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Mendiola, Manila
CRIMINAL LAW I
SECTION 1K
Contributors:
On the night of August 16, 2017, an 11-man team from the Caloocan
Police Community Precinct 7 conducted an anti-illegal drugs operation at Block
7, Riverside, Barangay 160, Caloocan City. Seventeen-year-old Kian Delos
Santos was killed over the course of this drug raid.
The NBI said contrary to the claim of the police officers that Kian fought
it out with the police, evidence showed that Kian was shot to the head —
behind the left ear and inside the left ear when he was in a fetal position.
However, on Kian’s case, the NBI said “PO3 Arnel Oares and his cohorts
accosted victim and afterwards dragged him towards Tullahan River and shot
him without mercy.”
The NBI said Kian was killed in the area opposite the police station
“which proves that they [police] have no intention in bringing victim to their
police office.”
The police argued that Kian has a .45 caliber pistol and two sachets of shabu.
But the NBI pointed out that Kian was only wearing boxer shorts making
it easier for the police to spot the firearm when they accosted him.
A criminal complaint is already pending before the DOJ also for murder
and torture were filed by Kian’s parents against the same police officers.
Police officers still claim that their actions were justified for they were acting
to defend themselves. They also claim that they were in performance of their
duty and were under order.
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
The defense claims justification for their acts, for they were acting on
self-defense against the unlawful aggression from the victim. By firing shots
against the police officers, their lives were put into imminent danger, hence,
they had to act in order to defend themselves, which led to the death of the
suspect.
However, evidence of the prosecution suggests that Kian did not fire a
pistol against the police officers. According to the witnesses, the police officers
were able to subdue Kian and put him under their control, thus, he is no longer
a threat to anyone. This only proves that it is impossible for Kian to shoot at
them. Kian cannot be an unlawful aggressor under this circumstance.
Unlawful aggression being absent; self-defense cannot be invoked by
the defense as a justifying circumstance to acquit the police officers from
criminal liability.
In the claim for avoidance of greater evil, the police officers’ claims that
since the deceased, Kian Delos Santos, drew his pistol and fired at them, the
police in order to avoid their injury or death, they acted in accordance to the
imminent danger of losing their lives therefore they acted within their instinct
of self-preservation.
The defense stated that they were acting in their official duty as police
officers assigned to the drug raid. But they did not follow the standard
operating procedures in making sure that the person being arrested is
unarmed and poses no threat. Considering the fact that the police officers
assigned in this drug raid they should have considered this hostile situation.
On the other hand, the prosecution recognizes the presence of the first
requisite; the accused is indeed acting in the performance of their duty. But
the injury caused to the deceased, who had already been apprehended, was
neither warranted nor necessary. Being that the first requisite is present, and
the second is absent, the defense is only entitled to an incomplete justifying
circumstance to mitigate their sentence.
Paragraph 6 (In obedience to an order)
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is
lawful.
Therefore, police officers in the above mentioned case cannot invoke the
justifying circumstances under paragraphs 1, 4, 5 & 6 of Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that the exempting
circumstance of insanity may be taken into account, it is necessary that (1)
there be a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; (2) that he acts without the least
discernment; or (3) that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
(People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 661) The insane is not so exempt in all
cases from criminal liability if it can be shown that he acted during a lucid
interval.
Although it has been held in People v. Rubios that any evidence that is
related to the mental condition of the accused after the commission of the
crime is inconsequential for the purposes of determining criminal liability
specially to support the plea of acquittal, however, other jurisprudences have
shown that the court was not excluded to use any subsequent acts or events
to prove that the accused indeed acted during lucid interval.
Experts testified that the accused was psychotic and insane before, during,
and after the commission of the crime. However, the court ruled that the
accused cannot invoke the defense of insanity because of the acts of the
accused immediately after the commission of the crime which is stated below:
The prosecution may also rely to the time when insanity was first raised
as a defense for the same must be invoked at the earliest possible or at the
very first opportunity. Thus, in People v. Opuran, the court held that the
accused-appellant Opuran acted during lucid interval as he only did raise
insanity after he testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. Invocation of
denial and alibi as defense indicates that the accused was in full control of his
mental faculties.
3. Can the bank security guard invoke par. 4 of Art. 12 RPC as his
defense in an alarm & scandal case for causing the discharge of his
firearm after slipping on the floor?
Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “Any person
who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it” shall be exempt from criminal
liability. It is important to point out that the basis for this paragraph is the
lack of negligence and intent of the person who committed such act.
We must also refer to the elements of RPC Art. 12, par. 4, for
reconciliation, which are (1) a person performing a lawful act (2) with due
care (3) causes an injury to another by mere accident (4) and without fault or
intention of causing it. Accident, as described by the third element, is
something that happens outside our will and although an act of our will, lies
beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. (Reyes, L., RPC
book 1, 240, 2017)
Relying on the facts presented, though the “slipping on the floor” might
fall in the scope of ‘accident’, there was no evidence that there was an injury
caused to another. The absence of such makes it an absence of the 3rd
element and therefore makes the defense insufficient.
To further understand what are alarms and scandal cases the below-
mentioned article from the RPC shall be enumerated.
Article 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding P200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any
firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm or
danger;
2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari or
other disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public
tranquility;
3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged in any
other nocturnal amusements, shall disturb the public peace;
4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any disturbance
or scandal in public places, provided that the circumstances of the case shall
not make the provisions of article 153 applicable.
Can the security bank guard invoke par 4 of Art 12 as his defense in alarms
and scandals for causing the discharge of his firearm after slipping on the
floor?
This defense would not hold up in court because it can be proven that although
there was a lack of intent on his part, there was negligence.
In the case at bar, though the security guard did not intend to discharge
his firearm, once the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable
doubt that there a commotion occurred, he must be punished. For his defense,
the guard may show that there were no people during that time or he was in
an isolated place that no one noticed the gunshot. But, to interpose as defense
that it was an accident, it will not hold in an Alarm and Scandal case.
According to Justice Reyes, the phrase "calculated to cause alarm or
danger" is actually a wrong translation of the original Spanish text. It just
necessarily means that it is the result, not the intent, that counts. In other
words, the defense that he did not intentionally discharge the firearm will not
hold in an Alarm and Scandal case. The defense must only be that the
discharge of firearm did not result to a commotion, or alarm and scandal in its
literal sense. For as long as there is disorder and commotion that resulted, it
will already be punishable.
Briefly put, these are crimes of disturbance, disturbance of the public peace,
by means of cause a scandal or an alarming situation, as described by the law
above.
-If the accidental discharge and not aimed at any person, this paragraph can
be invoked along with Article 12 (4) “Anyone who acts in defense of his
persons or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur.
-On the other hand, discharge is aimed at a person, accused will be liable
under Art 254z
Can the security bank guard invoke par 4 of Art 12 as his defense in alarms
and scandals for causing the discharge of his firearm after slipping on the
floor?
Republic Act (RA) No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006, took effect on May 20, 2006. The author of this law
is Senator Francis “Kiko” Pangilinan, and it was approved by the Congress,
Senate and the former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo during her term on
April 28, 2006. The enactment was a progressive step towards a more
restorative and child-oriented juvenile justice system. It is in consonance with
the United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child (UN CRC) when
promoting the child's reintegration and constructive role in society. The old
and stigmatizing terminologies as “youthful offender” was changed in
accordance with international laws and guidelines to “child in conflict with law”
or (CICL) to avoid labeling – which only contributes to the development of a
consistent pattern of undesirable behavior.
RA 9344 acknowledges the fact that most of the CICL have no proof of
age by presuming minority until otherwise proven. Sec 6, RA 9344 provides
for the Minimum age of criminal responsibility which states that a child 15
years of age or under at the time of the commission of the crime shall be
exempt from criminal liability. However, such child shall be subject to an
intervention program unless he/she acted with discernment in which case such
child will be subject to the appropriate proceedings set forth in the same Act.
Aforementioned section impliedly repealed Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code. It declares that a child 15 years of age or under is
exempt from criminal liability and that a child above 15 years but below 18
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless he/she
acted with discernment, such child shall be subject to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Legal effects:
The child shall be given to the custody and care of the parent or guardian
who shall be responsible with his surveillance and education. Otherwise, he
shall be committed to the care of the following, according to their order:
1. Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than 6-
year imprisonment, it shall conduct mediation, family conferencing and
conciliation;
2. In victimless crime where the imposable penalty is not more than 6-year
imprisonment, the local social worker/officer shall meet with the child and
his/her parents or guardians for the development of the appropriate diversion
and rehabilitation program;
3. Where the imposable penalty for the crime exceeds 6 years, diversion
measured may be resorted only by the court.
At the same time, Republic Act 9344 provides for other effects:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
In People v. Ancajas, GR No. 199270, October 21, 2015, the Court ruled
the conviction of the accused-appellant of the crime rape, but the case against
appellant Allain Ancajas shall be REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344 for Ancajas
committed the heinous crime 7 years prior to the enactment of RA 9344, a
time of which accused was still a minor. This section clearly justified the
retroactive application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With
more reason, the Act should apply to this (People v. Ancajas) case wherein
the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA was playing with her friend BBB
in the second floor of her family's house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner
arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with
them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse
with her by inserting his male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not
to tell anybody of what they did.
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect
and that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he took
the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. As we explained in discussing Sections 64
and 68 of R.A. No. 9344 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:
Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old
and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare
and development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's
age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344,
the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
LIMITATIONS OF RA 9344
The legislators recognize the vital role of children in nation building and
the State's duty to protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and
social well-being. To protect the best interest of the children, the Juvenile
Justice Welfare Act (JJWA) was crafted with transitory and retroactive
provisions. The transitory provisions are provided in Section 64, 65, 66, and
67 while the retroactive application of the law is provided in Section 68.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)
years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall
determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act,
to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence
for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.
5. Can a 14-year old minor, who had repeatedly been arrested for theft
and sale of shabu, invoke RA 9344 as his defense and be exempted
from liability?
The fact that the child had repeatedly been arrested for theft and sale
of shabu is immaterial because the only qualification the Act provides for the
Child and Youth Welfare Code to be validly invoked is “minors under 15 years
of age”.
Yes, the parents have civil liability. Pertinent provision of Republic Act
No. 10630 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 mandates that the
parents of minor incur civil liability hence, shall be jointly liable for damages
unless they prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that they were exercising
reasonable supervision over the child at the time the child committed the
offense and exerted reasonable effort and utmost diligence to prevent or
discourage the child from committing another offense. Hence, the purpose of
the said provision is a hope that it will act as a deterrent against poor
parenting, essentially scaring parents into paying attention.
To wit, Section 20-D of the abovementioned act provides that:
“As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of the following:
“A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in conflict with the law may require
the attendance of one or both parents of the child at the place where the
proceedings are to be conducted.
“The parents shall be liable for damages unless they prove, to the
satisfaction of the court, that they were exercising reasonable
supervision over the child at the time the child committed the offense
and exerted reasonable effort and utmost diligence to prevent or
discourage the child from committing another offense.”
R.A. No. 7610, or the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation, and Discrimination Act, was enacted in view of the State’s
responsibility to protect the children against all conditions prejudicial to their
development. The case to be considered involves a 14-year old minor who had
repeatedly been arrested for theft and sale of shabu. Clearly, the child is within
the purview of R.A. No. 7610 as to age, since it is provided in the law that:
Aside from those enumerated above, there are certain acts that are
punishable under the aforementioned law. In Sec. 2, the law states that, “it
shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely
threatened or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their
survival and normal development and over which they have no control.” In
relation to this, those circumstances may embrace a wide scope of acts by any
person as Sec. 3 provides that such circumstances include, “working under
conditions hazardous to life, safety and morals which unduly interfere with
their normal development.”
Reyes, L.B. (2017). The Revised Penal Code. Manila, Philippines: Rex Book
Store.