence. TIpoaLpEGlS is confined to the sphere of the contingent, and
cannot trespass on the territory of nature (cf. Phys. 196b17-22). So the two are
similar in some respects, but differ most of all in that TTpOalpEGlS is confined to
man. The contrast, however, did not remain there, and its most subtle application
involved the relation between TTpOalpEGlS and human nature. Aristotle already
raises the question of the role of <pUGls in moral character and, while acknowl-
edging its importance, concludes that virtue, to be complete, requires the additon
of TTpOalpEGlS KaL Ta OV EVEKa (EN 1117a4-5; cf. 1103a24-26, 1144bl-14, and
EE 1234a24-33). To ascribe a person's virtuous character to his 'nature' is some-
what to deny hirn credit for it; as it is to absolve hirn of responsibility if it hap-
pens to be bad. <PUGlS in this context clearly refers to one' s innate disposition.
Aristotle insists, however, 'that something also depends on the man hirnself' (EN
1114bI7). In a similar vein he says near the beginning of his Politics that the
union of the male and female is the most rudimentary social association, which
comes about 'not from TTpOalpEGlS ... , but from a natural (<pUGlKOV) urge to leave
behind offspring of a like kind' .55 Diogenes Laertius (vii 8) transmits a letter pur-
porting to be from Zeno the Stoic to Antigonus Gonatas, in which he says of any
young man who gravitates toward philosophy rather than toward a life of plea-
sure: <pclvEpos EGTlV OU jlOVOV <PUGEL TTpas EUyEvElav KAlVWV, aAAG KaL TTpoalpE-
GEl. And Dionysius of Halicamassus, speaking of Isocrates' superior handling of
grand themes in comparison with Lysias, writes: 'Perhaps by natUre he is high-
minded; or else, TTpOalpEGEl yE he habitually pursues lofty and admirable
designs.' 56
In these passages it is fair to detect the emergence of a concept of the will, as
the real and proper focus of praise and bIarne. That there is a faculty in man that
can distinguish itself from and even override one' s 'nature' is a realization that

54 Critics of the Stoics were evidently justified, for instance, in claiming that they identified
nature and necessity, and this formed a main point of attack. Cf. Alexander, De fato, ch. xiii, 181.
7ff.; Mantissa 185. 1ff.; and Sharples' comments, pp. 142-143.
55 Pol. 1252a28-30; cf. also Oec. I345b9: Tl] <pV(JEl EV<pV~S', Tl] TTpoalpE(JEl <plAOTTOVOS' TE
Kat. ÖlKalOS'.
56 Critical essays, de [socrate, §3; for additional examples of this contrast between TTpoalpE(JlS'
and <pV(JlS' cf. de Demosthene §3; Polybius 7. 11. Iff.; 7. 13.7; 10.26.8; Cicero, ad. Au., 10.4.8;
Alexander, Mantissa, 185.21-23; Eusebius, Praeparation Evangelica, 247c-d.
 128

foreshadows Kant' s Wille. But for obvious reasons this development was not
allowed to go far in Epictetus. As a Stoic he conforn1s to the view of <pualS' as
sovereign, both in a descriptive, and in a prescriptive sense, as the ultimate stan-
dard of values. So we find that Epictetus does indeed distinguish npoa(pEalS' and
<pualS', but only to subordinate the former to the latter. Their relationship should
be complementary rather than opposed; and Epictetus' formula for the 'end'
(TEAOS') is to keep npoa(pEalS' in accord with <pualS': npoa(pEalV KaTel <pualV
TT]pELV (cf. ii 2, 2; iii 4, 9; Ench. 4 and 13).
The influence of the apx~ tradition is discemible in a few fragments of Epicte-
tus which contrast npoa(pEalS' and TUXT]. Their relation in Aristotle is a subtle
one. Both are reckoned in 'the sphere of purposive events' (EV TOLS' EVEKa TOU-
Phys. 196b 10-197a8); but the result of TUXT] would have been recognized as a
purpose only if it had been anticipated and planned for. A similar distinction is
preserved in fragments 12, 24 and 66 of Epictetus.
But the most fertile opposition is that between npoa(pEalS' and avaYKT] (or El-
llaPIlEVT]). This is where one finds Epictetus most eloquent and original. This
contrast grew out of the ciPX~ tradition but, as we saw, acquired independent
importance owing to the philosophical debate over free will. According to
Epictetus, freedom is secured by limiting oneself to Ta npoalpETlKa, or what he
otherwise calls Ta E<p' ~ III v. What this class of things encompasses will be
explored below. For the present, it is enough to show that, for hirn, failure to
observe this cardinal rule is to subject oneself to civaYKT]. Thus the contrast is
preserved. Necessity (which Epictetus represents in an unfavorable light in con-
trast with the ideal of freedom) reigns outside the seIt; but need only exists to the
extent to which we faH to observe the boundaries of self: Cf. iv 7, 9-10: aKwAuTa
IlEV Ta npoalpETlKa, KWAUTa 8E Ta anpoa(pETa. Kal 8la TOUTO, EaV IlEV EV TOU-
f TOlS' 1l0VOlS' ~y~aT]Tal Ta aya8av TO aUTou Kal aUIl<PEpoV, TOLS' aKwAuTolS' Kal
E<p' EauT0, EAEU8EpOV faTal ... av 8' EV TalS' EKTOS' Kal anpoalpETOlS', avaYKT]
KWAUEa8al aUTO, EIlno8((Ea8al, 80UAEUE lV ... Cf. i 4, 18-19: 'Where is progress
[in philosophy]? If any man among you, renouncing Tel EKTOS', has concentrated
on npoa(pEalS', cultivating it and perfecting it. .. and has learned, that he who
craves or shuns Ta 11 ~ E<p' aUT4l can neither be free nor faithful, but must of
necessity (avaYKT]) rise and fall with them, and must (avaYKT]) end by subjecting
himself to other things' .57 It is apparent that civaYKT] is contrasted with
npoa(pEalS' here obliquely. Nevertheless it is often repeated so that their basic
opposition becomes clear. Moreover, npoal pEalS' is frequently called
ci vava yKaaTov, 'free from necessity', while Ta ci npoal pETa are called
avayKaaTa, subject to necessity.58
VI
Establishing the (implicit) context, however, is only one step in the interpreta-

57 Cf. also i 19,6; ii 2, 25; iv 4, 35; iv 5, 27; iv 7,19; iv 10,6; Ench. 2.2; 14.2; 13; 31. 2; 32.1.
58i 17,27; ii 5, 6-8; ii 15, 1; iii 3, 8-1Qi~J,JQ9~i~'h~~
 129

tion of the word. The precise range of meaning remains to be determined. For
just as Aristotle had redefined it, and Alexander recast the definition of the word
using a hybrid of Stoic and Peripatetic ideas, so Epictetus invests it with new sig-
nificance. A survey of his usage folIows. It does not undertake to account for all
appearances, or even nuances, of the word. One must remember that in making
such analyses we are pulling apart meanings that, as far as Epictetus is con-
cemed, belong together. The choice of a single word to support his whole ethical
philosophy reflects this. The underlying reality may be complex, but for hirn was
reducible to a single idea comprehended under a single term. This psychological
monism, if we may so call it, or unified view of man's place in nature, is a feature
of his writing that gives it much of its force and cogency.
First of all, it appears that Epictetus, like Aristotle before hirn, favored the
word because it underscored the connection between reason, discretion, or judg-
ment, on the one hand, and ethics on the other. The moral categories of right and
wrong, good and bad, depend on the discretionary power that reason alone
affords. And so we begin our survey with passages in which npoa( pEULS is
equivalent to reason: 59
(1) 'Consider who you are. To begin with, a man; that is, one whohas no fac-
ulty more sovereign than npoa[pEuLS, but everything else subordinate to it, and
npoa[pEuLS itself free from slavery and subjection. Consider, then, from what
things you are distinguished by virtue of AOyOS. You are distinguished from wild
beasts, and tarne ones ... ' (ii 10, 1-2). TIpoa[pEuLS is here treated as a virtual syn-
onym of AOyOS. It thus pre-empts an otherwise prominent Stoic term. (What
Epictetus gains by this substitution will become clear as the range of the word' s
meaning becomes clearer.) In Aristotle, we recall, npoa[pEuLS is a compound of
reason and desire; and there are places where Aristotle emphasizes its intellectual
content above all. 6o But in certain passages of Epictetus npoalpEuLS is öLClvoLa
plain and simple. This is especially clear in ii 23. Cf. §§ 16ff.: 'What is the faculty
that uses all the other faculties? TIpoa[pEuLS. What is it that tends to everything?
TIpoa[pEuLS. What is it that destroys the whole man, sometimes by hunger, some-
times by a noose, sometimes by hurling hirn off a cliff?61 TIpoaLpEuLS. Is there,
then, anything stronger than this among men?' The reference to npoaLpEuLS in
§ 16 as TO XPW~EVOV, 'the faculty that uses (the rest)' recalls i 1, 4-6, where ~
övva~LS ~ AOyL K~ is said to be what 'judges with discemment the art of music, of
grammar, and the other arts and faculties, passing judgment upon their uses and
pointing out the seasonable occasions for their use.' Hence the equation
npoa[pEuLS = AOyoS is assured. It is the supreme faculty, the 'one that uses' the
rest. All else is ÜAll.62 'For what is that which, in the case of the other faculties,

59 Bonhöffer 1890, 119, remarks that Epictetus often uses rrpOGLpECHS' where AOyOS', bLclVOlG, or
~YE~OVLKOV would do just as weIl.
60 Cf. Phys. 197a7: ~ rrpOGLpEO"LS' OUK aVEU bLGVOLGS'. Ross 1936,518 says that 'rrpOGLpEO"LS' in
196b 18 and bLclVOlG in b22 are evidently used as synonymous.'
61 Forms of suicide.

62 Cf. i 29, Iff., and ii 5, 6ff.

130

shows what it is worth? Is it each facuIty itself? Did you ever hear the facuIty of
sight say anything about itself? Of the faculty of vision? .. For which one of
them knows what it is and what it is worth? Which one knows when one ought to
use it and when not? What is the faculty that opens and closes the eyes, and turns
them away from the things from which it should turn them, but directs them
toward other things? The faculty of sight? No, but rrpoalpEulS ... When, then,
this faculty sees that all the rest are blind and deaf. .. , while it alone sees clearly
and surveys, not only all the rest, determining what each is worth, but itself also,
is it likely to pronounce anything else supreme but itself?' (ii 23, 6-11). Plato's
quest for the rroAl TlK~ or ßaulAlK~ TEXVl1 is realized, Epictetus asserts, in
rrpoalpEuls.6 3 It is the TEXVl1 TEXVWV, or 'architectonic' power that governs all
the rest. In this capacity it can only be AOyOS as the Stoics including Epictetus
.uniquely conceived it, 'the fragment ofGod given to man' (cf. ii 8,11, and i 14,
6). Divine rrpovola is mirrored in human rrpoalpEulS.
(2) In this connection it has a close affinity with another, equally common set
of terms, ~ XpflUlS TWV <pavTaulwv, or, more precisely, ~ bvva~lS ~ XPl1UTlK~
Twv<pavTaulwv: 'the power of using impressions'. Cf. i 30, 3-4: 'Ta arrpoalpETa
are nothing to me. What are the 'good' things? rrpoalpEulS oC(a bEL KaL XpflUlS
TWV <paVTaUlWV' .64 Now, we know from reports of Chrysippus' teaching that
<paVTaUlal were regarded as the external, 'proximate' causes of action, while
assent was the 'perfeet' , internal cause. Are we to conclude from the close con-
nection of these two ideas in Epictetus that he equated rrpoalpEulS with rational
assent, and regarded this alone as free and E<p' ~~Lv?65 This would be squarely in
line with orthodox Stoicism.66 However, it should be clear from the passages
quoted in (1) above that, while this is an important influence on his thought,
rrpoalpEulS goes beyond mere assent to external impressions. Consequently his
conception of freedom is more expansive.
(3) In several passages Epictetus links rrpoalpEulS with boy~aTa. Cf. iii 1, 42:
'Make beautiful your rrpoalpEulS, eradicate your worthless boy~aTa' (cf. also i
17, 26; i 29, 3; iii 1, 42; iii 19, 3). This tends to strengthen its identification with
reason.
On the principle enunciated by Aristotle, but shared by others, that 'any sys-
tematic whole may be identified particularly with the most sovereign element in
it' (EN 1178a2-6), Epictetusgoes on to make rrpoalpEulS, conceived as reason,
the defining mark of man. Cf. iii 1, 40: 'You are not flesh, nor hair, but

63 Cf. Plato, Pol. 304-305, esp. 304d, where the context, as in ii 23, concerns the proper use of
eloquence, and the faculty that is to make the determination.
64 Cf. also ii 23, 7, 40; ii 1,4; ii 22, 29; iii 22, 103; iv 5, 23; and, for a parallel, Alexander Man-
tissa, 23.
65 Such a view is certainly supported by a passage in Aulus Gellius (Noctes Atticae xix I =
Epictetus fr. 9 [Schenki]), where he attributes to Epictetus the view, '<pavTaCJlal non voluntatis sunt
neque arbitria', whereas he writes of CJuyKaTa8ECJElS', 'voluntariae suntfiuntque hominum arbitratu'.
66 Cf. Inwood 1985, ch. 3,42-101, for the central role assent played in their philosophy of mind
and especially the accomodation to fatalism.
 131

TTpOaLpEGlS'; iv 5, 11-12: '''My crockery is broken." Are you a piece of crockery

then? No, but you are TTpOaLpEGlS' (cf. also ii 10, 1). Such declarations naturally
recall Aristotle's dictum 'Such an ciPX~ (Le., TTpOaLpEGlS) is man.'
(4) Sandbach and others are not altogether mistaken, however, in glimpsing the
popular meaning 'moral character' behind Epictetus' use, because there are pas-
sages that support this interpretation. Cf. ii 10, 29: '[We do not pay sufficient
attention to] whether we are going to have a TTpOaLpEGlS characterized by self-
respect and good faith, or by shamelessness and bad faith'. Similar are other pas-
sages where morally evaluative terms are applied to the word (cf. also i 29, 1ff.; i
18, 6). The reason for using the same word to convey such different meanings
lies with the monistic psychology of the Stoics, which identified reason and emo-
tion, and the state of one' s 'Aoyos with one' s moral character, a doctrine Epictetus
shared with orthodox Stoicism (cf. Bonhöffer 1890,92-93).
(5) This leads to the next notable class of usages, those places where Epictetus
says that 'the good' lies in TTpOaLpEGlS and Ta TTpoalpETlKci alone. Cf. i 25, 1: 'If
all this is true and we are not silly nor merely mouthing words when we say,
"Man's good and evillie in TTpOaLpEGlS, and all other things are nothing to us",
why are we still distressed and afraid?' 67 This in turn recalls the Stoic doctrine
that virtue (cipET~) alone is good; everything else is indifferent. And Epictetus
actually applies the adjective ci8lci<popa to Ta ciTTpoaLpETa. 68 It follows that
TTpoa(pEGlS has virtually replaced cipET~ in his version of Stoicism, as it has
replaced 'Aoyos. Unlike cipET~, it is a neutral term, since, as moral character it can
be either good or bad, and so its use tends to generalize the lessons of the old
Stoa. At the same time it is much less formidable than the old Stoic ideal of
virtue, which, in Epictetus' case, has gone the way of the Stoic sage.
(6) The dichotomy between Ta npOGlpETlKG and Ta clnpOGlpETG is clarified in
certain passages. Often for instance the former are contrasted with the body,
which is frequently referred to by contemptuous terms like GW~ciTlOV, or GapKL-
8l0V. 69 Or they are opposed to externals (Ta EKTOS) generally.7o ITpoaLpEGlS, on
the other hand, defines the class of Ta EGW (ii 5,5), or Ta E~ci (cf. i 1,21-25; ii 5,
4). We have already seen it assimilated to the category of Ta E<p' .~~lv (cf. i 22,
10; ii 1,6, 12; ii 13, 10). And these include the psychic functions of apEelS, GVy-
KaTci8EGlS, 6p~~, ETTlßO'A~, UTTo'A1l4HS, etc. Cf. iii 18, Iff: 'Whenever some dis-
turbing news is reported to you, you ought to have ready at hand the following
principle: News, on whatever subject, never intrudes on TTpOaLpEGlS. Can anyone
bring you news that you have exercised apE~lS or uTTo'All~ls incorrectly? .. "But

67 Cf. also i 29, 47; ii 1,4; ii 10,25; ii 13, 10; ii 16, 1; iv 12,7; iii 10, 18.
68 Cf. i 30, 4. Epictetus nowhere distinguishes within the class of Ta OTTpOULpETU a subclass of
things TTPOTlY~EVU (or OTTPOTlY~EVU), as earlier Stoics did, but observes a radical distinction between
the things with and without value. There are, however, passages that mitigate this drastic impression:
cf. ii 23, 23ff.; and i 2, 10 ff.
69 Cf. i 1,23; ii 22,19; i 18,7; ii 10,27; ii 23, 22; iii 1,40,42; iii 18,3; iii 22, 106; iv 1, 100.
70 Cf. i 4, 18; i 29, 2; ii 22, 19; i 19,8; i 22, 10; ii 22, 26; iii 2, 13; iii 3, 8; iv 4,23; iv 12, 15; iv
13, 14; iii 3, 14ff.; Ench. 13.
132

my father has evil intentions against me." Against what? Surely not against your
TTpoalpEav;? Why, how can he? But against your n1ere body, your paltry posses-
sions; you are safe, it is not against you' (cf. also i 17, 20f.; iii 22, 104; iii 18,
Iff.).
(7) These poles of reality define the spheres of freedom and its absence
(avaYKll) respectively. The most characteristic thing about TTpoalpEalS' is that it
is free, or, as he likes to say with rhetorical fulness, avciyKaaTov, aKwAvToV,
aVE~TT68laTov (cf. ii 15,1; iii 26, 24; iv 1, 100; iv 7,8). As Long says, 'the words
"free from all restriction, compulsion and hindrance" " applied to man' s
TTpoal pEalS', 'compel the reader' sattention by repetition' (Long 1971, 190).
What scholars have not appreciated is that this description, made up of astring of
negative adjectives, is adapted from earlier Stoic descriptions of fate, or El-
llap~Evll. One regularly finds fate characterized as 'free from restriction', 'free
from hindrance' , 'irresistable', etc. in Stoic accounts of fate. 71 It is also
described, just like TTpoalpEalS' in Epictetus, as being immune to forces outside
of it (SVF ii 937 (p. 269, 25-26)). And Epictetus borrows the term aVlKllToV
('invincible'), applied by earlier Stoics to fate, and transfers it to man. 72 The
effect he creates by repeating this impressive list of epithets is to put man's will
on a par with god's as far as the degree of freedoll1 they enjoy.
(8) As reason is required for morality, so is freedom; responsibility for one's
character and actions is diminished to the extent that constraint is applied (cf. ii
23, 19, and i 22, 11). This, too, accounts for the association of the ideas.
TTpoa(pEalS is in its nature free; the body and an 'extemals' compose the realm
of 'necessity.' Cf. i 1, 7-9: 'As was fitting, the gods have put under our control
only the most excellent faculty of an and that which dominates the rest, namely
the power to make correct use of extemal impressions, but an the others they
have not put under our contro!. Was it because they refused? 1 for one think that
had they been able they would have entrusted us with the others also; but they
were quite unable to do that. For since we are on earth and tied to an earthly body
and earthly associates, how was it possible that, as regards them, we should not
be hampered by extemal things?' Stark contrasts like this one between mind and
body, intemals and extemals, Ta E<p' ~lllV and Ta OUK E<p' ~~lV are characteristic
of Epictetus (cf. Ench. 1, a statement of his thought in nuce).
(9) Such dualisms may threaten to dislocate the carefully developed monism of
the early Stoics generally and Chrysippus, with his compatibilist physics and
ethics, in particular. But there are passages that appear to bring Epictetus' views
more in line with those of his fellow Stoics. They include those where he writes
that our duty is 'to keep our TTpoalpEalS in accord with nature, free and unham-
pered'. Cf. i 4, 18ff.: 'Where is progress? Wherever anyone, withdrawing from
extemal things, tums his attention to his own TTpoalpEalS', cultivating it and per-

71 Cf. SVF ii 997 (p. 292,15-16); 1005 (p. 297, 8-9); 913 (p. 264,26-27); 914 (p. 265, 18-19);
917.
72 Compare SVF ii 976 and 997 (p. 292, 16) with ii 20, 18.
 133

fecting it in order to bring it into harmony with <pUGlS, elevated, free, unhindered,
untrammeled, faithful, and honorable.' 'As for me, I wish that death overtook me
occupied with nothing but my own rrpoaL pEGlS, trying to make it tranquil,
unhampered, unconstrained, free' (iii 5, 7). Cf. also i 17,28: 'Ifyou will, you are
free; everything will be in accordance with what is not merely your own will, but
also the will of God'; and iv 4, 23: 'In general, remember this: if you are going to
honor anything outside rrpOaLpEGlS, you have lost your rrpoa(pEGlS.' The tacit
assumption of these passages is that the freedom attached to rrpoa(pEGlS cannot
be taken for granted, but is alienable. It depends on bringing it into 'accord with
nature', i.e., the will of God. But this freedom does not differ at all from the tra-
ditional Stoic one; it is the freedom of the dog tied behind a moving cart who
chooses to follow the direction of the cart, rather than resist it. As Long and Sed-
ley remark, 'By lining up our own impulses with the pre-ordained good we can
achieve individual goodness, and the only truefreedom' (1987, i 394). Evidently
Epictetus is orthodox in this respect. Ultimately, however, it is the mind itself
that makes the determination to ally itself with fate or not. In this respect it still
deserves to be called radically free.
(10) This emerges from perhaps the most striking passages in Epictetus, those
where he insists that rrpOaLpEGlS is subject only to itself, not to any outside intlu-
ence (including God): 'Nothing else can overcome rrpOaLpEGlS, but it overcomes
itself' (i 29, 12). 'What is it that disturbs and bewilders the multitude? Is it the
tyrant and his bodyguards? Far from it. It is not possible that that which is by
nature free should be disturbed or frustrated by anything but itself' (i 19, 7).
'Nothing clrrpoaLpETov can hamper or injure rrpOalpEGlS; it alone can hamper or
injure itself' (iii 19, 2; cf. also i 17, 24ff. and ii 23, 19ff.). There is, then, a pre-
serve of freedom immune to the causal nexus outside the seIf; but it is very nar-
rowly circumscribed by the bounds of the self, conceived as the mind and the
psychological impulses springing from it. In the sphere of Tel EKTOS Epictetus
believes man is powerless. He retains the particularly Stoic category of fate, but
consigns it to the world outside the self. To counterbalance it, he describes an
inner world of equal complexity, independent of the outside world. This is what
he calls rrpoa(pEGlS and Tel rrpoalpETlKU. According to hirn, the only thing I can
control are my own psychic functions, or as Hardie put in a different context, 'the
only thing in the world that a man has the power to change is his mind' (Hardie
1980, 172).' This also helps explain why he is mute on the subject of action.
Aristotle located the range of rrpOalpEGlS in TO EVbEXO\lEVOV and E<p' ~\llV in the
outside world; but for Epictetus what is contingent and subject to change by us is
primarily our own souls, not events outside us (cf. iv 10, 8-9). The mind is free,
tractable, and its own master. Epictetus borrowed the philosophical word for
freedom in the face of determinism; but he developed it in a unique direction and
with it elaborated a new philosophy of mind.
VII
After this survey we are now in a better position to appreciate an incidental
134

advantage that adoption of this word affords. 'If you are going to honor anything
outside rrpoaCpEuLS', you have lost your rrpoaLpEuLS" (iv 4, 23). Such neat formu-
lations are only possible with a word having associations as rich and varied as
this. His use of it in place of AOyOS', ciPET~, ~YE jlOVL KOV, etc. enables Epictetus to
effect a synthesis of ideas only hinted at before. The Stoics were proud of the sys-
tematic unity of their philosophy, and the internal coherence of its separate
branches. A reflection of this striving after unity is their fondness for making
identity statements.?3 Epictetus does not have to resort to them, but they are
implied by his use of one word for several different ideas: intellect, mind, soul,
character, freedom, and so on. Epictetus argues for their identity on a higher level
of understanding, and can appeal to this one word for evidence of a kind. His phi-
losophy tries to connect Eu8aL jlOvLa, virtue, and man' s unique nature into a
coherent whole. Owing to the versatility of his favorite term, he can effect that
synthesis more smoothly (compare ii 23, §§ 19 and 29). Even better than Aristo-
tle, he succeeds in holding his thought together with this powerful, complex
term. 74

University of Kentucky
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Billerbeck, M. 1978. Epiktet: vom Kynismus. Leiden: Brill.
Bonhöffer, A. 1890. Epietet und die Stoa. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke.
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 135

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