People vs.

Larrañaga - Digested Case (The Chiong Sisters Murder Case)

G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño,
Ariel Balansag, Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy

Per curiam decision

FACTS:
On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come
home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot
of a cliff in Tan-awan, Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her
breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape,
and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After
almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police
having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan
Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James
Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the
following before the trial court: that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in
the evening of July 16, 1997, who told him to ride with them in a white car. Following them
were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew, who were in a red car. Josman
stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing, and
were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them
jointly, that after stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter
headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white
van driven by the former. They traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the
South Bus Terminal, that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had
a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped
Jacqueline, that Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push
her into the ravine, and that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while
being followed by the group while boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out.

In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

That on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the
Center for Culinary Arts, that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied
Mathematics, that in the evening of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he
was with his friends at the R & R Bar and Restaurant, Quezon City, that representatives
of four airline companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs
showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to July 17, 1997,
and that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the
security guard saw him in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997.

The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in
Cebu City, celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.

Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July
16, 1997, accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop
was only able to finish the work at 10:00 the following morning.

Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the
evening of July 16, 1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco,
transferred to DTM Bar, and went home at 3:00 the following morning.

Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of
Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision,
arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was consipiracy. James Anthony
was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether there was conspiracy?
2) Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the crime?
3) Whether the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty?

HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense
was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such point to a joint design and community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed
that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court
affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission
of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from
complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped
and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the
imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James
Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape
is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other
hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua
to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory
penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely
imposing “two (2) reclusiones perpetua”.
The Paco Case (Chiong Sisters Murder Case) -
The Paco Case (Chiong Sisters Murder Case) - G.R. Nos. 138874-75

This is the full copy of the Chiong Sister Murder Case judged by the Supreme Court.

The Chiong murder case (People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Juan Larrañaga et al.) was an incident
on July 16, 1997 in Cebu, in which sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong allegedly were kidnapped,
raped, and murdered.Francisco Juan "Paco" Larrañaga (b. 1977), a man of dual Filipino and Spanish
citizenship was, along with six others, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death by lethal injection
on February 3, 2004. Capital punishment in the Philippines has since been abolished.

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Saturday, July 29, 2017

Intent to Kill: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023

The requisites in establishing intent to kill.

Facts:

A brawl involving 15 to 18 members of two rival groups resulted to the stabbing of Anthony Galang, the
victim, by the herein petitioner, Giovannie Serrano. During the rumble, the victim was stabbed at the
left side of his stomach and was beaten until he fell into a nearby creek. In his fallen position, Galang
claimed that when he inspected his stabbed wound, he saw a portion of his intestines showed. The
victim received medical attention, stayed in the hospital for one week and thereafter stayed home for
one month to recuperate.

The RTC held that the crime committed reached the frustrated stage since the victim was stabbed on
the left side of his stomach and that the victim had to be referred from an infirmary to hospital for
medical treatment. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the crime committed only reached the
attempted stage as there was lack of evidence that the stab wound inflicted was fatal to cause the
victim’s death. It was observed that the attending physician did not testify in court and that the
Medical Certificate and the Discharge Summary issued by the hospital fell short of “specifying the
nature or gravity of the wound”.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted homicide instead of frustrated homicide.

Held:

Yes. The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by
independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim’s death without
timely medical intervention. When nothing in the evidence shows that the wound would be fatal
without medical intervention, the character of the wound enters the realm of doubt; under this
situation, the doubt created by the lack of evidence should be resolved in favor of the petitioner.

Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external
manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People, we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and
number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the
crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We also consider motive and the words
uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative
factors.

Thus, the crime committed should be attempted, not frustrated homicide.

You might also like:
 Intent to Kill: Serrano v. People, GR No. 175023
 Full Case: Tecson vs COMELEC G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004
 MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.
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Labels: Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Digested Cases

Sunday, June 25, 2017

Case Digest: NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005
NORMA A. ABDULLA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 150129 April 6, 2005

Facts: Convicted by the Sandiganbayan in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the crime of illegal use of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical malversation,
appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on petition for review under Rule 45. Along with Nenita Aguil
and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged under an Information which pertinently reads: That on or about
November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers,
being then the President and cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of their positions
and duties are accountable for public funds under their administration, while in the performance of their functions,
conspiring and confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being then the Administrative Officer
V of the said school, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for the
payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
amount was appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary school teachers of the said school, to
the damage and prejudice of public service .Appellant’s co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both
acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the Sandiganbayan in its decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended appellant’s sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the crime
charged.
Issue: 1) Whether or not there was unlawful intent on the appellant’s part.

2) Whether or not the essential elements of the crime of technical malversation is present.

Held: The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for
its imputation of criminal intent upon appellant. The presumption of criminal intent will not automatically apply to
all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act.
Here, appellant cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State
College to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil
service laws. There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose – payment of the wages of laborers
working on various projects in the municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers’ wages enjoy as
claims against the employers’ funds and resources. Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. Absent this required quantum of evidence would
mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The Sandiganbayan’s improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does not
save the day for the prosecution’s deficiency in proving the existence of criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale
from the constitutional presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent, this Court has no
basis to affirm appellant’s conviction. 2. The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary
differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA 6688. The third element of the crime of
technical malversation which requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is therefore
absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and Management for the use of the forty thousand
pesos (P40,000.00) allotment for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an ordinance
or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal leave
benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College, cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the
absence, as here, of any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment of salary
differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code
are lacking in this case. Acquittal is thus in order.

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Criminal Case Digest: People vs Oliva, 344 SCRA 435

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Labels: Criminal Law, Digested Cases

Criminal Case Digest: ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE

GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 138553.
June 30, 2005
ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005

Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed
against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan,
Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously
resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a
fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the
latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of
direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court.

Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably,
petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a)
the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the
offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its
findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and
substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.

You might also like:

People vs. Larrañaga - Digested Case (The Chiong Sisters ...

Criminal Case Digest: People vs Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067

Criminal Case Digest: People vs Lucas, GR Nos. ...

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Essential Requisites for Complete Self-Defense: CONRADO

CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No.152358,
February 5, 2004
CONRADO CASITAS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No.152358, February 5, 2004

FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE- ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE

Facts: Early in the morning of August 25, 1994, Romeo C. Boringot was awakened by his wife Aida, the latter having
heard somebody shouting invectives at her husband, viz: “You ought to be killed, you devil.” So Romeo stood up and
peeped to see who was outside. When he did not see anybody, he proceeded towards the road.
Upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with bolo which was more that 1 foot long. He
looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado whom he knew since the 1970’s and
whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant went on hacking him, hitting him in
different parts of the body, including ears and the head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him.
Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained 11
wounds.
Petitioner invoked self-defense. The trial court rejected petitioner’s plea of self-defense and convicted him of
frustrated homicide.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

Held: The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential
requisites for complete self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by
the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the petitioner thereby
submitted having deliberately caused the victim’s injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear
and convincing all the requisites of his affirmative defense. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
the weakness of that of the disbelieved after the petitioner admitted inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim. In this
case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense.
The number, nature and location of the victim’s wounds belie the petitioner’s claim that the said wounds or the victim
were inflicted as they duel with each other.
Witness for the petitioner testified that the wounds sustained by petitioner could not have been caused by bolo.
Petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have
bolstered his claim that he hacked the victim to defend himself. The petitioner did not do so.