Civil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary

Summary Cases:

● Civil Liberties Union (CLU) vs. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317

Subject:

Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices; Positions held in Ex-Officio capacity; De Facto
Officers; Statutory Construction of Constitutional Prohibitions

Facts:

(Former) President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284, allowing appointive officials of the
Executive Department (members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries) to hold,
in addition to his primary position, not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by petitioners on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.

Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the
Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said
exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to
the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

Held:

Constitutionality of EO 284

1. By ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention to the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.

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Constitutional Prohibition on Holding Multiple Offices

2. The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both
public and private office or employment.

3. It is quite notable that in all Constitutional provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of
Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,
and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure.”

4. These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of
Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

5. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself.

6. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.

Exception to Prohibition on Multiple Offices

7. The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held without
additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned official's office, namely:

(a)the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),
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 Article VII; or

(b) the Vice-President acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII;

(c) the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

8. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official
character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official
position."

9. An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports
Authority, and the Light Rail Transit Authority.

De Facto Officers

10. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and
as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

11. It has been held that “in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith
has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to
the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office.

12. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public
should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for
such services.

13. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual
services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them.

Statutory Construction
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14. The qualifying phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
cannot possible refer to the broad exceptions provided under Section 7, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution. To construe said qualifying phrase as such would render nugatory and meaningless the
manifest intent and purpose of the framers of the Constitution to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
other offices or employment in the government during their tenure.

15. Respondents' interpretation that Section 13 of Article VII admits of the exceptions found in Section 7,
par. (2) of Article IX-B would obliterate the distinction so carefully set by the framers of the Constitution
as to when the high-ranking officials of the Executive Branch from the President to Assistant Secretary,
on the one hand, and the generality of civil servants from the rank immediately below Assistant
Secretary downwards, on the other, may hold any other office or position in the government during their
tenure.

16. The Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by
its adoption and the evils if any sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed.

17. Moreover, it is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

18. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and
nugatory

19. Moreover, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as
intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself.

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