Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped by the
ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering him unable to
return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the
Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence
of the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the
government to pay the same.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby
concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability
and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful
defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not
apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs Government of
the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)
NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180
par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of
acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands)

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except
when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government does not undertake to
guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would
involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be
subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

Phil Agila Satellite v. Lichauco

RATIONALE:
When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his
own personal liability and cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34, Political Law, Isagani Cruz)

FACTS:

On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of

private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate name
Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S.
Lagdameo, Jr. for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots
161ºEand 153ºE to PASI for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28, 1996.

When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation and
management of its satellites by, among other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital,
conducting negotiations with its business partners, and making an initial payment. When they
requested the Land bank’s confirmation of its participation in a club loan for the government’s
assignment to PASI of orbital slots 161ºE and 153ºE, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T.
Lichauco sent a letter to the bank controverting the said assignment, clearly stating that orbital
slot 153°E can no longer be assigned to PASI. She subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for
several orbital slots including 153ºE in December 1997.

PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to learn
that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the
award for orbital slot 153ºE, filed on January 23, 1998 a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee," for injunction
to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153ºE, declare its nullity, and for damages.

PASI filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de Guzman charged Lichauco
with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
Because a prejudicial question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation
Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed and reconsideration was denied by Order dated
July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the Ombudsman
erred in dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE:
Is there a prejudicial question that exists?
if yes, Is the dismissal of the complaint on that account in order?

R U LI NG :
Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the
orbital lot 153°E is, in the civil case declared valid for being within Lichauco’s scope of authority
to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor
would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner.

No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that “the
proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon
petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer.” It would sanction
the extiguishment of the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89
vis a vis Article 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set
aside. The Ombudsman wasOrdered to reinstate the case for further proceedings.

Sayson v. Singson,G.R. No. L-30044, 19 December 1973

Second Division
[FERNANDO, J.]
FACTS: Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways who
found overpricing in the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. Singson as
sole proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint in the lower court against the Auditor
claiming for the payment of the balance, amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to
alleged overpricing. The lower court adjudged Singson as entitled to collect the balance. Hence
this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for
contractual money claims against the government?

HELD: NO.
Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the
vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the
Court except with the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his
claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which
prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed.

It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the
State, however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be
had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if
thereafter an appeal would be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the
Auditor General. Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been
elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter. What transpired was
anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not have the imprint of validity.

Republic v. Purisima

Facts:
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn Administration
in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising
from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight
Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre
Service , where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the
meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
government unless consent beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
WON the respondent’s decision is valid

Ruling:
No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision
of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent.""The doctrine of
non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution
is a logical corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the
assertion of any legal right as against the state, in itself the source of the law on which such
a right may be predicated. Nor is this all, even if such a principle does give rise to
problems, considering the vastly expanded role of government enabling it to engage in business
pursuits to promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought
alone that calls for its continued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They
could still proceed to seek collection of their money claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence Washington
Insurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as
it has operated in practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of
injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may still exist, is, from an objective
appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the
determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Republic of the
Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute
as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and
Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on the government.

REPUBLIC VS FELICIANO

G.R. No. 70853 148 SCRA 424 March 12, 1987

Facts:

The appeal was filed by 86 settlers of Barrio of Salvacion, representing the Republic of the
Philippines to dismiss the complaint filed by Feliciano, on the ground that the Republic of the
Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.

Prior to this appeal, respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land consisting of four lots. The trial court rendered a
decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the property,
Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the
decision of the trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for
more than 20 years under claim of ownership. The trial court ordered the settlers to present their
evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of evidence. Feliciano, on the other
hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision and the
trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.
The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. The case was reopened to allow
them to present their evidence. But before this motion was acted upon, Feliciano filed a motion
for execution with the Appellate Court but it was denied.

The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot
be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
Feliciano.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.

Discussions:

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing
that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of
statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative
act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Ruling/s:

No. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff
has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is
not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party
or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by
plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not
permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no
such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such
consent.

PNB VS CIR

G.R. No. L-32667 81 SCRA 214 January 31, 1978

Facts:

A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been
issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and
Laborers Association. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two grounds:
That the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff to serve the
writ of execution was contrary to law and

That the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In thus denying the
motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure to
abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) moves to quash the notice of garnishment is denied for the
lack of merit. PNB is therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the ‘notice of
Garnishment’ dated May 6, 1970.”

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the order denying motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized
as a grave abuse of discretion.

Discussions:

According to the doctrine of state immunity, under suits against Government Agencies:

“An incorporated Agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate judicial
personality. If the agency is incorporated, the test of suability is found in its charter.”

From the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him:
“It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign
character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its
privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself,
and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be
transacted.

Rulings:

No. Supreme Court ruled that there has not been a grave abuse of discretion. The premise that
the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity It does not follow
though that they were exempt from garnishment.

As stated in “National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations”, a

government owned and controlled corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. It may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes
just like any other corporation.

Justice Ozaeta held that it is well settled that when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. By
engaging in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations.

Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41299, 21 February 1983

[MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.]

FACTS: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real
estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros,
Rizal. Claiming that the conditions of mortgage have been broken, SSS filed an application for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney’s fees against the Social Security
System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully
and religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.

ISSUE: Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be held liable for damages?

HELD: YES.

There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a
personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS’
own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words “sue
and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that
the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions,
by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be
deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede
its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the enforcement and
protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the
Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs
governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver,
a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.

Farolan vs CTA

Facts:

S/S Pacific Hawk vessel with Registry No. 170 arrived on January 30, 1972 at the Port ofManila
carrying among others, 80 bales of screen net consigned to Baging BuhayTrading (Baging
Buhay). The import was classified under Tariff Heading no. 39.06-B of theTariff and Customs
Code at 35% ad valorem. Bagong Buhay paid the duties and taxesdue in the amount of
P11,350.00.The Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment
uponhearing the information that the shipment consisted of mosquito net made of nylonunder
Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Upon re-examination, itturns out that
the shipment was undervalued in quantity and value as previouslydeclared. Thus the Collector
of Customs forfeited the shipment in favor of thegovernment.Private respondent filed a petition
on August 20, 1976 for the release of the questionedgoods which the Court denied. On June
2,1986, 64 bales out of the 80 bales werereleased to Bagong Buhay after several motion. The
sixteen remaining bales weremissing. The respondent claims that of the 143,454 yards
released, only 116,950 yardswere in good condition and the rest were in bad condition. Thus,
respondents demandsthat the Bureau of Customs be ordered to pay for damages for the 43,050
yards itactually lost.

Issue:

Whether or not the Collector of Customs may be held liable for the 43,050 yardsactually lost by
the private respondent.

Held:

Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the privaterespondent
sustained with regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private r e s p o n d e n t ' s
claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of soverei
g n immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual
damages it sustained, for which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that
this case has been converted technically into a suit against the state.

On this point, the political doctrine that “state may not be sued without its consent,”categorically
applies. As an unincorporated government agency without
any separate judicial personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from suit. Al
ongwith the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty,
namely taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of
collecting revenues which is defined not a proprietary function. Thus private respondents claim
for damages against the Commissioner of Customs must fails.

FROILAN VS PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental
Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for
P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the
payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in
favor of the Shipping Commission. For various reasons, among them the non-payment of the
installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of said vessel and considered the
contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the
defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the
Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original
contract with the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.

Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of
replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and
that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court
issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to
dispose of said authority to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he
may have thereon. Plaintiff paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to
surrender possession of the vessel, he filed an action to recover possession thereof and have
him declared the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to
intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage
constituted thereon may be foreclosed.

Issues:

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of
the mantle of sovereign immunity and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having
done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it
filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against
the plaintiff to the recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it
of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the
different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action
against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level
of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the right to set up
whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.
LIM vs. Brownell
G.R. NO. L-8587
March 24, 1960
Ponente: Gutierrez David, J.
Topic: (State Immunity from Suit)

Facts:

Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Alien Property Administrator (later substituted
by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of four (4) parcels of land (which
were subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines) with a prayer for the payment
of back rentals. The Republic of the Philippines intervened in the case. The defendant Attorney
General of the United States and the defendant-intervenor Republic of the Philippines each filed
an answer, alleging by way of affirmative defense, among others, that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the claim for rentals since the action in that regard constituted a suit against the
Republic to which it had not given its consent.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s action constituted a suit against the Republic to which it had not
given its consent.

Ruling:

Yes. The appellate court's order of dismissal, with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages
against the defendant Attorney General of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines
must be upheld based upon the principle that a foreign state or its government cannot be sued
without its consent.

With respect to the recovery or return of the properties vested, section 33 of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, as amended, provides:

"SEC. 33. Return of property; notice; institution of suits, computation of time.—No return may be
made pursuant to section 9 or 32 unless notice of claim has been, filed: (a) in the case of any
property or interest acquired by the United States prior to December 18, 1941, by August 9,
1948; or (b) in the case of any property or interest acquired by the United States on or after
December 18, 1941, by April 30, 1949, or two years from the vesting of the property or interest
in respect of "which the claim is made, whichever is later.

Lots 1 and 2 were vested by the Alien Property Custodian on March 14, 1946". The two-year
period, therefore, within which to file a suit for their return expired on March 14, 1948. The claim
filed by plaintiff with the Philippine Alien Property Administration on November 15, 1948
obviously could not toll the two-year period that had already expired on March 14, 1948.

Regarding Lots 3 and 4, these lots were vested only on July 6, 1948 and consequently the two-
year period within which to file the action for their recovery expired on July 7, 1950. But in
computing that two-year period, the time during which plaintiff's claim with the Philippine Alien
Property Administration was pending— from November 16, 1948 when the claim was filed to
March 7, 1950 when it was disallowed—should be excluded. The complaint therefore filed on
November 13, 1950 is well within the prescribed period. Hence the case on said lots is hereby
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Santiago vs. Republic

Ildefonso Santiago, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Alfredo T. Santiago, petitioner, vs. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Director, Bureau of Plant
Industry, and the Regional Director, Region IX, Zamboanga City, repondent.

December 19, 1978

Fernando, J:

Facts:

 Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on
the terms that the Bureau should construct a building and install lighting facilities on the
said lot.
 When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case
pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the
petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without
the consent of the government.

Issue:

 Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.

Held:

 Yes.

Ratio:

 The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the
deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did
not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to be heard in the
court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity
which the government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to
proceed with the case.

USA VS RUIZ

G.R. No. L-35645 136 scra 487 May 22, 1985

Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the proceedings
done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those
provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair
projects. Eligio de Guzman land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to confirm
its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company construed this as an
acceptance of its offer so they complied with the requests. The company received a letter which
was signed by William I. Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects
because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating in repairs, and that the projects were
awarded to third parties. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against
the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
to be able to invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle
of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has
been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (juregestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A
state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.

Animos vs. PVAO

G.R. No. 79156, June 22, 1989

FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and
the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners
against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act
No. 65, as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the basis that Animos’
disability was only considered partial, rather than total, according to the “Rules on Disability
Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension benefits. The petitioner submits
that the rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the state.

HELD: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may not be invoked where
the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. When
officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual capacity, the cloak of
protection from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We
hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the amended complaint, which should be
taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one
against the officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the
contending architects, or to prevent them from making payment and recognition until the
contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained
and in the credit for the work done”. Hence, the complaint cannot be considered a suit against
the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we may consider a public official liable
in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts when done with malice and
in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.

DFA vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 113191
September 18, 1996
Ponente: Vitug, J.
Topic: (State Immunity from Suit)

Facts:

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against ADB.
Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the
Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"). ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that
the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article
55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to
Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The
Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived
its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favour Magnayi.

The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the
matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment."
When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether the ADB is correct in invoking its immunity from suit

2. Whether the ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction
giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether the DFA has the legal standing

Ruling:
1. Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and the Headquarter's Agreement establish that,
except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase,
sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form.
The Bank's officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in
their official capacity. The granting of these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants ans
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine Government. Being an international
organization that has been extended diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal
law.

2. No. The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the
ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attack.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes the determination of persons and institutions covered by
diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the
court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must
be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help to keep the
credibility of the Philippine government before the international community.

WHO vs Aquino Case Digest

Diplomatic Immunity, Political Question, Suits against International Agencies

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed
free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that
the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs
of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for
the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of
diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be
suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search
warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic
immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General,
as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to
diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in
the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or
other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure
and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard
of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs.
Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)

USA vs Guinto
Doctrine of incorporation; Doctrine of Immunity from Suit
G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990

Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in effect suits
against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in
connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said
base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia,
Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents who
claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area which was
not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of
preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction
on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not waived its non-
suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
2. Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally accepted
principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the
majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as
a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to
such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
with other states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as
against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into
a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and
divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:

1. The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government
to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the
American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
2. Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers or
agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts in
which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone must satisfy
the judgment.

The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for the paucity
of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in the grant of the
barbershop concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that
evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled to the
relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below for further
proceedings.
Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon

doctrine of sovereign immunity

G.R. No. 154705 405 SCRA 126 June 26, 2003

Facts:

This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the Republic
of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws and
jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister
Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units and
was to take effect in a period of four years.

When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration, he
allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the
standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the
agreement.

The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he filed
a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity
from suit.

2. Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim may
be sued herein in their private capacities.

Discussions:

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the principle of
the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.
All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.] A contrary
attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.

The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept of
sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the commercial
activities of a state.)

Rulings:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the republic of Indonesia cannot be deemed to have
waived its immunity to suit. The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri
imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that
the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into
contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the
embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it
entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered
into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot
be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

2. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic

agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisidiction of the receiving State. He shall
also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:

o a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the
receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes
of the mission;

o an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as

executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of
the sending State;

o an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the

diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.

The Solicitor General believes that said act may fall under subparagraph (c) thereof, but said
provision clearly applies only to a situation where the diplomatic agent engages in any
professional or commercial activity outside official functions, which is not the case herein.

KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO

(G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003)

Facts

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house
of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was
later acquitted by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special
agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic
immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed
to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States
Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

 The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the

two countries

 Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy

 Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust

operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then
be expected to make the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

PLDT VS NTC (190 SCRA 717)

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs National Telecommunications Commission

190 SCRA 717 [GR No. 88404 October 18, 1990]

Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted otherwise known as “An Act
Granting Felix Alberto and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to establish radio stations for
domestic and transoceanic telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the original
corporate name, which was changed to ETCI with amendment of the articles of incorporation in
1964. Much later, “CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be adopted before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn and abandoned.. On May 13, 1987, alleging
urgent public need, ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and
maintain a cellular mobile telephone system and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro
Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with prayer for provisional authority to operate phase
A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, however
NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a
cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and conditions, one of
which is that ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for the provision of
adequate interconnection facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile telephone switch and the
public switched telephone network and shall jointly submit such interconnection agreement to
the commission for approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the Albertos, as original owners of more
than 40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In 1968, the Albertos
reacquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of
their shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares.
Moreover, in 1964, ETCI had increased its capital stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in
1987, from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000.

Issue:

Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to the new stockholders amount to a
transfer of ETCI’s franchise which needs congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090.

Held:

No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the franchise, which is the corporation
itself and refers to a sale, lease or assignment of that franchise. It does not include the transfer
or sale of shares of stock of a corporation by the latter’s stockholders. The sale of shares of
stock of a public utility is governed by another law, in section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act
(CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public service commission (now NTC) is the government
agency vested with the authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed
capital stock of a telecommunications company to a single transferee. In other words, transfer of
shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not congressional authorization.
What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The
approval of the NTC may be deemed to have been met when it authorized the issuance of the
provisional authority to ETCI. There was full disclosure before the NTC of the transfers. In fact,
the NTC order of November 12,1987 required ETCI to submit its present capital and ownership
structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion before the NTC, dated November 8, 1987 or more
than a year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in its
capital stock from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers made by its
stockholders. A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by
stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is
owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires
congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the
same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation,
like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to
another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the
corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the
transfer of shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each
stockholder. It has the right to continuity or perpetual succession.

MAQUERA vs BORRA

Facts: Maquera seek to ask Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national,
provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate.

ISSUE:

whether or not RA no. 4421 is unconstitutional

HELD:

Supreme Court held that property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same. The court reasoned out that Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to
be voted shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned. Social
justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly,
no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office.

Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994

Facts :

Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition
case" on vendors of North EDSA.

Constitutional Issue :

Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a
fine for contempt.

Ruling :

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores
and carenderia cannot fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the
same in all parts of the world.

Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political
rights (right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education, employment and social
services.

Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity...Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only
be recognized and protected by it.

Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his
natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.

CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the
organization or administration of the government.

POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or

administration of the government.

PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988]

Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing
the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may
be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity
of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that
the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there
exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order
No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female
contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban
has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other
things, to the requirements of “public safety” as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule
making powers.

TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ

Facts: The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a
requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and
from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court
denied said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as scheduled.

The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of
medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the
scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after
consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under existing
rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for
admission into the medical colleges.

Issue: Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

Held: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a
word, the public order — of the general community. An important component of that public order
is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no one
can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue
that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one
hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand.
This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of
protecting the health and safety of the public.

PRC vs. De Guzman

G. R. No. 144681

June 21, 2004

Constitutional Law: Police Power

Facts:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the
Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released
their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter,
the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima
College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-
Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high.
Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another
eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also
observed that many of those who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both
subjects, and no one got a mark lower than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the
candidates from other schools was made. The Board observed that strangely, the unusually
high ratings were true only for Fatima College examinees. It was a record breaking
phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure Examination. For its part, the NBI found
that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician Examination
leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
The Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with
"immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-
Gyne examinations. It recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified.
Trial court’s judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and
intervenors to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians without prejudice to
any administrative disciplinary action which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such
causes and in the manner provided by law and consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution as any other professionals.

Issue:

Whether or not the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 (prescribes that a person who aspires to practice
medicine in the Philippines, must have “satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination) known as The Medical Act of 1959 a valid exercise of police power.
Held:

Yes. It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who
desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be
required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This
regulation takes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who would practice
medicine. *satisfactorily- defined as “sufficient to meet a condition or obligation” or “capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance” It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the
exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its
agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that regulates the
exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.

Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary

consultation to LGU regarding national projects

G.R. No. 129546 December 13, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and various
concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying, for
lack of cause of action, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs, parts of the
Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the President [President
Ramos], through Proclamation No. 635, for use as a sanitary landfill and similar waste disposal
applications.

The petioners opposed the implementation of said order since the creation of dump site
under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their constutents. Moreso, the
the dump site is to be constructed in Watershed reservation.

Through their concerted efforts of the officials and residents of Province of Rizal and
Municipality of San Mateo, the dump site was closed. However, during the term of President
Estrada in 2003, the dumpsite was re-opened.

A temporary restraining order was then filed. Although petitioners did not raised the question
that the project was not consulted and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court take
it into consideration since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.
Issue:
Whether or not the consultation and approval of the Province of Rizal and municipality of San
Mateo is needed before the implementation of the project..

Ruling:
The court reiterated again that "the earth belongs in usufruct to the living."

Yes, as lucidly explained by the court: contrary to the averment of the respondents,
Proclamation No. 635, which was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state- "to require all national
agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organization, and other concerned sectors of the community
before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction." Likewise Section
27 requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by government
authorities ans the prior approval of the Sanggunian is obtained." Corollarily as held in Lina ,
Jr. v. Paño, Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with the appropriate local government units,
should apply to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance
of the particular community implementing the project.

Relative to the case, during the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared before the
Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations. However, the
ambivalence of his reply was brought to the fore when at the height of the protest rally and
barricade made by the residents of petitioners to stop dump trucks from reaching the site, all the
municipal mayors of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things, “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code.” These include:

(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing
and other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of
natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming, and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of
rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]

(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the jurisdiction of
the municipality, adopting a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land
within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code, enacting
integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in
populous centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of buildings within said
fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions of this Code;[Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, …providing for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and
conservation of communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and
other similar forest development projects ….and, subject to existing laws, establishing and
providing for the maintenance, repair and operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply
water for the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply; regulating the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs;
protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose,
extending the coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal,
aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in connection with the water service; and
regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water.”[Section 447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Briefly stated, under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can
be implemented:
(1) prior consultation with the affected local communities, and
(2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.

Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is illegal.

CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs FRANCISCO

G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001

Fact: On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City a
complaint for expropriation against the respondents. Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3)
adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters respondents
constructed residential houses several decades ago which they had since leased out to tenants
until the present; on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of petitioner, upon
petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of
Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a
medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land

September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended Complaint after
declaring respondents as “small property owners” whose land is exempt from expropriation
under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public
purpose for petitioner’s failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong.

Issue: whether the RESPONDENT who is a SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS is EXEMPT FROM
EXPROPRIATION.”

Held: Yes, R.A. No. 7279, the “Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992” introduced a
limitation on the size of the land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law
expressly exempted “small property owners” from expropriation of their land for urban land
reform.

R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) defined that: “Small-property owners” are defined by two elements: (1)
those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not
more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban
areas; and (2) that they do not own real property other than the same.

MANUEL CAMACHO v. ATTY. JOVITO A. CORESIS

[ GR No. 134372, Aug 22, 2002 ]

QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of the present petition for certiorari is the Resolution dated June 3, 1997 of the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao, hereafter simply the Office, which dismissed the administrative and
criminal complaints against respondents Sixto O. Daleon, Aida Agulo, Desiderio Alaba, Norma
Tecson and the Board of Regents of the University of Southeastern Philippines (USP), Davao
City, for violation of Section 3 [a], [e] and [j] of Republic Act 3019 also known as the "Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act."[1] Also sought to be nullified is the Order of the Office dated
September 10, 1997, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts as
culled from the records are as follows:
Petitioner is the Dean of the College of Education of said university, since January 1994 to the
present. He has served the university as faculty member and as administrator for almost 13
years.[2]
Respondent, Dr. Sixto O. Daleon, is a Professor 6 and officer-in-charge of the Graduate School
of USP, with a salary grade of CS 29. The other respondents, Agulo, Tecson and Alaba, are
faculty members of said university. They enrolled under Dr. Daleon in the subject Ed.D. 317,
which is a Seminar in Curriculum Development, during the first semester of 1994-1995. At the
end of the semester, Dr. Daleon gave the three final passing grades of 1.0, 1.25 and 1.5,
respectively.[3] They were graded without requiring them to attend regular classes. Instead, Dr.
Daleon gave them a special program of self-study with reading materials, once a week tutorial
meetings, quizzes, and term papers.
Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to petitioner that during the first
semester of school year 1994-1995, there were "ghost students" in the Ed.D. 317 class of Dr.
Daleon. According to them, these "ghost students", namely Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were
given passing grades despite their failure to attend classes.[4]
On June 13, 1995, petitioner informed Dr. Daleon of the complaint. Petitioner requested the
latter to furnish him with photocopies of exams, term papers, and record of attendance of the
students involved. Dr. Daleon ignored the request.[5]
On July 28, 1995, the matter was raised in a university council meeting where it was agreed that
the University President, Dr. Edmundo Prantilla, would create a committee to investigate the
complaint.
In a letter dated August 10, 1995, Dr. Daleon apologized for the delay in responding to
petitioner's letter-request dated June 15, 1995. Dr. Daleon admitted that he made special
arrangements with Agulo, Alaba and Tecson regarding their course without petitioner's
approval.
Thereafter, petitioner wrote Dr. Prantilla recommending that Agulo, Tecson and Alaba be
required to attend regular classes in school year 1995-1996 and comply with the course
requirements in Ed.D. 317. Dr. Prantilla approved the recommendations. However, on
December 1, 1995, Dr. Prantilla entertained the appeal of Agulo for the validation of the grades
given by Dr. Daleon to the three of them. On December 23, 1995, the Board of Regents passed
its Resolution No. 2432 Series of 1995, upholding the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence, insubordination and violation of
R.A. 6770[6] was docketed as OMB-ADM-3-96-0132.
On May 28, 1996, petitioner submitted a Manifestation with Prayer, with a Supplement to
Complaint-Affidavit for Violation of R.A. 3019 and/or such other penal laws against Dr. Daleon,
Agulo, Alaba, Tecson and members of the USP Board of Regents,[7] including Dr. Prantilla. On
July 24, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an order directing respondent
members of the Board of Regents and the committee created to hear Administrative Case No.
96-602 to desist from conducting further proceedings thereon and to have the entire records of
said criminal complaint forwarded to the Office for possible consolidation with the administrative
complaint.
On June 3, 1997, a Resolution was issued by Atty. Jovito Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, dismissing the administrative and criminal complaints
against respondents. Approved by Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, the resolution in its dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding insufficient evidence to hold respondent Dr. Daleon liable for the
administrative charges of incompetence, insubordination and favoritism or unjust discrimination,
or of any other laws, let the instant case be ordered DISMISSED.
Likewise, finding no prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a), (e) and (j), the criminal
complaint filed by Dr. Camacho against Professor Daleon, Mr. Desiderio Alaba, Misses Aida
Agulo, Norma Tecson, and the Members of the Board of Regents of USP is hereby DISMISSED
outright for want of palpable merit.
AS RESOLVED.[8]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order
dated September 10, 1997.
Before us, petitioner now anchors the present petition on the following grounds:

1. THE SAID QUESTIONED DISPOSITIONS FAILED TO FIND THE ACTS OF

RESPONDENTS DALEON AND HIS RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS-AGULO, ALABA
AND TECSON TO BE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW
IN THE UNIVERSITY THE UNIVERSITY CODE, PARTICULARLY THE PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLES 128, 140, 141, 152 (LAST PARAGRAPH) THEREIN; AND OF THE
ACTS OF RESPONDENT BOARD OF REGENTS AS "ULTRA VIRES" AND
CONTRARY TO THE SAID LAW IN THE UNIVERSITY WHEN IT PASSED BOARD OF
REGENTS (BOR) RESOLUTIONS NO. 2432 S. OF 1995 ON DECEMBER 23, 1995
AND NO. 2449 S. 1996, RESPECTIVELY;
 2. THERE WAS OBVIOUS ABUSE AND GRAVE ERROR IN MISAPPLYING THE
PRINCIPLE OF "ACADEMIC FREEDOM" TO ABSOLVE RESPONDENT DALEON OF
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT; AND THE RESPONDENTS-STUDENTS AND
THE BOARD OF REGENTS (ALONG WITH SAID RESPONDENT DALEON) OF THE
ANTI-GRAFT CHARGES;
3. THE SAID RESOLUTION AND ORDER OF RESPONDENT GRAFT INVESTIGATION
OFFICER AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO WERE
ATTENDED BY PATENT "DUE PROCESS" VIOLATIONS AS THEIR FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS EMANATED FROM SELF-SERVING, INCREDIBLE AND HEARSAY
PROFFERS; AND DID NOT CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.[9]

In issue is whether or not public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in exonerating Dr. Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability
arising from his giving passing grades to Agulo, Tecson and Alaba without requiring them to
attend classes.
Petitioner avers that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, committed grave
abuse of discretion when it affirmed the impugned BOR resolution as it is contrary to the
University Code, violates due process and is based on self-serving hearsays. He argues that
the BOR resolution is based on a wrong interpretation of the constitutional provision on
"academic freedom".
In its Comment, the Office of Solicitor General posits a contrary view. The OSG argues that
public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion.[10] According to the OSG, there is
no provision in the University Code of USP which prohibits a professor or teacher from giving a
special program or arrangement tailored to meet the requirements of a particular course. [11]
We are in agreement with the position taken by the respondents through the OSG. The petition
lacks merit and ought to dismissed.
A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary
remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. To invoke the Court's power of judicial review
under this Rule, it must first be shown that respondent tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi- judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[12] Conversely, absent a showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the acts of the respondents may not be
subjected to our review under Rule 65.
From the records, we find no valid ground nor cogent reason to hold that the respondent Office
had gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution dated June 3, 1997. We
note that the conclusions in said resolution are based on substantial evidence easily verifiable
from the records. Well established is the principle that factual findings of administrative agencies
are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, provided such findings are
supported by substantial evidence,[13] as in this case. Graft Investigation Officer I Jovito A.
Coresis, Jr., of said Office gave weight to the counter-affidavit of Dr. Daleon[14] as corroborated
by the affidavit of Prof. Concesa P. Lagare,[15] Professor 2 of the College of Education, USP.
These affidavits averred that during the graduate school orientation program sometime in July
1995, the university's Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. Luz D. Ancheta, declared that
special arrangements between a professor and a graduate student may be allowed on a case-
to-case basis. Dr. Ancheta made this statement in reply to Dr. Daleon's query on the policy of
USP on attendance of graduate school students and whether Dr. Daleon could give grades to
students who do not attend classes. In her reply to Dr. Daleon's query, the VPAA even cited her
experience when she pursued her doctoral course at UP Los Baños. According to Dr. Ancheta,
she was given a special arrangement by one of her professors. She added that she, too, had
allowed the same special arrangement for her students at the USP Graduate School.
Public respondent also anchored his decision on Article 140 of the University Code, which
provides that the rules on attendance of students shall be enforced in all classes subject to the
modification by the Dean in the case of graduate students and other courses.[16] It is undisputed
that at the time that Dr. Daleon handled the graduate class in Ed.D. 317, he had already been
duly designated Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Graduate School by the President of USP and
was even entitled to the emoluments inherent to the Office of the Dean of the Graduate
School.[17] Accordingly, as OIC, performing the functions of the Dean of the Graduate School,
Dr. Daleon had the authority to modify the rule on attendance without seeking permission of
petitioner.
Further, Dr. Daleon's teaching style had the support of the members of the Board of Regents,
the body with the authority to formulate university policies, fully knowing the policy on
attendance of students in the graduate school. In passing Resolution No. 2432, S. 1995,[18]not
only did they validate the grade given by Dr. Daleon to Agulo, but they also gave an imprimatur
on the propriety, regularity and acceptability of Dr. Daleon's instructional approach. In said
resolution, the BOR cited Article 155 and Article 3 of the University Code, thus:
The Board upheld the first grading sheet submitted by Dr. S. Daleon in the light of the following
provisions of the University Code: (1) Article 155 which states that "no grade shall be changed
after the report has been submitted" and (2) Article 3 which states that "Every member of the
faculty shall enjoy academic freedom, which is the right of the professor to teach the subject of
his specialization according to his best lights… nor shall any restraint be placed upon him in the
choice of subjects for research and investigation."
The Dean must promote unity in his unit and must ensure that the dignity of every professor in
his unit is respected.[19]
As held by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the Resolution of the Board of Regents is
clearly an exercise of its sound discretion as the final arbiter of issues affecting the internal
operations of the university and as interpreter of the policies of the school.[20]
Finally, we agree with respondents' position on the primacy of academic freedom in regard to
higher institutions of learning. Dr. Daleon's teaching style, validated by the action of the USP
Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic
freedom.[21]Academic freedom is two-tiered that of the academic institution and the teacher's.
Institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives and the methods on how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.[22] It
encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."[23] The right of the
school to confirm and validate the teaching method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught."
Academic freedom also accords a faculty member the right to pursue his studies in his particular
specialty.[24] It is defined as a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as
investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being
subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalty because these conclusions are
unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.[25] As applied to the
case at bar, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and
experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students at
that), subject only to the rules and policies of the university. Considering that the Board of
Regents, whose task is to lay down school rules and policies of the University of Southeastern
Philippines, has validated his teaching style, we see no reason for petitioner to complain before
us simply because he holds a contrary opinion on the matter.
In our view, petitioner failed to establish that Dr. Daleon and the Board of Regents of the
University of Southeastern Philippines acted in evident bad faith or with manifest partiality in the
performance of their official duties. Hence, there is no basis to hold that the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao committed any grave abuse of discretion in exonerating respondents
below from both administrative and criminal charges. The resolution of that Office is in order for
it accords with the facts and the law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated June
3, 1997, of the Office of the Ombudsman- Mindanao is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.

[1]
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a
violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

xxx
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or
of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled. Xxx
UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA
G.R. No. 134625
August 31, 1999
313 SCRA 404

FACTS:
Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP CSSP Diliman. She already completed the units of course work required
and finished her dissertation and was ready for oral defense.

After going over her dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Paz that she committed
plagiarism. However, respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four out of the five
panelists gave a passing mark except Dr. Medina.

UP held meeting against her case and some of the panels indicated disapproval. Hence, she
expressed her disappointments over the CSSP administration and warned Dean Paz. However,
Dean Paz request the exclusion of Celine’s name from the list of candidates for graduation but it
did not reach the Board of Regents on time, hence Celine graduated.

Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the
doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges
against her.

CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private

respondent's doctorate degree.

The Board sent her a letter indicating that they resolved to withdraw her Doctorate Degree
recommended by the University Council.

She sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request
was denied by President

Hence, Celine then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and damages, alleging that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her
degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was deprived of her right to substantive
due process.

RULING:
No. Respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine was indeed heard several times.

Several committees and meetings had been formed to investigate the charge that private
respondent had committed plagiarism and she was heard in her defense.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process.
In the case at bar, Celine was informed in writing of the charges against her and given
opportunities to answer them. She was asked to submit her written explanation which she
submiited. She, as well, met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla
committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities
explaining her position.

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before
the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not
require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the
Board of Regents.