NECESITO V PARAS

FACTS:

Severina Garces and her son Precillano Necesito boarded a passenger truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines driven by Francisco Bandonell. The truck entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels swerved to the right.
The driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek
where water was breast deep. Garces died due to drowning while Necesito suffered injuries. Two actions for
damages and attorney's fees totalling over P85,000 were filed with the Tarlac CFI against the carrier. The carrier
pleaded that the accident was due to "engine or mechanical trouble" independent or beyond the control of the
defendants or of the driver Bandonell.
The trial court found that the bus was proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road and that
accident was due to the fracture of the truck’s right steering knuckle which could not be known by the carrier.
Thus, it dismissed the complaints holding that the accident was exclusively due to fortuitous events.

ISSUE: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the
evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the diligence required by law.

RULING:
Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, a passenger is entitled to recover
damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer,
whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care
which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary
tests. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier,
and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the carrier’s
liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he
has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. Carrier’s liability rests upon negligence, his failure to
exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and in case of a passenger's death or injury the
carrier bears the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE V CA

FACTS:
Private respondents are owners of a house near the petitioner’s four-story school building along the same
road. During a typhoon, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and blown away by strong
winds, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents’ house. In the aftermath, an ocular
inspection of the destroyed building was spearheaded by the city building official. In his report, he imputed
negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper anchorage of trusses to the roof
beams which caused the roof be ripped off the building, thereby causing damage to the property of respondents.
Respondents filed an action before the RTC for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana. Petitioner contested
that it had no liability, attributing the damage to a fortuitous event. RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was
affirmed by the CA. Hence present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the damage, in legal sense, can be attributed to a fortuitous event.

RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that petitioner is not liable, the damage being attributable to a fortuitous event. Art
1174 of the Civil Code states that: “Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared

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by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable”
To be liable for a fortuitous event, the respondent must prove that petitioners were negligent, with which
they fall short, merely relying on the report of the city building official. This is the same official that have
approved the building plans of petitioner, who made clear that there were no prior complaints regarding the
building. Since storms are common in the country, the part of the building in question should have failed against
stronger typhoons that preceded said storm, which it had not. Furthermore, petitioner was able to present evidence
that regular maintenance was carried out. Respondents also failed to support the claim of the actual loss they
suffered, merely relying on estimates without considering that wear and tear of respondents’ home which may have
had a contributory effect to the damage. Petition is granted and challenged decision is reversed.

MIAA V ALA INDUSTRIES

FACTS:
The contract for the structural repair and waterproofing of the IPT and ICT building of the NAIA airport
was awarded, after a public bidding, to respondent ALA. Respondent made the necessary repair and waterproofing.
After submission of its progress billings to the petitioner, respondent received partial payments. Progress billing
remained unpaid despite repeated demands by the respondent. Meanwhile petitioner unilaterally rescinded the
contract on the ground that respondent failed to complete the project within the agreed completion date.
Respondent objected to the rescission made by the petitioner and reiterated its claims. The trial court directed the
parties to proceed to arbitration. Both parties executed a compromise agreement and jointly filed in court a motion
for judgment based on the compromise agreement. The Court a quo rendered judgment approving the compromise
agreement. For petitioner’s failure to pay within the period stipulated, respondent filed a motion for execution to
enforce its claim. Petitioner filed a comment and attributed the delays to its being a government agency. The trial
court denied the respondent’s motion. Reversing the trial court, the CA ordered it to issue a writ of execution to
enforce respondent’s claim. The appellate court ratiocinated that a judgment rendered in accordance with a
compromise agreement was immediately executory, and that a delay was not substantial compliance therewith.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not decision based on compromise agreement is final and executory.
2) Whether or not delay by one party on a compromise justifies execution.

HELD:
1. A compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the
parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Hence, compromise agreement is final
and executory. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity
as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in
accordance with the Rules. Judges therefore have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it.
2. The failure to pay on the date stipulated was clearly a violation of the Agreement. Thus, non-fulfilment
of the terms of the compromise justified execution. It is the height of absurdity for petitioner to attribute to a
fortuitous event its delayed payment. Petitioner’s explanation is clearly a gratuitous assertion that borders
callousness.

AUSTRIA V CA
Facts:
Maria G. Abad received from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds to be sold on commission
basis or to be returned on demand. Maria Abad while walking home, two men snatched her purse containing
jewelry and cash, and ran away. Thus, Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay its value notwithstanding demands.

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Austria filed an action against Abad and Abad’s husband for recovery of the pendant or of its value, and damages.
Abad raised the defense that the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.

Issues:
1. Whether or not in a contract of agency (consignment of good for sole) it is necessary that there be prior
conviction for robbery before the loss of the article shall exempt the consignee from liability for such loss.
2. Whether or not Abad was negligent.

Ruling:
1. No. To avail of the exemption granted in the law, it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the
occurrence should be found or punished, it would only be sufficient to establish that the enforceable event, the
robbery in this case did take place without any concurrence fault on the debtor’s part, and this can be done by
preponderance of evidence. A court finding that a robbery has happened would not necessary mean that those
accused in the criminal action should be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused
did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take place.
2. No. In 1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the
levels attained in the present day. The diligence that Abad portrayed when she went home before she was robbed
was not a sign of negligence on her part.

BACOLOD-MURCIA V CA
Facts:

Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.(BMMC) is the owner and operator of the sugar central in Bacolod.
Alonso Gatuslao (Gatuslao) is a registered plantor of the Bacolod-Muria Mill District. BMMC and Gatuslao
executed an “Extension and Modification of Milling Contract. From crop year 1957-1958 up to crop year 1967-
1968, Gatuslao has been milling all the sugarcane grown and produced with the Mill of BMMC. From crop year
1920-21 to crop year 1967-68, the canes of planters adhered to the mill of BMMC were transported from the
plantation to the mill by means of cane cars and through railway system operated by BMMC. BMMC has been
hauling planter Gatuslao’s sugar cane to its mill or factory continuously until crop year 1967 – 1968.

The milling contract between BMMC and owners of the hacienda Helvetica expired at the end of the 1964-
1965 crop year. The portion of the railway traversing the hacienda Helvetica was closed as per decision of the
court. The use of the railroad tracks (traversing hacienda Helvetica) was temporarily allowed due to the
intervention of the President of the Philippines, which is until 1967-1978 milling season only. Gatuslao loaded
their cut cranes on trucks provided by the Bacolod-Murcia Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
(B-MACMA) during 1968-1969 crop year. BMMC had not been able to use its cane cars and railway system for
the cargo crop year 1968-1989.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the termination of petitioner’s right of way over the hacienda Helvetica caused by the
expiration of its amended milling contracts with the landowners of the land in question is fortuitous event or force
majeure which will exempt petitioner BMMC from fulfillment of its contractual obligation.
2. Whether or not BMMC was able to provide adequate and efficient transportation facilities of the canes of
Gatuslao and the other planters milling with BMMC during the crop year 1968-69.

Ruling:
1. No. The terms of the milling contracts were clear and undoubtedly there was no reason for BMMC to
expect otherwise. The closure of any portion of the railroad track, not necessarily in the hacienda Helvetica but in
any of the properties whose owners decided not to renew their milling contracts with the Central upon their

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expiration, was foreseeable and inevitable. Despite its awareness that the conventional contract of lease would
expire in crop year 1964-1965 and that refusal on the part of any one of the landowners to renew their milling
contracts and the corresponding use of the right of way on their lands would render impossible compliance of its
commitments, BMMC took a calculated risk that all the landowners would renew their contracts.
The closure of the railway lines was not an act of God nor it constitute force majeure. It was due to the
termination of the contractual relationships of the parties, for which BMMC is charged with knowledge. Owners of
the hacienda Helvetica notified BMMC as far back as August 1965 of its intention not to allow the passage of the
railway system thru its land after the aforesaid crop year. Adequate measures should have been adopted by BMMC
to forestall such paralyzations but the records show none.

2. No, BMMC failed to provide adequate transportation facilities to Gatuslao and other adherent parties. The
inadequacies of the reparto or trailer allotment as well as the state of unpreparedness on the part of BMMC to meet
the problem posed by the closure of the railway lines. It was established that after Gatuslao had cut his sugarcanes
for hauling, no trailers arrived and when two trailers finally arrived on October 1968 after several unheeded
requests, they were left on the national highway about one kilometer away from the loading station, the means of
transportation provided by BMMC is very inadequate to answer the needs of Gatuslao.

PHILCOMSAT V GLOBE TEL

FACTS:
Respondent Globe Telecom was engaged in the coordination of providing communication facilities for the
exclusive use of US Defense Communication Agency (USDCA) located in Clark Air Base, Pampanga and Subic
Naval Base, Zambales. Globe then contracred Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)
for providing such communication facilities. They entered into an Agreement which provides that, with the
knowledge that the RP-US Agreement would expire in 1991, Philcomsat would establish, operate and provide
earth station for the exclusive use of the USCDA and in return, Globe promised to pay the former monthly rentals.
Pursuant to the agreement, Philcomsat installed the earth station. Consequently, Senate adopted Resolution No.
141 which denied the extension of the term of use by the USCDA of the naval bases. Because of such event, Globe
informed Philcomsat that it would discontinue the use of the installed earth station, pursuant to Section 8 of the
Agreement which provides,
“Neither party shall be held liable or deemed to be in default for any failure to perform its obligation under this
Agreement if such failure results directly or indirectly from force majeure or fortuitous event. Either party is thus precluded from
performing its obligation until such force majeure or fortuitous event shall terminate. For the purpose of this paragraph, force
majeure shall mean circumstances beyond the control of the party involved including, but not limited to, any law, order,
regulation, direction or request of the Government of the Philippines, strikes or other labor difficulties, insurrection riots,
national emergencies, war, acts of public enemies, fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God.”

Philcomsat replied, reminding Globe of its obligation pursuant to Section 7 of the Agreement, stating
“Notwithstanding the non-use of the earth station, Globe shall continue to pay Philcomsat for the rental of the
actual number of T1 circuits in use, but in no case shall be less than the first two T1 circuits, for the remaining life
of the agreement.” Demands were made by Philcomsat to Globe to pay the rentals but the latter did not complied.
As such, Philcomsat filed with the RTC of Makati against Globe, praying that the latter be ordered to pay
its rentals plus interest. Globe filed an Answer, invoking that Resolution No. 141 constituted force majeure which
validly terminated the Agreement. The RTC ruled that Resolution No. 141 constituted force majeure. Nevertheless,
Globe must still pay monthly rental for December 1992 plus interest. Both parties appealed to the CA. CA
affirmed the RTC decision. Both partied filed a Petition for Review. Philcomsat contended that the discontinuation
of the RP-US Agreement pursuant to Resolution No. 141 did not constitute force majeure. Furthermore, it averred
that Section 8 of the Agreement is contrary to Article 1174 of the Civil Code and that the former did not have a
force of law. Globe, on the other hand, asserted that the termination of RP-US Agreement is a force majeure and
that Section 8 of the Agreement is not contrary to Article 1174 of the Civil Code because said provision does not
prohibit parties to a contract from providing for other instances when they would be exempt from fulfilling their
contractual obligations.
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ISSUES:
1.Whether or not Sec 8 of the agreement between Philcomsat and Globe is contrary to Art 1174, making it contrary
to law.
2.Whether or not the termination of the RP-US agreement is a force majeure.
3.Whether or not Globe is exempt from non-compliance with its agreement to Philcomsat.

RULING:
As to the first issue, the court ruled in negative. Section 8 is in accord with Article 1174 of the CC and did
not contravene the latter. Article 1159 of the Civil Code provides that "obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith." Courts cannot stipulate
for the parties nor amend their agreement where the same does not contravene law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, for to do so would be to alter the real intent of the parties, and would run contrary to the
function of the courts to give force and effect thereto. Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy, Section 8 of the Agreement which Philcomsat and Globe freely agreed upon has the force
of law between them.

In ruling the second issue, the court held that the RP-US Agreement termination constituted a force
majeure. Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure,
refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but inevitable. A fortuitous
event under Article 1174 may either be an "act of God," or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons, or an
"act of man," such as riots, strikes or wars. Philcomsat and Globe, in an agreement, as stated in Section 8, the
following events shall be deemed events constituting force majeure: 1. Any law, order, regulation, direction or
request of the Philippine Government; 2. Strikes or other labor difficulties; 3. Insurrection; 4. Riots; 5. National
emergencies; 6. War; 7. Acts of public enemies; 8. Fire, floods, typhoons or other catastrophies or acts of God; 9.
Other circumstances beyond the control of the parties. Clearly, the foregoing are either unforeseeable, or
foreseeable but beyond the control of the parties. There is nothing in the enumeration that runs contrary to, or
expands, the concept of a fortuitous event under Article 1174.

As to the last issue, the Court ruled that for Globe to be exempt from non-compliance with its obligation to
pay rentals under Section 8, the concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1) the event must be
independent of the human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
in a normal manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The Court found that all of the requisites were present. In addition, the Court found it unjust to require
Globe to continue paying rentals even though PHILCOMSAT cannot be compelled to perform its corresponding
obligation under the Agreement.

JIMMY CO V CA
FACTS:
On July 18, 1990, petitioner entrusted his Nissan pick-up car 1988 model to private respondent - which is
engaged in the sale, distribution and repair of motor vehicles - for the following job repair services and supply of
parts: Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990 fully serviced and supplied in
accordance with the job contract. After petitioner paid in full the repair bill in the amount ofP1,397.00, private
respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the vehicle on said date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter
could not release the vehicle as its battery was weak and was not yet replaced. Left with no option, petitioner
himself bought a new battery nearby and delivered it to private respondent for installation on the same day.
However, the battery was not installed and the delivery of the car was rescheduled to July 24, 1990 or three (3)
days later. When petitioner sought to reclaim his car in the afternoon of July 24, 1990, he was told that it was
carnapped earlier that morning while being road-tested by private respondent’s employee along Pedro Gil and
Perez Streets in Paco, Manila. Private respondent said that the incident was reported to the police.

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 Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the value thereof, petitioner filed a suit for damages
against private respondent anchoring his claim on the latter’s alleged negligence. For its part, private respondent
contended that it has no liability because the car was lost as a result of a fortuitous event - the carnapping.

ISSUE: They likewise agreed that the sole issue for trial was who between the parties shall bear the loss of the
vehicle which necessitates the resolution of whether private respondent was indeed negligent.
RULING:
On the merits. It is a not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability simply because the
damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be
considered as a fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful
possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as
such, carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be proved and
established that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor
the person alleged to be negligent has any participation. In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of
proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it which in this case is the private
respondent. However, other than the police report of the alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was
presented by private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an alleged
crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to established the carnapping. Neither does it
prove that there was no fault on the part of private respondent notwithstanding the parties’ agreement at the pre-
trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of
private respondent.
Even assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a fortuitous event, still private respondent
cannot escape liability. Article 1165 of the New Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of delay responsible
even for a fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. In this case, private respondent was already in delay
as it was supposed to deliver petitioner’s car three (3) days before it was lost. Petitioner’s agreement to the
rescheduled delivery does not defeat his claim as private respondent had already breached its obligation. Moreover,
such accession cannot be construed as waiver of petitioner’s right to hold private respondent liable because the car
was unusable and thus, petitioner had no option but to leave it.
Assuming further that there was no delay, still working against private respondent is the legal presumption
under Article 1265 that its possession of the thing at the time it was lost was due to its fault. This presumption is
reasonable since he who has the custody and care of the thing can easily explain the circumstances of the loss. The
vehicle owner has no duty to show that the repair shop was at fault. All that petitioner needs to prove, as claimant,
is the simple fact that private respondent was in possession of the vehicle at the time it was lost. In this case,
private respondent’s possession at the time of the loss is undisputed. Consequently, the burden shifts to the
possessor who needs to present controverting evidence sufficient enough to overcome that presumption. Moreover,
the exempting circumstances - earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity - when the presumption of fault is
not applicable do not concur in this case. Accordingly, having failed to rebut the presumption and since the case
does not fall under the exceptions, private respondent is answerable for the loss.

TUGADE V CA

Facts:
Tugade was found guilty beyond beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property for bumping the car of Holden caused by faulty brakes of his taxicab. He sought to exculpate himself with
the explanation that this fault could not and should not be traced to him.

Issue: Is the mishap caused by defective brakes fortuitous in character?

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Held:
No. An essential element of a caso fortuito is the occurrence of some extraordinary circumstance
independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees. This element is lacking in the present case. It is not
suggested that the accident in question was due to an act of God or to adverse road conditions which could not
have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else
through the negligence of its driver. This is not a caso fortuito which would call for an acquittal of the driver.

JUNTILLA V PUNTANAR
FACTS:
Jeepney was driven by Berfol Camoro from Danao City to Cebu City. It was Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire
exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Roberto Juntilla was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, he momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found
that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. He also injured his left arm, right thigh and on his back. Because
of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch
worth P852.70 was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City Hospital to attend
to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for
the watch.
Roberto Juntilla filed for breach of contract with damages. Respondents: beyond the control since tire that
exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used. RTC: favored Roberto Juntilla. CA: Reversed since
accident was due to fortuitous event

ISSUE: W/N there is a fortuitous event

HELD:
NO. CA reversed, RTC reinstated. Passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident
at a regular and safe speed; will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up; passenger jeepney was
overloaded with 3 passengers in the front seat, 14 passengers in the rear.
Caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will.
The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire.
Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits,
and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times
the source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the said contract, it
binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the circumstances. The records show that this
obligation was not met by the respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover any amount for failure
to prove such damages during the trial findings of facts of the City Court of Cebu

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 MTSC V MEDINA
Facts:
Prior to May 7, 1956, Mariano Medina had certain accounts with Manila Trading & Supply Co. On
January 8, 1957, Manila Trading & Supply Co. filed a complaint against Medina in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, claiming that Medina had failed to meet the installments due on the note for the months of September,
1956 up to and including January 7, 1957. Medina averred that the genuine receipts dated January 1957 should
raise the presumption that prior installments were paid.

Issue: Whether or not the Medina was correct in saying that genuine receipts dated January 1957 raise the
presumption that prior installments were paid.

Held:
No. Such receipts did not indicate that they were issued for the installments corresponding to the month of
January, 1957. And even if such recital had been made, the resulting presumption would only be prima facie.

CATUNGAL V RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
The petitioners and respondent entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale wherein spouses Catungal agreed to
sell and Rodriguez agreed to buy the lot conditioned on the payment of a certain price but the obligation to pay the
balance of the purchase price would only arise if Rodriguez would successfully negotiate and secure a road right of
way. Petitioners requested for an advance of 5M on the purchase price but Rodriguez objected stating that in view
of the terms of the Conditional Deed he would only pay balance of the purchase price if he would obtain a road
right of way and he was given sufficient time to do so and he was given the right to rescind the contract. But
spouses Catungal rescinded the contract. Rodriguez contends that the spouses’ unilateral rescission was unjustified
while the spouses Catungal contends that the terms of the Conditional Deed of Sale violated the principle of
mutuality under Art.1308 of the Civil Code stating the contract was a potestative condition because it was
dependent on the sole will of the debtor (Rodriguez).

ISSUE: WON the stipulations of their Conditional Deed of Sale constitute a potestative condition? NO.

HELD:
The stipulation wherein Rodriguez shall pay the balance of the the purchase price when he has
successfully negotiated and secured a road right of way is not a condition on the perfection of the contract nor on
the validity of the entire contract or its compliance as contemplated in Art 1308. It is a condition imposed only on
respondent’s obligation to pay the remainder of the purchase price. Applying Art. 1182, such a condition is not
purely potestative as petitioners’ contend. It is not dependent on the sole will of the debtor but also on the will of
the third persons who own the adjacent land and from whom the road right of way shall be negotiated. Such a
condition is likewise dependent on chance as there is no guarantee that respondent and the 3rd party landowners
would come to an agreement regarding the road right of way. This type of mixed condition is expressly allowed
under Art 1182. Art 1182: When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the
conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation
shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this code. In other words, the obligation to pay the balance is
conditioned upon the acquisition of the road right of way. Therefore, spouses Catungal cannot rescind the contract
nor demand the fulfillment of Rodriguez’ obligation to pay the balance. In the event the condition is not fulfilled,
Rodriguez can either proceed with the sale and demand return of his down payment or to waive the condition and
still pay the purchase price despite the lack of road access.