JOHN E.R. REYES and MERWIN JOSEPH REYES, Petitioner vs.

ORICO DOCTOLERO, ET.AL., Respondents

G.R. No. 185597 (August 2, 2017)
Third Division

Justice Jardeleza

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION: Damages

II. FACTS:

As John E.R. Reyes was approaching the basement parking of Makati

Cinema Square (MCS), Security Guard Orico Doctolero stopped him to give way
to outgoing cars. Allegedly, after several “stop and go” signals and heated
arguments, Orico shot John in the left leg. He also shot Merwin when the latter
rushed to John’s rescue. When he missed, Merwin caught Orico and pushed him
down, but was unable to control his speed. As a result, Merwin went inside MCS,
where he was shot in the stomach by another Security Guard, Romeo Avila.

John and Merwin filed a Complaint for Damages against the two guards
and their employer, Grandeur. They also impleaded MCS on the ground that it
was negligent in getting Grandeur’s services. RTC ruled against the guards, but
dismissed the complaint against Grandeur and MCS. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.

II. ISSUE: Whether or not Grandeur and MCS are vicariously liable for the
damages caused by the guards.

III. RULING:

No. As a general rule laid down in Art. 2176, one is only responsible for his
own act or omission, except when employer is made vicariously liable for the tort
committed by his employee under Art. 2180. Here, no employer-employee
relationship exists between MCS and the guards assigned to it by an agency.
Hence, Art. 2180 cannot apply.

On the other hand, Grandeur must prove two things to rebut the
presumption of negligence: first, that it had exercised due diligence in the
selection of employees, and second, that after hiring them, Grandeur had
exercised due diligence in supervising them. Here, both RTC and CA found that
Grandeur was able to prove, through testimonial and documentary evidence, that
it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
hiring of the guards. They presented among others, clearances from various
government agencies, certificates, and favorable test results in medical and
psychiatric examinations

To the question of diligent supervision, Grandeur presented evidence on

its standard operational procedures, certificates of attendance to various
seminars, and other related testimonial and documentary evidence.
 JUDITH DARINES and JOYCE DARINES, Petitioners vs.
EDUARDO QUINONES and ROLANDO QUITAN, Respondents
G.R. No. 206468 (August 2, 2017)
First Division

Justice Del Castillo

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION: Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages

II. FACTS:

Judith Darines and her daughter, Joyce, boarded Amianan Bus Line to
Baguio City, driven by Rolando Quitan. While travelling along Kennon Road, the
bus crashed into a truck. As a result, Joyce suffered cerebral concussion while
Judith had an eye wound which required operation. Hence, they filed a case for
Breach of Contract of Carriage and Damages against Quitan and Eduardo
Quinones (operator).

Respondents answer that Quitan was driving in a careful and prudent

manner, and that the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of the
truck driver who parked right after the curve without early warning device. RTC
ruled in favor of Petitioners, which CA reversed. CA likewise deleted the award of
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

II. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondents are liable for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.

III. RULING:

No. The principle that, in an action for Breach of Contract of Carriage,

moral damages may be awarded only in case (1) an accident results in death of
a passenger; or (2) the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, is pursuant to Art.
1764 in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code, and Art. 2220 thereof. There
being neither allegation nor proof that respondents acted in fraud or bad faith in
performing their duties, they are then not liable for moral damages.

Pursuant to Art. 2229 and 2234, exemplary damages may be awarded

only in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Since
petitioners are not entitled to those, then their claim for exemplary damages is
bereft of merit. Finally, considering the absence of any circumstances under Art.
2208, where attorney’s fees may be awarded, the same cannot be granted to
petitioners.
 PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs. APL CO. PTE. LTD., Respondent
G.R. No. 226345 (August 2, 2017)
Second Division

Justice Mendoza

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION: Sum of Money

II. FACTS:

The shipper, Chillies Export, turned over to APL 250 bags of chili pepper
for transport from India to Manila. In turn, BSFIL Technologies (consignee)
insured the cargo with Pioneer Insurance. Upon receipt of the goods, BSFIL
discovered that 76 bags were wet and infested with molds, and was declared as
total loss. As a result, BSFIL made a formal claim against APL and Pioneer. It
was found out that the shipment was wet because the water seeped inside the
container van APL provided. Pioneer then paid BSFIL Php 195k after evaluating
the claim.

After having been subrogated to all rights of BSFIL, Pioneer filed a case
for Sum of Money against APL. MTC granted the Complaint, which was affirmed
by RTC. However, CA reversed said decisions, ruling that the action was barred
by prescription, as the Bill of Lading set out a 9-month prescriptive period.

II. ISSUE: Whether or not the action was barred by prescription.

III. RULING:

No. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is embodied in

Art. 1370(1) of the Civil Code: “if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.”

In the subject Bill of Lading, it was stated that the carrier shall be
discharged from liability in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought in the
proper forum within 9 months after delivery. However, the same is qualified in
that when the 9-month period is contrary to any law compulsory applicable, the
period prescribed by said law shall apply.

Under the COGSA, in case of loss or damage cargo, the prescriptive

period is 1 year. Hence, the 9-month period in the Bill of Lading is inapplicable.
 CATHAY LAND, INC. and CATHAY METAL CORP., Petitioners vs.
AYALA LAND, INC., AVIDA LAND CORPORATION and
LAGUNA TECHNOPARK, INC., Respondents
G.R. No. 210209 (August 9, 2017)
First Division

Justice Del Castillo

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION: Easement of Right of Way

II. FACTS:

Cathay Group filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against

Ayala Land, Avida Land and Laguna Technopark, alleging that Ayala Group
unjustifiably denied passage to Cathay’s personnel, vehicles and heavy
equipment through its properties which caused the development of the latter’s
South Forbes Golf City project to be delayed. However, before trial could ensue,
the parties executed a Compromise Agreement wherein Ayala granted an
easement of right of way, in consideration of Cathay’s undertaking not to develop
the following: cemetery or memorial park, industrial park, high-rise buildings; low-
cost housing, and warehouse.

RTC approved the Compromise Agreement in its Judgment, hence Cathay

commenced the development of its project. However, Ayala noted that the
materials for the project showed plans to develop high-rise buildings. Thus, Ayala
made verbal and written demands to Cathay, but to no avail. Consequently, Ayala
filed a Motion for Execution with Application for Issuance of TRO. Cathay
opposed that the Compromise Agreement does not contain a provision limiting
building height at 3-storeys, and the proscription therein only pertains to “high-
rise buildings” without specific qualifications.

RTC ruled in favor of Ayala, and while the case was pending before CA,
RTC issued a Writ of Execution. Eventually, CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

II. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC and CA erred in issuing and affirming the
issuance of a Writ of Execution.

III. RULING:

Yes. Under Article 2037 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract

whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put
an end to one already commenced. It has the effect and authority of res judicata
upon the parties, but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.

In implementing a Compromise Agreement, the courts cannot modify,

impose terms different from the terms of the agreement, or set aside the
compromise and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties
without gravely abusing their discretion. Here, the remedies available to Ayala
under the Compromise Agreement were either to withdraw or suspend the grant
of easement of right of way. Thus, RTC gravely abused its discretion when it
granted a remedy that it is not available to Ayala, thereby imposing terms
different from what was agreed upon by the parties in their Compromise
Agreement.