Nizar Chaari Harrisson2012

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 83:1 2012 pp.
1–24
INTERSECTORAL ALLIANCE AND SOCIAL INNOVATION:

WHEN CORPORATIONS MEET CIVIL SOCIETY
by
Denis HARRISSON∗ and Nizar CHAARI
Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
and
Mariline COMEAU-VALLÉE
HÉC Montréal, Canada
ABSTRACT: This article analyses an alliance between a public utility company

and a consortium of Associations upholding consumer rights. The project consists of
developing means in order to help customers with very low income in a collection
situation by suggesting payment arrangements that would take account of their
financial situation. Inter-organizational collaboration is a way to increase the
capacities of organizations and to apply leverage to existing resources so as to solve
social problems more effectively by pooling together resources, skills and knowledge. We
examine the making of this social innovation through the arrangements taking in three
institutional dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulative. The case study shows
that the legitimacy of the agreement was based on recombining the values of fairness
and solidarity. The innovation process was rooted in the exchange of knowledge and
access to resources based on the expertise of actors. The agreement moved beyond the
experimental framework when it was diffused as a newly learned procedure which
became an organizational routine.
Alianza intersectorial e innovación social: ¿ Cuándo la empresa comercial

se cruza con la sociedad civil ?
El artı́culo examina la alianza entre una empresa de servicios públicos y un consorcio

formado por asociaciones de defensa de los derechos de los consumidores. El proyecto
consiste en desarrollar medios para ayudar a los clientes con menores rentas y
dificultades de pago. Se trata de proponer modalidades de pago que tengan en cuenta
su situación financiera. La colaboración interorganizativa es una forma de incrementar
las capacidades de las organizaciones para una puesta en común de las competencias,
∗ The authors thank the editor of the journal and anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments throughout the review process. We also appreciate the comments on an earlier draft
from our colleagues and students of Centre de recherche sur les innovations sociales (CRISES).
Email: harrisson.denis@uqam.ca

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Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

C 2012 CIRIEC. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, MA 02148, USA
2 DENIS HARRISSON, NIZAR CHAARI AND MARILINE COMEAU-VALLÉE
de los recursos y de los conocimientos, con el objetivo de resolver problemas sociales.

Se analizan los procesos de construcción de esta innovación social a través de los
compromisos asumidos en tres dimensiones institucionales: cognitiva, normativa y
reguladora. El estudio del caso pone de manifiesto que la legitimidad del compromiso
se basa en la consideración de los valores de solidaridad y de equidad. El proceso de
innovación se apoya en el conocimiento y el acceso a los recursos posibilitados por la
experiencia de los actores. La alianza se consolida cuando se propaga bajo fórmulas
procedimentales que se convierten en rutinas organizativas.
Intersektorale Allianz und soziale Innovation: Wenn Unternehmen auf die

Zivilgesellschaft treffen
Dieser Beitrag analysiert eine Allianz zwischen einem öffentlichen

Versorgungsunternehmen und einem Konsortium von Vereinigungen zur Wahrung
von Konsumentenrechten. Das Projekt besteht in der Entwicklung von Instrumenten zur
Unterstützung von Kunden mit sehr geringem Einkommen in einer Inkassosituation,
indem ihnen Zahlungsarrangements vorgeschlagen werden, die ihre finanzielle
Situation berücksichtigen. Interorganisationelle Zusammenarbeit stellt einen Weg dar,
die Kapazitäten von Organisationen zu erhöhen und die vorhandenen Ressourcen
besser einzusetzen, mit dem Ziel, soziale Probleme durch Bündelung von Ressourcen,
Fähigkeiten und Wissen effektiver zu lösen. Wir untersuchen die Durchführung
dieser sozialen Innovation, wobei wir drei institutionelle Dimensionen betrachten: die
kognitive, die normative und die regulative. Die Fallstudie zeigt, dass die Legitimität der
Vereinbarung auf einer neuen Zusammenführung der Werte Fairness und Solidarität
beruhte. Der Innovationsprozess wurde verwurzelt in dem Austausch von Wissen und
Zugang zu Ressourcen, basierend auf der Expertise der Akteure. Die Vereinbarung
verließ den experimentellen Rahmen, nachdem sie als ein neu erlerntes Verfahren
verbreitet wurde, das zur organisatorischen Routine wurde.
Entente intersectorielle et innovation sociale: quand l’entreprise marchande

croise la société civile ?
L’article examine l’alliance entre une firme de service public et un consortium formé
d’associations de défenses des droits des consommateurs. Le projet consiste à developer
des moyens pour aider les clients à faible revenu dans une situation de recouvrement.
Il s’agit de proposer des modalités de paiement qui tiennent compte de leur situation
financière. La collaboration interorganisationnelle est une façon d’accroı̂tre les capacités
des organisations par une mise en commun des compétences, des ressources et des
connaissances, afin de résoudre des problèmes sociaux. Nous analysons le processus de
construction de cette innovation sociale aux travers les arrangements pris dans les trois
dimensions institutionnelles: cognitive, normative et régulatoire. L’étude de cas montre
que la légitimité de l’arrangement repose sur la considération des valeurs de solidarité et
d’équité. Le processus d’innovation repose sur la connaissance et l’accès à des ressources

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INTERSECTORAL ALLIANCE AND SOCIAL INNOVATION 3
fondés sur l’expertise des acteurs. L’entente se consolide lorsque diffusée sous forme de
procédures qui deviennent des routines oganisationnelles.
1 Introduction
Undoutedly BECAUSE it is a recent phenomenon, few studies have examined

the various forms of alliance between services-producing companies and organizations
pertaining to the association sector. This article describes the circumstances under
which such a partnership is possible by examining an alliance between a public utility
company and a consortium of Associations1 upholding consumer rights. Corporations
and associations do not have the same agendas or the same ideological representation
regarding human rights and consumer rights (Yaziji and Doh 2009). Associations often
target companies through action aimed at changing a situation deemed to be intolerable
for their constituents (Walker et al. 2008). Relations fraught with conflict do not bode
well for the development of an alliance. However, companies are likely to be the target of
campaigns which threaten their legitimacy and performance. Thus, cooperative relations
can be a way for these organizations to reduce costly confrontations and reap some
benefits. Collaboration can be profitable because it helps to stimulate innovation by
paving the way for other cooperation agreements that can support regulation efforts.
For this, the research focuses on the activities of a forum for meetings and
discussions (the Working Group’s) on the creation of a partnership between the parties,
and of collection services for low-income households experiencing payment difficulties.
The aim of the Working Group’s activities, as stated by the main actors themselves, was
to implement ‘new business practices and means to help customers with very low income
in a collection situation by suggesting to them payment arrangements that would take
account of their financial situation’ (Working Group’s internal discussion paper ND)
(trans.). Although this agreement ultimately satisfied the leaders at Hydro-Québec and
the Associations’ advisors, the beginnings were nevertheless very hardgoing. It is this
shift from a conflictual situation to a collaborative agreement that is analysed. Both
organizations are driven by a set of values and logics that are opposing, but they succeed
in implementing a programme addressing a huge issue.
This article examines the innovation process related to intersectoral collaboration
by focusing on three empirical components: (a) values, (b) actors and their organizations,
and (c) process governance. First, we will briefly examine these three components
through the neo-institutionalist framework which provides the theoretical tools to
analyze the transition from an instituted organizational form to another configuration
(Philips et al. 2000, Lawrence et al. 2002, Di Domenico et al. 2009, Lawrence and
Suddaby 2006, Battilana et al. 2009). This shift allows for greater cooperation between
rival actors, in particular through the creation of a network which is conducive to the
exchange of knowledge and skills and access to resources (Powell et al. 1996). This
framework will be presented after a review of the academic literature on partnership and
networks, social innovation and inter-organizational and intersectoral collaboration.
1 Associations is used to refer specifically to the Coalition des associations de consommateurs

(Coalition of Consumer Associations) and l’Union des consommateurs (Consumers’ Union),
whereas association with a small ‘a’ refers to the third sector in general.

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2 On the borders of social innovation: partnership and networks
Partnership is a practice involving inter-organizational collaboration based on

the notion that problems can more effectively be solved through joint rather than
separate action (Agranoff and McGuire 2003, Reay and Hinings 2005). This complex
organizational form can be analyzed as a network offering creative solutions to problems
facing organizational actors (Swan and Scarbrough 2005, Kettl 2002). The spectrum of
arrangements is wide and varied (Geary and Roche 2003). Putting partnership into
practice requires continuous commitment on the part of actors who are faced with
changing conditions and must deal with multiple sources of authority (Philips, Lawrence
and Hardy 2002). The action of network members thus involves producing common
goals and the type of agreement reached will depend on the quality of individual and
institutional actors and the forms of exchange within the partnership (O’Leary et al.
2008, Reay and Hinings 2009). Various resources and types of expertise can be combined,
provided that costs and risks are appropriately shared between the parties involved
(Ospina and Yaroni 2003). Inter-organizational collaboration is a way to increase the
capacities of organizations and to apply leverage to existing resources so as to solve social
problems more effectively by pooling together resources, skills and knowledge (Hardy
et al. 2003). The challenge consists in managing the boundaries which are negotiated
and dealt within a cooperative relationship (Katz and Tushman 1983, Gulati et al.
2000, Anand and Khanna 2000, Tsasis 2009). Partnership thus facilitates innovation,
in the sense of solving a problem by arriving at an outcome that is jointly produced or
constructed by a range of actors (Vaillancourt 2009, Jetté 2008).
Collaboration within partnership is effective if the parties see an advantage in
it (Gazley 2010). This pragmatic view is influenced by the institutional coherence
represented by laws and policies, as well as by the parties involved, their mandates
and expectations, and the marks left by previous experiences such as conflicts and
attempts at reconciliation. Collaboration thus results from a combination of coercive
forces with stimulating and normative influences. Partnership is used to achieve a degree
of economic efficiency and better quality of service. A learning process takes place within
the organization since actors acquire new skills, a new sense of responsibility, and an
ability to manage the sources of uncertainty and avoid conflict (Gazley and Brudney
2007). Theses authors also point out that actors can have a subjective interpretation of
losing control and recognition, in particular, the loss of institutional authority. There is
also an uncertainty about using up resources to support activities whose outcomes are
not yet known.
Since partners do not want to lose their autonomy and authority, trust is the
key element in the sharing of experience and knowledge which are so favourable to
innovation (Laplante and Harrisson 2008). Successful experiences in turn generate
trust, which is then reinforced, thereby leading to a virtuous circle of cooperation through
the creation of new social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002, Ansell and Gash 2008). This
social capital is made up of individuals who circulate between several networks and
bring with them knowledge, influence and social links which are drawn on to bring out
original solutions to complex problems (Di Domenico et al. 2009, Battilana et al. 2009).
These problems can therefore be solved only if the individuals come together with the
intention to create and innovate.

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2.1 Innovation and social creativity
Nonetheless, collaboration between corporate and social enterprises needs a new

political and economic arrangement that reconciles the creation of wealth and social
justice (DiDomenico et al. 2009). This arrangement is an outcome of social creativity
produced in socio-technical environments in which various communities collaborate,
and through the commitment of individuals who possess diversified experience, varied
interests and different perspectives on the problems at hand (Battilana et al. 2009). This
can be built as a social innovation linked to the idea of economic and social progress and
well-being of its communities (Phills et al. 2009). Social innovation is a new solution
to a situation evaluated as unsatisfying toward a specific problem. To solve it, it needs
the collaboration of a diversity of social actors (Harrisson and Klein 2007). Diversity
and social distance, whether conceptual or technological, do not constitute constraints
in generating new ideas, quite the contrary. Innovation networks integrate diversity by
fostering frequent communication among stakeholders and promoting openness and
transparency (Fischer 2005, Mumford 2003). For an organizational actor, openness
means being able to integrate new knowledge which is not part of the usual repertoire of
knowledge needed to run the organization smoothly. Transparency means being able
to fully reveal the components of one’s game so that the other can discover one’s
intentions. This leads to pragmatic collaboration through competition and rivalries
between actors driven by different logics. Collaboration is a key process through which
new arrangements are possible by sharing the resources and knowledge (Reay and
Hinings 2009).
The creative process also involves generating and implementing new ideas
translated into action, that is, defining the problem and its construction, gathering
information, conceptualizing, and recombining concepts (Mumford et al. 2003). The
creative work is generally centred on the individuals who cooperate (Byrne et al.
2009). However, this process also requires substantial resources from the organization,
especially since the creative process is uncertain and contains risks such as coming up
with ideas that cannot be translated into innovation, or producing innovations which
fail because they are not taken up by others.
Social creativity is also dependent on individuals who are capable of moving
rapidly from one approach to the next (Fischer 2005, Mumford et al. 2002, Battilana et al.
2009, Byrne et al. 2009). These innovators are capable of anticipating the consequences
on several dimensions. Their key capacity thus consists in constructing analogies in
solving problems, which implies producing a new understanding of the social reality and
reproducing it in new and different situations (Sewell 1992, Suchman 1995). To this end,
innovators are actors who are authorized by their organization to cross the boundaries
in order to collect information and new knowledge and to bring these back to their
organization in a coded form. Innovators are individuals who have been involved in the
system for a long time, even though they may come from a background that is atypical for
their organization (Alter 2003). They also possess skills to translate ideas into practices
(Van de Ven and Angle 2000). How can these innovators create while institutions and
the systems of rules represent so many obstacles? Innovation is produced by respecting
some rules, reducing the influence of other rules and abolishing yet other rules. This
is why Schumpeter said that innovations are based more on ‘recombinations’ than on
pure inventions (Schumpeter 1983). The next section sets out the three dimensions

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involved in intersectoral collaboration in view of understanding how organizations and

associations manage to become partners in order to innovate together.
2.2 Institutional dimension and organizational structures
Organizational structures are aligned with cultural and cognitive belief systems
and the normative and regulatory arrangement which prevail in a given community
(Baum and Rao 2004). Organizations survive via this arrangement which is coherent
with the institutional environment (Campbell 2004, Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Their
constituents are engaged in activities requiring resources to which they can have access
only if they manage to agree on the means of allocation (Meyer and Rowan 1977).
This constitutes the legitimacy of the agreement (Scott 2001, DiMaggio and Powell
1991; Selznick 1996, Douglas 2004). But how is this legitimacy constructed? And how
is it transformed? The most enduring effects of social action can be felt through the
consequences for organizations as represented by changes in their practices, orientations
and policies (Haveman et al. 2007) or in their organizational forms (Swaminathan and
Wade, 2001; Rao, 2009). Such change is truly the ultimate consequence of a partnership
agreement and takes the form of new scripts, norms and operating rules guiding the
way organizations deal with the problems they face. The core of institution is being
composed of three dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulative (Scott 2001: 134).
These dimensions assure the stability and the sense of social life. Institutions become
taken for granted arrangements through which individuals interact without queries for
its validity. If an institution has to be transformed, it means that those dimensions have
to be reconsidered.
First, the cognitive dimension implies taking into account institutional arrange-
ment taken for granted in terms of the use and pertinence of organizational forms
and practices. According to Suchman (1995), this is the most powerful and influential
dimension of organizations, since, as it is deeply rooted and often not conscious,
transforming it requires a slow and intense process. It is through this dimension that
actors acquire models to regulate their perceptions. We will examine this institutional
dimension by analyzing the way actors introduce new values into the underlying
conception of reality, which is often different for a company and for an association,
and how the resulting logic of action is included in the innovation process (Lounsbury
and Glynn 2007, Reay and Hinings 2009). To innovate, it is also necessary to transform
values and to free oneself from preconceived ideas, to reconcile these to such a degree
as to allow for openness to cooperative agreements on concrete forms of intervention for
the public interest. Innovation can be better understood as a source of information and
knowledge that can grow only if they are shared (Osterlund and Carlisle 2005). To reach
this stage, however, ideas that are taken for granted must be broken down.
Second, the normative dimension is characterized by the adoption of organiza-
tional structures, forms and practices by individual and collective actors with recognized
and credible expertise (Scott 1998). These actors enable the systems to run smoothly
by continuously adjusting their commitments to those of others, based on the desire
to maintain the relationship. Several studies on the innovation process have shown
how essential the presence of certain individuals has been in terms of their ability
to move from one universe to the other (Callon 1992, Alter 2003, Van de Ven and
Angle 2000, Harrisson and Klein 2007). These ‘boundary spanners’ possess skills

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and attitudes which make them essential players who act as entrepreneurs capable
of avoiding, circumventing or transforming rules in order to open a passageway to the
new universe by proposing new rules or adapting existing ones (Campbell 2004, Hiatt
et al. 2009, Battilana et al. 2009). They stabilize for a period of time the evolutive
process of innovation by developing norms for governing meetings and discussions
within the networks. One part of our analysis will focus on these players who act as
real entrepreneurs.
Third, the regulatory dimension is the one that makes possible the production,
monitoring and sanctioning of activities by powerful actors such as the state and the
corporation that possess the power and ability to define organizational practices in
acceptable forms. This dimension is the target of social movements (Zald and McCarthy
1977, McAdam and Scott 2005) because it is the locus of change that also brings
transformations to the other two dimensions. The regulatory dimension best represents
the idea of the restrictive institution based on the model of clear rules and explicit
control mechanisms. However, even in this rigid system of rules, conformity is unstable.
Nevertheless, an innovation endures only if it leads to a sustainable system regulated
by rules. What is important is to agree on the rules. The firm uses its organization, with
its hierarchical leadership, to diffuse the new rules on which the ‘boundary spanners’
have agreed, rules that are legitimized through a constant and iterative interplay
between the three dimensions. The process of creating new rules is, however, not linear
since unanticipated effects are always possible. In the final section, we will examine
how innovative agreements are translated into rules. Thus, associations are vectors of
important changes in organizations since they strive to de-legitimize practices deemed
to be unacceptable. This provides opportunities to create other organizational forms
which slip in through cracks in the systems (Zald et al. 2005). Partnership is one of
these forms.
In brief, institutions acquire a ‘repertoire’ of solutions which are based on
principles used by the actors to recombine the arrangements. Fragments of existing
institutions are thus re-assembled by a coalition of actors. Hybrid models are
created, and routines are revamped in order to serve new objectives and produce
jointly constructed outcomes. Lastly, new institutions borrow the order, meaning and
legitimacy from past institutions and involve an evolutionary process of rearrangements
(Scott 2001, Campbell 2004).
How can these new relations be structured and stabilized? If there is little
engagement from corporations with civil society, this also means that there are few
precedents that can form the basis of patterns or routines to be followed. On the
contrary, these patterns must be created. Our hypothesis is that these new relations
are transformed by a process which engages organizational actors who possess the
cognitive and organizational capacities to transform the institutional link by working
simultaneously on three dimensions: cognitive, normative and regulatory.
3 Methodology
The information that was essential to this project was collected and compared
in several ways. We first gathered relevant documents from the company and

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the Associations, as well as information relating to the activities of the Working

Group:2 agendas, strategic plans, annual reports, reports on sustainable development,
memoranda, press reviews, newsletters, documents related to the mandate and the
arrangement agreed on by the stakeholders, reviews of the experiment and stakeholders’
analyses, the Working Group’s operating method, an analytical report on personalized
collection services (arrangements for deferred payment), briefing notes to department
heads, analyses of payment as a ratio of family income, work plans, analytical reports
on results and companion documents, documents specifying the parties’ positions at
different stages in the development of the agreement, notes presenting the Working
Group’s activities to the Hydro-Québec management committee, and other notes on the
experiment delivered to elected members, the Associations’ advisors, and Hydro-Québec
employees and executives. All this information was contained in approximately 400
documents having a total of nearly 1200 pages.
We were invited to three sessions of the Working Group where, through non-
participant observation, we were able to observe the behavior of the actors involved in
the process of implementing and diffusing the agreement. This allowed us to establish a
relationship of trust with these actors, making it easier for us to conduct semi-structured
interviews with them. A total of 18 interviews were conducted using an interview
schedule designed specifically for this project. At Hydro-Québec, the people interviewed
were advisors on Strategies and Business Practices from the collection department,
representatives and team leaders at different sites, and management representatives.
As for the Consumer Associations, the people interviewed were budget advisors linked
with the Coalition of Consumer Associations of Quebec or the Consumers’ Union. Nine
people from each of the two parties were interviewed. The people interviewed made up
a sample of key informants, selected according to the rational choice method (Strauss
and Corbin 1997). Thus, information was collected from individuals who are currently
members of the Working Group or who participated in creating it but who are no longer
part of the Working Group now. This way of selecting participants was favoured for the
diversity of viewpoints on the subject.
The interview questions were structured around three components: (I) the creation
of the Working Group, (II) the evolution of the Working Group and (III) the agreements
and solutions retained. These three major themes were used to grasp the overall
dynamics of the Working Group, including an analysis of the process of establishing
the network, the involvement of some actors in this process, the problems raised by the
process, the factors and conditions that were conducive to the creation of the network, the
tensions that arose and the problem-solving mechanisms used, the impacts on collection
practices, the choice of collection employees, and the type of problems discussed in the
agreement. The interviews were audiotape-recorded in their entirety. Lastly, the content
was analyzed by categorization in order to identify and group the response items together
around these themes. The fact that the themes addressed by the respondents converged
and that the information obtained became redundant as our data collection progressed
suggests that the subject was saturated (Glaser and Strauss 1967).
2 Working Group was the term used by the individuals interviewed to refer to this innovative
project involving the company and the associations. The full name of the project is the ‘Working
Group on low-income households experiencing payment difficulties’.

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The next section of the article is divided into four parts. First, we will present
the outcome of the innovation process which led to a solution created by the Working
Group members, a solution that was legitimized and diffused throughout the entire
organization and the Associations. We will also set out the context in which this
innovation was developed. Then, we will focus on the process involved in the creation
of this innovation. This section follows the approach presented in the previous section,
according to which the actors sought to transform their relationship under the cognitive
dimensions by working on the values that could change the source of legitimacy of
their actions; the normative dimension brings into play the actors of innovation and the
transitions from an arena of organized action to a framework of action to be created and
coded; the regulatory dimension shows the mode of governance of the Working Group
as well as the making of rules and their diffusion to a wider context.
4 Innovation and the context of its development
During the 1990s, Hydro-Québec and the Consumer Associations were in conflict
over the issue of low-income households in a collection situation. The Associations found
the company’s practices towards those most in need to be unacceptable. According to the
Associations’ representatives, Hydro-Québec’s policies at the time were oriented towards
profitability without taking into account the type of customer or the consequences of its
collection practices which had tightened up at the expense of those most in need.3 Hydro-
Québec could interrupt the delivery of electricity 12 months per year.4 The Associations’
representatives could not make headway with Hydro-Québec leaders in their attempts
to negotiate a debt relief scheme for low-income households. The campaign conducted
against the public corporation’s policies was relayed by the media which acted as
messengers of those most in need, putting out headlines such as ‘Poor Customers: Hydro
tightens the screw too hard. Consumer Associations suspend their negotiations with the
corporation’ (Le Soleil, 1 April 1999) (our trans.). Next, the Associations turned to the
political class in order to raise their awareness of the problem and encourage them to
deal with it.
At the time, the absolute profit strategy advocated by Hydro-Québec was not
working. Many low-income customers could not pay their bill in full and coercive
measures were not leading to results. The public corporation therefore decided to form an
alliance with pressure groups and thus turn them into partners. Its own analyses showed
losses that were impossible to recover, not to mention the great effort and energy devoted
to combating the representations made by the Associations. This partnership turned out
to be fruitful, with an agreement being reached in early 2000. This agreement contained
3 A study commissioned by the Working Group showed that in Quebec, electricity constituted
the main source of energy for 70% of residences. On average, households spent 3% of their income
on electricity, whereas this figure stood at 7% for low-income households. Proportionally, it thus
cost more for the latter.
4 From 1993 onwards, as a result of the death of a customer whose power had been cut off
during winter, Hydro-Québec adopted an internal directive stipulating that there would be no
interruption in service delivery for residential customers between December 1 and April 1. The
practice of not interrupting the delivery of electricity in winter became regulated following the
Distributor’s request to include it in the Conditions of Electricity Service in the early 2000s.

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two aspects: (a) potential solutions and agreements with the Consumer Associations;
(b) payment arrangements for low-income customers which allowed them to spread out
their debt over a 48-month period interest free, including personalized arrangements
for those who could not respect the terms of the arrangement, going as far as reducing
or even wiping out the debt or reducing the cost of current consumption. According to
the preliminary results of studies, the success rate of special repayment arrangements
was approximately 50%, which meant that a number of low-income households still
experienced payment difficulties even after arrangements had been applied, involving
an estimated total of approximately 40 000 customers (HQD internal document).
Fifty percent (50%) of customers in a heavy collection situation were low-income
households, whereas these customers made up only 7% of total households in 2006
(Joanis and Godbout 2009: 66).5
This alliance yielded conclusive results and matters improved to such an extent
that a Coalition representative said a few years later: ‘We now believe in the good will
of Hydro-Québec . . . There’s been a markedly positive improvement, both on the ground
and in terms of the way things are developing.’ (Coalition of Consumer Associations)
(our trans.).
Already in 2000, the public corporation outlined in its strategic plan its intention
to devote real effort towards providing payment support for low-income customers, while
adopting a more humane and flexible approach towards these customers. In accordance
with its sustainable development culture, the corporation has since stipulated that it
will act in partnership with communities and offer collection services that are adapted
to low-income customers. (Hydro-Québec, Sustainable Development Action Plan 2009–
2013).
Studies requested by the parties to the Working Group showed that the precarious
living conditions of vulnerable customers called for a degree of flexibility in payment
methods, that the very limited income of a large part of these customers did not allow
them to make full payments, and that the psychosocial aspects of individuals in poverty
increased their vulnerability in terms of respecting payment arrangements.
As a public corporation that accomplishes its mission by acting as a socially and
economically responsible distributor, Hydro-Québec had to seek to bring losses under
control and to reduce the number of complaints and interruptions in service. Moreover,
consumer protection was organized around consumer rights advocacy through various
activities, including non-partisan political action supported, in particular, by activities
involving representation and training on budget consultation provided to the population.
The Associations wished to offer continuous service which would take into account the
capacity to pay of very low income households along with an energy efficiency program
so as to reduce the gap in energy expenditure between the social groups. For the
Associations, the distributors’ business practice would have to be adjusted accordingly.
5 These authors observed, from 1976 to 2007, an increase in inequalities regarding market
income before governmental transfers and tax advantages. Thus, the state acts as an important
mediator in income equilibrium by aiming to reduce the gap between the richest and the poorest
in the population (Joanis and Godbout 2009). An internal study commissioned by the Working
Group showed that low-income households made up 18% of households in 2004 (Rapport SEPA
2004). According to Statistics Canada, the low-income threshold is not considered to be a poverty
threshold. The latter is more subjective and has continually been subject to controversy.

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During the 1980s and 1990s, the social, economic and political context was
favorable for developing a partnership between employers, unions and community
associations, as consecrated at the 1996 Socio-Economic Summit. This wider context
made it possible to harmonize the Working Group agreements with the government
action plan on combating poverty and social exclusion. Of course, the role of the state
should certainly not be overlooked. Moreover, a media campaign (April 1999) prompted
the public corporation to work with the Consumer Associations. The regulatory
framework changed and the institutions adjusted accordingly, offering new possibilities.
But what was the process that led to the creation of a network of innovators
made up of HQD executives and advisors and the Associations’ advisors? How did the
agreement emerge from meetings between these individuals, who managed to relay the
arrangements to their respective constituents and gain their approval in order to offer
innovative collection services to a category of customers with particular characteristics?
We will examine three particular aspects of this process: the values held by stakeholders,
which reveal the cognitive aspect of the institutions, the knowledge possessed by the
actors, which reveals the normative aspect, and the changes made in the rules which
show the regulatory aspect of the innovative process.
4.1 Values
The theme of values was central to the agreement. Alliances between organizations
that produce and distribute a service while making a profit have values that rival those
advocated by non-profit associations. If an alliance between these two opposing parties
was to be achieved, it meant that a degree of compatibility between their values was
necessary. That is, compatibility between values as opposed to the sharing of values.
A public corporation relies on the market for its dominant values while associations
coordinate their values through social justice. Moreover, in a plural and mixed economy,
several types of organization co-exist based on the recognition of the complementarity
of their activities (Defourny 2001, Lévesque 2007). Three main values are thus put
forward: democracy, solidarity and education.
Associations are defined first by their desire to participate in and influence
democratic life. They thus opt for a better sharing of information and knowledge
on consumption among citizens and public and private decision-makers. Consumer
Associations fight for improved living conditions for consumers in economic, social
and political terms by promoting values of social justice and solidarity, in particular,
in the face of market irregularities. As a result, they address the need to reduce
gaps between the living conditions of different socio-economic classes. This implies
considering the other as one’s fellow citizen and helping him/her when necessary (Blais
2007: 53). Citizens are associated through the duty of solidarity, the very foundations of
‘distributive justice.’ It is based on this principle, high on the scale of social values, that
the Associations formulate their orientations. Their actions are aimed first at the state
as a regulator which must take action to reduce social differences. Nevertheless, their
actions are also aimed at corporations whose practices tend not to treat customers as
citizens of a democratic society which seeks to narrow the gaps in living conditions
between people. The public company faces a particular challenge given that it is
situated between the precepts of the democratic state, which seeks to offer production

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and consumption conditions based on social justice, guaranteeing a degree of wealth

redistribution, and the corporation, which is in search of optimal profitability while
taking institutional constraints into account.
Corporate economic logic led Hydro-Québec’s decision-makers to focus the
organization’s objectives on measurable targets in the evolution of profitability. It was
over this discrepancy between irreconcilable objectives that the Consumer Associations
and the public corporation clashed. Achieving optimal profitability struck at the heart
of the principle of solidarity. These values were antinomic. For the decision-makers at
Hydro-Québec, actions could be undertaken for greater social justice; however, it was not
the corporation’s responsibility to reduce the gaps between the richest and the poorest
in society. In their view, this was primarily the goal of the Act to combat poverty and
social exclusion adopted in 2002.
Nevertheless, by focusing on the new values developed mainly in the early 2000s,
the public corporation was now in a position to meet the Associations’ representatives
and discuss with them about how to construct a common project. The role of the
organization in society, a public corporation whose corporate identity with regard to
citizens had been shaken, was about to change. Hydro-Québec now wanted to become a
leader in social responsibility and link the social sphere with the environment through
energy-saving measures and customer education (Hydro-Québec Report on sustainable
development, 2009). To this end, it relied on information and knowledge provided by the
Associations. These new directions contrasted sharply with the economic orientations of
previous years when profitability prevailed over everything else, justifying its tracking of
bad debts among those most in need. In its policies regarding sustainable development,
the public corporation adopted an active position with regard to the pertinence of a
partnership with the community in order to invest more fully in the latter (Internal
document on sustainable development, 2009).
The Associations, for their part, were very critical of the existing social order,
particularly with regard to income gaps between the richest and the poorest, and the
growing problems of consumer debt. Moreover, they also knew how to be pragmatic
since they also offered services to their constituents. They were thus used to working
within a rational economic logic. An agreement was thus conceivable. However, this
was not enough. Each party had to justify its action before its constituents and find
an arrangement that was better than immediate action. This involved breaking the
legitimacy of previous actions and constructing a new legitimacy for future actions. It
is this process of joint construction of the legitimacy of the agreement that we will now
examine.
Fairness was undoubtedly the value that tended to be most discussed between
the parties. The issue consisted in solving the dilemma of the asymmetrical position
between customers who paid the bill in full and others who only paid part of the bill
because their living conditions and income did not allow them to make the full payment
for the service delivered. Was this fair? This moral dilemma could be solved in a context
of solidarity, a value defended by the Associations, according to which all citizens can
make a collective effort and respond to the distress of those most in need. Thus, the
public corporation organized brainstorming sessions with an expert on the question
of fairness and surveyed its residential customers. Indeed, a strong majority (75%) of
respondents positively answered that such a service was fair.

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The strongest resistance nevertheless came from within the company where
executives were against such an arrangement. The expertise and the survey supported
the argument that solidarity should have priority over economic profitability in
defending the interests of customers who were most in need. However, this argument
needed to be deepened further still and based on robust and unshakeable foundations.
The actors thus constructed the main argument that electricity is an ‘essential service’
without which the most basic living conditions are altered. This argument was used to
legitimize the agreement by introducing a higher value into the ongoing discussions.
The corporation and the Associations were thus able to pursue their creative efforts in
seeking payment arrangements that would be appropriate for this type of customer.
It was the public interest which mattered and electricity became a common good –
for low-income earners only, since, for the rest of the population, the concern of
profitability prevailed. Moreover, it was demonstrated that, with the new collection
services for low-income households, the impact of the rates was neutral. This new
arrangement brought the market closer to the public interest, at least as it served the
agreement in an evolutionary process. Especially, it allowed the corporation to break
with the unidimensional market-based rationality as the only source of legitimacy. The
conception of electricity as an essential service was the outcome of Hydro-Quebec’s
cooperation with the Associations which linked up two very different universes.
This transformation of a market good into a common good was an analogy used
by the actors in referring to a value higher than the transformed good. This was the
key condition for the innovation process, and refers to the cognitive dimension of the
institutions, that which allowed the actors to transform the framework for interpreting
the reality. The actors did not create new values, they only mixed them together into a
‘new combination.’ To achieve this, meetings between innovative actors were necessary.
Who were these actors? This is the subject of the following section: the normative
aspect.
4.2 Actors, knowledge and recognition
Partnership involves collaboration between representatives of each party who

display qualities that are typical of the blend of diversified skills which are often seen
at the boundaries of organizations. This is the normative dimension of the innovation
process which refers to the circulation of information and knowledge by individuals.
Partners look for credible spokespersons with strong communication skills. Frequent
meetings and cooperative work sessions lead to and enhance collective creativity. Thus,
it is less a question of selecting individuals with original ideas and more a question of
choosing those who demonstrate, above all, exceptional capacities for working with other
people and reaching consensus, and who can withdraw when necessary, while being able
to confront ideas that are contrary to their own.
These innovators are capable of validating their viewpoint and being coherent
cognitively, and are open to experimentation and learning. They know how to surround
themselves with human resources who can bring progress to the cause. It is less a
question of having all the qualities themselves than of bringing together individuals
with complementary skills. Collective creativity is based on the experience and capacity
for initiative of individuals with different attributes. In this case, some individuals were

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very knowledgeable about the institutions; others, about the regulatory framework;
others still, about the type of customers and the problems they faced; others were capable
of constructing links, seeing the overall picture and being at the centre of gatherings;
others had access to resources which could be pooled together. The individuals who
were initially chosen believed above all that it was possible to arrive at an original
solution without knowing the outcome in advance. They were able to work in a culture
of diversity, since they had the ability to express their opinion, listen to other people’s
opinions, and seek to reconcile contrary opinions. They were patient and constructive
and, especially, they did not bear the stigma of past behaviors that were deemed to
be inappropriate. Thus, organizational skills, relational skills and technical skills were
present.
Organizational skills: Above all, these actors knew their organization and its mission,
and they knew how to work within certain parameters. In this case, creativity and
initiative consisted in opening new paths but within an already relatively marked out
territory. In fact, even before coming into contact with the Working Group members,
these individuals were selected above all for their knowledge of their organization.
Since they would have to present the results of the Working Group’s discussions to
their respective constituents, it was important to entrust the mandates to actors who
knew best how to deal with members in their own organization, whether leaders or
employees, advisors or members of Associations. Once a decision was arrived at in the
Working Group, it had to be approved by other authorities. The work thus did not end
at the doorstep of the Working Group’s meetings. The actors sometimes had to approach
individuals who were strongly prejudiced against the relevance of any partnership
between organizations and the Associations, which were viewed as adversaries, or
against working with customers who did not always enjoy the respect they were entitled
to. Only actors with a detailed knowledge of their organizations would be able to convince
or persuade their respective contituents, and, if needed, skillfully use organizational
rules to clear the obstacles in their way and gain approval for a decision made by the
Working Group.
Relational skills: These innovators interpreted and reconciled the two contradictory
representation models based on the well-known traditional role and the new role to be
constructed. Participating in the alliance did not consist in adopting a role other than
one’s own, but rather in understanding the other without nevertheless putting oneself in
a position of cognitive dissonance. It involved acting out one’s role in complementarity
with others and in respect of others, while being convinced that the contribution of
each would be beneficial for the alliance. These innovative actors gained an improved
ability to play their role as it became enriched with new knowledge from continous
exchanges between the different stakeholders. Thus, it can be maintained that if their
role remained identical to what it had been before the Working Group experiment,
each actor present remained authentic and loyal to his/her constituents first. This role
was nevertheless reconstructed in light of new knowledge which led to more accurate
decision making, expressed in clearer terms. The identities of these organizational actors
were partly reconstructed; however, at no time were they marked with ambiguity or
ambivalence towards the organization to which they belonged. This was a prerequisite
for trust that the individuals with whom they entered into a relationship in the context
of the Working Group would in turn develop. They were credible negotiating partners.
The actors were well aware of the perimeter of cooperation and, with experience, they

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managed to play skillfully with the fluidity of the boundaries. Thus, an equilibrium
between the traditional role and the ‘new role’ gradually emerged, and incompatible
and irreconcilable expectations were avoided. The Working Group members learned to
express their opinions and reveal their strategy based on others’ expectations. A new
‘role-set’ was constructed with the constituents and the new partners.
Technical skills: The Working Group members possessed expertise and know-how that
was specific to the files in question. It was thus important that this technical knowledge
be complementary. Advisors at Hydro-Québec knew how to set up a collection file, others
were knowledgeable about questions relating to electricity costs, and others possessed
knowledge on the programming of services. On the other hand, the Associations’ advisors
were skilled at defending low-income customers. The latter were quite well versed in
the situation of those in extreme indebtedness since they regularly dealt with people in
this situation and possessed detailed information on poverty as it was experienced on a
daily basis. This knowledge helped to clarify the image brought out by official statistics.
The innovators behind the Working Group had an analytical knowledge of the collection
files. When necessary, it was possible to bring in individuals who knew the files even
more thoroughly. This was a key element, especially at the beginning of the process
when it was important to choose the right individuals to initiate the Working Group’s
activities.
The institutions were identity sources for the actors who, in this respect, played
pre-defined roles, whereas the innovation context provided an opening for new values
to be presented and rejected. The qualities displayed by the actors in private outside
their official role enabled them to understand the other world. These meetings provided
opportunities to upgrade the knowledge acquired over the course of numerous informal
interactions.6 This tacit knowledge was presented to the constituents in order to change
the usual relational universe. It resulted from the actors continuously seeking to
establish coherence with their social environment. These innovators thus made choices
based on the newly promoted values (cooperating with the adversary, joint decision-
making, accountability, understanding others, compromise) while remaining aware of
those associated with the traditional context from which they were seeking to break away
(high-conflict relations, exercising a power relationship, mobilizing members, taking a
unilateral position). The innovators justified their action by recognizing that it would be
in the public interest for the new organizational configuration – an alliance made up of
partners working in an innovation network conceived for the constituents – to be fair and
effective. They also referred to the collective good. They put together arguments based
on the values, issues and goals of their respective organizations that served to legitimize
this organizational innovation. However, there was opposition since other arguments
which revealed another form of legitimacy were also brought up by those constituents
who wished to rely on the existing system of rules and who feared a shift away from the
mission. The innovators had to take this into account by continuously going back and
forth between the old world and the new.
This process also involved knowing the role of the other, the limits of the other’s
interventions, skills and knowledge on the subject. Nobody at Hydro-Québec had
6 The leaders of each party knew each other. They had interacted with each other on many
occasions during the confrontation period. They were thus able to better assimilate the knowledge
brought by others since they did not have to constantly assess the others’ reputation.

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expertise in the area of poverty, nor the legitimacy needed to support a discourse on the
public interest. Thus, forming an alliance with advisors from the Consumer Associations
enabled the leaders and employees at Hydro-Québec to fill in these knowledge gaps,
since it involved teaming up with individuals who dealt with low-income households on
a daily basis, who represented and were knowledgeable about the economic constraints
but also the culture, habits and behaviours of those most in need, and who were thus
able to provide a more global and complete portrait of poverty. For the Associations’
advisors, this was a form of recognition of their expertise on the subject. Moreover,
since the files were treated in a confidential manner, Hydro-Québec employees did not
possess information on the financial situation of the customers; they knew only the
collection situation. It was the Associations’ advisors who knew the whole situation.
The relationship was thus based on trust because the files of customers experiencing
payment difficulties were handled in a situation of asymmetric information. This is
why the alliance became permanent. It does not merely involve creating new payment
arrangements, but also ensuring that cases are treated fairly based on complete
information. Nevertheless, in some cases, the alliance can be done without given that,
since 2006, the Associations have not been involved in the operations as Hydro-Québec
employees have been collecting the information themselves.
Thus, the new organizational practices were constructed by individual and
collective actors who mapped out the path between the old and the new order. Lastly,
the Working Group members and their respective organizations also had to take care of
replacing members who had been there for a long time and make sure that the knowledge
would be transferred. This newly mapped out path had to be sustainable. A last and
essential dimension of the process was thus the regulatory dimension which led the new
organizational form to adopt a system of enabling rules governing the participants. This
will be explained in the next section.
4.3 Diversified and mixed forms
As these actors were working in an atypical form of collaboration, new means of

action had to be brought out rapidly. The Working Group was an ad hoc body renewed
by the parties each year. The partners could withdraw at any time thereby putting an
end to the Working Group’s activities. It thus represented a voluntary action which was
agreed to by the representing parties. There was no a priori regulatory framework, nor
any obligation other than a moral one. Thus, it was important that the Working Group
adopt norms of governance and decision-making. This experimental laboratory was
situated well outside the normal activities of the public firm and the Associations. Right
from the beginning, it was determined that decisions would be empirically based and
value judgements would be rejected. Thus, studies were commissioned from consultants
or external firms, and any experiments that were conducted were evaluated by a neutral
outside expert. The goal of these studies was to inform the members and document the
situation.
All action carried out by the Working Group members was based on facts.
Thus, the concept of low-income households was based on the definitions put out by
Statistics Canada and the National Council of Welfare, to which was added information
obtained from the Associations’ representatives as well as Hydro-Québec executives

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and employees who had a good knowledge of customers in a collection situation.

This exchange of knowledge and information was fundamental for the progress of
discussions in the Working Group. The climate of trust was reinforced and allowed
for the progression to other stages. Moreover, all stages were validated before the next
stage was initiated. Recognizing the skills of the Associations’ members was crucial in
understanding the progress made by the Working Group. In this respect, the Working
Group was successful at self-regulation.
A communication mode was also adopted. Thus, the Working Group members
agreed not to reveal the content of any discussions without the consent of all
existing members. The Working Group’s activities were communicated in a single
voice. Nevertheless, disagreements were sometimes expressed in public and tensions
sometimes ensued. However, not all conflict led to withdrawal, because, while incidents
were always possible, redress was also possible if the members were oriented towards
sustaining the Working Group. The settling of disagreements was simplified by the
fact that the stakeholders had developed informal links in addition to more formalized
relations.
When the discussions began, the members managed to convince their constituents
through arguments based on the trust and credibility of the first innovators. These
arguments had to be rapidly translated into measurable outcomes. The Working Group
members were successful in this regard. The outcomes achieved related to three
components: adapted payment arrangements, diffusion, and the Working Group itself.
The parties were not obliged to use the same evaluation criteria provided that they
recognized the legitimacy of the other party’s evaluation. Hydro-Québec is a company
which generates revenues. Thus, the goal of the collection department is to ensure
that customers pay their fair share based on the services consumed. Low-income
customers are no exception to this rule; however, it was recognized that special payment
arrangements might be provided to this vulnerable segment of customers.
For Hydro-Québec, the Working Group’s activities showed their willingness to hold
talks and cooperate with consumer groups. The personalized payment arrangements de-
veloped by the Working Group led to the recovery of 35 to 50% of annual losses (Interview
with a Hydro-Québec executive). Thus, the success rate was very high and was a mea-
surable result of how well the Working Group functioned. For the consumer groups, the
primary goals of the Working Group involved relaxing the collection measures for low-
income households who sometimes used the budget consultation services of Consumer
Associations.
One important outcome consisted in diffusing the adapted payment arrangements
throughout the entire Hydro-Québec network over the whole territory served, as well
as among all the Consumer Associations covering the same territory. The arrangement
was transformed into a procedure that could be applied upon a simple request, if the
customer met the eligibility conditions. It thus became an appropriate internal rule
beyond any personal judgement. In addition, these new rules were learned through a
transfer of knowledge which also explains the reasons for this shift with regard to low-
income households. In this sense, the shift was not entirely coercive. A single window
approach was adopted for the Associations and easily accessible to negotiating partners.
These procedures became a significant part of a best practice in social responsibility
which also contributed to improving the work climate for collection employees.

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The Working Group itself was also an outcome. In fact, it signified that the
partners favoured a new way of working by exchanging information, data, knowledge
and expertise on collection and the phenomenon of poverty experienced over an extended
period. This opened the way towards a better knowledge of the parties’ willingness to deal
with complex problems and find appropriate solutions to them. Moreover, the Working
Group on debt collection also demonstrated that it was possible for adversaries to agree
when the problem was circumscribed and the solutions proposed were regulated by the
Working Group members so that they did not spill over onto uncontrollable aspects of
the problem. This way of working also demonstrated that such a process could take place
in a harmonious way while reducing the sources of tensions between the parties. This
problem-solving model could also be used by other actors who want to undertake similar
courses of action. Thus, Hydro-Québec used this model by favouring cooperation in at
least one other working group on low-income households. Furthermore, the Associations
would like to use this model with other creditors in the public sector, but also in the
private sector, although in the latter case, the slope will be harder to climb.
4.4 The strength of the agreement in face of a new situation
After approximately 10 years of experimentation to create, develop and implement

this innovative practice, two recent developments and a new context have weakened
the sustainability of the agreement. The Working Group actors must in fact find new
solutions for low-income households that have finished paying off their debt based on a
personalized arrangement. What is to be done with these users who demonstrate that
the arrangement has been successful? Are they to be sent back among those customers
who can pay the bill in full with the risk that they might not be able to do so? It should
be added that nothing has been done to increase the income or decrease the energy
consumption of these 600 households. The Working Group has been wondering how
far their work can go. The second development has led to questioning about what is
to be done with low-income households that failed to pay off their debt even with the
personalized arrangement. According to an analysis made by the Working Group, these
users face serious problems due to their situation, chronic illnesses or psychological
distress. The solution thus lies more with recourse to community or public resources;
however, in this regard, links have yet to be created.
In addition to these two developments, which are typical of the type of difficulties
that such an agreement inevitably faces regardless of the context, the current economic
situation is not at all favorable to the sustainability of the agreement. In the 2010 Budget,
the government forecast significant rate increases, which are likely to weaken low-
income households which have not had a corresponding increase in income. Moreover,
the internal orientation of the public corporation has changed (for example, the number
of interruptions in service rose from 20 000/year in 2009 to 40 000/year in 2010).
The Associations wonder whether the tough approach of past decades is making a
comeback. This context is imposed by neo-liberal programming which involves raising
state revenues through the user-payer rather than through an increase in taxes. The
public company has adopted private sector practices, such as putting pressure on its
Call Centre employees, who are now held to a certain productivity standard calculated
in terms of the number and duration of calls. This is having a strong impact on the
agreement since these front-line employees identify customers experiencing payment

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difficulties by asking them a number of additional questions about their income so that
they can effectively refer them to personalized collection services, if needed. This new
orientation is leading to new behaviour on the part of these employees under stress,
and hardly encourages the latter to take more time with a customer who has particular
requirements.
The Associations have been hardly hit by the new economic situation and would
like, as in 1999, to launch a media campaign but they are wondering what impact it
would have. They feel that solidarity between citizens has been weakened and that the
poorest are suffering the consequences. The middle class is more indebted and is licking
its wounds from the financial crisis in 2008. Thus, it would not take kindly to news that
Hydro-Québec is helping those most in need. The context is no longer the same as it was
10 years ago since citizens have withdrawn into their own concerns.
However, within the company, the agreement is solid. Links have not been broken
and the monthly meetings still take place. ‘The relationship has been established and
it is strong’, said one Hydro-Québec manager. The question nevertheless remains: ‘How
can it be continued?’ Over time, the partnership has been consolidated, but it is being
undermined by external factors. Senior management’s support is an essential base in
terms of resisting these assaults. The agreement is not sufficiently established within
the organization since it has not reached the higher level of institutionalization which
would allow it to become deeply rooted. Nonetheless, this agreement is similar to what
Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips coined as a proto-institution (2002), This means that this
arrangement has the potential to become eventually an institution.
5 Conclusion
This article has shown how an intersectoral partnership was created between a
corporation and Consumer Associations staging rival actors who created new social
practices. This change was analyzed as a social innovation altering organizational
activities through the transformation of institutional rules. Our research highlights
the importance of the legitimacy of the new agreement based on the transformation
of three dimensions set in the institutionalist theory (Scott 1998). First, by recombining
the values of fairness and solidarity, the service produced and distributed by the
company was recognized as being an ‘essential service’ (cognitive aspect). Second, the
innovation process was rooted in the exchange of knowledge and access to resources
based on the expertise of rival actors who had to diffuse it to others (normative aspect).
Together, they succeeded in creating an innovative cooperation practice. Third, the
agreement moved beyond the experimental framework when it was diffused throughout
the organization and the Associations as a newly learned procedure that became an
organizational routine (regulatory aspect). At the theoretical level, we have suggested
that these dimensions are interrelated. Social innovation must be able to enter all
dimensions.
Second, our research has shown that despite different values and logics upheld by
the actors, it is possible to innovate through cooperation activities driven by pragmatism
without betraying the core value and the identity of the organizations. This requires a
multi-level collaboration between innovators able to build bridges between different
networks.

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Third, we have outlined that innovation process can be understood as a chain of

learning levels, wherein the validation of the previous level made it possible to advance
to the next level, even though the stages were not sequential. This process seems to have
been more spiral than linear. Returns to previous actions were possible. The innovation
relied on a process of discovery that owed a great deal to individual actors, who were
legitimized at the organizational level and were ready to agree to transform ideas.
Fourth, we have outlined that institutional arrangements must pass the test of
time. It means institutional context is moving by the pertubations of the market, new
political orientations of the State as well as the values held by the citizens. This new
institutional context can weaken the agreement than has been built patiently over a
long period of time. Only time will tell how solid the agreement is.
Our research is a contribution to the understanding of the intersectoral alliances
design. Given the complexity of current economic and social problems, it is crucial
to understand the dynamics of relationship between corporation and association as
a key component of social innovation process. At the theoretical level, we suggest that
this new organizational form is conceivable when the institutional context contributes
significantly to action taken in this direction. Thus, it is now possible ‘to reconcile
community welfare with wealth creation’ (DiDomenico et al. 2009: 903). This social
innovation is also the outcome of a transformation from a commodity to a common good
in the general interest.
This social innovation has been investigated in only one organizational field.
This is an important limitation to our conclusions. Further research is needed to
demonstrate how the innovation process is structured and how it led to the consolidation
of organizational practices. For this, research should focus on other fields that shed
light on experiences of intersectoral alliances. There are still too few studies that
address this important issue. Analysis of conditions for social innovation appears to be
particularly promising. Given the complexity of economic and social problems, alliances
between organizations from different sectors, and whose actions are based on contrasting
values and logics, can multiply. This type of partnership between rival actors staged
the complexity of the interactions and actions taken by innovators who act in fields
constrained by institutional rules. The difficulty is then to find the passageways leading
to lasting change. This is a line of research that must be followed in order to understand
how social changes can be achieved through social innovation.
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Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 83:1 2012 pp.

INTERSECTORAL ALLIANCE AND SOCIAL INNOVATION:

ABSTRACT: This article analyses an alliance between a public utility company

Alianza intersectorial e innovación social: ¿ Cuándo la empresa comercial

El artı́culo examina la alianza entre una empresa de servicios públicos y un consorcio

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

de los recursos y de los conocimientos, con el objetivo de resolver problemas sociales.

Intersektorale Allianz und soziale Innovation: Wenn Unternehmen auf die

Dieser Beitrag analysiert eine Allianz zwischen einem öffentlichen

Entente intersectorielle et innovation sociale: quand l’entreprise marchande

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Undoutedly BECAUSE it is a recent phenomenon, few studies have examined

1 Associations is used to refer specifically to the Coalition des associations de consommateurs

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

2 On the borders of social innovation: partnership and networks

Partnership is a practice involving inter-organizational collaboration based on

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

2.1 Innovation and social creativity

Nonetheless, collaboration between corporate and social enterprises needs a new

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

involved in intersectoral collaboration in view of understanding how organizations and

2.2 Institutional dimension and organizational structures

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

the Associations, as well as information relating to the activities of the Working

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

4 Innovation and the context of its development

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

and consumption conditions based on social justice, guaranteeing a degree of wealth

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

4.2 Actors, knowledge and recognition

Partnership involves collaboration between representatives of each party who

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

4.3 Diversified and mixed forms

As these actors were working in an atypical form of collaboration, new means of

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

and employees who had a good knowledge of customers in a collection situation.

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

4.4 The strength of the agreement in face of a new situation

After approximately 10 years of experimentation to create, develop and implement

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Third, we have outlined that innovation process can be understood as a chain of

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

LOUNSBURY M. and GLYNN M.A., 2007, ‘Cultural entrepreneurship: stories, legiti-

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

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