December 8, 1926

ACT NO. 3344

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, AS AMENDED BY ACT
NUMBERED TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SEVEN, CONCERNING THE RECORDING OF INSTRUMENTS
RELATING TO LAND NOT REGISTERED UNDER ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIX, ENTITLED "THE LAND
REGISTRATION ACT", AND FIXING THE FEES TO BE COLLECTED BY THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR INSTRUMENTS
RECORDED UNDER SAID ACT

SECTION 1. Section one hundred ninety-four of Act Numbered Two thousand seven hundred and eleven,
known as Administrative Code, as amended by Act Numbered Two thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 194. Recording of Instruments or Deeds Relating to Real Estate not Registered Under Act
Numbered Four Hundred and Ninety-Six or Under the Spanish Mortgage Law. — No instrument or deed
establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying or extinguishing rights with respect to real estate
not registered under the provisions of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, entitled 'The Land
Registration Act', and its amendments, or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, shall be valid, except as
between the parties thereto, until such instrument or deed has been registered, in the manner
hereinafter prescribed, in the office of the register of deeds for the province or city where the real estate
lies. ACcISa
"It shall be the duty of the register of deeds for each province or city to keep a day book and a
register book for unregistered real estate, in accordance with a form to be prepared by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice. The day book shall
contain the names of the parties, the nature of the instrument or deed for which registration is
requested, the hour and minute, date and month of the year when the instrument was received. The
register book shall contain, among other particulars, the names, age, civil status, and the residences of
the parties interested in the act or contract registered and in case of marriage, the name of the wife, or
husband, as the case may be, the character of the contract and its conditions, the nature of each piece of
land and its own improvements only, and not any other kind of real estate or properties, its situation,
boundaries, area in square meters, whether or not the boundaries of the property are visible on the land
by means of monuments or otherwise, and in the affirmative case, in what they consist; the permanent
improvements existing on the property; the page number of the assessment of each property in the year
when the entry is made, and the assessed value of the property for that year; the notary or the officer
who acknowledged, issued, or certified the instrument or deed; the name of the person or persons who,
according to the instrument, are in present possession of each property; a note that the land has not
been registered under Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law;
that the parties have agreed to register said instrument under the provisions of this Act, and that the
original instrument has been filed in the office of the register of deeds, indicating the file number, and
that the duplicate has been delivered to the person concerned; the exact year, month, day, hour, and
minute when the original of the instrument was received for registration, as stated in the day book. It
shall also be the duty of the register of deeds to keep an index-book of persons and an index-book of
estates, respectively, in accordance with a form to be also prepared by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, with the approval of the Secretary of Justice.
"Upon presentation of any instrument or deed relating to real estate not registered under Act
Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six and its amendments or under the Spanish Mortgage Law, which
shall be accompanied by as many duplicates as there are parties interested, it shall be the duty of the
register of deeds to ascertain whether said instrument has all the requirements for proper registration. If
the instrument is sufficient and there is no legitimate objection thereto, or in case of there having been
 one, if the same has been dismissed by final judgment of the courts, and if there does not appear in the
register any valid previous entry that may be affected wholly or in part by the registration of the
instrument or deed presented, and if the case does not come under the prohibition of section fourteen
hundred and fifty-two of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, the register of deeds shall
register the instrument in the proper book. In case the instrument or deed presented has defects
preventing its registration, said register of deeds shall refuse to register it until the defects have been
removed, stating in writing his reasons for refusing to record said instrument as requested. Any
registration made under this section shall be understood to be without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.
"The register of deeds shall be entitled to collect in advance as fees for the services to be
rendered by him in accordance with this Act, the same fees established for similar services relating to
instruments or deeds in connection with real estate in section one hundred fourteen of Act Numbered
Four hundred ninety-six, entitled "The Land Registration Act", as amended by Act Numbered Two
thousand eight hundred and sixty-six." AECacS
SECTION 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, December 8, 1926.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 198026, November 28, 2018 ]
NARCISO MELENDRES, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, OFELIA MELENDRES AND CHILDREN JOSE MARI MELENDRES, AND
NARCISO MELENDRES, JR., PETITIONERS, V. ALICIA CATAMBAY, LORENZA BENAVIDEZ, IN SUBSTITUTION OF HER HUSBAND
EDMUNDO BENAVIDEZ, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL (MORONG BRANCH), RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the now
deceased petitioner Narciso Melendres (Narciso), substituted by his wife, Ofelia Melendres, and children Jose Mari Melendres
and Narciso Melendres, Jr., assailing the Decision[2] dated May 27, 2011 (assailed Decision) and Resolution[3] dated August 3,
2011 (assailed Resolution) issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Second Division and Former Special Second Division,
respectively in CA-G.R. CV No. 93082, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated September 14, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Morong, Rizal, Branch 80 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 324-T.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As narrated by the CA in its assailed Decision, and as culled from the records of the case, the essential facts and antecedent
proceedings of the instant case are as follows:
[The instant case is centered on a 1,622-square-meter property located in Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal,
described as Lot No. 3302, Cad-393, Tanay Cadastre (subject property).]
[Petitioner Narciso claimed that] he inherited the [subject property] from Ariston Melendres [(Ariston)], who
died on January 1, 1992[.]
[Petitioner Narciso likewise alleged that respondent] Alicia Catambay's [(Catambay) predecessor-in-interest,
Alejandro Catambay (Alejandro),] like the other previous tenants and adjoining farmers of the subject
property, [had previously] attested that he and Ariston owned the subject property, which had an original
area of 13,742 square meters[,] and [that Petitioner Narciso and his father Ariston] were actually, publicly,
openly, adversely and continuously in possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years[.]
[Petitioner Narciso also maintained that] they planted it with palay on a regular seasonal basis; the subject
property became a private land by operation of law and it may not be treated as a public land falling under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands for the purpose of issuance of Homestead Patent[.] [Petitioner Narciso
also asserted that] Ariston paid the taxes on the subject property [as evidenced by various tax declaration
receipts spanning several years.]
[Petitioner Narciso also alleged that what respondent] Catambay [actually owns is] the 1,353-square-meter
parcel of landadjoining the subject property [on the eastern side of the subject property, which respondent
Catambay inherited] from the late Alejandro[.] [Immediately adjoining the aforesaid 1,353-square-meter lot
of respondent Catambay on the eastern side is a parcel of land owned by a certain Mercedes Amonoy
(Amonoy).]
[According to petitioner Narciso,] in 1971, unknown to him and Ariston, a Cadastral Survey Team from the
Bureau of Lands surveyed the subject property, the property of [respondent] Catambay, and other properties
in Barangay Plaza Aldea, Tanay, Rizal[.]
[An alleged] gross error [was] committed by the [Cadastral Survey Team of the Bureau of Lands, which]
resulted in the reduction of the original area of the subject property from 13,742 square meters to 4,762
square meters[, docketed as Lot No. 3300]. Original Certificate of Title [(OCT)] No. 1112, which contains an
area of only 4,762 square meters, was issued to Ariston[.]
On the other hand, OCT No. M-2177 for Lot No. 3302[, which covers the subject property] was [supposedly
mistakenly] issued [in favor of Alejandro] with an area of 1,622 square meters[.] [Upon the death of
Alejandro,] Transfer Certificate of Title [(TCT)] No. M-28802 was issued [in favor of respondent Catambay
after the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Alejandro.]
[Eventually, TCT No. M-28802 was cancelled and TCT No. M-39517 was issued in favor of respondents
Spouses Edmundo (Edmundo) and Lorenza (Lorenza) Benavidez (collectively, respondents Sps. Benavidez)
who bought the property from respondent Catambay]
[Petitioner Narciso] discovered the grave errors in the survey and registration of the subject property
sometime on September 13, 1989 and brought the same to the attention of [respondent] Catambay who
pointed to [respondent] Edmundo as her persistent buyer of the subject property[.]
[DENR Case]
[O]n November 24, 1989, a petition for reinvestigation was filed [by petitioner Narciso] before the
[Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)] in Taytay, Rizal. It was claimed by [petitioner Narciso] that a serious error was
committed by the Cadastral Survey Team of the Bureau of Lands in the conduct of the cadastral survey of
Cad-393 of the Tanay Cadastre.]
[O]n December 12, 1989, the CENRO ordered [respondents] Catambay and Edmundo to observe and
maintain the status quo on the subject property until such time that the case is finally resolved by the said
office[.]
[According to petitioner Narciso,] in spite of his written advice [to respondents Catambay and Edmundo] to
desist from any untoward action or from performing any act that would disturb or alter the status quo
condition of the subject property, [respondents Sps. Benavidez] proceeded with the possession and
occupation of the subject property by putting filling materials on it and converting it into a commercial area[,
specifically a gasoline station.]
[In its Order[5] dated January 21, 1993, the DENR Regional Office No. IV denied the petition filed by petitioner
Narcisio, holding that there was no error committed in the cadastral survey of the Tanay Cadastre.
The matter was elevated to the Office of the Secretary, DENR, which, in a Decision[6] dated June 27, 1995,
denied the appeal for lack of merit.
The matter was again elevated to the Office of the President (OP), which, in a Decision[7] dated June 30, 2003,
reversed the decisions of the DENR Regional Office and the Office of the Secretary, directing the DENR to
institute reversion proceedings respecting Lot Nos. 3302 and 3304 so that appropriate free patents and
corresponding titles be issued in favor of petitioner Narciso, respondent Catambay, and Mercedes Amonoy.
In the OP's Decision, the OP found that based on the evidence on record and the findings of the DENR
investigators themselves, "the area being actually worked and cultivated by [respondent] Catambay through
her overseer was included in the title of [Amonoy]"[8] and not the subject property. The OP also found that
petitioner Narciso and his predecessors-in-interest were the ones "in actual possession" of the subject
property and that petitioner Narciso "was still occupying and tilling the same area, which was not actually
possessed and occupied by both Catambay and Amonoy." Further, the OP held that the OCT issued in favor of
Catambay is "void".][9]
[Forcible Entry Case]
[During the pendency of the abovementioned petition for reinvestigation filed before the CENRO, petitioner
Narciso] sued [respondent] Edmundo for Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Restraining Order before the Municipal Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal [(MTC)].
[On January 14, 1994 the MTC declared Ariston as the rightful possessor of the land in controversy and
ordering respondent Edmundo to remove the improvements introduced on the property and to vacate and
restore petitioner Narciso to its physical possession.[10]
The MTC considered the admission of respondent Edmundo that he proceeded in filling the subject lot with
soil and other filling materials and constructed a gasoline station thereon without asking permission from
tenant Mendez. The MTC disregarded the claim of respondent Edmundo that he was the owner of
the land as ownership of the property was not material in actions for recovery of possession. Moreover, such
claim of ownership, even if valid, was belied by the Deed of Sale respondent Edmundo presented before the
MTC as it was only executed on February 5, 1990 or more than two (2) months after the date of his unlawful
entry on November 29, 1989.[11]
On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. It held that the issue involved in the case was not
merely physical or de facto possession but one of title to or ownership of the subject property; consequently,
the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.[12]
Petitioner Narciso appealed the case to the CA Special Twelfth Division. The appellate court sustained the
arguments of petitioner Narciso. It reversed the decision of the RTC and reinstated that of the MTC, affirming
the latter court's decision ejecting respondent Edmundo from the subject property. The matter was then
elevated to the Court.[13]
This Court, in Edmundo Benavidez v, Court of Appeals[14] (Benavidez v. CA), sustained the CA, Special Twelfth
Division's Decision, affirming the ejectment of respondent Edmundo from the subject property.
In the said case, the Court, in sustaining the CA, Special Twelfth Division's Decision affirming the ejectment of
respondent Edmundo from the subject property, upheld the MTC's finding that Ariston Melendres is the
rightful possessor of the subject property.[15]
The Court also sustained the MTC's assessment that a prior judgment issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) declaring Mendez, who is the tenant of petitioners, as the agricultural
tenant of the subject lot and ordering respondents to reinstate Mendez to the possession of the property
was a persuasive proof of possession by petitioners through their agricultural tenant, Mendez.[16]]
[DARAB Case]
[[Petitioner Narciso] and his tenant, Mendez, likewise filed a complaint for illegal conversion against
respondents Catambay and Benavidez before the [DARAB]. The case titled Ariston Melendres, rep. by Narciso
Melendres, Jr., and Felino Mendez v. Alicia Catambay, rep. by the Heirs of Alejandro Catambay and Edmundo
Benavidez, was docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ri-369-91.]
[O]n March 4, 1992, the DARAB found [respondent] Edmundo guilty of illegal conversion and ordered the
payment of damages to him and Mendez. [T]he DARAB [D]ecision[17] became final and executory and a writ
of execution was issued on August 24, 1992[.]
[In the aforementioned Decision, the DARAB found that "the records are replete with evidence adequately
establishing the claim of [petitioner Narciso and Mendez] that they were in possession of the landholding in
question until they were ejected by the Respondents in 1989."[18]
The DARAB ordered respondents Catambay and Edmundo to pay petitioners' tenant, Mendez, P61,875.00 as
disturbance compensation. In an [Acknowledgment][19] dated November 5, 1992, tenant Mendez certified
that he had received an amount of P61,875.00 from respondents in compliance with the DARAB's Decision.]
[The Instant Complaint for Annulment of
Deed of Absolute Sale with Reconveyance]
[On November 6, 1992, [petitioner Narciso] filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Absolute Sale with Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order
 against [respondents] Catambay, [the Sps. Benavidez,] and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch
[(RD)]. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 324-T.]
xxxx
[Respondents filed their Answer with Grounds for Dismissal and Compulsory Counterclaim, refuting the
allegations of petitioner Narciso. Eventually, respondents filed an Amended and Supplemental Answer with
Grounds for Dismissal and Compulsory Counterclaim and a Second Amended and Supplemental Answer with
Grounds for Dismissal and Compulsory Counterclaim. However, the parties decided to put aside the grounds
for dismissal and proceeded with the presentation of the witnesses of petitioner.]
On May 17, 1996, [respondents] filed their Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to Evidence on [the] grounds
that [petitioner Narciso] [had] no legal capacity to sue and for insufficiency of cause of action.
On November 8, 1996, the [RTC] dismissed the case [for lack of cause of action].
On appeal by [petitioner Narciso before the CA, Former Third Division, the appeal was initially denied.]
[However,] an Amended Decision[20] was [subsequently] issued by the [CA Former Third Division] on August
30, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55641 [reversing the RTC's dismissal of the case and] remanding this case to the
lower court [for further reception of evidence].
[In its Amended Decision, the CA Former Third Division found that the RTC's finding that there is a lack of
cause of action was incorrect considering that based on its review of the records of the case, the subject
property was held and occupied by petitioner Narciso and his predecessors-in-interest, "publicly, adversely,
and uninterruptedly, and in the concept of owner, for a very long time (some 50 years), before Ariston's
death on January 1, 1991."[21] The CA Former Third Division also found that the patent title covering the
subject property that "was issued in favor of Alejandro Catambay, father to Alicia Catambay, is a fraudulently
issued title because Alejandro Catambay was never an actual occupant of that lot in his lifetime, nor had he
laid any claim thereover during his lifetime."][22]
x x x On April 4, 2001, a Resolution was issued by [this Court] in G.R. No. 146025 declaring [CA-G.R. CV No.
55641] terminated for failure of [respondents Sps.] Benavidez to file their petition for certiorari within the
extended period which expired on January 6, 2001.
[In the remanded proceedings before the RTC, respondent] Lorenza Benavidez substituted [respondent]
Edmundo, who passed away on November 9, 2003.
[Petitioner Narciso] died on November 18, 2003 and he was substituted by [petitioners Ofelia, the wife of
Narciso, and the children of Narciso, i.e., Jose Mari and Narciso, Jr.]
xxxx
On September 14, 2007, [the RTC rendered its Decision[23] dated September 14, 2007 dismissing petitioner
Narciso's Complaint for lack of merit.
[Hence, petitioner Narciso, substituted by his wife and children, appealed the RTC's Decision before the
CA.][24]
The Ruling of the CA
In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioners' appeal, affirming the RTC Decision dated September 14, 2007, which
dismissed petitioner Narciso's Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Reconveyance against respondents. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 14, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 80, Morong,
Rizal in Civil Case No. 324-T is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
The solitary reason why the CA denied petitioners' appeal is due to its belief that the proper recourse to remedy the situation
is an action for reversion to be filed solely and exclusively by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and
not an action filed by a private person.[26]
Hence, the instant Petition.
Issue
Stripped to its core, the central question is whether there is sufficient cause to cancel the certificate of title covering the
subject property currently in the name of respondents Sps. Benavidez, i.e., TCT No. M-39517, which traces its origin from OCT
No. M-2177 issued in favor of Alejandro Catambay, and to reconvey the subject property in favor of petitioners.
The Court's Ruling
I. Procedural Issue
Before delving into the substantive issues of the instant case, the lone procedural issue raised by respondents shall be first
resolved by the Court.
Respondents ask the Court to dismiss the instant Petition outright because it does not raise pure questions of law. The instant
Petition admittedly raises certain questions of fact for the Court's appreciation and consideration; the instant Petition thus
involves mixed questions of fact and law.
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is unequivocal in stating that an appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering
that the findings of facts of the lower courts are conclusive and binding upon the Court.[27]
However, the Court has ruled in a catena of cases that such rule is not inflexible. The Court has recognized several exceptions
to the rule that only questions of law can be raised in a Rule 45 petition. Questions of fact may be revisited by the Court: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[28]
Here, the Court exercises its discretion in delving into the questions of fact involved in the instant Petition. As will be discussed
at length below, the findings of facts of the courts and various administrative bodies are in conflict with each other.
Further, the findings of fact made by the RTC in its Decision that are adverse to petitioners, as concurred in by the CA in its
Assailed Decision and Resolution, are premised on the supposed absence of evidence presented by petitioners. However, a
careful re-examination of the records sheds some light on the possibility that such conclusion made by the lower courts are
contradicted by the available evidence on record.
Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the Court exercises its discretion in setting aside the general rule that only pure questions of
law may be examined by the Court in assessing the instant Petition.
Having dispensed with the sole procedural issue raised against the instant Petition, the Court now addresses the substantive
issues.
The Validity of Free Patent No.
(IV-1) 001692 and OCT No. M-2177
II.
registered in the name of
Alejandro Catambay

At the heart of petitioners' Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Reconveyance is the allegation that OCT No.
M-2177, which was issued in favor of Alejandro Catambay, and from where respondents Benavidez trace their title over the
subject property, was invalidly issued and that they, petitioners, are the true owners of the subject property by virtue of their
actual, public, open, adverse and continuous possession of the subject property for more than 30 years.
The records show that in 1974, Alejandro filed with the DENR an application for free patent docketed as Free Patent
Application No. (IV-1) 6363-B covering the subject property. With the DENR considering the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, it issued, on November 22, 1977, Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692[29] covering the subject
property in the name of Alejandro. Pursuant thereto, the RD issued the corresponding OCT, i.e., the assailed OCT No. M-2177
in the name of Alejandro.
In its Decision denying petitioners' Complaint, the RTC essentially invoked the indefeasibility of OCT No. M-2177 and held that
petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that the said title was invalidly issued in the name of respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, Alejandro.[30]
While the Court is not unaware that upon the expiration of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued shall become incontrovertible and indefeasible,[31] the indefeasibility of title could be claimed only if a previous valid
title to the same parcel of land does not exist.[32] As a matter of fact, an action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy
available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name;
reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. Further, the
incontestable and indefeasible character of a Torrens certificate of title does not operate when the land covered thereby is
not capable of registration.[33]
In connection with these doctrines, the Court has previously held in Agne, et al. v. The Director of Lands, et al.,[34] that if
the land in question is proven to be of private ownership and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, the
free patent and subsequent title issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of a
Torrens title issued pursuant to a patent may be invoked only, when the land involved originally formed part of the public
domain. If it was a private land, the patent and certificate of title issued upon the patent are a nullity.[35]
The Court, in the aforesaid case, further explained that the rule on the incontrovertibility of a certificate of title does not apply
where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground
that they are null and void because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them, the land in question having been
withdrawn from the public domain prior to the subsequent award of the patent and the grant of a certificate of title to
another person.[36]
Similarly, in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[37] the Court explained that it is a settled rule that a free patent issued over
a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects whatsoever. Private ownership of land — as when there is
a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over
the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has no authority
to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership. Consequently, a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding
only if the land covered by it is really a part of the disposable land of the public domain.[38]
Therefore, with OCT No. M-2177 being susceptible to attack on the basis of petitioners' claim that there was an invalid
issuance of a free patent, as the subject property was already private property, the question that must be resolved by the
Court is this: Based on the evidence on record, is there sufficient proof that the free patent issued to Alejandro, i.e., Free
Patent No. (IV-1) 001692, from which OCT No. M-2177 and the subsequent TCT issued in favor of respondents Sps. Benavidez
trace their origin, is null and void?
Section 44, Chapter VI of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, states that a free patent may issue in favor of an
applicant only if (1) the applicant has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or (2) who shall have paid the real
estate tax thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person.
A hard second look at the factual findings of the various courts and administrative bodies, as well as the evidence on record,
reveals that Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692 issued in favor of Alejandro did not satisfy the abovementioned requisites for the
issuance of a free patent, making it null and void.
In sum, based on an exhaustive review of the records of the instant case, as well as the clear and unequivocal factual findings
made by several courts, including various administrative bodies, the Court finds that:
respondent Catambay and her predecessor-in-interest did not actually occupy the subject property as to warrant the
(1)
issuance of Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692;

respondent Catambay and her predecessor-in-interest actually occupied and cultivated the adjoining property
(2)
adjacent to the subject property and not the subject property; and

petitioners, through their predecessors-in-interest, have actually, publicly, openly, adversely and continuously
(3) possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner since the 1940's, cultivating the said property as a rice
field.

Factual Findings of the Various Courts and Administrative

A.
Bodies
The Court takes cognizance of the various factual findings of several lower courts, including findings previously made by this
Court, that petitioners were in actual possession of the subject property for several decades and that respondents actually did
not occupy the subject property.
1. Factual Findings by the Court in the
Forcible Entry Case (G.R. No. 125848)
First, it must be recalled that in Benavidez v. CA, this Court ruled with respect to the forcible entry case filed by petitioner
Narciso against respondents. The Court sustained the CA Special Twelfth Division's Decision, which in turn affirmed the MTC's
Decision ordering the ejectment of respondent Edmundo from the subject property.
In the said case, the Court, in sustaining the CA Special Twelfth Division's Decision, upheld the MTC's finding that Ariston is the
rightful possessor of the subject property, as he had always been consistently possessing and cultivating the land as a rice
field through his tenants.[39] The Court also sustained the MTC's assessment that the prior judgment of the DARAB declaring
Mendez as the agricultural tenant of the subject lot and ordering Benavidez to reinstate Mendez to the possession of the
property was a persuasive proof of possession by petitioners through their agricultural tenant, Mendez.[40]
In fact, it must be stressed that the Court upheld the MTC's finding that an ocular inspection conducted on October 11, 1990
established that the subject property, wherein a Petron gasoline station and some new structures were forcibly put up by
respondent Edmundo, is one and the same lot being claimed by petitioner Narciso, and that said property is the same lot
being managed by Mendez as the tenant of petitioners.[41] During the ocular inspection, the MTC held that other tenants and
farmers of adjoining and adjacent ricelands confirmed this factual finding. In fact, this factual finding led the MTC to issue a
writ of preliminary injunction against respondents.[42]
While it is true that the aforementioned factual findings sustained by the Court in G.R. No. 125848 are not by all means
conclusive upon this Court in deciding the issue at hand, considering that in a forcible entry case, the only issue for
adjudication is the physical or material possession over the real property and not ownership,[43] the Court deems such factual
findings as having persuasive effect, taken together with the other factual findings and the evidence on record. To stress, the
Court in G.R. No. 125848, in sustaining both the findings of the MTC and CA Special Twelfth Division, upheld the ejectment of
respondent Edmundo from the subject property on the basis of the established fact that Ariston and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in continuing possession over the subject property and cultivated such property as a
rice land for several decades. At the very least, this factual finding convinces the Court that, contrary to the unsupported
assertion of respondents, the Catambays were not in actual and continued possession of the subject property, which was an
essential and indispensable requisite for the granting of the free patent in favor of Alejandro.
1. Factual Findings by the CA Former
Third Division (CA-G.R. CV No. 55641)
Moreover, the Court notes that on November 8, 1996, the RTC initially issued a Resolution dismissing the instant case for lack
of cause of action which was affirmed by the CA on March 31, 2000. However, after a more thorough review of the evidence
on record, the CA Former Third Division issued an Amended Decision dated August 30, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55641.
In the said Amended Decision, the CA Former Third Division reversed the RTC's finding that there is a lack of cause of action
and found cause to remand the case for further reception of evidence. After its extensive review of the records of the case, it
was found by the CA Former Third Divison that the subject property was held and occupied by petitioner Narciso, through
his predecessors-in-interest, publicly, adversely, and uninterruptedly, and in the concept of owner, for some 50 years:
This Lot 3302 was by A. Melendrez (sic), a native resident of Tanay, Rizal, held and occupied publicly,
adversely, and uninterruptedly, and in concept of an owner, for a very long time (some 50 years), before his
death on January 1, 1991.[44]
The CA Former Third Division also made the unequivocal finding that the free patent title covering the subject property that
"was issued in favor of Alejandro Catambay, father to Alicia Catambay, is a fraudulently issued title because Alejandro
Catambay was never an actual occupant of that lot in his lifetime, nor had he laid any claim thereover during his
lifetime."[45]
The aforementioned Amended Decision became final and executory, with respondents failing to assail it.
Again, the abovementioned factual findings of the CA Former Third Division were arrived at after a thorough review of the
evidence on record. This dovetails with what the Court now finds in the records which reveal that, indeed, the Catambays
were never actual occupants of the subject property, and that petitioner Narciso, through his predecessors-in-interest,
occupied the subject property publicly, adversely, uninterruptedly, and in the concept of owner, for several decades.
 1. Factual Findings by the DARAB
(DARAB Case No. IV-Ri-369-91)
In addition to the foregoing, it must likewise be recalled that petitioner Narciso and his tenant, Mendez, filed a complaint for
illegal conversion against respondents Catambay and Sps. Benavidez before the DARAB. The case titled Ariston Melendres, rep.
by Narciso Melendres, Jr. and Felino Mendez v. Alicia Catambay, rep. by the Heirs of Alejandro Catambay and Edmundo
Benavidez, was docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ri-369-91.
In its Decision[46] dated March 4, 1992, the DARAB found respondents guilty of illegal conversion and ordered the payment of
damages to him and Mendez. The DARAB Decision became final and executory and a writ of execution[47] dated September 3,
1992 was eventually issued against respondents.
In the said Decision, the DARAB's findings unequivocally state that the claim of petitioners that they were in constant
possession of the subject property is adequately supported by the evidence on record:
Anent the first and second issues, the records are replete with evidence adequately establishing the claim
of the Complainants that they were in possession of the landholding in question until they were ejected
therefrom by the Respondents in 1989. Complainant Ariston Melendres by himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest Maria Paz Catolos, has been in continuous, uninterrupted, peaceful, open and
public possession of the questioned property with an original area of 13,742 square meters in the concept
of an owner as evidenced by Old Tax Declarations going far back as 1949. When a cadastral survey was
undertaken sometime in 1971, portions thereof were apparently erroneously included in the individual titles
of the adjoining owners namely Alejandro Catambay, (respondent Alicia Catambay's predecessor-in-interest)
and Mercedes Amonoy. x x x [I]t cannot be denied that all these many years, the Complainant Melendres
remained in material possession of the subject property as owner/legal possessor.[48] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Further, the DARAB likewise found that Mendez "was validly instituted as a tenant-lessee over the subject landholding by
fellow Complainant Melendres who is the legal possessor thereof x x x."[49]
In its Decision, the DARAB also ordered respondents to pay petitioners' tenant, Mendez, P61,875.00 as disturbance
compensation. The records bear an Acknowledgment[50] dated November 5, 1992, wherein tenant Mendez certified that he
had received an amount of P61,875.00 from respondents in compliance with the DARAB's Decision. This actually shows that
respondents readily acknowledged and recognized the validity of the aforementioned DARAB's Decision. Hence, respondents
cannot now be allowed to assail the findings of the DARAB after willingly accepting, recognizing, and expressing its
acquiescence over the DARAB's Decision.
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as the DARAB, will not be interfered
with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.[51] Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded
great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction.[52]
1. Factual Findings by the OP (O.P. Case
No. 95-1-6253)
Aside from the factual findings of the Court in G.R. No. 125848, the CA Former Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 55641, and the
DARAB in DARAB Case No. IV-Ri-369-91, it must be emphasized that the OP, in O.P. Case No. 95-1-6253, also arrived at a
similar conclusion that petitioners, and not respondents, have actually, publicly, openly, adversely and continuously possessed
the subject property in the concept of an owner since the 1940s, cultivating the said property as a rice field.
It must be recalled that on November 24, 1989, a petition for reinvestigation was filed by petitioner Narciso before the CENRO,
claiming that there was a serious error committed by the Cadastral Survey Team of the Bureau of Lands in the conduct of the
cadastral survey of Cad-393 of the Tanay Cadastre and that the subject property has been in the open, continuous, notorious,
and public possession of the Melendreses and their predecessors-in-interest for several decades.
In its Order[53] dated January 21, 1993, the DENR Regional Office No. IV denied the petition filed by petitioner Narciso. The said
Order was sustained by the Office of the Secretary of the DENR in a Decision[54] dated June 27, 1995.
However, the matter was elevated to the OP which, in a Decision[55] dated June 30, 2003, reversed the decisions of the DENR
Regional Office and the Office of the DENR Secretary, directing the DENR to institute reversion proceedings respecting Lot Nos.
3302 and 3304 so that the correct and appropriate free patents and corresponding titles be issued in favor of petitioner
Narciso, respondent Catambay, and Mercedes Amonoy.
In the OP's Decision, it must be stressed that the OP, after exhaustively going through the available evidence, found that the
area actually being worked on and cultivated by respondent Catambay does not pertain to the subject property. The OP
found credence in the Investigation Report of the CENRO, DENR Region IV, which found that:
[Respondent] Catambay is an owner of Lot No. 3302 with an area of (1,622) previously issued Free Patent No.
001692. On the basis of her title she cause (sic) the relocation of the same, but to her surprise her title
appears to be issued in the land owned by [petitioner Narciso], and not to one they were actually
cultivating and occupying;
xxxx
That in the course of the same investigation, it was finally ascertained that the area being actually worked
and cultivated by Miss Alicia Catambay through her overseer was included in the title of Mrs. Mercedes
Amonoy for Lot No. 3304 is the reason why the area was enlarged unconscionably and this fact was
supported by the findings during the relocation conducted within the premises of said two lots. The property
of [respondent] Catambay is in between the land of [petitioner Narciso] and Mrs. Amonoy. The tenants of
these three adjoining owners like Messers. Felino Mendez, Arturo J. Catambay and Melchor Samonte were of
the same opinion that the land owned by [respondent] Catambay were (sic) exactly included in the title of
Mrs. Mercedes Amonoy, and this was further attested to by several old reliable residents of the place, like
the person of Mr. Bernardo Piguing, President of the Farmer's Cooperative, and Chairman of the
BARC-Barangay Agrarian Reform Council and his two members, Mr. Florentino Bernal and Mr. Pedro Pendre,
and many others within the locality.[56] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, after reviewing the careful and thorough investigation conducted by the DENR on the matter at hand, the OP held that
respondent Catambay was actually surprised when she discovered that her title referred to the subject property, as it was not
the land her family was actually cultivating and occupying. Thus, the OP held that "[w]ith such findings and admissions by the
DENR lower officials themselves, it cannot be said that x x x the evidence for [petitioner Narciso] was not convincing enough
to support his contention that a mistake was committed by the Department's survey team in 1971."[57]
The OP also found that petitioner Narciso and his predecessors-in-interest were the ones "in actual possession" of the
subject property and that petitioner Narciso "was still occupying and tilling the same area, x x x which was not actually
possessed and occupied by both Catambay and Amonoy."[58]
Further, the OP held that since the free patent issued in favor of Alejandro covered an area which was not actually
possessed and occupied by him, the corresponding OCT is "void."[59]
To reiterate once more, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.[60] The confluence of factual findings made by the courts and several administrative bodies supports petitioners'
claim that they, through their predecessors-in-interest, have actually, publicly, openly, adversely and continuously possessed
the subject property for more than 30 years prior to the issuance of Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692 in favor of Alejandro in
1977, making the issuance of the said Free Patent null and void.
B. The Evidence on Record
As earlier intimated, that is not all. Aside from the aforementioned factual findings of the courts and the administrative bodies,
the Court finds, upon its own exhaustive review of the records of the instant case, that the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioners, if weighed against the evidence presented by respondents, more convincingly show that the subject property was
not at all possessed by respondents' predecessor-in-interest, i.e., Alejandro, and that the subject property was occupied,
possessed, and cultivated by petitioners, through their predecessors-in-interest, as a rice field for several decades.
1. Tax Declarations in the name of
Petitioners' Predecessors-In-Interest
First, the evidence on record bear that Tax Declarations in the name of the Melendreses covering the subject property were
issued spanning several decades, with the earliest Tax Declaration being issued in favor of petitioner Narciso's grandmother,
Maria Paz Catolos, in the 1940s.[61]
While tax declarations are not per se conclusive evidence of ownership, they cannot simply be ignored especially where, as
here, since the 1940s, Tax Declarations had already been registered in the name of petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest.[62] While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute credible proof of a claim of title over the property. Coupled with actual possession of the
property, tax declarations become strong evidence of ownership.[63]
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to
obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.[64]
Hence, the constant filing by the Melendreses of tax declarations covering the subject property spanning several decades,
taken together with the other pieces of evidence, shows that petitioners' claim of title over the subject property is consistent,
providing sufficient basis in proving their possession over the said property.
To the contrary, the earliest tax declarations produced by respondent Catambay covering the subject property are Tax
Declaration No. 01-2717[65] registered on April 30, 1985 in the name of Alejandro and Tax Declaration No.
01-3460[66] registered on September 29, 1988 in the name of respondent Catambay.
Aside from the fact that such tax declarations were registered only several years AFTER the application and granting of
Alejandro's free patent over the subject property, very telling is the fact that upon close examination of such tax declarations,
they are traceable from previous tax declarations in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Susana Catolos de Medenacelli.
It must be emphasized that under Tax Declaration Nos. 01-1555, 01-0876, 604, 4194, and 3440,[67] all in the name of Susana
Catolos de Medenacelli, who is the predecessor-in-interest of the Catambays, the property indicated in the said tax
declarations refer to the 1,353-square-meter property adjacent to the subject property, and NOT the subject property. This
lends support to the persistent claim of petitioners that the property actually owned and possessed by the Catambays refer to
the 1,353-square-meter property and not the subject property, which was consistently covered by tax declarations in the
name of petitioners' predecessors-in-interest.
1. The Sworn Testimony of Arturo
Catambay, respondent Catambay's
First Cousin
To provide further credence to petitioners' assertion that the property actually occupied and owned by respondent Catambay
is not the subject property, but another property adjacent to it, the Court takes notice of the testimony of respondent
Catambay's first cousin, Arturo Catambay (Arturo).
In his Malayang Salaysay[68] dated July 11, 1989, Arturo unequivocally declared under oath that he is the caretaker of
the land owned by the deceased Alejandro. He further declared that the land actually owned and possessed by Alejandro is
NOT the subject property, but a piece of land that is adjacent to the subject property which is owned by Ariston. He likewise
declared under oath that the subject property was being continuously occupied by the tenants of petitioners.
A review of the pleadings submitted by respondents reveals that this testimony was never rebutted by them. The Court finds
this evidence persuasive as it comes from a relative of respondents who was the one who actually occupied and maintained
the lands owned by respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Alejandro. As caretaker, Arturo had first-hand knowledge as to the
state and condition of the lands involved in the instant case.
1. The Sworn Testimonies of Petitioner
Narciso and Mendez
The evidence on record also reveals that petitioner Narciso unequivocally testified under oath, which was never contradicted
by respondents, that, as administrator of his father, Ariston, the subject property was already being cultivated by his family as
a rice field for several decades prior to the free patent application of Alejandro, and that he supervised the cultivation and
harvesting of palay gathered from the subject property by their farmer tenants.[69]
Petitioner Narciso also testified that the subject property was devoted to the planting of palay until November 1989 when
respondent Edmundo forcibly entered the subject property and filled up the area with materials, eventually putting up a
gasoline station.[70] Petitioner Narciso was even able to present an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate dated February 18,
1991 covering the subject property, which was executed upon the death of his father, Ariston.[71] Without doubt, this shows
that petitioner Narciso and his family have always and consistently viewed and treated the subject property as their own.
Petitioner Narciso's above testimony that the subject property has always been used by petitioners' family as a rice field was
corroborated by the family's tenant, Mendez, who testified in his Malayang Salaysay[72] dated January 13, 1990, that he had
been the caretaker and tenant of the subject property. He also testified under oath that the land being farmed by respondents
is the property adjoining the subject property and not the subject property, which was being managed by him as tenant.[73]
To provide further proof that the subject property was under the control of petitioners' family and that such property was
being utilized as a rice field, with Mendez as the assigned tenant, petitioner Narciso was even able to produce photographic
evidence showing the rice fields located in the subject property.[74]
The Court notes that respondents again failed to disprove and repudiate the testimonies provided by petitioner Narciso and
his witnesses that, for several decades prior to the free patent application of Alejandro, the subject property was utilized by
the Melendreses as a rice field, which was overseen by Mendez as their tenant, until 1989 when respondent Edmundo forcibly
entered the property.
The Court takes notice that, aside from the questioned Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692, OCT No. M-2177, and the subsequent
certificates of title that are traceable from OCT No. M-2177, the only evidence provided by respondents in substantiating their
claim that Alejandro had been in open, continuous, exclusive, actual, and notorious possession, occupation, and cultivation of
the subject property are the self-serving testimonies of respondents Catambay and Lorenza.
Therefore, taking all the available evidence on record, and recognizing the persuasive effect of factual findings made by
different administratrive agencies and courts, the Court finds and so holds that (a) respondent Catambay and her
predecessor-in-interest did not actually occupy the subject property, (b) that respondent Catambay and her
predecessor-in-interest actually occupied and cultivated the adjoining property adjacent to the subject property and not the
subject property, and (3) that petitioners, through their predecessors-in-interest, have actually, publicly, openly, adversely and
continuously possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner since the 1940s, cultivating the said property as a rice
field.
The open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other
sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.[75]
In connection with the foregoing doctrine, the Public Land Act states that those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least 30 years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title.[76]
In Heirs of Celso Amarante v. Court of Appeals,[77] the Court similarly ruled that the open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of public land for more than 30 years by a person who occupied the land by planting various coconut, mango, and bamboo
trees, wherein the grandchildren of the planter likewise continued occupying the said property for several years, created the
legal fiction whereby the said land, upon completion of the requisite period of possession, ipso jure became private property:
We should consider next the character of the rights held by petitioners in respect of Lot 1236. The testimony
of Celso Amarante showed that in 1974, the coconut trees planted by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest were already approximately seventy (70) years of age. The mango trees had trunks
with circumferences of about three (3) arm lengths; indicating once more that those trees were very old. x x x
More importantly, there is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No.
1942, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which provides as follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x xx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of the title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant, and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.[77a]
There is no question that petitioners, at the time they had been forcibly driven off the Sitio Campulay parcel
of land, had through their possession and that of their predecessors-in-interest complied with the
requirements of long continued (at least 30 years), bonafide, open, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot 1236 which was of course, originally agricultural land of the public domain.[78]
The Court notes that the circumstances and issues surrounding the instant case find much resemblance to the previously
decided case of Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[79] wherein the Court similarly held that since the petitioners therein
were able to prove their open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for several decades,
such land was deemed to have already been acquired by the petitioners therein by operation law, thus segregating
such land from the public domain. This led the Court to invalidate the free patent covering such land, as well as the certificate
of title issued by virtue of such void free patent:
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal effects
whatsoever. Private ownership of land — as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the
same land, because the Public Land law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands
has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to
private ownership. Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the
nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really a part of the
disposable land of the public domain.
In the instant case, it was established that Lot 2344 is a private property of the Santiago clan since time
immemorial, and that they have declared the same for taxation. Although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land by
respondents and their predecessors-in-interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a
right to a government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was thus
segregated from the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the
free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are void.
Similarly in Magistrado v. Esplana, the applicant for a free patent declared that the lots subject of the
application formed part of the public domain for the sole purpose of obtaining title thereto as cheaply as
possible. We annulled the titles granted to the applicant after finding that the lots were privately owned and
continuously possessed by the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. Likewise,
in Robles v. Court of Appeals, the free patent issued to the applicant was declared void because the lot
involved was shown to be private land which petitioner inherited from his grandparents.
Respondents' claim of ownership over Lot 2344-C and Lot 2344-A is fully substantiated. Their open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of Lot 2344-C in the concept of owners for more than
seventy years supports their contention that the lot was inherited by Mariano from her grandmother Marta,
who in turn inherited the lot from her parents. This fact was also corroborated by respondents' witnesses
who declared that the house where Marta and Mariano's family resided was already existing in the disputed
portion of Lot 2344 even when they were still children. It is worthy to note that although Lot 2344-C was
within the property declared for taxation by the late Simplicio Santiago, he did not disturb the possession of
Marta and Mariano. Moreover, while the heirs of Simplicio tried to make it appear that Mariano built his
house only in 1983, Nestor Santiago admitted on cross-examination that Mariano Santiago's house was
already existing in the disputed lot since he attained the age of reason. The fact that Mariano did not declare
Lot 2344-C for taxation does not militate against his title. As he explained, he was advised by the Municipal
Assessor that his 57 square meter lot was tax exempt and that it was too small to be declared for taxation,
hence, he just gave his share in the taxes to his uncle, Simplicio, in whose name the entire Lot 2344 was
declared for taxation.[80]
Hence, since the evidence on record, including the factual findings of the various courts and administrative bodies, indubitably
establish that petitioners, through their predecessors-in-interest, have actually, publicly, openly, adversely and continuously
possessed the subject property in the concept of an owner, cultivating the subject property as a rice field, for more than 30
years, the subject property became the private property of petitioners ipso jure by virtue of law.
The Court notes that, in issuing its assailed Decision, the CA did not reverse, invalidate, or refute whatsoever the various
factual findings made by the courts and administrative bodies on the validity of petitioners' claims. The CA's sole reason in
denying the appeal filed by petitioners was its belief that the proper remedy of petitioners is an action for reversion that may
only be filed by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and not by any private party.[81] The CA's solitary
basis in dismissing petitioners' appeal is erroneous.
An action for reversion involves property that is alleged to be of State ownership, aimed to be reverted to the public
domain.[82] As held by the Court in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[83] there is no merit to the contention that only the
State may bring an action for reconveyance with respect to property proven to be private property by virtue of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession. The nullification of the free patent and title would not therefore result in its
reversion to the public domain. Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real party-in-interest;
inasmuch as there was no reversion of the disputed property to the public domain, the State is not the proper party to bring a
suit for reconveyance.
In the instant case, by virtue of the actual, public, open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property by
petitioners in the concept of an owner since 1940s, the subject property ceased to be a land of the public domain and became
private property.
Hence, in line with established jurisprudence, if the land in question is proven to be of private ownership and, therefore,
beyond the jurisdiction of the then Director of Lands (now Land Management Bureau), the free patent and subsequent title
issued pursuant thereto are null and void. The indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Torrens title issued pursuant to
such null and void patent do not prevent the nullification of the title. If it was private land, the patent and certificate of title
issued upon the patent are a nullity.[84]
Therefore, the Court finds Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692 issued in favor of Alejandro Catambay null and void. Necessarily, OCT
No. M-2177 which was issued in accordance with Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692 is deemed invalidly issued.
The Validity of the Contract of Sale
III. Entered Between Respondent Catambay
and Respondents Sps. Benavidez

In light of the nullity of Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692 and OCT No. M-2177, the Court now proceeds to rule on whether or not
respondents Sps. Benavidez's claim of title over the subject property should be upheld.
It must be recalled that respondents Sps. Benavidez' title over the subject property is sourced from a contract of sale entered
with respondent Catambay, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 5, 1990.[85] By virtue of this contract of
sale, TCT No. M-39517[86] was issued in the name of respondents Sps. Benavidez.
Despite the fact that the title of respondents Sps. Benavidez is traced from the defective title of respondent Catambay, the
Court takes notice of the rule that the purchaser of a piece of property is not required to explore further than what the
Certificate indicates on its face.[87]
This rule, however, applies only to innocent purchasers for value and in good faith; it excludes a purchaser who has
knowledge of a defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonable prudent man to inquire into the
status of the property.[88] Time and time again, this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as
evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior
to registration. Mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur.[89]
One cannot rely upon the indefeasibility of a TCT in view of the doctrine that the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title
does not extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad faith.[90]
In a long line of cases, the Court has defined a purchaser in good faith or innocent purchaser for value as one who buys
property and pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other person's claim on
or interest in it.[91] It has been held that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon him who
asserts that status and it is not sufficient to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, that is, that everyone is
presumed to have acted in good faith.[92]
To stress, the onus probandi is borne by respondents Sps. Benavidez to prove that they are innocent purchasers in good faith
and for value. Upon exhaustive review of the records of the instant case, the Court is very much convinced that respondents
Sps. Benavidez failed to satisfy this burden.
While respondent Lorenza provided testimony that they committed acts verifying whether the title was clean, such as
conducting an ocular inspection,[93] aside from this testimony being self-serving and uncorroborated, the evidence on record
clearly show that respondents Sps. Benavidez had actual and not merely constructive knowledge that there were other
persons claiming interest over the subject property.
The records[94] show that respondent Edmundo was represented by counsel, i.e, Atty. Pangalangan, in the petition for
reinvestigation filed by petitioner Narciso before the CENRO, wherein petitioner Narciso made known his claim that he and his
predecessors-in-interest are the lawful owners and possessors of the subject property.
In fact, on December 12, 1989, the CENRO issued an Order[95] addressed to respondents, including respondent Edmundo, to
observe and maintain the status quo on the subject property until such time that the case is finally resolved by the said office.
The said Order itself specifically indicates that respondent Edmundo was furnished a copy of the Order.
Further, a formal demand letter[96] dated November 29, 1989 was sent by petitioner Narciso, through counsel, specifically
addressed to respondent Edmundo, apprising the latter as to the claim of ownership and possession of the Melendreses over
the subject property.
Significantly, during the trial, respondent Catambay herself testified categorically that respondents Sps. Benavidez had
knowledge of the claims of petitioner Narciso over the subject property prior to the sale entered into with her:
In other words categorically they have knowledge of the complaints of Narciso Melendres even before they purchased
Q.
this subject parcel of land?

A. Yes, they did.[97]

In fact, it bears stressing that even the RTC itself, in its Decision dated September 14, 2007, found that "defendants Alicia
Catambay and defendants-spouses Benavidez had knowledge of the conflicts over the subject property during their sale
transaction, x x x."[98]
A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an
innocent purchaser for value. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.[99]
All told, there is absolutely no doubt in the mind of the Court that respondents Sps. Benavidez were not innocent purchasers
of the subject property.
It should be clarified, however, that notwithstanding the Court's declaration that the subject property is private property
belonging to petitioners and that Free Patent No. (IV-1) 001692, as well as all the certificates of title originating therefrom, are
null and void, the title of petitioners over the subject property is still imperfect; the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of
petitioners is still subject to the rules on confirmation of title under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act. Nevertheless, as
similarly held in Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago,[100]this imperfect title of the petitioners is enough to defeat the free
patent and certificate of title issued over the subject property in favor of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. As
petitioners are deemed the lawful owners of the subject property ipso jure by virtue of their open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property, they have the exclusive right to apply for the issuance of a
certificate of title through judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2011 and Resolution
dated August 3, 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals, Special Second Division and Former Special Second Division, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 93082 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring NULL and VOID the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 5, 1990 executed between respondent Alicia
Catambay and respondents Spouses Edmundo and Lorenza Benavidez in so far as the subject property is concerned;
and

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch to CANCEL any and all certificates of title traced from Original
Certificate of Title No. M-2177.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,[*] JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., on wellness leave.

[*]
Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 17-75.
[2]
Id. at 87-105. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo
and Elihu A. Ybañez concurring.
[3]
Id. at 108-109.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 76-85. Penned by Judge Maria Teresa Cruz-San Gabriel.
[5]
Records, pp. 709-713.
[6] Id. at 714-719.
[7] Id. at 842-847.
[8] Id. at 845, quoting the Investigation Report dated January 15, 1990 of Miguel Zacarias, Land Investigator and Acting Chief of

the Investigation Section, CENRO DENR Region IV.

[9]
Id. at 847.
[10]
See Benavidez v. CA, 372 Phil. 615, 619 (1999).
[11]
Id. at 620.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 621.
[14]
372 Phil. 615 (1999).
[15] Id.
[16]
Id.
[17] Records, pp. 396-406.
[18] Id. at 401.
[19] Id. at 408.

[20] Rollo, pp. 111-115.

[21] Id. at 112
[22] Id. at 114.
[23] Id. at 76-85.

[24] Id. at 88-102.

[25] Id. at 105.
[26] Id. at 104.
[27] Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. CA, 472 Phil. 11, 22 (2004).

[28] Id. at 22-23.

[29] Records, p. 708.
[30] Rollo, p. 83.

[31] Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, Sec. 32.

[32] Register of Deeds v. Philippine National Bank, 121 Phil. 49, 51 (1965).
[33] Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, 121 Phil. 681, 686 (1965).
[34] 261 Phil. 13 (1990).
[35] Id. at 25.
[36] Id.
[37] 452 Phil. 238 (2003).
[38] Id. at 248.
[39] See supra note 14.
[40] Id. at 620.
[41] Id. at 619.
[42] Id.

[43] De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 287 Phil. 298, 302 (1992).

[44] Rollo, p. 112.
[45] Id. at 114; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[46] Records, pp. 396-406.
[47] Id. at 407.
[48] Id. at 401-402.
[49] Id. at 403; emphasis supplied.

[50]
Id. at 408. Erroneously labeled as "ACKOWLEDGEMENT."
[51]
Encinas v. Agustin, Jr., et al., 709 Phil. 236, 260 (2013).
[52]
Spouses Hipolito, Jr. v. Cinco, 677 Phil. 331, 334 (2011).
[53]
Records, pp. 709-713.
[54]
Id. at 714-719.
[55]
Id. at 842-847.
[56]
Id. at 845-846.
[57] Id. at 846-847; emphasis supplied.
[58] Id. at 847; emphasis supplied.
[59] Id.; emphasis supplied.
[60] Spouses Hipolito v. Cinco, et al., supra note 50.
[61]
Tax Declaration Nos. 01-2843, 01-0870, 5768, 3445, 4265, 597 and Declaration of Real Property Tax No. 2475, 28856; see
Records, pp. 357-365.
[62]
Id.
[63]
See Ranola v. CA, 379 Phil. 1, 11 (2000).
[64]
Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, supra note 36 at 248.
[65]
Records, p. 373.
[66] Id. at 372.
[67]
Id. at 374-378.
[68] Id. at 410.
[69] See TSN dated July 21, 1993, pp. 15-16.
[70] Id.

[71] Records, pp. 438-441.

[72] Id. at 411.
[73] Id.
[74] Id. at 389.

[75] The Director of Lands v. IAC, et al., 230 Phil. 590, 599-600 (1986).
[76] Public Land Act, Sec. 48(b).
[77] 264 Phil. 174 (1990).
[77a] Subsequently amended by Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1073, January 25, 1977. See Sps. Fortuna v. Republic, 728

Phil. 373 (2014).

[78] Supra note 77, at 187-188.
[79] Supra note 36.

[80] Id. at 248-250. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

[81] Rollo, p. 104.
[82] See Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 260 (2002).
[83] Supra note 36.
[84] Agne, et al. v. The Director of Lands, et al., supra note 34.
[85] Rollo, p. 201-202.
[86] Id. at 198.
[87] Abad v. Guimba, 503 Phil. 321-330 (2005)
[88] Id.
[89] See Sps. Portic v. Cristobal, 496 Phil. 456, 466 (2005).
[90] See Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 15, 33-34 (2000).
[91] Sps. Tanglao v. Sps. Parungao, 561 Phil. 254, 262 (2002), citing Tanongon v. Samson, 431 Phil. 32, 45 (2004).

[92] Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 32, 45 (2004).

[93] Rollo, pp. 533-537.
[94] TSN dated June 16, 2005, pp. 13-15.
[95] Records, p. 409.
[96] Id. at 388.
[97] TSN dated January 27, 2005, at p. 15; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[98] Rollo, p. 84.

[99]
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., 387 Phil. 283, 303 (2000)
[100]
Supra note 37.

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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 197733, August 29, 2018 ]
SAMUEL AND EDGAR BUYCO, PETITIONERS, V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CAGUIOA, J:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] dated January 26, 2011 (Decision) of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68708, reversing and setting
aside the Decision[4] dated August 15, 2000 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82 (RTC) in
LRC Case No. OD-06 that granted the petitioners' application for land registration over a large parcel of land described as Lot 1,
Psu-127238 (Subject Land) with an area of approximately 3,194,788 square meters located in barrios Canduyong,
Anajao[5] and Ferrol, Tablas, Romblon, and the Resolution[6] dated June 30, 2011 of the CA denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The CA Decision narrates the factual antecedents as follows:
On October 14, 1976, brothers Edgardo H. Buyco and Samuel H. Buyco, through their attorney-in-fact Rieven
H. Buyco, filed an application for registration of a parcel of land with [then] Court of First Instance of
Ro[m]blon, Branch 82. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-51706. The parcel
of landsought to be registered was particularly described as follows:
"A parcel of land (Lot I, under surveyed for the heirs of Lilia Hankins situated in the barrios of
Canduyong, Anahao, and Ferrol, Municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Tablas
Island under PSU 127238) LRC Record No. _______: Bounded on the North by properties of
the heirs of Rita Fiedacan and Alexander Hankins; on the Northeast, by Canduyong River and
property of Alexander Hankins; on the East, by properties of Andres Cuasay, Escolastica
Feruelo, Candido Mendoza, Raymundo Goray, Pedro Goray, Manuel Yap, Feliza Fedri and
Silverio Mierculecio; on the Southeast, by property of Candido Mendoza, the Heirs of Benita
Formilleza, Silverio Mierculecio[,] Zosimo Llorca, Lot 2, and properties of Beatrice Hankins
and Zosimo Llorca; on the West, by properties of Maria Llorca and Miguel Llorca; and on the
Nort[h]west, by property of Catalino Fabio, Pont ‘I’ is S. 33 deg. 24"., 4075.50 m. From
B.L.L.M. 1, Odiongan, Romblon. Area THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED NINETY[-]FOUR
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY[-]EIGHT (3,194,788) SQUARE METERS, more or less."
The Republic of the Philippines through the Director of Lands opposed the application for registration.
Trial on the merits ensued.
On February 5, 1985, the Land Registration Court rendered its judgment granting aforesaid application, the
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of title to the parcel
of land designated as Lot No. 1 PSU-127238 and its technical description together with all
the improvements thereon, in the name of the herein applicants, recognizing the interest of
the Development Bank of the Philippines to be annotated on the certificate of title to be
issued as mortgagee for the amount of P200,00[0].00 with respect to the share of applicants
Samuel H. Buyco."
'Upon the decision become (sic) final let the corresponding decree and certificate of title be
issued accordingly."
The Director of Lands appealed said Decision to [the CA] on the basis that the trial court erred as follows:
"(1) in not declaring the applicants barred by the Constitution from applying
for registration because they are American citizens and are thus disqualified from acquiring
lands in the Philippines;
"(2) in holding that applicants had established proprietary rights over the land even before
acquiring American citizenship through naturalization; and
"(3) in not dismissing the application for registration because of applicants' failure to
overthrow the presumption that the land applied for is public landbelonging to the State.
(Director of Lands vs. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992])"
The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. [0]5824.
On November 21, 1989, the [CA] dismissed for lack of merit the appeal interposed by the Director of Lands.
The Director of Lands filed a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the review and reversal of
the decisions of the trial court in LRC Case No. N-48 and the [CA] in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 91189.
On November 27, 1991, the Supreme Court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenge Decision of the public respondent of
21 November 1989 in CA-G.R. CV No. 05824 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision of 5
February 1985 of Branch 82 of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in Land Registration Case
No. N-48, LRC Record No. N-51706 is REVERSED.
"SO ORDERED."
On December 6, 1995, or approximately six (6) years later, Edgar Buyco and Samuel Buyco filed for the
second time an application for registration of title covering the same parcel of land, particularly described as
follows:
"A parcel of land, described on plan as Lot 1, Psu-127238 situated in the Barrios of
Canduyong, Anajao and Ferrol, of Tablas. Bounded on the North along lines 30-34 by
property of Catalino Fabro; along line 34-35 by property of Heirs of Rita Fiedacan and
Esnislao Sulit; along lines 35-51 by property of Alexander Hankins; along lines 51-56 by
Condoyong River, about 12 meters wide; on the East, along lines 56-62 by property of
Alexander Hankins; along line 62-63 by property of Andres Cuasay; along line 63-64 by
property of Escolastica Feruelo; along line 64-65 by property of Candido Mendoza; along line
65-66 by property of Raymundo Goray; along lines 66-68 by property of Pedro Goray; along
lines 68-70 by property of Manuel Yap; along line 70-72 by property of Feliza Fadri; along
line 72-1 by property of Silverio Mierculecio; on the South along line 1-2 by property of
Candido Mendoza; along lines 2-4 by property of Heirs of Benita Formelleza; along line 4-5
by property of Silverio Merculecio; along line 5-6 by property of Zosimo Llorca; along line 6-7
by property of Beatrice Hankins; along lines 7-10 by Lot 2, Psu-127238; along lines 10-12 by
property of Beatrice Hankins; along lines 12-14 by property of Zosimo Llorca; on the West
along lines 14-22 by property of Maria Llorca; and along lines 22-30 by property of Miguel
Llorca. Beginning from a point marked "1" on plan being S. 33 deg. 24 min. W., 4075.50
meters from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Municipality of Odiongan, Province of Romblon, xxx xxx xxx.
 Containing an area of Three Million One Hundred Ninety[-]Four Thousand, Seven Hundred
Eighty[-]Eight (3,194,788) Square Meters."
On February 23, 1996, appellant Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition with a motion to dismiss the
application for registration of title on the bases that 1) res judicata has already set in; and that 2) the
applicants did not acquire vested rights over the subject parcel of land before acquiring American citizenship.
The Buycos opposed the Republic's motion to dismiss contending that res judicata was not applicable to the
present case and that appellee Samuel A. Buyco has already reacquired his Filipino citizenship.
On May 29, 19[9]6, the trial court denied the Republic's motion to dismiss, opining that, in the case at bar
being a land registration case, the provisions of Act No. 496 prevails (sic) over those of the Rules of Court. The
Rules of Court can only apply by analogy or in a suppletory character, and only when practicable and
convenient. Vis-a-vis Section 1(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, Section 37 of Act No. 496, thus, prevails.
Section 37 of said Act states, to wit:
"If in any case, the court finds that the applicant has no proper title for registration, a decree
shall be entered dismissing the application and such decree may be ordered to be without
prejudice. The applicant may withdraw his application at any time before final decree, upon
terms to be fixed by the court; provided, however, that in a case where there is an adverse
claim, the court shall determine the conflicting interests of the applicant and the adverse
claimant, and after taking evidence shall dismiss the application for the registration or shall
enter a decree awarding the land applied for or any part thereof, to the person entitled
thereto and such degree, when final, shall entitle to the issuance of an original certificate of
title to such person."
Thus, according to the trial court:
"Therefore, as mandated by Sec. 37 of Act No. 496, since the order of dismissal is without
prejudice, it goes without saying that the applicant, notwithstanding of (sic) the dismissal of
his application, can, if he believes his evidence warrants for a tenable subsequent
application for registration, file another application for (sic) because the dismissal of his
previous application was without prejudice. He is not barred by the rule on prior judgment
or res judicata because this rule has been expressly made not applicable in the case at bar by
said Sec. 37 of Act No. 496 when it provides:
"x x x a decree shall be entered dismissing the application and such decree
may be ordered to be without prejudice." x x x
As to the issue of whether applicants, being American citizens, are not qualified to acquire lands in the
country and not entitled to the benefits under Act No. 496, the court ratiocinated that the same was still
premature and untimely and that said issue [s] can only be resolved after trial on the merits.
Trial on the merits ensued.
On April 13, 1998, the Buycos submitted documents to establish jurisdictional requirements x x x[.]
xxxx
[Testimonial evidence were adduced through the presentation of Samuel Buyco, Alfonso Firmalo, Silverio
Mercolesio, Manuel Firmalo, Eulalia Fabregas, Buenafe Fetalvero, Jimmy Feltalco, Nilda San Gabriel, Romulae
Gadaoni, and Bienvenida Ferrancullo, as witnesses.]
On August 15, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment granting the application for registration of title by the
Buycos. The decretal portion of aforesaid Decision states:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court hereby orders the registration of title to the parcel
of land denominated as Lot No. 1, Psu-127238 and its technical descriptions together with
all the improvements thereon in the name of Samuel H. Buyco.
"Upon the decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree and certificate of title be
issued accordingly.
"SO ORDERED."
On September 4, 2000, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a notice of appeal.
On July 9, 2010, [the CA], in aid of resolving the present case, required the parties within fifteen (15) days
from notice to inform it as to whether any supervening event or change of circumstances which would
materially and substantially affect the result thereof, has already overtaken the present action.
 Both parties submitted their compliance but failed to spell out any supervening event that would warrant the
dismissal of this case.
Hence, [the CA] deemed this case submitted for resolution.[7]
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision dated January 26, 2011, granted the appeal holding that res judicata finds application
to land registration cases and that all its elements are present in this case.[8] Also, the case in G.R. No. 91189, concerning the
petitioners' first application for land registration, had been decided with finality. Based on the doctrine of finality of judgment,
the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest.[9]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision rendered by the trial court on August 15, 2000 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution[11] dated June 30, 2011.
Hence, the instant Petition. The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment[12] dated
January 30, 2012. The petitioners filed a Reply[13]dated August 30, 2013.
The Issues
The Petition raises the following issues:
1. whether the CA erred in not applying Henson v. Director of Lands[14] and its companion cases which held that the
dismissal of an application for registration of land cannot be considered prejudicial to its subsequent refiling unless
there is an explicit adjudication that the land sought to be registered belongs to the Government.

2. whether the CA violated the petitioners' right to due process when it arbitrarily and capriciously refused to recognize
the fact that, in the intervening period between the first and second applications for registration, the petitioners have
removed or cured the obstacles to registration mentioned in G.R. No. 91189.[15]
The Court's Ruling
Ultimately, the petitioners implore the Court to grant their second application to bring the Subject Land within the operation
of the Torrens system under Act No. 496, despite the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1529,[16] because they "have
removed or cured the obstacles to registration mentioned in G.R. No. 91189."
One of the obstacles to their first registration application to bring within the operation of the Land Registration Act[17] the
Subject Land as found by the Court in The Director of Lands v. Buyco[18] (G.R. No. 91189) was the absence of evidence to prove
that the Subject Land is alienable and disposable, to wit:
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove that the property subject of the
application is an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain. On the contrary, based on their
own evidence, the entire property which is alleged to have originally belonged to Charles Hankins was
pasture land. According to witness Jacinta Gomez Gabay, this land has been pasture land, utilized for grazing
purposes, since the time it was "owned" by the spouses Charles Hankins and Laura Crescini up to the present
time (i.e., up to the date she testified). In Director of Lands vs. Rivas,[19] this Court ruled:
"Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10
distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable)."
The instant application was filed, heard and decided under the regime of the 1973 Constitution.[20]
Since the petitioners' second registration application would rise or fall depending on whether they had adduced sufficient
competent evidence to overcome the alienable and disposable classification obstacle, the Court will now scrutinize the proofs
that they offered to show that the Subject Land is alienable and disposable. These are:
1. Exhibit "DD" purports to be a blue print copy of the Sketch Plan of Lot 3675, Cad. 341-D as prepared for the Heirs of Lilia
Hankins situated in the barrios of Canduyong, Anajao and Tubigon, Odiongan, Tablas, Romblon containing an area of
3,194,788 square meters with technical description and a Certification, which is sub-marked as Exhibit "DD-1" that states:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that this is a true and correct sketch plan of Lot 3675, Cad. 341-D, ODIONGAN CADASTRE, as
traced from the Cadastral Map and checked against the technical description on file in this Office.
This is to certify further that Lot 3675 is within the alienable and disposable zone, Project No. 7, L.C. Map 660.
 Issued this 18th day of August, 1976, at Odiongan, Romblon, Philippines.
For the District Land Officer:
(Sgd.)

BRUNO P. NOCHE
Land Investigator
[Officer-in-Charge][21]

Bruno Noche was not presented but Exhibit "DD" was testified upon by petitioner Samuel Buyco.[22]
2. Exhibit "OO" which is the one-page report of Romulae Gadaoni (Gadaoni), who was Land Management Officer III, of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) stationed at Odiongan, Romblon, and the Land Investigator who conducted an ocular inspection of the property of the
petitioners in 1976 and July 3, 1998,[23] states:
In compliance with your Subpoena Duces Tecum Adtestificandum (sic) dated 15 July 1998, the undersigned
has the honor to submit report.
1. The land is covered by survey plan PSU-127238 and correspondingly assigned as Lot 3675, CAD 341-D,
Odiongan Cadastre with a total area of 319.4788;

2. The area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under Project No. 7, LC Map 660
and released and certified as such on 21 May 1927;

3. Upon inspection on 3 July 1998 with Mr. Buyco, I found out that the bigger portion of the land is
utilized as a ranch by the Tan Brothers. The land is level and rolling and enclosed with fence;

4. There are lots of improvements (Please see attached Xerox Copy made an integral part of this
investigation report);

5. That there are agencies/entities which have shown interest in acquiring the land, namely Romblon
State College, Odiongan, Romblon, the Municipal Government of Odiongan, and etc.;

6. That there are around three hundred fifty (350) cows roaming the area.
August 14, 1998, Odiongan, Romblon.
Submitted by,
(Sgd.)
ROMULAE S. GADAONI
Land Management Officer III[24]
3. The testimony of Gadaoni on August 19, 1998. He testified, among others, that:
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. CASANOVA:
xxxx
Q - Mr. Witness, what did you find in this ocular inspection, what was used in the identification of the land?

The land was covered by a survey plan PSU-127238, and correspondingly assigned as Lot No. 3675 with a
total area of 319.4788 hectares. The land was developed to cattle grazing and it is hilly and rolling but
A -
enclosed with barbwire fence, and within the land I can see about 350 cows and some improvements also
like buildings.

Mr. Witness, you said that the land is partly level and partly rolling did you ascertain whether or not
Q -
the land is under alienable and disposable area?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - Now, Mr. Witness, have you prepared and rendered a written report?

A - I have sir.

May I request that this report of the witness dated August 14, 1998 be marked as Exhibit "OO".

xxxx

ATTY. CASANOVA: May I request that the attached list of assets, facilities and improvements introduced by the
applicants on the land be marked as Exhibit "PP".

xxxx

CROSS EXAMINATION BY FISCAL FRADEJAS:

xxxx

Q - Now, I believed you are aware of the previous application for title over the same parcel of land?

A - Yes, sir.

Q - Was/there an ocular inspection conducted in that previous application?

A - Yes, I conducted an ocular inspection.

Q - And x x x what improvements were found on this property?

A - I also found cows, there is a ranch and there are some coconuts.

Q - In other words, there are improvements found on the property?

 A - Yes, sir.

Q - And was that parcel also fenced at that time?

A - It was fenced x x x.

xxxx

Can you tell this Court, how did you come to know that the land falls within the alienable and disposable
Q -
zone?

A - We have a record in the office and they can easily be determined by placing the LC Map and other maps.

Q - Is there any law on that matter placing that parcel of land within the alienable and disposable zone?

Because you know in a certain map there is a cadastral map, the alienable and disposable land is indicated
A -
and the forest land is also indicated.

Q - And the map covers the whole of Island of Tablas?

A - We have a cadastral map of Odiongan, and every municipality.

And after verifying the map of Odiongan, you came to know that the land subject matter of the application
Q -
falls within the alienable and disposable zone?

A - Yes, sir.[25]

The foregoing proofs, however, fall short of the evidentiary requirements to sufficiently establish that the Subject Land is
within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In the recent case of In Re: Application for Land Registration Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of the Philippines[26] (Dumo), the
Court reiterated the requirement it set in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.[27] that there are TWO
documents that must be presented to prove that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable and
disposable: (1) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records, and (2) a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.[28]
Dumo also stated that: "a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the
property sought to be registered because the onlyway to prove the classification of the land is through the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the President himself."[29] This is consistent with Republic of the Philippines v.
Nicolas,[30] which cited Republic of the Philippines v. Lualhati,[31] wherein the Court rejected the attempt of the applicant to
prove the alienable and disposable character of the subject land through PENRO or CENRO certifications.[32]
Given that the proofs which the petitioners presented in this case to prove the alienable and disposable character of the
Subject Land proceed mainly from a Certification dated August 14, 1998 issued by the CENRO of Odiongan, Romblon, which is
insufficient, their second attempt to register the Subject Land under the Torrens system must suffer the same fate as their
first.
The Petition, being unmeritorious based on the resolution of the second issue, the Court deems that a resolution of the first
issue is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 26, 2011 and Resolution dated June 30, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68708 are AFFIRMED in reversing and setting aside the Decision dated August 15, 2000 of
the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82 in LRC Case No. OD-06. The Application for Registration of the
petitioners in LRC Case No. OD-06 is dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe (Acting Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo,[*] and J. Reyes, Jr.,[**] JJ., concur.

[*]
Designated additional Member per Raffle dated August 20, 2018.
[**]
Designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-39, excluding Annexes.
[2] Id. at 40-69. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam (now a Member of this

Court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison concurring.

[3] Eleventh Division.

[4] Rollo, pp. 127-154. Penned by Executive Judge Francisco F. Fanlo, Jr.
[5] Sometimes referred to as Anahao in some parts of the records.
[6] Rollo, pp. 70-71.

[7] CA Decision dated January 26, 2011, rollo, pp. 41 -60.

[8] See id. at 63-67.
[9] Id. at 67-68.
[10] Id. at 68.
[11] Id. at 70-71.
[12] Id. at 331-351.
[13] Id. at 364-376.
[14] 37 Phil. 912 (1918).

[15] Rollo, p. 11.

[16] PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE, issued on June 11, 1978; see Narciso Peña, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

(1980 Rev. Ed.), p. 26.

[17] Act No. 496, approved on November 6, 1902 and effective on February 1, 1903 (January 1, 1903, according to Sotto v.

Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 [1922]); Peña, id. at 25.

[18] 290 Phil. 504 (1992).
[19] 225 Phil. 288, 294 (1986).
[20] The Director of Lands v. Buyco, supra note 18 at 521.
[21] Exh. "DD-1," Exhibits for the Applicants.
[22] See CA Decision dated January 26, 2011, rollo, p. 50.
[23] Id. at 57.
[24] Exh. "OO," Exhibits for the Applicants.
[25] TSN, August 18, 1998, pp. 34-40.
[26] G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018.
[27] 578 Phil. 441 (2008).
[28]
In Re: Application for Land Registration Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 26, at 15-16. In the
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Caguioa, he called attention to the issuance of DENR Administrative Order No.
2012-09, which delegated unto CENRO, PENRO and the National Capital Region Regional Executive Director not only the
authority to issue certifications on land classification status, but also certified true copies of approved land classification maps
with respect to lands falling within their respective jurisdictions. (J. Caguioa, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, In Re:
Application for Land Registration Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018, pp. 1-2.)
[29] Id. at 16.
[30] G.R. No. 181435, October 2, 2017, pp. 11-12.
[31] 757 Phil. 119, 132(2015).
[32] In Re: Application for Land Registration Suprema T. Dumo v. Republic of the Philippines, supra note 26, at 17.

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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017 ]
THE HEIRS OF PETER DONTON, THROUGH THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE, FELIPE G. CAPULONG, PETITIONERS, VS. DUANE
STIER AND EMILY MAGGAY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 13, 2014 and the Resolution[3] dated January
21, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated December 14,
2009 and the Order[5] dated May 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC) dismissing the complaint
for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages originally filed by now-deceased[6] Peter Donton (Donton),
the predecessor of herein petitioners Heirs of Peter Donton (petitioners), for insufficiency of evidence.

The Facts

The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land with improvements located at No. 33, Don Jose Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City, consisting of 553.60 square meters,[7]more or less (subject property). It was previously covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-137480[8] of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City under the name of Donton until
its registration in the names of respondents Duane Stier (Stier) and Emily Maggay (Maggay; collectively, respondents) under
TCT No. N-225996.[9]

Sometime in June 2001, while Donton was in the United States, he discovered that herein respondents took possession and
control of the subject property, as well as the management of his business operating thereat.[10] Donton's lawyers in the
Philippines made demands upon respondents to vacate the subject property and to cease and desist from operating his
business, but to no avail.[11] Thus, Donton was forced to return to the Philippines, where he learned that respondents, through
alleged fraudulent means, were able to transfer the ownership of the subject property in their names.[12] Accordingly, his title,
TCT No. N-137480, had been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. N-225996, had been issued in respondents' names.
Hence, he filed the instant complaint[13] for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages against
respondents and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that the signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale[14] dated July
16, 2001, by virtue of which he purportedly sold the subject property to respondents, was a forgery.[15]He denied signing or
executing the document in favor of respondents, especially considering that on the date of its purported execution, i.e., July
16, 2001, he was allegedly still in the United States, having departed from the Philippines on June 27, 2001 and returned only
on August 30, 2001.[16] He averred that respondents conspired with the employees of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to
defraud him, and that Stier is an American citizen and a non-resident alien who is, therefore, not allowed by law to own any
real property in the Philippines.[17] Accordingly, he prayed that TCT No. N-225996 in respondents' names be annulled and
cancelled; that a new title be issued in his name as the rightful owner of the subject property; and that respondents be
ordered to pay him P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P200,000.00 as exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.[18]

In their Answer with Counterclaim,[19] respondents claimed that the subject property had been lawfully transferred to them,
asserting that on September 11, 1995, Donton executed an Occupancy Agreement[20] whereby he acknowledged that Stier
had been residing thereat since January 5, 1995; that Stier had extended a loan to him in the amount of P3,000,000.00 on July
5, 1997, secured by a mortgage over the subject property and its improvements; and that until full payment thereof, Donton
allowed Stier to occupy the same. Respondents likewise claimed that Donton executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
dated September 11, 1995 in favor of Stier, giving him full authority to sell, mortgage, or lease the subject
property.[21] Unfortunately, Donton failed to pay his obligation to Stier; thus, they initially executed a "unilateral contract of
sale"[22] dated June 25, 2001 over the subject property. Eventually, however, they executed the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
July 16, 2001. As such, respondents argued that Donton cannot feign ignorance of the sale of the subject property to them. By
way of counterclaim, respondents prayed for the awards of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, exemplary
damages in the amount of P200,000.00, and P400,000.00 as attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.[23]

During trial, Donton presented the findings of Rosario C. Perez (Perez), Document Examiner II of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, who, after comparing the alleged signature of Donton on the Deed of Absolute Sale
to his standard ones,[24] found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure, and other
individual handwriting characteristics" between them, and concluded that they were not written by one and the same
person.[25] Perez herself testified on the results of her examination.

In an Order[26] dated February 9, 2004, the RTC allowed the substitution of petitioners as plaintiffs after Donton passed away
on November 22, 2003.

On the other hand, respondents waived[27] their right to present their evidence.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[28] dated December 14, 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence,[29] finding that the Deed of Absolute Sale, being a public and notarial document, enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and thus cannot be simply defeated by Danton's bare allegation of forgery of his signature thereon.[30]

Likewise, the RTC refused to give probative weight to the expert testimony offered by Perez after the latter admitted that she
conducted the examination of the sample signatures not by virtue of a court order, but at the instance of Donton and the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG).[31] She also admitted that she did not know the source of the documents
procured by the CIDG that she used in her examination. On this score, the RTC held that the forensic examination and
testimony of Perez were self-serving,[32] further explaining that it was not bound to accept the findings of a handwriting
expert.[33] Therefore, the same cannot be used to invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale and the title issued to respondents.

Petitioners moved[34] to set aside the RTC Decision, which the RTC treated as a motion for reconsideration and which it
subsequently denied in an Order[35] dated May 4, 2011. In denying petitioners' motion, the RTC reiterated the disquisitions in
its Decision and added that petitioners failed to prove that Stier is an American citizen.[36] It explained that the only evidence
that petitioners presented was a Certification[37] from the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) certifying that one Duane Otto Stier, an
American citizen, visited the Philippines on September 2, 2001 and left on October 6, 2001. As such, the RTC reasoned that the
same was not sufficient to prove Stier's citizenship; at most, it merely proved the alleged travel of the latter.[38] Similarly,
petitioners failed to show that Stier is married, as alleged in the complaint. With respect to petitioners' contention that
Maggay had no capacity to acquire real property, the RTC found the same to be bereft of probative value, being merely an
opinion.[39] Finally, the allegation that Donton was in the United States from June 27, 2001 until August 30, 2001, and
therefore not in the Philippines on July 16, 2001 at the time of the execution of the sale lost its credibility in the face of his
admission that he was in the Philippines in the last week of July 2001.[40]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed[41] to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[42] dated June 13, 2014, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the assailed RTC Decision and Order, finding that
petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.[43] It held
that the aforesaid document was notarized and therefore enjoys the presumption of validity, which can only be overturned by
clear and convincing evidence.[44] Further, upon examination of Donton's passport stamps, which petitioners offered in
evidence to prove that Donton could not have signed the Deed of Absolute Sale on July 16, 2001, the CA held that although he
departed from the Philippines on June 27, 2001, there was no entry stamp of his admittance to the United States sometime
between said date and August 30, 2001, the date of his return to the Philippines.[45]

As regards the findings and testimony of Perez, the CA held that "[n]otwithstanding Perez's expert testimony that the
questioned signature and the standard signatures [of Donton] were not signed by the same person,"[46] the RTC was correct in
declaring her testimony as self-serving. It considered that Perez did not know the source of the documents, and that it was the
CIDG that provided her with Donton's standard signatures. She admitted that she had no actual knowledge of whether the
documents given to her for examination came from Donton, and that she merely proceeded to examine them without
verifying the source.[47] Thus, the source of the documents being unverified, it cannot be concluded that the signatures
thereon are the genuine signatures of Donton.

Finally, the CA sustained the RTC in ruling that petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that Stier is an American
citizen and married, and that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property. On this score, the CA quoted with approval
the RTC's findings that the BOI-issued Certification procured and presented in evidence by petitioners was insufficient to
prove Stier's alleged American citizenship, and that there was dearth of evidence to further prove their allegation that he is
married, or that Maggay had no capacity to purchase real property.[48]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[49] was denied in a Resolution[50] dated January 21, 2015; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's consideration is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners failed to discharge the burden
of proof required to be entitled to the reliefs prayed for in this case, namely, the annulment of title and reconveyance of
property with damages.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court deems it necessary to underscore that a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done acting on a
petition for review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law.[51] Thus, in petitions
for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record and when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[52] Finding a
confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence
presented and draw conclusions therefrom.[53]

In civil cases, basic is the rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." It
is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth, or evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.[54]

The main thrust of petitioners' contention in this case is that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery.
They maintain that it was not possible for him to have signed the said document considering that he was not in the Philippines
on July 16, 2001, the date of execution and notarization thereof, he being in the United States at the time. To bolster this
argument, they offered in evidence, among others, the immigration stamps on Donton's passport,[55] showing that the latter
departed from the Philippines on June 20, 2001 and returned on August 30, 2001.

However, as the courts a quo have aptly opined, the foregoing immigration stamps are insufficient to prove that Donton was
physically absent from the country to have been able to appear before the notary public on July 16, 2001, the date of the
acknowledgment of the Deed of Absolute Sale. It is well to point out, as the RTC did, that petitioners failed to prove Donton's
arrival or entry in the United States, where he alleged to have gone, and his departure therefrom to return to the Philippines
on August 30, 2001. Without evidence of such admittance to and departure from the United States between June 27, 2001
and August 30, 2001, the Court cannot discount the possibility that Donton may have returned to the Philippines anytime
between those dates to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale. This is especially so in light of his own admission in the complaint
that he returned to the Philippines "sometime in the last week of July 2001"[56] allegedly to ascertain the truth and veracity of
the information he received that the subject property had been transferred to respondents. These inconsistencies heavily
militate against him, effectively tainting his credibility as a witness and rendering doubtful the veracity of his testimony.

Furthermore, forgery, as a rule, cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery - in this case, petitioners. The fact of forgery can only be established by a
comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged.[57] Pertinently, Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato,[58] the Court explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of
handwritings in this wise:

x x x [T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm,
pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the
questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The
result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific
instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
 position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities,
between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.[59]

To prove forgery, petitioners offered in evidence the findings and testimony given by expert witness Perez, who declared that
she found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke structure and other individual handwriting
characteristics" between the signature that appears on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the standard signatures of Donton,
thereby concluding that they were not written by one and the same person.[60] On cross-examination, however, Perez
admitted that she had no actual knowledge of the source of the specimen signatures given to her for examination, as it was
the CIDG personnel who provided her with the same.[61] Thus, as the CA correctly observed, Perez's findings deserve little or
no probative weight at all, considering that the signatures which she used for comparison came from an unverified source.
Perforce, petitioners are left with no conclusive evidence to prove their allegation that Donton's signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale was forged.

It bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when
the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.[62]

In fine, the Court, therefore, upholds the findings of the courts a quo in this respect.

Be that as it may, the Court, however, differs from the findings of the courts a quo with respect to Stier's citizenship. More
than the Certification[63] issued by the BOI, which clearly states that Stier is an American citizen, the records contain other
documents validating the information. For instance, in paragraph 1[64] of respondents' Answer with
Counterclaim,[65] they admitted paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the Complaint insofar as their personal circumstances are concerned,
and paragraph 2 of the Complaint states:

"2. Defendant DUANE STIER is of legal age, married, an American citizen, a non-resident alien with postal
address at Blk. 5, Lot 27, A, B, Phase 1, St. Michael Home Subd., Binangonan, Rizal; x x x"[66] (Emphases
supplied)

Similarly, one of the attachments to the Manifestation[67] filed by respondents before the RTC is an Affidavit[68] executed by
Stier himself, stating:

"I, DUANE STIER, of legal age, married, American citizen x x x"[69] (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing statements made by Stier are admissions against interest and are therefore binding upon him. An admission
against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute since no man would declare
anything against himself unless such declaration is true. Thus, an admission against interest binds the person who makes the
same, and absent any showing that this was made through palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset
it,[70] especially so in this case where respondents failed to present even one piece of evidence in their defense.[71]

Hence, the courts a quo erred in ruling that Stier's American citizenship was not established in this case, effectively rendering
the sale of the subject property as to him void ab initio, in light of the clear proscription under Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution against foreigners acquiring real property in the Philippines, to wit:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities
qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain as well as private lands.[72]

In light of the foregoing, even if petitioners failed to prove that Donton's signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery,
the sale of the subject property to Stier is in violation of the Constitution; hence, null and void ab initio. A contract that
violates the Constitution and the law is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect
at all.[73] Furthermore, Stier is barred from recovering any amount that he paid for the subject property, the action being
proscribed by the Constitution.[74]

Nevertheless, considering that petitioners failed to prove their allegation that Maggay, the other vendee, had no capacity to
purchase the subject property, the sale to her remains valid but only up to the extent of her undivided one-half share
therein.[75] Meanwhile, the other undivided one-half share, which pertained to Stier, shall revert to Donton, the original owner,
for being the subject of a transaction void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale, together with TCT No. N-225996
issued in respondents' favor, must be annulled only insofar as Stier is concerned, without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any subsequent purchasers for value of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 21, 2015
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97138, which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint filed by petitioners on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered: (1) annulling the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 2001 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; (2) annulling Transfer Certificate of Title
No. N-225996 insofar as respondent Duane Stier is concerned; and (3) directing the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City to issue a
new title in the name of Peter Donton and Emily Maggay, all without prejudice to the rights of any subsequent purchasers for
value of the subject property.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio,* Acting C. J., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Caguioa, J., on leave.

*
Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 2469 dated August 22, 2017.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 57-65.

[2]
Id. at 82-92. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Associate
Justice Manuel M. Barrios concurring.

[3]
Id. at 93-94.

[4]
Records, Vol. II, pp. 418-424. Penned by Judge Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.

[5]
Id. at 455-457.

[6] See Certificate of Death; records, Vol. I, p. 263, including dorsal portion thereof.

[7]
Id. at 12.

[8]
Id. at 10.

[9]
Id. at 11.
[10]
Records, Vol. II, p. 418.

[11]
Id.

[12]
Id. at 418-419.

[13] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

[14] Id. at 194-195.

[15]
Id. at 3.

[16]
See Copy of Donton 's passport with immigration stamps; id. at 196-197.

[17]
Id. at 3-4.

[18]
Id. at 5-6.

[19]
Id. at 35-40.

[20]
Id. at 41.

[21]
Id. at 37.

[22] Id. at 42.

[23]
Id. at 39.

[24] See Sample Signature of Donton; id. at 215.

[25]
See Questioned Document Report No. 153-02; id. at 203-204.

[26]
Id. at 273.

[27]
Records, Vol. II, p. 416.

[28]
Id. at 418-424.

[29]
Id. at 424.

[30] Id. at 421.

[31]
Id. at 422.

[32]
Id.

[33]
Id. at 424.

[34]
Id. at 431-435.

[35]
Id. at 455-457.
[36]
Id. at 456

[37]
Records, Vol. I, p. 202.

[38]
Records, Vol. II, p. 456.

[39] Id.

[40] Id.

[41]
Id. at 458.

[42]
Rollo, pp. 82-92.

[43]
See id. at 90.

[44]
Id. at 91.

[45]
Id. at 88.

[46]
Id. at 89.

[47]
Id. at 90.

[48] Id. at 90-91.

[49]
See Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 2014; CA rollo, pp. 146-155.

[50] Rollo, pp. 93-94.

[51]
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Vestruz, 754 Phil. 307, 317 (2015), citing Jao v. BCC Products Sales, Inc., 686 Phil. 36, 41
(2012).

[52]
New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 499 Phil. 207, 213 (2005), citing The Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. CA, 472 Phil. 11, 22-23 (2004).

[53]
Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Vestruz, supra note 51, at 317-318.

[54]
Spouses Ramos v. Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust Company, 705 Phil. 221, 232 (2013).

[55] Records, Vol. I, p. 197.

[56]
Id. at 2, paragraph 6.

[57]
Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 855-856 (2015).

[58]
Supra note 57.

[59]
Id. at 856, citing Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, 432 Phil. 895, 908-909
(2002).
[60]
See Questioned Document Report No. 153-02; records, Vol. I, pp. 203-204.

[61]
TSN, March 26, 2003, pp. 23-24.

[62]
Supra note 57, at 856-857.

[63] Records, Vol. I, p. 202.

[64] Id. at 35.

[65]
Id. at 35 40.

[66]
Id. at 2.

[67]
Id. at 223-226.

[68]
Id. at 242 244.

[69]
Id. at 242.

[70]
Stanley Fine Furniture v. Galiano, 748 Phil. 624, 631-632 (2014).

[71]
See Order dated February 5, 2009; records, Vol. II, p. 416.

[72]
Frenzel v. Catito, 453 Phil. 885,904 (2003), citing Po v. CA, 239 SCRA 341, 346 (1994).

[73]
See Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil. 461, 492-493 (1947); Rellosa v. Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 835 (1953); Caoile v.
Peng, 93 Phil. 861 (1953); Po v. CA, supra note 72; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 366 Phil. 863, 869
(1999).

[74] See Fullido v. Grilli, 785 SCRA 278, 301; Frenzel v. Catito, supra note 72 at 908.

[75]
See Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. v. Melecio-Yap, 740 Phil. 35, 51 (2014).

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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209518, June 19, 2017 ]
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, PETITIONER, V. ANA KARI CARMENCITA NUSTAD, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY.
MARGUERITE THERESE L. LUCILA, RESPONDENT.
 DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Petitioner Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante seeks to set aside and reverse the: (1) Decision[1] dated February 27, 2013, which
dismissed petitioner's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65; and (2) Resolution[2] dated October 2, 2013, which denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811.

The Facts
On June 2, 2011, Respondent Ana Kari Carmencita Nustad (Nustad), as represented by Atty. Marguerite Therese Lucila (Atty.
Lucila), filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City (RTC) and prayed that Ma. Hazelina A.
Tujan-Militante (Tujan-Militante) be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena City the owner's duplicate copy
of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159, which were all issued in Nustad's name.
She averred that Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.
In its Order dated July 26, 2011, the RTC set the petition for a hearing[4].
Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and Annul Proceedings[5] dated September 2,
2011. She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she was not able to receive summons.
Moreover, she argued that the Order appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty that she is in
possession of the subject titles.
The Ruling of the RTC
[6]
In an Order dated November 23, 2011, the RTC denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the
case. Further the RTC stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of the case when it ordered Tujan-Militante to surrender
TCT Nos. T-435798, T-436799, T-387158 and T-387159 because it merely set the petition for a hearing.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration[7] and alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by Nustad in favor of
Atty. Lucila is void and non-existent. Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a Norwegian, who is not
allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from the dismissal of the case, petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Land Registration Authority be impleaded. Moreover, Tujan-Militante prayed for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In an Order[8] dated February 27, 2012, the court a quo denied Tujan-Militante's Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Tujan-Militante filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
[9]
In a Decision dated February 27, 2013, the CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of Tujan-Militante, but
nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by Tujan-Militante's filing of her Motion for Reconsideration. Such Motion sought
for affirmative reliefs, which is considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution[10] dated October 2, 2013.
Hence, this appeal.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons. However, it is equally significant
that even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the
latter voluntarily appears before it.[11] Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds of relief aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.[12]
In this case, while Tujan-Militante's motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the court a quo on the ground of improper
service of summons, the subsequent filing of a Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount to
voluntary appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is inconsistent with the position
that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates
submission to the [court]'s jurisdiction.[13]
As to the claim of Tujan-Militante that the requirements laid down in Sec. 24, Rule 132[14] of the Rules of Court apply with
respect to the power of attorney notarized abroad, he cited the ruling in Lopez v. Court of Appeals.[15] In said case, this Court
held that the power of attorney must comply with the requirements set forth under Sec. 25 (now Sec. 24), Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court in order to be considered as valid.
Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that:
Section 24. Proof of official record.- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 19 of Rule 132 states that:
Section 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (emphasis supplied)
In the Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro[16], this Court clarified that the ruling in the Lopez case is inapplicable because the
Rules of Evidence which were then effective were the old Rules, prior to their amendment in 1989. When the Rules of
Evidence were amended in 1989, the introductory phrase "An official record or an entry therein" was substituted by the
phrase "The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19"[17], as found in the present Rules. Also,
Section 25 of the former Rules became Section 24 of the present Rules.
On this note, the case of Heirs of Spouses Arcilla explained further:
It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under Section
24 refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19 (a), to wit: written official acts or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial
documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not
have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.[18] (emphasis supplied)
As the Rules explicitly provide that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service refers only to written official
acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country, as found in Section 19(a), Rule 132, such enumeration does not include documents acknowledged
before a notary public abroad.
With all these, We rule on the validity of the subject notarial document. What is important is that [Nustad] certified before a
commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer an oath that she is authorizing Atty. Lucila to institute the petition
before the court a quo on her behalf.[19]
A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be evidence that
is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant; otherwise, the document should be upheld.[20]
Lastly, Tujan-Militante's contention that the TCTs under the name of Nustad are invalid because of her citizenship constitutes
a collateral attack on the titles. The CA correctly ruled that the issue as to whether an alien is or is not qualified to acquire the
lands covered by the subject titles can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.[21]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February 27, 2013 and Resolution dated October 2,
2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124811 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
 August 3, 2017
NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on June 19, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on August 3, 2017 at 10:45 a.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Division Clerk of Court

[1]
Rollo, pp. 43-49.
[2]
Id. at 47-48.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid and concurred in by Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Edwin
D. Sorongon.
[4] Rollo, pp. 50-51.
[5] Id. at 52-60.
[6] Promulgated by Judge Bienvenido A. Mapaye.

[7] Id. at 63-77.

[8] Id. at 112-114.
[9] Supra note 1.
[10] Rollo, pp. 41-42.

[11] Wong v. Factor-Koyama, G.R. No. 183802, September 17, 2009.

[12] Nation Petroleum Gas, Inc. v. Rizal Commercial Banking Corp., G.R No. 183370, August 17, 2015.
[13] Reicon Realty Corp. v. Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204796, February 4, 2015.
[14] Section 24. Proof of official records. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when

admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made
by the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office.
[15]
G.R. No. L-77008, December 29, 1987, 156 SCRA 838.
[16] G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, Ibid.
[19] Heirs of Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008.
[20] Abalos v. Heirs of Torio, G.R. No. 175444, December 14, 2011.
[21] Director of Lands v. Gan Tan, G.R. No. L-2664, May 30, 1951.
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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 237714, November 12, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SCIENCE PARK OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, MR. RICHARD ALBERT I. OSMOND, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated October 12, 2017 and the
Resolution[3] dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 108099, which affirmed the
Decision[4] dated August 10, 2016 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malvar-Balete, Batangas (MCTC)
in LandRegistration Case (LRC) No. N-129, granting respondent Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.'s (SPPI) application for
original registration in accordance with Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529,[5] otherwise known as the
"Property Registration Decree."

The Facts

On November 20, 2014, SPPI filed with the MCTC an Application[6] for original registration of a 7,691-square meter (sq. m.)
parcel of land denominated as Lot 5809, Psc-47, Malvar Cadastre, located in Barangay Luta Norte, Malvar, Batangas
(subject land).[7] SPPI claimed that: (a) the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945;[8] (c) the subject land is not mortgaged or
encumbered, nor claimed or possessed by any person other than itself;[9] and (d) it bought the land from Cenen D. Torizo
(Cenen) as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[10] dated October 17, 2013.

To prove its claim that the subject land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, SPPI presented
a certification[11] dated February 26, 2016 issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) –
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Batangas City (CENRO) stating that the land is within the alienable
and disposable zone under Project No. 39, Land Classification (LC) Map No. 3601, based on DENR Administrative Order No.
97-37 (DAO 97-37) issued by then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos on December 22, 1997,[12] as well as certified
photocopies[13] of LC Map No. 3601 and DAO 97-37.[14]

On the other hand, to support its claim of possession in the concept of owner prior to June 12, 1945, it presented
documentary and testimonial evidence that: (a) the subject land was previously owned by Gervacio Lat (Gervacio),[15] who
held a 1955 tax declaration in his name;[16] (b) Gervacio was assisted by his tenant in cultivating the land and harvesting the
crops thereon;[17] (c) Gervacio was succeeded by his daughter, Ambrocia Lat, who sold the subject land to Spouses Raymundo
Linatoc and Maria Reyes (Sps. Linatoc) through a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan ng Lupa" dated April 25, 1968;[18] (d) after
Sps. Linatoc's demise, their heirs executed an "Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver and Renunciation of Rights" on
June 4, 1995, waiving their rights, interests, and participation in the subject land in favor of Ernesto Linatoc
(Ernesto);[19] (e) Ernesto subsequently sold the same land to Cenen on March 13, 2012 by virtue of a "Kasulatan ng Ganap na
Bilihan;"[20] and (f) the subject land is now owned by SPPI which purchased the same from Cenen.[21]

The MCTC Decision

In a Decision[22] dated August 10, 2016, the MCTC granted SPPI's application for original registration, holding that it was able
to establish that: (a) it has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land in
the concept of owner even prior to June 12, 1945, tacked to the possession of its predecessors-in-interest; and (b) the land is
alienable and disposable per verification by the forester of the DENR CALABARZON Region, CENRO, Batangas City from
the landclassification map issued pursuant to DAO 97-37.[23] While the legal custodian of the DENR's official records, Chief of
the Records Management and Documentation Division, Jane G. Bautista (Ms. Bautista),[24] was not presented to identify the
certified copy of DAO 97-37 presented before the court, the MCTC took judicial notice of the authenticity of DAO 97-37 on the
basis of a stipulation in LRC No. N-127[25] (a land registration case filed by SPPI involving a different parcel of land previously
heard and decided by the same MCTC) between the same handling Government Prosecutor[26] and the same counsel for the
applicant, to dispense with the presentation of Ms. Bautista.[27]

Petitioner the Republic of the Philippines, herein represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner), moved for
reconsideration but was denied in an Order[28] dated October 14, 2016.[29] Hence, it appealed[30] to the CA, arguing that the
MCTC erred in granting SPPI's application for land registration despite the latter's failure to prove that: (a) the
subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since no DENR official had confirmed that
DAO 97-37 was authentic and still in force at the time;[31] and (b) it and its predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
and exclusive possession of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945, since the earliest
possession was shown to have started only in 1955, and it failed to identify its predecessors prior to that time.[32]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[33] dated October 12, 2017, the CA affirmed the MCTC Ruling. It declared that the land is alienable and disposable,
and held that the MCTC properly took judicial notice of DAO 97-37 in view of the acquiescence of the handling Government
Prosecutor after the trial judge announced that the parties in LRC No. N-127 had already stipulated on dispensing with the
presentation of Ms. Bautista, and after satisfying himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was certified.[34] It also ruled
that SPPI adequately proved through testimonial and documentary evidence that it and its predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the subject land in the concept of owner since June 12,
1945.[35]

Petitioner sought reconsideration[36] but was denied in a Resolution[37] dated February 9, 2018; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application
for land registration.

The Court's Ruling

In an application for land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving, by clear, positive, and
convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.[38]

In the instant case, SPPI essentially asked the MCTC for judicial confirmation of its imperfect title pursuant to Section 14 (1) of
PD 1529, which provides:
 Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
(1) notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Under the said provision, the applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish that: (a) the land or property forms
part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain at the time of the filing of the application for registration; (b) it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (c) the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[39]

Verily, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the State owns the land applied for, and proving that
the land has already been classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the filing of the application.[40] To prove the
alienability and disposability of the land sought to be registered, an application for original registration must be accompanied
by two (2) documents, i.e., (1) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the DENR's official records; and (2) a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or
the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR based on the land classification approved by
the DENR Secretary.[41]

In the present case, petitioner maintains that SPPI failed to prove that the subject land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain since DAO 97-37 was never properly identified in court, and the MCTC should not have taken
judicial notice of the record of other cases even when the said other cases have been heard or pending in the same court.[42]

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they
already know them.[43] Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on
request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to
be heard thereon.

"As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been
tried or are actually pending before the same judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception that in the absence of
objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of the
case filed in its archives as read into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated. Thus, for said
exception to apply, the party concerned must be given an opportunity to object before the court could take judicial notice of
any record pertaining to other cases pending before it."[44]

As correctly ruled by the CA, the conditions necessary for the exception to be applicable were established in this case. Notably,
the handling Government Prosecutor (a) did not object to the dispensation of the testimony of the DENR legal custodian of
official records, Ms. Bautista, in view of the similar stipulation between him and the same counsel of SPPI in LRC No. N-127
previously heard and decided by the MCTC,[45] and (b) satisfied himself that the copy of DAO 97-37 presented was duly
certified by Ms. Bautista. Only then was the photocopy of the certified copy duly marked as exhibit.[46]

Moreover, contrary to petitioner's protestation,[47] the land sought to be registered need not have been declared alienable
and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier in order for the applicant for registration to secure the judicial confirmation of its
title. Such contention had already been declared as absurd and unreasonable in Republic v. Naguit.[48]Registration under
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529 is based on possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. "The
applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing
of the application for registration,"[49] which SPPI was able to do.

However, notwithstanding the alienability and disposability of the subject land, the Court finds that SPPI failed to present
convincing evidence that its alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required by law.

For purposes of land registration under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land subject of the
application. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would
actually exercise over his own property.[50] Possession is: (a) open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not
clandestine; (b) continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken, and not intermittent or occasional; (c) exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;
and (d) notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.[51]

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12,
1945 or earlier, SPPI presented, among others, the testimony of Nelia Linatoc-Cabalda (Nelia). Nelia, who was born in 1936,
claimed to have known of Gervacio's ownership and cultivation of the subject land when she was about seven (7) years old, or
around 1943, as she and other children her age would frequent the subject land where they played and gathered
fruits.[52] However, such testimony was insufficient to establish possession in the nature and character required by law that
would give right to ownership. In a number of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that to prove open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation in the concept of owner, the claimant must show the nature[53] and extent of
cultivation[54] on the subject land, or the number of crops planted or the volume of the produce harvested from the crops
supposedly planted thereon;[55] failing in which, the supposed planting and harvesting of crops in the land being claimed only
amounted to mere casual cultivation which is not the nature of possession and occupation required by law. Consequently,
SPPI failed to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of its claimed possession and occupation of the
subject land because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession thereof were not established.

Furthermore, SPPFs evidence were insufficient to prove that its possession and occupation were for the duration required by
law. The earliest tax declaration in Gervacio's name presented by SPPI, i.e., Tax Declaration (TD) No. 6243, dates back to
1955[56] only, short of the requirement that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership should be since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. That TD No. 6243 cancels a prior tax declaration, i.e., TD 1052, would not help SPPI's cause in view of
the absence of any evidence (a) identifying Gervacio or any other prior possessor as the declared owner under TD 1052,
and (b) indicating its effectivity date. Thus, the Court cannot subscribe to the CA's conclusion that it can be "reasonably
assumed that before the issuance of [TD] No. 6243, the subject [land] had already been occupied by [Gervacio] or other prior
claimants."[57] The payment of realty taxes and declaration of the subject land in the name of Gervacio in 1955 gives rise to the
presumption that he claimed ownership and possession thereof only in that year.[58]

In sum, the Court finds that SPPI's unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of possession and occupation do not constitute
the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject land of the nature and duration required
by Section 14 (1) of PD 1529. Accordingly, the CA erred in affirming the MCTC's grant of SPPI's application for
original registration of its imperfect title over the subject land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. A new judgment is hereby entered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated
October 12, 2017 and the Resolution dated February 9, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 108099, and
accordingly, DENYING respondent Science Park of the Philippines, Inc.'s (SPPI) application for original registration of the
subject land.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,* JJ., concur.

*
Designated Additional Member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 15-32.

[2]
Id. at 38-51. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Ramon
Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of the Court), concurring.

[3]
Id. at 53-54.

[4]
Id. at 56-64. Penned by Presiding Judge Charito M. Macalintal-Sawali.

[5]
Entitled "AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(June 11, 1978).

[6] In Re: Application for Original Registration of Title dated November 18, 2014. Rollo, pp. 69-75.

[7]
Id. at 76.

[8]
See id. at 70.

[9]
See id. at 70-71.

[10]
Id. at 80-84.

[11]
Not attached to the rollo.

[12]
See rollo, pp. 41-43.

[13]
See id.

[14]
See id. at 60.

[15]
See id. at 40 and 58.

[16]
See id. at 43 and 60.

[17]
See id. at 40 and 58.

[18]
See id. at 40-41 and 58.

[19]
See id. at 41 and 58-59.

[20]
See id. at 41 and 59.
[21]
See id.

[22]
Id. at 56-64.

[23]
See id. at 62-63.

[24] See id. at 45 and 60.

[25] See id. at 48.

[26]
See id. at 199-200.

[27]
See id. at 49.

[28]
Not attached to the rollo.

[29]
See rollo, p. 44.

[30]
See Brief for the Oppositor-Appellant dated May 2, 2017; id. at 90-99.

[31]
See id. at 94.

[32]
See id. at 97.

[33] Id. at 38-51.

[34]
See id. at 48-50.

[35] See id. at 50-51.

[36]
See Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated October 12, 2017) dated November 29, 2017; id. at 65-68.

[37]
Id. at 53-54.

[38]
See Dumo v. Republic, G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018.

[39]
See Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 219070, June 21, 2017, 828 SCRA 77, 88; and Republic v. Estate of Santos, 802 Phil. 800,
811-812 (2016);

[40]
See Dumo v. Republic, supra note 38; citing Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 605 Phil. 244, 269 (2009).

[41]
See Dumo v. Republic, id.; citing Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441, 452-453 (2008).

[42]
See rollo, p. 23.

[43] See Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 195876, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 1, 50.

[44]
See id. at 52; underscoring supplied.

[45]
See rollo, pp. 49-50.
[46]
See id.

[47]
See id. at 27.

[48]
489 Phil. 405, 413-414 (2005). In the said case, the Court held:

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section
14 (1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase "under a bona fide
claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation
renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it
effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated[,] considering that before June 12, 1945, the
Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If
the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.

[49] Republic v. Heirs of Spouses Ocol, 799 Phil. 514, 529 (2016).

[50]
Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., 727 Phil. 608, 625 (2014).

[51]
Republic v. Estate of Santos, supra note 39, at 814.

[52]
See rollo, p. 50.

[53]
See Republic v. Estate of Santos, supra note 39, at 816.

[54]
See Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., 525 Phil. 358, 380 (2006).

[55]
See Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., supra note 50, at 626.

[56] See rollo, pp. 43 and 60.

[57]
See id. at 50.

[58]
See Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., supra note 41, at 457-458.
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THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 216999, July 04, 2018 ]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. RONALD M. COSALAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 27,2014 Decision[1] and the February 4, 2015
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98224 which affirmed in toto the July 29, 2011 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet (RTC), Branch 10, granting the application for registration of title filed by of Ronald
M. Cosalan (respondent).

The Antecedents
The controversy involves a parcel of land located in Sitio Adabong, Barrio Kapunga, Municipality of Tublay, Benguet, with an
area of 98,205 square meters, more or less, under an approved Survey Plan PSU-204810, issued by the Bureau of Lands on
March 12, 1964.
Respondent alleged that the Cosalan clan came from the Ibaloi Tribe of Bokod and Tublay, Benguet; that he was the eldest son
of Andres Acop Cosalan (Andres), the youngest son of Fernando Cosalan (Fernando), also a member of the said tribe; that he
was four generations away from his great-grandparents, Opilis and Adonis, who owned a vast tract of land in Tublay, Benguet;
that this property was passed on to their daughter Peran who married Bangkilay Acop (Bangkilay) in 1858; that the couple
then settled, developed and farmed the said property; that Acop enlarged the inherited landholdings, and utilized the same
for agricultural purposes, principally as pasture land for their hundreds of cattle;[4] that at that time, Benguet was a cattle
country with Mateo Cariño (Mateo) of the landmark case Cariño v. Insular Government,[5] having his ranch in what became
Baguio City, while Acop established his ranch in Betdi, later known as Acop's Place in Tublay Benguet, that Mateo and Acop
were contemporaries, and became "abalayans" (in-laws) as the eldest son of Mateo, named Sioco, married Guilata, the eldest
daughter of Acop; and that Guilata was the sister of Aguinaya Acop Cosalan (Aguinaya), the grandmother of respondent.[6]
Respondent also alleged that Peran and Bangkilay had been in possession of the land under claim of ownership since their
marriage in 1858 until Bangkilay died in 1918; that when Bangkilay died, the ownership and possession of the land was passed
on to their children, one of whom was Aguinaya who married Fernando; that Acop's children continued to utilize part of
the land for agriculture, while the other parts for grazing of work animals, horses and family cattle; that when Fernando and
Aguinaya died in 1945 and 1950, respectively, their children, Nieves Cosalan Ramos (Nieves), Enrique Cosalan (Enrique), and
Andres inherited their share of the land; that Nieves registered her share consisting of 107,219 square meters under Free
Patent No. 576952, and was issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- 776;[7] that Enrique, on the other hand, registered
his share consisting of 212,688 square meters through judicial process, docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-87,
which was granted by then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio and Benguet, Branch 3, and was affirmed by the Court in its
Decision[8] dated May 7, 1992, and that OCT No. O-238 was issued in his favor.[9]
Similarly, Andres sought the registration of his share (now the subject land) consisting of 98,205 square meters, more or less,
through judicial process. He had the subject landsurveyed and was subsequently issued by the Director of Lands the
Surveyor's Certificate[10] dated March 12, 1964. Thereafter, he filed a case for registration, docketed as LRC Case No. N-422
(37), Record No. N54212, before RTC Branch 8. The case, which was archived on August 23, 1983, was dismissed on motion of
Andres in the Order[11] dated November 13, 2004.
In 1994, Andres sold the subject land to his son, respondent, for the sum of P300,000.00, evidenced by the Deed of Absolute
Sale of Unregistered Land[12] dated August 31, 1994.
On February 8, 2005, respondent filed an application for registration of title of the subject land before RTC Branch
10.[13] Respondent presented himself and Andres as principal witnesses and the owners of the properties adjoining the
subject land namely, Priscilla Baban (Priscilla) and Bangilan Acop (Bangilan).
Respondent in his application alleged, among others, that he acquired the subject land in open, continuous, exclusive,
peaceful, notorious and adverse occupation, cultivation and actual possession, in the concept of an owner, by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial; that he occupied the said land which was an ancestral land; that
he was a member of the cultural minorities belonging to the Ibaloi Tribe;[14] that he took possession of the subject land and
performed acts of dominion over the area by fencing it with barbed wires, constructing a 200-meter road, levelling some areas
for gardening and future construction and planted pine trees, coffee and bamboos; and that he declared the subject land for
taxation purposes and paid taxes regularly and continuously.[15]
Priscilla, the maternal first cousin of Andres, testified that she was born in Acop, Tublay, Benguet on January 15, 1919 to
parents Domingo Sapang and Margarina Acop (Margarina); that she inherited the property adjacent to the subject land from
Margarina who, in turn, inherited it from her father Bangkilay; that her property and the subject land used to be parts of the
vast tract of land owned by Bangkilay; that when Bangkilay died, the property was inherited by his children; that one of his
daughters, Aguinaya, took possession of her share of the property; that Aguinaya and her husband Fernando then used
the land for vegetation, raising cattle and agricultural planting; that when spouses Aguinaya and Fernando died, Andres took
possession of the subject land and planted pine trees which he sold as Christmas trees, but when the sale of pine trees was
banned, he allowed other people to use the trees for firewood; and that Andres thereafter sold the property to
respondent.[16]
Bangilan, on the other hand, testified that he was 73 years old; that he had been residing in Barangay Adabong since he was
seven (7) years old; that his father Cid Acop inherited the property adjoining the subject land; and that his fathers property
was issued a certificate of title.[17]
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) - Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), opposed the
application filed by respondent on the ground that the subject land was part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
established under Proclamation No. 217.
The RTC Ruling
On July 29, 2011, the RTC approved respondent's application for registration. It held that the subject land was owned and
possessed by his ancestors and predecessors even before the land was declared part of the forest reserve by virtue of
Proclamation No. 217.
The RTC took note of the fact that the DENR itself issued free patent titles to lands within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve.
Specifically, the properties of Nieves and Cid Acop, which were immediately adjacent to the subject land had been granted
torrens titles by the DENR though similarly located within the forest reserve. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places the land described
under approved Survey Plan PSU-204810 issued by the Bureau of Lands on March 12, 1964 containing an
area of 98,205 square meters, more or less under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, as supported by its technical description, in the name of Ronald M. Cosalan.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated August 27, 2014, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. It held that "[a]ncestral lands which are
owned by individual members of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or Indigenous Peoples (IPs) who, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of
owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims are uncontested by the members of the
same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under C.A. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act or Act 496,
the Land Registration Act."[19]
Also, the CA stated that "while the Government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right of a private
individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be recognized and
should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated ... Government in the first instance may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have
intervened before such reservation is made."[20]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[21] but it was denied by the CA in its resolution dated February 4, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
The grounds for the allowance of the petition are:
THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE SUBJECT LAND IS A FOREST LAND WITHIN THE CENTRAL CORDILLERA FOREST RESERVE.
IT WAS CONSIDERED A FOREST LAND EVEN PRIOR TO ITS DECLARATION AS SPECIAL FOREST
RESERVE UNDER PROCLAMATION NO. 217. THEREFORE, IT IS NOT REGISTRABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS' RELIANCE IN CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF DENR AND CARIÑO V.
INSULAR GOVERNMENT IS MISPLACED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION GRANTING RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION BASED ON OH
CHO VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, RAMOS VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, AND REPUBLIC VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ENRIQUE COSALAN ARE ERRONEOUS CONSIDERING THAT SAID
CASES ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE. WHAT IS MORE, THE COURT OF
APPEALS' DECISION IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE
ENUNCIATED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN DIRECTOR OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND
DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND HILARIO.
IV
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12 OF THE IPRA LAW IN
RELATION TO SECTION 48 OF THE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 IS COMPLETELY
ERRONEOUS. COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 APPLIES EXCLUSIVELY TO AGRICULTURAL
PUBLIC LANDS.[22]
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner insists that the subject land is a forest land even prior to the enactment of Proclamation No. 217. Respondent's
father even admitted that the subject land was in an elevated area of the forest reserve, which explains the absence of
permanent improvements thereon and was utilized only for "kaingin."[23] According to petitioner, the fact that the land was
subjected to the kaingin system does not deprive it of its character as forest land.[24]
Petitioner claims that it is only the Executive Department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of public
domain into alienable and disposable lands.[25]
Respondent's Arguments
In his Comment,[26] respondent countered that the subject land was an ancestral land and had been and was still being used
for agricultural purposes; and that it had been officially delineated and recognized when the Director of the Bureau of Lands
approved the survey plan for the land claimed by his predecessors and issued PSU-204810 on March 12, 1964.[27] He averred
that the subject land was openly and continuously occupied by him and his predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial,
and was cultivated or used by them for their own benefit.[28]
Respondent claimed that though the subject land was located in an elevated area, it had been used for dryland agriculture
where camote, corn and vegetables were planted, for grazing of farm animals, and cattle; some portions were subjected to
tree farming and several improvements have been introduced like the construction of a 200-meter roads and the levelling of
other areas for future construction, gardening, and planting of more pine trees, coffee and bamboo.[29]
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
As a rule, forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve cannot be a subject of private appropriation
and registration. Respondent, however, was able to prove that the subject land was an ancestral land, and had been openly
and continuously occupied by him and his predecessors in-interest, who were members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371[30] otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA Law) defined ancestral lands as follows:
 Section 3 (b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,
continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by
government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces
or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots[.]
Ancestral lands are covered by the concept of native title that "refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as
far back as memory reaches, have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and
are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest."[31]To reiterate, they are
considered to have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that way.
The CA has correctly relied on the case of Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,[32] which institutionalized the concept of native title.
Thus:
Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has
been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the
same way before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.[33] (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it appears that lands covered by the concept of native title are considered an exception to the Regalian
Doctrine embodied in Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.[34]
The possession of the subject land by respondent's predecessors-in interest had been settled in the case of Republic v. CA and
Cosalan[35] filed by respondent's uncle, Enrique Cosalan. In the said case, Aguinaya, the mother of Enrique, and grandmother
of respondent, filed an application for free patent on the parcels of land which included the subject land as early as 1933. The
Court held that Enrique and his predecessors-in-interest had been in continuous possession and occupation of the land since
the 1840s, long before the subject land was declared part of a forest reserve.[36] Moreover, the CA in its decision noted that
Nieves and Cid Acop, whose lands were adjacent to the subject land, were awarded titles to their respective lands despite
being located within the same forest reserve as the subject land.
Petitioner's reliance on the ruling of Director of Land Management and Director of Forest Development v. CA and Hilario[37] is
misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with the present case as the evidence presented in this case sufficiently established
that private interests had intervened even prior to the declaration of the subject land as part of a forest reserve. As discussed
in Republic v. CA and Cosalan:[38]
The present case, however, admits of a certain twist as compared to the case of Director of Lands, supra, in
that evidence in this case shows that as early as 1933, Aguinaya, mother of petitioner has filed an Application
for Free Patent for the same piece of land. In the said application, Aguinaya claimed to have been in
possession of the property for 25 years prior to her application and that she inherited the land from her
father, named Acop, who himself had been in possession of the same for 60 years before the same was
transferred to her.
It appears, therefore, that respondent Cosalan and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the land since the 1840s. Moreover, as observed by the appellate court, the
application of Aguinaya was returned to her, not due to lack of merit, but –
"As the land applied for has been occupied and cultivated prior to July 26, 1894, title thereto
should be perfected thru judicial proceedings in accordance with Section 45 (b) of the
Public Land Act No. 2874, as amended."
Despite the general rule that forest lands cannot be appropriated by private ownership, it has been
previously held that "while the Government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary right
of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification
must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated ...
Government in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is
made.[39] (emphases supplied)
Hence, respondent's application for registration under Section 12 of the IPRA Law in relation to Section 48 of the CA No. 141
was correct. Section 12, Chapter III of IPRA Law states that individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in
character and actually used for agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of
eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.
As stated, respondent and his witnesses were able to prove that the subject land had been used for agricultural purposes even
prior to its declaration as part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. The subject land had been actually utilized for
dry land agriculture where camote, corn and vegetables were planted and some parts of which were used for grazing farm
animals, horses and cattle. Moreover, several improvements have been introduced like the 200-meter road and the levelling
of areas for future construction, gardening, planting of more pine trees, coffee and bamboo.
Verily, as the IPRA Law expressly provides that ancestral lands are considered public agricultural lands, the provisions of the
Public Land Act or C.A. No. 141 govern the registration of the subject land. Also, Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act declares
who may apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to wit:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Property Registration Decree to wit:
xxxx
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of public domain, under a bona fide claim of
(b) acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
(c)
domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 (As amended by PD. No. 1073, dated January 25,
1997).

In Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando,[40] it was held that where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of
Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the court — an application therefore being sufficient.[41]
Certainly, it has been proven that respondent and his predecessors-in interest had been in open and continuous possession of
the subject land since time immemorial even before it was declared part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217. Thus, the registration of the subject land in favor of respondent is proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 27, 2014 Decision and the February 4, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 98224 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Martires, JJ., concur.

August 16, 2018

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on July 4, 2018 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the Supreme Court in the
above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on August 16, 2018 at 3:05 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

 Division Clerk of Court

[1]
Id. at 50-63; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr., and Mario V. Lopez,
concurring.
[2]
Id. at 64-65.
[3]
Id. at 72-80.
[4]
Id. at 122; par. no. 7 of Respondent's Comment.
[5]
8 Phil. 150 ( 1907).
[6]
Rollo, p. 122; par. no. 5 of Respondent's Comment.
[7]
Id. at 307-308.
[8]
Docketed as G.R. No. L-38810, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. CA, 284 Phil. 575 (1992).
[9]
Records, pp. 309-310.
[10] Id. at 291-292.
[11] Id. at 329.
[12] Id. at 294-295.
[13] Id.at 1-3.
[14] Id. at 1-2.
[15] Id.at 121.
[16] TSN, dated January 26, 2009.
[17] Id.

[18] Rollo, p. 80.

[19] Rollo, p. 61
[20] Rollo, pp. 61-62, quoting Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Island, 10 Phil 10 (1919).
[21] Id. at 66-70.

[22] Rollo, pp. 17-19.

[23] Id. at 20.
[24] Id. at 21-22.

[25] Id. at 23.

[26] Id. at 120-147.
[27] Id. at 126.
[28] Id. at 128.
[29] Id. at 129.
[30] An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, creating a

National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, establishing implementing mechanisms, appropriating funds therefore, and
other purposes.
[31] Section 3 (1), of R.A. No. 8371 otherwise known as the IPRA Law.
[32] 400 Phil. 904 (2000).
[33] Citing Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, 941 (1909)
[34] Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Sin, 730 Phil. 414,423 (2014), citing Valiao, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.,

677 Phil. 318, 326 (2011).

[35] 284 Phil. 575 (1992).
[36] Id. at 579-580.
[37] 254 Phil. 456 ( 1989).
[38] Supra note 35.
[39] Id.
[40] 488 Phil. 140 (2004).
[41] Id. at 152-153. citing Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424 (1925).
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EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017 ]
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO,
ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO
SIMBALAN, AND MARK BRAZIL, PETITIONERS, VS. RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A.
LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA.
RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ, JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S.
LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI,
LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ,
ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE
AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, AND AS REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT RAMON ABERASTURI,
RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's en
banc Decision dated October 20, 2015, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its
Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners maintain that it is the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), not
the regular courts, which has jurisdiction over disputes and controversies involving ancestral domain of the Indigenous
Cultural Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) regardless of the parties involved.

Petitioners argue that the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint,
admits of exceptions and can be relaxed in view of the special and unique circumstances obtaining this case, i.e., the actual
issue, as shown by their motion to dismiss, involves a conflicting claim over an ancestral domain. They seek to apply by
analogy the principles in Ignacio v. CFI Bulacan,[1] Ferrer v. Villamor,[2] Nonan v. Plan,[3] among others, where it was held that
the allegations of tenancy by the defendant in its answer may be used in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court,
and if indeed tenancy exists, the same should be lodged before the Court of Industrial Relations (now the Department of
Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board). They also invoke Leoquinco v. Canada Dry Bottling Co.,[4] and Mindanao Rapid Co. v.
Omandam[5] where it was ruled that if allegations of labor disputes or employer-employee relations are alleged by defendants
in their answer and the same is shown to exist, the Industrial Court (now the National Labor Relations Commission) takes
cognizance of the case.

Petitioners also argue that the Court's interpretation of Section 66[6] of Republic Act No. 8371, or the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act of 1997," (IPRA) to the effect that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group, is contrary to law and the
Constitution. They posit that the State recognizes that each ICC or IP group is, and has been since time immemorial, governed
by their own customary laws, culture, traditions and governance systems, and has the right to preserve and develop them as
they may deem fit and necessary. Thus, each ICC and IP group did not, and does not, need an act of Congress such as the IPRA,
to enforce their customary laws among themselves and their respective communities, and more so in further developing them.

Petitioners insist that claims and disputes within ICCs/IPs and/or between ICCs/IPs shall be resolved using customary laws,
consistent with the State policy under the Constitution and the IPRA to recognize, respect and protect the customs, traditions
and cultural integrity and institutions of the ICCs/IPs. They claim that cases of disputes between IPs within the same ICC/IP
group are always resolved completely and with finality in accordance with their customary laws and practice, hence, the
interpretation that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction in cases of disputes among IPs within the same ICC/IP group is not only
absurd but unconstitutional. They aver that even disputes between different ICCs/IPs shall also fall within the jurisdiction of
whatever their customary laws and practice provide since Section 65[7] of the IPRA does not so distinguish. They presume that
after coexisting for centuries in adjacent ancestral domains, some of the ICCs/IPs have developed their own indigenous means
of settling disputes between other ICCs/IPs.

With respect to unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IP groups and between ICCs/IPs and non-IPs,
petitioners theorize that they fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP pursuant to the provisions of the IPRA. They cite the
concurring opinion of Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. that the second and third parts of Section 66 of the law only provide for
a condition precedent that is merely procedural and does not limit the NCIP jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of
ICC/IPs. They contend that such interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the IPRA which lay out NCIP's jurisdiction
under Sections 46(g),[8] 62,[9] 69,[10] 70[11] and 72[12] of the IPRA.

Petitioners further point out that Section 72 of the IPRA permits the imposition of penalties under customary law even to
non-IPs, and does not distinguish as to whom customary law may apply. According to them, any natural or juridical person, IPs
or not, found to have violated provisions of then IPRA, particularly those identified in Section 72, may be dealt with by
imposing penalties found in the corresponding customary laws. They submit that Section 72 does not require as a condition
precedent familiarity of the person to be penalized to the existing customary law of the affected community nor does it
require for the said customary law to have been published to allow for its imposition to any person who committed the
violation. Thus, they assert that Section 72 negates the ruling that NCIP's jurisdiction applies only to Sections 52, 54, 62 and 66,
insofar as the dispute involves opposing parties belonging to the same tribe.

Petitioners likewise aver that Sections 46(g), 62, 69, 70 and 72 of the IPRA, taken together and in harmony with each other,
clearly show that conflicts and disputes within and between ICCs/IPs are first under the jurisdiction of whatever their
customary law provides, but disputes that are not covered by their customary laws, either between different ICCs/IPs or
between an ICC/IP and a non-IP are also within the jurisdiction within the NCIP. Petitioners invoke The City Government of
Baguio City v. Masweng[13] and Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. v. Masweng[14] to support their theory that NCIP has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a dispute or controversy over ancestral domains even if one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP group.

In essence, petitioners argue that (1) the IPRA was not enacted to protect an IP from another IP whether from the same or
different group, because they have their own means of resolving a dispute arising between them, through customary laws or
compromises, as had been done for a very long time even before the passage of the law; (2) the IPRAis meant to address the
greater prejudice that IPs experience from non-IPs or the majority group; and (3) the limited interpretation of Section 66 of
the IPRA to its minute details without looking into the intent of the law will result in an unimaginable situation where the
jurisdiction of the NCIP is only limited to those where both parties belong to the same ICCs/IPs; and (4) the. application of the
provisions of the IPRA, as a national law and a landmark social justice legislation, is encompassing and not limited to a
particular group, i.e., ICCs/IPs.

In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that (1) the NCIP and not the regular courts has
jurisdiction over the case under the principle that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, and pursuant to jurisprudence allowing exemptions thereto; (2) the jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case rests upon the NCIP as conferred by the IPRA; (3) the IPRA is a social legislation that seeks to protect the IPs
not so much from themselves or fellow IPs but more from non-IPs; (4) the IPRA created the NCIP as the agency of government
mandated to realize the rights of IPs; (5) in the exercise of its mandate, the NCIP was created as a quasi-judicial body with
jurisdiction to resolve claims and disputes involving the rights of IPs; (6) the jurisdiction of the NCIP in resolving claims and
disputes involving the rights of IPs is not limited to IPs of the same tribe; (7) harmonizing the related provisions of
the IPRA supports the argument that the NCIP has jurisdiction over cases involving IP rights whether or not the parties are IPs
or non-ICCs/IPs; (8) the NCIP as quasi-judicial agency provides IPs mechanisms for access to justice in the fulfillment of the
State's obligations to respect, protect and fulfill IP's human rights; (9) the NCIP has the competence and skill that would
greatly advance the administration of justice with respect to protection and fulfillment of ICC/IP rights/human rights; and (10)
recognition and enforcement of customary laws and indigenous justice systems fulfill the State's obligations as duty bearers in
the enforcement of human rights.

While the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration fail to persuade, there is
a need to clarify the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs.

The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of a case is not merely
based on the allegations of the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings. It is
well settled that the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the
defendant.[15] Suffice it also to state that the Court is unanimous[16] in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the
ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and amended complaint based on the allegations
therein is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with the ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case:

Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of
pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia,
"jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action." It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the mission of the parties or conferred by
acquiescence of the court.[17]

In his Separate Opinion, Justice Arturo D. Brion also concurred with the ponencia's conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction
over the case because (1) the CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order is not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, (2) jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint; and (3) the
NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP group.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez agreed with the ponencia that jurisdiction over the original and
amended complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, correctly lies with the RTC, based on the principle that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint.

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen likewise voted to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari, and to
affirm the assailed decision and resolution of the CA. He concurred with the ponencia in holding that respondents' action,
alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP.

In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for reconsideration to justify a reversal of its ruling
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' original and amended complaint based on the allegations therein lies
with the RTC.

The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the complex nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as shown by the
different but well-reasoned opinions of the Associate Justices concerned vis-a-vis the arguments in petitioners' motions for
reconsideration.
To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall
fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the real issue involves dispute over
a land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the power
to hear, try and decide the case. In exceptional cases under Sections 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have
jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Velasco's position is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, regardless of
whether or not they belong to the same IP/IC group. According to him, all cases and disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP; all cases and disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by
the jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs;
and regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.

For Justice Brion, the IPRA's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to
disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, he stresses that the NCIP maintains primary jurisdiction
over: (1) adverse claims and border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (2) cancellation of
fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs); and (3) disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between
members of the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Perez opines that neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. He adds that the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs
based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non ICC/IP. He concludes that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the
jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited, and confined only to cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to
the same ICC/IP group.

Justice Leonen is of the view that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to disputes where both parties are members of ICC/IP
group and come from the same ethnolinguistic group. He states that the requirements for the proper exercise of the NCIP's
jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, are as follows: (1) the claim or dispute must involve the rights
of ICCs/IPs; (2) both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP group; (3) these parties must have exhausted remedies under
their ICC/IP's customary laws; and (4) compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under customary laws must
be evidenced by a certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute,
to the effect that the dispute has not been resolved.

Meanwhile, in Lim v. Gamosa,[18] which was penned by Justic Perez, the Court held that the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is
at best concurrent with that of the regular trial courts:

As previously adverted to, we are not unaware of The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng,
et al. and similar cases where we made an implicit affirmation of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one
of the parties are non-ICCs/IPs. Such holding, however, and all the succeeding exercises of jurisdiction by the
NCIP, cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction, where there is no such
explicit conferment by the IPRA. At best, the limited jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the
regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought
before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.[19]

Guided by the foregoing ruling, the Court held in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan[20] that the NCIP-Regional Hearing Office (RHO),
being the agency that first took cognizance of petitioner-appellant's complaint, has jurisdiction over the same to the exclusion
of the MCTC. In said case where both parties are members of the same ICC and the subject of their dispute was an
ancestral land, petitioner-appellant first invoked the NCIP's jurisdiction by filing with the RHO his complaint against
respondents for "Land Dispute and Enforcement of Rights." When the RHO dismissed the complaint without prejudice for his
failure to first bring the matter for settlement before the Council of Elders as mandated by the IPRA, petitioner-appellant filed
instead a complaint for forcible entry before the MCTC. Aside from its ruling that th NCIP has excluded the MCTC of its
jurisdiction over the same subject matter the Court said that petitioner is estopped from belatedly impugning the jurisdiction
of the NCIP-RHO after initiating a complaint before it and receiving ail adverse ruling.

Based on the diverse views on the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs, the recent jurisprudence[21] on the matter, as well as petitioners' arguments in their motions for reconsideration, the
Court is confronted again with the issue of whether the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to cases where both parties are ICCs/IPs,
or primary and concurrent with regular courts, and/or original and exclusive to the exclusion of said courts, on all matters
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.

After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under
Section 66 of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same
ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the
proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.

To begin with, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. A court of general jurisdiction
has the power or authority to hear and decide cases whose subject matter does not fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.[22] In contrast, a court of limited
jurisdiction, or a court acting under special powers, has only the jurisdiction expressly delegated.[23] An administrative agency,
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction which could wield only such powers that are specifically
granted to it by the enabling statutes.[24] Limited or special jurisdiction is that which is confined to particular causes or which
can be exercised only under limitations and circumstances prescribed by the statute.[25]

As held in the main decision, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when
they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group because of the qualifying provision under Section 66
of the IPRA that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws." Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrict the general language or
operation of the statute,[26]and that what determines whether a clause is a proviso is the legislative intent,[27] the Court stated
that said qualifying provision requires the presence of two conditions before such claims and disputes may be brought before
the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved. The Court thus
noted that the two conditions cannot be complied with if the parties to a case either (1) belong to different ICCs/IP groups
which are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws, or (2) if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP
member who is neither bound by customary laws or a Council of Elders/Leaders, for it would be contrary to the principles of
fair play and due process for parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its own distinct customary
laws and Council of Elders/Leaders. In which case, the Court ruled that the regular courts shall have jurisdiction, and that the
NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is, in effect, limited to cases where the opposing parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

That the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is limited can be further gathered from Justice Perez' discussion in Lim v.
Gamosa,[28] thus:

Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos.
122B and 122C as expressly repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly," such an implied repeal is predicated upon the condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable
conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. The two laws refer to different subject matters, albeit
the IPRA includes the jurisdiction of the NCIP. As such, resolution of conflicts between parties who are not
both ICCs/IPs may still fall within the general jurisdiction of regular courts dependent on the allegations in the
complaint or petition and the status of the parties.

There is no clear irreconcilable conflict from the investiture of jurisdiction to the NCIP in instances where,
among others, all the parties are ICCs/IPs and the claim or dispute involves their rights, and the specific
 wording of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, Sections 19-21 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, and Sections 33-35 on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

We should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of the Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 66 of
the IPRA which, to reiterate: (1) did not use the words "primary" and/or "original and exclusive" to
describe the jurisdiction of the NCIP over "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" and (2)
contained a proviso requiring certification that the parties have exhausted their remedies provided under
customary laws.

We are quick to clarify herein that even as we declare that in some instances the regular courts may exercise
jurisdiction over cases which involve rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for these kinds of disputes
necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law bestows on ICCs/IPs.

In Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan,[29] the Court affirmed and emphasized the afore-quoted ruling in Lim v. Gamosa[30] where it
struck down as void an administrative rule that expanded the jurisdiction of the NCP beyond the boundaries of the IPRA.

However, exception must be taken to the pronouncement in Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan[31] that "[a]t best, the limited
jurisdiction of the NCIP is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of the latter's general jurisdiction
extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies."

Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject
matter and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court indifferently, that of
several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a
certain subject matter can be brought in any one of several different courts, they are said to have concurrent
jurisdiction."[32] While courts of concurrent jurisdiction are courts of equal dignity as to matters concurrently cognizable,
neither having supervisory power over process from the other,[33] the rule is that the court which first takes cognizance of an
action over which it has jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief has the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy
without interference from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in which similar actions are subsequently instituted between
the same parties seeking similar remedies and involving the same questions.[34] Such rule is referred to as the principle of
priority or the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. Although comity is sometimes a motive for the courts to abide by the
priority principle, it is a legal duty of a court to abide by such principle to reduce the possibility of the conflicting exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction, especially to reduce the possibility that a case involving the same subject matter and the same parties
is simultaneously acted on in more than one court.[35]

After a careful perusal of the provisions of the entire IPRA, the Court discerns nothing therein that expressly or impliedly
confers concurrent jurisdiction to the NCIP and the regular courts over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
between and among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group. What the Court finds instead is that the NCIP's limited
jurisdiction is vested under Section 66 of the IPRA, while its primary jurisdiction is bestowed under Section 52(h) and 53, in
relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, and Section 54 thereof.

Having discussed why the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited, but not concurrent with the regular
courts, the Court will now expound on the NCIP's primary jurisdiction over claims regardless of whether the parties are
non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different ICCs/IP groups, namely: (1) adverse claims and border disputes arising from the
delineation of ancestral domains/lands,(2) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs, and (3) disputes and violations ofiCCs/IPs
rights between members of the same ICC/IP.

Primary jurisdiction is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act
upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.[36] Given that the provisions of the enabling statute are the yardsticks by
which the Court would measure the quantum of quasi-judicial powers that an administrative agency may exercise, as defined
in the enabling act of such agency,[37] it is apt to underscore the provisions of the IPRA which invest primary jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IP groups to the NCIP, as the primary government agency responsible for the
recognition of their ancestral domain and rights thereto:[38]

1. Section 52(h) of the IPRA anent the power of the NCIP Ancestral Domain Office (ADO) to deny application for CADTs, in
relation to Section 62, regarding the power of the NCIP to hear and decide unresolved adverse claims:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:

xxxx

h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject
any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That
in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of
ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and
assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.

xxxx

SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within
the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear
and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral
domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,further, That
any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining
to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition
for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.[39]

2. Section 53 on the NCIP-ADO's power to deny applications for CALTs and on the NCIP's power to grant meritorious claims
and resolve conflicting claims:

SECTION 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands.-

xxxx

e) Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted
including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at
least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional
offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date
of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station
will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers
and radio station are not available;

f) Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each
 application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection
and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case
of conflicting claims among individuals or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of
the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for
the identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and

g) The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed
and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in tum, evaluate the report submitted. If the NCIP finds such claim
meritorious, it shall issue a certificate of ancestral land, declaring and certifying the claim of each individual
or corporate (family or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.[40]

3. Section 54 as to the power of the NCIP to resolve fraudulent claims over ancestral domains and lands:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs,
review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found
to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after
due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.[41]

As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP has primary jurisdiction over these cases even if one of the parties
is a non ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs groups. Indeed, the questions involved in said
cases demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience, and services of the
NCIP to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.[42] No less than the IPRA states that the NCIP is the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights
thereto,[43] with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.[44] At this juncture, it is not amiss to state that
the NCIP's decision shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.[45]

Meanwhile, the fatal flaw in petitioners' insistence that the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction is exclusive and original, can be
gathered from records of the Bicameral Conference Committee cited in Justice Brion's Separate Opinion:

The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill
1728 was originally worded exclusive and original jurisdiction. During the Bicameral Conference, the lower
house objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:

Sen. Juan Flavier: (Chairman of There is exclusive original. And

the Senate Panel) so what do you suggest?

.... ....

Rep. Zapata (Chairman of the Chairman, may I butt in?

Panel for the House of
Representatives)

Sen. Flavier Yes, please.

Rep. Zapata This was considered. The
original, we were willing in the
house. But the "exclusive", we
objected to the word
"exclusive" because it would
only be the commission that
would exclude the court and
the Commission may not be
able to undertake all the
review nationwide. And so we
remove the word "exclusive"
so that they will have original
jurisdiction but with the
removal of the word
"exclusive" that would mean
that they may bring the case
to the ordinary courts of
justice.

Sen. Flavier Without passing through the

commission?

Rep. Zapata Yes, Anyway, if they go to the

regular courts, they will have
to litigate in court, because if
its (sic) exclusive, that would
be good.

Sen. Flavier But what he is saying is that...

Rep. Zapata But they may not have the

facility.

Rep. ____ Senado na lang.

Rep. Zapata Oo, iyong original na lang.

Sen. Flavier In other words, it's not only

the Commission that can
originate it, pwedeng mag
originate sa courts.
 Rep. Zapata Or else, we just remove
"exclusive original" so that they
will say, the National will have
jurisdiction over claims. So we
remove both "exclusive and
original".

Sen. Flavier So what version are you

batting for, Mr. Chairman?

Rep. Zapata Just to remove the word

"exclusive original." The
Commission will still have
jurisdiction only that, if the
parties will opt to go to courts
of justice, then this
have (sic) the proper
jurisdiction, then they may do
so because we have courts
nationwide. Here there may be
not enough courts of the
commission.

Sen. Flavier So we are going to adopt the

senate version minus the
words "exclusive original"?

Rep. Zapata Yes, Mr. Chairman, that's my

proposal

Sen. Flavier No, problem. Okay, approved.

xxxx[46]

The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" mean that the NCIP shares
concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra
vires for the NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that it as exclusive jurisdiction.[47]

Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs under
Section 66 of the IPRA cannot be exclusive and original, is because of the so-called "Contentious Areas/Issues" identified in the
Joint Department of Agriculture-Land Registration Authority-Department of Environment and Natural Resources-National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DARDENR-LRA-NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012.[48] Such contentious
matters arose in the course of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,[49] the IPRA, the
Public Land Act,[50] and the Land Registration Act,[51] as amended by the Property Registration Decree,[52] which created not
only issues of overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR and NCIP, but also operational issues and conflicting claims in
the implementation of their respective programs.
Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order defines those contentious areas/issues which are subject of
operational issues and conflicting claims between and among the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP, as follows:

1. Untitled lands being claimed by the ICCs/IPs to be part of their AD/AL which are covered by approved survey plans
and also being claimed by the DAR and/or the DENR.

2. Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), Emancipation Patents (EPs), and Patents
within Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)/Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Claim (CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).

3. Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR over lands within Ancestral Land/Domain Claims such
as, but not limited to, Community-Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA), Socialized Forest Management Agreement (SIFMA), Protected Area Community-Based Resources
Management Agreement (PACBRMA), Forest Land Grazing Management Agreement (FLGMA), Co-Management
Agreement, Certificate of Stewardship Contract (CSC), Certificate of Forest Stewardship Agreement (CFSA), Wood
Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land Use Permit (SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP), Special
Private Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore Lease Agreement/Permit (FLA/FLP).

4. Exploration Permit (EP), Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); Mineral Agreement (either Production
Sharing, Co-Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-covered areas.

5. Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared areas a portion or the entirety of which is subsequently
issued a CADT/CALT.

6. Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of the CADTs/CALTs but for any reason not
segregated/excluded.

7. Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise between and amongst the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP as
may be determined by the National/Regional/Provincial Joint Committees, as created under Section 19 of the Joint
Administrative Order.

8. Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP in behalf of the ICCs/IPs over those identified titled
areas found within the AD/AL.
It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-stated contentious areas/issues, and affecting the rights of parties
who are non-IPs or those who belong to different ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due process, however, such
parties cannot be compelled to comply with the two conditions[53] before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP
under Section 66 of the IPRA, since IPs/ICCs are recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and
Council of Elders/Leaders. Hence, the Court cannot sustain the view that the NCIP shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

Moreover, having in mind the principle that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce, have the force and effect of law, and are entitled to great respect,[54] the Court cannot ignore
that Sections 14 and 16 of the Joint DAR-DENR LRA-NCIP Administrative Order provide for the proper forum where the
contentious areas/issues involve lands with prior and vested property rights, thus:

Section 14. Exclusion/Segregation of Lands Covered by Judicially Decreed Titles and Titles Administratively
issued by DENR and DAR. In the delineation and titling of ADs/ALs, the NCIP must exclude and segregate all
lands covered by titles. For this purpose, the registered owner of the land may opt to submit to the NCIP a
copy of the title of the property to facilitate segregation or exclusion pursuant to existing guidelines and
other pertinent issuances.

The ICCs/IPs, however, are not precluded from questioning the validity of these titles in a proper forum as
 hereunder enumerated:

1. DAR Secretary for registered EPs or CLOAs; and

2. Regional Trial Court for registered patents/judicially-decreed titles.

On the other hand, the DAR and DENR shall not process titles pursuant to their mandate on lands certified by
NCIP as ancestral domain or ancestral lands except in areas with prior and vested rights. Provided, however,
that the certification by NCIP on lands as Ancestral Domains or Ancestral Lands pursuant to Section 52(i)
of IPRA presupposes that the provision of Section 13 hereof on the projection of survey plans and issuance of
Certification ofNon-Overlap have already been complied with.

xxxx

Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties. Titled lands under the Torrens System issued prior
to IPRA are deemed vested rights pursuant to the provision of Section 56 of IPRA. Accordingly, the DAR shall
proceed with the CARP coverage of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by the Supreme Court
without prejudice, however, to the rights of the ICCs/IPs to question the validity of these titles before a court
or body of competent jurisdiction.[55]

Note that the "property rights" referred to in Section 56[56] of the IPRA belong to those acquired by individuals, whether
indigenous or non indigenous peoples, as said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic originof the ownership of these
rights.[57] Considering the rule on statutory construction that courts should not distinguish where the law does not do so,
the IPRA thus recognizes and respects "vested rights" regardless of whether they pertain to IPs or non-IPs, and it only requires
that these "property rights" already exist and/or vested upon its effectivity.[58]

On petitioners' assertion that Section 72[59] of the IPRA negates the ruling that the NCIP has jurisdiction only over claims and
disputes under Sections 52, 54, and 62 thereof, even if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, the Court finds
the same as misplaced.

Note that under Section 72 of the IPRA, any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of the IPRA may be
punished either (1) in accordance. with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned, provided that the penalty shall not be a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, and that neither death penalty nor excessive fines shall be imposed; or (2) upon
conviction, by imprisonment of not less than 9 months but not more than 12 years, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00 nor
more than P500,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. Again, it would be contrary to
the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group to be subjected to its
separate and distinct customary laws, and to be punished in accordance therewith. The Court thus rules that the NCIP shall
have primary jurisdiction over violations of IPRA provisions only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
same ICC/IP group. When the parties belong to different ICC/IP group or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, jurisdiction
over such violations shall fall under the proper Regional Trial Court.

Justice Brion has aptly discussed that even if Section 72 of the IPRA is a special penal law that applies to all persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs, the NCIP jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights is limited to those committed by and against members of the
same ICC/IP group, thus:

Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the rights.ofiCCs/IPs shall be punished "in
accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned.... without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP
concerned to avail of the protection of "existing laws. . .[i]n which case," the penalty shall be imprisonment
and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of the court."

"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while "the court" refers to the regular
courts as opposed to administrative bodies like the NCIP.
 Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and file an action before
the regular courts, in which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this
perspective, Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.

The phrase "without prejudice," however, means without limiting the course of action that one can take.
Thus, a recourse under customary laws does not take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under
existing national laws. An express caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must not be
cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death penalty or excessive fines.

Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, then the NCIP's jurisdiction is
limited to punishment under customary laws.

The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two important issues: first, whether it is
legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member
of a particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.

Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, must be published.

Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even
the regular courts have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A
contrary ruling would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.

Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another. Otherwise, the former would be
forced to observe a non binding customary law.

Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to those
committed by and against members of the same ICC/IP.

This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights of ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are
violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the regular
courts. In this situation, the NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with "legal assistance in
litigation involving community interest."[60]

There is also no merit in petitioners' argument that the Court's interpretation of the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of
the IPRA runs counter to its purpose to protect the rights, customs, customary laws and cultural integrity of the ICCs/IPs. To
stress, even as Section 66 grants jurisdiction to the NCIP over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, it is required that
the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs who have exhausted all their remedies under their customs and customary law before
bringing their claim and dispute to the NCIP.[61] And, in some instances that the regular courts may exercise jurisdiction over
cases involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the governing law for such disputes necessarily include the IPRA and the rights the law
bestows on ICCs/IPs.[62]

It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, peace building processes or mechanism under Section 15[63] of the IPRA pertains only to those customary laws
and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights. In this regard, it is fitting to quote the Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources[64] on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and other
related provisions, like Section 15, of the IPRA:

Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to
say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states,
"The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
 determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws
under IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. xxx

xxxx

The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a
dispute is a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the application of customary layv is not required.

Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes concerning
ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The utilization of
customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recogmzmg the application thereof through
legislation passed by Congress.

Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the Civil
Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence,
and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local Government Code of 1991
calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues involving members of
indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of disputes if such are
ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples.[65]

Likewise, unavailing is petitioners' contention that unresolved claims and disputes between different ICCs/IPs groups, and
those between ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs should fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. In this regard, the Court shares the
view of Justice Perez:

That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving
rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and
customary law to govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the
dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since tile NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy
involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within
the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and non members of ICCs
ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and
breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily
contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the
NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law
in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP
controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP.[66]

Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation" done in The City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng[67] of
the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties is not ICC/IPs, a careful review of that case would show that the
Court merely cited Sections 3(k),[68] 38[69] and 66 of the IPRA and Section 5[70] of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated
April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP, as bases of its ruling to the effect that
disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP-RHO. However, the Court did not identify and elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's "original and exclusive
jurisdiction" on disputes or controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs. Hence, such description of the nature and
scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the point, can only be considered as an obiter
dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata and does not embody the
determination of the court.[71]
On a final note, the Court restates that under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have limited jurisdiction over claims and
disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP group; but if
such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular
courts shall have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52(h) and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as well as Section 54,
the NCIP shall have primary jurisdiction over adverse claims and border disputes arising from the delineation of ancestral
domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties are non ICCs/IPs, or members
of different ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both parties belong to
the same ICC/IP group.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, and Tijam, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., See separate concurring opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on April 18, 2017 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme Court
in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on June 13, 2017 at 2:10 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)

FELIPA G.
BORLONGAN-ANAMA

Clerk of Court

[1]
149 Phil. 137 (1971).

[2] 158 Phil. 322 (1974).

[3]
159 Phil. 859 (1975).

[4]
147 Phil. 488 (1971).

[5]
149 Phil. 358 (1971).

[6]
Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICC/IPs: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties
have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the
Council of Elder/Leaders who partidpated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

[7]
Section 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall
be used in resolving the dispute.

[8]
Section 46. Offices within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the following offices which shall be responsible for the
implementation of the policies hereinafter provided:

g) Legal Affairs Office. - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the NCIP on all legal matters concerning ICCs/IPs
and which shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in litigation involving community interest. It shall
conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/IPs against a natural or juridical person believed
to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On the basis of its findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative
action to the NCIP.

[9]
Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral
domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between
and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,
further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to
the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

[10] Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those
pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and other document of similar nature as
may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;

c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity.

[11]
Section 70. No Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No inferior court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any of its duly authorized or designated offices
in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws relating to
ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

[12]
Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec.
10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI
hereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty
shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be
imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In
which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less
than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000)
nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.
In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a
consequence of the unlawful act.

[13]
597 Phil. 668 (2009).

[14] 705 Phil. 103 (2013).

[15] Spouses Atuel v. Sps. Valdez, 451 Phil. 631, 645 (2003).

[16]
Penned by Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta and concurred in by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and
Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Concurring Opinion), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion (Separate
Opinion), Lucas P. Bersamin, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez (Concurring Opinion), Jose Catral Mendoza,
Bienvenido L. Reyes, Estela M. PerlasBernabe, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Separate Concurring), and Francis H. Jardeleza. Associate
Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Mariano C. Del Castillo, on official leave.

[17]
Citations omitted.

[18]
Lim, et al. v. Hon. Gamosa, G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015.

[19]
Citations omitted and emphasis added.

[20]
Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan, G.R. No. 189852, August 17, 2016. Penned by Chief Justice Sereno, with Associate Justices
Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, concurring.

[21]
Lim, et al. v. Han. Gamosa, supra note 18, and Begnaen v. Spouses Caligtan, supra note 20. Penned by Associate Justice
Perez, with Chief Justice Sereno, and Associate Justices Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa,
concurring.

[22] Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, et al., 695 Phil. 627, 653 (2012).

[23]
21 C.J.S. Courts § 16 (1940).

[24]
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, et al., supra note 22, at 653.

[25]
21 C.J.S. Courts § 16 (1940).

[26]
Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931, 949 (1921).

[27]
Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utililies Employees Association, 19 Phil. 409, 411 (1947).

[28]
Supra note 18.

[29]
Supra note 20.

[30] Supra note 18.

[31]
Supra note 20.

[32]
21 C.J.S. Courts § 18 (1940).
[33]
Id. § 488.

[34]
Id. § 492.

[35]
20 Am Jur 2d Courts § 91 (1995).

[36] Unduran v. Aberasturi, October 20, 2015.

[37] Id. citing Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, supra note 22, at 660.

[38]
Sec. 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). - To carry out the policies
herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights
and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.

[39]
Emphasis and underscoring added.

[40]
Emphasis and underscoring added.

[41]
Emphasis and underscoring added.

[42]
Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 649 Phil. 423, 438 (2010), citing Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 402-403
(2002).

[43]
IPRA, Section 38.

[44] IPRA, Section 39.

[45]
IPRA, Section 67.

[46]
Citing October 9, 1997 Bicameral Conference Meeting on the Disagreeing Provisions of SBN 1728 and 9125. (Emphasis in
the original)

[47]
Emphasis added; underscoring in the original.

[48]
Subject: Clarifying, Restating and Interfacing the Respective Jurisdictions, Policies, Programs and Projects of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in Order to Address
Jurisdictional and Operational Issues Between and Among the Agencies.

[49]
Republic Act No. 6657.

[50]
Commonwealth Act No 141, as amended.

[51]
Act No. 496.

[52] Presidential Decree No. 1529.

[53]
Exhaustion of all remedies provided under customary laws, and the Certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.

[54]
Estate Nelson Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc., et al., 687 Phil. 153, 162 (2012).
[55]
Emphasis in the original; underscoring added.

[56]
Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested
upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.

[57]
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment & Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904, 1080 (2000), Separate Opinion of Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan.

[58] Id.

[59]
Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in
Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33,
Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no
such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or
excessive fines be imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of
existing laws. In which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and imprisonment upon
the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been
suffered by the latter as a consequence of the unlawful act. (Emphasis and underscoring added)

[60]
Citations omitted; Italics and emphasis in the original.

[61] Lim v. Gamosa, supra note 18.

[62]
Id.

[63]
Section 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions, and Peace Building Processes. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right
to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanism
and other customary laws and practices within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the national legal
system and with internationally recognized human rights.

[64]
Supra note 57.

[65]
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, supra, at 1084-1085. (Citations omitted)

[66]
Emphasis in the original.

[67]
Supra.

[68]
Section 3. Definition ofTerms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxxx

k) National Commissian on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created under this Act, which shall be under the
Office of the President, and which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs;

[69]
Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). - To carry out the policies
herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights
and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto.

[70]
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of
R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO)

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

xxxx

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes,
a.
between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

xxxx

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as
a.
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date
of registration.

[71]
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Suntay, 678 Phil. 879, 913-914 (2011).

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

I maintain my concurrence with the well written opinion of Justice Diosdado M. Peralta clarifying the application of Section
66[1] of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997. I can do no better than to
reiterate his words:

After a circumspect review of the relevant laws and jurisprudence, the Court maintains that the jurisdiction
of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA is limited [to] claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where
both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.[2]

In my concurrence to the original decision, I pointed out that this was premised on Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act, which has required that "no [claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples] shall be brought to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws."[3] The primacy given to customary laws assumes membership in the same
ethnolinguistic group that have been and still are practicing the same customary norms not contrary to law.

Thus, Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act will apply to parties belonging to the same Kankanaey group in Besao,
Mountain Province. However, it cannot apply to disputes between a Hanunoo Mangyan from Mindoro and a B'laan from
Tampakan in Sultan Kudarat. Its application to various tribes in Kalinga depends on whether they share the same customary
norms. While the various indigenous communities in Kalinga may belong to the same ethnolinguistic grouping, they may not
share the same norms. The same is equally true among the various subtribes of the Subanen in the Zamboanga Peninsula.

Definitely, Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not apply in this case, where one of the parties do not belong
to the same ethnolinguistic group as the other.

More importantly, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act cannot be interpreted as a charter that removes all minoritized Filipinos
from the workings and application of the national legal system. Persons and groups belonging to what is still now considered
as indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples interact with other cultures who consider themselves as Filipinos. To
my knowledge, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act is an exemplary social legislation that should assist members of indigenous
cultural communities to be empowered in all their relationships. The statute was not designed to facilitate their continued
social and cultural isolation. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act shouid not cause their further marginalization.

To insist that the NCIP has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction in any conflict involving indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples is to insist on a dangerous and debilitating stereotype. It is to assume that no indigenous
cultural communities/indigenous peoples have intellectual or moral resource to deal with outsiders on equal footing in regular
courts of justice. It is also to insist that our regular judges should not inform themselves of the concerns of indigenous peoples
or that they cannot acquire the cultural sensitivity to be able to resolve conflicts among indigenous peoples fully and fairly.
Insisting that the NCIP should exclusively deal with all conflicts between and among indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples for so long as there is a member of ani indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
involved creates an unnecessary artificial enclave that maintains the insidious caricatures of backward peoples insisted by our
colonial past. Indigenous peoples are not that strange that they cannot deal with or be dealt with by regular courts. To insist
otherwise is to betray the desire of empowerment implicit in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.

II

There is also another equally important Constitutional principle at stake in our interpretation of Section 66 of the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act. This pertains to the extent of the power of Congress to create enclaves of administrative bodies with
quasi-judicial jurisdiction removing from the judiciary conflicts, which it should constitutionally adjudicate.

The traditional justification of the grant of quasi-judicial powers to administrative bodies under the control and supervision of
the Executive was that it was necessary to be able to deal with the perceived complexities of modem life. There was
recognition that the resolution of some conflicts required technical expertise for which judges in regular courts were not
equipped.

However, there is a trend towards the specialization of regular courts of justice. Today, we have specialized Family
Courts,[4] environmental salas,[5] and commercial courts, among others. Recently, we authorized the designation of specialized
cybercrime courts.[6]

Furthermore, under the supervision of the Supreme Court, we have the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) that routinely
holds courses on very specialized subjects. The requirements for taking the bar have been liberalized. Consequently, the basic
training of judges is now different from what it was when this Court found the basis for quasi-judicial jurisdiction. Now, we
have judges who are also trained engineers, molecular biologists, math majors, economists, and psychologists, apart from
those who specialize in political science or philosophy. While administrative agencies with quasi-judicial powers were an initial
modality to deal with modernity, they would not be the only exclusive approach.

In my view, the power of the Judiciary to adjudicate remains vulnerable unless we shape the parameters for granting
quasi-judicial jurisdiction to administrative agencies with greater clarity and precision. The grant of judicial power to the
Judiciary cannot be undermined by Congressional action through the unbounded transfer of adjudicatory powers to
quasi-judicial administrative agencies.

In my view, controversies may be adjudicated by administrative agencies only when the resolution of conflicts among parties
are necessary in order that the Executive department can implement a program mandated by law. For instance, conflicting
applications of two (2) applicants to the same bandwidth may be settled by an administrative body because it is necessary to
comply with the standards and procedures for allocating a scarce resource. In the same manner, a controversy between two
(2) mining companies over the same meridional blocks should be settled first by an administrative agency to allow the
Executive to determine the company that will assist in the enjoyment and exploitation of our mineral resources under a
production sharing or joint venture arrangement within the limitations provided by law. Conflicting claims between two (2)
groups of farmers claiming tenancy rights or the status of agrarian reform beneficiaries must be settled by an administrative
agency so that the owners of a Certificate of LandOwnership Award (CLOA) could be determined. This is instrumental to
achieve the objectives of the agrarian reform program set by the Constitution and specified by law.

It is not only that the resolution of a conflict requires specialized knowledge. In order that adjudication can be constitutionally
carved out of the judicial sphere and initially put within administrative purview, there must also be a clear showing that the
resolution of the conflict is necessary to pursue the implementation of a program provided by law.

This will be absent if our interpretation of Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act is that the NCIP should have
jurisdiction in any and all conflicts for so long as one (1) party belongs to an indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples group. In many of these controversies, it may not even be specialized knowledge in customary law involved but
simply general knowledge in existing law. This is the situation in the present case.

IV

This Court's decision in this case should only be limited to what is necessary to resolve the conflict as presented by the facts.
Any other interpretation of any other provision of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act or the implementing rules promulgated
by the NCIP or jointly with any other department might foreclose the proper interpretation when facts, which we cannot now
foresee, present themselves.

For instance, no provision of the Joint Administrative Order No. 1 of the DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP on "contentious issues" is in
controversy in this case. It would be premature to hazard any correct interpretation of any of its provisions absent an actual
case. Our opinion may be construed as binding although only obiter. We cannot render advisory opinions risking our
institutional inability to foresee all possible factual permutations.

Thus, where registered emancipation patents or CLOA's may be questioned should be the proper subject of another case
where the facts will properly be laid. It is possible that a Torrens title has been issued or that extrinsic fraud will be present.
We cannot yet state, as a rule, that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary is more definitive as
compared with the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court applying the provisions of Presidential Decree 1529.

Furthermore, the penalties provided by the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act is not in issue in this case. It may not have been
properly pleaded. The danger is that it may foreclose future discussion as to the validity of any of its related provisions.

I recommend that we keep within the narrow bounds of the issues presented in this case. It is sufficient to state that Section
66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act is not basis to hold that the NCIP has jurisdiction over a conflict between a member of
an indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples and a non-member of the same indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

[1]
Rep. Act No. 8371 sec. 66 provides:

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

[2] Ponencia, p. 9.

[3]
Rep. Act No. 8371, sec. 66.

[4]
Rep. Act No. 8369, sec. 3 provides:

Section 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the country.
In case where the city is the capital of the province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the
highest population.

[5]
Supreme Court Adm. O. No. 23-08 (2008), Designation of Special Courts to Hear, Try and Decide Environmental Cases.

[6]
Adm. Matter No. 03-03-03-SC, Designating Certain Branches of the Regional Trial Courts to Try and Decide Cybercrime
Cases Under Republic Act No. 10175.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: June 28, 2017

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Supreme Court E-Library

771 PHIL. 536

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015 ]
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO,
ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO
SIMBALAN, AND MARK BRAZIL, PETITIONERS, VS. RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A.
LOPEZ, MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA.
RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ,
CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A.
ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H.
LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE,
MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated August 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, and the Resolution[3]dated July 4, 2007, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal
Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located
at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.

On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners and
possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land(Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361 hectares, which
appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe.

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages[4] (original complaint for accion reivindicatoria) against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed as Civil Case No. 04-03-01, the
petition was raffled off to Branch 11.

On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer, alleging that respondents have no cause of action
against them.

On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Petitioners alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe members, assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) in the processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim in May 2003. On July 25, 2003, Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 08-02003 to
the Talaandig tribe over its ancestral domain in Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area of 11,105.5657 hectares. On October 30,
2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners
argued that NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and
controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).

On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing
Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to one for
"Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief," with the attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint[5] (amended complaint for
injunction). On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.

On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, alleging that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.

On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, and declared
petitioners' Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a consequence of the
grant of the said motion to amend and supplement complaint.

On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for an ocular inspection of the disputed land to determine the
last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status of the area.

On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint.

On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and Motion for Judgment by Default.
On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order[6] resolving all pending incidents before it, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's [herein petitioners'] motion to refer the case to the
RHO-NCIP and its manifestation for an ocular inspection are hereby denied for being bereft of merit. Further,
defendants [petitioners], except Macapayag and Brazil, are hereby declared in default for their failure to file
their Answer to the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as against defendants Macapayag and
Brazil, be called for pre-trial and ex-parte presentation of evidence as against the rest of defendants
[petitioners] on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Furthermore, the injunctive writ prayed for by
the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. Accordingly, defendants [petitioners], their agents
and privies, or any other or all persons acting for and in their behalves, are hereby ordered to observe,
maintain and preserve the status quo subject of the action and/or the relation between the parties in order
to protect the rights of the plaintiffs while the case is pending in court and to cease and desist from
performing any acts that in one way or another contravene the tenor of this order, while awaiting final
determination of the instant suit or until further orders of this court. Furthermore, to answer for whatever
damage that defendants [petitioners] may sustain by reason of this injunction order if the court should finally
decide that plaintiffs [respondents] are not entitled to the relief it prayed for, plaintiffs [respondents] are
hereby directed to put up a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) executed
in favor of the party enjoined.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order, which in turn denied the referral
of the case to the NCIP, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The assailed Order dated
February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the order of default against petitioners,
except Macapayag and Brazil, is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the complaint and properly refused to refer the case to the
RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of both original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended complaint [injunction],
the CA found that the subject matter of both complaints is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA noted that the only
substantial amendment made was with regard to the nature of the action which originally was one of accion
reivindicatoria and then changed to one for damages. And except for some amendments as to petitioners' alleged violent acts
and the prayer for declaration of their title to the subject property, the rest of the amended complaint was basically the same
as the original one, including the reliefs prayed for by respondents. Anent the writ of preliminary injunction, the CA held that
the RTC's assailed February 14, 2005 Order is self-explanatory as to why the issuance of the same was proper considering the
circumstances of the case.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its August 17, 2006 Decision.

Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO OVER A
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION INVOLVING AN ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE TALAANDIGS.
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A QUO ALLOWING THE
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SOLE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE
LOWER COURT.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, THE COURT A QUO HAS ADMITTED THAT A CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS.[9]

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction, Damages and
other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare landclaimed by respondents is undisputedly within the ancestral domain of the
Talaandig tribe over which a CADT has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even granting that the case is purely a
personal action, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it concerns a claim and dispute involving rights of
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.

On the second issue, petitioners argue that the amendment of the complaint from accion reivindicatoria to injunction with
damages was clearly meant to oust the NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the RTC by concealing the real
issue in the case, which is the parties' conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land in Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon.
According to petitioners, the cause of action in the complaint for accion reivindicatoria is the claim of ownership and recovery
of possession of the said landwhich is undisputedly found within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain covered by CADT No.
R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners contend that
respondents amended the complaint to one for injunction to downplay the real issue which is the dispute over a land that is
within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts complained of, such as harassment, threats,
acts of terrorism, among others, supposedly committed against respondents.

On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that whether the complaint is one for Injunction or Accion
Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere in respondents' original and amended complaints is it stated that
petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral domain. Petitioners
take exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, as strict
adherence thereto would open the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by
crafting their complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on their court of choice. Petitioners contend that the literal
averments of the complaint are not determinative of the jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues are
evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases, the real nature and character of the pleadings and issues are not merely
found in the complaint, but also in the subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties. Petitioners stress that although the
complaint banners the subject matter as one for injunction, the pleadings of respondents show that the subject matter is the
conflicting ownership claims over the land. In fact, petitioners point out that the records of the case show that various pieces
of evidence have been presented to prove that the dispute involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.

For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file this petition,
since they failed to make prima facie showing that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were authorized to represent
the Talaandig tribe. Respondents insist that based on the allegations in their amended complaint for injunction and damages,
the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely personal action and incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents assert that the real issue is whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of violence, terrorism,
destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a permanent injunction and hold the latter liable for damages.
Respondents also point out that petitioners cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731, because the conflict does not
involve an ancestral domain and they (respondents) are not IPs so the condition precedent before bringing a dispute before
the NCIP cannot be satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary laws by the parties.

The petition has no merit.

On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have legal
capacity or standing and locus standi to file the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they
are authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is governed
by the "real parties in interest" rule found in Section 2,[10] Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real party-in-interest is
adapted in Section 2,[11] Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That petitioners are the real parties
in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the
NCIP[12] filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein
that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real
property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor Macapayag and
Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig
Indigenous Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a
certification[13] that the disputed land is within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of
Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.[14] In contrast, respondents failed to
submit any evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents'
contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is without merit.

In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents' amended
complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."[15]

Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all civil actions
which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition with the NCIP.[16]

On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving
ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the
concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral
domain or landis located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the
dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with
 the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision.[17]

In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as
the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought before it. Section 5, Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for
the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of
ICC/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or
desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) ofR.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and

settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled
under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of

Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and
issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371.
Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.

Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and 14, Rule
IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous
dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP.
In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance
the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or
a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;

b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he
 voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and
irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable
reasons.[18]

Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their respective
cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which tribunal may properly
exercise jurisdiction over this case.

In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their title over said land to one
Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957. They averred that,
together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1957 and that they
have been in physical, actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and adverse possession of said land in the concept of
owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They alleged that said land was declared alienable and disposable
since August 3, 1927 per certification of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. They claimed that by means
of fraud, stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said land, without permission and against the consent of the
landowners, caused damages therein and harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. They
added that petitioners continue such harassment by means of armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles at
them during nighttime, causing great fear and threat.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs, among others: (1) to cause the preliminary injunction to be made
permanent for the respondents to enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of physical harm, harassment and
undue obstruction caused by petitioners; (2) to order petitioners to respect and not to harass, intimidate and cause trouble to
the prior possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right of title; (3) to order petitioners to pay moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees and costs of suit; and (4) to declare respondents' title as having become
a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident of an absolute owner.

In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on the other hand, respondents further alleged that sometime in
November 2003, petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon respondents' farm workers
to drive them away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that, despite having hired private security
guards to secure and protect their property, these violent incidents were followed by more acts of violence, lawlessness,
harassment, terrorism to drive away respondents from the land which they claim to lawfully own and possess.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs: (1) to order petitioners and their representatives, to stop and
refrain from committing acts of violence, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and terrorism against
respondents, and to maintain the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare land by respondents as an attribute
of ownership; (2) to declare petitioners to have committed acts of violence, harassment, intimidation, destruction, assault and
other forms of lawlessness against respondents, and to permanently order petitioners to stop and refrain from committing
similar acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay respondents actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and treble costs.

After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court notes that respondents
neither alleged therein that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or controversy over
ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion
reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while the
allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on allegations
therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their
ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. ~ The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition with the NCIP.

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs
only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the qualifying
provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition with the NCIP."

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion
of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification
by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice
systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices
within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized
human rights.[19]

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices
traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive definition, it can
be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions can be
complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their own separate and
distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds
true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor
governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do
not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this
case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the
real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not
the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case.

There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the
parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, viz.:

1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral domain
involving parties who do not belong to the same, but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:
 xxxx

h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is
deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject
any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That
in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of
ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and
assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.

xxxx

SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within
the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear
and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral
domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further,
That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for
Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.[20]

2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP, to wit:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs,
review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found
to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after
due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.[21]

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims
between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic administrative
law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law,[22] the
Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,[23] Rule III, Section 5[24] and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP
Rules[25] as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such
disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Paduran v. DARAB,[26] "[J]urisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law. Otherwise stated,
jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.[27] Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules
of procedure cannot.[28] In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the
same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by
the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of
the concerned ICC/IP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4,
2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, and Del Castillo, JJ., on official leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., pls. see concurring opinion.
Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on October 20, 2015 a Decision/Resolution, copy attached herewith, was rendered by the Supreme
Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on November 23, 2015 at 2:55 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD)
FELIPA G. BORLONGAN-ANAMA
Clerk of Court

[1] Rollo, pp. 21-50.

[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim Jr., with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Sixto Marella Jr.,
concurring; rollo, pp. 56-68.

[3]
Rollo, pp. 11-13.

[4]
CA rollo, pp. 29-42.

[5]
Id. at 74-80.

[6]
Id. at 25-28.

[7] Id. at 28.

[8]
Id. at 348.

[9]
Id. at 433.

[10]
SEC. 2. Parties-in-Interest. - A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

[11]
Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, Rule VI, Section 2. Real Party-in-lnterest. - Every case must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest who shall sue as "plaintiff or "petitioner". The person being sued shall be
referred to as "defendant" or "respondent."

In actions involving general interest, the real party-in-interest shall be the ICCs/IPs or person/s authorized, through a
community resolution, by majority of the ICCs/IPs in the community to represent them.

A "real party-in-interest," as provided in Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of Court, and adapted herein, is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

[12] CA rollo, pp. 65-71.

[13]
Records, p. 262.

[14]
CA rollo, pp. 179-204.

[15]
Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 91, 98.

[16]
Emphasis added.

[17]
Id.

[18]
Id.

[19]
IPRA, Sec. 15.

[20] Emphasis added.

[21]
Id.

[22] Fort Bonifacio Dev't Corp. v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, et al., 617 Phil 358, 369 (2009).

[23]
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as
but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be
resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the Order or Decision.

[24]
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A.
8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites,
sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and
among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged
to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371.
Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.

[25]
Section 13. Certification to File Action. — Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous dispute
settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard to
customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding
the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer or
employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;

b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable damage or
injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

d. Where the Coucil of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable reasons.

[26]
444 Phil. 213(2006).

[27]
Paduran v. DARAB, supra, at 223.

[28]
Republic of the Philippines v. CA, 331 Phil. 1070, 1076 (1996).

CONCURRING OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

I concur with the ponencia that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction over the case. Both original and amended
complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia, "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiffs cause of action."[1] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court.[2]

However, I would like to submit some points for consideration which run counter to the opinion of my esteemed colleague. It
is my position that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) regardless of whether or not they belong to
the same IP/IC Community. This is pursuant to Section 66 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8371,[3] otherwise known as "The
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA) as follows:

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to
the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to
the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied.)

A careful scrutiny of Section 66 of the IPRA would reveal that it is composed of three parts: (1) the NCIP has jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; (2) the requirement of exhaustion of all remedies provided under the
customary laws of the ICCs/IPs; and (3) a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders as a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition with NCIP.

The first part lays down the basis of jurisdiction of the NCIP. It can be gleaned from this part that the law is silent if the parties
should belong to the same IP/IC Community. What the law only provides is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

The second part contains the proviso that should be followed before the NCIP acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Said proviso states: "Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws."

The third part, on the other hand, refers to the certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders as a condition precedent to the
filing of a petition with NCIP. This is in relation to the second part requiring the exhaustion of all remedies.

The second and third parts of the provision should not be interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the NCIP to claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
The proviso only provides for a condition precedent. It is merely procedural and does not divest the NCIP of jurisdiction over
parties not belonging to the same IP/IC Community. As provided in Section 14, Rule IV of the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure[4] of the NCIP (NCIP Rules), a party which does not belong to the same IP/IC Community is exempted from the
requirement of certification, to wit:

Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

1. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical
person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his
official functions;
 2. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except
when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

3. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and
irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

4. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuses to issue the necessary certification without justifiable
reasons. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, it is my position that the NCIP has jurisdiction over the following:

a. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP; and

b. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or among ICCs/IPs even if one of the
parties does not belong to the same IP/IC Community.

All cases and disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP. Consequently, all cases
and disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts regardless of the
subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of ICCs/IPs. Moreover, the regular courts have jurisdiction over
cases and disputes as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.

To limit the jurisdiction of the NCIP to claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or among parties
belonging to the same ICC/IP would be contrary to the purpose for which the NCIP was created. It must be pointed out that
the NCIP is an administrative body entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special knowledge and training.
It is charged with the implementation of the law, considering its competence, expertise, experience and informed judgment.
As such, the NCIP is vested with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers. It is the primary government agency "responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of
the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto."[5] It is quasi-judicial because it has
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of the ICCs/IPs.[6] It is quasi-legislative because of its rule-making
power.[7] Because of its expertise in the field of ICCs/IPs, it is better equipped than the trial courts in resolving the claims and
disputes involving rights where the parties are both ICCs/IPs.

Anent the issue as to what customary laws apply in cases where the parties involved in the claims and disputes do not belong
to the same IP/IC Community, the NCIP may apply the customary law common to both ICCs/IPs or that which can be applied
by analogy.

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that there is no need to declare the following provisions as null and void:

i. The first and third paragraphs of Rule IX, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8371 which
provide:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving ICCs/IPs,
such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned
parties through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is
located.

xxxx

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the Order or Decision.
ii. Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules which provides:

Section. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction
over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

1. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

2. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;

3. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or

desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

4. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

5. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

1. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement
of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

2. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

1. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within
one (1) year from the date of registration.[8]

iii. Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules which provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous
dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP.
In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance
the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.[9]

Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a
public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;

b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and
irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable
reasons.[10]
The abovementioned rules can be interpreted in harmony with the provisions of the IPRA law. Said rules do not expand the
jurisdiction of the NCIP but merely enumerate the claims and disputes falling within its jurisdiction. Section 14(b) does not
automatically dispense with the certification required by law as the parties may opt to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of
the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is akin to a barangay conciliation proceeding under the Local Government Code wherein
the conciliation process is a condition precedent that affects the sufficiency of the cause of action, not the jurisdiction of the
court.[11]

However, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8371 is not anchored on legal mooring. Said
paragraph reads:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and
adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be
adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier discussed, Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371 is explicit that the NCIP's jurisdiction is confined only to claims and disputes
where the parties are both ICCs/IPs. Such being the case, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of the IRR of R.A. No.
8371 should be declared null and void because it is contrary to the provision of Section 66 of the IPRA. It is well-settled that an
administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law.[12] A rule or regulation
cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement.[13] Any rule that is not consistent with the
statute itself is null and void.[14] Since the rule in question is at war with Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371, then it must be excised.

Anent the resolution of the substantive issue in the case at bar, I agree with the ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over
the instant dispute.

ACCORDINGLY, I concur to DENY the Petition for Review.

[1] Ponencia, p. 8.

[2] Gomez-Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 499, 507.

[3]
AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (1997).

[4]
Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003.

[5]
Supra note 3, Section 38.

[6]
Id. Section 66.

[7]
Id. Section 44(c).

[8] Supra note 4.

[9]
Id.

[10]
Id.
[1']
Heirs of Fernando Vinzons v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 541, 548 (1999).

[12]
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 175707, November 19, 2014.

[13]
Id.

[14] Id.

SEPARATE OPINION

BRION, J:

I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. I write this Separate Opinion to express my
own approach to the case, and to elaborate on relevant points that may need emphasis.

I base my concurrence on the following grounds:

(1) The CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 order is not tainted with grave abuse;

(2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and the allegations of the complaint.

(3) The National Council for Indigenous Peoples' (NCIP) jurisdiction over disputes is limited to cases where both parties are
members of the same ICC/IP.

I also concur with the ponencia that the NCIP has jurisdiction over adverse claims, boundary disputes, and cancellation of
fraudulently issued Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs), regardless of the parties involved. But I clarify and
emphasize my view that while the NCIP possesses quasi-judicial powers, its jurisdiction is only primary, and not exclusive.

The RTC's February 14, 2005 order is

NOT tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The present petition is an appeal from the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's petition for certiorari. Hence, this Court must
determine whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the February 14, 2005
order.

The petitioners alleged before the CA that the February 14, 2005 order is tainted with grave abuse because it: (i) denied the
petitioners' motion to refer the case to the NCIP; (ii) declared the petitioners in default; and (iii) issued the writ of preliminary
injunction.[1]

Jurisprudence[2] has traditionally defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Based on this definition, I share the view that the RTC did not abuse its discretion, much less commit any grave abuse of
discretion.

At the time the respondents amended the complaint, the petitioners had yet to file their answers to the original complaint,
hence, the amendment was still a matter of right. The rule on amendments as a matter of right applies to a co-defendant who
has yet to file his responsive pleading, even if his co-defendants have already done so.[3] Thus, while Macapayag and Brazil
have filed their answers, the respondents still have the right to amend the complaint with respect to the rest of the
petitioners.

Likewise, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in declaring the petitioners in default and in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction.

The RTC declared the petitioners in default only after they failed to file their answers within the period allowed. On the other
hand, the writ of preliminary injunction sought to maintain the status quo to prevent both parties from committing further
acts of violence; there is no caprice in maintaining the peace.

Nevertheless, default orders are issued on the presumption that the defendant no longer opposes the allegations and reliefs
demanded in the complaint.[4] In this case, the petitioners vehemently opposed the RTC's cognizance of the complaint, and
refused to file their answers because they believed that jurisdiction belongs to the NCIP.

In the interest of justice, I support the CA in lifting the order of default to allow the parties to try the case on the merits.

Jurisdiction is determined
by the allegations of the complaint

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and by the material allegations of the complaint.[5] Under these
standards, the petitioner's argument, i.e., that the NCIP has jurisdiction because the case involves the rights of ICCs/IPs, is
without merit.

As the ponencia pointed out, both the original and the amended complaints do not allege that the respondents were ICCs/IPs,
or that the dispute involves an ancestral dominion.[6] Hence, on the face of the respondents' complaint, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the injunction case.[7]

Neither am I impressed with the petitioners' argument that, where the actual issue is evidenced by the subsequent pleadings,
jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint's literal averments. This Court has consistently ruled that jurisdiction never
depends on the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.[8]

The NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited

where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.

I join the ponencia in ruling that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or
where the opposing parties are members of different ICC/IP.

My concurrence is based on the following: (i) Section 66 contains a proviso that limits the NCIP's jurisdiction; (ii) the RTC, not
the NCIP, has jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of ICC/IP rights; (iii) Congress had no intention to apply customary laws to
non-ICCs/IPs.

I. Section 66 contains a proviso that

limits the NCIP's jurisdiction.
The NCIP's jurisdiction is outlined in IPRA's Section 66:

SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to
the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to
the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (emphasis supplied)

Section 66 is composed of three parts: the first states the NCIP's jurisdiction; the second requires the prior exhaustion of
remedies under customary law; and the third states that a certification from the council of elders/leaders is a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

The first part lays down the NCIP's jurisdiction, i.e., over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The NCIP's
jurisdiction is not dependent on who the parties are, but on whether the dispute involves the rights of ICCs/IPs.

However, the second part contains the proviso "Provided, However, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws." The third part begins with the phrase "for this
purpose"; the "purpose" referred to being the exhaustion of remedies under their customary laws.

Jurisprudence tells us that the office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law.[9]

Taking these considerations into account, while the NCIP's jurisdiction is initially couched in general terms to include any and
all disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs, the second and third parts limit the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes where both
parties have remedies to exhaust under customary laws.

Consequently, the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over disputes involving non-ICCs/IPs because non-ICCs/IPs have no
customary laws to exhaust.

The limitation likewise applies to disputes where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs.

Each ICC/IP has its own set of customary laws and council of elders/leaders. To require members of a particular ICC/IP to
appear before the council of elders/leaders of another ICC/IP would be to require the former to observe the customary laws
of the latter. This is repugnant to the right of each ICC/IP to use its own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict
resolution institutions, and peace building processes or mechanisms.[10]

II. The RTC not the NCIP, has

jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights
committed by Non-ICC/IP.

As I had earlier discussed, the first part of Section 66 shows that jurisdiction is not dependent on who the parties are to the
dispute, but on whether the dispute involves the rights of ICCs/IPs.

Guided by the rule that provisos should not be construed to limit the main provisions of the statute;[11] this Court must not
read Section 66 in isolation but must read it together with the related provision. In this case, the Court must identify the rights
of ICCs/IPs, and determine whether the NCIP is the proper venue for the enforcement of these rights.

The IPRA grants ICCs/IPs rights: (i) over ancestral domains/lands;[12] (ii) to self-governance and employment;[13] (iii) to social
justice and human rights;[14] and (iv) to cultural integrity.[15] These rights are spread throughout several chapters, mainly under
Chapters III to VI.
It must be noted, however, that most of these rights are state policies, and only the following are clearly demandable and
enforceable: the rights over ancestral domains and lands;[16] the right against unlawful intrusion;[17] the right to equal
protection and to nondiscrimination;[18] the right against unlawful acts pertaining to employment;[19] the rights to religious,
cultural sites and ceremonies, including archaeological artifacts;[20] and the right to withhold access to biological and genetic
resources.[21]

Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the rights of ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the
customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned....without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP concerned to avail of the protection of
"existing laws... [i]n which case" the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of
the court"[22]

"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while "the court" refers to the regular courts as opposed
to administrative bodies like the NCIP.

Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and file an action before the regular courts, in
which case, the penalty shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective,

Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including non-ICCs/IPs.

The phrase "without prejudice," however, fneans without limiting the course of action that one can take.[23] Thus, a recourse
under customary laws does not take away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing national laws. An express
caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must not be cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the
death penalty or excessive fines.[24]

Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, then the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to
punishment under customary laws.[25]

The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two important issues: first, whether it is legally possible
to punish non-ICCs/IPs with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular ICC/IP could be
punished in accordance with the customary laws of another ICC/IP.

Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as
tax and revenue measures, must be published.[26]

Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular courts
have the power to penalize non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling would be
constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.

Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another. Otherwise, the former would be forced to
observe a non-binding customary law.

Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and
against members of the same ICC/IP.

This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights of ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by
non-ICCs/IPs or by members of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the regular courts. In this situation, the
NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with "legal assistance in litigation involving community interest."[27]

III. Congress had no intention to apply

customary laws to non-ICCs/IPs.
Some might conceivably argue that Congress passed the IPRA and created the NCIP precisely to bind non-ICCs/IPs to
customary laws.

I do not agree with this view.

The records of the Senate and the bicameral committee hearings show that the legislators focused mainly on: (i) the grant of
Ancestral Domains/Lands to ICCs/IPs; (ii) the NCIP's organizational transition from its predecessor-agencies; and (iii) budgetary
concerns. Section 66 's controversial proviso was not even discussed on the Senate floor or during the bicameral committee
hearings.

In the course of the bill's[28] early development, the Senate technical working group[29] realized that it would be difficult for the
NCIP to adjudicate rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws, on one hand, and the rights of ICCs/IPs under customary laws,
on the other. They were likewise concerned with the possible conflict between the customary laws of contending ICCs/IPs.

As a solution, the Senate technical working group proposed the creation of the Office on Policy, Planning and Research (OPPR)
and a Consultative Body that will compile all customary laws, and assist the NCIP in its exercise of quasi-judicial powers:

Sir, it's over and above the customs and tradition. What I'm trying to
Mr. Mike Mercado pointout is, it's the whole plan for the sector. Two issues po ang sinasabi
(representative of Sen. Juan Flavier): ko. Number one is regarding the need to put it down because we talked
about conflict of rights here...

The Presiding Officer: ... With the Non-IPs.

With the non-IPs possibly which would happen. It would be easy if the
conflict could be between IPs of the same group. So it would be easier to
Mr. Mercado:
resolve. But paano po 'yung if there would be a conflict between an IP and
non-IP.

Mr. Raiz: Non-IP.

Because the assumption nga— oo, 'yong sa civil law relations, may mga
Mr. Mercado: conflicts po na possible na mangyayari. So, actually, sabi ko nga, maybe we
can do away with it. That's one issue. xxx

'Yong point ni Mike is very meritorious, 'yon dapat, Dahil unang una, the IPs
Mr. Austria: should themselves show to the other sectors kung ano ba 'yon rule nila sa
society.xxx

Let's go back to that discussion on the creation of a separate office on

planning and policy, and research.
I think it's more germane to mention those points that Mike has enunciated
Ms. Damaso: earlier—that this be a primary function of that office xxx continuing
documentation of customary laws customary law and other usage 'no for
complete mediation or resolution, which would be derived from the
culture base of the IPs.

....

You were mentioning iyong other groups. What about the commission?
Should they be mandated to do the research and to, you know, to compile
The presiding officer: such laws. Kasi yung nakikita ko doon sa idea niMike is, like for example,
kung may conflict iyong IPs and Non-IPs, paano mo sasabihin, although
sasabihin natin na yung customary law nga yung mag-go-govern, pero
paano natin i-po-prove—-although kailangan natin i-recognize na mayroon
 ganuong problem. Sabihin natin it's an oral practice, it's an oral customary
law pero mas maganda siguro kung iyon nga kung i-compile mo tapos eto
ganito yon. So mayroon tayong pang...

For example po on practical ground, I think ang power is lodged with the
Commission which is collective in nature iyong mga adjudicatory
power. Assuming not all of them would belong to one tribe, they would
belong to a different sector or group. I know that it is being practiced and
it's not written down, so I have to make decision also as a part of that
Commission—as a commissioner based on something, so I have to also
acquaint myself on the practices of other groups because that is part of the
Mr. Mercado: power of the commission to adjudicate. For practical purposes only, how
would I know the practices of the particular groupings, which I am
supposed to adjudicate, assuming that we only have 113 tribes or
groupings and we have five commissioners. Those other five or those other
commissioners who are not aware of that particular practice, to that they
will depend their judgment on. So, there is also a need for this five
commissioners to be familiar with the practice of other groups because
they will make decisions also.

Ms. Damaso: Yeah, Mike, I think your point is to compile, meaning document.

Mr. Mercado: Document only, hindi ho isabatas.

Ms. Damaso: But not to codify. It's a different ball game to codify.

Actually ginamit ko yung term, nag-usap kami ni Didith, sabi ko, "it's
compile only". Because, it's beyond the power of this commission to make
codifications. But 'yung point kanina ni Datu Sulang is actually going a step
further. Kunwari like Muslims, bakit nare-recognize na 'yong three
marriages Because there is four marriages and they have specific law for
that. If we will not compile it, mahihirapan tayong ma-attain 'yong level
Mr. Mercado:
na 'yon na sana mas maganda kung 'yong all practices, for example on
marriage sa iba't ibang tribes ma-recognize rin ng law. Pero if we will not
document the practices, hindi natin maa-attain 'yong level na 'yon. Kaya
mas maganda kung mayroon tayong documentation that when legislators
if and when they decide to make it a law, mayroon silang existing na
gagamitin. xxx

.... ....

Couldn't NCIP hire or form a consultative body from which each tribe will
be represented by a co-tribal consultant aside from the documentation of
Ms. Chavez
customary laws? Pwede ba 'yon ganoon? Kasi kahit may documentation...
(emphasis supplied)

Baka pwede isama sa IRR, implementing rules and regulations 'yong

The presiding officer:
mga tribal tribal consultancy.

Ms. Chavez: Sa IRR.

Pwede naman siguro 'yon gawin. Anyway, specifics na 'yon. General lang
The Presiding officer:
'yong functions na ilagay natin.

xxxx
While the IPRA did create the OPPR, and directed the NCIP to form a consultative body, their functions had nothing to do with
the NCIP's exercise of quasi-judicial powers.

The OPPR's objective is to document customary laws for monitoring, evaluation, and policy purposes to assist Congress in
formulating appropriate legislations benefiting ICCs/IPs.[30] On the other hand, the consultative body's role is to advise the
NCIP on matters "relating to the problems, aspirations, and interests of the ICCs/IPs."[31]

The variance between the deliberations and the law suggests that Congress passed the IPRA without considering the
inevitable conflict of rights under national and customary laws. In my opinion, this casts doubt on whether Congress did give
the NCIP the mandate to settle disputes between non-ICCs/IPs and ICCs/IPs.

It is true that the IPRA echoed our Constitution[32] in "[recognizing] the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.[33] However, I do not subscribe to the idea
that customary laws should bind non-ICCs/IPs simply because Congress ordered the NCIP to compile them.

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[34] former Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug opined[35] that customary
laws should not apply to non-ICCs/IPs simply because Congress parroted the Constitution:

The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that
would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution
could have itself easily provided without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice
Davide has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Convention, thus: (emphasis supplied)

"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property
rights' or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is
concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be submitted to
Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the
codification of these customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now mandate
that the same must immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to determine the
extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to whatever may have
been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the horse."15

The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with
specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due
process clause," as I so understand it in Tañada vs. Tuvera would require an apt publication of a legislative
enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted
to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding
and effective as such, (emphasis in the original)

I share Justice Vitug's view. Laws must be published before they take effect. The publication of all laws "of a public nature" or
"of general applicability" is mandatory.[36] Without publication, non-ICCs/IPs would be deprived of due process of law.[37]

The NCIP has Primary Jurisdiction over Claims

regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/IPs,
or members of a different ICCs/IPs.

I note that Section 66 applies only to "disputes" and not to "claims":

 SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws, xxx xxx
(emphasis and omissions supplied)

The word "claim" in section 66 relates to rights of ICC/IP over ancestral domains/lands.[38]

Four sections in the IPRA are dedicated to the NCIP's jurisdiction over "claims": first, Section 52 (h), which refers to the power
of the NCIP Ancestral Domains Office (NCIP-ADO) to deny applications for CADTs; second, Section 53, which refers to the
NCIP-ADO's power to reject applications for Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles(CALTs); third,Sec. 54, on fraudulent
claims; lastly, Sec. 62, which refers to the resolution of adverse claims.

Sections 52 (h) and 53 require the NCIP-ADO to publish and post applications for CADTs/CALTs to notify all persons, including
non-ICCs/IPs. Section 62 allows all interestedpersons, including non-ICCs/IPs, to file adverse claims over disputes arising from
delineation of ancestral domains.[39]

Under Section 54, the NCIP may, upon the written request of ICCs/IPs, review existing claims and after notice and hearing,
cancel CADTs and CALTs that were fraudulently acquired by any person or community.[40]

In these cases, the NCIP has jurisdiction even if one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are
members of different ICCs/IPs.

The NCIP's jurisdiction is

primary and not exclusive.

Finally, I wish to point out that while the NCIP possesses quasi-judicial powers, its jurisdiction is not exclusive.

The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66 (then Section 71) of Senate Bill 1728 was
originally worded exclusive and original jurisdiction.[41]During the Bicameral Committee Conference,[42] the lower house
objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:

Sen. Juan Flavier:

(Chairman of the There is exclusive original. And so what do you suggest?
Senate Panel)

..... ....

Rep. Zapata
(Chairman of the
Chairman, may I butt in?
Panel for the House
of Representatives):

Sen. Flavier: Yes, please.

This was considered. The original, we were willing in the house. But the
"exclusive", we objected to the word "exclusive" because it would only be
the commission that would exclude the court and the Commission may not
Rep. Zapata: be able to undertake all the review nationwide. And so we remove the
word "exclusive", so that they will have original jurisdiction but with the
removal of the word "exclusive" that would mean that they may bring the
case to the ordinary courts of justice.
Sen. Flavier: Without passing through the commission?
 Yes. Anyway, if they go to the regular courts, they will have to litigate in
Rep. Zapata:
court, because if its (sic) exclusive, that would be good.

Sen. Flavier: But what he is saying is that...

Rep. Zapata: But they may not have the facility.

Rep.______ Senado na lang.

Rep. Zapata: Oo, iyong original na lang.

In other words, it's not only the Commission that can originate
Sen. Flavier:
it, pwedeng mag-originate sa courts.

Or else, we just remove "exclusive original" so that they will say, the
Rep. Zapata National will have jurisdiction over claims. So we remove both "exclusive
and original".

Sen. Flavier: So what version are you batting for, Mr. Chairman?

Just to remove the word "exclusive original." The Commission will still have
jurisdiction only that, if the parties will opt to go to courts of justice, then
Rep. Zapata: this have (sic) the proper jurisdiction, then they may do so because we
have courts nationwide. Here there may be not enough courts of the
commission.

So we are going to adopt the senate version minus the words "exclusive
Sen. Flavier:
original"?

Rep. Zapata: Yes, Mr. Chairman, that's my proposal.

Sen. Flavier: No, problem. Okay Approved.

xxxx

The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" meant that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the regular courts. Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires for NCIP to promulgate rules and
regulations stating that it has exclusive jurisdiction.

The NCIP's jurisdiction, however, while not exclusive, is primary.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.[43]

On the other hand, when Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction to a judicial or quasi-judicial entity over certain matters by
law, its action evinces its intent to exclude other bodies from exercising the same.[44]

Having primary jurisdiction is not equivalent to having exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, to avoid confusion, and to prevent future
litigants from claiming that the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction, the Court should remind the NCIP and other administrative
bodies to refrain from claiming that they have exclusive jurisdiction when no such jurisdiction is conferred by law.

Accordingly, the NCIP's Implementing Rules and Regulations, which state that the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction[45] should be
modified to read "primary jurisdiction."
 Conclusion

In sum, the law's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole jurisdiction over disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the
rights of non-ICCs/IPs under national laws. However, the NCIP maintains primary jurisdiction over: (i) adverse claims and
border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains/lands; (ii) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs; and (iii)
disputes and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.

For these reasons, I vote to grant the petition. The RTC should forthwith continue with the injunction case.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 62-63.

[2]
Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 665 Phil. 267 (2011). See Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
132753, February 15, 1999, 103 SCAD 430, 303 SCRA 186.

[4] See Delbros v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72566, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 533.

[5]
Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 81 (2010), citing Morta, Sr, v. Occidental, G.R. No. 123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167.

[6]
Page 12 of the Ponencia.

[7] Section 19 (1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

[8]
Nuñez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc, G.R. No. 1 80542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 142.

[9]
Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 326 (1921), citing 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight v.
Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac, 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.], 1207; McCormick v. West Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N.W.,
128; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist[1916], 26 Idaho, 222; 141 Pac, 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these
principles concerning provisos are applied.)

[10] Section 15 of the IPRA.

[11]
Supra note 9.

[12]
Chapter III grants the ICCs/IPs the right to own and possess their ancestral domains/lands including the right to: claim
ownership; develop; not to be relocated; be resettled, and to return in case of displacement; regulate the entry of migrants;
access integrated systems for the management of inland waters and air space; claim parts of reservations;
resolve land conflicts in accord with customary laws of the area; transfer lands to/among the members of the same ICCs/IPs;
redeem property sold to a non-member of an ICC/IP, whenever necessary.

[13]
Chapter IV grants ICCs/IPs the right to: use their own justice system, conflict resolution institutions and peace building
processes; determine their priorities for development; form tribal barangays.

[14]
Chapter V grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: equal protection of laws; protection during armed conflicts; equal employment
opportunities and benefits; associate and to collectively bargain; basic services. In addition, IPRA declares that ICC/IP women
shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities with men.

[15]
Chapter VI grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: preserve and protect their culture, traditions and institutions; access to
education; practice and revitalize their traditions and customs; restitution of intellectual property taken without their free
consent; maintain and protect their religious and cultural sites; use and control ceremonial objects; repatriate human remains;
full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual rights; prevent access to biological, genetic resources
and indigenous knowledge without their free and prior consent; receive from the national government funds earmarked for
their archaeological and historical sites.

[16]
Section 7 of the IPRA.

[17] Section 8 of the IPRA.

[18] Section 21 of the IPRA.

[19]
Section 24 of the IPRA.

[20]
Section 33 of the IPRA.

[21]
Section 35 of the IPRA.

[22]
SECTION 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. — Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this
Act, such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec.
10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI
hereof, shall be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty
shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be
imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In
which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less
than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000)
nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court.
In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a
consequence of the unlawful act.

[23]
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/without prejudice.

[24] Section 72 of the IPRA.

[25]
Under Section 46 (g), the NClP-Legal Affairs Office (NCIP-LAO) shall conduct preliminary investigations on violations of
1CC/IP rights and on the basis of its findings, initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative action to the NCIP. The
Legal or Administrative Action that Section 46 (g) refers to is the action to enforce punishment under customary laws.

[26]
See Tahada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985, 146 SCRA 446.

[27]
Section 46 (g) of the IPRA.

[28]
The IPRA is the product of Senate Bill 1728 and House Bill 9125. The bill originated from the Senate, and was the
consolidation of four separate bills: S.B. Nos. 343, 618, 1476, and 1486. Then as senator, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo authored Senate Bill No. 618, which proposed the creation of the NCIP.

[29]
July 30, 1996 Committee on Cultural Communities; Senate Technical Working Group.

[30] Sec. 46 (b) of the IPRA.

[31]
Section 50 of the IPRA.

[32]
The CONSTITUTION, Section 5, Art. XII.
[33]
Section 2 (b) of the IPRA.

[34]
G.R. No. 135385, 400 Phil. 904 (2000); In this case, the divided Court upheld the IPRA's Constitutionality.

[35]
Id., Separate Opinion.

[36] Supra note 26.

[37] CONSTITUTION, Art. Ill, Sec. 1.

[38]
The IPRA classified claims as either communal or individual. The word "claim" or "claims" appeared fifteen times in
the IPRA in different sections and sub-sections, all of which are connected with ancestral domains and lands: First, under
Sections 3 (a) in defining ancestral domain; second, Section 3 (b) in defining Ancestral Lands; third, Sec. 3 (e) in defining
Communal Claims; fourth, in Sec. 3 (h) in classifying ICCs/IPs; fifth, in Sec. 3 (j) on defining individual claims; sixth, in Sec. 3 (1)
in defining native titles; seventh, Sec. 4 on the concept of ancestral lands; eighth, in Sec. 7 (a) on the right of ownership of
ancestral domains; ninth, in Sec. 7 (g) on the right to claim parts of reservations; tenth, in Sec. 52 (d) on proof of Ancestral
Domain Claims; eleventh, in Sec. 52 (h) discussing when NCIP can favorably endorse an action upon a claim on
Ancestral Land; twelfth, in Sec. 53 in the Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands; in sec. 54 on
fraudulent claims; thirteenth, in Sec. 62 on resolving adverse claims in delineated ancestral lands; fourteenth, in Sec. 63 on
the applicability of laws with respect to claims of ownership of property disputes, and fifteenth, under section 66.

[39]
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interests, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral
domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the
proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between
and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided,
further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to
the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the
Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

[40] Section 54 of the IPRA.

[41]
The Commission, through its Regional Offices, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
rights of indigenous people: Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies under their customary laws. For this purpose a Certification shall be issued by the Council who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition
precedent to the filing of a petition with the Commission, (underscoring ours)

[42]
October 9, 1997; Bicameral Conference Meeting on the Disagreeing Provisions of SBN 1728 and HBN 9125.

[43]
Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 140, 153.

[44]
Pua v. Citibank, G.R. No. 180064, September 16, 2013, 705 SCRA 684.

[45]
RULE III. The NCIP shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of the ICCs/IPs and all cases
pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:

A. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office: (emphasis supplied)

1. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs, except those which involve
oppositions to pending applications for CALT and CADT;
2. Enforcement of compromise agreements or decisions rendered by ICCs/IPs;
 3. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8 (b) of R.A. 8371;
4. Interpretation, implementation, or enforcement of Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) entered into by parties as a
result of the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) process;
5. Cases involving Projects, Programs, Activities within ancestral lands/domains being implemented without the
required FPIC of the affected/host IPs/ICCs;
6. Petitions for annotation on CADTs and CALTs or cancellations thereof, except notice of Us pendens and those that will
result to transfer of ownership;
7. Actions for damages including, but not limited to, claims for royalties and other benefits.
8. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between
and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
9. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
B. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commission En Banc (emphasis supplied)

1. Petition for cancellation of registered CADTs and CALTs alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to,
any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371, provided that such action is filed within one
(1) year from the date of registration;
2. Actions for cancellations of Certification Precondition (CP), Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), issued by the NCIP, as
well as, rescissions of FP1C-M0A; and
3. Any other case that deems to vary, amend, or revoke previously issued rulings, resolutions, or decisions of the
Commission en banc.

CONCURRING OPINION

PEREZ, J.:

While I agree with the holding in this case that jurisdiction over the original and amended complaint, accion
reivindicatoria and injunction, before the court a quo, correctly lies with the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): (1) an accion
reivindicatoria, a civil action involving interest in real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00; and (2) an injunction, a
civil action incapable of pecuniary estimation, I offer my view on the complex nature of the jurisdiction of the National
Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) conferred in the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA), Republic Act No. 8371.

Even if in this case the complaint was amended from an accion reivindicatoria to one for injunction, both containing
allegations clearly falling within the RTCs jurisdiction, petitioners insist and maintain that as indigenous persons, except for
two (2) petitioners, with the subject property claimed as their ancestral land, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction
over the case. For the petitioners, with a submission that the ponencia already dismissed, the mere fact that this case involves
members of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Persons (ICCs/IPs) and their ancestral land, automatically endows
the NCIP, under Section 66 of the IPRA, with jurisdiction over petitioners' complaint. Even the NCIP is of the view of its original
and exclusive jurisdiction over both the original and amended complaints. Hence, the two (2) Motions to Refer the Case to the
Regional Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP) filed by the NCIP Hearing Officer before the
court a quo.

I concur with the ponencia on the basis of the principle that "jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and determined by the allegations in the complaint, and that the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted." As clearly delineated in the ponencia, upon a careful review of Section 66 and based on
the qualifying proviso, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they
arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. And, as clearly alleged by the petitioners in their complaint, the
defendants they impleaded are not indigenous people.

I submit that the jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be definitively drawn to settle doubts that still linger due to the implicit
affirmation done in The City Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.[1] of the NCIP's jurisdiction over cases
where one of the parties are not ICCs/IPs.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by statute, to hear and decide a case.[2] The
authority to decide a cause at all is what makes up jurisdiction.

The enabling statute, Section 66 of the IPRA, is the measure of quasi-judicial powers the NCIP may exercise:[3]

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought
to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to
the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied).

The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the IPRA which recognizes and promotes all the
rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of the Constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate of the NCIP to protect
and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.[4]

The other provisions point out that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.[5] Nonetheless, the creation of such a government agency
does not per se grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the regular courts from taking cognizance,
and exercising jurisdiction over cases which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs.

Significantly, while Section 66 uses the word "all" to qualify the ICCs/IPs "claims and disputes" covered by NCIP jurisdiction, it
unmistakably contains the proviso, that restrains or limits the initial generality of the grant of jurisdiction.

As outlined in the ponencia, the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP are: (1) the claim and dispute involves the
rights of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. Both elements must
be present prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction.

We cannot, therefore, be confined to the first phrase that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs and therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and disputes to the
exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the legislative intention that: (1) the NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or
(2) the regular courts be excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature
could have easily done so as in other instances conferring primary, and original and exclusive jurisdiction to a specific
administrative body.

Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested by the Constitution or by
statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.[6] The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the
jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.[7] In one occasion, we have held that regular courts cannot or
should not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before
the question is resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered.[8] The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question arising in the
proceeding before the court."[9]

Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction.[10] It applies where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.[11] In some instances, the
Constitution and statutes grant the administrative body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized
government agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of jurisdiction bestowed by the Constitution and statutes
on the Ombudsman.

The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice[12] delineated primary and
concurrent jurisdiction as opposed to original and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution and statutes[13] on the
Ombudsman concurrent, albeit primary, with the Department of Justice.

Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:

SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and prosecute cases involving
public officials. If it were the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly
declared the exclusive conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as
may be provided by law.

Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15
thereof provides:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.

Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 to
lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8,
dated November 8, 1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, to
wit:

A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman charging any public officer or
employee including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the subject of
criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving criminal offenses may be
subdivided into two classes, to wit: (I) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute, such
cases.

The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by
an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their
assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.

The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigative
agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.

It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly differentiated the authority to
investigate cases from the authority to prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on
the nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases. Whence, focus is directed to
the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that
the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise
of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.

That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not
exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the Court. (Emphasis
supplied)

In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in 1990, the Court expressly
declared:

A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the power of investigation
including preliminary investigation vested on the Ombudsman is exclusive.

Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of the Ombudsman Act, the
Court held in said case:

Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government. Such investigatory agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial court.

In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to
conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the
only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation in the exercise of his
primary jurisdiction.
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the Ombudsman, under the
authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a
public official, elucidating thus:

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty to "act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or
omission of any public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13.) The Ombudsman is also empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the
Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action against a public official xxx and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to
penetrate judges' and fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into
malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create
a special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the
acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).

Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the Ombudsman as a special body to
investigate erring public officials would be wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of
minor and less grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would exclude those
grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official powers and prerogatives, for it is the
investigation of the latter where the need for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like
the Ombudsman, is greatest.

At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in the Cojuangco, Jr. case and
the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court
elucidated on the nature of the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.

In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that the Ombudsman has
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate is merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case
of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the
approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not
have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all.
In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate
charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public
official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act
or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement
of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.

In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice in connection with
the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may
conduct the investigation.

In Natividad vs. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor contended that it is the
Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over
his case for alleged Murder, the Court held:

The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs.
Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation
relative to the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on the
cases cognizable by the former.

In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the subject matter, has been in a
state of flux.

These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486, — the first law on the
Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.

The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to read as follows:

'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: '(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fme of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where
the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fme
of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court."

A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense
to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in
relation to his office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00.

Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second requirement has been met, the first
requirement is wanting. A review of these Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Big. 129, would
reveal that the crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their office" if it is to
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has
been retained by Pres. Decree No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary
jurisdiction on its power to investigate.

It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pan materia to Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987
Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to
investigate is dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari materia when
they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of persons or things, or object, or cover the same
specific or particular subject matter.

It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not only to be consistent with itself,
but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system. The rule is expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi, " or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of
the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into
consideration. It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had in mind
previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of any express repeal or amendment,
the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute,
specifically, Pres. Decree No. 1861.

R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan Law (P.D. 1861) likewise
provides that for other offenses, aside from those enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public officers or employees
in relation to their office.

In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies
such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at
any stage. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx

To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges against
any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor
or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that
all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere
superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the
preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law
agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is
derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case as not being
contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman
may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
I referred to Honasan II to emphasize the point that the NCIP cannot be said to have primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP
cases comparable to what the Ombudsman has in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We do
not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA.

Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs.

Here, I revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative body
which in all instances of such grant was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or the enabling statute, to wit:

1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections contests;[14]

2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A[15] prior to its transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court by
virtue of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation Code;

3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties
imposed by it in the exercise of its powers, functions and responsibilities;[16]

4. Department of Agrarian Reform's[17] primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources;[18]

5. Construction' Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving contracts of
construction, whether government or private, as long as the parties agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration;[19]

6. Voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators' original and exclusive jurisdiction over all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies;[20]

7. The National Labor Relations Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases listed in Article 217 of the Labor
Code involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural; and

8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all deportation cases.[21]

That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs
where the opposing party is non-ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to govern in the
lives of the ICCs/IPs.

Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights
of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs
which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a
practical concern, non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot
determine the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the
controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short,
the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given
controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an
opposing non-ICC/IP.

In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,[22] the Court delineated the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, specifically
paragraph 3 thereof, as all money claims of workers, limited to "cases arising from employer-employee relations." The same
clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today, but the Court ruled that such was a
limitation on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:

The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is outlined in Article 217 of
the Labor Code xxx:

"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by
the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of-wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims
for employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;

4. Cases involving household services; and

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts.

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters."

While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the
entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place, paragraph 3 should
be read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor
practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4
(claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and paragraph 5
(relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying
element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out
of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the
rule of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any other
paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an
examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended by BP Blg. 227, and even though earlier
versions of Article 217 of the Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee relations,'" which clause was not expressly carried over, in
printer's ink, in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which
do not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore
fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority
to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of
Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection the employer-employee relationship,
or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that money claims of workers which
now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have
some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs" does not necessarily grant the NCIP
all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of the parties, i.e.
whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.

In all, for the reason that under the provisions of the IPRA, specifically Section 66 thereof, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is special
and limited, confined only to cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to the same ICC/IP, the original
and amended complaint herein properly fall within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, specifically the RTC. Thus, I concur in
the denial of the petition.

[1]
G.R. No. 180206, 597 Phil. 668 (2009).

[2]
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 154470-71 and G.R. Nos. 154589-90, September 24, 2012, 681
SCRA521 556

[3]
Id.

[4] Section 39 IPRA.

[5]
Section 38 IPRA.

[6] Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125339, June 22, 1998, 291 SCRA 122, 132.

[7] See Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. v. NTC, 388 Phil. 624, 636 (2000).

[8]
Sps. Abejo v. Judge De la Cruz, 233 Phil. 668, 684-685 (1987).

[9]
Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 403 (2002).

[10]
Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427
SCRA 46, 67.

[11]
Supra note 9.

[12]
Supra note 10.

[13]
Republic Act No. 6770, known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" and the "1987 Administrative Code."

[14]
Article IX-C, Section 2, paragraph 2.

SEC. 2. The Commission on elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

xxx

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction, xxx

[15]
Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission over
corporations, partnerships and other forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and
decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving.
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partnership,
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholder,
partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.

b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members, or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders,
members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it
concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and

c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships
or associations.

[16]
RA 9136, Section 43, paragraph u.

[17]
Including the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication board (DARAB).

[18]
The DAR's jurisdiction under Section 50 of RA 6657 is two-fold: (1) Essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement
and administration of laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second is
judicial and involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.

[19]
Except for disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Cdde of
the Philippines; EO No. 1008 or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law.

[20]
Articles 260-261 of the Labor Code.

[21] Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 10, Section 31.

[22]
G.R. No. 80774, 244 Phil. 741, 747 (1988).

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J..:

I concur with the ponencia in holding that respondents' action, alleged to be involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an
indigenous cultural community/indigenous people (ICC/IP), does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).

A careful reading of Section 66[1] of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997,
with particular emphasis on its proviso will reveal that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to disputes where both parties are
members of ICC/IPs and come from the same ethnolinguistic group.

Thus, the assailed Decision dated August 17, 2006 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00204-MIN must be affirmed.

The present Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] is an offshoot of a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order or preliminary prohibitory injunction with damages[3] (Original Complaint) filed by
respondents against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon on March 3, 2004, docketed as
Civil Case No. 04-03-01. This Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria was subsequently amended by respondents into a Complaint
for injunction, damages, and other relief[4] (Amended Complaint).

On March 20, 2004, petitioners Brazil and Macapayag filed their Answer to the original Complaint, asserting that respondents
had no cause of action against them.[5]

On March 23, 2004, the other petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They argued that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the case. They asserted that they were members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan Talaandig Tribal
Association or the Talaandig Tribe, and claimed residence in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon. They noted that on July
25, 2003, Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued in favor of the Talaandig Tribe through
NCIP En Bane Resolution No. 08-2003. On October 30, 2003, this Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim was formally awarded
to the Talaandig Tribe by former President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo. The Certificate covered a total area of 11,105.5657
hectares in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon.[6] Petitioners argued that as the case filed by respondents entailed a
dispute over the ancestral land of an ICC/IP, it fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the NCIP.[7]

On July 1, 2004, the NCIP filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office - National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (Motion to Refer). As with petitioners who filed the Motion to Dismiss, the NCIP insisted that the Regional Trial Court
did not have jurisdiction over the case.[8]

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement the original Complaint into one for injunction,
damages, and other relief. Attached to this Motion was the amended Complaint.[9]

On July 30, 3004, petitioners filed their Opposition to the Admission of the amended Complaint. On August 1, 2004, they also
filed a Motion to Dismiss the amended Complaint, insisting on the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction.[10]

On August 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order granting the Motion to Amend and Supplement. The same
Order declared the NCIP's Motion to Refer and petitioners' Motions to Dismiss moot and academic.[11]

On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer and another Motion to Dismiss.[12]

On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and a Motion for Judgment by Default.[13]

On February 14, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order denying the Motion to Refer, declaring petitioners (except
Macapayag and Brazil, who had earlier filed an Answer) in default, and calling the case for pre-trial (against Macapayag and
Brazil) and for ex-parte presentation of evidence (against the other petitioners). The court also issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction subject to respondents' posting of a P100,000.00 bond.[14]

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before
the Court of Appeals.

In the Decision[15] dated August 17, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification (i.e., lifted the order of default) the
Regional Trial Court's February 14, 2005 Order. In the Resolution dated July 4, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition was filed.

Petitioners pray that the Court of Appeals' August 17, 2006 Decision and July 4, 2007 Resolution be reversed and set aside and
that a decision be rendered declaring that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction, enjoining the Regional Trial Court from
proceeding, ordering that the case be referred to the NCIP, and declaring void the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court.

Petitioners insist that the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case as it involves the ancestral domain of an
ICC/IP. They also assail the amendment of the Complaint from accion reivindicatoria to one for injunction, saying that the
amendment was made merely to clothe the Regional Trial Court with jurisdiction and to downplay how the case is ultimately
concerned with an ICC/IP's rights over its ancestral domain. Likewise, they claim that the NCIP should not be deprived of
jurisdiction merely on account of the Complaints' failure to allege that parties to the case belong to ICCs/IPs.

This case concerns the issue of which, between the Regional Trial Court and the NCIP, has jurisdiction over the case.

The case filed by respondents does not fall within the scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction as laid out in Section 66[16] of the
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.

"Jurisdiction is the power and authority of [a] tribunal to hear, try and decide a case."[17] Moreover, "[jurisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by law."[18] It could not be conferred by any other source, such as the parties' action or conduct
and "any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void."[19]

The NCIP does not have jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties does not belong to an indigenous cultural community.

Section 38 of the Act created the NCIP to carry out the policies set forth in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Per Section 38,
the NCIP "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as
well as their rights thereto." Section 39 provides for the NCIP's mandate to "protect and promote the interest and well-being
of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions."

Chapter IX of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act pertains to the quasi-judicial powers of the NCIP. Thus, Section
69[20] expressly enables the NCIP to exercise powers that are necessary incidents of this quasi-judicial power: the
promulgation of rules and regulations; the administration of oaths; the power to summon parties, issue subpoenas, and
contempt power; and the power to issue writs of injunction. Section 68[21] enables the NCIP to issue writs of execution.
Section 67[22] provides for the mode of appeal from decisions of the NCIP. Section 70[23] bars inferior courts from restraining
proceedings in the NCIP. Section 65[24] establishes a framework for resolving disputes by recognizing the primacy of customary
laws and practices.

Section 66 specifically provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP:

SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a
certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition with the NCIP.

Section 66's grant of jurisdiction is ostensibly cast in absolute terms: "over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."

However, further into Section 66 are two clauses that qualify the NCIP's jurisdiction. First is the proviso that "no such dispute
shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. " Second is
that "a certification . . . issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved . . . shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. "

A cursory reading of these clauses shows that they state a procedural requirement (i.e., exhaustion of remedies under
customary law) and a formal requirement (i.e., certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders) that must first be
complied with before the NCIP may take cognizance of a case. However, these procedural and formal requirements are not all
there is to the qualifying clauses of Section 66.
 II

Attention must be drawn to the proviso's choice of words. To reiterate, the proviso reads: "Provided, however, That no such
dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws."

The proviso uses the plural term "the parties." It also uses the plural "their," which is a possessive pronoun substituting for the
noun phrase "the parties."

The use of the plural "the parties" necessarily means that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies provided under
customary laws is a requirement that is not exclusive to a singular party.

The basic framework of adversarial litigation, as is the case in our a jurisdiction, is one that entails two (2) parties: first, the
one initiating or bringing the action (i.e., the plaintiff/complainant/ claimant/petitioner); and the one against whom an action
is initiated or brought (i.e., the defendant/respondent).

Thus, for Section 66 to say that "the parties" must exhaust all remedies is to say
that both plaintiff/complainant/claimant/petitioner, on one hand, and defendant/respondent, on the other, must comply. In a
case brought by A against B, both A and B must comply with the requirement.

Had Section 66 intended that compliance with the requirement by only one party shall suffice, it should have used the singular
"a party," similar language like "either party" or permissive language like "a/the party/ies? Had Section 66 intended that the
requirement must be complied with by a specific party, it should have used specific language like "the petitioner."

One may point out that the plural "the parties" can be taken to mean two or more of several petitioners, or two or more of
several respondents where there are multiple petitioners and/or respondents. This interpretation is untenable. Precisely, it
would find application only in situations where there are multiple petitioners and/or respondents. To adopt this interpretation
would, therefore, be to unduly restrict and to render inutile under general circumstances the requirement of exhaustion of
remedies.

III

The phrase "their customary laws" is significant in two respects. First, "their" is a plural possessive pronoun substituting for
the noun phrase "the parties." Second, "their" is a possessive determiner indicating possession (or otherwise a sense of
belonging) of the words that follow it.

Section 66's use of the phrase "their customary laws" is, therefore, to say that "the parties" have customary laws. Considering
what the phrase "the parties" refers to (as explained previously), it follows that both the petitioner(s) and the respondent(s)
must have or adhere to customary laws in order that a case between them may fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP.

Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act defines "customary laws" as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
....

f) Customary Laws — refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs[.] (Emphasis
supplied)

It is evident that only those belonging to ICCs/IPs have or adhere to customary laws. Since Section 66 refers to parties having
customary laws, it follows that the NCIP's jurisdiction, as defined in Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act, is limited
to parties who belong to ICCs/IPs. It excludes those who do not.

To hold otherwise is to summarily compel those who do not belong to ICCs/IPs to adhere and subject themselves to
customary laws despite their not having "traditionally and continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed"[25] these laws.
This runs afoul of fair play and violates their right to due process.

Thus, Section 66's qualifiers—as specifically worded—indicate that cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP must be
limited to those where both parties belong to ICCs/IPs.

IV

The requirement that both parties must exhaust all remedies provided under their customary laws necessarily means that
both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP.

The word "respective" denotes "belonging or relating to each one of the people or things that have been mentioned."[26]

Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act conceives of "customary laws" as "refer[ring] to a body of ... rules, usages,
customs[,] and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed by respective ICCs/IPs." Thus,
inherent in the Act's conception of "customary laws" is a recognition that each ICC/IP has a set of continually recognized,
accepted, and observed rules, usages, customs, and practices that is distinct and separate from those of other ICCs/IPs.

The recognition that ICCs/IPs have distinct customary laws is similarly a recognition that each ICC/IP has a distinct dispute
settlement mechanism pursuant to their respective customary laws. To belong to a specific ICC/IP is, therefore, to say that
one adheres not only to a specific set of customary laws but also to a specific dispute settlement mechanism applicable to that
ICC/IP.

Thus, much as interpreting Section 66 as encompassing disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP runs afoul of fair
play and violates the (non-ICC/IP member's) right to due process, so does interpreting Section 66 as encompassing disputes
where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs. As with the former, to make such a conclusion is to summarily compel a party
who adheres to a specific set of customary laws and dispute settlement mechanisms to adhere and be subjected to another
set of customary laws.

Rule IV, Section 14 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP
(NCIP Rules) provides for situations "[w]here one of the parties . . . does not belong to the same IP/IC Community" as an
exception to the requirement of a certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute. This is a recognition that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not provide a dispute settlement
mechanism where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs. However, even as Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules does away
with the certification requirement, it cannot serve to extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes involving parties from different
ICCs/IPs.

Extending the NCIP's jurisdiction to those who do not belong to an indigenous cultural community or are not indigenous
peoples finds no support elsewhere in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.

Section 66 is the sole provision of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act that spells out the NCIP's jurisdiction in respect of
the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

This court has defined quasi-judicial power as follows:

 Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative
agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power
when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature,
where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the proper
exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

Judicial power, in turn, has been defined in Macasiano v. National Housing Authority,[28] as the "right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."[29] In Lopez v. Roxas:[30]

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.[31]

It is true that the other provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act pertain to the competencies of the NCIP. However, a
reading of these provisions will show that they do not extend the NCIP's jurisdiction, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power,
to those who do not belong to ICCs/IPs.

Section 38[32] creates the NCIP and states its purpose as "the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto."

Section 39[33] articulates in broad language the mandate of the NCIP to "protect and promote the interest and well-being of
the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions."

Section 44[34] provides that the NCIP shall have the "powers, jurisdiction and function" provided therein in order that it may
"accomplish its mandate." Section 44 lists 17 of such "powers, jurisdiction and function":

Item (a) identifies the NCIP "as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek government
(1)
assistance and as the medium, through which such assistance may be extended."

Item (b) authorizes the NCIP "[t]o review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs ... to propose relevant laws and
(2)
policies[,]" a function which is evidently not (quasi-)judicial in nature.

(3) Item (c) refers to the "formulat[ion] and implementation] [of] policies, plans, programs and projects[.]"

Item (d) permits the NCIP to avail itself of "the services and support" of experts and consultants, whether from
(4)
government or the private sector.

(5) Item (e) places in the NCIP the authority "[t]o issue certificate[s] of ancestral land/domain title."

(6) Item (f) enables the NCIP "to enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangement[s]. . . and ... to obtain loans."

Item (g) enables the NCIP "[t]o negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts[,] and/or properties . . .
(7)
and administer the same."

(8) Item (h) makes the NCIP the "coordinator] [of] development programs and projects."
 Item (i) enables the NCIP "[t]o convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as
(9)
propose policies or plans."

Item (j) spells out the NCIP's advisory and reportorial duties vis-a-vis the President of the Philippines, i.e.,
(10) "[t]o advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty (60)
days after the close of each calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements."

(11) Item (k) allows the NCIP "[t]o submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals."

Item (1) spells out the budgetary duty of the NCIP, ie., "[t]o prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the
(12)
Office of the President."

Item (m) relates to the "issu[ance] [of] . . . certification[s] as a pre-condition to the grant of... authority for the
(13) disposition, utilization, management[s] and appropriation by any private individual, corporate entity or any
government agency, corporation or subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain[.]"

Item (n) provides for the NCIP's appellate power, i.e., "[t]o decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the
(14)
various offices within the Commission."

Item (o) provides for the NCIP's rule-making power, i.e., "[t]o promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for
(15)
the implementation of this Act. "

Item (p) is a catch-all provision enabling the NCIP "[t]o exercise such other powers and functions as may be
(16)
directed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines."

Item (q) allows the NCIP "[t]o represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences and
(17)
conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and other related concerns."

None but two (2) of these 17 "powers, jurisdiction and function[s]" are directly related to the NCIP's exercise of its
quasi-judicial power. These two (2) items are item (n)—on the NCIP's appellate power—and Item (o)— on the NCIP's
rule-making power— which may be read vis-a-vis Section 69's investiture upon the NCIP of the power "[t]o promulgate rules
and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its internal
functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." Neither of these two
states that the NCIP's jurisdiction extends to disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP or to those where the parties
belong to different ICCs/IPs.

Item (m) enables the NCIP to exercise authority over those who not belong to ICCs/IPs, i.e., "any private individual, corporate
entity or any government agency, corporation or subdivision thereof." However, item (m) refers specifically to the "issuance
of certification[s] as a pre-condition to the grant of ... authority for the disposition, utilization, management[s] and
appropriation ... on any part or portion of the ancestral domain[.]" It does not refer to the "exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature"[35] and the "determin[ation] [of] actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."[36]

VI

Reliance on the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing Rules and Regulations and the NCIP's rules in support of the
assertion that the NCIP has jurisdiction is misplaced. In extending the NCIP's jurisdiction, these rules contradict statutory
provisions.

Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing Rules and Regulations reads:

RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR

ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
 Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands,
involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall
be resolved by the concerned parties through the application of customary laws in the area
where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard
and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before
the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of
Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or Decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 reads:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;

Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of
c.
ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes,
a.
between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as
a.
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date
of registration. (Emphasis supplied)

Apart from these, Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous
dispute settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP.
In giving due regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance
the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following cases:
 1. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person
or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official
functions;

2. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when
he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

3. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and
irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

4. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable
reasons. (Emphasis supplied)

These provisions support the conclusion that the NCIP has jurisdiction even over cases where a party does not belong to an
ICC/IP.

However, it is a basic principle in administrative law that an administrative rule must conform to and not contradict the
provision of an enabling law. In Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:[37]

As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code,[38] an administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law
on which it is based. . . . The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of
law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and
purposes of the law, and should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
by law.

To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling
law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to
implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void.

While administrative agencies . . . may issue regulations to implement statutes, they are without authority to
limit the scope of the statute to less than what it provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms,
or in any way modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency
for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and
an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.[39]

The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act does not extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes involving those who do not belong to
ICCs/IPs. The precise wording of Section 66 and the silence of the remainder of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on
extending the NCIP's jurisdiction bear this out.

Likewise, "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law.[40] No amount of administrative rule-making can vest
jurisdiction where neither Constitution nor statute vests it.

Thus, Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Section 5, and
Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules, insofar as they extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes where a party does not
belong to an ICC/IP, must be deemed null and void. They are inconsistent with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act in that they
modify and expand the NCIP's jurisdiction as spelled out in Section 66. In light of this discrepancy between a basic law and
administrative rules, the basic law—the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act— must prevail.

VII
In sum, the requirements for the proper exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction over a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, are as follows:

(1) The claim or dispute must involve the rights of ICCs/IPs;

(2) Both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP;

(3) These parties must have exhausted all remedies provided under their ICC/IP's customary laws; and

Compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under customary laws must be evidenced by a
(4) certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute, to the
effect that the dispute has not been resolved.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondents do not belong to an ICC/IP. Their sole interest is in their supposed ownership
and possession of land which, in turn, "appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe."[41] Thus, the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples may not exercise jurisdiction over the case filed by respondents.

VII

Customary norms are as varied as there are tribes within ethnolinguistic groups. If we are to animate the spirit of both the
Constitution and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, we should not stereotype all cultures as homogenous or incapable of
dynamic interfaces with each other. Customary law is a descriptive label which should acknowledge that each tribe lived
through its own history and endogenously emerged their own set of norms reflecting their values and lifeways. To say that the
customary norms of the Kalinga are the same as those of the Subanen betrays the same colonial mindset that marginalized
what our colonizers called as "Non-Christian Tribes" in the distant past.

Neither should we straightjacket any culture as incapable of dynamic interfaces or accommodation with other cultures.
Various groups of indigenous communities are able to work with the entirety of our legal system in appropriate cases. This
case, which involves a party not of their tribe, is certainly one such case.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The assailed Decision dated August 17, 2006 and
Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN must be AFFIRMED.

[1]
SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

[2]
Rollo, p. 21-50.

[3]
Id. at 60, Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006.

[4]
Id.

[5] Id.

[6]
Id. at 79, Original Certificate of Title.
[7]
Id. at 30-32, Petition for Review on Certiorari.

[8]
Id. at 60, Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006.

[9]
Id.

[10] Id. at 61.

[11] Id.

[12]
Id.

[13]
Id.

[14]
Id. at 61-62.

[15]
Id. at 57-68.

[16]
SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification
shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

[17] Veneracion v. Mancilla, 528 Phil. 309, 325 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].

[18]
Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457, 468 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing Spouses Vargas v. Spouses
Caminas, 577 Phil. 185 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 503 Phil. 288 (2005)
[Per J. Tinga, Second Division]; and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229 Phil. 234, 242 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, First
Division].

[19]
Magno v. People of the Philippines, 662 Phil. 726, 735 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division]; citing Machado v. Gatdula, 626
Phil. 457 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

[20]
SECTION 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. — The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those
pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and other document of similar nature as
may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;

c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity.

[21]
SECTION 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. — Upon expiration of the period herein provided and no appeal is
perfected by any of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own initiative or upon motion by the
prevailing party, shall issue a writ of execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to execute final decisions, orders or
awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP.

[22]
SECTION 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. — Decisions of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way
of a petition for review.

[23]
SECTION 70. No Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. — No inferior court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any of its duly authorized or designated offices
in any case, dispute or controversy arising from, necessary to, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws relating to
ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

[24]
SECTION 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices. — When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices
shall be used to resolve the dispute.

[25]
Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997), sec. 3(f).

[26]
Merriam Webster Online (Visited October 21, 2015).

[27]
Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 538 Phil. 817, 860-861 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division], citing Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1018-1019 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[28]
G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA236 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

[29]
Id. at 243.

[30]
124 Phil. 168 (1966) [Per C.J. Concepcion, En Banc].

[31]
Id. at 173, citing Black, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. p. 82; Ruperlo vs. Torres, 100 Phil. 1098 [Per J. Labrador, Unreported
Case], in turn citing 34 C.J. 1183-1184; Wheeling & Elm Grove Railroad Co., Appt. vs. Town of Philadelphia, et al., 4 LRA (NS) pp.
321, 328-329.

[32]
Section 38. "National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). — To carry out the
policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and
protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the rights thereto.

[33]
Section 39. Mandate. — The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to
their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.

[34]
Section 44. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall have the following powers, jurisdiction and
function:

a) To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek government assistance and as the medium,
through which such assistance may be extended;

b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing laws and policies pertinent thereto and to propose
relevant laws and policies to address their role in national development;

c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects for the economic, social and cultural development of
the ICCs/IPs and to monitor the implementation thereof;

d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from other agencies of government or employ private experts
and consultants as may be required in the pursuit of its objectives;
e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;

f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangement, with government or private agencies or
entities as may be necessary to attain the objectives of this Act, and subject to the approval of the President, to obtain loans
from government lending institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs;

g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or properties in whatever form and from whatever source,
local and international, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer
the same in accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any condition, in such manner consistent with the
interest of ICCs/IPs as well as existing laws;

h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the advancement of the ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper
implementation thereof;

i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as propose policies or plans;

j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty (60) days after the
close of each calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements;

k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to carry out the policies under this Act;

1) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the President;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease, grant, or any other similar authority for
the disposition, utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual, corporate entity or any government
agency, corporation or subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain taking into consideration the
consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;

n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the Commission;

o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act;

p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines; and

q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and
other related concerns.

[35]
Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, 538 Phil. 817, 860-861 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division], citing Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1018-1019 (1996) [Per J. Vitug, First Division].

[36] Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, July 1, 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].

[37]
617 Phil. 358 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

[38]
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse,
or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
[39]
Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 617 Phil. 358, 368-369 (2009) [Per J.
Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc], citing Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407 (2005) [Per Acting C.J. Panganiban,
Third Division] and Sunga v. Commission on Elections, 351 Phil. 310 (1998) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].

[40]
Machado v. Gatdula, 626 Phil. 457, 468 (2010) [Per J. Brion, Second Division], citing Spouses Vargas v. Spouses Caminas,
511 Phil. 185 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division]; Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 503 Phil. 288 (2005) [Per J. Tinga,
Second Division]; and Dy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 229 Phil. 234, 242 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

[41]
Ponencia, April 23, 2014, p. 2.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: November 10, 2017

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Supreme Court E-Library

SECOND DIVISION
[ A.C. No. 11334, January 07, 2019 ]
JOCELYN SORENSEN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, RESPONDENT.

A.C. NO. 11335

JOCELYN SORENSEN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:

The Case

These consolidated administrative cases stemmed from the continuous negligence of respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon to
handle the legal matters entrusted to him by his client and herein complainant, Jocelyn Sorensen, or to atleast inform
complainant of the progress of the cases. This is in violation of Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

Complainant Jocelyn Sorensen alleges that she first engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Florito T. Pozon in 1995 for
the reconstitution of the title of Lot No. 6662 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP
10,000.00).

In 1996, complainant again engaged respondent's services to file a petition for the issuance of a new owner's copy of
the title of Lot No. 6659 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

In 2000, complainant engaged respondent's services for a third time to secure the title of Lot No. 6651 in Pangan-an,
Lapu-Lapu City for the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

In 2003, complainant engaged respondent as her counsel for the last time to secure the title of Lot No. 2393-M in Yati, Liloan,
Cebu for the sum of Twenty-Four Thousand Pesos (PhP 24,000.00).

In 2011, complainant filed a verified Complaint[1] against respondent, docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3151 and CBD Case No.
11-3182, with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission) for respondent's alleged
neglect to handle complainant's cases or to at least inform complainant of the progress of the cases, in violation of Rules
18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Complaint alleged that despite complainant's payment
amounting to Seventy-Two Thousand Pesos (PhP 72,000.00), the above mentioned cases have yet to be concluded.

To support her allegations, complainant attached cop1es of the following to her complaint:

(1) Annex A - copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 2,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 and PhP 3,000.00 for
Lot No. 6659 dated 4 November 1996;

(2) Annex B - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 5,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 dated 15 November
1995;

(3) Annex C - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 3,000.00 dated 17 March 1999;

(4) Annex D - a copy of the acknowledgement receipt for PhP 3,000.00 for Lot No. 6662 dated 17 March 1999;

(5) Annex E- a copy of a check amounting to PhP 5,000.00 dated 27 October 2001;

(6) Annex F-a copy of a check amounting to PhP 40,000.00 for Lot Nos. 6651 and 6659 dated 22 January 2003;
and

(7) Annex G- a copy of a check amounting to PhP 6,000.00 dated 7 May 2000.

In his Answer,[2] respondent admitted that he was the legal counsel for complainant's lots in Cebu. For the 1995 case covering
Lot No. 6662, respondent alleged that the acceptance fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000.00) was made in several
installments. Respondent alleged that the 1996 case turned out to be a difficult case because an aggrieved party appeared
and filed a criminal action against complainant including respondent. The case was settled amicably and complainant decided
to forego the case.

For the 1996 case covering Lot No. 6659, respondent alleged that he only received a partial payment of Three Thousand Pesos
(PhP 3,000.00) out of the agreed upon acceptance fee of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (PhP 15,000.00).

For the 2000 case covering Lot No. 6651, respondent alleged that he had already gone to the City Assessor of Lapu-Lapu City
and to the Revenue Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Banilad, Cebu City to handle the matter.
Respondent averred that the delay was due to complainant's refusal to shoulder respondent's travel costs to the Land
Registration Office in Quezon City. Similar to the second case, complainant failed to present any witness to prove the
circumstance of loss of the owner's copy of the title. -

Lastly, for the 2003 case, respondent alleged that the delay was again due to complainant's failure to present any witness to
show that she or her predecessors-in-interest possessed the lot since 1940 or prior thereto.

The Commission ruled that "[e]ven if the complainant did in fact fail to provide witnesses, it was the duty of the respondent as
her counsel to communicate the importance and necessity of getting witnesses to advance their cause."[3] The Commission
faulted respondent for allowing eight years to pass without addressing complainant's cases. Furthermore, even without the
presentation of witnesses, respondent was able to secure a favorable decision from the Regional Trial Court ofLapu-Lapu City
in the 1996 case involving Lot No. 6659 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City.

Thus, respondent averred that what remains unresolved are the legal matters involving Lot No. 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu
City, and Lot No. 2393-M in Liloan, Cebu.

The Reports and Recommendations of the Commission on

Bar Discipline

On two separate instances, the Commission submitted two Reports and Recommendations to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, finding respondent guilty of violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On 18 June 2013, the Commission, through Commissioner Leo B. Malagar, submitted a Report and Recommendation[4] for
CBD Case No. 11-

3151. The Commission stated:

Clearly, the respondent is guilty of neglecting the complainant's legal matter which was entrusted to him in
1995, and such negligence in connection with the above-mentioned transactions renders respondent liable.
Moreover, respondent failed to keep the complainant who was his client informed of the status of the
transactions and he likewise failed to respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information.

In view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be ADMONISHED
considering that the complainant has not been materially prejudiced from respondent's omissions. Moreover,
it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be ORDERED TO RETURN the full amount of PhP
72,000.00 which the complainant has paid to the respondent.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[5]

On 2 February 2015, Commissioner Hannibal Augustus B. Bobis of the Commission on Bar Discipline likewise submitted a
similar Report and Recommendation[6] for CBD Case No. 11-3182. The Commission stated:

The respondent should be penalized for the acts alleged in the complaint. Although there are no more issues
concerning Lots 6662 and 6659 both located in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City, there are remaining issues
involving Lot 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City and Lot 2393-M in Liloan, Cebu. Admittedly, respondent
started work on these lots some time in the years 2000 and 2003, respectively. Thus, by the time the
complainant filed her complaint in September 2011, there has already been a lapse of eight (8) years since its
inception.

xxxx

As for the reimbursement of the sum of PhP 72,000.00, only a partial amount shall be returned to the
complainant.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be suspended for three (3) months
and that he should return the amount of twenty one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000.00) to the [complainant].

Respectfully submitted.[7]

The Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines
On 5 June 2015, a Resolution[8] was passed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying the
Reports and Recommendations of the Commission:

xxxx

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioners in the above-entitled cases, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", considering applicable laws and Respondent's [guilt for] violating Canon 18,
Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, Respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. Moreover, he is Ordered to Return the
amount of Twenty One Thousand (P21,000.00) Pesos.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Board of Governors consolidated the above-entitled cases as they involved the
same parties and raised similar Issues.

The Issue

Whether or not respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon is guilty of neglecting the legal matters entrusted to him by his client and
herein complainant, Jocelyn Sorensen.

The Ruling of the Court

We adopt the ruling of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. When a
lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic learning, skill, and
ability to handle the case. Thus, a lawyer's duty to safeguard the interests of his client commences from his retainer, the time
the lawyer accepts money from a client, until his effective release from the case, the time the legal matter in litigation is finally
disposed of.[9]

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent neglected the legal matters entrusted to him by complainant. Respondent even
failed to at least inform complainant of the progress of the cases. Respondent's inaction is clearly in violation of Rules 18.03
and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Rules state:

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 -A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information.

With regard to the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer, sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts is
required. This Court has consistently meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law to lawyers who neglect
their client's affairs and, at the same time, fail to return the latter's money and/or property despite demand.[10]

Considering respondent's lack of prior administrative record, suspension from the practice of law for one year is sufficient for
respondent's misconduct.

The case of Meneses v. Atty. Macalino[11] further emphasized that when a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended
purpose.

Conversely, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to the
client.

In the present case, respondent failed to safeguard complainant's interests after the retainer commenced. Respondent's mere
acceptance of the money from the client without fulfilling his duties as a lawyer is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety.
Respondent's actions constitute a clear violation of the trust reposed in him by complainant.

Complainant alleged that respondent received PhP 72,000.00 for filing fees. However, we agree with the Resolution of the
Board of Governors that only PhP 21,000.00 shall be returned to the complainant for failing to fulfill his duties as a lawyer. The
return of only the partial amount of PhP 21,000.00 was explained in the Report and Recommendation of the Commission in
CBD Case No. 11-3182. The Commission explained:

The March 17, 1999 acknowledgement receipt with the amount of three thousand pesos (PhP 3,000.00)
cannot be used against the respondent as he did not receive it personally. Likewise, the October 27, 2001
check in the amount of five thousand pesos (PhP 5,000.00) is not evidence that respondent received the said
amount as it is a "pay to cash" check.

The aggregate amount of ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000.00) represented in the July 4, 1996
acknowledgement receipt, the November 15, 1995 acknowledgement receipt, and the March 17, 1999
acknowledgement receipt were all specified to be for the services rendered by the respondent for Lot 6662 in
Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City which had already been resolved. Thus, respondent had already worked for this
amount.

Legal services were likewise concluded for the titling of Lot 6659 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City. Thus,
complainant is not entitled to the reimbursement of the agreed upon legal fee of fifteen thousand pesos (PhP
15,000.00).

Nonetheless, complainant should be reimbursed for the agreed legal fee of fifteen thousand pesos (PhP
15,000.00) to secure the title to Lot 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City. The remaining balance shall be
considered as spent for the expenses incurred by the respondent as this amount was beyond the agreed
upon legal fee as stated in the position paper of the complainant.

For the agreed fee to secure the title to Lot 2393-M in Yati, Liloan, Cebu, the complainant was only able to
prove that respondent received the amount of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000.00). Thus, the said amount
shall likewise be reimbursed to her.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent x x x should return the amount of
twenty one thousand pesos (PhP 21,000.00) to the [complainant].[12]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon GUILTY of violating Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year effective
immediately upon receipt of this Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely in the future. Respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Jocelyn Sorensen the amount of PhP
21,000.00 with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid for the
unresolved legal matters involving Lot No. 6651 in Pangan-an, Lapu-Lapu City and Lot No. 2393-M in Liloan, Cebu. Respondent
shall submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten (10) days from payment.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,[*] JJ., concur.

[*]
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2630 dated 18 December 2018.

[1]
Rollo (A.C. No. 11334), pp. 3-4 and Rollo, (A.C. No. 11335), pp. 2-A-3.

[2]
Rollo (A.C. No. 11334), pp. 37-40.

[3]
Id. at 117.

[4] Id. at 120-123.

[5] Id.
at 122-123.

[6] Td. at 114-119.

[7] Id. at 116, 118-119.

[8] Id.
at 112-113.

[9] Segovia
v. Atty. Javier, A.C. No. 10244, 12 March 2018.

[10] Andrada
v. Atty Cera, 764 Phil. 346 (2015); Maglente v. Atty. Agcaoili, Jr., 756 Phil. 116 (2015); Segovia-Ribaya v. Atty.
Lawsin, 721 Phil. 44 (2013).

[11] 518
Phil. 378,385 (2006).

[12] Rollo
(A.C. No. 11334), pp. 118-119.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: March 22, 2019

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Supreme Court E-Library

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 232060, January 14, 2019 ]
VIRGILIA T. AQUINO, NAZARIA T. AQUINO, AVELINA A. RONQUILLO, PATROCINIO T. AQUINO, AND RAMONCITO T.
NEPOMUCENO, PETITIONERS, VS. ESTATE OF TOMAS B. AGUIRRE, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the December 7, 2015 Decision[2] and May 15, 2017 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R SP No. 136103, which respectively granted the herein respondent's Petition for Annulment of
Judgment and thus nullified, reversed, and set aside the March 21, 2014 Order [4] and all other orders of the Bacoor, Cavite
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19 in LRC Case No. 8843-2009-59 and denied herein petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents

In 2009, petitioners Virgilia Aquino, Nazaria Aquino, Avelina Ronquillo, Patrocinio Aquino, Manuela Aquino, Lucita Bamba,
Ramoncito Nepomuceno, and Domingo Manimbao filed LRC Case No. 8843-2009-59 fur reconstitution of the lost Cavite
Registry of Deeds copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3269 registered in the name of their deceased parents.

On March 21, 2014, the RTC issued an Order, decreeing as follows:

x x x [I]t has been established that petitioners are the children of deceased Spouses Basilio A. Aquino and
Ambrosia Tantay. The deceased spouses left a parcel of land located at Bacoor, Cavite, containing an area of
Three Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Four (300,824) square meters, covered by and embraced in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3269, as evidenced by the owner's duplicate copy of the title, which has
been presented to the Branch Clerk of Court for comparison with the xerox copy submitted to the Land
Registration Authority. The subject property has been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
Spouses Basilio [A Aquino] and Ambrocia Tantay under Tax Declaration No. 238-0015-125611 and the realty
tax thereto had been paid until the year 2014. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the subject property since the year 1930's up to the present. That upon verification with the
Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, where the original copy of the said title is
supposedly on file, the said title is allegedly not existing and does not form part of their records. However, a
Report dated March 5, 2014 issued by the Land Registration Authority, states that:

'(2) The entire Imus Friar Land Estate of which Lot 5800 is a portion, appears in the records
of this Office to have been applied for registration of title in LRC (CLR) Record No. 8843 for
which Decree No. 101200 was issued on August 8, 1921.

(3) The technical description of Lot No. 5800 of the Imus Friar Land Estate, appearing on the
reproduction of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3269 was found correct after examination
and due computation. Said technical description when plotted on the Municipal Index Sheet
Nos. 9421, 12834, 17787 and 11772, does not appear to overlap previously plotted/decreed
properties in the area;'

The Government did not adduce any contrary evidence.

Considering the finding of the LRA that the technical description on TCT No. T-3269 was found correct and
does not overlap with other properties in the area, the petition is granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite is hereby
ordered to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3269, registered in the name of
Basilio Aquino married to Ambrocia Tantay, using as basis the owner's duplicate copy of the title, upon
payment of the corresponding legal fees.

SO ORDERED.[6]
On the claim that the property subject of the petition for reconstitution is covered by another existing title - TCT No. T-6874 -
respondent Estate of Tomas B. Aguirre filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of General Default with Motion to Admit Attached
Opposition,[7] which the trial court denied in a May 22, 2014 Order.[8] Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[9]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

However, before the above motion for reconsideration of the RTC's May 22, 2014 Order could be resolved, respondent filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment[10] with prayer for injunctive relief before the CA.

On December 7, 2015, the CA issued the assailed Decision, decreeing as follows:

Petitioner[11] asserts that there was extrinsic fraud committed in obtaining the assailed trial court's order in
the reconstitution proceedings because petitioner never had knowledge of the same or that petitioner was
kept ignorant of the suit. Thus, petitioner [claims] it was deprived of its day in court to oppose the petition.

Petitioner contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because private
respondents[12] failed to state the jurisdictional facts in their petition as required under Republic Act No.
26.[13]

THIS COURT'S RULING

The issue to be resolved before us is whether or not the trial court's order directing the Office of the Register
of Deeds of the Province of Cavite to reconstitute the original copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3269,
registered in the name of Basilio Aquino married to Ambrocia Tantay, should be annulled.

We rule in the affirmative.

Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an action with the Court of Appeals
to annul judgments or final orders and resolutions of Regional Trial Courts in civil actions. This remedy is only
available if 'the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are
no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.' Here, the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief are not available to petitioner without its fault because it was not made a party to
the reconstitution proceedings. Thus, the only remedy left to petitioner in this case is a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47, which it, in fact, filed.

xxxx

Petitioner invoked both grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction to support its petition.

xxxx

There are badges of fraud present in the case at bar which are committed by private respondents, such as: 1)
they never made petitioner estate a party to the reconstitution proceedings; 2) they never mentioned that
they were not in possession of the subject property; 3) they never divulged to the court that it was petitioner
estate who is presently occupying and in open, exclusive and adverse possession of the subject property; and
4) they never stated that there are other persons claiming rights over the property subject of
their reconstitution proceedings. All these tactics were employed by private respondents, not only to induce
the trial court in approving their petition, but also to prevent petitioner from participating in the proceedings
or opposing the petition. Here, petitioner estate was kept away from the reconstitution proceedings, was
ignorant thereof, and had no knowledge of the suit until 7 April 2014. These circumstances warrant the
granting of the petition.
We disagree with the contentions of private respondents that this petition is premature and that petitioner is
guilty of forum shopping. Petitioner need not await the resolution of its motion for reconsideration because
it is not a condition precedent in filing a petition for annulment. x x x

x x x The present petition for annulment is also based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

xxxx

The governing law for judicial reconstitution of title is R.A. No. 26. Section 15 thereof provides when an order
for reconstitution shall issue, as follows:

xxxx

From the foregoing, the following must be present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient
and proper to warrant the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at
the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

In reconstitution proceedings, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that before jurisdiction over the case
can be validly acquired, it is a condition sine qua nonthat the certificate of title has not been issued to
another person. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, the
reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition
for issuance of new title. x x x The existence of a prior title ipso facto nullifies the reconstitution proceedings.
The proper recourse is to assail directly in a proceeding before the regional trial court the validity of the
Torrens title already issued to the other person.

In the case at bench, the RTC lacked jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No.
T-3269 registered in the name of Basilio Aquino, there being another certificate of title, TCT No. T-6874,
covering the subject property in this case in the name of a different owner, registered in the name of Tomas
Aguirre. This was indicated in the Register of Deeds' Manifestation dated 1 April 2014 which was filed before
the trial court.

x x x Accordingly, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the same, and its judgment rendered thereafter is
null and void, which may be attacked anytime.

Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 provides for the contents of the petition for reconstitution, while Section 13
provides for the statements which shall be indicated in the notice of the petition.

The petition of private respondents failed to state the following: 1) the location, area and boundaries of the
property; 2) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; 3) the
names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the
adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; and 4) a statement that no
deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration.

It is noteworthy that during the Clarificatory Hearing before this Court held last 4 February 2014, the
following were established and admitted: 1) petitioner made improvement on the subject property, put up a
fence, and assigned security guards thereat; 2) petitioner is in possession of the subject property; and 3)
Transfer Certificate of Title No.T-3269 being reconstituted, is actually covered by, identical to and/or the
same as the real property covered by TCT No. T-6874 registered in the name of Tomas Aguirre.
 Similarly, the notice of hearing failed to state the following: 1) the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property; 2) the owners of the adjoining properties; 3) all other interested parties
[including herein petitioner]; 4) the location, area and boundaries of the property. No proof was presented
that the adjoining owners and actual occupants of the subject property were notified of the hearing.

In Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court ruled that the requirements of Section 12
and Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 are mandatory and jurisdictional and non-compliance therewith would render
all proceedings utterly null and void. The Highest Court reiterated this rule in Tahanan Development Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., and re-affirmed said doctrine in MWSS vs. Sison, et al., as follows, to wit:

xxxx

x x x Thus, the RTC lacked jurisdiction in the reconstitution proceedings.

Its orders were null and void.

It need not be emphasized that the RTC hastily acted on the petition tor reconstitution because it did not act
on the Register of Deeds' Manifestation dated 1 April 2014 informing the Court of the existence of TCT No.
T-6874 registered in the name of Tomas Aguirre married to Adelita C. Aguirre, which also covers the same
property covered by TCT No. T-3269 in the name of Basilio Aquino married to Ambrocia Tantay. x x x The
validity of the certificate of title can be threshed out only in a direct proceeding filed for the purpose. A
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally.

It is also a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether the title was procured by falsification or fraud
can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. x x x

Indeed, the reconstitution proceeding constituted a collateral attack on the Torrens title of Tomas Aguirre.
The proper recourse of the private respondents to contest the validity of the certificate of title is not through
the subject petition tor reconstitution, but in a proper proceeding instituted for such purpose.

The conflict between the two sets of titles has to be resolved. The present standoff cannot remain
indefinitely under a titling system that assures the existence of only one valid title for every piece of
registered land.

Based on the foregoing, the petition for annulment is warranted.

There is no need to rule upon the other incidents in this case. The injunctive reliefs prayed for were already
denied by this Court during the Clarificatory Hearing held on 4 February 201[4].

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Order dated 21 March 2014 and all other orders issued by the Regional Trial Court Branch 19, City of Bacoor,
Cavite, in LRC Case No. 8843-2009-59 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE tor being NULL and VOID. Accordingly, the
Petition for Reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3269 is DISMISSED. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.[14] (Citations omitted)

Petitioners moved to reconsider, but in a May 15, 2017 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.

Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues to be resolved:

I.

THE MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS DECISION

AND RESOLUTION COMPELLED HEREIN PETITIONERS X X X TO PRAY FOR THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT TO EXERCISE ITS POWER TO REVIEW FACTUAL FINDINGS OF APPELLATE
COURTS.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
JUDGMENT DESPITE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH UNDER RULE 47 IN ORDER
FOR THE PETITION TO PROSPER.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF FORUM
SHOPPING.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTIONS 12 AND 13 OF R.A. NO.
26 ARE APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.

V.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS CONSTITUTED A COLLATERAL ATTACK AGAINST THE ALLEGED TITLE OF
TOMAS AGUIRRE.

VI.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN OPTING NOT TO MAKE A RULING ON THE
UNLAWFUL PARTICIPATION OF THE FIRM M.A AGUINALDO & ASSOCIATES AND THEIR USURPATION OF THE
UNDERSIGNED LAW FIRM'S AUTHORITY TO REPRESENT THE PETITIONERS.[15]

Petitioners' Arguments

Petitioners contend that under Section 1 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[16] the remedy of annulment of
judgment is available only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the party seeking annulment; that the CA erred in granting respondent's petition
for annulment of judgment as it was not without other appropriate remedies which it could have availed of, such as its
pending motion for reconsideration of the May 22, 2014 Order which it filed an d remains pending before the RTC, as well as
the availability of the remedy of appeal in the event of denial of the said motion for reconsideration; that respondent pre-
empted the ruling of the RTC; that its petition for annulment of judgment was thus premature; that their title (TCT No. T-3269)
actually exists under the name of their parents, based on Patent No. 47326 which was awarded by the government in favor of
Basilio Aquino pursuant to Decree No. 101200 issued on August 8, 1921 as per LRC (CLR) Record No. 8843, and as such, they
had the right to rely on their title and claim that no other individual had an interest in the property covered thereby; that the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) itself confirmed that the subject property was indeed registered in the name of their father
and the technical description thereof did not overlap with any other titled properties; that the LRA issued a Certification[17] to
the effect that respondent's title (TCT No. T-6874) did not exist and did not form part of the records within LRA's registry, and
for this reason, respondent could not have any interest in petitioners' title; that they complied with the requirements
prescribed by law for the proper prosecution of their petition for reconstitution; that respondent was guilty of forum shopping
for not declaring in its CA petition for annulment that its motion for reconsideration was still pending with the RTC; that in
petitions for reconstitution of title where the source is the owner's duplicate copy - such as in this case - there is no need for
the petitioner to notify the occupant and/or the adjoining landowners of the petition; and that it was erroneous for the CA to
rule that their petition for reconstitution constituted a collateral attack on respondent's TCT No. T-6874, for in the first place,
their title was registered prior to respondent's supposed title, and second, said respondent's title did not actually exist or
formed part of the records of LRA's registry.

Petitioners thus pray that the assailed dispositions be annulled; and in lieu thereof, the respondent's CA petition for
annulment of judgment be dismissed.

Respondent's Arguments

Respondent, on the other hand, failed to file its written comment to the Petition despite directives issued by this Court.[18]

Our Ruling

The Petition is granted.

In its Urgent Motion to Lift Order of General Default with Motion to Admit Attached Opposition filed before the RTC,
respondent alleged and admitted that its title - TCT No. T-6874 - was derived from the same Original Certificate of Title No.
1002, pursuant to the same Decree No. 101200, and was issued from the same LRC Record No. 8843 as petitioners' title, TCT
No. T-3269. The only difference is that its TCT No. T-6874 was entered only on March 21, 1963, while petitioners' TCT No.
T-3269 was entered on March 21, 1956, or much earlier.

On its face, therefore, respondent's title - TCT No. T-6874 - is null and void, for it was issued upon land that had been earlier
titled in the name of another, namely, Basilio Aquino - petitioners' supposed predecessor-in-interest.

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that in the case of two certificates of title purporting to include the same land, the earlier in
date prevails.

In Degollacion v. Register of Deeds of Cavite we held that if two certificates of title purport to include the
same land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the
certificates of title were derived. Citing our earlier ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals we declared:

x x x where two transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, to two
different persons, for the same parcel of land even if both are presumed to be title holders
in good faith, it does not necessarily follow that he who holds the earlier title should prevail.
On the assumption that there was regularity in the registration leading to the eventual
issuance of subject transfer certificates of title, the better approach is to
trace the originalcertificates from which the certificates of title in dispute were derived.
Should there be only one common original certificate of title, x x x, the transfercertificate
issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity
tainting the process of registration.[19] (Citations omitted)

By respondent's own admission, its title is subordinate to petitioners'. In fact, it is patently null and void on its face, because it
could not have acquired title upon land already earlier registered in the name of another. Primus tempore, potior jure - first in
time, stronger in right. For this reason, respondent has no right - and no personality - to intervene in
the reconstitution proceedings instituted by the petitioners.

It was evident from respondent's own pleadings filed with the courts that its purported rights to the property were
non-existent, having for their basis a title that was issued upon property that was already previously registered in the name of
another. Indeed, respondent has no conceivable right to the property, having for its basis a void title that came after the same
property was already transferred to and owned by another - in this case, the petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Basilio
Aquino.

As for the sufficiency of the petition for reconstitution, the Court agrees with petitioners' argument that, since the source
of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate copy, there is no need to give notice to other parties. "[T]he service of notice of the
petition for reconstitution filed under R.A. 26 to the occupants of the property, owners of the adjoining properties, and all
persons who may have any interest in the property is not required if the petition is based on the owner's duplicate certificate
of title or on that of the co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's."[20]

Respondent and the CA contend that notices to owners of adjoining lots are mandatory in the
judicial reconstitution of a title. They cite as authority Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26, which we reproduce
hereunder:

'SEC. 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to
be published at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official
Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the
municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named
therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice
shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if
known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons
having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition.
The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of
the notice as directed by the court.'

The clear language of the law militates against the interpretation of respondent and the appellate court. The
first sentence of Section 13 provides that the requirements therein pertain only to petitions
for reconstitution filed under 'the preceding section,' Section 12, which in tum governs those petitions based
on specified sources. We quote Section 12 below:

'SEC. 12. Petition for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(t),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance,
by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's,
mortgagee's[,] or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same
had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the
owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the name and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the
property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have interest
in the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the
property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof
has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to
be introduced in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached
 thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made
exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be
further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by
the Commissioner of Land Registration, or with a certified copy of the description taken
from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.'

In other words, the requirements under Sections 12 and 13 do not apply to all petitions for
judicial reconstitution, but only to those based on any of the sources specified in Section 12; that is, 'sources
enumerated in Section 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act.'

Sections 2 and 3 of RA 26 provide as follows:

'SEC. 2. Original certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by
a legal custodian thereof;

(d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be,
pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

'SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by
a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
 (f) Any other documents which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis
for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.' (Italics supplied)

In the present case, the source of the Petition for the reconstitution of title was petitioner's duplicate copies
of the two TCTs mentioned in Section 3(a). Clearly, the Petition is governed, not by Sections 12 and 13, but by
Section 10 of RA 26. We quote said Section 10 in full:

'SEC. 10. Nothing hereinabove provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in
interest from filing the petition mentioned in Section Five of this Act directly with the proper
Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in Section 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or
4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the Court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in Section Nine
hereof: And provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section
shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section Seven of this Act.'

Nothing in this provision requires that notices be sent to owners of adjoining lots. Verily, that requirement is
found in Section 13, which does not apply to petitions based on an existing owner's duplicate TCT.[21]

Having disposed of the relevant issues in the foregoing manner, the Court finds it unnecessary to delve into the other
allegations in the Petition. They are irrelevant to a complete and effective determination of the case.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 7, 2015 Decision and May 15, 2017 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136103 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 21,2014 Order and all other orders of the Bacoor,
Cavite Regional Trial Court, Branch 19 in LRC Case No. 8843-2009-59 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Jardeleza, Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-38.

[2]Id. at 103-118; penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Elihu
A. Ybañez.

[3]
Id. at 39-46; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and
Elihu A. Ybañez.

[4]
Id. at 61-63; penned by Presiding Judge Matias M. Garcia II.

[5]
Id. at 119-147.

[6] Id. at 61-63.

[7]
Id. at 64-76.

[8]
Id. at 77-80.

[9] Id. at 81-83.

[10]
Id. at 84-100.

[11]
Herein respondent.
[12]
Herein petitioners.

[13]
An Act Providing a Special Procedure For The Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed.

[14]
Rollo, pp. 108-117.

[15] Id. at 8-9.

[16] RULE 47 - ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS AND RESOLUTIONS

Section 1. Coverage. - This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

[17]
Rollo, p. 148.

[18]
Id. at 190, Resolution of August 16, 2017, as well as the Court's June 6, 2018 Resolution granting respondent additional
time within which to file comment.

[19]
Top Management Programs Corporation v. Fajardo, 667 Phil. 144, 162 (2011).

[20]
Republic v. Sanchez, 527 Phil. 571, 585 (2006).

[21]
Puzon v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc., 406 Phil. 263, 271-274 (2001).

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SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 195908, August 15, 2018 ]
JOSE A. BERNAS AND THE WHARTON RESOURCES GROUP (PHILIPPINES), INC., PETITIONERS, V. THE ESTATE OF FELIPE YU
HAN YAT, REPRESENTED BY HERO T. YU, RESPONDENT.

[G.R. No. 195910, August 15, 2018]

FELOMENA S. MEJIA (DULY SUBSTITUTED BY HEIRS CARMELITA S. PONGOL AND MAGDALENA S. TUMAMBING),
PETITIONERS, V. FELIPE YU HAN YAT, RESPONDENT.

D E C I SI O N

CAGUIOA, J:
These are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari (Petitions) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) Seventeenth Division dated December 14, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82681 and the
Resolution[2] dated February 28, 2011 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioners.

Facts
The present case involves a parcel of land known as Lot 824-A-4 (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. RT-28758 (30627) PR-9639 (TCT No. 30627), located at Brgy. Matandang Balara, Quezon City, consisting of
30,000 square meters, more or less, which is part of Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate containing an area of 147,072 square meters
registered in the name of respondent Felipe Yu Han Yat (Yu Han Yat).[3]
Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots under Subdivision Plan Psd-13-018013, duly approved by the Bureau
of Lands on August 13, 1991, as part of his plan to develop and convert the subject property. [4] As a consequence, TCT No.
30627 was cancelled and derivative titles, namely TCT Nos. 47294 to 47353 (Yu Han Yat TCTs), were issued in his name.[5]
To finance his plan of developing the subject property, Yu Han Yat applied for loans with several banks using some [6] of the Yu
Han Yat TCTs as security. However, when the mortgage instruments[7] were presented for registration, the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City refused to record the same on the ground that the Yu Han Yat TCTs overlapped with the boundaries covered
by another title: TCT No. 336663 registered in the name of Esperanza Nava (Nava).[8] However, in Consulta No. 2038[9] issued
on October 15, 1992, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) reversed the action taken by the Register of Deeds, and ordered
the registration of the mortgage instruments on Yu Han Yat's TCTs.[10]
Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas (Bernas) and Felomena S. Mejia (Mejia) claimed ownership over the subject property.
They claim that Nava was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663 until she sold parts of the said
lot to Mejia and Gregorio Galarosa (Galarosa).[11] On September 15, 1986, Mejia executed with Nava a Deed of Sale with Right
of Redemption by virtue of which Mejia acquired the real property covered by TCT No. 336663, subject to Nava's right to
redeem the same.[12] When Nava failed to redeem the property, Mejia then filed a petition for consolidation of title under her
name. The petition was granted in a Decision dated June 28, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-90-5211 rendered by Branch 85 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.[13]
Since TCT No. 336663 bore the annotation "subject to verification," the Register of Deeds of Quezon City referred the matter
to the LRA for consultation. In a Resolution dated March 15, 1991, in LRA Consulta No. 1890,[14] the LRA upheld the
registrability of TCT No. 336663 in the name of Mejia. In LRA Consulta No. 1890, the LRA reasoned that a court decision is
needed to categorically determine that the titles from which TCT No. 336663 were derived were spurious before it could
order that the encumbrance was not registrable. Thus:
In his letter of January 22, 1991, the herein petitioner [Register of Deeds of Quezon City] elevated
en consulta to this authority the registrability of the deed of sale with right of redemption executed by Nava
in favor of Mejia, it appearing that Nava's title, Transfer Certificate of Title no. 336663. contains a
memorandum that the same is subject to verification by the Verification Committee on Questionable Titles
which was annotated thereon pursuant to Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 239 dated November 4, 1982. The
only issue, therefore, to be resolved is whether or not the deed of sale with right of redemption may be
registered.
xxxx
Considering that the findings of the Verification Committee that the Dominga Sumulong title was fabricated
and non-existent cannot justify the suspension of registration of deeds affecting titles derived from
Sumulong's reconstituted title and that this Office will be pre-empting the court's judgment on the matter if
it were to suspend registration of documents involving titles it has administratively determined to be
fabricated, there appears to be no more constraint in the registration of the deed of sale with right of
redemption. This is especially true in this case where the court has already ordered the consolidation of
ownership in favor of Felomena S. Mejia and directed the Register of Deeds to cancel Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 336663 and issue, in lieu thereof, a transfer certificate of title in the name of
Mejia.[15] (Underscoring omitted)
Hence, by virtue of the said Resolution, the Deed of Sale with Right of Redemption was annotated on the title of the subject
property.
On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton Resources Group (Philippines), Inc. (Wharton), entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement[16] with Mejia whereby the latter agreed to sell to Wharton the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
336663. Subsequently, a Deed of Sale[17] was entered into between Mejia and Wharton conveying to the latter the subject
property.
In April 1992, Bernas discovered that there was another title covering about three hectares which overlapped a portion of the
property registered under TCT No. 336663.[18]This other title, TCT No. 30627, indicated Yu Han Yat as the registered owner
pursuant to subdivision plan Psd-2498 of a parcel of land located in Bayanbayanan, Marikina.[19]
On June 24, 1992, Bernas filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu Han Yat's TCTs, claiming that a Deed of Sale was executed
between himself, for and on behalf of Wharton, and Mejia over the realty covered by TCT No. 336663 which overlaps portions
covered by Yu Han Yat's TCTs.[20]
On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City refused to record the subject
mortgages affecting the Yu Han Yat TCTs. This prompted Yu Han Yat to file another consulta with the LRA which, in a
Resolution dated October 15, 1992, ordered the registration of the mortgage to the properties.[21]
Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting of Title[22] before the RTC of Quezon City docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-92-13609 against the Estate of Nava (represented by Antonio N. Crismundo), Galarosa, Mejia, Bernas, and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Estate of Nava, et al.).[23] Mejia then filed an Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaims[24] and claimed, among others that, (a) Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627, was invalid because it originated from
TCT No. 8047, which was issued on the basis of a spurious subdivision plan, Psd-2498; (b) Psd-2498 was spurious because it
represents to cover a parcel of land located in Barrio Bayanbayanan, Marikina, whereas the actual location of Lot 824 Piedad
Estate was in Caloocan City and Quezon City; and (c) the registrability of Mejia's rights and ownership over the subject
property was sustained by the LRA in LRA Consulta No. 1890.[25] Bernas also filed an Answer with Application for Injunctive
Relief[26] dated December 10, 1992 to restrain Yu Han Yat from undertaking development works on the subject property.
On December 20, 1993, the RTC issued an Order[27] granting Bernas' application for preliminary injunction. The RTC, in the said
Order, stated that:
This Court finds the respondents to have amply proven their entitlement to the relief. Petitioner in this case
has failed to convince this Court to act otherwise. The Court takes notice of a number of allegations brought
up by petitioner's witness in the person of Atty. Bustos, however, the short of it all is that the
respondents' titlewhich is traced back from the title of Dominga Sumulong remains valid and subsisting
insofar as the lot in question is concerned. Under the decisions rendered in Civil Case No. Q-11962 of then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City entitled Zaida M. Santos vs. Dominga Sumulong and in
Civil Case No. 11180 entitled Pilar Ibanez Vda. De Suzuaregui et al., vs Constitutional Hills Deverlopment (sic)
Corporation, Dominga Sumulong, et al.; it is stated therein that the title of Dominga Sumulong is not wholly
null and void but only insofar as the lots involved are concerned which does not particularly refer to the lot in
question in the instant case.[28]
On August 12, 1994, Yu Han Yat filed an Amended Petition[29] dated August 9, 1994 to implead Wharton, in view of the fact
that the latter was the beneficial owner of the subject property and that Bernas was only its agent.[30] On October 3, 1994,
Bernas and Wharton filed an Amended Answer to Amended Petition[31] dated September 29, 1994, adding the following
affirmative defenses: (a) that Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition stated no cause of action because petitioners are innocent
purchasers for value; and (b) although there was an annotation in TCT No. 336663 that the same was "subject to verification,"
the registrability of the title was nevertheless upheld in LRA Consulta No. 1890. The Amended Answer likewise interposed a
cross-claim against Mejia for possible breach of her Memorandum of Agreement with Bernas.[32]
Trial ensued, and on March 15, 2004, the RTC issued a Decision[33] ruling in favor of the Estate of Nava, et al., and Wharton.
The trial court reasoned as follows:
Based on the records and evidence presented[,] the properties subject of the controversy are TCT No. 30627
of the petitioner (Exhibit "G") and TCT No. 336663 (Exhibit "6" for Mejia as adopted by Bernas). Details
underlying the procurement of those titles from the parties were quite overwhelming. But the history of how
such titles came about does not convince the court to grant the relief sought by the petitioner.
Careful reading of the amended petition shows the evident objective of the claim – that is to nullify the
respondents' title (TCT 336663) (Rollo, page 276, Volume 1) that runs to the very core of challenging the
indefeasibility of Torrens title seeking succor under the guise of a petition for quieting of title.
Undeniably, the amended petition admits that petitioner's title overlaps with TCT No. 336663 (paragraphs 7
and 14, Amended Petition, Rollo, pages 212-21 A, Volume 1). The petition likewise cited Consulta No. 2038
(Exhibit "O") of the Land Registration Authority, from which petitioner wanted to conclude that TCT No.
336663 is of doubtful authenticity. The petitioner, however, contradicted himself when in his Memorandum
 he conceded that the findings of the Land Registration Commission is not binding upon this court. This leads
to a point where the Government, through the Solicitor General, filed a nullification and cancellation
proceedings (sic) (Exhibit "JJ") against Esperanza Nava from whom respondents Bernas and Mejia
derived title to TCT No. 336663. The case was cited by petitioner in the petition and he jumped into
conclusion that it constituted full knowledge upon respondents that indeed TCT No. 336663 is void and
ineffective (Paragraphs 17 and 18, Amended Petition, Rollo, page 275, Volume 1) without evidence of a
decision from Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which heard the case. It was in stark
contrast to the evidence presented by respondent Galarosa that the court ordered the Government to
submit proof of service of summonses within ten (10) (sic) from completion lest the court will be constrained
to dismiss or archive the case (Exhibit "17"). The records do not account up to this time on the progress of
said case. What is apparent is the similar action filed by the Government against Amado R. Santos, the
predecessor-in-interest of Esperanza Nava for nullification and cancellation proceedings of titles that
included the latter's title. The case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-52834 before Branch 95 of this jurisdiction
was dismissed for lack of merit (Exhibit "16" for Galarosa).
The very import of these pieces of evidence is that the petition misleads the court into believing that TCT No.
336663 has been decisively concluded to be void and ineffective. While it is true that TCT No. 336663 bears
an annotation which reads: "This title is subject to verification by the LRC Verification Committee on
questionable titles, plans[,] decrees and other documents" (Exhibit "KK-1" Exhibit "8-Galarosa"), this court
has yet to await a final decision or decree that would indeed declare the questioned title null and void. Proof
of which is incumbent upon the petitioner.
It is worthy to note that respondent Bernas' Memorandum quickly pointed out that petitioner's title which
was based on plan PS 2498 (sic) referred to a parcel of land located in Bayanbayanan, Marikina, Metro Manila
(Exhibit "I-Mejia" and Exhibit "E"-Petitioner) which is poles apart from respondents' title that covered a land
in Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Petitioner did not present convincing evidence to overturn such fact
except to plainly state that "the person who prepared the Survey Plan may have been confused as to the
Property's (sic) exact location". Although petitioner went on to prove that his property covered by TCT No.
30627 was in Quezon City as he presented Commonwealth Act No. 502 (Exhibit "A"). Nowhere in said
evidence proved that Bayanbayanan, Marikina was set to form part of the boundaries of Quezon City under
Section 3 thereof. Simply put, the petitioner utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving the
sustainability of his posture.
It is a well entrenched rule that in an action for quieting of title, the petition must prove legal or
equitable title to the land as the far reaching implication of which is quieting titled lands and putting to stop
forever any question of legality of the registration in the certificate or questions that may arise therefrom. To
allow the petitioner to nullify the title of the respondents to the property in question would mean an obvious
collateral attack which is not permitted under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. "A certificate
of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered modified or cancelled only in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law." (Virginia Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et. al., G.R. No.
76265, March 11, 1994)[34] (Emphasis in the original)
Aggrieved, Yu Han Yat appealed the above Decision of the RTC to the CA.
In its Decision, the CA granted Yu Han Yat's appeal and held that: (a) the petition for quieting of title, and the petition for
annulment of title are essentially the same; and (b) Bernas and Mejia's title was void as they source their ownership from
Dominga Sumulong's title to the property which had been declared as null and void by the CA in previous cases. The CA also
awarded actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of Yu Han Yat. Herein petitioners
Bernas, Mejia, and Wharton[35]sought reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the same was denied by the CA on February 28,
2011.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
For resolution of the Court are the following issues:
Whether petitioners complied with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when they filed the Petitions dated April
(a)
15, 2011 and April 20, 2011;
(b) Whether the filing of the Petitions constituted forum shopping; whether Petitions are barred by res judicata;

Whether Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the title of petitioners (and their
(c)
predecessors-in-interest) over the property subject of TCT No. 336663;

Whether the CA ruling that the property covered by respondent's title is the same as the property subject of TCT No.
(d)
336663 is supported by the evidence on record;

(e) Whether the case of Manotok, et al. v. Barque[36] (Manotok) applies;

(f) Whether the CA erred when it took judicial notice of proceedings in other cases before it;

Whether Yu Han Yat's alleged payment of real property tax constitutes proof of ownership or superior title over the
(g)
property covered by TCT No. 336663; and

(h) Whether petitioners are liable to the estate of Yu Han Yat (respondent) for damages and attorney's fees.

THE COURT'S RULING

On whether petitioners complied with Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure when they filed the Petitions dated
April 15, 2011 and April 20, 2011

Before delving into the substantive issues raised by petitioners, the Court deems it proper to first discuss the procedural issue
raised by respondent in its Comment — that the Court should have dismissed the case because the Petition raised questions
of fact which are outside the province of an appeal through Rule 45.
It is true that, as a general rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, and that petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should
only raise questions of law.[37] This rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;

(7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;

(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;

(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different
 conclusion;

(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and

(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[38]

Some of the exceptions are present in this case. The rulings alone of the RTC and the CA were contradictory, to the point that
they differ on their rulings on each of the issues presented in this case. Further, and as will be discussed in detail later on, the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at certain factual findings and legal conclusions. The Court must perforce
conduct a judicious examination of the records to arrive at a just conclusion for this case.
On whether the filing of the Petitions constituted forum
shopping, and whether the Petitions are barred by res
judicata

Respondent claims that petitioners violated the rule against forum shopping when petitioner Bernas failed to inform the Court
that a similar case was pending because Mejia had filed an appeal of the assailed CA Decision subsequent to the filing by
Bernas. This failure supposedly constitutes a violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, which states that:
SECTION 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed
any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim,
a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint
or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance
with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute
willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and
shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In addition, respondent also asserts that since the heirs of Esperanza Nava (Heirs of Nava) did not appeal the CA Decision,
then the same constitutes res judicata as regards petitioners Bernas and Mejia. Thus, the case should be dismissed.
Respondent's assertions fail to convince. Petitioners did not commit forum shopping by filing separate appeals. In Young v.
Spouses Sy,[39] the Court held that there is forum shopping where there exist:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions;

(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and

the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which
(c)
party is successful would amount to res judicata.[40]

While there was identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, there was no identity of parties in the case at bar. Granted
that both Mejia and Bernas trace their title from Nava, this does not, by itself, make their interests identical. Bernas' and
Mejia's interests remain separate, and a judgment on one will not amount to res judicata on the other as, for instance, Bernas
could, and did, raise the defense that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property and thus should not be
bound by any adverse judgment should Mejia's title be found defective. The same reasoning applies to respondent's assertion
that Mejia's and Bernas' claims were now barred by res judicata because the Heirs of Nava did not appeal. The heirs of Nava
hold an interest separate from Mejia's and Bernas', and the latter could not be adversely affected by the fact that the Heirs of
Nava no longer filed an appeal.
On whether Yu Han Yat's Amended Petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the title of petitioners (and
their predecessors-in-interest) over the property subject of
TCT No. 336663

Bernas and Mejia claim that the CA erred when it upheld as valid the petition for quieting of title filed by Yu Han Yat. They
claim that the petition for quieting of title was a collateral attack, as opposed to a direct attack, on TCT No. 336663, which is
proscribed under the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles.
Petitioners are mistaken. The CA was correct in holding that the petition for quieting of title filed by Yu Han Yat was not a
collateral attack on TCT No. 336663, and was, in fact, a direct attack on the same. In Villarica Pawnshop v. Spouses
Gernale,[41] the issue before the Court was whether litis pendentia was present when there were two pending cases between
the same parties: one for quieting of title, and another for annulment and cancellation of title. Ruling in the affirmative, the
Court held that:
Civil Case No. 438-M-2002 is for quieting of title and damages, while Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 is for
annulment and cancellation of titles and damages. The two cases are different only in the form of action,
but an examination of the allegations in both cases reveals that the main issue raised, which is ownership
of the land, and the principal relief sought, which is cancellation of the opposing parties' transfer
certificates of title, are substantially the same. The evidence required to substantiate the parties' claims is
likewise the same. The proceedings in Civil Case No. 502-M-2002 would entail the presentation of essentially
the same evidence, which should be adduced in Civil Case No. 438-M-2002. As cited by the CA, this Court
held in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi that:
The underlying objectives or reliefs sought in both the quieting-of-title and the
annulment-of-title cases are essentially the same — adjudication of the ownership of the
disputed lot and nullification of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily
apparent that the same evidence of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-title case
would also be used in this petition.
The subject cases are so intimately related to each other that the judgment that may be rendered in one,
regardless of which party would be successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[42] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The pronouncement above does not mean that in all instances, cases for quieting of title and for annulment of title are
essentially the same, as the CA incorrectly held in its assailed Decision.[43] However, petitioners are mistaken in their
conclusion that the action filed by Yu Han Yat was a collateral attack just because it was denominated as a "petition for
quieting of title" instead of a "petition for annulment of title."
The test is not the name of the action, but the ultimate objective of the same and the relief sought therein. Applying the said
test in this case, the petition for quieting of titlefiled by Yu Han Yat was a direct attack on the petitioners' title as the petition
specifically sought to annul TCT No. 336663 in the name of Nava.[44] Thus, even as petitioners correctly claim that in assailing
the validity of a Torrens title, there must be a direct proceeding expressly instituted for the purpose, the fact of the matter is
that the petition for quieting of title was exactly that proceeding as it was filed precisely to question the validity of TCT No.
336663.
On whether the Court of Appeals' ruling that the property
covered by respondent's title is the same as the property
subject of TCT No. 336663 is supported by the evidence on
record

Petitioners question the following findings of the CA:

We have scoured and scrutinized the records of the case and found that petitioner-appellant's title was
derived from a valid title while respondents-appellees failed to prove that their title were derived from a
valid one. Furthermore, petitioner-appellant was able to show how he acquired the subject property from his
immediate predecessors and was able to account for the previous major transactions involving Lot 824, its
subdivision and, finally, until it was transferred to him.
 It is incorrect to state that TCT No. 30627, is a transfer from Original Title (sic) No. 8047, when it is clear that
it came from Original Title No. 614, pursuant to Decree No. 6667. It is of judicial notice that OCT No. 614,
embraces many lots involving the Piedad Estate which are located in Quezon City.
It is clearly typographical error that, as stated, TCT No. 8047 is a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R because the
technical description therein does not correspond to technical description stated in TCT No. 8047, but it
instead corresponds to the technical description stated in TCT No. 36633 (sic), after its subdivision.
On respondent-appellee Bernas' claim that TCT 8047 was a transfer from TCT No. 3633, which involved a
different property, We have scrutinized the same and it is apparent that TCT 8047, (sic) would show that the
one who made such certification used a different typewriter as the entry "3633/T-R," appears to be different
from the typewritten description of the property which used carbon paper. Likewise, it was certified that
the title contains two pages, however, for unknown reasons, the second page was not presented; thus, the
Court has no way of checking whether there are encumbrances that may be annotated therein which would
trace that how (sic) TCT 8047 came to be.[45]
They contend that the CA Decision was not based on the evidence on record, and that TCT No. 30627 allegedly covers a
property different from the one covered by TCT No. 336663 from which they derive their claims.
Petitioners' contention is without merit. Prescinding from the CA's justifications as to the use of a different typewriter, a
careful scrutiny of the voluminous records of this case would reveal that the CA was ultimately correct that Yu Han Yat was
able to establish better title over the subject property. Simply put, the CA was correct in holding that it was Yu Han Yat who
was able to account for the previous major transactions involving the property and was able to show how he acquired the
subject property from his immediate predecessors. To be sure, Yu Han Yat painstakingly traced his title, complete with
documentary and testimonial evidence, in the following manner:
1. Petitioner's title, TCT No. RT28758 (30627) PR-[9]639 (Exh. "G") was issued on March 9, 1956, being a
transfer from TCT No. 8047 in the name of Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. (Exh. "1-Galarosa"). Both
petitioner's title and that of Mr. Tan, Jr. have the following technical descriptions, to wit:
"A parcel of land (Lot 824-A-4 of the subd. plan Psd-22842 being a portion of Lot 824-A
described on plan Psd-2498 (LRC Rec. No.), situated in Q. City, bounded on the N., by Lot
9471 on the E., by Lots 824-A-1, 824-A-2, 824-A-3 of the subd. plans on the SE. by Tuason
Estates; on the W., by Lot 824-B of plan Psd-2498. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan,
being S. 85 deg. 22'E., 3255.54 from LM No. 16, Piedad Estate; thence N.1 deg,. 42'W.,
290.30 m. to pt. 2; thence E., 115.00 m. to pt. 3; thence S. 0 deg. 08'E., 248.64 m. to pt. 4;
thence S. 68 deg, 47'W., 114.78 m. to pt. of beginning; containing an area of THIRTY
THOUSAND (30,000) SQ.M. more or less All pts. referred to are indicated on the plan and are
marked on the ground pts. 1 & 2 are marked by Old PLS Cyl, Cone, Mons. & the pt. 3 & 4 by
PLS Cyl, Cone. Mons. bearings true; declination 0 deg. 45'E., date of the subd. survey Nov. 4,
1947."
xxxx
3. The validity and regularity of petitioner's title is borne out by the fact that it can be traced back to
the title of Juan Porciuncula issued prior to 1930. Porciuncula's title is TCT No. T-10849 covering "Lot 824 of
the 'PIEDAD ESTATE SUBDIVISION' Case No. 5975 of the Court of Land Registration" (Exh. "R" and "R-1" TSN
Lara, 4 April 1995 page 68) the original of which was presented in Court and identified by Mr. Lara of the
Pasig Registry. Due to the document's old age, the same had to be placed in a plastic sheet to prevent further
deterioration, as mere holding would break the document. In fact, the edges of the document, including the
portion on which the date where the title's issuance should have appeared, have been torn to small pieces.
4. On 21 November 1931, an entry written in Spanish was made at the back of TCT No. 10849 to record the
subdivision of the lot into Lot 824-A consisting of 60,012 sq. meters, and Lot 824-B with an area of 87,060 sq.
meters, pursuant to Subdivision Plan Psd-2498. At the same time, the entry recorded the sale of Lot 824-A to
Castor B. Cruz for the sum of P1,220.00. The date of the deed of sale was 20 August 1930. (Exh "R-2") As a
result of the sale to Castor B. Cruz, TCT No. T-10849 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-20897 and
T-20898 (Exh. "R-3" TSN Lara, 4 April 1995 page 103).
5. While TCT No. 20897 could not be found in the Registration Book (T-84-A) of the Pasig Registry and was
listed as missing after the titles were inventoried (TSN Lara, 4 April 1995 pages 87, 88), the Index Card of
Porciuncula shows that TCT No. T-10849 was replaced by TCT No. 20897 and 20898 (Exh. "S" and "S-1").
 Likewise, the Index Card of Castor Cruz shows that TCT No. 20897 was issued in his name for Lot 824-A. (Exh.
"U" and "U-1")
6. On 9 February 1939, TCT No. 20897 was cancelled by TCT No. [366633] issued in the name of Sps. Juan M.
Ruiz and Conchita O. Baradi (Exh. "V"). The cancellation and issuance of a new title was occasioned by the
sale of Lot 824-A by Castor B. Cruz to the said spouses which sale was registered in the Primary Entry Book
(Exh. "W") under Entry No. 5445 (Exh. "W-1", TSN Lara, 4 April 1995 pages 112-114). The cancellation of
Castor B. Cruz' TCT No. 20897 and the issuance of TCT No. T-[36633] were also recorded in the Index Card of
the former. (Exh. "U-1").
7. As described in the TCT No. [36633] in the name of the Spouses Ruiz, the parcel of land covered by
the title is as follows:
"A parcel of land (Lot No. 824-A of the subdivision plan Psd-2498, being a portion of Lot No.
824, described on the original plan of the Piedad Estate, G.L.R.C. Record No. 5975), situated
in the Municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the N., by the property of
Juan Porciuncula (Lot No. 947 of the subdivision plan No. 2507) on the E. by Lot No. 823 of
Piedad Estate; on the SE by property of Tuason Estate; and on the W. by property of Juan
Porciuncula (Lot 824-B of the subdivision plan). Beginning at a point marked "1" on the plan,
being N. 89 deg. 33'E 3486.40 m. from L.M. No. 16, Piedad Estate, thence S. 0 deg. 04'E., I,
196.40 m. to point "2"; thence S. 68 deg. 47' W., 259.15 m. to point "3"; thence N. 1 deg. 42'
W., 290.30 m. to point "4"; thence 250.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of
sixty thousand and twelve square meters (60,012) more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and on the ground points 1 and 2 are marked by old points and points
3 and 4 by P.L.S. concrete monuments to 15 x 60 centimeters. Bearings true, declination 0
deg. 48' E., date of original survey, July 1 to December 14, 1907, and that of the subdivision
survey, June 11-13, 1927--/" (Exh "V"; Exh. "2"-Galarosa)
8. On 6 October 1948, a Subdivision Plan was recorded on the Spouses Ruiz' TCT No. [36633]. Under the
Subdivision Plan, Lot 824-1 was subdivided into four lots, namely: Lots 824-A-1, 824-A-2, 824-A-3 and 824-A-4.
The same annotation mentioned Lot 824-A-4 to have been sold to Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. for the sum of
P8,000.00 pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 12 July 1948 (please see also Exh "CC"). As a result, TCT No.
36633 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. 8044, 8045, 8046 and 8047 were issued (Exh.
"2-a"-Galarosa).
9. TCT No. 8047 for Lot 824-A-4 appears to have been directly issued in the name of Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr.
(Exh. "1" and "2-a"-Galarosa). This is the same title that was cancelled when TCT No. 30627 in favor of
petitioner was issued on 9 March 1956 (Exh. "G") pursuant to a Deed of Sale dated 6 March 1956 executed by
Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. in favor of Felipe Yu Han Yat for the sum of P30,000.00 (Exh. "BB").[46]
Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that their title does not cover the same property and that even assuming that both titles
cover the same property, Yu Han Yat still allegedly failed to prove that his title was superior over theirs.
Both arguments of petitioners fail to convince.
First, petitioners' argument that Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627, does not cover the same property as their title, TCT No.
336663, is because TCT No. 30627 came from TCT No. 8047 which, in turn, bears an annotation that it is "a transfer from TCT
No. 3633/T-R," a title that covers a property situated in Murphy, Quezon City.[47] They point out that, in contrast, TCT No.
336663 covers a parcel of land located in Piedad Estate in Quezon City.[48] The CA dismissed this contention and ruled that the
annotation that TCT No. 8047 is "a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R" was a clear typographical error "because the technical
description therein does not correspond to [the] technical description stated in TCT No. 8047, but it instead corresponds to
the technical description stated in TCT No. 36633, after its subdivision."[49] The CA attributed the typographical error to the
"use of a different typewriter," which ruling is being vigorously contested by the petitioners. According to them, the difference
in the technical descriptions between those stated in (a) TCT Nos. 8047 and 336663 and (b) TCT No. 3633/T-R should be
construed to mean that "there was an error in transferring the technical description from the latter to the former."
The Court agrees with the CA. Both TCT No. 30627 and TCT No. 336663 cover the same property as shown by their respective
technical descriptions stating that the parcel of land covered is Lot 824 of the Piedad Estate.[50] The fact that TCT No. 8047,
from which TCT No. 30627 was derived, bears an annotation that it was a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R which covers a
property in Murphy, Quezon City casts little doubt on the title of Yu Han Yat.
The Court is more inclined to uphold the view that the error lies in the annotation in TCT No. 8047 that it was "a transfer from
TCT No. 3633/T-R," as compared with petitioners' theory that the error was in the entire technical descriptions contained in
TCT Nos. 8047 and TCT No. 336663. It is notable that TCT No. 8047 was, in truth, a transfer from TCT No. 336663, as shown by
the meticulous narration of Yu Han Yat quoted above. To repeat, records show that TCT No. 336663, in the name of Spouses
Ruiz, was cancelled when the lot was subdivided into four lots: Lot 824-A-1, Lot 824-A-2, Lot 824-A-3, and Lot 824-A-4. TCT No.
336663 was cancelled, and TCT Nos. 8044, 8045, 8046, and 8047 were issued in lieu of the same. TCT No. 8047 was then
cancelled when the lot was sold to Yu Han Yat in 1956. In other words, the error occurred in encoding that TCT No. 8047 was
"a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R" instead of "from TCT No. 36633." As Yu Han Yat convincingly argued:
It defies logic to believe such a preposterous claim – that there is greater likelihood of an error occurring in
copying the technical description, rather than to consider more likely a typographical error occurring in
typing TCT No. 3633/T-R instead of TCT No. 336663 (sic). A technical description is a lengthy narration which
would be improbable to be erroneously transferred from one title to another, if good faith is to be presumed
in the performance of one's duty. On the other hand, the confusing similarity in the numbers appearing on
the title (TCT No. 3633/T-R and TCT No. 336663 [sic]) is more susceptible to being interchanged.[51]
Thus, the Court quotes with approval the following disquisition by the CA:
Moreover, We cannot close our eyes to the fact that TCT No. 30627 (transfer from TCT No. 8047) was issued
on March 9, 1956, while TCT No. 336663 (transfer from TCT 116925/T-588) was issued only on October 28,
1985. Thus, as between two certificates of title issued to different persons covering the same land in whole
or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and that is, TCT No. 30627, under [Yu Han Yat]'s title.[52]
It is well established in jurisprudence that where there are two certificates of title covering the same land, the earlier in date
must prevail as between the parties claiming ownership over it. As early as the 1915 case of Legarda vs. Saleeby,[53] the Court
already said that:
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented
to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the
difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in
his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the
case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether
the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier
certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q. S. C. R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N. Z. R., 155; Lloyd vs. May-field, 7 A. L. T.
(V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V. L. R., 152; Register of Titles vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W. A. R., 118.)" Hogg
adds however that, "if it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written
documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may
be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian
Torrens System," supra, and cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens
System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to
include the same land the earlier in date prevails [x x x] In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior
certificate is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate
who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of
the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the
case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold
the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same
registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
xxxx
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act that the owner of the
earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied
to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before
the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The general rule is that
the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which
his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against
the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.[54] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Verily, it is undoubtedly clear that between the parties in this case, it is Yu Han Yat who has shown that he has better title over
the subject property for having presented the earlier title.[55] The contention that Bernas (on behalf of Wharton) and Mejia
were "innocent purchasers" is thus immaterial, for even if it is assumed that they are indeed such, they still could not acquire
a better right than their transferor — Nava — whose title was issued much later than Yu Han Yat's transferor.
Another evidentiary contention by Bernas purportedly establishing his better right to the subject property was that TCT No.
T-10849, issued before 1930 to Juan Porciuncula, which was the origin of Yu Han Yat's title, was based on subdivision plan
Psd-2498. In turn, Psd-2498 indicates that it is a subdivision plan of a lot located in "Bayanbayanan, Mariquina."[56] Supposedly,
this establishes that the land covered by Yu Han Yat's title is different from the one covered by his title. With regard to this
issue, the CA ruled that:
While it is true that, under PS 2498 (sic), it was stated that the property is located in Bayanbayanan,
Mariquina, however, it must be noted that at the time the survey was conducted on June 11-13, 1927, the
property was still under the Province of Rizal and that Quezon City was only created pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 502, and approved on October 12, 1939. However, subsequent subdivision of Lot
824 would reveal that the property is located at Quezon City.[57]
Bernas asserts that the above ruling of the CA was not supported by evidence on record and was bereft of factual basis nor
based on established facts.
The Court, however, agrees with the resolution of the CA. The CA was justified in taking judicial notice when Quezon City was
established. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA correctly held that the Quezon City was established only in 1939, upon the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 502,
the city's charter. Hence, when the survey for Psd-2498 was conducted in 1927, Quezon City did not as yet exist. Further, the
property in question has always been referred to as part of the Piedad Estate. In turn, Commonwealth Act No. 502 defined the
boundaries of Quezon City as follows:
SECTION 3. Boundaries. — The boundaries and limits of the territory of said city are established and
prescribed as follows: Beginning at a point marked "1" which is identical to Boundary Monument No. 1 of
Piedad Estate; to point "2", which is Boundary Monument No. 2 of Piedad Estate; thence downstream
following the Arroyo between Payatas Estate and Mariquina Estate to point "3", which is the junction of the
Arroyo and Mariquina River; thence downstream following Mariquina River to point "4", which is the crossing
of Mariquina by the old Rosario Road; thence westward following the old Rosario Road to point "5", which is
the south-easternmost corner of Wack Wack Golf and Country Club; thence following the road along the
south boundary of the Wack Wack [Golf] and Country Club to point "6" where the said road crosses the creek
which is the source of Salapan Creek; thence downstream following the Salapan Creek to point "7", which is
the junction of Salapan Creek and Dario River; thence southward following the Salapan River to its
intersection with the east boundary of the City of Manila to point "8"; thence north-westward following the
east boundary of the City of Manila to point "9" near La Loma Cabaret, which is a corner of the boundary of
the City of Manila near the entrance to the North Cemetery; thence northward following the boundary of the
City of Manila to point "10", which is the northeast corner of said City; thence westward along said City of
Manila boundary at a distance of 100 meters to point "11"; thence northward paralleling the Novaliches Road
at a distance of 100 meters from the property line on the side of said road to point "12", which is at a
distance of 100 meters north of the crossing of Samson Street (road connecting Balintawak Monument with
Bonifacio Monument); thence eastward paralleling Samson Street and the Circumferential Road at a distance
of 100 meters on the northside of said street and road to point "13", which is the center of the Culiat Creek;
thence upstream following the Culiat Creek to point "14", which is the junction of Pasong Tamo River and
Culiat Creek; thence upstream following Pasong Tamo River to point "15", which is the junction of Pasong
Tamo River and Pinagpatayan Buaya Creek; thence to the point of beginning. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In Porciuncula v. Adamos,[58] the Court notably observed that the Piedad Estate is "located in barrio Bayanbayanan, Caloocan,
Rizal (now Diliman, Quezon City)."[59] As Yu Han Yat noted, the history of Bayanbayanan, Caloocan may have caused the
misdescription of municipality in Psd-2498:[60]
While it is true that the subdivision plan of Lot 824 (Psd 2498) of the Piedad Estate shows that it is located in
the Barrio of Bayanbayanan, Municipality of Marikina, a deeper understanding and analysis of the history of
the subject property will reveal that the misdescription in the subdivision plan is nothing more than a product
of confusion between Bayanbayanan, Marikina and Bayanbayanan, Caloocan.
x x x A reading of the documents would reveal that the source of the insidious claim by the petitioners that
the property is located in Bayanbayanan, Marikina stems from an erroneous reference in Psd 2498 dated
June 11-13, 1927 made by a certain Engr. Sixto Fernando. The said survey indicates that the location of Lot
824, Piedad Estate containing a total area of 147,072 square meters to be in Bayanbayanan, Marikina. When
Quezon City was created by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 502, the boundaries and limits of the city would
show that Piedad Estate indeed became part of it, to wit:
Sec. 3. Boundaries. — The boundaries and limits of the territory of said city are established
and prescribed as follows: Beginning at a point marked "1" which is identical to Boundary
Monument No. 1 of Piedad Estate; to point "2", which is Boundary Monument No. 2 of
Piedad Estate; thence downstream following the Arroyo between Payatas Estate and
Mariquina Estate to point "3", which is the junction of the Arroyo and Mariquina River;
thence downstream following Mariquina River to point "4", which is the crossing of
Mariquina by the old Rosario Road; thence westward following the old Rosario Road to
point "5", x x x. (Emphasis in the original)
x x x It is apparent that Engr. Sixto Fernando, while making the subdivision plan Psd 2498 in 1927 mistook the
portion of respondent's property to be in Bayanbayanan, Marikina.
x x x The "Marikina mistake" appears in only one document, as against several evidence showing that
respondent's property is in Quezon City. The inadvertent mention that Felipe Yu Han Yat's property (and the
entire Lot 824) is located in Bayanbayanan, Mariquina appears in one and only one document and that is in
Psd-2498. Except for this mistake in the designation of municipality, all other data in the survey plan
Psd-2498 are consistent with the property being in Piedad Estate, Matandang Balara, Quezon City.
x x x Further, as stated above, the technical description in respondent's TCT 28758 (30627) PR-9639,
referred to the same survey plan, Psd-2498 and went on further to state that the property is located in
Quezon City. The said Transfer Certificate of Title where the above cited technical description was
mentioned, was prepared by no less than the Register of Deeds. This is a conclusive proof that if at all, the
erroneous reference to Bayanbayanan, Mariquina in Psd-2498 was rectified by the Register of Deeds
himself, when he prepared the title and correctly described the location of the property to be in Quezon
City. Noting further the fact that in doing so, he was using as basis the same Psd-2498.[61] (Emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing disquisition persuades the Court that the annotation that Psd-2498 pertains to a parcel land in "Bayanbayanan,
Mariquina" was indeed a mere inadvertent error.
To be sure, the above factual findings arrived at by the CA are all based on a painstaking review of the voluminous records of
this case. The ultimate truth revealed by the evidence on record is that TCT No. 8047 was a transfer from TCT No. 336663,
contrary to the annotation that it was "a transfer from TCT No. 3633/T-R." Likewise, the CA correctly took judicial notice of the
fact that Quezon City was not yet established at the time the survey for Psd-2498 was conducted. Therefore, the Court so
holds that Yu Han Yat's title, TCT No. 30627, and Mejia and Bernas' title, TCT No. 336663, cover the same property.
On whether the case of Manotok, et al. v. Barque applies

Petitioner Mejia argues that the CA erred in ruling in favor of Yu Han Yat, when it did not inquire as to how the latter was able
to trace his title from valid alienation by the government pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1120, or the Friar Lands Act,
because Piedad Estate was considered a friar land. Mejia argues that the CA fell short of the yardstick laid down in the case
of Alonso v. Cebu Country Club,[62] (Alonso) where the Court held:
Section 18 of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act unequivocally provides: "No lease or sale made by the Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands (now the Director of Lands) under the provisions of this Act shall be valid until
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (now, the Secretary of Natural Resources). Thus, petitioners' claim
 of ownership must fail in the absence of positive evidence showing the approval of the Secretary of Interior.
Approval of the Secretary of the Interior cannot simply be presumed or inferred from certain acts since the
law is explicit in its mandate. This is the settled rule as enunciated in Solid State Multi-Products Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals and reiterated in Liao vs. Court of Appeals.[63]
Likewise, in the case of Manotok,[64] the Court held that:
It must be borne in mind that the disputed property is part of the "Friar Lands" over which the Government
holds title and are not public lands but private or patrimonial property of the Government and can be
alienated only upon proper compliance with the requirements of Act No. 1120 or the Friar Lands Act.
xxxx
It was thus primordial for the respondent to prove its acquisition of its title by clear and convincing evidence
in view of the nature of the land. In fact, it is essential for both respondent and petitioners to establish that it
had become private property. Both parties failed to do so. As we have held earlier, petitioners have not
succeeded to prove their claim of ownership over the subject property.[65]
Mejia's assertion on this ground fails. In the case of Alonso, the Court needed to ascertain both parties' compliance with the
Friar Lands Act because the plaintiffs claim was precisely hinged on the alleged sale by the government of the land in question
to Francisco Alonso. On the other hand, the Court in Manotok needed to check the parties' compliance with the Friar Lands
Act because each of the parties questioned the petition for administrative reconstitution filed by the other. Hence, the Court
needed to ascertain which of the parties actually held a valid claim to the lands in question, so that it could accordingly
grant reconstitution.
The instances present in Alonso and Manotok do not exist in the case at bar. The issue of whether there was a valid transfer
from the government to either of the parties was never raised in the proceedings in the trial court or upon initial appeal.
Mejia only raised the issue of compliance with the Friar Lands Act only upon her motion for reconsideration with the CA, and
eventually upon appeal to this Court. Mejia is precluded from doing this, as it is well settled in jurisprudence that an issue
which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal as it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[66] As Yu Han Yat correctly argued:
Certainly, the issue of whether an inquiry was made as to how the respondent's predecessors-in-interest may
trace their title to a valid alienation by the government under the provisions of Act No. 1120 was not among
those raised before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. If it were so, respondent would have presented
evidence to show that he measures up to the yardstick laid down by the Supreme Court in
the Manotok case. It must be recalled that the only primordial issue between the parties in this case is
whose title is genuine and authentic based on the respective evidence presented. This was how the
Honorable Court of Appeals simplified the otherwise convoluted and antagonistic theories of ownership
between the parties. But insofar as the alienation by the government of the property in question under the
provisions of Act No. 1120 is concerned, that was never put in issue both in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals.[67](Emphasis supplied)
To emphasize, points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[68] Issues raised for the first time on
appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.[69] To consider the alleged facts and
arguments belatedly raised would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.[70] As such,
the Court so holds that the principles under Alonso and Manotok are inapplicable in the case at bar.
On whether the Court of Appeals erred when it took judicial
notice of proceedings in other cases before it

In further ruling in favor of Yu Han Yat, the CA held that TCT No. 336663, or the Nava TCT, was null and void by taking judicial
notice of other cases decided by it, specifically the case of CA-G.R. No. 77666, titled "Heirs of Dominga Sumulong y Roxas,
represented by Wilfredo Sumulong Torres v. Hon. Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 79, Quezon City, et
al."[71] In the said case, the CA invalidated TCT No. 56809 registered in the name of Dominga Sumulong for being improperly
reconstituted: As TCT No. 336663 originated from TCT No. 56809, the CA concluded that Bernas' and Mejia's title were also
null and void because of the "legal principle that the spring cannot rise higher from its source."[72]
Petitioners decried the act of the CA of taking judicial notice of a previous case decided by it, and argued that the CA
committed a serious error of law.
The Court rules in favor of petitioners on this ground. It is well settled that, as a general rule,
 courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the
same judge.[73]
It is true that the said rule admits of exceptions, namely:
In the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge
(a)
of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it
is sufficiently designated; or

when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
(b) direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending.[74]

Neither of these exceptions, however, exists in this case. The parties were not informed, much less their consent taken, of the
fact that the CA would take judicial notice of these cases. Thus, the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the records of CA-G.R.
No. 77666 in the process of adjudicating this case.
Nevertheless, despite this error, the result remains that Yu Han Yat is the rightful owner of the subject property in light of the
Court's ruling above that there is an overlap between the properties covered by the two TCTs in question, and that the
evidence showing Yu Han Yat's title to be earlier means that Yu Han Yat holds better title.
In view of such ruling, the Court no longer sees the need to tackle the issue of whether Yu Han Yat's payment of real property
taxes constitutes proof of ownership or superior title over the subject property. In any event, the Court has consistently ruled
that:
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership.[75]
On whether petitioners are liable to respondent for damages
and attorney's fees

The CA awarded to Yu Han Yat the following amounts in the form of damages:
(a) P1,630,514.17 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
(d) Attorney's Fees in the amount of P272,868.25
As to the actual damages, the CA held that petitioners were liable therefor because Yu Han Yat deserved adequate
compensation for the duly substantiated losses suffered by him to protect his interest over the property. The CA also awarded
moral damages to Yu Han Yat because of the supposed wrongful issuance by the RTC of the preliminary injunction, and the
refusal of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to issue a License to Sell to Yu Han Yat due to the pendency of
the case. Exemplary damages were likewise awarded by the CA by way of example or correction for the public good. Finally,
the CA awarded attorney's fees because Yu Han Yat was supposedly forced by the petitioners to incur expenses in litigation to
protect his interest.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the Court finds no basis in awarding the above damages to Yu Han Yat. In ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Appeals,[76] the Court held that in the absence of malice or bad faith in the prosecution of the
case, the award of damages is unavailing:
There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of
the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a
 draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. If damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.[77]
In the same way, the Court believes that petitioners were honestly convinced of the validity of their claim to the subject
property. As subsequent holders of the same through a sale, both Mejia and Bernas (and consequently, Wharton) were
expected to insist on their supposed ownership over the property in question. Consequently, the Court deems it proper to
delete the award of damages in favor of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 14, 2010, and the
Resolution dated February 28, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 82681 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court deletes the
award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees in favor of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson),[*] Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

[*]
Senior Associate Justice (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. I, pp. 57-82. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Isaias P.
Dicdican and Franchito N. Diamante concurring.
[2] Id. at 84-87.
[3] Id. at 59.
[4] Id.
[5] Id.

[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id
[9] Id. No copy of Consulta No. 2038 was attached in the records of the case, but the CA indicated in its Decision that it was

attached in its records. Neither of the parties, however, contests the existence of Consulta No. 2038.
[10] Id.
[11] Id. at 25 and 88.

[12] Id. at 25.

[13] Id. at 118-119.
[14] Id. at 120-122.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at 123-124.
[17] Id. at 125-130.
[18] Id. at 26.
[19] Id.

[20] Id. at 60 and 159.

[21] Id. at 61
[22] Id. at 138-143.
[23] Id. at 58.
[24] Id. at 148-151.
[25] Id. at 28.
[26] Id. at 58.
[27] Id. at 159-161.
[28] Id. at 161.
[29] Id. at 198-208.
[30] Id. at 29.
[31] Id. at 220-237.
[32] Id. at 29-30.
[33] Id. at 88-91.
[34] Id. at 90-91.
[35]
Wharton was not indicated among the respondents-appellees in the title of the case, but was mentioned as one of the
parties that filed the Motion for Reconsideration dated January 12, 2011. See id. at 84.
[36]
595 Phil. 87 (2008).
[37]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1.
[38]
Cereno v. Court of Appeals, 695 Phil. 820, 828 (2012).
[39]
534 Phil. 246 (2006).
[40] Id. at 264.
[41] 601 Phil. 66 (2009).
[42] Id. at 80-81.
[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. I, p. 65.
[44]
Id. at 203.
[45]
Id. at 72-73.
[46]
Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. II, pp. 631-634.
[47]
Id. at 714.
[48]
Id. at 715.
[49]
Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. I, p. 73.
[50] Id. at 152 and 273.
[51]
Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. II, p. 760.
[52] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. I, p. 69.
[53] 31 Phil. 590 (1915).
[54] Id. at 595-599.

[55] According to the CA Decision, TCT No. 30627 or Yu Han Yat's title is traceable from OCT No. 614, which was issued on

March 12, 1912 (rollo [G.R. No. 195908] Vol. I, pp. 72 and 273). On the other hand, petitioners were unable to trace
their title to OCT No. 614 and could only present a title issued on Oct. 28, 1985 (id. at 378).
[56] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. I, p. 26; rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. II, p. 717.

[57] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. 1, p. 73-74.

[58] 103 Phil. 611 (1958).
[59] Id. at 612.
[60] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. II, p. 763.

[61] Id. at 763-765.

[62] 462 Phil. 546 (2003).
[63] Id. at 561-562.

[64] Supra note 36.

[65] Id. at 147.
[66] Bote v. Spouses Veloso, 700 Phil. 787, 865 (2012).
[67] Rollo (G.R. No. 195908) Vol. II, p. 766.
[68] Madrid v. Spouses Mapoy, 612 Phil. 920, 934 (2009).
[69] Id.
[70] Id.
[71] Rollo (G.R. No 195908) Vol. I, p. 75.
[72] Id. at 76.
[73] Tabuena v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 51, 57 (1991).
[74] Calamba Steel Center, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 497 Phil. 23, 35 (2005).
[75] Ganila v. Court of Appeals, 500 Phil. 212, 224 (2005).

[76] 361 Phil. 499 (1999).

[77] Id. at 531-532.
 Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: November 29, 2018
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Supreme Court E-Library

G.R. No. 204617. July 10, 2017.*

ESPERANZA BERBOSO, petitioner, vs. VICTORIA CAB-RAL, respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law, and
the factual findings of the lower courts are, as a rule, conclusive on the Supreme Court (SC).—At the outset, a Rule 45 petition
is limited to questions of law, and the factual findings of the lower courts are, as a rule, conclusive on this Court. Despite this
Rule 45 requirement, however, Our pronouncements have likewise recognized exceptions, such as the situation obtaining
here — where the tribunals below conflict in their factual findings and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.

Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best
proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence.—It is a basic rule
of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of
proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove. Respondent alleged that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to Fernando as evidenced by the Kasunduan
dated December 17, 1994. As such, respondent bears the burden of proving that there is indeed a sale between petitioner and
Fernando, rather than petitioner to prove that there is no sale. Examination of the records will show that the Kasunduan
dated December 17, 1994 is a mere photocopy; as such, the same cannot be admitted to prove the contents thereof. The best
evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents
of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary
evidence.

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

437

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437

Berboso vs. Cabral

Same; Same; Same; Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states that a private document, before the same can be
admitted as evidence, must first be authenticated.—Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states that a private document,
before the same can be admitted as evidence, must first be authenticated, to wit: Sec. 20. Proof of private
document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be. In Otero v. Tan, 678 SCRA 583 (2012), the Court held that: The requirement of authentication of a private document is
excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied
under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d)
when the document is not being offered as genuine.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificate of Title; Property Registration Decree No. 1529; Section 48 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of title and allows only a direct
attack thereof.—Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate
of title and allows only a direct attack thereof. A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action is to annul or set
aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to
obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.

Same; Same; Same; Upon expiration of one (1) year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and
indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding.—Upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. Therefore,
TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M) issued in favor of petitioner and her children as heirs of Alejandro are indefea-

438

438

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

sible and binding upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for
cancellation of title. Thus, We find that the petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the validity
of TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M); as such, the same should not be allowed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Herminio L. Ruiz for petitioner.

Lauron, Delos Reyes & Partners for respondent.

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Esperanza Berboso assailing the Decision1 dated May 7,
2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 100831, which reversed and set aside the Decision2 dated August 30,
2006 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 12283, dismissing the case filed
by respondent Victoria Cabral for cancellation of emancipation patents (EP).

The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:

The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land located in Barangay Saluysoy, Municipality of Meycauyan, Bulacan
containing an area of 23,426 square meters (subject land). The subject land was awarded to Alejandro Berboso (Alejandro) by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on September 11, 1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and
Normandie B. Pizarro; Rollo, pp. 65-81.

2 Id., at pp. 124-128.

439
VOL. 830, JULY 10, 2017

439

Berboso vs. Cabral

273 by virtue of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-056450. The same was duly registered with the Register of Deeds of
Meycauyan, Bulacan.

On July 27, 1987, CLT No. 0-056450 was replaced by EP No. 445829 covering 22,426-sq.-m. and EP No. 445830 covering the
remaining 1,000-sq.-m.

On November 17, 1992, after Alejandro had fully complied with all the requirements for the final grant of title, the Register of
Deeds of Meycauyan, Bulacan issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. EP-046 and TCT No. EP-047 in the name of
Alejandro. TCT Nos. EP-046 and EP-047 thereby cancelled EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed with the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) her first
petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.

Meanwhile, Alejandro died in 1994. After his death, his heirs settled his estate and executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate. Thus, on April 15, 1996, TCT Nos. EP-046 and EP-047 were cancelled and TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M) were
issued in the name of the heirs of Alejandro, namely, Esperanza Vda. de Berboso, Juan Berboso, Benita Berboso Gonzales,
Adelina Berboso Villegas and Rolando Berboso.

The PARAB rendered a decision in favor of Alejandro and accordingly affirmed the validity of the EP Nos. 445829 and 445830.
Respondent’s appeal to the DARAB was denied. Respondent elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Review docketed as
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 44666. The CA in its Decision4 dated April 21, 1998, affirmed the decisions of the PARAB and the DARAB.

_______________

3 Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of the Land they
Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor.

4 Rollo, pp. 101-110.

440

440

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

Respondent assailed the CA decision to this Court, but on December 9, 1998 Resolution,5 this Court dismissed the
respondent’s petition. Pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration (MR) filed by the respondent, the latter filed
on February 26, 1999, her second petition for the cancellation of the said EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 before the PARAB
docketed as DARAB Case No. R-03-02-8506’99. Respondent claimed that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to a
certain Rosa Fernando (Fernando) within the prohibitory period under the existing rules and regulations of the DAR and
prayed again for the cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 awarded to Alejandro. Petitioner specifically denied the
allegation of respondent that she sold a portion of the subject land to Fernando.

On March 17, 1999, this Court, in its Resolution6 denied with finality the MR filed by respondent.

Then, on December 20, 2000, the PARAB issued its Decision,7 in connection with the second petition of respondent, granting
respondent’s petition and ordered as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against [petitioner] and order is hereby issued:

1. ORDERING [petitioner] and other persons acting in her behalf to vacate the landholdings in question, subject of this
present litigation;

2. ORDERING the cancellation of Emancipation Patent Nos. 445829 and 445830;

3. DIRECTING the DAR officers and personnel concerned to reallocate the subject

_______________
5 Court Third Division Resolution in G.R. No. 135317 entitled Victoria Cabral v. Adjudication Board Department of Agrarian
Reform and Spouses Alejandro and Esperanza Berboso; id., at p. 111.

6 Id., at p. 112.

7 Id., at pp. 118-122.

441

VOL. 830, JULY 10, 2017

441

Berboso vs. Cabral

landholdings in favor of qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with its existing DAR laws, rules and regulations on the
matter.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner appealed the PARAB’s decision to the DARAB, which the latter granted in its Decision9 dated August 30, 2006 in
DARAB Case No. 12283, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Honorable Adjudicator a quo dated December 20, 2000 is hereby SET
ASIDE. A NEW JUDGMENT is hereby rendered DISMISSING the petition filed by petitioner-appellee for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10
Respondent herein appealed the DARAB’s decision to the CA docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 100831. The CA in its Decision11
dated May 7, 2012, reversed the DARAB and reinstated the PARAB’s decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Review is GRANTED and the assailed 30 August 2006 Decision
and the Resolution dated 21 June 2007 of the DARAB is [sic] REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the 20 December 2000
Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.12

_______________

8 Id., at p. 122.

9 Id., at pp. 124-128.

10 Id., at p. 128.

11 Id., at pp. 65-81.

12 Id., at p. 81.

442

442

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

Aggrieved, petitioner brought the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues, viz.:

I. DOES THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR HAVE JURISDICTION TO ACT ON A SECOND PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF AN
EMANCIPATION PATENT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN CANCELLED, FILED AFTER THE DEATH OF THE ORIGINAL
GRANTEE/BENEFICIARY OF THE SAID EMANCIPATION PATENT[,] AND LONG REPLACED BY A CERTIFICATE OF

TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE PETITIONER AND HER CHILDREN WHO WERE NOT EVEN IMPLEADED IN THE SAID PETITION
AND WHEREIN THE PARTIES HAVE NO TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER;

II. CAN THE RESPONDENT QUESTION THE VALI-DITY OF THE TORRENS TITLE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER AND TO HER
CHILDREN BEFORE THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR WITHOUT VIOLATING THE EXPRESS PROVISION OF SECTION 48 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 WHICH EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO
COLLATERAL ATTACK, IT CANNOT BE ALTERED, MODIFIED, OR CANCELLED EXCEPT IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW AND DOES THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR HAVE ANY JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN ORDER WHICH WOULD AFFECT
THE RIGHTS, OWNERSHIP, INTEREST AND POSSESSION OF THE REGISTERED OWNER OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE WHO WERE
NOT EVEN IMPLEADED IN THE PETITION;

III. WHEN WILL THE TEN YEARS PROHIBITORY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 24 OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM PROGRAM (R.A. NO. 6657) COMMENCE, IS IT FROM THE DATE THE LAND WAS AWARDED TO THE BENEFICIARY, OR
WILL IT COM-

443

VOL. 830, JULY 10, 2017

443

Berboso vs. Cabral

MENCE TO RUN ONLY FROM THE DATE THE CLOA OR EMANCIPATION PATENT WAS ISSUED TO THE BENEFICIARY?;

IV. UNDER THE RULE OF EVIDENCE, WHICH WEIGHT [sic] MORE, A FINAL DECISION RENDERED BY A COMPETENT COURT OR
THE FINDINGS AND OPINION OF THE PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR BASE [sic] ON UNVERIFIED AND UNIDENTIFIED PRIVATE
DOCUMENTS WHOSE ORIGINAL COPY WERE NOT EVEN PRESENTED[;]
V. DOES FORUM SHOPPING AND THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA APPLIES [sic] IN THIS SECOND PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
OF EMANCIPATION PATENT FILED BY THE RESPONDENT[.]13

Ultimately, the issues to be resolved in this case are: 1) whether the principle of res judicata and forum shopping apply in this
case, such that the second petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was barred by Our decision in G.R. No.
135317 dismissing respondent’s first petition; 2) whether the petitioner sold the subject land to a certain Fernando in
violation of the prohibition to transfer under the provisions of P.D. No. 27; and 3) whether the petition for cancellation of EP
Nos. 445829 and 445830 constitute as a collateral attack to the certificate of title issued in favor of Alejandro.

The Court’s Ruling

At the outset, a Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law, and the factual findings of the lower courts are, as a rule,
conclusive on this Court. Despite this Rule 45 requirement, however, Our pronouncements have likewise recognized ex-

_______________

13 Id., at pp. 27-28.

444

444

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

ceptions,14 such as the situation obtaining here — where the tribunals below conflict in their factual findings and when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.15

The principle of res

judicata and forum

shopping does not apply

in the present case.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent in filing the second petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 raised

_______________

14 In Prudential Bank (now Bank of the Philippine Islands) v. Rapanot, G.R. No. 191636, January 16, 2017, 814 SCRA 334, We
held that as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. However, there are recognized
exceptions to this general rule, namely:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

15 Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso v. Perez, G.R. No. 173926, March 6, 2013, 692 SCRA 491.
445

VOL. 830, JULY 10, 2017

445

Berboso vs. Cabral

issues which havebeen already resolved by this Court in the first petition. The second petition involves the same subject land,
same parties, same cause of action and same reliefs prayed for. The respondent filed the second petition while the MR in G.R.
No. 135317 was still pending for resolution before this Court. As such, respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Further,
petitioner claims that the elements of litis pendentia were clearly present in this case. In the first petition, the validity of EP
Nos. 445829 and 445830 was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 135317; as such, the same constitutes res judicata to the
second petition.

We are not persuaded.

In Daswani v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, et al.,16 the Court elucidated that:

In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to consider is whether the
elements of litis pendentia concur, namely: a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; b) there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and, c) that the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other
case.17

Meanwhile, in Club Filipino, Inc., et al. v. Bautista, et al.,18 the Court enumerated, to wit:

The elements of res judicata are: 1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; 2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdic-

_______________
16 G.R. No. 190983, July 29, 2015, 764 SCRA 160.

17 Id.

18 G.R. No. 168406, January 14, 2015, 745 SCRA 636.

446

446

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

tion over the subject matter and the parties; 3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there
must be as between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.19

In the case at bar, the first petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was based on the validity of its issuance in
favor of Alejandro, while the second petition was based on the alleged violation of the prohibition on the sale of the subject
land. As such, there is no, as between the first petition and the second petition, identity of causes of action. Therefore, the
final decision in G.R. No. 135317 does not constitute as res judicata on the second petition.

II

Respondent was not able

to prove that petitioner

violated the prohibition

on the sale of the subject

land.

It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.20 The party who alleges an affirmative fact
has the burden of proving it because mere allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. Verily, the party who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove.21

Respondent alleged that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to Fernando as evidenced by the Kasunduan22 dated
December 17, 1994. As such, respondent bears the burden of

_______________

19 Id.

20 Reyes v. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 120.

21 Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Chante, G.R. No. 170598, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 149.

22 Rollo, p. 148.

447

VOL. 830, JULY 10, 2017

447
Berboso vs. Cabral

proving that there is indeed a sale between petitioner and Fernando, rather than petitioner to prove that there is no sale.

Examination of the records will show that the Kasunduan dated December 17, 1994 is a mere photocopy; as such, the same
cannot be admitted to prove the contents thereof. The best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof
must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the
document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence.23

Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court states that:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;

exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

Rule 130, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides the rules when secondary evidence may be presented, thus:

_______________

23 Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., G.R. No. 191696, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 599.
448

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable.—When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.

Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the
execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3) the
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the
document and its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence.24

Nowhere in the records will show that the respondent proved that the original of the Kasunduan dated December 17, 1994
exists. Respondent even failed to explain why she merely presented a photocopy of the Kasunduan. Respondent likewise
failed to prove the contents of the Kasunduan in some authentic document, nor presented Fernando, a party to the said
Kasunduan or any witness for that matter. As such, respondent failed to prove the due execution and existence of the
Kasunduan. Therefore, a photocopy of the Kasunduan cannot be admitted to prove that there is indeed a sale

between petitioner and Fernando.

Further, the Kasunduan is merely a private document since the same was not notarized before a notary public.

Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states that a private document, before the same can be admitted as evidence, must
first be authenticated, to wit:

_______________
24 Id.

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Berboso vs. Cabral

Sec. 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in

evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

In Otero v. Tan,25 the Court held that:

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the
document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the
genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered as
genuine.26
Here, the Kasunduan is not authenticated by the respondent. No one attested to the genuineness and due execution of the
document. Fernando was not presented nor did he submit an affidavit to confirm and authenticate the document or its
contents. Neither was the requirement of authentication excused under the above cited instances.

Since the Kasunduan dated December 17, 1994 was not authenticated and was a mere photocopy, the same is considered
hearsay evidence and cannot be admitted as evidence against the petitioner. The CA, therefore erred when it considered the
Kasunduan as evidence against the petitioner.

_______________

25 G.R. No. 200134, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA 583.

26 Id.

450

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

III

The petition for cancellation

of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830

constitutes as a collateral

attack to the validity of the

certificate of title issued in

favor of petitioner and her

children. Therefore, the same

should be dismissed.

Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree proscribes a collateral attack to a certificate of title and allows
only a direct attack thereof.27 A Torrens title cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. When the Court says direct attack, it means that the object of an action is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a
different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.28

In Bumagat, et al. v. Arribay,29 the Court reiterated the rule that:

Certificates of title issued pursuant to emancipation patents acquire the same protection accorded to other titles, and become
indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance
of the patent. Lands so titled may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding; nor can they be decreed to other
individuals. The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the

_______________

27 Firaza, Sr. v. Ugay, G.R. No. 165838, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 26.

28 Hortizuela v. Tagufa, G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, 751 SCRA 371.

29 G.R. No. 194818, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 439.

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Berboso vs. Cabral

character of the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee;
thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act.30

As such, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a
certificate issued in a registration proceeding.31 Therefore, TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M) issued in favor of petitioner
and her children as heirs of Alejandro are indefeasible and binding upon the whole world unless it is nullified by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a direct proceeding for cancellation of title.32 Thus, We find that the petition to cancel EP Nos.
445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the validity of TCT Nos. 263885(M) and 263886(M); as such, the same should not
be allowed.

Therefore, in view of the fact that respondent was not able to sufficiently prove that petitioner sold the subject land to
Fernando and that the petition to cancel EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 is a collateral attack to the validity of TCT Nos. 263885(M)
and 263886(M), We hold that the CA erred in reversing the decision of the DARAB.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 7, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 100831 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 30, 2006 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 12283 dismissing the case filed by respondent Victoria Cabral is REINSTATED.

_______________

30 Id.

31 Id.

32 Cagatao v. Almonte, G.R. No. 174004, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 172.
452

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Berboso vs. Cabral

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin and Martires, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., On Official Leave.

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Notes.—The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence is
admissible other than the original document itself. (Lorenzana vs. Lelina, 800 SCRA 570 [2016])

Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was
formally offered. (Id.)

——o0o—— Berboso vs. Cabral, 830 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 204617 July 10, 2017

G.R. No. 196888. July 19, 2017.*

AURELIA NARCISE, GLORIA A. DELA CRUZ, MARITESS O. GARCIA, PHILIP FALCON, ENRICO M. VITUG, LYNETTE C. PONTRERAS,
BONIFACIO BARRAMEDA, RAMON S. MORADA, MANUEL G. VIOLA, ZENAIDA LANUZA, CIRILO G. SALTO, TEODORO DEL
ROSARIO, NANCY G. INSIGNE, MELANIE G. VIANA, ROMEO TICSAY, AMY J. FRANCISCO, MARIE J. FRANCISCO, ZENAIDA LANUZA,
MIGUELITO B. MARTINEZ, APOLONIO SANTOS, MARIVIC TAN, JANE CLOR DILEMA, VALENTINO DILEMA, JOSE L. PANGAN,
ANTONIA M. MANGELEN, IMELDA MANALASTAS, TEODORICO N. ANDRADE, AIDA L. CRUZ, MANUEL YAMBOT, JAIME SERDENA,
ARIEL PALACIOS, EVE BOLNEO, LIBETINE MODESTO, MA. AILEEN VERDE, BENNY ILAGAN, MICHELLE ROMANA, DANILO
VILLANUEVA, LEO NALUGON, ROSSANA MARASIGAN, NELIE BINAY and ISABELITA MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. VALBUECO, INC.,
respondent.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Reversion; Actions; An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141,
seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer of
certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

320

320

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

through fraud and misrepresentation.—An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks
to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer of certificate of
title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. In cancelling and
nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to
the mass of public domain. Such action is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.

Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Annulment of Titles; An action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks
for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the
property back to the State, but to its lawful owner.—An action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks
for the cancellation and nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the
property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact
that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of
title was void ab initio.
Same; “Reversion” and “Annulment of Titles,” Distinguished.—In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land, while in an action for annulment of patent and certificate of title,
pertinent allegations deal with plaintiffs ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as
defendant’s fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.

Same; Ownership; Acquisitive Prescription; Acquisitive prescrip-tion is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable
property by possessor through the requisite lapse of time.—Acqui-si-tive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a
real or immovable property by possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. The possession contemplated as foundation for
prescriptive right must be one under

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Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

claim of title or adverse to or in prescription. On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years, or ordinary, which requires possession in good faith and with a just title for a
period of ten years.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an owner of a piece of land to
recover it, if the Director of Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public land, grants a free patent to the one who has
occupancy and cultivation.—It must be noted that the trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an owner of a piece of land
to recover it, if the Director of Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public land, grants a free patent to the one who has
occupancy and cultivation. The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, contrary to petitioners’ claim, covers those issues
between two or more applicants for a free patent, which is not the case here. Here, respondent claims to be the owner of the
subject properties prior to the issuance of the patents and the corresponding certificates of title. Thus, the trial court has
jurisdiction to hear the case.

Civil Law; Prescription; The defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations
in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss.—The defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Such issue
must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims and defenses.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Raymond Roland R. Rojas for petitioners.

Jaso, Dorillo & Associates for respondent.

Emiliano S. Pomer for Ricardo Canta, et al.

322

322

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

TIJAM, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated
December 21, 2010 and Resolution2 dated May 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89616.

Facts
On March 8, 2005, respondent Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free Patents, Certificates of Title and
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 8144,3 against petitioners Narcise, et al., the Department of Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Register of Deeds of Bataan before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Branch 1.

In said Complaint, respondent alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful
possession since 1970.4 Respondent averred that from 1977 until 1999, Original Certificates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer
Certificates of Title covering the lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners.5

Instead of filing their respective Answer, petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action,
failure to state cause of action, defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription.

On December 7, 2006, the RTC issued an Order,6 granting petitioners’ motions. The RTC ruled that the instant case is an
action for reversion because petitioners are not qualified to

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and
Elihu A. Ybañez; Rollo, pp. 9-20.

2 Id., at pp. 21-22.

3 Id., at pp. 100-135.

4 Id., at p. 106.

5 Id., at p. 11.

6 Rendered by Judge Benjamin T. Vianzon; id., at pp. 280-283.

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Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

be issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back to the State. Thus, it is the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
who is the real party-in-interest, and not the respondent. The dispositive portion of the same reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let the instant complaint be dismissed and the motion to declare some defendants in
default is necessarily denied.

SO ORDERED.7

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC in its Order8 dated March 7, 2017.

Undaunted, respondent filed an appeal9 before the CA. In a Decision10 dated December 21, 2010, the CA reversed and set
aside the ruling of the RTC. The CA maintained that respondent alleged all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of the
subject free patents. The fallo thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga
City, Branch 1 dated December 7, 2006 and March 7, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to
the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.11

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 which was denied in a Resolution13 dated May 11, 2011.

Hence, this petition.

_______________

7 Id., at p. 283.

8 Id., at p. 296.

9 Id., at p. 297.

10 Id., at pp. 9-20.

11 Id., at p. 19.

12 Id., at pp. 373-388.

13 Id., at pp. 21-22.

324

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

Issues

Petitioners interposed the following grounds for review:

I.

Whether or not the instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment of free patents and certificates of
title;

II.

Whether or not respondent is the real party-in-interest; and

III.

Whether or not the instant case had already prescribed.14

Our Ruling

The petition is denied.

An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original certificate of
registration, and nullify the original certificate of title, including the transfer of certificate of title of the successors-in-interest
because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation.15 In cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores
the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such
action is filed by the OSG pursuant to its authority under the Administrative Code.16

_______________

14 Id., at pp. 40-41.

15 Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, October 13, 2010, 633 SCRA 64, citing SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, G.R.
No. 152570, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 522, 528-529.

16 Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, G.R. No. 168661, October 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513.
325

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Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for the cancellation and
nullification of the certificate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert the property back to the
State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of
the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab
initio.17

Thus, the difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to
be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed
land, while in an action for annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiff’s ownership of
the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant’s fraud or mistake in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.18

A careful perusal of respondent’s complaint reads:

3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful, adverse, continuous and peaceful possession since sometime in
1970 and up to the present time, by itself and its predecessor-in-interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of rights,
claims, interest as evidence [sic] by the documents x x x and the rest by occupation and planting of root crops and other
including trees. x x x

4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and the cultivation and planting of different root crops and
trees were always in the premises since 1970 or thereabouts, and their presence were never

_______________
17 Katon v. Palanca, Jr., G.R. No. 151149, September 7, 2004, 437 SCRA 565.

18 Heirs of Ambrosio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379, February 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206.

326

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

disturbed nor molested by anybody until sometime in the year 2000. x x x19 (Emphasis ours)

In this view, We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in the complaint show that
respondent asserts its ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.

Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership of a real or immovable property by possessor through the requisite
lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted.20 The possession contemplated as foundation for prescriptive right must be one under claim of title or
adverse to or in prescription.21

On this note, acquisitive prescription may either be extraordinary, which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30
years,22 or ordinary, which requires possession in good faith and with a just title for a period of ten years.23

Without going into the merits of the case, We hold that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently show that respondent
claims its ownership right by expounding on its uninterrupted possession of the same for a period of at least 35 years. Also,
respondent’s claim of its possession in a public, peaceful and uninterrupted manner constitutes an allegation of ownership by
acquisitive prescription.

_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 106-107.

20 Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 284.

21 Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109262, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 534.

22 Andres v. Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Incorporated, G.R. No. 201405, August 24, 2015, 768 SCRA 56.

23 Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310.

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Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

Being an action for annulment of patents and titles, it is the respondent who is the real party-in-interest for it is the one
claiming title or ownership adverse to that of the registered owner.24

Moreover, We agree with the CA when it declared that petitioners’ argument of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is
misguided.

It must be noted that the trial court has jurisdiction over an action of an owner of a piece of land to recover it, if the Director
of Lands, thinking that it is still disposable public land, grants a free patent to the one who has occupancy and cultivation.25
The jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, contrary to petitioners’ claim, covers those issues between two or more applicants
for a free patent,26 which is not the case here. Here, respondent claims to be the owner of the subject properties prior to the
issuance of the patents and the corresponding certificates of title. Thus, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Lastly, the defense of prescription is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings
and must not be resolved in a motion to dismiss. Such issue must be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits wherein
both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.27

Verily, the CA did not err in considering the instant case as an action for annulment of patents and titles.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 21, 2010 and the Resolution dated May
11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89616 are AFFIRMED in toto.

_______________

24 Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397.

25 Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III, G.R. No. 61113, February 21, 1990, 182 SCRA 420.

26 Id.

27 National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129169, November 17, 1999, 318 SCRA 255.

328

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Jardeleza and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Appeal denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.

Notes.—An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession
of the property subject of the fraudulent acts. (Lausa vs. Quilaton, 767 SCRA 399 [2015])

The Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State in sales of real estate to aliens
incapable of holding title thereto. (Ang vs. Estate of Sy So, 799 SCRA 266 [2016])

——o0o—— Narcise vs. Valbueco, Inc., 831 SCRA 319, G.R. No. 196888 July 19, 2017

G.R. No. 227124. December 6, 2017.*

HEIRS OF VICTOR AMISTOSO, namely: VENEZUELA A. DELA CRUZ, FLORA A. TULIO, WILFREDO D. AMISTOSO, RUFINO D.
AMISTOSO, VICENTE D. AMISTOSO, MAXIMO D. AMISTOSO, and ZENAIDA D. AMISTOSO, petitioners, vs. ELMER T. VALLECER,
represented by EDGAR VALLECER, respondent.

Agrarian Reform; Tenancy Relationship; Agrarian Disputes; Elements of.—In order to classify a matter as an agrarian dispute
which falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), it must be first shown
that a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. For such relationship to be proven, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, namely: (a) that the parties are the landowner and the

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (c) that there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (d) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (e)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein and regardless of the
defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss by the defendant.—It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the
action was commenced, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs
sought therein and regardless of the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss by the defendant.

Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment.’—“Res judicata literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.’” It also refers to the “rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered
on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bar by Prior Judgment; For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.—For res

270

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must
be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificates of Title; Collateral Attack; Time and again, it has been held that a certificate of
title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and that the issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an action
expressly instituted for such purpose.—It should be pointed out that petitioners’ attack on the validity of respondent’s
Torrens title in Civil Case No. S-606 by claiming that their father Victor became the owner of the subject property by virtue of
the CLT issued to him in 1978 constitutes a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their
possession of the property in an accion publiciana, not in a direct action aimed at impugning the validity of the judgment
granting the title. Time and again, it has been held that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and that
the issue of the validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose. Hence, any declaration
the CA may have made in its October 17, 2003 Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606 cannot affect respondent’s
ownership over the property nor nullify his Torrens title, as the adjudication was only for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Dario M. Mandantes for petitioners.

Cresencio Palpagan, Jr. for respondent.

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Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated February 24, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated August
10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 06720, which upheld the Resolution4 dated May 28, 2014 and the
Order5 dated December 3, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 28 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
L-298, denying the Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses filed by petitioners Heirs of Victor Amistoso, namely:
Venezuela A. Dela Cruz, Flora A. Tulio, Wilfredo D. Amistoso, Rufino D. Amistoso, Vicente D. Amistoso, Maximo D. Amistoso,
and Zenaida D. Amistoso (petitioners) for their failure to substantiate their affirmative defenses of res judicata, prescription,
and laches.

The Facts

Sometime in March 1996, respondent Elmer T. Vallecer (respondent), through his brother Dr. Jose Benjy T. Vallecer (Benjy),
filed a Complaint6 for recovery of possession and damages against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. S-606,7 involving a
2,265-square-meter parcel of land, located in Labason, Zamboanga del Norte, described as Lot C-7-A and

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1 Rollo, pp. 10-19.

2 Id., at pp. 134-139. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo T. Lloren, with Associate Justices Rafael Antonio M. Santos and
Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, concurring.

3 Id., at pp. 153-154.

4 Id., at pp. 126-127. Penned by Judge Oscar D. Tomarong.

5 Id., at p. 128.
6 See Complaint (With Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Prohibitive Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order) dated
March 1, 1996; id., at pp. 36-42.

7 The Complaint was filed before the RTC of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11. Id., at p. 36.

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covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-442148 (TCT T-44214) and Tax Declaration No. 93-73299 under respondent’s
name. He claimed that he purchased the property sometime in June 1990 after confirming with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) that the property was not tenanted. When he started making preparations for the construction of a commercial
building on the property, petitioners, with the aid of their workers, agents, representatives, and/or employees, stopped or
barred him by force, threats, and intimidation. Despite repeated demands10 and explanations made by the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)11 of the DAR during a pre-litigation conference that no landlord-tenancy relationship ever
existed between them as regards the property, petitioners continued to refuse him from entering and enjoying possession of
his property.12 Thus, he prayed for the court to, among others, order petitioners, with their representatives, agents,
employees, and assigns, to vacate the property and pay damages.13

In their defense,14 petitioners claimed that they have been in actual, peaceful, and continuous possession of the land as
evidenced by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-00262315 (CLT) issued in November 1978 to their predecessor-in-interest
Victor Amistoso (Victor) by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27.16

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8 Id., at p. 43, including dorsal portion.

9 Id., at p. 44, including dorsal portion.

10 Id., at pp. 49-57.

11 See DAR MARO Resolution dated October 10, 1995; id., at pp. 45-48.

12 Id., at pp. 37-40 and 95.

13 Id., at pp. 40-41.

14 See Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Motion to Dismiss dated April 8, 1996; id., at pp. 58-61.

15 Id., at p. 62.

16 Entitled “Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to them the Ownership of

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On January 8, 2001, the RTC declared respondent as the absolute owner of the subject property under his name.17 On appeal,
the CA rendered a Decision18 dated October 17, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70128 (October 17, 2003, CA’s Decision) reversing
the RTC’s ruling. It found that Benjy failed to show proof of his capacity to sue on respondent’s behalf and that the CLT issued
by the DAR acknowledges petitioners as “deemed owner” of the land after full payment of its value. Having proven full
compliance for the grant of title, petitioners have a right to the land which must be respected.19 This CA’s Decision became
final and executory on November 4, 2003,20 and consequently, a Writ of Execution21 was issued on May 9, 2005.
Thereafter, or on July 18, 2012, respondent filed a Complaint22 for quieting of title, ownership, possession, and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. L-298, subject of the present case. Asserting ownership
over the property under TCT No. T-44214 and tax declarations, and citing petitioners’ unlawful possession and occupation
thereof despite repeated demands to vacate, respondent claimed that: petitioners’ CLT does not contain the technical
description of the property which it purportedly covers; the tenancy relationship from which petitioners anchor their
possession pertains to the portion of the adjacent land that belongs to Maria Kho Young with whom they ad-

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the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor” dated October 21, 1972.

17 See RTC’s Decision dated January 8, 2001 in Civil Case No. S-606 penned by Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena; Rollo, pp.
64-93.

18 Id., at pp. 94-98. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and
Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.

19 Id., at pp. 96-97.

20 See Entry of Judgment; id., at p. 99.

21 Id., at pp. 100-101. See also Receipt of Possession dated May 27, 2005; id., at p. 102.

22 Id., at pp. 103-110.

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Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

mittedly have the tenancy relationship; and the October 17, 2003 CA’s Decision involving Civil Case No. S-606, annotated on
his TCT No. T-44214, constitutes a cloud on his title.23 Thus, respondent prayed for the court to: restrain and prohibit
petitioners from continuing to usurp his real rights on the property as owner thereof; prevent or prohibit them from dealing
and negotiating the property with any person for any purpose; prohibit or prevent them from obstructing and preventing the
free passage, possession, use, and appropriation of the property and its fruits; declare him as the absolute owner of the
property; and order petitioners to vacate the property and remove all structures and improvements introduced thereon at
their expense.24

Petitioners, for their part, filed an Answer with Counterclaim and Affirmative Defenses25 invoking res judicata, prescription
and laches. In support thereof, they pointed out that the October 17, 2003 CA’s Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606
had already become immutable. Likewise, they moved to hear and resolve the affirmative defense.26

The RTC’s Ruling

In a Resolution27 dated May 28, 2014, the RTC denied petitioners’ Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses for lack
of merit, declaring that the principle of res judicata would not apply in view of the lack of identity of causes of action. It held
that in contrast to Civil Case No. S-606, which involves recovery of possession, Civil Case No. L-298 is essentially one for
declaration of ownership. It also ruled that since

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23 Id., at pp. 105-108.

24 Id., at pp. 109-110.

25 Dated August 15, 2012. Id., at pp. 111-115.

26 See Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses dated December 3, 2012; id., at pp. 117-121.

27 Id., at pp. 126-127.

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the land is covered by a Torrens title, it can no longer be acquired by prescription or be lost by laches.28

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration29 which the RTC denied in an Order30 dated December 3, 2014. Undaunted,
they elevated the case before the CA via a petition for certiorari,31 arguing that Civil Case No. L-298 for quieting of title is
barred by res judicata, and that respondent lacked cause of action.32

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision33 dated February 24, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. It held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in holding that Civil Case No. L-298 is not barred by res judicata, considering that Civil Case No. S-606 filed by
respondent is anchored on his right to possess the real property as the registered owner; while Civil Case No. L-298 was filed
in order to clear his title over the land and remove all adverse claims against it.34

Dissatisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration,35 additionally arguing that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to cancel their CLT.
The CA denied petitioners’ motion in a Resolution36 dated August 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

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28 Id., at p. 126.
29 See Motion for Reconsideration dated June 17, 2014; id., at pp. 129-131 (pages are misarranged).

30 Id., at p. 128.

31 Dated March 18, 2015. Id., at pp. 22-33.

32 Id., at pp. 27-32.

33 Id., at pp. 134-139.

34 Id., at pp. 137-139.

35 See Motion for Reconsideration dated March 11, 2016; id., at pp. 140-143.

36 Id., at pp. 153-154.

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The Issues Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not Civil Case No. L-298 is barred by res judicata.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Preliminarily, petitioners insist, albeit belatedly, that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the complaint in Civil Case No. L-298,
considering that what is sought to be cancelled is their CLT; hence, an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB.37

The argument is specious.

In order to classify a matter as an agrarian dispute which falls under the jurisdiction of the DARAB, it must be first shown that
a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. For such relationship to be proven, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, namely: (a) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (b) that the
subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (c) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (d)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (e) that there is personal cultivation on the part
of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (f) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee.38

Moreover, it is well-settled that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced, irrespective of whether or not the

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37 Id., at pp. 15-16.

38 Bumagat v. Arribay, 735 Phil. 595, 607; 725 SCRA 439, 452-453 (2014), citing Atuel v. Valdez, 451 Phil. 631, 643; 403 SCRA
517, 526 (2003).
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plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein and regardless of the defenses set up in the
court or upon a motion to dismiss by the defendant.39

In this case, a reading of the material allegations of respondent’s complaint in Civil Case No. L-298 and even petitioners’
admissions readily reveals that there is neither a tenancy relationship between petitioners and respondent, nor had
petitioners been the tenant of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest. In fact, respondent did not even question the validity of
petitioners’ CLT nor sought for its cancellation. Rather, what respondent sought was for a declaration that the property
covered by his Torrens title is different from the property covered by petitioners’ CLT in order to quiet his title and remove all
adverse claims against it. Clearly, this is not an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB’s jurisdiction.

Proceeding to the main issue, petitioners contend that Civil Case No. S-606 and Civil Case No. L-298 were founded on the
same facts, allegations, and arguments, and sought the same relief, i.e., to cancel their CLT. Considering that the October 17,
2003 CA’s Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606 had already attained finality, the same constitutes res judicata to Civil
Case No. L-298.40

The Court disagrees.

“Res judicata literally means ‘a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment.’” It also refers to the “rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the

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39 See Laresma v. Abellana, 484 Phil. 766, 777; 442 SCRA 156, 168 (2004).

40 See Rollo, pp. 17-18.

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same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.”41

For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order
must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.42

In this case, the Court finds that Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-298 on the ground of res judicata
as the causes of action in the two cases are not the same.

In particular, in Civil Case No. S-606, respondent alleged that he purchased the property after confirming with the DAR that it
was not tenanted; that petitioners, with their workers and/or representatives, stopped or barred him by force, threats, and
intimidation from entering and occupying the property; and that despite repeated demands43 and explanations made by the
MARO44 that no landlord-tenant rela-

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41 Republic v. Yu, 519 Phil. 391, 395-396; 484 SCRA 416, 420 (2006). See also Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376,
382; 755 SCRA 1, 8-9 (2015); Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva, 528 Phil. 570, 576; 496 SCRA 135, 140 (2006); and
Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 463, 465; 193 SCRA 437, 439-440 (1991), citing Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1470, Rev.
4th ed., 1968.

42 Dy v. Yu, 763 Phil. 491, 509; 762 SCRA 357, 373 (2015); citation omitted. See also Republic v. Yu, id., at p. 396; p. 421; and
Gutierrez v. Court of Appeals, id., at p. 467; p. 441.
43 See Rollo, pp. 49-57.

44 See DAR MARO Resolution dated October 10, 1995 (id., at pp. 45-48), declaring that: “[t]his Office believes that Mr. Victor
B. Amistoso expanded his occupation, possession and cultivation as a tenant over the lot of his landlord Maria Kho Yang and
by the act of tolerance exceeded and/or intrudes up to the lot owned by Roman Bantilan. Clearly, Amistoso’s possessory right
over Lot No. B is valid

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tionship ever existed between them as regards the property, petitioners continued to prohibit him from entering and enjoying
possession of his property. He thus prayed for the court to order petitioners, with their representatives, et al., to vacate the
property and pay damages.45

At this point, it is apt to clarify that the CA erroneously classified Civil Case No. S-606 as an accion reivindicatoria, or a suit
which has for its object the recovery of possession of real property as owner and that it involves recovery of ownership and
possession based on the said ownership.46 As plaintiff in Civil Case No. S-606, respondent never asked that he be declared the
owner of the land in question, but only prayed that he be allowed to recover possession thereof from petitioners. As such,
Civil Case No. S-606 should have instead, been properly classified as an accion publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the
right of possession of land.47 Hence, while petitioners were acknowledged by the DAR as “deemed owners” of the land in Civil
Case No. S-606, such declaration was merely provisional as it was only for the purpose of determining possession. In Gabriel,
Jr. v. Crisologo,48 the Court thoroughly discussed the nature and purpose of an accion publiciana:

Also known as accion plenaria de posesion, accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.

_______________
by virtue of an existing tenancy relationship while on the other Lot No. C-7 is mere tolerance and does not affect ownership
for there is no valid and binding tenancy relationship thereof. x x x”

45 Id., at pp. 40-41.

46 See Hilario v. Salvador, 497 Phil. 327, 335; 457 SCRA 815, 824-825 (2005).

47 Id.

48 735 Phil. 673; 725 SCRA 528 (2014).

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Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership. When parties, however, raise
the issue of ownership, the court may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the
property. This adjudication, nonetheless, is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to
the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.49 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, in Civil Case No. L-298, respondent asserted his ownership over the property by virtue of his Torrens title,
and alleged that petitioners’ tenancy relationship actually pertains to the portion of the adjacent land that belongs to Maria
Kho Young with whom petitioners admittedly have the tenancy relationship. Respondent also claimed that petitioners’ CLT
does not contain the technical description of the property which it purportedly covers and therefore does not show that their
alleged tenancy right falls on his property.50 Thus, the October 17, 2003 CA’s Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606
and petitioners’ unlawful possession and claim of ownership constitute a cloud on his title over the property. Accordingly,
respondent prayed for the court to declare him as the absolute owner of the property, and restrain and prohibit petitioners
from performing and/or continuing to perform act/s that affect his possession and enjoyment thereof as owner.51

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49 Id., at p. 683; pp. 537-538, citing Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, 637 Phil. 131, 141-142; 623 SCRA 130, 140-141 (2010).

50 See Rollo, pp. 105-108.

51 Id., at pp. 109-110.

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Clearly, the complaint in Civil Case No. L-298 is, as indicated herein, one for quieting of title pursuant to Article 47652 of the
Civil Code. In Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral,53 the Court discussed:

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real
property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet
the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other
claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud
of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use,
and even abuse the property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed,

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52 Article 476 of the Civil Code reads:

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

53 710 Phil. 235; 697 SCRA 266 (2013).

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Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer

claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. S-606 and L-298 are different from each other.
And thus, the ruling in the former would not operate as res judicata on the latter.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that petitioners’ attack on the validity of respondent’s Torrens title in Civil Case No. S-606
by claiming that their father Victor became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the CLT issued to him in 1978
constitutes a collateral attack on said title. It is an attack incidental to their quest to defend their possession of the property in
an accion publiciana, not in a direct action aimed at impugning the validity of the judgment granting the title.55 Time and
again, it has been held that a certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and that the issue of the validity of
title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.56 Hence, any declaration the CA may have made
in its October 17, 2003 Decision stemming from Civil Case No. S-606 cannot affect respondent’s ownership over the property
nor nullify his Torrens title, as the adjudication was only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.

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54 Id., at pp. 256-257; pp. 289-290; citations omitted.

55 See Urieta Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro, supra note 49 at p. 144; p. 143.

56 See Wee v. Mardo, 735 Phil. 420, 430-431; 725 SCRA 242, 254 (2014); citations omitted. See also Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, which reads:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.—A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.

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All told, the October 17, 2003 CA’s Decision involving Civil Case No. S-606 did not bar the filing of Civil Case No. L-298 that
seeks to determine the issue of the property’s ownership, clear respondent’s title over the property, and remove all adverse
claims against it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 24, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 10, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 06720 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta, Caguioa and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—In its concept as a bar by prior judgment under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, res judicata dictates
that a judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction operates as an absolute bar to a subsequent
action involving the same cause of action since that judgment is conclusive not only as to the matters offered and received to
sustain it but also as to any other matter which might have been offered for that purpose and which could have been
adjudged therein. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Coquia, Jr., 646 SCRA 215 [2011])

While tenancy as a defense in ejectment cases does not auto-matically divest the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of its
jurisdiction over ejectment cases, the MCTC should have heard and received evidence to determine whether the MCTC had
jurisdiction over the case. (Enesio vs. Tulop, 710 SCRA 738 [2013])

——o0o—— Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Vallecer, 848 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 227124 December 6, 2017

G.R. No. 196074. October 4, 2017.*

FLORENCIA ARJONILLO, petitioner, vs. DEMETRIA PAGULAYAN, as substituted by her heirs namely: HERMANA VDA. DE
CAMBRI, PORFIRIO T. PAGULAYAN, and VICENTE, MAGNO, PEDRO, FLORENCIO, MELECIO, LERMA, all surnamed MATALANG,
and AUREA MATALANG-DELOS SANTOS, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Ownership; In order to successfully maintain actions for recovery of ownership of a real property, the
complainants must prove the identity of the land and their title thereto as provided under Article 434 of the Civil
Code.—Arjonillo and her coheirs claim that the subject properties were owned by their predecessor, Cue. They sought to
recover its full possession from Pagulayan by filing an accion reivindicatoria before the RTC. It is then incumbent upon them to
convince the court by competent evidence that the subject properties form part of Cue’s estate because in order to
successfully maintain actions for recovery of ownership of a real property, the complainants must prove the identity of the
land and their title thereto as provided under Article 434 of the Civil Code. They have the burden of proof to establish the
averments in the complaint by preponderance of evidence, relying on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the
weakness of their opponent’s evidence.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; A witness can only testify on facts within his personal knowledge; Unless the
testimony falls under any of the recognized exceptions, hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value.—Despite claiming knowledge of the terms and conditions of the sale, perusal of the
deed of absolute sale revealed that Dr. Valdepanas was neither a party nor a witness to the transaction. It is noticeable that Dr.
Valdepanas merely repeated statements he heard from Cue and Chua Bun Gui. When asked if he was present whenever Cue
paid Chua Bun Gui, he did not give a categorical answer but simply claimed that he knew about it personally. More
importantly, proponent offered the testimony to prove “that the

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

lot in question was purchased by the late Avelardo Cue and not by the defendant, Demetria Pagulayan, although the Deed of
Sale was in the name of the said defendant Demetria Pagulayan.” It was offered as evidence of the truth of the fact being
asserted. Clearly, the above quoted testimony is hearsay and thus inadmissible in evidence. A witness can only testify on facts
within his personal knowledge. This is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth
of a disputed fact. Unless the testimony falls under any of the recognized exceptions, hearsay evidence whether objected to
or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.
Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificates of Title; It is fundamental that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein.—We agree with the finding of the CA that “[t]he documentary and testimonial evidence on record clearly support
[Pagulayan’s] ownership of the disputed property as reflected in TCT No. T-35506, which was issued in her name pursuant to
the aforesaid Deed of Sale.” It is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The titleholder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership, including possession of the property.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Batungbacal & Associates for petitioner.

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 promulgated on 7 January 2011 and Resolution2 dated

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1 Rollo, pp. 28-35; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B.
Dimaampao and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

590

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

16 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89206, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated 31
August 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Tuguegarao City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 4778.

The Facts

Avelardo Cue (Cue) died intestate on 8 December 1987 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Cue died single with no surviving descendants
or ascendants but was survived by the following: 1) his brother, Felix Cue; 2) Alfonsa Sim and Rodolfo Sia, his niece and
nephew by his deceased sister Marta Cue; 3) the herein petitioner Florencia Arjonillo (Arjonillo), his niece by his deceased
sister Angelita Cue; and 4) Antonio, Isidra, Jacinto, Juanio, Nenita and Teodora, all surnamed Cue, his nieces and nephews by
his deceased brother Francisco Cue. On 21 June 1989, they executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Cue.

According to the heirs of Cue, the decedent acquired the following properties during his lifetime:

a) Lot 999-B-3-B, Psd-57204, being a portion of Lot 999-B-3, Psd-52698, located at Poblacion, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, with an
area of two hundred ten (210) square meters, more or less; bounded on the N along line 1-2 by Calle Commercio; on the N
and E, along lines 2-3-4 by Lot 999-B-3-A, of the subdivision plan, and on the S, along line 4-1 by Lot 999-A, Psd-46471 (Pedro
Abraham and Josefina Abraham); reasonably assessed at P105,000.00;

b) A 2-storey commercial building erected on Lot 999-B-3-B, Psd-57204, made of strong materials; assessed at P73,320.00.4

_______________

2 Id., at p. 36.

3 Records, pp. 446-452.

4 Id., at p. 446.
591

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Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

Lot 999-B-3-B, however, is registered in the name of Demetria Pagulayan (Pagulayan) per Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-35506, issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Cagayan.

Some of the heirs of Cue, including Arjonillo, instituted Civil Case No. 4778 with the RTC for “Reivindicacion, with Partition and
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.”5 They alleged that although the
property was registered in the name of Pagulayan, it was Cue who purchased it using his own funds; that being his paramour,
Pagulayan exercised undue influence on him in order to register the property exclusively in her own name; and that the
registration of the property in the name of Pagulayan is void as it is against public policy.

On the other hand, Pagulayan alleged that she acquired the property from Spouses Chua Bun Gui6 and Esmeralda Valdepanas
Chua (Spouses Chua) for and in consideration of P20,000.00 which was acknowledged to have been received in full by the
vendors as evidenced by the deed of absolute sale executed on 25 August 1976.7 She prayed in her answer that the complaint
be dismissed since the plaintiffs have no legal personality or cause of action against her.

The Ruling of the RTC

On 31 August 2006, the RTC rendered a decision declaring that Pagulayan is not the rightful owner of the subject property and,
consequently, ordered the partition of the subject lot and building among the heirs of Cue. According to the RTC, “[Demetria]
failed to substantiate her financial capability to acquire the properties subject of the suit, more so to erect and

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 1-9.

6 Also stated as Ching and Gin in the testimonies.

7 Records, p. 333; Exhibit “1.”

592

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

put up a building thereon jointly with Avelardo Cue.”8 Its findings were based, among others, on the testimony of Dr. Benito
Valdepanas (Dr. Valdepanas), who is a nephew of Spouses Chua:

After making a thorough evaluation on the merits of the case, as it has been well substantiated by the testimonies of
witnesses presented during the court proceedings, Demetria Pagulayan failed to prove her claim that she bought the lot in
question and put up a building thereon. Noted as well in the records of the case is the Deposition of a witness who testified
among others that he knows the lot described in TCT No. T-35506; that said witness has personal knowledge of the sale of the
lot in question by his uncle to the late Avelardo Cue; and that Defendant Demetria Pagulayan is a mere salesgirl of the late
Avelardo Cue.

The allegations of the Plaintiffs as above discussed have been, in the mind of the Court, preponderantly proven as evidenced
by the testimonies and documents presented during the trial of the case.9

The Ruling of the CA

Upon review, the CA, in its Decision dated 7 January 2011, reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision and dismissed the case. A
motion for reconsideration was filed which was denied in the CA’s Resolution dated 16 March 2011.
In dismissing the case, the CA found that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the
properties in dispute form part of the estate of Cue. It was also found that the testimonies of their witnesses could be
considered as mere hearsay because they did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances attending the execution

_______________

8 Id., at p. 449.

9 Id., at p. 451.

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of the deed of sale in favor of Pagulayan and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-35506 in her name.10

Issues

Arjonillo is now before the Court assailing the decision of the CA on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED OR SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S 31 AUGUST
2006 DECISION AND DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 4778 ABANDONING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
COURT A QUO.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED ON THE INDEFEASIBILITY OF RESPONDENT
DEMETRIA PAGULAYAN’S TITLE AND CATEGORICALLY DECLARED THAT THE OWNERSHIP OF THE DISPUTED PROPERTIES
BELONG TO HER.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT CONSIDERED WITNESS DR. BENITO
VALDEPANAS’ TESTIMONY AS HEARSAY.11

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is without merit.

When a case is appealed to the CA, it is thrown wide open for review by that court which thereby has the authority to affirm,
reverse, or modify the assailed decision of the lower court. The appellate court can render an entirely new decision

_______________

10 Rollo, p. 32.

11 Id., at p. 17.

594

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

in the exercise of its power of review in order to correct patent errors committed by the lower courts.12

Arjonillo and her coheirs claim that the subject properties were owned by their predecessor, Cue. They sought to recover its
full possession from Pagulayan by filing an accion reivindicatoria before the RTC. It is then incumbent upon them to convince
the court by competent evidence that the subject properties form part of Cue’s estate because in order to successfully
maintain actions for recovery of ownership of a real property, the complainants must prove the identity of the land and their
title thereto as provided under Article 434 of the Civil Code.13 They have the burden of proof to establish the averments in
the complaint by preponderance of evidence,14 relying on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of
their opponent’s evidence.15

Rather than dispensing with their burden of proof as required under the law, Arjonillo and her coheirs concentrated on
attacking Pagulayan’s claim of ownership over the subject properties on the ground of the latter’s alleged lack of financial
capability to purchase the land and erect a building thereon. It was consistently emphasized that Pagulayan was a mere
salesgirl who only had an annual salary of P1,950.00 in 1976.16 On this basis, Arjonillo and her coheirs maintained that
Pagulayan could not have acquired the property on 25

_______________

12 Sazon v. Vasquez-Menancio, 682 Phil. 669, 679; 666 SCRA 707, 716 (2012), citing Heirs of Carlos Alcaraz v. Republic, 502
Phil. 521, 536; 464 SCRA 280, 294-295 (2005).

13 Ibot v. Heirs of Francisco Tayco, 757 Phil. 441, 449-450; 755 SCRA 75, 85 (2015).

14 Arado v. Alcoran, 763 Phil. 205, 216; 762 SCRA 37, 49-50 (2015).

15 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 198799, 20 March 2017, 821 SCRA 41.

16 Exhibit Folder; Exhibit “2” Felix Cue, Individual Income Tax Return of Pagulayan for the calendar year 1976.

595
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Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

August 1976 as reflected in the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Spouses Chua.17

They also tried to prove that contrary to what appears in the deed of sale, the actual transaction transpired between Chua
Bun Gui and Cue. But Chua Bun Gui did not testify during the trial. Neither his wife nor any witness to the sale was presented.
Instead, Arjonillo and her coheirs presented the testimony of Dr. Valdepanas who, as earlier noted, is the nephew of Spouses
Chua and has a clinic adjacent to the property under scrutiny. The subject of his testimony, however, is not of matters he
himself knows; thus, it should be disregarded for being hearsay.

Dr. Valdepanas testified as follows:

Q: Now, you said a while ago that Chua Bun [Gui] was the former owner of the lot in question, what did Chua Bun [Gui] do
with the lot in question?

A: Two or three days after the fire that was August 22 1977 my uncle Chua Bun [Gui] went home to had a cup of coffee he told
me that he sold the lot in question to Avelardo Cue when in fact I was also interested to buy it.

Q: Are we made to understand that the transaction regarding the sale of the lot in question to Avelardo Cue was made in your
house?

A: No, sir. Avelardo Cue told me that the lot in question was sold in installment basis when in fact I offered to purchase the lot
in question in cash basis, sir.

xxxx

Q: Were you present whenever the late Avelardo Cue made payments to your uncle Chua Bun Gin?

A: [A]side from knowing it personally, the late Avelardo Cue told me that he paid fifty percent of the

_______________
17 Records, p. 333; Exhibit “1.”

596

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

purchased price and the remaining balance on installment basis, sir.18

Despite claiming knowledge of the terms and conditions of the sale, perusal of the deed of absolute sale revealed that Dr.
Valdepanas was neither a party nor a witness to the transaction. It is noticeable that Dr. Valdepanas merely repeated
statements he heard from Cue and Chua Bun Gui. When asked if he was present whenever Cue paid Chua Bun Gui, he did not
give a categorical answer but simply claimed that he knew about it personally. More importantly, proponent offered the
testimony to prove “that the lot in question was purchased by the late Avelardo Cue and not by the defendant, Demetria
Pagulayan, although the Deed of Sale was in the name of the said defendant Demetria Pagulayan.”19 It was offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact being asserted. Clearly, the above quoted testimony is hearsay and thus inadmissible in
evidence. A witness can only testify on facts within his personal knowledge.20 This is a substantive prerequisite for accepting
testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact.21 Unless the testimony falls under any of the recognized
exceptions, hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value.22

On the other hand, to shed light on how she could afford to purchase the land, Pagulayan testified that she worked with free
board and lodging from 1954 to 1976 and deposited her

_______________

18 TSN, 29 March 1996, pp. 5-8.

19 Records, p. 439.
20 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 36.

21 Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Domingo, 757 Phil. 23, 50; 754 SCRA 245, 274 (2015), citing Da Jose v. Angeles, 720 Phil.
451, 465; 708 SCRA 506, 521 (2013).

22 Republic v. Galeno, G.R. No. 215009, 23 January 2017, 815 SCRA 191.

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Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

earnings in an account with the Philippine National Bank.23 She further testified that she withdrew some of the money and
used it in reselling palay and pigs.24

The following documents were offered and admitted in evidence25 to support Pagulayan’s claim that it is indeed she who
owns the land in question: 1) a notarized deed of absolute sale26 executed by Spouses Chua on 25 August 1976 conveying the
property to Pagulayan; 2) TCT No. T-3550627 registered in the name of Pagulayan; and 3) Real Property Tax Receipts for
199328 and 199429 which were offered to prove that the land’s tax declaration was in the name of Pagulayan.

We agree with the finding of the CA that “[t]he documentary and testimonial evidence on record clearly support [Pagulayan’s]
ownership of the disputed property as reflected in TCT No. T-35506, which was issued in her name pursuant to the aforesaid
Deed of Sale.”30 It is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership,
including possession of the property.31

Though it has been held that placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership
thereof can no longer be disputed,32 this Court cannot

_______________
23 TSN, 25 August 1999, p. 8.

24 Id., at p. 9.

25 Records, p. 348.

26 Id., at pp. 333-334; Exhibit “1.”

27 Id., at p. 335; Exhibit “2.”

28 Id., at p. 339; Exhibit “6.”

29 Id., at p. 338; Exhibit “5.”

30 Rollo, p. 33.

31 Orencia v. Cruz Vda. de Ranin, G.R. No. 190143, 10 August 2016, 800 SCRA 65.

32 Heirs of Delfin and Maria Tappa v. Heirs of Jose Bacud, G.R. No. 187633, 4 April 2016, 788 SCRA 13, 32, citing Vda. de
Figuracion

598

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan

ignore the fact that Arjonillo, together with her co-heirs, failed to discharge the burden of proving their claim by a
preponderance of evidence as required under the law. Based on the foregoing, we find no persuasive argument in the instant
petition that will convince us to overturn the assailed judgment of the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 7
January 2011 and 16 March 2011, respectively, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 89206 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some
persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. (Espineli vs. People, 725 SCRA 365 [2014])

Hearsay evidence has no probative value because it is merely the witness’ recitation of what someone else has told him,
whether orally or in writing. (Josefa vs. Manila Electric Company, 730 SCRA 126 [2014])

——o0o——

_______________

v. Figuracion-Gerilla, 703 Phil. 455, 469; 690 SCRA 495, 508-509 (2013). Arjonillo vs. Pagulayan, 841 SCRA 588, G.R. No. 196074
October 4, 2017

G.R. No. 195726. November 20, 2017.*

MARCELINO DELA PAZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Supreme Court; The Supreme Court (SC), not being a trier of facts, does not routinely undertake the reexamination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.—The Court, not being a trier of facts, does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.
Ordinarily, we will not review the factual findings of the lower courts as they are conclusive and binding. This rule, however, is
subject to a number of exceptions, i.e., when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court. Here, the

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Dela Paz vs. Republic

CA reversed the RTC’s Order because it found the submitted documentary evidence unsatisfactory to warrant reconstitution.

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; It is the duty of the Supreme Court (SC) to carefully scrutinize and
verify all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications.—Time and time again, we have cautioned the lower courts against
the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution. In such cases, it is the duty of the court to carefully scrutinize and
verify all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications. In fact, we have warned the courts in reconstitution proceedings of
the tampering of genuine certificates of title and the issuance of fake ones — a widespread occurrence that has seriously
threatened the stability of our Torrens system. It is most unfortunate that our courts have been, at times, unwitting
accomplices to these transactions and easy targets for corruption.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed
in its original form and condition.—Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and condition. Its only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law,
in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The process involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the
authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented for fear of the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a
reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed. Henceforth, it is imperative that a proper standard
be set in evaluating the probative value of the documentary evidence. Having such a standard would guide our courts
accordingly in granting the reconstitution of a certificate of title, and would serve as a yardstick in determining whether trial
court judges have grossly violated their judicial duty to warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Same; Land Registration; Clear and Convincing Evidence; The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is
that a party must prove its allegations not merely by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing
evidence.—The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its allegations not
merely by a preponderance of evi-

36

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dela Paz vs. Republic

dence, but by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a
firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. It is indeterminate, being more than preponderance, but
not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Appropriately, this is the
standard of proof that is required in reconstitution proceedings. To our mind, clear and convincing evidence proving the
jurisdictional requirements must exist before a court may order the reconstitution of a destroyed or lost title. An order
reconstituting a title would produce two (2) effects: the cancellation of the alleged lost or destroyed title and the reissuance of
a new duplicate title in its original form and condition. In addition, a reconstitution proceeding is an in rem proceeding; and
when an order in such a proceeding becomes final, the findings therein can no longer be opened for review. With these in
mind, evidence proving the petitioner’s allegations in a petition for reconstitution is needed because, without proof that a
certificate of title existed and was eventually lost or destroyed, this alleged lost or destroyed title is still presumed to exist.

Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title may be done
judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in Republic Act (RA) No. 26; or administratively, in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.—Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No. 6732, allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title. Based
on the foregoing, reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title may be done judicially, in accordance with the special
procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26; or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732. By filing the
Petition for Reconstitution with the RTC, Marcelino sought judicial reconstitution of TCT No. 206714.

Statutory Construction; Ejusdem Generis; Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned.—None of the documents submitted by Marcelino fall under paragraph (f) because they are not similar to

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Dela Paz vs. Republic

those mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e), which all pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Thus, in Republic of the
Phils. v. Santua, 564 SCRA 331 (2008), we held that when paragraph (f) speaks of any other document, the same must refer to
similar documents previously enumerated therein, that is, those mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; It is settled that reconstitution on the basis of a survey plan and
technical description is void for lack of factual support.—It is settled that reconstitution on the basis of a survey plan and
technical description is void for lack of factual support. In themselves, such plan and technical description are not recognized
sources of reconstitution of title under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26. In fact, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 and LRA Circular No. 35
dated 13 June 1983, the submitted survey plan and technical description are mere additional documents that accompany the
competent sources for reconstitution.

Same; Same; Same; Tax Declarations; A tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of claim of ownership, which,
however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding.—Neither does the tax declaration submitted support Marcelino’s
cause. A tax declaration can only be prima facie evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a
reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance of such title is proper. At most, the tax declaration is merely a
prima facie evidence that the subject land has been declared for taxation purposes by Marcelino.

Same; Same; Same; The requirements under Republic Act (RA) No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied
with.—The requirements under R.A. No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied with. In a reconstitution
proceeding, the petitioner is burdened to adduce in evidence the documents in the order stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 as
sources of the deed to be reconstituted,

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dela Paz vs. Republic

and likewise burdened to prove the execution or existence of the original copy of the title, which is the copy on file with the
Registry of Deeds, and the contents thereof. Here, Marcelino failed to do both; thus, the CA did not commit a reversible error
in reversing the RTC’s order, and in dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Edilberto C. Cruz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MARTIRES, J.:

Before this Court is a Rule 45 petition1 assailing the 4 October 2010 Decision2 and the 17 February 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91196 which reversed the Order4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 220 of Quezon
City (RTC), to reconstitute Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 206714.

The Facts

On 5 June 2007, Marcelino Dela Paz (Marcelino) filed a verified petition for reconstitution of TCT No. 206714 covering a parcel
of land described as follows:

A parcel of land (Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A) of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-2114428, being a portion of

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 7-17.

2 Id., at pp. 20-30; penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda
Lampas Peralta and Danton Q. Bueser.

3 Id., at pp. 33-34.

4 Id., at pp. 31-32; penned by Presiding Judge Jose G. Paneda.

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Dela Paz vs. Republic

Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2 (LRC) Psd-1774344 L.R.C. Record No. 3563, situated in Barrio of Bagbag, Quezon City, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the N. points 2 to 3 by existing road 8 m. wide; on the E. and S. points 3 to 4 and 4 to 1 by Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-1
(LRC) Psd-177344. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan beginning 50 deg. 50’E., 457.01 m. from L.W. 22, Piedad Estate;
thence N. 22 deg. 40’3., 28.02 m. to point 2; thence N. 85 deg. 54’3., 15.00 m. to point 3; thence S. 1 deg. 57’W., 25.06 m. to
point 4; thence S. 85 deg. 54’W., 24.97 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE
METERS more or less.5

This parcel of land was the subject of an extrajudicial settlement dated 23 October 2000 among the heirs of Luz Dela Paz,
namely: Franklin S. Bortado, Sr., Franklin P. Bortado, Jr., and Marylou Bortado. Thereafter, Marcelino and his mother, Jenny
Rose Dela Paz, bought the subject land on 23 November 2005.

Based on the petition for reconstitution, the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was destroyed by fire that razed the Quezon City
Hall building on 11 June 1988, thus, the owner’s duplicate copy was lost as evidenced by the affidavit of loss duly registered
and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Marcelino submitted the following as evidence: (1) a photocopy of
TCT No. 206714; (2) real property tax declarations; (3) receipts of payments of real property tax; and (4) the land’s sketch plan
and subdivision plan.

Marcelino likewise submitted a Land Registration Authority (LRA) report stating that the plan and technical description of the
property may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted title. In addition, Marcelino
submitted a certified microfilm copy of the

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 59-60; mentioned in the OSG’s comment and transcribed from a photocopy of the alleged TCT No. 206714
attached as Annex “A” of the Petition for Reconstitution of Title.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dela Paz vs. Republic

plan and a technical description of the property on file with the LRA, which he claimed to be a valid basis and reference for
reconstitution. Marcelino believed that these documents corroborate the other documentary evidence covering the subject
property.

After considering the evidence presented, the RTC granted the petition and ordered the reconstitution of TCT No. 206714
based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description submitted. The RTC said:

The [c]ourt, after considering the evidence presented, finds that this is a proper case for the judicial reconstitution of the
original and owner’s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206714 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City based
on the approved subdivision plan and technical description of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. 206714 in the name of Luz
Dela Paz and to issue second owner’s duplicate copy of the title to the petitioner Marcelino Dela Paz, based on the approved
subdivision plan and technical description which may be used as basis for the inscription of the technical description of the
reconstituted certificate, provided, that the reconstituted title should be made subject to such encumbrance as may be
subsisting, and provided, further, that no certificate of title exists in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.6

The Assailed CA’s Rulings

When the case was elevated before the CA, the RTC’s decision was reversed and set aside, and the petition for reconstitution
was dismissed. The CA was not convinced that the

_______________

6 Id., at p. 32.

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Dela Paz vs. Republic

evidence adduced in support of the petition for reconsideration was enough. It held:

First. The heirs of Luz Dela Paz, who allegedly executed the Extrajudicial Settlement and Deed of Absolute Sale relative to the
subject property covered by TCT No. 206714 were not presented in court to acknowledge the same. The contract of sale was
not even registered with the Register of Deeds as required under Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 for it to become a credible basis for
the granting of [Marcelino]’s cause.

Second. W[e] observe that the Certification issued by the Quezon City Registry of Deeds relative to the alleged loss of the
original of TCT No. 206714 due to fire that razed the City Hall on June 11, 1988 was a form document as the name of Luz Dela
Paz and the number of the TCT were merely entered on the blanks therein provided.

Further, it cannot be deduced from the wordings of the said certification that TCT No. 206714 was actually issued and
registered under Luz Dela Paz. It states that “x x x the original of TCT No. 206714 allegedly registered under the name of Luz P.
Dela Paz was/were not included among those saved titles during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall Building last June 11,
1988 x x x.” Furthermore, it could hardly be concluded therefrom that TCT No. 206714 was indeed part of the Registry’s
record. Although it was mentioned therein that TCT No. 204714 was not among those salvaged files during the fire incident, it
does not necessarily follow that this document was among those records on file with the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.

Third. It should be remembered that the original TCT No. 206714 was allegedly destroyed during the June 11, 1988 fire
incident. The owner’s duplicate copy was allegedly lost in 2001. From 1988 to 2001, the heirs of Luz Dela Paz did not bother to
file a petition for the reconstitution of the damaged TCT. They even failed to execute an affidavit concerning the loss of their
copy in 2001 when at that time they were the alleged owners and pre-

42

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Dela Paz vs. Republic

sumably in possession of said property. It was only when the subject lot was transferred to [Marcelino] and his mother Jenny
Rose Dela Paz on November 23, 2005 that said affidavit was made at [Marcelino]’s instance. In said document, he failed to
explain the surrounding circumstances how said copy was lost. He just made a general statement therein that the duplicate
original copy “got lost and could no longer be located despite diligent effort to locate the same.” Inexplicably, the extant
petition was filed only in 2007 or nineteen (19) years from the copy’s destruction in 1988.

Fourth. The tax declaration and tax receipt presented cannot likewise be valid bases for reconstitution as these documents are
issued for tax purposes only. Besides, a tax declaration is not a reliable source of reconstruction of a certificate of title. It can
only be prima facie evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A
reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely
determines whether are issuance of such title is proper. (Citations omitted)
Fifth. The photocopy of TCT No. 206714 offered by [Marcelino] can only be considered secondary evidence, hence,
inadmissible. Absent any satisfactory proof that would establish its admissibility as provided under Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, the same cannot be relied upon [for] the reconstitution of the subject certificate of title.

What further surprises this Court is that [in] the said copy, the name of the subject lot’s registered owner was concealed as
the space provided for therein was deliberately covered. [Marcelino] even failed to testify why he had a photocopy of the
owner’s duplicate copy and how he was able to secure the same. (Italics supplied)

Sixth. The Sketch Plan and Subdivision Plan submitted by [Marcelino] are mere additional requirements under R.A. No. 26 and
per se not sufficient bases for reconstitution. This is evident under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26, thus:

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xxxx

We also examined the LRA Report dated January 21, 2008 verifying that the plan and technical description of Lot
457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the Subdivision Plan are true representations of the lot approved under (LRA) PR-08-01589-R. Despite
said certification, [we] cannot still ascertain whether this lot was indeed covered by TCT No. 206714 and registered under Luz
Dela Paz. The Report states “x x x Transfer Certificate of Title No. 206714, allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering
Lot 457- A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-214428 x x x.” The Technical Description and Sketch/Special Plan
appended therewith do not even bear the TCT covering said property. Moreover, the officers who certified and verified the
plan and technical description of the land were not presented as witnesses to confirm the same.7
Aggrieved by the reversal, Marcelino filed a motion for reconsideration that the CA eventually denied; hence, the present
petition.

The Petition

Marcelino faults the CA in saying that the documentary evidence submitted are not enough to reconstitute TCT No. 206714.
He argues that he has fully complied with the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26. The RTC even
found it proper to reconstitute based on the approved subdivision plan and technical description of the property.

Marcelino submits that the documents he submitted are sufficient to establish the existence of TCT No. 206714 to warrant its
reconstitution. Although the certification that the original copy of TCT No. 206714 was not included among those saved during
the fire is pro forma, it is still a public

_______________

7 Id., at pp. 26-29.

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document which contents are presumed to be true and accurate. Meanwhile, the LRA report favors reconstitution because (1)
the approved plan and technical description were verified by the LRA; and (2) the report mentions that the approved plan and
technical description may be used as basis for the property’s description in the reconstituted title. As to the other documents,
Marcelino maintains that they are genuine evidence for reconstitution as they are public documents. Therefore, considered all
together, the pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient for reconstituting TCT No. 206714.

The Court’s Ruling

The present petition is devoid of merit.

Preliminary considerations

The issue to be resolved in this case is whether Marcelino presented competent proof that TCT No. 206714 may be
reconstituted based on the documentary evidence he submitted. We generally do not entertain a question of fact requiring a
reevaluation of the evidence on record, given the limited rule review provided us in Rule 45 that a petition shall only raise
questions of law.

The Court, not being a trier of facts, does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case.8 Ordinarily, we will not review the factual findings of the lower courts as they
are conclusive and binding. This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, i.e., when the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court. Here, the CA reversed the

_______________

8 Republic v. Heirs of Julio Ramos, 621 Phil. 123, 133; 613 SCRA 314, 324 (2010), citing Cosmos Bottling Corporation v.
Nagrama, Jr., 571 Phil. 281, 298; 547 SCRA 571, 584-585 (2008).
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RTC’s Order because it found the submitted documentary evidence unsatisfactory to warrant reconstitution.

For this reason, we take cognizance of the issue before us and shall examine the probative weight of the pieces of evidence
presented by Marcelino to support his petition for reconstitution.

Quantum of evidence required

in reconstituting a Certificate

of Title

Time and time again, we have cautioned the lower courts against the hasty and reckless grant of petitions for reconstitution.
In such cases, it is the duty of the court to carefully scrutinize and verify all supporting documents, deeds, and certifications. In
fact, we have warned the courts in reconstitution proceedings of the tampering of genuine certificates of title and the
issuance of fake ones — a widespread occurrence that has seriously threatened the stability of our Torrens system. It is most
unfortunate that our courts have been, at times, unwitting accomplices to these transactions and easy targets for corruption.9

Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition.10 Its
only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were
when the loss or destruction occurred.11 The process
_______________

9 See Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 241 Phil. 75, 83; 157 SCRA 62, 70 (1988), cited in Republic v. Holazo, 480
Phil. 828, 835-; 437 SCRA 345, 352 (2004). See also Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727, 743: 116
SCRA 261, 277-278 (1982).

10 Vda. de Anciano v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875, 876 (1953).

11 Lee v. Republic, 418 Phil. 793, 800; 366 SCRA 524, 531 (2001); Heirs of Pedro Pinote v. Dulay, 265 Phil. 12, 21; 187 SCRA

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involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented for fear of the chilling
consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed.12

Henceforth, it is imperative that a proper standard be set in evaluating the probative value of the documentary evidence.
Having such a standard would guide our courts accordingly in granting the reconstitution of a certificate of title, and would
serve as a yardstick in determining whether trial court judges have grossly violated their judicial duty to warrant the
imposition of administrative sanctions.
The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its allegations not merely by a
preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence.13 Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established.14 It is indeterminate, being
more than preponderance, but not to the extent of

_______________

12, 19-20 (1990); Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 598; 305 SCRA 118, 124-125 (1999).

12 Republic v. Pasicolan, 758 Phil. 121, 141; 755 SCRA 495, 516 (2015).

13 Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, 565 Phil. 59, 92; 540 SCRA 304, 344-345 (2007); Republic v.
Imperial Credit Corporation, 578 Phil. 300, 308; 555 SCRA 314, 322 (2008); Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic, 480 Phil. 787, 798; 437
SCRA 311, 320-321 (2004); Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, 643 Phil. 57, 167; 628 SCRA 668, 780-781 (2010), citing
Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc., 462 Phil. 546, 562; 417 SCRA 115, 124-125 (2003); Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181
Phil. 432, 439; 93 SCRA 238, 244 (1979). Reiterated in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, 201 Phil. 727, 744; 116
SCRA 261, 278 (1982); Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, 209 Phil. 325, 337; 124 SCRA 394, 405-406
(1983); Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, 272-A Phil. 467, 478; 195 SCRA 482, 494- (1991); and Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v.
Velasco, 343 Phil. 115, 136; 277 SCRA 342, -362-363 (1997).

14 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 227, 5th Edition.

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such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.15 Appropriately, this is the standard of proof that is
required in reconstitution proceedings.16

To our mind, clear and convincing evidence proving the jurisdictional requirements must exist before a court may order the
reconstitution of a destroyed or lost title. An order reconstituting a title would produce two (2) effects: the cancellation of the
alleged lost or destroyed title and the reissuance of a new duplicate title in its original form and condition. In addition, a
reconstitution proceeding is an in rem proceeding; and when an order in such a proceeding becomes final, the findings therein
can no longer be opened for review.17 With these in mind, evidence proving the petitioner’s allegations in a petition for
reconstitution is needed because, without proof that a certificate of title existed and was eventually lost or destroyed, this
alleged lost or destroyed title is still presumed to exist.

Therefore, in order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of a lost or destroyed title, the
petitioner must clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the
certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petition has legal interest
over the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.

The petition lacks competent

evidentiary basis to reconstitute

TCT No. 206714.

_______________

15 Id.

16 See Republic v. Catarroja, 626 Phil. 389, 396; 612 SCRA 472, 479 (2010); Republic v. Heirs of Spouses Donato Sanchez and
Juana Meneses, 749 Phil. 999, 1004; 744 SCRA 700, 705 (2014).

17 Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System v. Sison, supra note 13 at p. 335; pp. 403-404; Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v.
Lim, 208 Phil. 394, 406; 123 SCRA 464, 476-477 (1983).
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In his petition, Marcelino enumerates the documents he had submitted, which the RTC relied upon in granting the petition for
reconstitution:

(1) Extrajudicial Settlement dated 23 October 2000 executed by the heirs of the late Luz Dela Paz involving the property
covered by TCT No. 206714;

(2) Affidavit of Publication of the extrajudicial settlement issued by the newspaper Remate dated 20 March 2000;

(3) Deed of Absolute Sale dated 23 November 2005 executed by the heirs of Luz Dela Paz in Marcelino’s favor concerning the
subject lot;

(4) Certification dated 17 November 2006 issued by the LRA to the effect that TCT No. 206714 was not included among those
saved titles during the fire that razed the Quezon City Hall Building on 11 June 1988 and the records leading to its issuance
were burned;

(5) Affidavit of Loss dated 23 November 2005 executed by Marcelino as to the loss of the duplicate owner’s copy of TCT No.
206714 duly annotated by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;

(6) Tax Declaration or Official Receipt issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City showing payment of real
property tax covering the subject lot;
(7) A photocopy of TCT No. 206714;

(8) Extrajudicial Sketch Plan of TCT No. 206714;

(9) Subdivision Plan certified by the microfilming officer of the LRA; and

(10) The LRA Report to the trial court which states:

1. The present petition seeks the reconstitution of TCT No. 206714, allegedly lost or destroyed and supposedly covering Lot
457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-214428 situated in the Barrio of Bagbag, Quezon City.

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2. The plan and technical description of Lot 457-A-12-B-2-B-2-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-214428, were verified correct
by this Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-08-01589-R pursuant to the
provisions of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information anent the property in question is respectfully submitted for consideration in the
resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section
15 of Republic Act No. 26 to grant the same, the plan and technical description having been approved, may be used as basis
for the inscription of the technical description on the reconstituted certificate.18

Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended by R.A. No.
6732, allows the reconstitution of lost or destroyed original Torrens title.19 Based on the foregoing, reconstitution of a lost or
destroyed certificate of title may be done judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A.

_______________

18 Rollo, pp. 13-14.

19 Section 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title.—Original copies of certificates of titles lost or
destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall
be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with
this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act may
be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as
determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or
damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds:
Provided, further, that in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).

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No. 26;20 or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732. By filing the Petition for Reconstitution with
the RTC, Marcelino sought judicial reconstitution of TCT No. 206714.

Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources for reconstitution of TCTs:

Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an
authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed
transfer certificate of title was issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered;
and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title. (Emphasis supplied)

_______________

20 An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed.

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Not one of the documentary evidence Marcelino had presented falls under this enumeration. Our reasons, apart from those
that the CA had already discussed, are as follows:

First. The extrajudicial settlement and the deed of absolute sale cannot fall under paragraph (d) of Section 3 of R.A. No. 26
because (1) these were not filed with the Registry of Deeds and, more importantly, (2) these were not the basis for the
issuance of TCT No. 206714. True, they involve the same property covered by TCT No. 206714; however, neither the
extrajudicial settlement nor the deed of sale reflects under whose name the title should be registered. If we were to use the
extrajudicial settlement between the heirs of Luz Dela Paz as basis for a reconstituted title, the title should reflect that the
land is registered under their names. By analogy, the same logic applies if we were to use the deed of absolute sale in favor of
Marcelino. As clearly alleged in the petition, Marcelino seeks to reconstitute the title under the name of Luz Dela Paz; hence,
for the court to order the reconstitution of a title where the registered owner is Luz Dela Paz, a deed of transfer or other
document transferring ownership to such person should be presented.

Second. The photocopy of TCT No. 206714 that Marcelino offered as evidence is not a certified copy previously issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City or by the legal custodian thereof. The requirement for a certified true copy of the title has
practical considerations: (1) a copy of a document, without a certification that it is an exact copy of the original from its legal
custodian, lacks credibility and weight as evidence; and (2) it would be impossible to reconstitute a title not based on an exact
and accurate copy of its original. As noted by the CA, the name of the registered owner in the photocopy of TCT No. 206714
was concealed as the space provided for therein was deliberately covered.21 Following the purpose of reconstitution, we
cannot allow the reproduction of a title based on a docu-

_______________

21 Rollo, p. 28.

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ment that does not identify the registered owner. This circumstance on its own already raises doubt as to the authenticity and
genuineness of the photocopy of TCT No. 206714.

Third. None of the documents submitted by Marcelino fall under paragraph (f) because they are not similar to those
mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (e), which all pertain to documents issued or are on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.22 Thus, in Republic of the Phils. v.
Santua,23 we held that when paragraph (f) speaks of any other document, the same must refer to similar documents
previously enumerated therein, that is, those mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

The documents alluded to in paragraph (f) must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding in order.24 If the petitioner
for reconstitution fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior documents (except with respect to the owner’s
duplicate copy of the title which it claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and had failed to find them, the presentation of the
succeeding documents as substitutionary evidence is proscribed.25

Moreover, it is settled that reconstitution on the basis of a survey plan and technical description is void for lack of fac-

_______________

22 Republic. v. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828, 840; 437 SCRA 345, 353 (2004), citing Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra
note 9.

23 586 Phil. 291, 298; 564 SCRA 331, 338 (2008). See also Heirs of Felicidad Dizon v. Discaya, 362 Phil. 536, 545; 303 SCRA
197, 204-205 (1999).

24 Republic v. Holazo, supra.

25 Id.
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tual support.26 In themselves, such plan and technical description are not recognized sources of reconstitution of title under
Section 3 of R.A. No. 26. In fact, under Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 and LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983, the submitted
survey plan and technical description are mere additional documents that accompany the competent sources for
reconstitution. This can clearly be gleaned from the wording of the law:

Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f)
of this Act, shall be filed with the [Regional Trial Court], by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest
in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if
any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location area and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the building or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or
other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration thereof has
not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of
the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to
be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section

_______________
26 Lee v. Republic, supra note 11 at pp. 802-803; p. 533; Dordas v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59; 270 SCRA 328 (1997).

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2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly
approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior
certificate of title covering the same property. (Emphasis and underlining supplied)

Similarly, paragraph 5 of LRA Circular No. 35 dated 13 June 1983 states that:

In case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) and 3(f) of Republic Act No. 26,
in relation to Section 12 thereof, the signed duplicate copy of the petition to be forwarded to this Commission shall be
accompanied by the following:

(a) A duly prepared plan of said parcel of land in tracing cloth, with two (2) print copies thereof, prepared by the government
agency which issued the certified technical description, or by a duly certified technical description. Where the plan as
submitted is certified by the government agency which issued the same, it is sufficient that the technical description be
prepared by a duly licensed Geodetic Engineer on the basis of said certified plan. (Emphasis and underlining supplied)
Fourth. Neither does the tax declaration submitted support Marcelino’s cause. A tax declaration can only be prima facie
evidence of claim of ownership, which, however, is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding. A reconstitution of title does
not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title but merely determines whether a re-issuance
of such title is proper.27 At most, the tax declaration is merely a prima facie evidence that the subject land has been declared
for taxation purposes by Marcelino.

_______________

27 Republic v. Santua, supra note 23 at p. 299; p. 340.

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In sum, all these documentary evidence being considered, we find that not one of them is a competent source for
reconstitution.

The requirements under R.A. No. 26 are indispensable and must be strictly complied with. In a reconstitution proceeding, the
petitioner is burdened to adduce in evidence the documents in the order stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 as sources of the
deed to be reconstituted, and likewise burdened to prove the execution or existence of the original copy of the title, which is
the copy on file with the Registry of Deeds, and the contents thereof.28 Here, Marcelino failed to do both; thus, the CA did
not commit a reversible error in reversing the RTC’s order, and in dismissing the petition for reconstitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The 4 October 2010 Decision and the 17 February 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91196 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.

Notes.—A reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. (Republic vs. Rosario, 782 SCRA 271 [2016])

University of the Philippines’ (UP’s) titles over its landholdings are recognized and confirmed both by law and jurisprudence.
(Id.)

Courts must be cautious and careful in granting reconstitution of lost or destroyed titles. (Id.)

——o0o——

_______________

28 Heirs of Pastora Lozano v. Register of Deeds, Lingayen, Pangasinan, 530 Phil. 255, 267; 498 SCRA 518, 532 (2006). Dela Paz
vs. Republic, 845 SCRA 34, G.R. No. 195726 November 20, 2017

G.R. No. 171836. October 2, 2017.*

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by HON. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, in his capacity as DAR-OIC Secretary,
petitioner, vs. SUSIE IRENE GALLE, respondent.

G.R. No. 195213. October 2, 2017.*

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. SUSIE IRENE GALLE, substituted by her heirs, namely HANS PETER, CARL OTTO,
FRITZ WALTER, and GEORGE ALAN, all surnamed RIETH, respondents.

Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Due Process; Undervaluation results in denial of due process of law.—LBP and DAR

_______________

* SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION.

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Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle

argue in their respective Motions for Reconsideration that it was improper for the Court to nullify the DARAB’s October 15,
1996 Decision, which is already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review. If only the DARAB Decision were correct,
this proposition would apply. However, far from it, the DARAB Decision goes against the law; at the same time, it is unfair,
unjust, and oppressive, for the reason that the just compensation decreed therein is grossly erroneous. Galle’s properties
were grossly undervalued, and the DAR committed serious lapses in the process of expropriating the same. Undervaluation
results in denial of due process of law. This Court has repeatedly held that — Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The
compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive the
owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public.

Eminent Domain; Eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government.—Eminent domain
is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government. However, such power is not boundless; it is
circumscribed by two constitutional requirements: “first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain
affects an individual’s right to private property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty, the need for its circumspect
operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, we said: The exercise of the right of
eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and
the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater
tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley v. Mountainlake Water
Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec.

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576].) The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of
governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from
abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th ed.], Sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil. 411.)

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Void Judgment; Being a void judgment, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board’s (DARAB’s) Decision “may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even
necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.”—The DARAB’s
October 15, 1996 Decision is null and void. It cannot therefore acquire finality. Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have
no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a
lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.
Being a void judgment, the DARAB’s Decision “may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not
even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.”

Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; The settled principle is that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
taking.—It would appear that the CA should have depreciated the property to its 1988 level, given the directive in DAR
Administrative Order No. 5(II)(C.2)(c), to the effect that the comparable sales transactions that may be considered in
computing Comparable Sales (CS) should be those sales transactions that were executed within the period January 1, 1985 to
June 15, 1988, and registered within the period January 1, 1985, to September 13, 1988. This found reiteration in the Alfonso
case, and later in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Tañada, 814 SCRA 117 (2017). However, a serious legal issue in this
regard would necessarily arise: Galle’s

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property was taken only in 1993, and the settled principle is that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
taking. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, this Court reiterated this long-established principle, thus:
The ‘taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding.’ In
computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the ‘value of the land
at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment.’ ‘The time of taking is the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.’

PETITION for review on certiorari of the report and recommendation of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

LBP Legal Services Group for petitioner LBP.

Ma. Zenaida M. Garcia for respondent Heirs of Galle.

RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On August 11, 2014, the Court issued a Decision1 in the instant case, decreeing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:

1. The Petition in G.R. No. 171836 is DENIED. The assailed September 23, 2004 Decision and February 22, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 80678 are AFFIRMED;

2. The Petition in G.R. No. 195213 is GRANTED IN PART. The assailed July 27, 2010 Consolidated Decision and January 19,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Ap-

_______________

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 195213), pp. 1131-1172.

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peals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00761-MIN and C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00778-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
3. Civil Case No. 4436-2K3 is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is directed to receive evidence and immediately
determine the just compensation due to Susie Irene Galle’s estate/heirs — including all applicable damages, attorney’s fees
and costs, if any — in accordance with this Decision, taking into consideration Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, the
applicable Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Orders, including Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as
amended by Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, and prevailing jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals is further
directed to conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommendations within 90 days
from notice of this Decision; and

4. The petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines is ORDERED to PAY Susie Irene Galle’s estate or heirs — herein respondents —
the amount of SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIXTY-THREE AND 91/100 PESOS (P7,534,063.91), in
cash, immediately upon receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.2

On September 22, 2014, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration3 arguing that it was
improper for this Court to declare null and void the October 15, 1996 Decision in DARAB Case No. JC-RIX-ZAMBO-0011-CO,
which fixed just compensation on the basis of outdated 1991 data instead of valuation criteria as of 1993, the time of taking of
the subject property; that said October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision is already final and executory and thus beyond judicial
review, even by this Court; and that even if it were to be assumed that said DARAB Decision is null and

_______________

2 Id., at p. 1170.

3 Id., at pp. 1173-1186.

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Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle

void, it nonetheless cannot be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 insisting that the October 15,
1996 DARAB Decision is correct; that the 1991 valuation is accurate since the actual taking of Galle’s property for purposes of
fixing just compensation may be said to have occurred at that time when the Notice of Coverage was served upon Galle; that a
property valuation discrepancy of three years is not significant in the determination of just compensation due to the owner of
expropriated property; and that the October 15, 1996 DARAB Decision, being correct and having attained finality, shall prevail
as regards the amount of just compensation to be paid for Galle’s expropriated property.

On September 15, 2015, the Court of Appeals (CA) submitted its Report and Recommendation,5 stating as follows:

Simply put, in the crucial choice of the applicable formula for determination of the land value of the subject properties, We
need to ascertain whether the three (3) factors are present, relevant, and applicable.

The Capitalized Net Income (CNI) factor

This refers to the difference between the gross sales (AGP x SP) and total cost of operations (CO) capitalized at 12%, expressed
in the following equation form:

CNI = (AGP x SP) – CO

.12

Before proceeding to the computation proper, We noted the following significant circumstances:

_______________

4 Id., at pp. 1192-1203.

5 Id., at pp. 1230-1248; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello and concurred in by Associate Justices Henri Jean
Paul B. Inting and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.
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1) There was noncompliance by the DAR with the rules prescribed by Section 16 of RA 6657, to wit: a) failure of the DAR,
after having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, to send out a notice to acquire the land to the owners
by personal delivery or registered mail and post the same in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the
property is located; b) lack of actual inspection by LBP and DAR;

2) LBP, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari dated March 7, 2011 filed before the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No.
195213, declared that in November 1995, a reevaluation of the Galle property was made by LBP taking into consideration the
factors under DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 06, Series of 1992 as amended by AO No. 11, Series of 1994 where the
valuation was Php7,534,063.91;

3) In its Petition for Review dated December 29, 2005 before this Court docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00761, LBP made the
same declaration that the just compensation for Galle must be computed in accordance in [sic] AO 6, Series of 1992, as
amended.

4) In this final stage of the case, however, particularly in their Memorandum filed before this Court, LBP would now insist
that the applicable Administrative Order is AO 2 Series of 2009, claiming that the basic formula of AO 6, as amended, and AO 2
are the same. No explanation was given by LBP for their sudden shift to AO 2 instead of AO 6 in their determination of just
compensation. This change of theory of the case results in undue surprise to the opposite party, and offends the basic rules of
fair play Justice, and due process.

DAR Administrative Order 02-09 pertains to Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition and Distribu-

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tion of Agricultural Lands under Republic Act No. 6657, as amended by Republic Act No. 9700. It seeks to strengthen the
comprehensive reform program and provides for the continuing acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands covered
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) for a period of five (5) years under various phases, and the
simultaneous provision of support services and the delivery of agrarian justice to Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs).

xxxx

Obviously out of that coverage are Galle’s properties which had already been taken as far back as 1993. This fact, to Our mind,
effectively rules out LBP’s suggestion that DAR AO 2-09 should control the computation of just compensation. In short[,] in
determining the just compensation due to Galle, AO 02-09 did not have the effect of changing the basic formula to be used in
the valuation: it continues to be governed by AO 6, as amended, as LBP itself had always insisted all throughout this litigation,
until its recent change of tune.

Now back to Administrative Order No. 6 which computes AGP as the latest available 12 month’s gross production immediately
preceding the date of offer in case of VOS or date of notice of coverage in case of CA while SP is reckoned as the average of
the latest available 12 month’s selling prices prior to the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP for processing. It should be
particularly noted that the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP from DAR is mandated to mean the very date when the
claimfolder is officially determined by LBP to be complete, that is, with all the required documents and valuation inputs duly
verified and validated and ready for computation and processing.

As a matter of record, Galle’s properties were compulsorily acquired (CA). Yet, the date of coverage of her properties has
remained uncertain. Nowhere in the records is it shown that Galle had been notified pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657.
This omission had remained unexplained, even as it had remained undisputed by DAR and LBP. Surprisingly, a Notice of
Coverage was

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submitted by LBP. A notice of land valuation dated August 25, 1992 in the amount of P6,083,545.26 was allegedly offered and
it further states that the Notice of Acquisition is dated January 21, 1991 or 19 months earlier, contrary to the law’s mandate
that the Notice of Acquisition should state the specific offer of compensation. In the notice of land valuation, mention was
made of a notice of acquisition dated January 22, 1991, which actually was a postdate, a date that was yet to come more than
a year into the future. Such a gross failure of the government agency concerned to notify Galle pursuant to Section 16 of RA
6657 had rendered computation of the AGP uncertain, speculative, and unreliable — especially when made to depend on the
basis of the date submitted by LBP, considering that the date of notice of coverage is uncertain to begin with. AGP is the one
year’s Average [G]ross Production immediately preceding the date of offer in case of Voluntary [O]ffer to [S]ell (VOS) or date
of notice of coverage in case of compulsory acquisition (CA). We therefore opine that the failure of DAR to notify [the]
landowner as mandated by law had effectively and unduly prevented the [landowner] from submitting the required
statement of income and other proofs to show the clear financial condition of the estate. Securing and unduly relying on
indirect, tangential, and largely secondary information definitely create a significant impact on the CNI factor and its reliability
and fairness.

Assuming arguendo that LBP received the claimfolder of Galle from DAR on October 4, 1991, then We cannot help agreeing
with the respondents’ position that it does not necessarily mean that the claimfolder was already complete with the essential
requirements and ready for processing. DAR AO No. 11, Series of 1994, clearly provides that:

For purposes of this Administrative Order, the date of receipt of claimfolder by LBP from DAR shall mean the date when the
claimfolder is determined by the LBP to be complete with all the required documents and valua-

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tion inputs duly verified and validated, and is ready for final computation/processing.

LBP secured a certification from PCA on selling prices of copra on July 21[,] 1995, thus it is fair to assume that [on] October 4,
1991 date of receipt, the claimfolder was yet to be completed. It was not at all complete and ready for processing.

In sum, considering that the [date] of the notice of coverage and the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP cannot be
determined with certainty, it is now impossible to arrive at the relevant average gross production and selling prices as well as
the cost of operations. [This is] because respondents had been prevented from submitting — as and when pertinent data and
statistics were still fresh and available — an accurate and realistic statement of income. And all these, because of the
unexplained and unjustifiable failure or omission of DAR to notify the [landowner] of the subject land acquisition as expressly
mandated by law. The so-called industry figure used by LBP as the cost of operations in lieu of a statement of net income
which Galle allegedly failed to submit could not be appreciated against the innocent [landowner] Galle, and in favor of the
erring state agency. Because of want of reliable data, through no fault of the [landowner], CNI could not be accurately
ascertained.

Considering that CNI factor is not present, We find it proper to use the following formula in AO 6, as amended, in computing
just compensation for Galle:

When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

Respondents Galle presented Resolutions of the City Government of Zamboanga City showing the payment for properties
expropriated by the City as determined by the City Appraisal Committee fixing the value of private lands for its acquisitions or
expropriations for governmental purposes. These were resolutions between

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years 2000 and 2003. Respondents brought down the values of the properties to the year 1993 using the appreciation and
conversely depreciation rate factor of 5% employed by bank appraisers. The barangays mentioned in the resolutions are near
Barangay Patalon, where Galle’s properties [are] located and taken in 1993.

(Summary of the 5 Resolutions issued by the City

Government of Zamboanga)

We opted to use the 3 Resolutions instead of 5 since the Talisayan area had the same appraised value.

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Taking into consideration that the questioned property is a fully developed land with a heavy extraction of sand and gravel on
the river that abounds Galle’s property, the comparable contemporaneous sales transactions of nearby places (Patalon,
Talisayan, Sinubung) the average of the CS factor should be:

91.32 (Patalon) + 139.67 (Talisayan) + 139.67 (Sinubung)

3
= 123.55 per square meter x 3,568,257 square meters (356.8257 hectares)

CS = Php440,858,152.35

On the other hand, the market value of the property which refers to the market value per Tax Declaration, are as follows:

Applying the formula LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1), the value of the property would be:

LV = 440,858,152.35 (.90) + 9,083,202.00 (.10)

396,772,337.115 + 908,320.20

LV = 397,680,657.315

In summary, this Court recommends that the just compensation due to Galle be set at Php397,680,657.315. Such valuation, it
is respectfully submitted, is fair, reasonable, and consistent with the letter and spirit of the law and applicable DAR regulations
on the fixing of just compensation, specifically AO 6, as amended.

The Supreme Court consistently defined just compensation as ‘the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator,’ and that the gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. In order to be
‘just,’ the payment must be real, substantial, full, and ample. The concept of just

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compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land, but also the
payment of the land within a ‘reasonable time’ from the taking of the property.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered ‘just’ inasmuch as the property owner is made to suffer the
consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with his or her loss.

In this case, the DAR literally took respondent’s land without her knowledge and participation, and without paying her just
compensation. Worse, from the time of the taking of respondent’s land in 1993 to the time this case reached the Supreme
Court until it was decided on 11 August 2014, LBP has not compensated respondent although DAR has already distributed the
lands to the farmer beneficiaries for more than twenty-one (21) years ago. Justice and equity require that the unreasonable,
even oppressive, delay in the payment of just compensation be appropriately remedied by the award of legal interest in
respondent’s favor. Legal interest is the measure of damages arising from delay (mora solvendi) under the Civil Code. We thus
RECOMMEND 12% interest per annum, computed from November 17, 1993 to June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July 1,
2013 until their full satisfaction in the nature of damages for the delay in payment.

We also RECOMMEND an award of attorney’s fees. The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. If at all granted, attorney’s fees must
be reasonable, just, and equitable. It is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law to justify the grant of such
award. It must be clearly explained and justified by the trial court in the body of its decision.

In this case, We deem it proper that an award of attorney’s fees be allowed at the suggested rate of 5% of the total amount
payable in this suit. It is needful to note

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that although the main case appears at surface to be merely for determination of just compensation with damages, that
complaint had, in reality, spawned several incidents in the close to twenty-two (22) years that this case has gone thorough
litigation. Earlier, the DAR elevated the case to this Court seeking relief from the denial of their motion to dismiss. Then, after
the SAC had constituted the Board of Commissioners, respondent had to wiggle her way through in presenting and defending
her claim for just compensation and damages. Then, respondent had to contend with the separate petitions for review filed
by DAR and LBP before this Court, which were later elevated to the Supreme Court. And now, respondent still has to deal with
the remand of these cases for determination of just compensation. It is noteworthy that respondent’s land had been actually
taken from her and distributed to the farmer beneficiaries as far back as 1993. Yet LBP has not compensated at all. That is
twenty-one long years of downright delay (mora solvendi). It is even sad to note that the original respondent had already
passed to the great beyond without seeing the fruition of her toils and efforts, all because of the prolonged process of
determination of what is due her in compensation. In fine, taking into account the overall factual milieu in which this case has
proceeded, We find it just and equitable to award attorney’s fees equivalent to 5% of the total just compensation payable in
this suit.

FOR THESE REASONS, this Court RECOMMENDS the amount of Php397,680,657.315 as just compensation for the Galle
properties, which shall earn legal interest of 12% interest per annum, computed from November 17, 1993 to June 30, 2013
and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until the entire obligation is fully paid, minus whatever amount may have been already
paid in accordance with the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 11 August 2014. In addition, LBP is adjudged liable to pay
respondent Susie Irene Galle or her Heirs attorney’s fees equivalent to 5% of the total amount of just compensation adjudged
in this suit. No costs.

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.6

In an October 5, 2015 Resolution,7 this Court resolved to await the En Banc ruling in the case of Alfonso v. Land Bank of the
Philippines,8 the resolution of which would settle long-standing issues surrounding the computation of just compensation for
lands placed within the coverage of the government’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. This was reiterated in the
Court’s subsequent April 20, 2016 and October 19, 2016 Resolutions.9

On November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc issued its ruling in the Alfonso case. It held, relevantly:
For example, the Cuervo Report cited a number of ‘comparable sales’ for purposes of its market data analysis. Aside from lack
of proof of fact of said sales, the Report likewise failed to explain how these purported ‘comparable’ sales met the guidelines
provided under DAR AO No. 5 (1998). The relevant portion of DAR AO No. 5 (1998) reads:

II. C.2 The criteria in the selection of the comparable sales transaction (ST) shall be as follows:

a. When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay level, additional STs may be secured from the
municipality where the land being offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable STs. In case there
are more STs available than what is required at the municipal level, the most recent transactions shall be considered. The
same rule shall apply at the provincial level when no STs are available at the municipal level. In all cases, the com-

_______________

6 Id., at pp. 1240-1248.

7 Id., at p. 1258.

8 G.R. Nos. 181912 and 183347, November 29, 2016, 811 SCRA 27.

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 195213), pp. 1259-1260.

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bination of STs sourced from the barangay, municipality and province shall not exceed three transactions.
b. The land subject of acquisition as well as those subject of comparable sales transactions should be similar in topography,
land use, i.e., planted to the same crop. Furthermore, in case of permanent crops, the subject properties should be more or
less comparable in terms of their stages of productivity and plant density.

c. The comparable sales transactions should have been executed within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988, and
registered within the period January 1, 1985, to September 13, 1988.

d. STs shall be grossed up from the date of registration up to the date of receipt of CF by LBP from DAR for processing, in
accordance with Item II.A.9. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To this Court’s mind, a reasoned explanation from the SAC to justify its deviation from the foregoing guidelines is especially
important considering that both the DAR and the LBP were unable to find sales of comparable nature.

Worse, further examination of the cited sales would show that the same far from complies with the guidelines as to the cutoff
dates provided under the DAR AO No. 5 (1998). The purported sales were dated between November 28, 1989 (at the earliest)
to March 12, 2002 (at the latest), whereas DAR AO No. 5 (1998) had already and previously set the cutoff between June to
September of 1988. We also note that these purported sales involve much smaller parcels of land (the smallest involving only
100 square meters). We can hardly see how these sales can be considered ‘comparable’ for purposes of determining just
compensation for the subject land. (Emphasis supplied)

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The Court’s Resolution

Motions for Reconsideration

LBP and DAR argue in their respective Motions for Reconsideration that it was improper for the Court to nullify the DARAB’s
October 15, 1996 Decision, which is already final and executory and thus beyond judicial review. If only the DARAB’s Decision
were correct, this proposition would apply. However, far from it, the DARAB’s Decision goes against the law; at the same time,
it is unfair, unjust, and oppressive, for the reason that the just compensation decreed therein is grossly erroneous. Galle’s
properties were grossly undervalued, and the DAR committed serious lapses in the process of expropriating the same.
Undervaluation results in denial of due process of law. This Court has repeatedly held that —

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the
taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. Even
as undervaluation would deprive the owner of his property without due process, so too would its overvaluation unduly favor
him to the prejudice of the public.10 (Emphasis supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lajom,11 the Court made the following pronouncement as well:

As a final word, the Court would like to emphasize that while the agrarian reform program was undertaken primarily for the
benefit of our landless farmers, this undertaking should, however, not result in the oppression of landowners by pegging the
cheapest value for their lands.

_______________

10 B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals, 290-A Phil. 371, 374; 216 SCRA 584, 586 (1992).

11 741 Phil. 655, 669; 733 SCRA 511, 526 (2014).

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Indeed, although the taking of properties for agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, it should not
be carried out at the undue expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and agrarian
reform laws.

On the matter of serious lapses committed by DAR in the expropriation of Galle’s property, the Court agrees with the CA’s
factual findings in its September 15, 2015 Report and Recommendation that:

x x x Nowhere in the records is it shown that Galle had been notified pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657. This omission had
remained unexplained, [and] undisputed by DAR and LBP. x x x Such a gross failure of the government agency concerned to
notify Galle pursuant to Section 16 of RA 6657 had rendered computation of the AGP uncertain, speculative, and unreliable —
especially when made to depend on the basis of the date submitted by LBP, considering that the date of notice of coverage is
uncertain to begin with, x x x We therefore opine that the failure of DAR to notify landowner as mandated by law had
effectively and unduly prevented the [landowner] from submitting the required statement of income and other proofs to
show the clear financial condition of the estate. Securing and unduly relying on indirect, tangential, and largely secondary
information definitely create a significant impact on the CNI factor and its reliability and fairness.

xxxx

In sum, considering that the dates of the notice of coverage and the date of receipt of the claimfolder by LBP cannot be
determined with certainty, it is now impossible to arrive at the relevant average gross production and selling prices as well as
the cost of operations. These because respondents had been prevented from submitting — as and when pertinent data and
statistics were still fresh and available — an accurate and realistic statement of income. And all these, because of the
unexplained and unjustifiable failure or omission of DAR to

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notify the [landowner] of the subject land acquisition as expressly mandated by law. The so-called industry figure used by LBP
as the cost of operations in lieu of a statement of net income which Galle allegedly failed to submit could not be appreciated
against the innocent [landowner] Galle, and in favor of the erring state agency. Because of want of reliable data, through no
fault of the [landowner], CNI could not be accurately ascertained.12

Eminent domain is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty and inherent in government. However, such power is not
boundless; it is circumscribed by two constitutional requirements: “first, that there must be just compensation, and second,
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”13

Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual’s right to private property, a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected
with the rights to life and liberty, the need for its circumspect operation cannot be overemphasized. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, we said:

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in
derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is
held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right
to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public

_______________

12 Rollo (G.R. No. 195213), pp. 1242-1243.

13 Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) v. J. Kings and Sons Company, Inc., 603 Phil. 471, 480; 585 SCRA 484, 488
(2009), citing Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga v. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 542, 551; 518 SCRA 649, 658 (2007).

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purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubt[ful] interpretation. (Bensley v. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec. 576])

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of
governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of
the substantial provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from
abuse. . . . (Dillon on Municipal Corporations [5th ed.], Sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio v. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil.
411)14 (Citations omitted)

For the foregoing reasons, the DARAB’s October 15, 1996 Decision is null and void. It cannot therefore acquire finality.

Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution
based on it is void: x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.15

_______________

14 Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 676, 688-689; 328 SCRA 137, 145 (2000).

15 Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 428 Phil. 32, 42; 378 SCRA 28, 36 (2002), citing Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250,
287; 280 SCRA 20, 57 (1997) and Leonor v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 74, 88; 256 SCRA 69, 82 (1996).

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Being a void judgment, the DARAB’s Decision “may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not
even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored.”16

16 Imperial v. Armes, G.R. Nos. 178842 & 195509, January 30, 2017, 816 SCRA 87, citing Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474;
652 SCRA 341 (2011).

Just Compensation

Under DAR AO No. 5 (1998), issued on April 15, 1998:

II. The following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the valuation of lands subject of acquisition
whether under voluntary offer to sell (VOS) or compulsory acquisition (CA).

A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where:

LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
xxxx

A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

(Emphasis supplied)

The CA was correct in utilizing the above formula, in the absence of a CNI factor, which could not be determined based on the
extant data. In the same manner, it correctly applied

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the property values determined by the Zamboanga City Government and its Appraisal Committee as contained in the former’s
Resolutions; this Court declares so in the absence of official data on comparative sales and in the face of DAR’s gross
mishandling of Galle’s case and the multiple irregularities committed by it, which resulted in inordinate delay and wrongful
determination and payment of just compensation to the landowner who passed away before she could receive and enjoy
what was due her. Meanwhile, the agrarian beneficiaries of her land have profited and benefited from the use thereof,
considering the period that has elapsed (20 years), the location thereof, the rise in land prices, and commercialization of the
area,17 in which case it may be said that the nature of the property has been altered considerably during the interregnum.

The Court validates the CA’s use of data relative to property values in three barangays within Zamboanga City, which is
authorized under AO No. 5, particularly AO No. 5(II)(C.2)(a) which states:
a. When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay level, additional STs may be secured from the
municipality where the land being offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable STs. In case there
are more STs available than what is required at the municipal level, the most recent transactions shall be considered. The
same rule shall apply at the provincial level when no STs are available at the municipal level. In all cases, the combination of
STs sourced from the barangay, municipality and province shall not exceed three transactions. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

_______________

17 The subject property is situated near the Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone Authority and the Ayala de Zamboanga
Industrial Estate, which were established as early as in 1997.

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For the same reason, the Court finds nothing wrong with using the appreciation and depreciation rate factor of 5% employed
by bank appraisers, in the absence of official DAR data/evidence or any other reliable method, and given the DAR’s
incompetence in handling Galle’s case and the unjust consequences that resulted from such inefficiency and neglect. After all,
Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL) provides that —

Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
(Italics supplied)
It would appear that the CA should have depreciated the property to its 1988 level, given the directive in DAR Administrative
Order No. 5(II)(C.2)(c), to the effect that the comparable sales transactions that may be considered in computing Comparable
Sales (CS) should be those sales transactions that were executed within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988, and
registered within the period January 1, 1985, to September 13, 1988. This found reiteration in the Alfonso case, and later in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Tañada.18 However, a

_______________

18 G.R. No. 170506, January 11, 2017, 814 SCRA 117, where the Court held:

Notably, in Alfonso, we recognized that comparable sales is one of the factors that may be considered in determining the just
compensation that may be paid to the landowner. However, there must

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Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Galle

serious legal issue in this regard would necessarily arise: Galle’s property was taken only in 1993, and the settled principle is
that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Salvador Encinas, this Court reiterated this long-established principle, thus:

The ‘taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding.’ In
computing the just compensation for expropriation proceedings, the RTC should take into consideration the ‘value of the land
at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of judgment.’ ‘The time of taking is the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic.’19 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
In Alfonso, the Court reiterated the settled doctrine that the ultimate determination of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings remains a judicial prerogative, stating thus:

For the guidance of the bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the DAR’s expertise as the
concerned implementing agency, courts

_______________

still be proof that such comparable sales met the guidelines set forth in DAR-AO No. 5 (1998), which included among others,
that such sales should have been executed within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988 and registered within the
period January 1, 1985 to September 13, 1988. (Emphasis supplied)

19 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Peralta, 734 Phil. 219, 234; 723 SCRA 528, 543-544 (2014).

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should henceforth consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated into the applicable DAR
formulas in their determination of just compensation for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their
judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is not warranted under the specific circumstances of the
case before them, they may deviate or depart therefrom, provided, that this departure or deviation is supported by a
reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In other words, courts of law possess the power to make a final
determination of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied)
Taking the cue from Alfonso, therefore, the Court finds no merit in applying the rule laid out in DAR Administrative Order No.
5(II)(C.2)(c), as it goes against the fundamental principle in eminent domain that just compensation shall be determined as of
the time of taking. The reason behind DAR Administrative Order No. 5(II)(C.2)(c) is evident: it sets a cap on the expropriation
value of properties placed under the agrarian reform program in order that these properties may be acquired as cheaply as
possible and at little cost to government; understandably, it is aimed at preventing the dissipation of the state’s coffers. But
this goes against the mandate of the Constitution; the great cost to private landowners occasioned by an unwarranted
undervaluation of their properties cannot be ignored. If DAR Administrative Order No. 5(II)(C.2)(c) were to be applied in the
present case, there would be an unjust taking, a clear violation of due process.

For the above reasons, the Court finds the CA’s computation of just compensation in the amount of P397,680,657.31 to be
proper and in order, having based the same on property values and comparative sales/values of properties within the Patalon,
Talisayan, and Sinubung areas in 1993, when Galle’s properties were taken, that is, when the Zamboanga City Registry of
Deeds cancelled Galle’s titles and transferred the

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entire property to the State, in whose favor TCT Nos. T-110,927 and T-110,928 were issued.

The Court likewise agrees with the CA findings on the matter of attorney’s fees. However, instead of the rate imposed by the
CA, i.e., 5% of the just compensation adjudged herein, we deem the amount of P100,000.00 realistic, reasonable,
commensurate, and just under the circumstances.

The recommendation for the imposition of interest is also well-taken. Thus, legal interest shall be adjudged and pegged at the
rate of 12% per annum from November 17, 1993 until June 30, 2013; and thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid,
just compensation shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum, conformably with the modification on the rules
respecting interest rates introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.20
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the September 15, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals with
modification as to the amount of attorney’s fees. Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines is ORDERED to PAY Susie Irene Galle’s
estate or heirs, herein respondents:

1) The amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN
AND 31/100 PESOS (P397,680,657.31) as just compensation for the expropriation of her estate, the herein subject properties;

2) ATTORNEY’S FEES in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00); and

3) INTEREST at the rate of 12% per annum from November 17, 1993 until June 30, 2013; and thereafter, or beginning July 1,
2013, the total award shall earn in-

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20 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lajom, supra note 11.

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terest at the legal rate of 6% per annum until the same is fully paid.

4) No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,** Perlas-Bernabe and Tijam,*** JJ., concur.

Report and recommendation of Court of Appeals adopted with modification.

Notes.—A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained,
which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. (Paulino vs.
Court of Appeals, 725 SCRA 273 [2014])

The Supreme Court (SC) has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the
payment of just compensation, deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Lajom, 733 SCRA 511 [2014])

——o0o——

_______________

** Designated additional member per raffle dated February 8, 2017 vice Ret. Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez.

*** Designated additional member pursuant to A.M. No. 17-03-03-SC dated March 14, 2017. Department of Agrarian Reform
vs. Galle, 841 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 171836, G.R. No. 195213 October 2, 2017

G.R. No. 221513. December 5, 2016.*

SPOUSES LUISITO PONTIGON and LEODEGARIA SANCHEZ PONTIGON, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MELITON SANCHEZ, namely:
APOLONIA SANCHEZ, ILUMINADA SANCHEZ (deceased), MA. LUZ SANCHEZ, AGUSTINA SANCHEZ, AGUSTIN S. MANALANSAN,
PERLA S. MANALANSAN, ESTER S. MANALANSAN, GODOFREDO S. MANALANSAN, TERESITA S. MANALANSAN, ISRAELITA S.
MANALANSAN, ELOY S. MANALANSAN, GERTRUDES S. MANALANSAN, represented by TERESITA SANCHEZ MANALANSAN,
respondents.

Civil Law; Land Registration; Torrens System; Under the Torrens System as enshrined in Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, the

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* THIRD DIVISION.

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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

decree of registration and the certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of entry of the decree of registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person
responsible for the fraud.—Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529, the decree of registration and the
certificate of title issued become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree of
registration, without prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.
However, actions for reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed beyond the one-year period. As elucidated in
Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431 (1990).

Same; Same; Reconveyance; Implied Trust; An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property.—An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance
of the certificate of title over the property. By way of additional exception, the Court, in a catena of cases, has permitted the
filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title. The common
denominator of these cases is that the plaintiffs therein were in actual possession of the disputed land, converting the action
from reconveyance of property into one for quieting of title. Imprescriptibility is accorded to cases for quieting of title since
the plaintiff has the right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to
vindicate his right.

Same; Contracts; While Article 1358 of the New Civil Code seemingly requires that contracts transmitting or extinguishing real
rights over immovable property should be in a public document, hornbook doctrine is that the embodiment of certain
contracts in a public instrument is only for convenience.—While Art. 1358 of the New Civil Code seemingly requires that
contracts transmitting or extinguishing real rights over immovable property should be in a public document, hornbook
doctrine is that the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument is only for convenience. It is established in
jurisprudence that nonobservance of the prescribed
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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

formalities does not necessarily excuse the contracting parties from complying with their respective obligations under their
covenant, and merely grants them the right to compel each other to execute the proper deed. A contract of sale has the force
of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to abide, in good faith, by their respective contractual
commitments notwithstanding their failure to comply with Art. 1358.

Same; Same; Principle of Relativity of Contracts; The principle of relativity of contracts dictates that contractual agreements
can only bind the parties who entered into them, and cannot favor or prejudice third persons, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.—The principle of relativity of contracts dictates that contractual agreements
can only bind the parties who entered into them, and cannot favor or prejudice third persons, even if he is aware of such
contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. The doctrine finds statutory basis under Art. 1311 of the New Civil Code.

Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the heirs of the contracting parties are precluded from denying the binding effect of the
valid agreement entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. This is so because they are not deemed “third persons” to the
contract within the contemplation of law.—The law is categorical in declaring that as a general rule, the heirs of the
contracting parties are precluded from denying the binding effect of the valid agreement entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest. This is so because they are not deemed “third persons” to the contract within the contemplation of
law. Additionally, neither the provision nor the doctrine makes a distinction on whether the contract adverted to is oral or
written, and, even more so, whether it is embodied in a public or private instrument. It is then immaterial that the
Extrajudicial Settlement executed by Flaviana was not properly notarized for the said document to be binding on her heirs,
herein respondents.

Same; Same; Voidable Contracts; Under the law, a voidable contract retains the binding effect of a valid one unless otherwise
annulled.—Under the law, a voidable contract retains the binding effect of a valid one unless otherwise annulled. And as
prescribed, the action for annulment shall be brought within four (4) years, in cases of intimidation, violence or undue
influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases. Unfortunately for respondents, the
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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

prescriptive period for annulment had long since expired before they filed their Complaint. They cannot be permitted to
circumvent the law by belatedly attacking, collaterally and as an afterthought at that, the validity of the erstwhile voidable
instrument in the present action for declaration of nullity of title. The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement cannot then be
gainsaid. Ratified by their inaction, the document of conveyance, as well as the consequences of its registration, would then
bind the respondents. This still holds true notwithstanding the glaring irregularities in the Petition for Approval. Obvious to the
eye and intellect as the errors may be, they are of no moment since the Extrajudicial Settlement, a private writing and
unpublished as it were, nevertheless remains to be binding upon any person who participated thereon or had notice thereof.

PERALTA, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Civil Law; Land Registration; Reconveyance; View that whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is determined by
the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or one
based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract.—Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is determined
by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or one
based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract. It is true that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
ordinarily prescribes in ten (10) years, subject to the exception mentioned above. However, in actions for reconveyance of the
property predicated on the fact that the conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of
action would be unavailing. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. In
the instant case, the action filed by respondents is essentially an action for reconveyance based on their allegation that the
title over the subject property was transferred in petitioners’ name without any valid document of conveyance. Since
respondents’ complaint was based on the allegation of the inexistence of a valid contract, which would have lawfully
transferred ownership of the subject property in petitioners’ favor, such complaint is, therefore, imprescriptible.

Same; Same; View that the above document, being a private instrument, is not a sufficient basis to convey title over the
disputed
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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

property in favor of petitioners.—The ponencia rules that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was not properly notarized;
thus, rendering the written contract a private instrument which, nonetheless, binds respondents. This notwithstanding, it is
my considered opinion that the above document, being a private instrument, is not a sufficient basis to convey title over the
disputed property in favor of petitioners.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Juvy Mell B. Sanchez-Malit and Roniel D. Muñoz for petitioners.

Dipatuan P. Umpa for respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the March 26, 2015
Decision1 and September 14, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100188.3 The assailed rulings
affirmed the trial court judgment that declared Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 162403-R, under the name of petitioners,
null and void because of the fraud and irregularities that allegedly attended its issuance.

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 11-28; penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato,
Jr. and Manuel M. Barrios.

2 Id., at pp. 40-43.

3 Entitled “Heirs of Meliton Sanchez, namely: Apolonia Sanchez, Iluminada Sanchez, Ma. Luz Sanchez, Agustin S. Manalansan,
Perla S. Manalansan, Ester Manalansan, Godofredo S. Manalansan, Israelita S. Manalansan, Eloy S. Manalansan, Gertrudes S.
Manalansan, Represented by Teresita Sanchez-Manalansan, Attorney-in-fact v. Luisito Pontigon and Leodegaria Sanchez
Pontigon.”

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The Facts

Meliton Sanchez (Meliton) had been the owner of a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Gutad, Floridablanca, Pampanga.
Said property was duly registered in his name under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 207 issued on October 15, 1938.4

On August 11, 1948, Meliton died intestate, leaving the subject property to his surviving heirs, his three children, namely:
Apolonio, Flaviana, and Juan, all surnamed Sanchez. Petitioner Leodegaria Sanchez-Pontigon (Leodegaria) is the daughter of
Juan and petitioner Luisito Pontigon (Luisito) is the husband of Leodegaria. The respondents herein, who are all represented
by Teresita S. Manalansan (Teresita), are Meliton’s grandchildren with Flaviana.

On September 17, 2000, the respondents filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Title and Real Estate Mortgage with
Damages5 against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. G-06-3792 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 49 of
Guagua, Pampanga.6 Respondents posited that the property in issue had never been partitioned among the heirs of Meliton,
but when respondents verified with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga (RD) the status of the parcels of land sometime in
August 2000, they discovered that OCT No. 207 was nowhere to be found — what was only with the RD’s custody was the
owner’s copy of OCT No. 207, free of any annotation of cancellation or description of any document that could have justified
the transfer of the property covered. Despite this fact, petitioners, even without any document of conveyance, were able to
transfer the title of the subject lot to their names, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 162403-R
on May 21, 1980 covering the

_______________

4 Rollo, p. 12.

5 Id., at pp. 139-145.

6 Id., at p. 13.

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same parcel of land. Hence, respondents, argued that the transfer of title to petitioners was fraudulent and invalid, and that
petitioners merely held title over the subject property in trust for Meliton’s heirs.7

It was further averred that post-transfer, petitioners unlawfully and fraudulently obtained a loan from, and mortgaged the
subject property to, Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor) — an additional defendant in Civil Case No.
G-06-3792. Quedancor allegedly did not take the necessary steps to verify the title over and the true ownership of the subject
property.8
Deprived of their inheritance over the subject property, to their damage and prejudice, respondents prayed that TCT No.
162403-R be declared null and void; that the real estate mortgage in favor of Quedancor likewise be nullified; that OCT No.
207 registered under Meliton’s name be reinstated; and that damages be awarded in their favor.9

In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the Complaint. They countered that the conveyance in their
favor is evidenced by an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Meliton Sanchez and Casimira Baluyut with Absolute Sale
(Extrajudicial Settlement) that was prepared and notarized by Atty. Emiliano Malit on November 10, 1979. In fact, Apolonio,
Juan, and Flaviana filed before Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga a Petition for Approval of the
Extrajudicial Partition (Petition for Approval). Petitioners further alleged that on December 29, 1979, a Decision was rendered
granting the petition adverted to, which ruling became final and executory based on a certification dated February 15, 1980
issued by the then clerk of court.10

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7 Id., at pp. 13-14.

8 Id., at p. 14.

9 Id., at p. 143.

10 Id., at p. 163.

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Petitioners also raised the following affirmative defenses: that respondents had no cause of action against petitioners,
Quedancor, and the RD; that respondent Teresita Sanchez Manalansan (Teresita) had no authority to represent all the
respondents in the case; and that twenty (20) years had already passed from the issuance of TCT No. 162403-R on May 21,
1980 before respondents lodged their Complaint. Petitioners would file on October 10, 2002 a motion to dismiss reiterating
the defense that respondents’ action is already barred by prescription.11

For its part, Quedancor explained that petitioners mortgaged to it the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 162403-R as security
for a Php6,617,000.00 loan extended in their favor. It claimed that the mortgage was approved in good faith since it verified
with the RD the veracity of petitioners’ title. Moreover, by way of affirmative defense, Quedancor maintained that
respondents have no cause of action against it. It then prayed that respondents be ordered to pay the corporation damages
and attorney’s fees.12

With the issues joined, trial on the merits ensued.

During trial, respondent Teresita, attorney-in-fact of her coparties, testified that the subject property was merely held in trust
by her uncle Juan, Meliton’s son and petitioner Leodegaria’s father, who had been paying the taxes on the property since he is
the most educated and successful of the three siblings; and that she was the one who verified with the RD and discovered that
only the owner’s copy of OCT No. 207 was in the office’s custody sans any annotation of cancellation or encumbrance.13
Myrna Guinto, a Record Officer at the RD and witness for the respondents, testified that the duplicate

_______________

11 Id., at p. 164.

12 Id., at pp. 146-150.

13 Id., at pp. 163-164.

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owner’s copy adverted to indeed bears no indication that it had been cancelled or otherwise encumbered.14

On the other hand, petitioner Luisito testified that even though he and his wife do not particularly like the location of the lots
in issue, they accepted Juan, Apolonio, and Flaviana’s offer to sell to them Meliton’s erstwhile property due to sentimental
reasons. The Extrajudicial Settlement was then executed and the Petition for Approval filed to effect the transfer in
petitioners’ name. The petition for approval, according to Luisito, was favorably acted upon by the CFI of Pampanga on
November 30, 1979, which ruling allegedly became final and executory.15

Leodegaria corroborated Luisito’s testimony that they were constrained to purchase the lot for its emotional attachment to
them. She revealed that it was her father Juan who hired a lawyer, Atty. Malit, to effect the transfer, and that she was present
when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed by the three siblings, with Lucita Jalandoni and Agustin Manalansan as
instrumental witnesses. Atty. Malit deposited into Flaviana’s account the payments of the purchase price. And since then,
petitioners occupied and developed the disputed lot.16

Atty. Lorna Salangsang-Dee (Atty. Dee), the Register of Deeds for Pampanga, likewise took the witness stand to explain that all
documents relative to titles issued prior to October 1995 were destroyed by the lahar and flash floods that inundated their
office. She further testified, on cross-examination, that she concluded that the owner’s duplicate certificate of OCT No. 207
appears in their records because there was a transaction that warranted its surrender to the Registry.17

_______________

14 Id., at pp. 165-166.

15 Id., at pp. 170-171.

16 Id., at pp. 171-172.

17 Id., at pp. 172-173.

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In rebuttal, respondent Teresita was recalled as witness. She claimed that the first time she saw the Extrajudicial Settlement
was when it was presented in court. She brought to the court’s attention the fact that the document was allegedly executed
on November 10, 1979, when her mother, Flaviana, was already 69 years of age. It was Teresita’s contention that Flaviana, in
her advanced age was already senile during the date material and, thus, could not have validly consented to the sale of her
property. Teresita admitted, though, that she has no document to prove the status of her mother’s then mental condition.18

The second rebuttal witness, Thiogenes Manalansan Ragos, Jr. (Thiogenes), son of respondent Perla Manalansan and
grandson of Flaviana, claimed that on November 7, 1979, between 2:00-3:00 p.m., Juan, Luisito, and Leodegaria arrived at the
house of Flaviana to coerce her into signing a document. Because Flaviana refused to affix her signature, she was forcibly
taken by the three. Thereafter, Thiogenes accompanied his mother, Perla, to the police station to report the incident. There,
he allegedly saw Perla file a complaint stating, among others, that Juan was persuading Flaviana to sign a document of sale.19

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

During the course of the trial, the RTC issued its Order dated May 28, 2003 denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss, ruling that
respondents’ cause of action has not yet prescribed. The RTC ratiocinated that by filing a motion to dismiss, petitioners
hypothetically admitted the allegations in the complaint that they and respondents are co-owners of the subject property,
being the heirs of Meliton. Having fraudulently obtained title over the subject property to the prejudice of respondents, a
trust relation was created by operation of

_______________

18 Id., at pp. 175-177.

19 Id., at pp. 177-178.

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law, whereby petitioners merely held the subject property in trust for and in behalf of their co-owners. As held, an action
based on this trust relation could not be barred by prescription.20

Subsequently, on June 28, 2012, the RTC promulgated a Decision21 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:22

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring null and void Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162403-R registered in the name of defendants-spouses Luisito
Pontigon and Leodegaria Sanchez and declaring herein plaintiffs represented by Teresita Sanchez Manalansan as rightful
co-owners to a one-third portion of the property embraced in said title previously registered in the name of Meliton Sanchez
per Original Certificate of Title No. 207;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 162403-R and issue a new title in favor of the Heirs of
Meliton Sanchez, upon payment of the necessary taxes and lawful fees;

3. Upholding the validity of the real estate mortgage constituted on TCT No. 162403-R and setting aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued against defendant Quedancor without prejudice to the rights of herein plaintiffs as co-owners of
the mortgaged property;

4. Denying plaintiff’s claim for damages and attorney’s fees as well as defendants’ counterclaims for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
The RTC maintained that the transfer of title of the subject property to petitioners was tainted with irregularities. While

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20 Id., at p. 18.

21 Id., at pp. 160-188; penned by Jesusa Mylene C. Suba-Isip.

22 Id., at pp. 187-188.

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the trial court took judicial notice of the floods and lahar that inundated the Provincial Capitol, it found strange that the
owner’s duplicate certificate, but not the original copy, of OCT No. 207, would remain with the RD, clean of any annotation or
marking at that.23

Anent the Petition for Approval, the RTC noted that the pleading filed before the CFI was verified by Juan alone; that the court
order setting it for hearing was not signed by the then presiding judge; and that the certification of the CFI judgment granting
the Petition for Approval was a mere photocopy and does not satisfy the best evidence rule. Additionally, the RTC weighed
against petitioners the fact that the Petition for Approval was prepared earlier than the Extrajudicial Settlement sought to be
approved. The Extrajudicial Settlement was dated November 10, 1979, while the Petition for Approval was dated November 9,
1979, albeit filed on November 12, 1979.24

Taking substantial consideration of the “damning rebuttal evidence” of respondents,25 the trial court deemed implausible
petitioners’ postulation that they purchased the subject property for sentimental reasons. It further held the petitioners did
not particularly dispute that respondents are heirs of Meliton. Thus, upon Meliton’s death, co-ownership existed among the
siblings, Juan, Apolonio and Flaviana. Finally, the RTC held that the subject property should then be divided equally among the
three (3) heirs.26

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,27 but their contentions were rejected by the RTC anew.28 Aggrieved, they
elevated the case to the CA via appeal.

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23 Id., at pp. 181-182.

24 Id., at pp. 180-181.

25 Id., at p. 182.

26 Id., at pp. 182-183.

27 Id., at pp. 189-200.

28 Id., at pp. 201-202.

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Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Through its assailed Decision, the appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC and disposed of the case in the following
wise:29

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated June 28, 2012 of Branch 49, Regional Trial Court of Guagua,
Pampanga in Civil Case No.

G-06-3792 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

At the outset, the CA ruled that petitioners’ appeal was procedurally infirm. Citing Sec. 1(f), Rule 5030 of the Rules of Court,
the CA held that failure of petitioners to submit a

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29 Id., at pp. 27-28.

30 RULE 50

Dismissal of Appeal

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.—An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on
that of the appellee, on the following grounds:

xxx

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as required in Section
13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44.

xxx
RULE 44

Ordinary Appealed Cases

xxx

Section 13. Contents of appellant’s brief.—The appellant’s brief shall contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:

(a) A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments and page references, and a table of cases
alphabetically arranged, textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they are cited. x x x

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subject index is fatal to the appeal and warrants the outright denial of their plea.31

Even if the absence of the subject index were to be excused, the appellate court nevertheless found no cogent reason to
disturb the trial court’s ruling. The CA explained that the Extrajudicial Settlement cannot be considered a public document
because it was not properly notarized. It could not then bind third persons, including respondents, according to the appellate
court.32 Moreover, the CA ruled that the document adverted to is bereft of any probative value for failure on the part of
petitioners to comply with the rules on the admissibility of private documents as proof.33 It also shared the RTC’s
observations as regards the Petition for Approval.34 Given the irregularities attending the execution and approval of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the CA concluded that it could not have conveyed title to petitioners, and that TCT No. 162403-R,
consequently, is a nullity.35
From the date of their receipt of the adverse ruling, petitioners had until May 9, 2015 within which to move for
reconsideration therefrom. It would be on May 4, 2015 when petitioners would interpose their Motion for Reconsideration36
and Entry of Appearance37 of Atty. Roniel Dizon Muñoz (Atty. Muñoz). Atty. Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Atty. Malit), the counsel
who previously represented the petitioners in the earlier proceedings, never informed the court that she is withdrawing from
the case.

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31 Rollo, p. 21.

32 Id., at p. 23.

33 Id., at p. 24.

34 Id., at p. 25.

35 Id., at p. 26.

36 Id., at pp. 109-120.

37 Id., at p. 121.

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On October 2, 2015, petitioners received a copy of the Notice of Resolution38 with Entry of Judgment39 dated September 14,
2015, which provides thusly:40

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves as follows:

1. The Entry of Appearance as Counsel for Defendants-Appellants Spouses Pontigon filed by Atty. Roniel Dizon Muñoz is
simply NOTED WITHOUT ACTION; and

2. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Dizon Muñoz is hereby EXPUNGED from the Rollo of this case, being a mere
scrap of paper with no remedial value for having been filed by unauthorized counsel.

Accordingly, the Division Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to issue an Entry of Judgment in consonance with Section 3(b),
Rule IV and Section 1, Rule VII of the IRCA, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

In fine, the CA treated the Motion for Reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper since it was allegedly not filed by petitioners’
counsel of record. Atty. Muñoz was not vested with the authority to file the pleading in their behalf since the manner by
which petitioners substituted their counsel is not consistent with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.41 Cit-

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38 Id., at pp. 123-126.

39 Id., at p. 127.

40 Id., at p. 126.

41 Section 26. Change of attorneys.—An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the
written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
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ing Ramos v. Potenciano,42 the CA held that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless the following requisites
concur: there must be (1) a written application for substitution; (2) written consent of the client to the substitution; and (3)
written consent of the attorney to be substituted, if such consent can be obtained. x x x 43

Unless these formalities are complied with, no substitution may be permitted and the attorney who appeared last in the case
before such application for substitution would be regarded as the attorney of record and would be held responsible for the
conduct of the case.44

Unfazed, petitioners again filed a Motion for Reconsideration,45 this time from the September 14, 2015 Resolution. The said
motion remains pending with the CA to date. In the interim, the appellate court remanded the folders of this case to the court
of origin.

Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issues

The pivotal issues of the current controversy are as follows:

I. Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that Atty. Muñoz did not have the authority to file the Motion for
Reconsideration in behalf of the petitioners, rendering it a mere scrap of paper;
II. Whether or not respondents’ cause of action is barred by prescription;

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entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse
party.

42 No. L-19436, November 29, 1963, 9 SCRA 589, 592-593.

43 Id., at p. 592; Rollo, p. 125.

44 Id.; id.

45 Id., at pp. 128-132.

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III. Whether or not the appellate court correctly held that the Extrajudicial Settlement does not bind the respondents;

IV. Whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement is admissible as evidence;

V. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that TCT No. 162403-R is a nullity because of the irregularities that attended its
issuance;
VI. Whether or not a relaxation of the procedural rules is warranted in this case.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition. The resolution of the issues raised herein shall be discussed seriatim, beginning with the
procedural aspect of the case.

The CA erred in denying the

Motion for Reconsideration for

want of authority of counsel

Oft-cited, but rarely applied, is that technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of justice and to benefit the
deserving.46 This controversy before us, however, is one of the exceptional instances wherein the proverb can properly be
invoked.

We entertain this petition notwithstanding the finality of the judgment because fault here lies with the CA for its unjustified
denial of the first Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Muñoz, and for its refusal to resolve the still pending second
Motion for Reconsideration in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100188. It was plain error for the appellate court to have treated the first
Motion for Reconsideration as a sham plead-

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46 Magsino v. De Ocampo, G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014, 733 SCRA 202, 220.
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ing for allegedly not having been filed by the counsel of record.

The September 14, 2015 Resolution of the appellate court is premised on the alleged failed substitution of counsel. Premised
on the immediate assumption that Atty. Muñoz was intended as a replacement for Atty. Sanchez-Malit, the CA concluded that
nonobservance of Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court rendered Atty. Muñoz’s filing of the first Motion for Reconsideration
to be wanting of authority.

The theory of the CA is flawed.

Apropos herein is the Court’s teaching in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Pamintuan Dev. Co.,47 to wit:

[A] substitution cannot be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new lawyer and that the
representation of the first counsel of record continuous until a formal notice to change counsel is filed with the court. Thus,
absent a formal notice of substitution, all lawyers who appeared before the court or filed pleadings in behalf of the client are
considered counsels of the latter. All acts performed by them are deemed to be with the clients’ consent. (Emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforequoted doctrine, it is imperative that the intention of the petitioners to replace their original counsel, Atty.
Sanchez-Malit, be evidently clear before substitution of counsel can be presumed. The records readily evince, however, that
herein petitioners did not manifest even the slightest of such intention. No inference of an intent to replace could be drawn
from the tenor of either the first Motion for Reconsideration or in Atty. Muñoz’s Entry of Appearance.

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47 G.R. No. 167886, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 344; citing Sublay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 381 Phil. 198;
324 SCRA 188 (2000).
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To dispel any lingering doubt as to the true purpose of Atty. Muñoz’s entry, worthy of note is that he indicated in his Entry of
Appearance that his office address is “Sanchez-Malit Building” in Dinalupihan, Bataan.48 More, both counsels signed the
present petition for review on certiorari, indicating only one address, the very same building of Atty. Sanchez-Malit, for where
court processes shall be served. Indubitably, the Entry of Appearance by the new lawyer, Atty. Muñoz, ought then be
construed as a collaboration of counsels, rather than a substitution of the prior representation. Consequently, the CA should
have entertained and resolved the Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners through Atty. Muñoz, despite Atty.
Sanchez-Malit’s non-withdrawal from the case.

Verily, it was wrong for the CA to have denied outright petitioners’ first Motion for Reconsideration, and to have directed the
post-haste issuance of the Entry of Judgment. These haphazard actions resulted in the deprivation of petitioners of a
guaranteed remedy under the rules. But more than the need to rectify the CA’s procedural miscalculation, the liberal
application of the rules is justified under the circumstances in order to obviate the frustration of substantive justice.

Respondents’ action is already

barred by prescription

The May 28, 2003 Order of the RTC denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription cannot be sustained.
To recall, the RTC held that as co-owners of the subject property, a trust relation was established between the parties when
petitioners fraudulently obtained title over the same.49 An action anchored on this relation of trust is imprescriptible, or so
the RTC ruled.
_______________

48 Rollo, p. 121.

49 Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee

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We find this ruling of the RTC not in accord with law and jurisprudence.

Under the Torrens System as enshrined in P.D. No. 1529,50 the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of entry of the decree of registration, without
prejudice to an action for damages against the applicant or any person responsible for the fraud.51 However, actions for
reconveyance based on implied trusts may be allowed beyond the one-year period. As elucidated in Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr.:52

_______________

of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

50 Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes.

51 Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.—The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and
the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title
obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall
such petition be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein,
whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action for
damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.

52 260 Phil. 456, 468-469; 181 SCRA 431, 442 (1990).

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[N]otwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of another person, he can still be
compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to the rightful owner. The property registered is deemed to be held
in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is registered. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to
shield and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. This is what reconveyance is all about. Yet, the right to seek
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute nor is it imprescriptible. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the
point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property.53

By way of additional exception, the Court, in a catena of cases,54 has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance
despite the lapse of more than ten (10) years from the issuance of title. The common denominator of these cases is that the
plaintiffs therein were in actual possession of the disputed land, converting the action from reconveyance of property into

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53 Vda. de Portugal v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 242 Phil. 709, 715; 159 SCRA 178, 183 (1988).

54 David v. Malay, 376 Phil. 825; 318 SCRA 711 (1999); 166 Phil. 429 (1977).

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one for quieting of title. Imprescriptibility is accorded to cases for quieting of title since the plaintiff has the right to wait until
his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.55

A perusal of respondents’ Complaint,56 though, reveals that the allegations contained therein do not include possession of
the contested property as an ultimate fact. As such, the present case could only be one for reconveyance of property, not for
quieting of title. Accordingly, respondents should have commenced the action within ten (10) years reckoned from May 21,
1980, the date of issuance of TCT No. 162403-R, instead of on September 17, 2000 or more than twenty (20) years thereafter.
The Extrajudicial Settlement

is a private document that is

binding on the respondents

The appellate court did not err in ruling that the Extrajudicial Settlement was not properly notarized given the absence of
Flaviana’s residence certificate number. As it appears, no identification was ever presented by Flaviana when the document
was notarized. Be that as it may, the irregularity in the notarization is not fatal to the validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement.
For even the absence of such formality would not necessarily invalidate the transaction embodied in the document — the
defect merely renders the written contract a private instrument rather than a public one.

While Art. 1358 of the New Civil Code seemingly requires that contracts transmitting or extinguishing real rights over
immovable property should be in a public document,57 horn-

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55 Alfredo v. Borras, 452 Phil. 178, 206; 404 SCRA 145, 166 (2003).

56 Rollo, pp. 139-145.

57 Article 1358. The following must appear in a public document:

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book doctrine is that the embodiment of certain contracts in a public instrument is only for convenience.58 It is established in
jurisprudence that nonobservance of the prescribed formalities does not necessarily excuse the contracting parties from
complying with their respective obligations under their covenant, and merely grants them the right to compel each other to
execute the proper deed.59 A contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and they are expected to
abide, in good faith, by their respective contractual commitments60 notwithstanding their failure to comply with Art. 1358.

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(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights
over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest therein as governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and 1405.

xxx

Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

xxx

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases, an agreement
hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:

xxxx

(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein.

xxx

58 Zamora v. Miranda, 700 Phil. 191, 203; 687 SCRA 13, 25 (2012).

59 Article 1357. If the law requires a document or other special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the
following article, the contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected.
This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the contract.

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As similarly observed by the appellate court, the Extrajudicial Settlement is not a nullity, but a valid document, albeit a private
one. The CA never declared the document as void, but only that it cannot be considered as binding on third parties. It added,
however, that respondents fall within the category of “third persons” against whom the stipulations in the private document
can never be invoked.61 On this point, we digress.

The principle of relativity of contracts dictates that contractual agreements can only bind the parties who entered into them,
and cannot favor or prejudice third persons, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.62 The
doctrine finds statutory basis under Art. 1311 of the New Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)

The law is categorical in declaring that as a general rule, the heirs of the contracting parties are precluded from denying the
binding effect of the valid agreement entered into by their predecessors-in-interest. This is so because they are not deemed
“third persons” to the contract within the contemplation of law. Additionally, neither the provision nor the doctrine makes a
distinction on whether the contract adverted to

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60 Article 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be
complied with in good faith.

61 Rollo, p. 23.

62 Philippine National Bank v. Dee, 727 Phil. 473, 480; 717 SCRA 14, 22 (2014).
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is oral or written, and, even more so, whether it is embodied in a public or private instrument. It is then immaterial that the
Extrajudicial Settlement executed by Flaviana was not properly notarized for the said document to be binding on her heirs,
herein respondents.

Reliance by the trial court on the so-called “damning rebuttal evidence” is misplaced and cannot be countenanced. Said
evidence contradicts the very allegations in their Complaint. It effectively modifies the respondents’ theory of the case and
transforms the action so as to include a collateral attack on the deed of conveyance. It cannot escape the attention of the
court that despite alleging in their Complaint and in their initial presentation of evidence that there was no document of
conveyance that justifies the issuance of TCT No. 162403-R, respondents made a complete turnabout and virtually admitted
the existence of the Extrajudicial Settlement on rebuttal, but nevertheless argued against its validity.

To review, Thiogenes, son of respondent Perla Manalansan, testified that on November 7, 1979, Juan, Luisito, and Leodegaria
forcibly took Flaviana and coerced the latter to execute the sale in favor of petitioners. If this version of the facts were to be
believed, this could only mean: (a) that the Extrajudicial Settlement existed, (b) that Flaviana’s heirs knew of its existence; and
(c) that Flaviana’s consent was vitiated through force and intimidation. Noteworthy, too, is that Agustin Manalansan, one of
the respondents in this case, even signed the deed as an instrumental witness to the execution of the deed. Yet, he did not
testify to disavow the signature appearing above his name in the Extrajudicial Settlement.

The above circumstances render the Extrajudicial Settlement voidable, not void.63 Under the law, a voidable contract retains
the binding effect of a valid one unless otherwise an-

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63 Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is
voidable.
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nulled.64 And as prescribed, the action for annulment shall be brought within four (4) years, in cases of intimidation, violence
or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.65 Unfortunately for respondents, the prescriptive period
for annulment had long since expired before they filed their Complaint. They cannot be permitted to circumvent the law by
belatedly attacking, collaterally and as an afterthought at that, the validity of the erstwhile voidable instrument in the present
action for declaration of nullity of title.

The validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement cannot then be gainsaid. Ratified by their inaction, the document of conveyance, as
well as the consequences of its registration, would then bind the respondents. This still holds true notwithstanding the glaring
irregularities in the Petition for Approval. Obvious to the eye and intellect as the errors may be, they are of no moment since
the Extrajudicial Settlement, a private writing and unpublished as it were, nevertheless remains to be binding upon any person
who participated thereon or had notice thereof.66

Petitioners complied with

the rules on authentication

of private documents

Likewise, the CA erroneously ruled that the Extrajudicial Settlement is bereft of probative value because of petitioners’ alleged
failure to comply with the rules on the admissibility of evidence set forth under Rule 132, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
_______________

64 Art. 1390, New Civil Code.

65 Art. 1391, id.

66 Rules of Court, Rule 74, Sec. 1.

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evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Contrary to the CA’s ruling, petitioners complied with the foregoing authentication requirements. Pertinent hereto is
petitioner Leodegaria’s testimony on January 13, 2009:67
Atty. Malit So what is the document they executed?

Witness Then they executed a deed of sale, after that the lawyer took over the required documents to this effect like this
extrajudicial settlement, that is one, and two, that is to pay all the taxes for more than fifty (50) years, Ma’am. After that the
deed of sale then the extrajudicial settlement and after the [extrajudicial] settlement they signed in front of the lawyer and
after that publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Atty. Malit Now you mentioned that a document entitled extra-judicial settlement, if that copy will be shown to you, would
you be able to identify it?

Witness Yes Ma’am.

Atty. Malit I am showing to you a document entitled extra-judicial settlement of the estate of deceased spouses Meliton
Sanchez and Casimira Baluyot, will you please go over this document.

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67 Rollo, pp. 78-80; Petition for Certiorari, pp. 17-19, citing TSN of January 13, 2009, pp. 8-12.

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Which consists of two (2) pages and tell us if this is the one executed by Juan, Flaviana, and Apolonio?

Witness Yes Ma’am.

Atty. Malit Above the names of Juan, Flaviana and Apolonio (sic) are signatures, do you know whose signatures are these?

Witness These are the signatures of Juan, Flaviana and Apolonio, Ma’am.

Atty. Malit Why do you know that these are the signatures of Juan, Flaviana, and Apolonio?

Witness Because I was present with my lawyer, Ma’am.

Atty. Malit On the second page of the document you are holding [two] (2) witnesses whose signatures appear on said
document can you recall whose signatures are these?

Witness The signatures of Lucita Jardinas and Agustin Manalansan, Ma’am.

Atty. Malit Who is this Lucita Jalandoni?

Witness Lucita is the witness from the office of Atty. Malit, Ma’am.

Atty. Malit How about the other signature, Agustin Manalansan?

Witness Agustin Manalansan is the son of Flaviana Sanchez, Ma’am.

Atty. Malit Is he the same person who is one of the plaintiffs in this case?

Witness Yes, sir (sic). (Emphasis supplied)

As can be gleaned from the transcripts, the contents of petitioner Leodegaria’s testimony satisfy the rules pertaining to the
admissibility of documentary evidence. Her claim that she was present at the time the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed
is competent proof of the said document’s authenticity and due execution. To be sure, neither the RTC nor the CA
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held that the credibility of petitioner Leodegaria was impeached; the adverse findings against her and her husband were
predicated mainly on the erroneous perception that her evidence-in-chief is inadmissible.

Irregularities in the issuance

of TCT No. 162403-R would not

necessarily invalidate the same

Proceeding now to the issue on whether or not the nullification of TCT No. 162403-R is warranted, it must be borne in mind
that the assailed document of title, as a government issuance, enjoys the presumption of regularity.68 It was then incumbent
upon the respondents to prove, by preponderant evidence, that the issuance of TCT No. 162403-R on May 21, 1980 was
attended by fraud as they claim.

Respondents endeavored to overcome the burden of evidence in proving their allegation of fraud by presenting as witness
Myrna Guinto, an employee of the RD of Pampanga, who testified that the original copy of OCT No. 207, the parent title of
TCT No. 162403-R, is not in their custody as it is missing in their vault, and that the owner’s duplicate certificate in its stead
does not bear any annotation of cancellation or encumbrance.

We are inclined, however, to give more credence to the explanation given by the Registrar of Deeds, Lorna Salangsang-Dee,
that the presence of the owner’s duplicate certificate in their vault signifies that there was most likely a transaction registered
with the office concerning the same. Indeed, there could not be any other plausible reason except that it was as a result of the
transaction that owner’s duplicate certificate was surrendered to the RD.

In any event, even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that the issuance of TCT No. 162403-R was marred
_______________

68 Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).

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by irregularities, this would not necessarily impair petitioners’ right of ownership over the subject lot. As held in Rabaja Ranch
Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System:69

x x x justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or
negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the
title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto.
Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration
officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents, in the instant case, miserably failed to prove that petitioners were parties to the perceived fraud. Basic are the
tenets that he who alleges must prove, and that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Here, the
allegations relating to petitioners’ participation to the fraud were nothing more than general averments that were never
fleshed out to more specific fraudulent acts, let alone substantiated by the evidence on record.

To clarify, what was only established was that there were lapses in the observance of the standard operating procedure of the
RD in its issuance of titles, based on the loss of the original title and the absence of an annotation of cancellation even on the
duplicate owner’s original. The performance or nonperformance of these acts, however, cannot be attributed to herein
petitioners, as registrants, for these are within the ambit of the duties and responsibilities of the officers of the
_______________

69 609 Phil. 660, 676-677; 592 SCRA 201, 217 (2009).

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RD.70 All the registrant was required to do was to surrender the duplicate owner’s original,71 which petitioners accomplished
in the case at bar.

Worth recalling, too, is that contrary to respondents’ claim, there was a valid document of conveyance that could justify the
issuance of TCT No. 162403-R in petitioners’ favor. In view of the validity of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the Court hesitates to
conclude that the challenged TCT was fraudulently issued. At most, there appears to be, in this case, lapses in the standard
operating procedure of the RD, which do not and could not automatically impair petitioners’ ownership rights and title, but
merely expose the negligent officers to possible liability.

Succinctly, we conclude from the foregoing disquisitions that: respondents’ action has already prescribed; the Extrajudicial
Settlement, though a private instrument, is nevertheless valid and binding on the heirs of the contracting parties; the
Extrajudicial Settlement is admissible in evidence; and absent proof of complicity in the alleged fraud that attended the
issuance of TCT No. 162403-R, petitioners’ rights under the said document of title cannot be impaired. These correc-

_______________

70 Sec. 57, of P.D. No. 1529 provides:

Sec. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances.—An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall
execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner’s duplicate certificate.
The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The
original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped “cancelled.” The deed of conveyance shall be
filled and indorsed wit the number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.

71 Id.

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tions in judgment, to our mind, are considerations that severely outweigh and excuse petitioners’ procedural transgressions.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Entry of Judgment September 14, 2015 in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100188 is hereby LIFTED. The March 26, 2015 Decision and September 14, 2015 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100188, as well as the Decision dated June 28, 2012 and the Order dated December 14, 2012 in
Civil Case No. G-06-3792 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49 of Guagua, Pampanga, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Let a new judgment be issued:

1. Upholding the validity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 162403-R registered in the name of petitioners Luisito and
Leodegaria Pontigon; and

2. Dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Title and Real Estate Mortgage for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., Please see Dissenting Opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

PERALTA, J.:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, I register my dissent from the majority decision on the following grounds:

First, both the RTC and the CA found that the execution and approval of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale and the
subsequent transfer of title of the subject property to

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petitioners were tainted with irregularities, among which are the following:

1. Despite the loss of the original copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the custody of the Registrar of Deeds (RD)
for Pampanga, the latter still issued a TCT in the name of petitioners merely on the basis of the owner’s duplicate copy of the
OCT which does not contain any annotation of cancellation;
2. The TCT in petitioner’s name was issued based only on the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, which is a private
document;

3. The Petition for Approval of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated November 9, 1979 was prepared earlier than the
Extra-Judicial Settlement sought to be approved, which was dated November 10, 1979;

4. Copies of the Petition for Approval of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Certification which attests to the
existence of a CFI Decision which supposedly granted the said Petition were mere photocopies;

5. The alleged Order issued by the CFI which set the hearing for and publication of the Petition for Approval of the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was not signed by the Presiding Judge.

The Court has repeatedly held that it is not necessitated to examine, evaluate or weigh the evidence considered in the lower
courts all over again.1 This is especially true where the trial court’s factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the CA as in
the present case.2 Factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal.3 Based on these irregularities, the RTC

_______________

1 Bacalso v. Aca-ac, G.R. No. 172919, January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 308.

2 Id.

3 Id.

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and the CA are justified in concluding that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale could not have validly conveyed title
to petitioners and that the TCT which was issued in their favor is null and void.

Indeed, the irregularities attendant in the present case do not indicate a mere lapse on the part of the RD in the issuance of
the disputed TCT.

Considering that the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT in the custody of the RD does not contain any annotation of its
cancellation, it is a grievous error on the part of the RD to consider such duplicate copy as basis in cancelling the OCT and
issuing a new TCT in petitioners’ favor.

In the first place, there is no OCT to cancel as the original copy which is in the custody of the RD has been destroyed. Thus, the
proper procedure that should have been followed was to reconstitute first the lost or destroyed OCT, in accordance with
Section 11075 of PD 1529. The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a
lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title

_______________

75 Section 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title.—Original copies of certificates of title lost or
destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall
be reconstituted judicially in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with
this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate prescribed in said Act is
hereby abrogated.

Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be given to the Register or Deeds of the place where the
land is situated and to the Commissioner of Land Registration. No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a
certificate of title shall become final until the lapse of thirty days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the
Commissioner of Land Registration of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such
officials.

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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

of a person to a piece of land.76 The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.77 The lost
or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in the custody of the Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered,
this document is replaced with a new one that basically reproduces the original.78 After the reconstitution, the owner is
issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted title.79 It is from this reconstituted title that a new TCT may be derived. Thus, it is
error on the part of the RD to have issued the disputed TCT in favor of petitioners in the absence of a duly reconstituted OCT.

The irregularity in the issuance of the contested TCT is also highlighted by the fact that the supposed Order which set the
hearing for and publication of the Petition for Approval of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was not signed by the
Presiding Judge. In addition, copies of the Petition for Approval of the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, as well as the
Certification which attests to the existence of a CFI Decision which supposedly granted the said Petition, were mere
photocopies. In this regard, the CA was correct in ruling that mere photocopies of documents, being secondary evidence, are
inadmissible as evidence unless it is shown that their originals are unavailable.

The ponencia also holds that respondents’ action is already barred by prescription by restating the rule that an action for
reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the date of
registration or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property; that, as an added exception, this Court

_______________

76 Republic v. Vergel De Dios, 657 Phil. 423, 429; 642 SCRA 414, 419 (2011).

77 Id.

78 Id.

79 Id.
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has permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance even beyond the 10-year period in cases where the plaintiffs therein
were in actual possession of the disputed land, thereby converting the action from reconveyance of property into one for
quieting of title. Applying the above rule to the present case, the ponencia holds that since respondents’ complaint did not
allege their possession of the contested property as an ultimate fact, it follows that the case could only be one for
reconveyance of property, not for quieting of title. Thus, respondents should have commenced their action within ten (10)
years from May 21, 1980, the date of the issuance of the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in petitioners’ favor. However, since
respondents only filed their Complaint on September 17, 2000, or more than twenty (20) years thereafter, their action has
already prescribed.

I beg to disagree.

Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded
on a claim of the existence of an implied or constructive trust, or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent
contract.80 It is true that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten (10) years, subject
to the exception mentioned above. However, in actions for reconveyance of the property predicated on the fact that the
conveyance complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim of prescription of action would be unavailing.81 The action or
defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.82 In the instant case, the action filed by
respondents is essentially an action for reconveyance based on their allegation that the title over the subject property was

_______________

80 Uy v. Court of Appeals, Mindanao Station, Cagayan de Oro City, G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015, 770 SCRA 513.

81 Heirs of Rosa Dumaliang v. Serban, 545 Phil. 243, 257; 516 SCRA 343, 358 (2007), citing Heirs of Romana Ingjug-Tiro v.
Casals, 415 Phil. 665, 673; 363 SCRA 435, 442 (2001).

82 Id.
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Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez

transferred in petitioners’ name without any valid document of conveyance. Since respondents’ complaint was based on the
allegation of the inexistence of a valid contract, which would have lawfully transferred ownership of the subject property in
petitioners’ favor, such complaint is, therefore, imprescriptible.

Lastly, the ponencia rules that the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale was not properly notarized; thus, rendering the written
contract a private instrument which, nonetheless, binds respondents. This notwithstanding, it is my considered opinion that
the above document, being a private instrument, is not a sufficient basis to convey title over the disputed property in favor of
petitioners. In this regard, the case of Gallardo v. Intermediate Appellate Court83 is instructive, to wit:

xxxx

Petitioners claim that the sale although not in a public document, is nevertheless valid and binding citing this Court’s rulings in
the cases of Cauto v. Cortes, 8 Phil. 459, 460; Guerrero v. Miguel, 10 Phil. 52, 53; Bucton v. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499 wherein this
Court ruled that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces legal effects between the parties.

The contention is unmeritorious.

As the respondent court aptly stated in its decision:

True, as argued by appellants, a private conveyance of registered property is valid as between the parties. However, the only
right the vendee of registered property in a private document is to compel through court processes the vendor to execute a
deed of conveyance sufficient in law for purposes of registration. Plaintiffs-appellants’ reliance on Article 1356 of the Civil
Code is unfortunate. The general rule enunciated in said Art. 1356 is that contracts are obligatory,
_______________

83 239 Phil. 243, 253-254; 155 SCRA 248, 258-259 (1987).

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in whatever form they may have been entered, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The next
sentence provides the exception, requiring a contract to be in some form when the law so requires for validity or
enforceability. Said law is Section 127 of Act 496 which requires, among other things, that the conveyance be executed
“before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record or a notary public or a justice of the peace, who shall certify
such acknowledgment substantially in form next hereinafter stated.”

Such law was violated in this case. The action of the Register of Deeds of Laguna in allowing the registration of the private
deed of sale was unauthorized and did not lend a bit of validity to the defective private document of sale.

With reference to the special law, Section 127 of the Land Registration Act, Act 496 (now Sec. 112 of P.D. No. 1529) provides:

Sec. 127. Deeds of Conveyance, . . . affecting lands, whether registered under this act or unregistered shall be sufficient in
law when made substantially in accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to convey, encumber, . . . or
bind the lands as though made in accordance with the more prolix forms heretofore in use: Provided, That every such
instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign the
instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the
person or persons executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a court of record, or a notary public, or
a justice of the peace, who shall certify to such acknowledgment substantially in the form next hereinafter stated. (Emphasis
supplied)
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It is therefore evident that Exhibit “E” in the case at bar is definitely not registerable under the Land Registration Act.

Likewise noteworthy is the case of Pornellosa and Angels v. Land Tenure Administration and Guzman, 110 Phil. 986, where the
Court ruled:

The deed of sale (Exhibit A), allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and
does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. While it is valid and binding upon the parties with respect to
the sale of the house erected thereon, yet it is not sufficient to convey title or any right to the residential lot in litigation. Acts
and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over
immovable property must appear in a public document.

xxx

Thus, Section 57 of Presidential Decree 152984 (PD 1529) provides:

Section 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances.—An owner desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall
execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the
registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owner’s duplicate certificate.
The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the
registration book in which the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding certificate. The
original and the owner’s duplicate of the grantor’s certificate shall be stamped “canceled.” The deed of conveyance shall be
filled and indorsed with the

_______________
84 Property Registration Decree.

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number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.85

In relation to the above provision, Section 112 of the same Decree provides for the “Forms Used in Land Registration and
Conveyancing,” to wit:

Section 112. Forms in conveyancing.—The Commissioner of Land Registration shall prepare convenient blank forms as may
be necessary to help facilitate the proceedings in land registration and shall take charge of the printing of land title forms.

Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law in the form of public instruments shall be registrable:
Provided, that, every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons executing the same in the presence of at least
two witnesses who shall likewise sign thereon, and shall acknowledged to be the free act and deed of the person or persons
executing the same before a notary public or other public officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment. Where the
instrument so acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page whereon acknowledgment is written, each
page of the copy which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds, or if registration is not contemplated, each
page of the copy to be kept by the notary public, except the page where the signatures already appear at the foot of the
instrument, shall be signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons executing the instrument and their witnesses,
and all the ages sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number of pages shall be stated in the
acknowledgment. Where the instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or en-

_______________

85 Emphasis supplied.

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cumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment.86

Based on the above discussions and provision of law, it is clear that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale may not be
used as a valid basis for the issuance of the questioned TCT in the name of petitioners.

Accordingly, I vote to DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision dated March 26, 2015 and Resolution dated September 14,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 100188.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Notes.—An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and
legal owner. (Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33 [2014])
Under the civil law principle of relativity of contracts under Article 1131, contracts can only bind the parties who entered into
it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.
(Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Chiok, 742 SCRA 435 [2014])

——o0o——

_______________

86 Emphasis supplied. Pontigon vs. Heirs of Meliton Sanchez, 812 SCRA 274, G.R. No. 221513 December 5, 2016

G.R. No. 213209. January 16, 2017.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GER-TRUDES V. SUSI, respondent.

Civil Law; Estoppel; The State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent any showing
that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens.—It is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its
citizens. Thus, whether or not the OSG’s motion to vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not
bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the RTC which it claimed to have acted without
jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no
opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his burden of
proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the
registered owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the
basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.

Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under Republic Act (RA) No.
26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a
person to registered land.—The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of
the reconstitution is to enable, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed
Torrens certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.
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Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 26 provides two (2) procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of
lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the source of the petition for reconstitution.—RA 26 provides two
procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the source of
the petition for reconstitution. Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and requirements for sources falling
under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down the procedure and
requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f). Thus, before the court can
properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for, petitioner
must observe the above procedures and requirements prescribed by the law. In numerous cases, the Court has held that the
noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null and void. The rationale underlying this
rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all
cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the
same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. As such, the court upon which the reconstitution
petition is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record and the legal provisions laying down the
germane jurisdictional requirements.

Same; Same; Same; It is well to point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under Republic Act (RA) No. 26 are
duty-bound to take into account the Land Registration Authority’s (LRA’s) report.—Records show that as early as January 16,
2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation dated December 5, 2005, had already called the court’s attention to its Report dated March
1, 1995 in the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88, expressing serious doubts on the authenticity of Susi’s
duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other titles over the subject land. It is well to point out that trial courts
hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the LRA’s report. Notably, both the RTC and
the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before Branch 77 was filed on the basis of
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Republic vs. Susi

Susi’s purported owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi’s prior reconstitution petitions, as
stated in the LRA’s Report, were anchored on an owner’s duplicate certificate bearing a different serial number, i.e., Serial No.
1775634. Indeed, a perusal of the said certificates of title, which were attached to the Republic’s motion for reconsideration
of the CA’s Decision dated February 13, 2014, reveals that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The
Court notes that Susi did not refute the existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her comment to
the said motion.

Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the
date of hearing of the reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial
court with jurisdiction thereon.—In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant’s purported owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, the reconstitution petition should be treated as falling under Section 3(f) of RA 26, and the trial
court should require compliance with the requisites under Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26. In particular, the reconstitution
petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13, 2005 Order failed to show that
notices were sent to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an interest in, or who have buildings or
improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as the owners of adjoining
properties. Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of
hearing of the reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the trial court with
jurisdiction thereon. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or one having interest
in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and void.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Amorin Law Offices for respondent.

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Republic vs. Susi

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution3
dated June 25, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 127144, which upheld the Order4 dated July 5, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77 (RTC): (a) denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ (Republic) Motion
to Vacate Judgment in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b) upholding the Decision5 dated January 12, 2011, granting
respondent Gertrudes V. Susi’s (Susi) petition for reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118999.

The Facts

On September 27, 2005 Susi filed before the RTC a verified Petition6 for reconstitution of TCT No. 118999 purportedly
registered in her name, Covering Lot 257 of plan Psu-32606 located in Barrio (now Barangay) Talanay, Quezon City (QC), with
an area of 240,269 square meters (subject land). She claimed that the original copy of TCT No. 118999 was destroyed by the
fire that gutted the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City (RD-QC) on June 11, 1988;8 hence, the petition based

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 11-37.

2 Id., at pp. 42-49. Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and
Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.

3 Id., at pp. 84-85.

4 Id., at pp. 169-170. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Belen Ringpis-Liban.

5 Id., at pp. 125-128. Penned by Judge Vivencio S. Baclig.

6 Dated September 12, 2005. Id., at pp. 107-112.

7 Mentioned as “Lot 35” in the said reconstitution petition; id., at p. 108.

8 Id., at p. 110.

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Republic vs. Susi

on the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999,9 docketed as LRC Case No. Q-20493(05).

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an Order10 dated October 13, 2005: (a) setting the
case for initial hearing on February 2, 2006; (b) directing that the concerned government offices be furnished a copy thereof;
and (c) directing that the said order be published in the Official Gazette once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks and posted
at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled hearing at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, the bulletin boards of the
RTC, as well as the Sheriff’s Office of the RTC of QC, and the Barangay Hall of the barangay where the subject land is
situated.11 The notice was published in the December 19 and 26, 2005 issues of the Official Gazette (Vol. 101, Nos. 51 and
52),12 and posted as required.13

On January 16, 2006, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) filed with the RTC a Manifestation14 dated December 5, 2005
stating that respondent filed similar petitions for reconstitution covering the subject land before Branches 88 and 220 of the
same RTC, for which it had previously issued Reports dated March 1, 199515 and December 12, 1995,16 respectively.

On February 2, 2006, Susi presented proof of the jurisdictional requirements without any opposition.17 The City Government
of QC (QC Government) thereafter filed an Opposi-

_______________

9 Id., at pp. 80-81.

10 Records (Vol. I), pp. 24-25.

11 Id., at p. 25.

12 See Certificate of Publication dated December 28, 2005 of the National Printing Office; id., at p. 34.

13 See Certification dated October 24, 2005 issued by RTC’s Sheriff IV, Angel L. Doroni; id., at p. 28.

14 Id., at p. 29 and Rollo, p. 115.

15 Rollo, pp. 272-273.

16 Id., at p. 274.

17 See Order dated February 2, 2006; Records (Vol. I), p. 38.

402

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

tion18 dated February 3, 2006 on the ground of res judicata.19 However, the latter was subsequently declared to be without
any locus standi to oppose the reconstitution petition.20

After Susi was allowed to formally offer her evidence,21 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance in the
case, and manifested that it had deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor of QC to appear on its behalf, subject to its
supervision and control.22

The RTC’s Ruling

In a Decision23 dated January 12, 2011 (January 12, 2011 Decision), the RTC granted Susi’s petition, and directed the RD-QC to
reconstitute the lost/destroyed original copy of TCT No. 118999.24

The RTC ruled that the presentation of the owner’s copy of TCT No. 11899925 and the Certification26 from the RD-QC that the
original of TCT No. 118999 was burned during the fire that razed the QC Hall on June 11, 1988 were sufficient to warrant the
reconstitution sought. It held that the subject petition was not barred by the dismissal by Branch 220 of the same RTC of a
similar petition anchored on her failure to: (a) comply with the technical requirements of the law, specifically, her omission to
allege matters required under Sections

_______________

18 Id., at pp. 39-46 and Rollo, pp. 226-232.

19 Id., at pp. 39-40 and id., at pp. 226-227.

20 See Order dated December 13, 2010; id., at pp. 243-244.

21 See Order dated May 14, 2008; id., at p. 143.

22 See Notice of Appearance dated May 6, 2008; id., at p. 147.

23 Rollo, pp. 125-128.

24 Id., at p. 128.

25 Id., at pp. 80-81.

26 Dated March 31, 1997 issued by Register of Deeds Samuel C. Cleofe. Id., at p. 114.

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Republic vs. Susi

11 and 12 of Republic Act No. (RA) 26;27 and (b) convince the court that TCT No. 118999 sought to be reconstituted was valid
and existing at the time it was destroyed, holding that both objections have been sufficiently overcome in the present case.28

Dissatisfied, the QC Government filed a motion for reconsideration,29 while the Republic, through the OSG, filed its Notice of
Appeal,30 which were both denied in an Order31 dated July 8, 2011. The QC Government’s subsequent Notice of Appeal32
was also denied in an Order33 dated September 15, 2011, on the grounds that (a) it has no authority to appear or to bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic; and (b) the appeal was belatedly filed, hence, not perfected. The RTC likewise
declared the January 12, 2011 Decision as having attained finality.
On October 25, 2011, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment,34 insisting that the January 12, 2011
Decision should be set aside and vacated on the ground of res judicata.35 On March 8, 2012, Sunnyside Heights Homeowner’s
Association, Inc. moved36 to join the OSG’s motion, claiming to be registered owners and occupants of various portions of the
subject land.

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27 Entitled “An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title Lost or Destroyed”
(September 25, 1946).

28 Rollo, pp. 127-128.

29 Dated January 27, 2010. Records (Vol. I), pp. 352-365.

30 Dated January 28, 2011. Rollo, pp. 129-130.

31 Id., at pp. 140-141. Issued by Acting Presiding Judge Ma. Belen Ringpis-Liban.

32 Dated August 15, 2011. Records (Vol. II), pp. 436-437.

33 Rollo, pp. 142-143.

34 Dated October 21, 2011. Id., at pp. 144-152.

35 Id., at pp. 148-149.

36 See Motion to Join the OSG in its Motion to Vacate Judgment (dated October 21, 2011) dated March 5, 2012; Records (Vol.
II), pp. 519-525.

404
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, the LRA filed a Manifestation37 (a) expressing its unwillingness to comply with the directive
contained in the January 12, 2011 Decision; and (b) praying that the RTC set aside the same and dismiss Susi’s petition on the
ground that her owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 118999 is of doubtful authenticity.38 Consequently, the LRA maintained that
there was a need to comply with the mandatory and jurisdictional requirements under Sections 3(f), 12, and 13 of RA 26,
without which the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject petition.39

In an Order40 dated July 5, 2012 (July 5, 2012 Order), the RTC denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment, considering that the
January 12, 2011 Decision had become final and executory after the Republic’s appeal had been denied due course.
Thereafter, the corresponding Writ of Execution41 was issued on July 20, 2012.

Unperturbed, the Republic filed a Petition for certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction42 before the CA, docketed as C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 127144.

The CA’s Ruling

In a Decision43 dated February 13, 2014, the CA found no reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC in granting the petition for reconstitution, considering that Susi was able to sufficiently establish that

_______________

37 Dated March 24, 2011. Id., at pp. 410-418 and Rollo, pp. 131-139.

38 See Rollo, p. 138.

39 Id., at pp. 133-137.

40 Id., at pp. 169-170.

41 Records (Vol. II), pp. 693-695. Issued by Branch Clerk of Court Virgilio R. Follosco.

42 Dated October 22, 2012. Rollo, pp. 171-198.

43 Id., at pp. 42-49.

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Republic vs. Susi

the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted was valid and existing under her name at the time it was destroyed.44

The CA found the principle of res judicata to be inapplicable to this case since the dismissal of the prior similar petition was
based on Susi’s failure to comply with the technical requirements of the law. Hence, the latter was not precluded from filing
another petition to prove the necessary allegations for the reconstitution of the subject title, which the RTC correctly found to
have been fully established.45

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,46 attaching therewith a copy of a Resolution47 issued by the LRA en consulta,
stating, among others, that: (a) the subject land is also covered by subsisting titles and occupied by a number of persons;48
and (b) Susi has two (2) uncertified reproduced owner’s duplicate copies of TCT No. 118999, but bearing different serial
numbers49 — i.e., a copy bearing serial number 177563450 which was earlier presented before Branch 220, and another one
with serial number 112195551 adduced in evidence a quo.

In a Resolution52 dated June 25, 2014, the CA denied the said motion; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed no grave abuse
of discretion in: (a) issuing the Order dated July 5,

_______________

44 Id., at p. 47.

45 Id., at p. 46.

46 Dated February 28, 2014. Id., at pp. 50-67.

47 Signed by Administrator Eulalio C. Diaz III on December 20, 2013; id., at pp. 68-75.

48 Id., at p. 74.

49 Id., at pp. 74-75.

50 Id., at p. 81.

51 Id., at p. 80.

52 Id., at pp. 84-85.

406

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

2012 denying the Republic’s Motion to Vacate Judgment in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05); and (b) upholding the January 12, 2011
Decision granting Susi’s petition for reconstitution.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

A. The Republic is not estopped

from assailing the propriety

of the order of reconstitution.

At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents,
absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens.53 Thus, whether or not the OSG’s motion to
vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules of Court (Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the
reconstitution ordered by the RTC which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the
case. Moreover, it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the
person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the title sought to be
reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the registered owner thereof. As such, the Republic is not estopped from
assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on record, such petition has no merit.54
B. Procedures and requirements

for reconstitution of lost or

destroyed certificates of title;

effect of noncompliance.

_______________

53 Republic v. Verzosa, 573 Phil. 503, 508; 550 SCRA 382, 388 (2008).

54 Republic v. Tuastumban, 604 Phil. 491, 509; 586 SCRA 600, 618-619 (2009).

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Republic vs. Susi

The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or
destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable,
after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens certificate in the same
form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction.55

RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of title
depending on the source of the petition for reconstitution.56 Section 10 in relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and
requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down
the procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f).57 Thus, before
the court can properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed
for, petitioner must observe the above procedures and requirements prescribed by the law.58
In numerous cases, the Court has held that the noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements deprives the
trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all its proceedings are rendered null
and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the conferment in the trial court of the authority to
undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of
obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the

_______________

55 See Republic v. Mancao, G.R. No. 174185, July 22, 2015, 763 SCRA 475, 480; emphasis supplied.

56 Republic v. Domingo, 697 Phil. 265, 271; 683 SCRA 604, 610 (2012); emphasis supplied.

57 Id.

58 See Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 411 Phil. 369, 388; 358 SCRA 715, 730 (2001).

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.59 As such, the court upon which the
reconstitution petition is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record and the legal provisions
laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements.60

C. The petition for reconstitution

failed to comply with the ap-

plicable procedures and re-

quirements for reconstitution.

The present reconstitution petition was anchored on a purported owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 (questioned
certificate) which is a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3(a)61 of RA 26, prompting Branch 77 to follow the
procedure outlined in Sections 962 and 1063 of the said law.

_______________

59 Id., at p. 389; p. 731. See also Castillo v. Republic, 667 Phil. 729, 745-746; 652 SCRA 600, 614 (2011); and Dordas v. Court
of Appeals, 337 Phil. 59, 66-67; 270 SCRA 328, 335-336 (1997).

60 Heirs of Marcela Navarro v. Go, 577 Phil. 523, 532; 554 SCRA 658, 667 (2008).

61 Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title[.]

62 Section 9. A registered owner desiring to have his reconstituted certificate of title freed from the encumbrance
mentioned in Section seven of this Act, may file a petition to that end with the proper Court of First Instance, giving his reason
or reasons therefor. A similar petition may, likewise, be filed by a mortgagee, lessees or other lien holder whose interest is
annotated in the reconstituted certificate of title. Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at
the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies, at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may

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409

Republic vs. Susi

However, records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation64 dated December 5, 2005, had already
called the court’s attention to its Report65 dated March 1, 1995 in the previous reconstitution petition before Branch 88,
expressing serious doubts on the authenticity of Susi’s duplicate title, and informing it of the existence of other titles over the
subject land.66

_______________

require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certificate of title, the name of the registered owner,
the names of the interested parties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the property, and the
date on which all persons having an interest in the property must appear and file such claim as they may have. The petitioner
shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication and posting of the notice: Provided, however, That after the expiration of
two years from the date of the reconstitution of a certificate of title, if no petition has been filed within that period under the
preceding section, the court shall, on motion ex parte by the registered owner or other person having registered interest in
the reconstituted certificate of title, order the register of deeds to cancel, proper annotation, the encumbrance mentioned in
section seven hereof.

63 Section 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any registered owner or person in interest from filing the
petition mentioned in section five of this Act directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in
Sections 2(a), 2(b), 3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And provided, further,
That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to the encumbrance referred to in Section
seven of this Act.

64 See Records (Vol. I), p. 29; and Rollo, p. 115.

65 The said report was submitted in the earlier reconstitution petition filed by Susi before Branch 88 of the same RTC. See
Rollo, pp. 72-273.

66 The said report stated, inter alia, that: (a) the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1775634 is of
doubtful authenticity as it could not have been issued by the RD-QC on June 16, 1967 because the judicial form bearing the
said serial number was issued by the LRA to the RD-San Carlos, Negros Occidental only on
410

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

It is well to point out that trial courts hearing reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the
LRA’s report.67 Notably, both the RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before Branch
77 was filed on the basis of Susi’s purported owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi’s prior
reconstitution petitions, as stated in the LRA’s Report, were anchored on an owner’s duplicate certificate bearing a different
serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed, a perusal of the said certificates68 of title, which were attached to the
Republic’s motion for reconsideration of the CA’s Decision dated February 13, 2014, reveals that save for the serial number, all
the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that Susi did not refute the existence of the said certificates bearing
different serial numbers in her comment69 to the said motion.

In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant’s purported owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the
reconstitution petition should be

_______________

October 13, 1970; and (b) the subject land, i.e., “Lot 25, Psu-32606, when plotted in MIS 2754 appears to have been originally
subdivided into parcels A to L where TCT Nos. 40476 and 49480 were among the titles issued. It also appears that sub-lots
25-A to 25-L were subsequently subjected to several subdivisions and/or consolidations, one of which is Pcs-13-000571, as
surveyed for Filinvest Land, Inc. (now Filinvest Dev. Corp.) being a consolidation and subdivision of the parcels covered by TCT
Nos. 304657, 304785, 305195, 305203, 385220, and 306097 covering a total area of 187,523 square meters.” (Id., at p. 272)

67 See Republic v. Sanchez, 527 Phil. 571, 592; 495 SCRA 248, 267-269 (2006).

68 Rollo, pp. 80-81 and Records (Vol. II), pp. 894-895.

69 See Comments on the Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (Dated February 28, 2014) dated April 1, 2014; Records
(Vol. II),

pp. 898-901.
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Republic vs. Susi

treated as falling under Section 3(f)70 of RA 26, and the trial court should require compliance with the requisites under
Sections 1271 and 1372 of RA 26.73

_______________

70 Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be
available, in the following order:

xxxx

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.

71 Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or
3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having
an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate
of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner’s, mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate had been issued,
or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area, and boundaries of the property; (d) the
nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names
and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have interest in the property;
(f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other
instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not
been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the
petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be
made exclusively from sources enumerated in Sections 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied with a
plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration, or with a certified
copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property. (Emphases supplied)
412

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in compliance with the October 13,
2005 Order failed to show that notices were sent to the other occupants, possessors, and persons who may have an interest
in, or who have buildings or improvements on the land covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as
the owners of adjoining properties.74

Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the date of hearing of
the reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order to vest the

_______________

72 Section 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days
prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at
the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of
hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the
name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owners of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the location, area, and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The petitioner shall,
at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

73 Supra note 67 at p. 591; pp. 251-252.

74 The Court notes that while the RTC issued an Order dated October 7, 2005 requiring Susi to: (a) amend her petition to
state the necessary information; and (b) submit a technical description of the subject land pending the issuance of the Notice
of Hearing (Records [Vol. I], p. 19), it subsequently set aside the said order upon a finding that the petition falls under Sections
9 and 10 of RA No. 26 (id., at p. 23) in view of Susi’s representation that the petition is anchored on her owner’s duplicate
original of TCT No. 118999.

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Republic vs. Susi

trial court with jurisdiction thereon.75 If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on a possessor or
one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and the order of reconstitution is null and
void.76

Thus, in light of the LRA’s report of the subsistence of other certificates of title over the subject land, it behooved the RTC to
notify the registered land owners of the reconstitution proceedings, in observance of diligence and prudence;77 however, it
failed to act accordingly. But more than this, courts have the inherent power to correct fatal infirmities in its proceedings in
order to maintain the integrity thereof.78

In view of the failure to comply with the requirements of Sections 12 and 13 of RA 26, particularly, on the service of notices of
hearing on the registered owners and/or actual possessors of the land subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case, and all proceedings held thereon are null and void. That being said, the Court finds it
unnecessary to delve on the other matters raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated June 25, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 127144, upholding the Order dated July 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 77 in LRC Case No. Q-20493(05) which denied the Motion to Vacate Judgment filed by peti-

_______________
75 See Opriasa v. The City Government of Quezon City, 540 Phil. 256, 265-266; 511 SCRA 234, 243 (2006); Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 368 Phil. 412, 424; 309 SCRA 110, 121-122 (1999); and Republic v. Marasigan, 275 Phil. 243, 253; 198 SCRA 219,
226 (1991).

76 See Manila Railroad Co. v. Moya, 121 Phil. 1122, 1128; 14 SCRA 358, 363 (1965).

77 See Republic v. De Asis, Jr., 715 Phil. 245, 258; 702 SCRA 258, 270-271 (2013).

78 Supra note 67 at p. 593; p. 269.

414

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Susi

tioner Republic of the Philippines, and sustained the grant of the petition for reconstitution filed by respondent Gertrudes V.
Susi, are hereby SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING the petition for reconstitution for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution set aside.

Notes.—It is imperative to remind trial courts that granting Petitions for Reconstitution is not a ministerial task. (Republic vs.
Pasicolan, 755 SCRA 495 [2015])
The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title under Republic Act (RA) No. 26 means the restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. (Republic vs. Mancao, 763
SCRA 475 [2015])

——o0o—— Republic vs. Susi, 814 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 213209 January 16, 2017