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CONSOLIDATED TIPS
(2017 Bar Examinations)
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra
Speedy trial in Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution covers only
the trial phase of criminal cases, whereas Section 16 covers all phases of any judicial, quasi-
judicial or administrative proceedings. (Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution, A
Comprehensive Reviewer)
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused
in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient, the right to the speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 188165 & G.R. No. 189063, 11 December 2013, J. Bersamin)
INOCENTES v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 205963-64, 7 July 2016
J. Peralta
HELD: YES. The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve the
criminal charges against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated Inocentes'
constitutional right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him, as well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly on
complaints filed before it.
RIGHT TO BAIL
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015
J. Bersamin
Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and a
Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argues that (a) the mitigating circumstances of age
and voluntary surrender should grant him bail since the penalty imposable
would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; (b) the
prosecution’s failure to show that evidence of his guilt is strong; and (c) he is
not a flight risk. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution against his Motions
and denied his Motion for Reconsideration on the abovementioned motions.
ISSUE: Can bail be granted to a 90-year old Senator (or public servant)
who is already in his advanced age and has voluntarily surrendered to a
charge which prescibes a non-bailable penalty of reclusion perpetua?
It must be noted that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the
presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his
favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. However, the
determination of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two
mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
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health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of
his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense
but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
PEOPLE v. VALDEZ
G.R. Nos 216007-09, 8 December 2015
J. Peralta
Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that “[a]ll
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties x x x.” The term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not
imposable, penalty.
Indeed, the trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that
in charging a complex crime, the information should allege each element of
the complex offense with the same precision as if the two (2) constituent
offenses were the subject of separate prosecutions. Where a complex crime is
charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the offense proven.
765935 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a matter of right in plunder
committed through malversation of public funds, but the aggregate amount
or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired must be
at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an accused who is
alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru falsification of
official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no longer entitled
to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as low as
P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.
The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact
doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act
carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification
of the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine
may apply. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the
beneficiaries and the country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for
the nullification of the P144.378 Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social
and economic services funded through the DAP. Thus, the Court upheld the
efficacy of such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine.
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the
executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of
the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate
funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it)
collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.
However, the presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by
Belgica, et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional
because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund,
as well as P.D. No. 1869 (as amended by P.D. No. 1993), which amended
PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29,
Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does
not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation
as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.
The determination of probable cause to charge a person in court for a criminal offense
is exclusively lodged in the Executive Branch of the Government, through the Department of
Justice. Initially, the determination is done by the investigating public prosecutor, and on
review by the Secretary of Justice or his duly authorized subordinate. The courts will respect
the determination, unless the same shall be shown to have been made in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P. Samson,
G.R. No. 205972 & G.R. NO. 164352, 9 November 2016, J. Bersamin)
Moreover, the courts could intervene in the determination of probable cause only
through the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, not by
appeal through the petition for review under Rule 43. Thus, the Court of Appeals could not
reverse or undo the findings and conclusions on probable cause by the Secretary of Justice
except upon clear demonstration of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the Secretary of Justice. (Caterpillar, Inc. v. Manolo P. Samson,
supra.)
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Revised Penal Code,
Article 100).
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made
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before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. (Rules of Court, Rule 111,
Section 1)
* INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS. In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. (Rules of Court,
Rule 111, Section 3)
* As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment
of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing
lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. (People and AAA v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015, J. Peralta)
* Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be
assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the
lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment,
but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a
denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is
grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not tantamount to putting private
respondents in double jeopardy. (People and AAA v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, 25
February 2015, J. Peralta)
PENALTIES
Penalties with divisible duration, the periods of which are not expressly mentioned in
Article 76 are called “penalties not composed of three periods” since Article 76 has not fixed
the duration of their periods, they must be computed in accordance with Article 65. Under
this provision, the time included in the duration of penalty shall be divided into three equal
portions and periods shall be formed from each portion.
The penalty for malversation under paragraph 2 of Article 217 of the RPC is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium period. The range of this penalty is not found in Article
76. Considering that this penalty is not composed of three periods, the time included in the
penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 (Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014, J.
Bersamin).
The duration of “prision mayor in its minimum and medium period” is 6 years and 1
day to 10 years. To determine “the time included in the duration,” deduct “one day” and the
lower limit of the prescribed penalty from its upper limit.
Four years, which is “the time included in the duration,” shall be divided into three
equal portions.
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4 years
÷3
-------------------------
1 year and 4 months --------- one third portion of the penalty
The minimum, medium and maximum periods shall be formed out the 3 equal
portions of the penalty. The time included in the duration of each period is 1 year and 4
months.
6 years
+1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
7 years and 4 months
+ 1 year and 4 months
----------------------------
8 years and 8 months
+1 year and 4 months
-----------------------------
10 years
Thus, the minimum period of the prescribed penalty of “prision mayor in its minimum
and medium periods” ranges from 6 years and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months; its medium
period ranges from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months; its maximum period
rages from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day to 10 years (Zafra v. People, G.R. No. 176317, July 23,
2014, J. Bersamin).
PEOPLE v. MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227, 20 July 2011
J. Peralta
Appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the
RTC's Decision. R.A. No. 9344 took effect on 20 May 2006, while the RTC
promulgated its decision on 14 September 2005, when the appellant was no
longer a minor. The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with
Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, the laws
that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the
imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to
death.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344
as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and academic.
It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when this case
was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The
records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19
(2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years
old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have
suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to
the provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension
of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the
provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.
If the check is unfunded, stealing the check and presenting it for payment with the
bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to accomplish the crime of
qualified theft since the check is unfunded (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, 13 July 2009,
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J. Bersamin)
JACINTO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 162540, 13 July 2009
J. Bersamin
ISSUE: Whether Jacinto is liable for the crime of qualified theft for
taking a check without value.
HELD: NO. Jacinto is not liable for the crime of qualified theft for
taking a check without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Jacinto is
found liable for committing an impossible crime. In Intod v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved
factual impossibility, i.e., a man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another
with the intention to steal the latter’s wallet, but gets nothing since the pocket
is empty. Jacinto’s case is closely akin to the example of factual impossibility
given in Intod. In this case, Jacinto performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Jacinto’s evil intent
cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for
Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched.
ESTAFA
CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016, 29 April 2014
J. Peralta
Novation cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of contract is not an
element. In theft case, there was no contractual relationship or bilateral agreement which can
be modified or altered by the parties (People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, 29 April 1968, En
Banc).In estafa through falsification of public documents, the liability of the offender cannot
be extinguished by mere novation (Milla vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, 25 January 2012).
bank, her employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank accounts of depositors;
and falsification of a commercial document, by forging the signatures of depositor in the
withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the respective
slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes,
because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips.
Other view: If falsification is committed for the purpose of enabling the accused to
commit malversation (People vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs. People,
G.R. No. 176317, 23 July 2014, J. Bersamin) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, 6
August 2014) with less risk of being detected, the accused is liable for complex crime proper.
Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon
C. Aquino in his book on the Revised Penal Code, “The principal distinction between
the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the
property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft even if
the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material
or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the
same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his
conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa.
PEOPLE v. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 163662, 25 February 2015
J. Bersamin
FACTS: Villanueva insists on the absence of fraud when she drew the
postdated checks, averring that: (a) the checks were issued as replacement; (b)
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the checks could only be deposited or encashed after Madarang was notified
of the sufficiency of funds; and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution
failed to embody the real intention of the parties. She argues that estafa under
paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code was not committed
because the checks were not executed prior to or simultaneous with the
alleged fraud; and because Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks.
HELD: Yes.
All the elements of estafa were present. The first element was
admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the checks to
Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she had purchased. There is no
question that Madarang accepted the checks upon the assurance of
Villanueva that they would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that
Madarang would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of valuable
jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless Villanueva gave such
assurance to her. The second element was likewise established because the
checks were dishonored upon presentment due to insufficiency of funds or
because the account was already closed. The third element was also proved
by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure to collect
from Villanueva the balance of ₱995,000.00.
the obligor cannot be prosecuted for estafa because the element of deceit is
lacking. When the payee was informed that the checks are not covered by
adequate funds, bad faith or estafa shall not arise.
Villanueva does not impress. Her defense crumbles because she did
not present proof of the supposed agreement. The receipt signed by her
proved the transaction and her issuance of the postdated checks by listing the
items bought and the postdated checks issued as payment. If the parties
really agreed for Madarang to deposit the checks only after notice of the
sufficiency of funds, then such agreement should have been incorporated in
the receipt as an integral part of the transaction, or simply written in another
document with Madarang's express conformity for Villanueva's protection.
We simply cannot accept that Villanueva signed the receipt despite not
including the supposed agreement that would shield her from probable
criminal prosecution. In that regard, her being a businesswoman presumably
made her aware of the consequences of issuing unfunded checks. All that she
is claiming here is that the receipt did not express the true intention of the
parties, implying that no written document substantiated her alleged defense.
She did not claim at all that she had been coerced or intimidated into signing
the receipt as written. Her self-serving statements on the agreement were
entirely inadequate to establish her assertions, for they were not proof.
The notice of dishonor required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be given to the drawer,
maker or issuer of a check should be written. If the service of the written notice of dishonor
on the maker, drawer or issuer of the dishonored check is by registered mail, the proof of
service consists not only in the presentation as evidence of the registry return receipt but also
of the registry receipt together with the authenticating affidavit of the person mailing the
notice of dishonor. Without the authenticating affidavit, the proof of giving the notice of
dishonor is insufficient unless the mailer personally testifies in court on the sending by
registered mail. (Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, 24 September 2012, J. Bersamin)
For a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove the following
essential elements, namely:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or
for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
there were no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment. (Resterio v. People, G.R. No.
177438, 24 September 2012, J. Bersamin)
In Zafra vs. People (G.R. No. 176317, 23 July 2014, J. Bersamin), there is a big
disparity between the amount covered by receipts issued to the taxpayer, and the amount for
the same receipts in the tax collection reports indicating the falsification resorted to by the
accused in the official reports he filed, thereby remitting less than what was collected from
taxpayers concerned, resulting to the loss of revenue for the government as unearthed by the
auditors. Thus, the accused is liable for complex crime of malversation through falsification
of documents.
MURDER
PEOPLE v. JUGUETA
G.R. No. 202124, 5 April 2016
J. Peralta
HELD: YES. They are equally responsible for the death of Divina's
children because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill
Divina’s family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission
of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common
design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all. Here,
the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of
Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer
22
necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from
appellant's firearm that killed the children.
If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the aggravated form
under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. If the victim accidentally killed is not the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple carnapping and
homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and robbery (People vs. Sia,
G.R. No. 137457, 21 Novenber 2001). Although not punishable under RPC, it can be treated as
a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, 25
January 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which is the direct and natural
consequence of simple carnapping.
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ESTIPONA v. LOBRIGO
G.R. No. 226679, 15 August 2017
J. Peralta
FACTS: After the Prosecution rested its case, accused former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager
Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the
Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were
denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to
show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After the respective motions
for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the
Sandiganbayan, they filed their respective petitions for certiorari.
24
HELD: YES. The special civil action for certiorari is generally not
proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of
the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that “the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the
demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment.”
BPI v. HONTANOSAS
G.R. No. 157163, 25 June 2014
J. Bersamin
25
HELD: No. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction upon the
application of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly
constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of
their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of
the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should
the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the
remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment.
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the
applicant has a right in esse to be protected, and that the acts sought to be
enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary injunction should not
determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a
preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury,
and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
been denied. However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil
Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the
issuance by the RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the
petitioner from instituting criminal complaints for violation of BP No. 22
against the respondents was unwarranted.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
HELD:
1. Yes. It is erroneous for the CA to declare that "it is only at the pre-
trial that the rules allow the courts to render judgment on the pleadings and
summary judgment, as provided by Section 2(g) of Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court." The filing of the motion for summary judgment may be done prior to
the pre-trial. Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court permits a party seeking to
recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or seeking declaratory
relief to file the motion for a summary judgment upon all or any part thereof
in his favor (and its supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions) "at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served;" while Section 2 of
Rule 35 instructs that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may file the motion for
28
2. No. The rule only spells out that unless the motion for such
judgment has earlier been filed, the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the
court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge
may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such
judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by
either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35(Summary Judgment) of
the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the
judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion
for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion.
Even so, the petitioners cannot validly insist that the CA should have
first resolved their Motion for Summary Judgment before holding the pre-trial.
They could not use the inaction on their motion to justify their non-
appearance with their counsel at the pre-trial, as well as their inability to file
their pre-trial brief. In that regard, their appearance at the pre-trial with their
counsel was mandatory.
Requisites:
1. An agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof:
(a) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right
therein, or
(b) unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right;
29
2. there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
(A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8)
If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied
and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal
acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports
detailing the progress and execution of the judgment, and the court may evaluate and
monitor compliance. (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 8, Section 7)
Special Commercial Courts in Quezon City, Manila, Makati, and Pasig shall have
authority to act on applications for the issuance of writs of search and seizure in civil actions
for violations of the Intellectual Property Code, which writs shall be enforceable nationwide.
(A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC, otherwise known as “Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights
Cases,” Rule 2, Section 2)
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, the Special Commercial Courts in the
judicial regions where the violation of intellectual property rights occurred shall have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of search and seizure. (Id.)