IEEE Guide For Motor Control Centers Rated Up To and Including 600 V AC or 1000 V DC With Recommendations Intended To Help Reduce Electrical Hazards

IEEE Guide for Motor Control Centers
Rated up to and including 600 V AC or

1000 V DC with Recommendations
Intended to Help Reduce Electrical
Hazards
IEEE Industry Applications Society
Sponsored by the
Petroleum and Chemical Industry Committee
IEEE
3 Park Avenue IEEE Std 1683™-2014
New York, NY 10016-5997
USA
Authorized licensed use limited to: Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute. Downloaded on August 09,2019 at 13:35:47 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Std 1683™-2014

Hazards
Sponsor
Petroleum and Chemical Industry Committee

of the
IEEE Industry Applications Society
Approved 16 May 2014
IEEE-SA Standards Board
Abstract: Functional design recommendations and field practices for motor control centers
(single- and three-phase 50 Hz and 60 Hz and dc) are provided in this guide. The features and
practices described in this guide are intended to help reduce the probability that an incident will
occur due to shock or arc flash hazards when qualified persons are performing certain activities.
The recommendations within this guide are intended to augment the existing requirements of
applicable standards for motor control centers, e.g., NEMA ICS 18 Motor Control Centers, UL 845
Motor Control Centers, NMX-J-353-ANCE, and CSA C22.2 No. 254. This guide also provides
recommendations for interface relationships between the specifier, manufacturer, installer, and
user for safety-related concerns. It also provides a framework from which specifiers/users can
select specific MCC features and system characteristics that are applicable to their specific
situation and needs.
The recommendations in this guide complement safety requirements and procedures as

stipulated by workplace safety standards and site practices and site procedures, e.g., NFPA 70E
Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Standard,
site practice on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), etc.
Keywords: arc flash, arc resistant, circuit protection, electrical safety, IEEE 1683™, low voltage,
MCC, motor control centers, selectivity, shock, thermal monitoring
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

3 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5997, USA
Copyright © 2014 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

All rights reserved. Published 1 August 2014. Printed in the United States of America.
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Engineers, Incorporated.
National Electrical Code and NEC are both registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Inc.
National Electrical Safety Code and NESC are both registered trademarks and service marks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Inc.
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Participants
At the time this IEEE guide was completed, the Improved Safety and Reliability in Low-Voltage Motor
Control Centers Working Group had the following membership:
Marcelo E. Valdes, Co-Chair

Ben McClung, Co-Chair
Rachel M. Bugaris, Vice Chair
Craig M. Wellman, Secretary
Gabriel Arce Mark Kendall Vince Saporita

Jean Ayoub Ed Larsen Larry Saunders
Terry Becker Robert G. Lau Todd Sauve
Darrell Broussard John McAlhaney Terry L. Schiazza
Mike Bryant L. Bruce McClung Robert L. Seitz
D. Ray Crow Peter Megna George W. Smith
Sonny Dela Jim Mitchem Jeremy Smith
Daniel R. Doan Daleep Mohla Larry Stahl
Paul Dobrowsky Robert Morris Louis Torres
Keith Fager Ari Ojanpera David Tucker
Steve Hansen David Pace Peter Walsh
Erich Heberlein Anthony Propes Kenneth White
John Hempstead Jack Richards Edgar Yee
Tim Rohrer
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this guide. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
William Ackerman Douglas Giraud Ahmad Mahinfallah

Gabriele F. D. Alleva H. Glickenstein Arturo Maldonado
Ilanchezhian Balasubramanian Mietek Glinkowski Frank Mayle
Robert Beavers Randall Groves John McAlhaney, Jr.
Thomas Blair Paul Guidry William McBride
William Bloethe Ajit Gwal Nigel McQuin
Bill Brown Thomas Hawkins Peter Megna
Gustavo Brunello Lee Herron T. David Mills
Michael Bryant Gary Heuston James Mitchem
Rachel Bugaris Scott Hietpas Jeffery Mizener
David Burns Werner Hoelzl Georges Montillet
Ted Burse Ben C. Johnson Jerry Murphy
Eldridge Byron Andrew Jones Paul Myers
Paul Cardinal Harry Josten Daniel Neeser
Keith Chow John Kay Dennis Neitzel
Donald Colaberardino Mark Kendall Michael Newman
Bryan Cole Chad Kennedy Joe Nims
Glenn Davis Tanuj Khandelwal T. Olsen
Daniel Doan Yuri Khersonsky Lorraine Padden
Paul Dobrowsky Royce King K. James Phillips
Carlo Donati Jim Kulchisky Iulian Profir
Gary Donner Saumen Kundu John Rama
Robert Durham Chung-Yiu Lam Daniel Leland Ransom
Marcia Eblen Ed Larsen Michael Roberts
Keith Fager Wei-Jen Lee Thomas Rozek
Keith Flowers Duane Leschert Vincent Saporita
Gary Fox Kevin Lippert Todd Sauve
Carl Fredericks Albert Livshitz Bartien Sayogo
Doaa Galal William Lockley Robert Schuermann
Frank Gerleve Jeffrey Lord Robert Seitz
David Gilmer Greg Luri David Singleton
vi
Copyright © 2014 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Veselin Skendzic Wayne Timm Peter Walsh
Jeremy Smith Louis Torres John Webb
Jerry Smith David Tucker Craig Wellman
Gary Stoedter Eric Udren Kenneth White
Paul Sullivan Marcelo Valdes James Wright
Peter Sutherland John Vergis Edgar Yee
David Tepen Matthew Wakeham Matthew Zeedyk
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this guide on 16 May 2014, it had the following
membership:
John Kulick, Chair

Jon Walter Rosdahl, Vice Chair
Richard H. Hulett, Past Chair
Konstantinos Karachalios, Secretary
Peter Balma Michael Janezic Ron Peterson

Farooq Bari Jeffrey Katz Adrian Stephens
Ted Burse Joseph L. Koepfinger* Peter Sutherland
Clint Chaplain David J. Law Yatin Trivedi
Stephen Dukes Hung Ling Phil Winston
Jean-Phillippe Faure Oleg Logvinov Don Wright
Gary Hoffman Ted Olsen Yu Yuan
Glenn Parsons
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative

Michael Janezic, NIST Representative
Catherine Berger
IEEE-SA Content Publishing
Lisa Perry
IEEE-SA Technical Community
vii
Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 1683-2014, IEEE Guide for Motor Control Centers Rated up to and including
600 V AC or 1000 V DC with Recommendations Intended to Help Reduce Electrical Hazards.
Low-voltage motor control centers (MCCs) are the most widely used control and distribution equipment in
industrial and commercial establishments. The IEEE working group for this guide consisted of dedicated
industry professionals who realize that enhancing the safety of the operating and maintenance personnel
interfacing with low-voltage motor controls centers is paramount.
The working group believes that enhancing safety relies on a combination of system design, product
selection, product design, procedures, training, and other factors based on operation and maintenance
requirements. Every decision in system design, product selection, installation, maintenance activity, usage
activity, procedures, tools, protective equipment, and training of personnel who use and maintain MCCs
can impact the safety of workers who must interface with the equipment for many years after initial
installation. The working group has endeavored create one cohesive document of guidelines to assist users,
system designers, manufacturers of MCCs, and maintenance personnel, as well as others, in making
decisions that may lead to a greater degree of safety surrounding this important type of electrical control
equipment. In many cases, decisions are not clearly incorrect or correct, and readers will need to use
engineering judgment to decide the best course of action to take, for their situation and for their facility.
However, it is hoped that this guide will assist in making better decisions when such judgments must be
made.
The guidelines in this document are strictly voluntary and are not intended to replace mandatory
manufacturing, testing or safety standards, codes or regulations that apply in relevant situations.
Readers who find this document useful, or lacking, are encouraged to participate in future revisions of this
IEEE guide to improve it for future generations of electrical workers.
viii
Contents
1. Overview .................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 General ................................................................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Scope ................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Equipment condition and maintenance ................................................................................................ 3
1.4 Word usage .......................................................................................................................................... 3
2. Normative references.................................................................................................................................. 3
3. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................. 4
4. Overcurrent protection................................................................................................................................ 5
4.1 Fault location ....................................................................................................................................... 5
4.2 Fault current flow ................................................................................................................................ 6
4.3 Likely range of arcing current and impact of overcurrent protective device (OCPD) sensitivity........ 7
4.4 Selectivity versus arc flash incident energy protection ........................................................................ 7
4.5 Use of temporary protection settings ................................................................................................... 8
4.6 Overcurrent protective device (OCPD) selection ................................................................................ 9
5. Defined operations and safety issues ........................................................................................................ 12

5.1 Pulling conductors ............................................................................................................................. 16
5.2 Recommended test for plug-in unit before installation ...................................................................... 16
5.3 Recommendations for inserting units ................................................................................................ 16
5.4 Maintenance with a test position or status to provide control power ................................................. 16
5.5 Maintenance tasks in energized units ................................................................................................ 16
5.6 Overcurrent device maintenance ....................................................................................................... 17
6. Diagnostics and indicators ........................................................................................................................ 17

6.1 Objectives .......................................................................................................................................... 18
6.2 Digital monitoring, control systems, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA),
distributed control system (DCS), etc. ............................................................................................... 18
6.3 Trip status indication ......................................................................................................................... 19
6.4 Determining absence of voltage ........................................................................................................ 19
6.5 Monitoring electrical connections ..................................................................................................... 20
6.6 Status indication for temporary protection settings ........................................................................... 20
7. MCC construction .................................................................................................................................... 21

7.1 Reducing the potential for arcs within the MCC ............................................................................... 21
7.2 Incoming compartment design........................................................................................................... 21
7.3 MCC unit design ................................................................................................................................ 22
7.4 Barriers between fuses ....................................................................................................................... 23
7.5 Isolation between field wireways and units ....................................................................................... 23
7.6 Provisions for infrared thermography ................................................................................................ 24
7.7 Markings ............................................................................................................................................ 24
7.8 Support and dressing of field conductors........................................................................................... 24
7.9 Horizontal and vertical bus assembly ................................................................................................ 24
7.10 Protection from vermin, MCC structure barriers ............................................................................. 25
7.11 Use of arc-resistant designs ............................................................................................................. 25
8. Factory tests .............................................................................................................................................. 26
9. Interface between specifier, manufacturer, installer, and user .................................................................. 26

9.1 Equipment specifier ........................................................................................................................... 26
9.2 Equipment manufacturer ................................................................................................................... 30
ix
9.3 Equipment installer ............................................................................................................................ 31
9.4 Equipment user .................................................................................................................................. 32
Annex A (informative) Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 33
x
Hazards
IMPORTANT NOTICE: IEEE Standards documents are not intended to ensure safety, health, or
environmental protection, or ensure against interference with or from other devices or networks.
Implementers of IEEE Standards documents are responsible for determining and complying with all
appropriate safety, security, environmental, health, and interference protection practices and all
applicable laws and regulations.
This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers.
These notices and disclaimers appear in all publications containing this document and may
be found under the heading “Important Notice” or “Important Notices and Disclaimers
Concerning IEEE Documents.” They can also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at
http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.
1. Overview
This guide provides functional design recommendations for motor control centers (MCCs) intended to help
reduce the likelihood of shock and arc flash injuries. Users are instructed to comply with all safety laws and
regulations applicable to their location, systems, equipment, and operations.
1.1 General
It is not the intent of this guide to encourage or endorse work of any kind on energized equipment; working
on energized equipment is dangerous and can result in death or serious injury. However, it is recognized by
the working group that such work on occasion does transpire for a variety of reasons. Any such work
should only be done by a qualified person in a manner that safeguards persons and property, including
placing the equipment in an electrically safe work condition whenever possible prior to the start of any
work.
1.
IEEE Std 1683-2014
IEEE Guide for Motor Control Centers Rated up to and including 600 V AC or 1000 V DC with Recommendations
Intended to Help Reduce Electrical Hazards
This guide primarily focuses on shock and arc flash hazards and provides recommendations intended to
reduce the probability that an incident will occur due to these hazards. As with any electrical power
equipment, steps should be taken to address these (and other) hazards. The prudent step is always to
remove the hazard. In the case of an energized MCC, this can be done by establishing an electrically safe
working condition and verifying the absence of voltage.1 However, de-energizing equipment may not be
appropriate for certain diagnostic tasks. Workplace safety standards (such as NFPA 70E,2 CSA Z462, and
other equivalent national standards) recognize such tasks that may require MCC doors to be open while
qualified persons work on or near energized conductive components (live parts) under specific situations
where they can be justified. Working on or near energized parts should be a last resort in the workplace,
utilized only after all opportunities for establishing an electrically safe work condition have been exhausted.
Work on energized parts at 50 V or more should only be performed if the employer can demonstrate that
de-energizing will introduce additional hazards or is not feasible due to equipment design or operational
limitations.3
In contrast to the stated work situations recognized by workplace safety standards, the intent of the present
base MCC standards is more restrictive; they are written with the expectation that qualified persons only
perform limited inspection activities near, but in no case perform maintenance activities on, energized
parts. The purpose of this guide is to augment the requirements of the base MCC standards and identify
specific MCC design features and field practices that help reduce the likelihood of shock or internal arcing
faults when qualified persons are performing normal activities on and near energized parts. However, the
design features and field practices described in this guide may not eliminate all potential hazards. It is not
the intent of this guide to enable every user to perform all possible maintenance tasks on or near energized
parts. Rather it is to help enable qualified persons to perform the types of activities described in this guide
with less likelihood of incident or injury.
Thus, when an MCC is manufactured and applied in accordance with the base MCC standards and
augmented with some of the design and application features proposed by this guide, the MCC should be
better equipped for a broader range of activities to be carried out under the requirements of NFPA 70E,
CSA Z462, or other applicable workplace safety standards.
Although features described within this guide provide options that can be selected when specifying an
MCC, not all features within this guide may be available from all manufacturers and some features may be
incompatible with others or not suitable for all situations. Additionally, some of the content of the guide
addresses system design decisions, not equipment or features provided by MCC manufacturers. Therefore,
it is not the intent of this guide to be cited within a specification as a standard for a manufacturer to meet.
Rather, the intent is to provide a guide from which users can select specific MCC features and system
characteristics that are applicable to their specific situation and needs. These equipment features and system
characteristics should be incorporated into the specifications and system design as appropriate.
1.2 Scope
This guide applies to single- and three-phase 50 Hz and 60 Hz MCCs rated not more than 600 V ac or 1000
V dc.
The recommendations within this guide augment the existing requirements of applicable MCC standards
(NEMA ICS 18 and UL 845/ NMX-J-ANCE/CSA C22.2 No. 254, collectively referred to as “base MCC
standards”). In addition, this guide provides recommendations for electrical system design to help improve
safety of the motor control system.
1
This concept is discussed in NFPA 70E.
2
Information on references can be found in Clause 2.
3
NFPA 70E-2012, Article 130.2(A).
2
IEEE Std 1683-2014
The recommendations in this guide should be used in conjunction with safety requirements and procedures
as stipulated by appropriate workplace safety standards, site practices and procedures, and manufacturers’
instructions.
1.3 Equipment condition and maintenance
All information contained in this guide is based on the premise that the existing conditions related to the
equipment and installation are such that the installation
a) Was specified and designed correctly based on the application requirements and in accordance with
applicable codes and standards.
b) Was installed in accordance with applicable codes, standards, and manufacturer’s requirements.
c) Has been correctly operated and maintained since its installation in accordance with applicable
codes, standards, and manufacturer’s requirements.
Given these to be true, it can be reasonably expected that the equipment will function as intended and
without incident, which is the basis for the information in this guide. This guide is further based on the
premise that should any of these conditions prove to be false or absent, the information contained herein
cannot be applied as stated.
1.4 Word usage
From 6.4.7 of the 2013 IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual, the words shall, should, may, and
can mean the following:
The word “shall” indicates mandatory requirements strictly to be followed in order to conform to the
standard and from which no deviation is permitted (shall equals is required to).
The word “should” indicates that among several possibilities one is recommended as particularly
suitable, without mentioning or excluding others; or that a certain course of action is preferred but not
necessarily required (should equals is recommended that).
The word “may” is used to indicate a course of action permissible within the limits of the standard
(may equals is permitted to).
The word “can” is used for statements of possibility and capability, whether material, physical, or
causal (can equals is able to).
2. Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document (i.e., they
should be understood and used, so each referenced document is cited in text and its relationship to this
document is explained). For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the
latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
CANENA Tri-national standards (these three standards are identical, except for language)
⎯ ANCE NMX-J-353-ANCE, Motor Control Centers—Specifications and Test Methods.4

⎯ CSA 22.2 No. 254, Motor Control Centres.5
⎯ UL 845, Motor Control Centers, Underwriters Laboratories.6
4
NMX-J-ANCE is published by La Asociación de Normalización y Certificación, A.C (http://www.ance.org.mx/). Copies are
available at http://www.ance.org.mx.
5
CSA 22.2 No 254 is published by the Canadian Standards Association (http://www.csagroup.org/). Copies are available at
http://shop.csa.ca/.
3
IEEE Std 1683-2014
CSA Z462, Workplace Electrical Safety.7
IEEE Std 1584™, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations.8, 9
NEMA ICS 18, Motor Control Centers.10
NFPA 70, National Electrical Code® (NEC®).11
NFPA 70E, Electrical Safety for Employee Workplaces.
3. Definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The IEEE Standards
Dictionary: Glossary of Terms and Definitions12 should be consulted for terms not defined in this clause.
arc flash: An electrical explosion caused by vaporizing metal and characterized by a plasma ball, extreme
heat and pressure, loud noise, bright light, molten metal splatter, and smoke. A person standing nearby may
be injured or killed. The most common injury is severe burns caused by the intense heat, which can ignite
clothing. This hazardous event is usually initiated by a metallic tool, test probe, under-rated test instrument
or loose equipment part contacting energized bare parts and creating a short circuit or ground fault. The
loose device is propelled out by magnetic forces and draws an arc, initiating the plasma ball.
arc flash boundary: When an arc flash hazard exists, an approach limit at a distance from a prospective
arc source within which a person could receive a second degree burn if an arc flash were to occur.
NOTE—A second degree burn is possible by an exposure of unprotected skin to an electric arc flash above the incident
energy level of 5 J/cm2 (1.2cal/cm2).13, 14
current-limiting overcurrent device: A device that, when interrupting currents in its current-limiting
range, reduces the peak current, and consequently the effective RMS current and let-through energy
flowing in the faulted circuit to a magnitude substantially less than that obtainable in the same circuit if the
device were replaced with a solid conductor having comparable impedance.15
current-limiting range: The prospective fault current range over which a current-limiting overcurrent
device will reduce the current flowing in the faulted circuit to a magnitude substantially less than that
obtainable in the same circuit if the device were replaced with a solid conductor having comparable
impedance.
electrically safe work condition: A state in which an electrical conductor or circuit part has been
disconnected from energized parts, locked/tagged in accordance with established standards, tested to ensure
the absence of voltage, and grounded if determined necessary.13
6
UL 845 is published by Underwriters Laboratories LLC (http://www.ul.com/). Copies are available at http://www.ul.com.
7
CSA Z462 is published by the Canadian Standards Association (http://www.csagroup.org/). Copies are available at
http://shop.csa.ca/.
8
IEEE publications are available from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, NJ
08854, USA (http://standards.ieee.org/).
9
The IEEE standards or products referred to in this clause are trademarks of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
10
NEMA ICS 18 is published by the National Electric Manufacturers association (http://www.nema.org/). Copies are available at
http://www.nema.org/.
11
NFPA 70 is published by the National Fire Protection Association (http://www.nfpa.org/). Copies are available at
http://www.nfpa.org/.
12
IEEE Standards Dictionary: Glossary of Terms and Definitions is available at http://shop.ieee.org.
13
From NFPA 70E-2012.
14
Notes in text, tables, and figures are given for information only and do not contain requirements needed to implement the standard.
15
From NFPA 70 National Electric Code, 2011, Clause 240.2.
4
IEEE Std 1683-2014
finger-safe: Energized terminals or parts cannot be contacted by an IEC articulate probe that is shown in
Figure 10 of UL 845.
motor control center (MCC): A floor-mounted assembly of one or more enclosed vertical sections
typically having a horizontal common power bus and principally containing combination motor-control
units. These units are mounted one above the other in the vertical sections. These sections normally
incorporate vertical buses connected to the common power bus, thus extending the common power supply
to the individual units. Power may be supplied to the individual units by bus bar connections, by stab
connection, or by suitable wiring.16
overcurrent protective device (OCPD): A fuse or circuit breaker.
qualified person: One who has skills and knowledge related to the construction and operation of the
electrical equipment and installations and has received safety training to recognize and avoid the hazards
involved.13
short-circuit protective device (SCPD): A device that may not provide protection from overloads or low-
level ground faults, such as a circuit breaker with only an instantaneous trip; sometimes referred to as an
MCP or motor circuit protector.
zone selective interlocking (ZSI): A method used to improve the response of protective devices in the
event of a fault by allowing upstream devices to react faster to faults within their zone while maintaining
selectivity for faults that occur within the zone of the downstream device. ZSI utilizes a signal between a
downstream overcurrent protective device and an upstream protective device to indicate that the
downstream device has sensed and is reacting to an overcurrent condition. The signal is used by upstream
device to alter a corresponding protective characteristic to a slower response to allow the downstream
device to clear the fault without sacrificing selectivity.
4. Overcurrent protection
Careful selection of the overcurrent protective device (and settings, if applicable) for the MCC bus and
individual units is critical to provide safe and reliable operation of the MCC. Arcing currents can be well
below the bolted fault current and calculated arcing current levels. Low arcing current can lead to longer
arcing durations, resulting in higher than expected incident energy exposure. When considered at the
beginning of the design process, both system reliability and arc flash reduction may be achievable over the
range of all possible currents, not just the maximum available current or calculated arcing current values.
4.1 Fault location
Overcurrent protection is an important part of minimizing the arc flash hazard, particularly in terms of
lowering incident energy for an arc flash event. It is important, when assessing the benefit of a particular
MCC design, to understand whether the conductors on the line side of an overcurrent protective device
(OCPD) may become part of an event that originates on the load side of the device. In situations where that
may be the case, an OCPD further upstream from the device should be recognized as the protective device
that will help limit the fault energy. See Figure 1 for illustrations of arc faults initially occurring on the load
side of an overcurrent devices and potential propagation to the line side of these overcurrent protective
devices. The arc may transfer due to the plasma being formed around the line side of the device by the load
side arc. Once the arc transfers to the line side, the local device is no longer able to interrupt the fault
current and extinguish the arc.
16
From NEMA ICS-18-2001.
5
IEEE Std 1683-2014
Figure 1 — A fault that propagates to the line side of a local protective device requires
the next device upstream to interrupt the current flow
4.2 Fault current flow
When determining which fault current contributes to arc flash incident energy versus which current should
be considered when analyzing overcurrent devices for selectivity it is important to understand current flow
in systems with multiple sources and motor contribution. Current that flows through the distribution
equipment feeder to the MCC main bus will impact both selectivity and arc flash incident energy at the
main bus. Contribution from the motors connected to the same MCC bus may not impact selectivity for a
main locally connected at the MCC bus or the feeder at the power distribution equipment feeding the MCC,
but the motor contribution will contribute to arc flash incident energy. Figure 2 shows a dual source MCC
with local mains powered from two feeders in a dual source substation with an open tie circuit breaker. For
the fault on the left side of the MCC main bus selectivity between the main equipment left main (ML) and
the left feeder (FL), as well as selectivity between ML and the left MCC main, depends on the current from
the left source (IFL). However, the arcing current below the MCC main depends on current from both main
sources (IFL and IFR) and the local motor contribution (IMC).
6
IEEE Std 1683-2014
NOTE—MCC shown without tie device is not a recommended

practice. Use of an MCC without a tie device that is interlocked with
upstream sources mechanically, electronically, or by strict procedures
is not recommended.
Figure 2 —Multi-source MCC with motor contribution
4.3 Likely range of arcing current and impact of overcurrent protective device
(OCPD) sensitivity
Determining potential arcing current is an important step in determining what level of sensitivity is required
for the protective devices selected. IEEE Std 1584 provides equations to determine an arcing current range.
The range recognizes arcing current variance observed in the IEEE 1584 test data that is the basis for the
IEEE 1584 model. However, the arcing current range determined by the IEEE 1584 equations are based on
various assumptions regarding bolted fault current, arcing gap, and system voltage that may introduce
additional sources of variance. It is suggested that users apply engineering judgment to account for
additional variation in arcing current, particularly lower arcing current, which can drive higher incident
energy if the overcurrent device’s response time is significantly slower at the lower arcing current. The
amount of additional variance will depend on system conditions. The IEEE 1584 equations should be
applied conservatively while applying engineering judgment.
4.4 Selectivity versus arc flash incident energy protection
Reduction in incident energy by an OCPD will be dependent on the following three key factors:
⎯ The speed at which the OCPD clears arcing current

⎯ The current-limiting capability of the device
⎯ The ability of the device to detect the arcing current
7
IEEE Std 1683-2014
An overcurrent device that has excellent arc flash mitigating performance at one fault current level may
have significantly reduced performance at a lower (or higher) level. The MCC specifier should take into
account overcurrent device performance over a fault current range starting at the lowest possible arcing
fault levels up to the highest possible arcing current level.
In industrial power distribution systems, selectivity between layers of overcurrent devices is typically
preferred in order to achieve maximum system reliability. Traditionally, this requires that line side devices
closer to the source employ less sensitive settings or ratings and operate slower for any one given value of
overload or fault current. In extreme cases, mains and large feeders in equipment such as low-voltage
power switchgear may be selected without instantaneous protection to achieve selectivity. Such a strategy
results in reduced protection and may result in higher calculated incident energy levels in the event of an
arc flash. The delayed onset of protection may also result in clearing times that exceed the withstand ratings
of the MCC main bus structure if the MCC also contains feeder devices that protect too slowly. To improve
protection and reduce incident energy values it is desirable to use the instantaneous protection function on
every circuit breaker when it is available, or to select and size fuses that are within their current-limiting
range at the arcing currents of interest, and thereby provide better arc flash protection. Traditional time-
current-curve analysis will often result in a perceived lack of selectivity if overcurrent devices have
overlapping instantaneous clearing curves. However, manufacturers have developed selectivity analytical
techniques, instantaneous algorithms, and selectivity tables to provide improved selectivity with
instantaneous protection as well as documented selectivity between devices that may otherwise be
considered non-selective. Optimum use of the published selectivity tables or manufacturer suggested
techniques may allow use of a sufficiently low instantaneous setting on a feeder to an MCC bus to reliably
sense arcing current at the bus, yet provide full selectivity for all, or most, branch devices in the MCC.
Typically such selectivity is facilitated if the branch circuit devices are current limiting. Capabilities may
vary by manufacturer and are subject to frequent improvement. It is suggested that the manufacturer of the
upstream and MCC overcurrent devices be consulted for the most up-to-date information.
Often devices are selected on a continuous current rating and fault current capability. A separate
coordination study and arc flash study is then implemented in an attempt to select settings to achieve
selective coordination and protection. However, separating device selection and sizing from the
coordination and arc flash mitigation analysis may not yield optimal results. When specifying branch and
main devices, the selectivity performance and incident energy mitigation performance should be evaluated
before devices are specified. Different types of devices with equal continuous rating and interrupting rating
may have very different selectivity or incident energy mitigation capability. Arc flash incident energy
control, while at the same time achieving selective coordination, may require adjustments in the system
design, but careful selection of device type and sizes may help reduce or eliminate any compromise.
In recent years, manufacturers have introduced improved circuit breaker trip selectivity and new analytical
techniques to better determine selectivity between circuit breakers and between circuit breakers and fuses
ANSI/IEC 60529-2004 [B1]. In a carefully designed system it may be possible to achieve significant levels
of instantaneous selectivity while still providing instantaneous protection at arcing current level if circuit
size and device selections are made to specifically achieve this goal.
4.5 Use of temporary protection settings
Circuit breakers and protective relays may be available with alternate instantaneous trip or overcurrent
protection settings that can be temporarily enabled for more sensitive or faster protection. The settings may
be activated by a user control or automatic switch based on an external control such as proximity switch,
motion indicator or similar. These controls have various names in industry and are typically utilized while
maintenance or troubleshooting activities are being performed.
When implementing such a scheme, attention should be paid to indication of system protection status.
Employees involved in maintenance activity that utilize temporary protection settings should be able to
control and ascertain the status of that protection at all times. In other words, the controls should be able to
be locked out in the more protective state and status indication should be visible where the work is being
8
IEEE Std 1683-2014
performed. For example, if a feeder in a switchgear line up feeding an MCC has an alternate, more
protective setting, the switch and some indication may be provided in the proximity of the circuit breaker.
Additional status indication should be provided in the proximity of the MCC so personnel working on the
MCC can verify that the enhanced protection is available and operational before and during work tasks.
Indication should positively reflect the status of the protective device’s protection, not the status of the
control signal to the protective device. Positive indication may be provided by the trip unit or relay
providing an indication via a contact closure, or voltage signal that it has altered its protection characteristic
from the normal setting, to the more protective setting. Positive indication of the more protective status
should be provided and should operate similarly, regardless of where the control signal to initiate/cease
protection originated. Work procedures should be carefully crafted to include enabling the more protective
condition before the start of the task, and disabling after the end of the task so that reliable system operation
is restored after all personnel are no longer at risk. When a procedure is used as a safety measure while
performing a task on energized equipment or circuits over 50 V, it is important that the procedure be
properly documented, personnel be qualified to perform the task, and required shock and arc flash PPE is
worn. When implementing an “administrative procedure” as a safety measure, it is important to take human
factors into consideration, properly document the procedure, and incorporate the procedure in required
maintenance or operational tasks. A manually activated switch that initiates a temporary protection setting
is an example of an administrative procedure. While this may be a valuable feature to provide, the user is
reminded that most occupational health and safety regulations prefer safety by engineering design to safety
by administrative procedure.
To maintain reliable plant operation it is important that the temporarily enhanced protection be set to
normal mode when the maintenance activity is finished. Annunciation of protection status should also be
designed to catch the attention of operating personnel that may not be directly involved in the maintenance
activity so they know that the system is operating in its protective mode versus its normal operating mode.
4.6 Overcurrent protective device (OCPD) selection
For typical industrial systems, smaller molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs), operating in their
instantaneous range, and current-limiting fuses, operating in their current-limiting range, tend to limit
incident energy to 1.2 cal/cm2 or less. Larger low-voltage power circuit breakers (LVPCBs) operating
instantaneously often interrupt in 3 cycles or less, limiting incident energy to 8 cal/cm2 or less in many
cases. Careful selection of overcurrent device such that they operate as fast as possible in the expected
arcing current range is important to reducing possible incident energy, all else being equal.
Some circuit breakers and motor circuit protectors (MCPs) may have arc flash mitigation capability defined
by manufacturer-based testing. Where such performance is determined by the manufacturer, the range of
instantaneous operation for the device should be compared with the potential arcing fault current range
expected so that the device can operate quickly at the lowest calculated arcing current values and hence
provide the desired arc flash incident energy mitigating effect. Overcurrent devices labeled as current
limiting usually provide good incident energy mitigation; however, it is important to use the manufacturer’s
recommended arc flash incident energy assessment method, or the recommendations in IEEE Std 1584 to
verify acceptable performance. Many smaller molded case circuit breakers, not marked as current limiting,
provide current-limiting performance or sufficiently fast protection to significantly mitigate arc flash
incident energy. When implementing specific devices it may be of value to consult the manufacturer to
understand the level of protection provided by the specific devices and likely replacements. Consideration
should be given to availability of the correct spare devices in case OCPD replacements (fuses or circuit
breakers) are needed on a rush basis.
Whenever possible, devices should be selected to provide the desired degree of protection at the expected
arcing currents. To achieve this it is important to know, or at least have a good estimate of, minimum and
maximum expected bolted fault current. The overcurrent protection devices and system selected should
provide the desired degree of protection at both ends of the expected arcing current range defined by IEEE
Std 1584 based on the expected bolted fault range. Refer to 4.3 for additional considerations.
9
IEEE Std 1683-2014
4.6.1 Main bus protection
Protection of the MCC main bus depends on the OCPD providing power to the MCC. In the case where a
main overcurrent device is provided within the MCC it will determine, in part, the protection level of the
bus on its load side, given at least the limitations discussed above. The feeder OCPD upstream from the
MCC determines line side protection of the main OCPD at the MCC. Use of an instantaneous circuit
breaker or current-limiting fuse protection at a main located on the MCC bus or the feeder in the
distribution equipment feeding the MCC is desirable. When the overcurrent devices for the MCC loads and
the power distribution equipment feeding the MCC are selected, it is important to consider selectivity
requirements as well as desired arc flash incident energy performance simultaneously. The use of
manufacturer’s selectivity tables, other selectivity data, zone selective interlocking, switched temporary
enhanced protection, or other methods manufacturers offer may result in a system that provides both
acceptable incident energy levels and selective coordination.
It is generally best if the overcurrent protection device is able to interrupt current from an arcing fault
within the instantaneous or current-limiting range of the device. For LVPCBs that often is about 3 cycles at
60 Hz. Large MCCBs (typically larger than 600 A, but may vary by manufacturer) may be able to clear in
about 1.5 cycles and current-limiting devices such as fuses or small (typically 600 A or below, but may
vary by manufacturer) current-limiting molded case circuit breakers may clear in less than ½ cycle. Many
of the faster devices may have manufacturer provided incident energy transfer functions. For industrial
power systems where fault currents are below 65 kA it is reasonable to expect that incident energy can be
kept below 8 cal/cm2 at the main bus, as long as the arcing current is large enough to operate the OCPD
within its instantaneous or current-limiting range (see Figure 3).
Cal/cm2, various clearing times, 480V, HRG, 32mm,

18", Arc in Box
10 0.008 seconds 0.025 seconds
0.05 seconds 1.2 Cal/Cm2
4 Cal/Cm2 8 Cal/Cm2
6
Cal/cm2
0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Ibf
Figure 3 —Relationship between incident energy and bolted fault current for various
clearing times17
Additional improvements in primary protection or backup protection may be achieved by the use of zone-
selective interlocking between overcurrent devices in the MCC and the feeder to the MCC, use of
temporary settings as described in 4.5, or even the use of shunt impedance arc flash mitigation devices such
17
Calculated according to IEEE Std 1584-2002. Assumptions: 480 V, high resistance ground, open box configuration, 25 mm gap
between electrodes, working distance of 455 mm.
10
IEEE Std 1683-2014
as an earthing, grounding, or shorting switch18 or similar apparatus able to quickly close under fault
conditions.
When making OCPD sizing and selection decisions one should consider scenarios throughout the life of the
MCC. Overcurrent protection should be selected to provide the best possible protection during normal
operation, diagnostic, and maintenance activities.
4.6.1.1 MCC bus withstand ratings
MCC bus short-circuit withstand ratings are usually three cycles. MCC with longer withstand ratings may
be made available by manufacturers as an optional offering. However, MCC buses are not required, by
standard, to achieve the 30 cycle rating that is required in low-voltage switchgear standards, such as IEEE
Std C37.20.1 [B9]. Hence if LVPCBs without instantaneous protection in switchgear are used to protect an
MCC, the MCC bus may not be fully protected. This may be a major consideration where the MCC is close
coupled to switchgear in a configuration that allows through faults to flow through the MCC bus to feeders
without instantaneous protection at the feeders. Solutions include using instantaneous protection in the
main protecting the MCC, specifying current-limiting main or upstream feeder protective devices, or
procuring an MCC with sufficient short-circuit withstand for the application. Manufacturers may test MCC
for additional withstand over and above the minimum requirements in the applicable MCC standards;
however, faster protection is generally more desirable than higher withstand.
4.6.2 Starter and feeder protection within the MCC
Most MCCs are composed of small loads rated 600 A or less. Generally, small motor circuit protectors
(MCPs) and molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs) are relatively fast in their instantaneous range. Incident
energy performance calculations should be based on the published curves and IEEE Std 1584, or
manufacturer’s incident energy transfer function if provided. For both current-limiting fuses and circuit
breakers, manufacturers may provide arc flash incident energy mitigation performance data that may be
better than what the default IEEE 1584 methodology would provide. However, when the manufacturer does
not provide such data the IEEE 1584 methods should be used. Generally, the lower the current rating of the
overcurrent device and the faster the device is in the likely arcing current range, the better the arc flash
incident energy mitigation capability will be.
In the case of larger overcurrent devices (typically 600 A and greater, but may vary by manufacturer),
similar techniques to those considered for the main may be required. Again it is possible that manufacturers
have provided arc flash incident energy performance data on specific devices at each size. That data, along
with selectivity capabilities, should be considered.
4.6.3 Motor protection
The NEC allows the size of the motor branch-circuit short-circuit and ground-fault protective devices for
squirrel cage, Design B, (energy-efficient) motors to be set very high relative to full load current. The NEC
maximums are not required or recommended sizing, just the maximum allowed. Protection may be lower if
the circuit and application allow it.
The user may select lower ratings or settings for protective devices to help reduce the potential for injuries
if an arc flash occurs. In many applications, devices sized to 125% of the full load current may be sufficient
to allow the motor to start and run normally while providing better protection than if the code allowed
maximum is used. Using minimum-sized fuses or circuit breakers can sometimes result in nuisance tripping
forcing the use of larger devices to obtain reliable operation. A smaller, faster OCPD may help improve
18
Alternate arc flash mitigation devices such as fast-acting earthing, grounding, or shorting switches (sometimes referred to as
crowbars) or other shunt energy absorption devices help provide protection by quickly providing an alternate current path when the
control system senses that an arc flash is present. Light, current, or other means, including a combination of sensing methods, may
drive the control system. Use of these devices is possible for arc flash hazard mitigation for some MCC buses.
11
IEEE Std 1683-2014
protection as well as facilitate selectivity. Refer to “Motor Terminal Box Explosions Due to Faults” [B4]
for additional information on arcing faults that have occurred with motors.
If faster acting, smaller OCPD are selected for motor circuits and other branch circuits, then faster acting,
lower rated OCPD MCC mains and switchgear feeder OCPD can be selected. The size and type of branch
circuit protector in the larger MCC circuits can become the prime determinants of system selectivity and
arc flash protection if it is desired to obtain both types of performance simultaneously.
5. Defined operations and safety issues

Part of NFPA 70E and CSA Z462 is the development of work standards and training for performing
defined operations.
At all times careful consideration should be given to the exact activity that may expose a worker to arc
flash hazard or other safety risk. Arc flash incident energy calculations do not take into account other
effects such as arc-blast or hazards caused by MCC starters that may not be fully inserted and secured,
doors or panels that may be affected by pressure build-up inside a small enclosure, etc. The severity of the
consequence of an event (estimated by incident energy calculations), as well as the opportunity for harm
(related to how often the task is performed), and the likelihood of the task causing an incident all contribute
to the total hazard workers are exposed to for a given task.
When specifying an MCC design, the ultimate goal should be to enable operation and maintenance of the
MCC with minimum exposure to potential shock and arc flash hazards. Table 1 illustrates how some design
features can be utilized to help reduce exposure to these hazards during common tasks.
The scenarios described in Table 1 are for informational purposes. NFPA 70E, CSA Z462, and other
appropriate work practices and procedures must always be followed.
12
IEEE Std 1683-2014
IEEE Guide for Motor Control Centers Rated up to and including 600 V AC or 1000 V DC with Recommendations Intended to Help Reduce Electrical Hazards
Table 1 —Defined operations and exposure

Unit state (energized or de-energized), Status of SCPD,
Exposure to possible arc flash Refer to
Task application considerations, and design OCPD, or Door position Exposure to voltage19
will usually require PPE clause
options disconnect
1. Turn disconnect on and off Energized or de-energized Opened or Closed Closed No No20
2. Start or stop motor Energized Closed Closed No Yes (unless standing outside arc flash
boundary)
3. Reset motor overload Energized Closed Closed No No20
Energized or de-energized—look at handle to

see its position. If cause for the trip has been Closed,
eliminated and the circuit is safe to energize Tripped then opened for No, if line side barrier is in place and
4. Determine if breaker has tripped21 inspection Yes 6.3
then it may be reset. OCPD/SCPD condition if no testing is performed.
should be verified before resetting if trip was
due to short circuit. Reset After closing
Yes, but only to verify the disconnect Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
De-energized—continuity tests and fuse is off, to verify the line side barrier is off, to verify the line side barrier is in
5. Determine if fuses have blown21 Opened Opened 6.3
replacement may be required. in place, and to determine absence of place, and to determine absence of
voltage in the unit voltage in the unit
6. Test for absence of voltage De-energized Opened Opened Yes Yes 6.4
7. Visual inspection with door open Energized Closed Opened Yes Yes
8. Infrared scan with door open Energized Closed Opened Yes Yes 6.5.1
19
Shock protection PPE is required.
20
If an employee is within the arc flash boundary, exposure to a possible arc flash exists unless the equipment is rated as arc resistant. Consider the following:
a) NFPA 70E-2012 130.7(A) Informational Note No. 2 states, “It is the collective experience of the Technical Committee on Electrical Safety in the Workplace that normal operation of enclosed electrical equipment,
operating at 600V or less, that has been properly installed and maintained by qualified persons is not likely to expose the employee to an electrical hazard.”
b) When a withdrawable MCC unit is removed for maintenance and then reinstalled in a de-energized MCC, arc flashes may occur on the initial energization of the MCC or initial closing of the unit disconnect due to
bent stabs not making proper connections on the buses.
c) Any interaction with equipment involves the risk of an incident. The potential severity of the incident, as well as the potential likelihood of an incident, drives control measures including the level of PPE used.
Ultimately, the decisions of when to use, or not use, PPE and degree of PPE depends on the hazard assessment made for the particular situation by qualified employees following applicable standards, manufacturer’s
recommendations, and company procedures.
21
Refer to NEMA ICS 2-2000 Annex A for recommended “Maintenance of Motor Controllers After a Fault Condition” [B11].
13
IEEE Std 1683-2014
options disconnect
9. Infrared scan through window
suitable and listed for the application.
Note that IR windows may be rated as
Energized Closed Closed No No20, 22, 23 6.5.1
“arc resistant” when covered, but may
not be arc resistant when crystal is
exposed for use.
Yes, but only to determine absence of Yes, but only to determine absence of
a) Bus de-energized Opened Opened or Closed
voltage on bus voltage on bus
b) Bus energized—Withdrawable stabs

provided so unit stabs can be disconnected
10. Remove or install units Yes, but only to determine absence of
from bus by withdrawal into unit and then Opened Opened or Closed Yes
voltage in the unit
unit can be withdrawn. Unit stored with stabs
in a protected position.
c) Bus energized—Stabs protected by
Opened Opened or Closed Yes Yes
guarding when unit is not in MCC.
Yes, but only to verify the disconnect Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
11. Installing temporary Unit energized (de-energize to attach CTs or is off and the line side barrier is in off and the line side barrier is in place,
Opened Opened
instrumentation ammeter). place, and to determine absence of and to determine absence of voltage in
voltage in the unit the unit
Yes, but only to determine absence of Yes, but only to determine absence of
12. Test motor insulation resistance Unit de-energized. Opened Opened
voltage in the unit voltage in the unit
a) De-energized if no electronic device Yes, to verify the disconnect is off Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
13. Troubleshoot to find defective requires control power for troubleshooting. and the line side barrier is in place, off and line side barrier is in place, and
device or wiring in unit or field by: (Perform operation tests by operating contacts and to determine the absence of to determine the absence of line voltage
Opened Opened
- continuity tests by hand where possible.) voltage in the unit. in the unit.
- ground fault tests
- operation tests Then No. Then, No.
b) Energized if electronic devices outside unit
require power for operation or if energized Closed Open Yes Yes
troubleshooting is preferred.
Line Voltage
Yes, to verify the disconnect is off Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
c) Same situation, energized, but with test and the line side barrier is in place, off and line side barrier is in place, and
position provided. This allows and to determine the absence of to determine the absence of line voltage
Opened Opened voltage in the unit. 5.2
troubleshooting of electronic devices that in the unit.
require power to operate. Then No.
Control Voltage Then, No.
Yes
22
Refer to Footnote 20 and consider that an arc flash usually initiated as a result of human interaction inside the equipment. In this case, no one is interacting with the equipment.
23
Hazard may exist if equipment is not properly installed and maintained. Refer to 1.3 for additional considerations. In addition; “All energized electrical equipment presents a hazard. Consensus is that equipment in proper
operating condition—properly installed and maintained per codes and manufacturer’s instructions—presents less risk than equipment not meeting these conditions. Any interaction with equipment involves the risk of an
incident. The potential severity of the incident, as well as the potential likelihood of an incident, drives control measures including the level of PPE used. Ultimately the decision of when to use, or not use PPE, and degree of
PPE used depends on the hazard assessment made for the particular situation by qualified individuals following applicable standards, company procedures, and manufacturer’s recommendations.
14
IEEE Std 1683-2014
options disconnect
Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
Yes, to verify the disconnect is off
d) Same situation, de-energized in unit if off and line side barrier is in place, and
and the line side barrier is in place,
electronic devices in field that require control to determine the absence of line voltage
Opened Opened and to determine the absence of
power for troubleshooting are supplied from in the unit.
voltage in the unit.
panelboard or separate source.
Then No.
Then, No.
Line Voltage
e) Same situation, energized in unit if
Yes, to verify the disconnect is off
electronic devices in field that require control Yes, but only to verify the disconnect is
and the line side barrier is in place,
power for troubleshooting are supplied from off and line side barrier is in place, and
and to determine the absence of
panelboard or separate source. Separate to determine the absence of line voltage
Opened Opened voltage in the unit.
source of control power energizes some MCC in the unit.
Then No.
13. Troubleshoot to find defective unit wiring but warning label on door states,
device or wiring in unit or field by: “This unit is energized from two sources of Control Voltage Then, No.
- continuity tests power.” Yes
- ground fault tests
- operation tests Yes, to verify that line side barrier is
Yes, but only to determine barriers are
in place and all load side energized
present to prevent contact by an IEC
terminals are guarded by barriers to
f) Energized if electronic devices such as articulate probe (finger) with any
prevent contact by an articulated
variable speed drive controls that require Closed Opened energized terminals as defined in UL
finger per UL 845-2005, 8.1.8.2. 24
power for tuning are provided. 845-2005 8.1.8.2 Note.
Then, still exposed to voltage, but
Then, No.
probability of an incident is reduced.
Table 1 — Defined operations and exposure (continued)
24
For these applications UL 845 Clause 8.1.8.2 allows for guarding of energized load side terminals to prevent contact by an IEC articulate probe (finger). This optional guarding reduces the likelihood of a safety incident but
does not eliminate it. See figure 10, pg. 120 UL 845-2005.
15
IEEE Std 1683-2014
5.1 Pulling conductors
Pulling conductors within an energized MCC is strongly discouraged. This is a common cause of electrical
injuries. If really necessary, consideration should be given to the direction of pull, based on MCC
configuration, motor location, and conditions surrounding both ends of the pull. A non-conductive fish tape
or similar precautions should be used.
5.2 Recommended test for plug-in unit before installation
After performing maintenance on a plug-in unit or prior to installing a unit of unknown condition (such as
those that may have been in storage for long periods of time), a high-potential or insulation resistance test
should be performed to check for short circuits or degradation of insulation, before it is installed on the
MCC bus.
Different starter designs may offer less or more protection to line side connections and hence manufacturer
recommendations may vary in this regard. Risk of a compromised connection mechanism or dielectric
deterioration during maintenance or storage should be mitigated via appropriate tests and inspection.
5.3 Recommendations for inserting units
If available, manufacturer’s instructions for the recommended insertion procedure should be reviewed.
Before installing the unit, the user should inspect the stabs to check that they are not bent and properly
aligned before inserting the unit into the MCC structure.
The MCC unit should be inserted in such a way to avoid inadvertent mechanical damage or misalignment
that would impair the electrical characteristics of the stab-to-bus connection while an MCC unit is being
plugged into an open cell of an MCC structure.
5.4 Maintenance with a test position or status to provide control power
If control power is required for troubleshooting, the hazardous exposures may be reduced by providing a
test position status that allows testing of control circuitry at control voltage levels without exposure to
higher line side voltage. The MCC unit can then be described to have a fully engaged, operational, or
connected condition, a test position or status where only control level voltage is present and a fully
disengaged or disconnected position. If possible, it is recommended that the unit be locked in test position
while troubleshooting.
If units are to be removed and replaced while the MCC is energized, a test or fully disengaged position,
which removes motor power from the unit and protects the stabs while the unit is out of the MCC, and
allows disconnection of the stabs from the bus and reconnection in a tightly controlled manor. This greatly
reduces the hazardous exposure.
5.5 Maintenance tasks in energized units
Work is to be performed in a de-energized state, whenever possible. Most, if not all of the troubleshooting
described below should be able to be accomplished via serial or Ethernet communications or external
control devices.
Maintenance activities in energized units may include the following:
⎯ Repeated resetting of timers
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
⎯ Tuning of variable speed drive controls

⎯ Diagnostic tests or troubleshooting where it is required or preferred to be done while the unit is
energized
For units where it is expected that energized work will be performed in the unit with the line voltage and/or
a control voltage of 50 V or higher present, a barrier and/or IP20 [B1] terminals should be provided to
prevent accidental contact with energized parts. Where IP20 terminals are too small for the lugs, plug in,
easily-removable and replaceable barriers should be provided
MCC unit control power less than 50 V may be desirable because this helps reduce the hazard on the
terminals on which employees are most likely to be working. NFPA 70E states, “energized electrical
conductors and circuit parts that operate at less than 50 V to ground are not required to be de-energized
where the capacity of the source and any overcurrent protection between the energy source and the worker
are considered and it is determined that there will be no increased exposure to electrical burns due to
electric arcs.”
5.6 Overcurrent device maintenance
The user should recognize any limitations or requirements associated with the overcurrent protection to
achieve optimum arc flash incident energy mitigation. Uncontrolled changes in circuit breaker settings,
circuit breaker or fuse replacement, or any other change to the system that affects overcurrent protective
device performance can have an undesirable effect on arc flash incident energy mitigation performance.
Changes, natural or manmade, in insulating materials can affect dielectric performance. Before initiating
any maintenance or operating activity that may place personnel in a hazardous situation the system’s proper
condition should be verified.
Overcurrent and switching devices such as molded case circuit breakers (MCCB), low-voltage power
circuit breakers (LVPCB), fused switches, and contactors require regular maintenance. Manufacturer
recommended practices, in some cases modified to suit environmental considerations, should be strictly
followed. Proper operation of overcurrent devices and switching devices is important to achieving optimum
arc flash incident energy mitigation performance. Similarly it is important that proper operation of all
critical electronics, sensing and communication be verified prior to depending on it to provide proper
operation at a critical moment.
For all devices that provide a critical part of the arc flash or safety measures in an MCC it is important to
have access to the correct replacement parts. Whether indicating lights, fuses, or circuit breakers, it is
important that systems be properly maintained and any component that requires replacement be replaced
with one providing equal or improved performance.
6. Diagnostics and indicators

During the course of maintenance activities, it is possible that employees may be exposed to energized
conductors, which involve shock and arc flash hazards. If activity requires access to energized conductors
for voltage measurement, status indication, or takes place in the proximity of energized conductors, it is
imperative that all possible guards against accidental contact be in place and appropriate PPE is worn.
Specific tasks, the access needed for them, and means to help reduce the hazards are discussed in this
clause.
Even when MCC doors and panels are closed it is possible that an arc flash hazard exists for people
working on the equipment within the arc flash boundary. Should an arcing fault occur and panels are not
able to contain the effects of the arcing fault, a risk of injury due to an arc flash event would be present.
Having enough distance to be outside of the arc flash boundary, using arc-resistant equipment of sufficient
withstand, or suitable PPE is preferred.
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6.1 Objectives
The following provides recommendations for enhanced features that may help address and mitigate the risk
associated with performing diagnostic activities while the MCC is energized.
Diagnostic activities include testing for the absence of voltage, examination, adjustment, servicing,
maintenance, and troubleshooting. These activities may be necessary when a specific incident arises and
de-energizing the MCC is not practical to investigate the problem.
At no time is maintenance activity on energized equipment preferable over maintenance activity on de-
energized equipment. NFPA 70E states, “Energized electrical conductors and circuit parts to which an
employee might be exposed shall be put into an electrically safe work condition before an employee
works….” Whenever possible all maintenance activity should be carried out with the equipment in an
electrically safe state and following all safety procedures recommended by the applicable workplace safety
standards, such as NFPA 70E and CSA Z462, and manufacturer’s recommendations.
6.1.1 Minimize the time a door is opened
Hazards are present whenever a MCC compartment door is opened while the equipment is energized.
Therefore the primary safety design goal is to help minimize exposure to these hazards. This can be
accomplished by, among other things, providing the information that employees need either on the front of
the door or elsewhere, outside the unit. Generally, the more information that is available remotely or from
MCC door-mounted instrumentation, the less need to diagnose or test the circuitry or devices while
exposed to energized conductors. Remote location for metering and diagnostic information is preferred as a
person reading instrumentation on a MCC front may still be within the arc flash boundary for that
equipment, or other equipment nearby.
Implementation of diagnostic indicators, inspection windows, displays, and other tools that allow remote or
local operation and troubleshooting of an MCC unit without exposing personnel to energized conductors
should be considered a best practice. Characteristics described in this subclause are intended to provide
guidance on features that are available in the industry to facilitate specific trouble shooting activities with
the MCC unit door closed. However, additional capabilities not mentioned in this list may be provided by
manufacturers that offer other valuable capabilities to diagnose the MCC unit and associated wiring,
controls, and loads.
The goal of these recommendations is to enable the functional status of a MCC unit and associated circuits,
to be determined by providing indication of the status of components and motor conditions outside the
units.
6.2 Digital monitoring, control systems, supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA), distributed control system (DCS), etc.
Well-planned uses of serial communications can significantly simplify and empower operations as well as
troubleshooting, and can significantly reduce wiring needs with commensurate reduction in wiring
complexity and possibly reducing potential failure points with associated reduction in maintenance needs.
Serial communication facilitates implementation of remote controls, instrumentation, and diagnostics.
Providing a networked system where MCC unit and circuit information is transmitted to a digital
monitoring and/or control system is an effective way to help reduce the work to be done with the door open
and the unit energized (Blair, et al. [B2]). The monitoring system can report starter operations, trips, motor
load, overload settings, control power status, and/or other conditions that can help reduce or eliminate
troubleshooting time within the unit. If a networked system is not implemented, there are alternate means to
obtain information from an electronic starter monitor without the need to open the unit and expose
personnel to energized conductors. A local display that connects with all the units in the MCC or displays
on each individual unit can be used for control, monitoring, or diagnostics. If individual displays are
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
deemed too costly, the unit information can be presented to a portable display through a door mounted
plug, wirelessly, or in any other manner that allows maximum access to useful information without the
need to interface with energized conductors or circuits. In addition, manufacturers may offer ways to
connect portable display devices or computers to assist in diagnostics and monitoring of the unit and
associated circuitry. Capabilities vary widely by manufacturer and are frequently updated.
6.3 Trip status indication
Door mounted pilot lights, external mechanical indication, or internal indicators can be used to simplify
diagnostic work. They may include, but are not limited to, indicators for the following:
⎯ Circuit breaker trip

⎯ Ground fault protection trip
⎯ Overload relay trip
⎯ Blown fuse indication for line fuses
⎯ Motor running indication
6.4 Determining absence of voltage
Voltage testing is an integral part to any electrical safety program. Workplace safety standards, such as
NFPA 70E and CSA Z462, require employees to establish an electrically safe working condition before
doing any work on or near energized equipment parts. Absence of voltage should be confirmed after lock-
out/tag-out and when returning to a task after being absent from the work area. Equipment should be
assumed to be energized and the appropriate personnel protective equipment (PPE) must be donned until
the absence of voltage has been confirmed.
Part of that task involves verifying the absence of voltage by using a voltage tester to test each phase
conductor or circuit part to verify that it is de-energized. A voltage tester is an instrument, usually portable,
which senses the presence of voltage in a reliable way. Using the wrong voltage tester (meter) can result in
equipment and or personnel injury; therefore, the tester should be rated for the equipment and working
properly. Each phase conductor or circuit part must be tested both phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground.
Testers should be tested before and after each use on a confirmed voltage source to verify proper operation.
Verifying absence of voltage exposes employees to possible shocks and arc flashes, so minimizing those
risks are important. The accepted means of testing per NFPA 70E and CSA Z462 is with a voltage tester.
The probes of the voltage tester must be applied to test points. The test points should be accessible without
removing barriers. Test probe access holes in barriers should be finger safe and meet the requirements of
IP20 (ANSI/IEC 60529-2004 [B1]).
Means should be provided to determine absence of voltage:
⎯ On MCC incoming lugs or line side lugs of main OCPD

⎯ On load side of main OCPD
⎯ On line side of unit SCPD or OCPD (verification that the stabs have disengaged from the bus)
⎯ On load side of unit SCPD or OCPD
⎯ On terminals of any separate control power source—control power bus or other external power
source
Depending on a digital monitoring system to determine absence of voltage for energized work is prohibited
by NFPA 70E and CSA Z462. However, using permanently placed indicators can provide a preliminary
indication and may assist maintenance personnel. Ultimately, absence of voltage must be ascertained by the
procedures described in NFPA 70E or CSA Z462.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
6.5 Monitoring electrical connections
Electrical connections that are not welded or made in such a way that high reliability makes periodic testing
unnecessary may require periodic inspection. Targets for inspection may include power cable connections,
fuses, circuit breakers, starters, overload relays, and bus connections.
It may be necessary to check for tightness and consequently tighten any of the power connections described
above. System design and layout should facilitate access to any areas that require connections to be
tightened or replaced when the system is appropriately de-energized.
6.5.1 Infrared thermography
“Thermography has been shown to improve reliability in electrical equipment, including motor control
centers.” (Epperly, Heberlein, and Eads [B5].) Infrared (IR) thermography has proven to be a reliable
method of detecting overheated electrical connections and devices. For further discussion on IR
thermography, see NFPA 70B, sections 11.17.1 and 11.17.5 [B12].
IR data is most useful when obtained from energized equipment under significant load and requires targets
to be accessible via a direct line of sight. Inspections can be performed by opening enclosure doors or
panels to access IR targets; however it is also possible to perform closed panel inspections when IR
windows or ports are installed in the external sheet metal of the MCC, which may help reduce exposure to
energized conductors. The closed panel IR inspection process is preferred and should be used where
possible and practical.
Specifiers should advise manufacturers if they intend to perform IR inspections so that potential targets and
IR windows or ports are located to facilitate closed panel inspection. Refer to 7.6 for additional
construction considerations.
6.5.2 Permanent monitoring systems
Permanently installed systems can be used to sense internal temperature or local temperature rise, monitor
connections, and identify hot spots. These systems typically allow maintenance activities involved in the
detection of hot spots and loose connections to be performed remotely, reducing potential hazards and
exposures. Permanent monitoring systems may require intelligent (MCC with electronic monitoring, data
processing, and communications) or networked MCCs.
Third-party vendors (not the MCC manufacturer) may provide alternative methods for temperature sensing
and monitoring. Although these systems may be quite functional and high quality, they are typically
installed after the MCC has shipped to the customer. Equipment modifications not supported by the
manufacturer of the equipment may have unintended consequences on equipment performance. If this is a
concern, equipment manufacturers and the third-party provider should be consulted to determine if the
system is suitable for installation in that particular equipment.
6.6 Status indication for temporary protection settings
Where an energy-reducing maintenance function is provided on the main breaker or the upstream feeder
circuit breaker to reduce available arc flash incident energy at the MCC bus, 240.87 of the 2011 version of
the NEC, requires that a local indication of a “maintenance mode of protection” be provided. Indication
should be easily verifiable to maintenance personnel working on the MCC. It is preferable that the
indication provide positive status of the protection instead of only status of the control switch for the
improved protection. It is suggested that the energy-reducing maintenance switch be lockable and included
in energy control procedures.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
7. MCC construction
7.1 Reducing the potential for arcs within the MCC
Accidental contact with energized conductors or components can create a shock and/or arc flash hazard. To
help reduce the potential for accidental contact with bus bars and other energized parts of the equipment, it
is recommended that adequate insulation, isolation, compartmentalization, spacing, or guarding is used
where accidental contact may be otherwise likely.
Furthermore, an arc initiated in one area of the equipment can propagate within the same compartment
(from load to supply side of protective device) or adjacent compartment if energized conductors are
exposed and come in contact with the conductive plasma caused by the initial arc. Designs or features that
prevent propagation or encourage the arc to extinguish, such as insulation, compartmentalization, adequate
spacing, or other appropriate means should be considered in areas where arc propagation is a concern.
Manufacturers should be encouraged to add features that minimize the possibility of accidental contact and
arc propagation within equipment. However, users should not alter their behavior or work practices due to
the expectation that any part of the equipment is completely free from the possibility of accidental arcs or
arc propagation.
7.2 Incoming compartment design
7.2.1 Incoming compartment with main OCPD
Where a main OCPD is provided within the MCC, the area between the line side of the OCPD to the
incoming conductors should be designed in such a way that the potential for an arc to occur is minimized
(see 7.1). Barriers should be provided to isolate this area from the rest of the compartment, to help reduce
the likelihood of an arc occurring or propagating.
Provisions should be provided to allow line side testing for absence of voltage without requiring the
removal of barriers or guards.
In the event of an arc flash, these features will not reduce the severity or amount of incident energy that
could be released. The main OCPD within the MCC could fail, requiring the upstream OCPD to clear the
fault—perhaps after a time delay intended to maintain selectivity. However, these features do help reduce
the likelihood of an arc flash since most arcing faults occur due to loose parts or tools contacting bare,
energized parts.
7.2.2 Incoming compartment without main OCPD
Where no OCPD is provided [i.e., main lug only (MLO)], line side terminals and any exposed power bus
should be protected from accidental contact with a barrier or insulation system.
Provisions should be provided to allow line side testing for absence of voltage without requiring the
removal of barriers or guards.
In the event of an arcing fault in the incoming compartment of an MCC, the MLO configuration with a
current-limiting upstream OCPD may result in lower levels of incident energy than a similar MCC with the
current-limiting OCPD located in the incoming compartment. This is because a fault could occur on the
line side of the OCPD in the incoming compartment, or the ionized plasma from an arc on the load side
could flash over and create a secondary fault on the line side. This will require the next upstream device to
clear the fault, which may result in longer arcing durations and higher incident energy levels.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
7.2.3 Connections to power bus
Connection from the load side of the main disconnect or OCPD or from the line side lugs, where no
disconnect or OCPD is provided, to the riser bus should be insulated or guarded to help reduce the
likelihood of an arc flash occurring.
Provisions should be provided to allow line side indication or testing by the user for absence of voltage
without requiring the removal of barriers or guards, and connection of power monitoring equipment. A
method should be provided to allow continuous voltage level monitoring of each phase during normal
operation. It should enable monitoring voltage phase-to-phase and phase-to-ground after any main
disconnect or on incoming lugs where there is no disconnect.
Access to control and/or metering components should be isolated from main power bus via means of
barriers and/or compartmentalization.
7.3 MCC unit design
MCC units are provided as either plug-in types or fixed unit designs where the line side connections are
made through bolted connections. Plug-in type motor starter units are typically available for NEMA sizes 4
and smaller and feeder breaker units are generally available for breaker frame ratings of less than 400A.
Some manufacturers may provide plug-in units at larger NEMA sizes or current ratings. The designer
should consult with the manufacturer for the availability of these units. The following subclauses discuss
the differences in safety considerations when applying plug-in or fixed-unit designs.
7.3.1 Fixed-unit design
Conductors from the bus to the line side of the OCPD should be designed to minimize the possibility of an
arc occurring (see 7.1).
Provisions should be provided to perform inspections and verify the tightness of connections (see 6.5).
These features do not reduce the incident energy that could be released, but they help reduce the likelihood
of an arc fault occurrence because it is believed that many arc flash faults occur due to loose parts or tools
left in the unit.
7.3.2 Plug-in unit design
Connections from the line side of the main disconnect to stab assembly and the stab assembly to the
vertical bus should be designed in such a way that the likelihood of an arc occurring or propagating from
downstream is minimized (see 7.1).
Provisions should be provided to perform inspections and verify the tightness of connections within the
unit, if possible (see 6.5).
7.3.2.1 Plug-in unit stab design
Stabs should be designed such that they are housed in a rigid fashion that prevents adjacent phases from
coming in contact if bent. If the spacing between adjacent phases is such that the stabs could bend and
make contact with an adjacent phase, a partial shroud made from insulating material or additional guarding
should be provided.
Provisions should be provided so that stabs cannot be bent and are protected while the unit is not installed
in the MCC.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
Stabs should not be exposed to physical or mechanical damage through ordinary handling outside of the
structure. If the MCC unit is placed on a tabletop surface, the stabs should not be damaged under the static
weight of the unit.
7.3.2.2 Plug-in unit alignment features
Users should endeavor to procure an MCC that is as easy as possible to maintain. That includes
consideration for the ease with which units are inserted and removed from the MCC structure. The design
should include hangers, slides, or other features to facilitate insertion of the unit into the section and
maintain alignment between the line connections on the unit and mating bus system in the MCC section
during unit insertion. Different sizes and types of units may require different levels of force and some may
require mechanical equipment to properly handle them during insertion or extraction. However, it is
important that the equipment be selected and installed with these requirements in mind. Consideration
should be given to the working space requirements of required handling equipment that may be needed for
removal and insertion, as well as the ease of handling of individual units commensurate with their size and
weight.
7.3.2.3 Plug-in units with test position
When a test position is provided, the following should be considered:
⎯ If the unit is physically moved away from the bus or line connection stabs are moved within the
unit, bus shutters, or similar means of isolation, should be provided. The shutters should isolate the
main line side bus from the MCC unit when the unit is considered disconnected for test or fully
disconnected status.
⎯ Indication of the shutter status or position is desirable. If the MCC unit has a fully-connected, test,
and fully-disconnected status available, the user should be provided with clear and obvious
indication of the unit status. Transitional states should be indicated or marked as the more
hazardous status until the unit is fully confirmed to be in the less hazardous status.
7.3.2.4 Line connections for plug-in units with door closed
The ability to make the electrical connection between the line connections (stabs) on plug-in units and the
mating bus system with the door closed can help reduce shock hazards. Furthermore, the ability to make
electrical connections between the stab and bus system remotely with the door closed also reduces, but may
not eliminate, arc flash hazards by increasing the working distance.
When the stabs are disconnected, bus shutters or similar should be provided to isolate the main bus from
the MCC unit. Indication of the stab and shutter status, or position, is desirable. The user should be
provided with clear and obvious indication of the unit status. Transitional states should be indicated or
marked as the more hazardous status until the unit is fully confirmed to be in the less hazardous status.
For plug-in units without this capability, refer to recommended pre-installation tests in 5.2.
7.4 Barriers between fuses
For improved separation where fuses are not already finger-safe, it is recommended that fuse inter-phase
barriers be provided.
7.5 Isolation between field wireways and units
To help reduce the hazardous voltage in the wireway compartment, unit terminal blocks for field wiring
should be contained within the unit and not the vertical wireway compartment.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
Unit power and control wire routed from the wireway into units should to be fed through tightly fitting
grommets or other protected openings that protect insulation from mechanical damage. If terminals are
provided access to energized parts should be protected with suitable barriers.
7.6 Provisions for infrared thermography
When IR inspections are performed, potential targets must be accessible via direct line of sight. Vertical
sections and units should be designed to facilitate closed-panel inspection processes (IR windows or ports)
where possible and practical. IR windows or ports should be arc resistant if installed in arc-resistant
equipment. Consult with window and equipment manufacturer.
Documentation should identify which connections and components are accessible for IR scanning.
7.6.1 Touch guards
IR targets are often protected by a touch guard intended to help reduce accidental contact with energized
conductors. Inspections should be possible without removing any touch guard that cannot be removed
safely while the MCC is energized. Therefore, touch guards for IR targets should allow transmission of IR
energy, either by use of IR transmissive materials or by sufficiently perforating the guard with a series of
finger-safe cutouts.
7.7 Markings
Line marking should be requested on the “source/power” side of the disconnect device or short-circuit
protective device of the unit’s high-energy circuits. The marking should be the word “Line” or the
equivalent wording; or use of a symbol(s) (e.g., the lightning bolt symbol) or the equivalent symbol(s). It
should be noted that main incoming cables may enter at the top or bottom of the equipment and hence the
line side of the main overcurrent device may also be the top or the bottom. If this is unusual within a
facility it may be wise to use extra signage to attract the attention of maintenance personnel.
All ingress barriers should have markings consistent with country requirements for barriers isolating
energized parts.
All markings should be in the appropriate language (or symbols as noted in this guide), as necessary, for
the country in which the MCC will be installed. A manufacturer may choose to utilize multiple languages
on an MCC.
7.8 Support and dressing of field conductors
Good workmanship practices should be used in the field connection wiring. The MCC manuals provided by
the manufacturer should provide guidance on the installation and “dressing” of this field wiring. Dressing
of power wiring is important due to the forces they may be exposed to due to short circuits, starting inrush
currents, etc. Documentation should be provided on the instruction and guidance (dressing) of field power
conductors and instruction on the support of these conductors. The documentation may be in the form of
photographs, illustrations, or verbal descriptions. Care should be taken to confirm that there are no loose
strands of wires that have been terminated.
7.9 Horizontal and vertical bus assembly
All threaded fastener assemblies used for electrical connections should be a pressure-type to help provide
good electrical connections. For example, concave pressure washers, split lock washers, SEMS screws
(screws with captive washers), spring-steel lock nuts, etc.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
Bus material and plating should be appropriate for the environment where the MCC will be installed. All
aluminum buses and all copper buses rated over 600 A are required to be plated at bus connection points.25
Tin or silver bus plating is commonly used and generally provides reliable performance in most
environments. However, these materials may corrode in certain atmospheres, in which case an alternative
should be requested. For example, silver is known to react with sulfur and should be avoided in the
presence of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) or carbon disulfide (CS2).
Insulated or isolated bus is desirable to help reduce the possibility of arcing faults and accidental contact
with energized buses. Where joints require thermal monitoring such as IR scans, or maintenance such as
joint tightening, manufacturers should provide adequate provisions that allow both activities as required.
Supplier should be asked to state in quotation if bus connections are welded or not and if bolted or riveted,
what provision if any can be provided to allow IR scanning of bus connections.
Access points of the vertical bus that are intended for the electrical connection of the MCC stab-in unit
should be blocked by an insulation shutter or cover when the cell of an MCC structure is unoccupied, or
when an MCC stab-in unit is removed from the cell of an MCC structure.
7.10 Protection from vermin, MCC structure barriers
Vermin can cause equipment failure if they compromise the dielectric integrity of the insulation systems.
Barriers should be specified to prevent access to vermin at the open ends of the MCC line-up(s) between
the floor channels. A maximum gap of 6.4 mm (0.25 in) is allowable between the barrier edge and the floor
surface.
7.11 Use of arc-resistant designs
Arc resistance is a desirable characteristic in any equipment that may pose an arc flash hazard if personnel
could be exposed to the hazard. Any claims of arc resistance should be based on a recognized applicable
test procedure and acceptance criteria, such as IEEE Std C37.20.7 [B7].
Arc-resistant designs are intended to provide an additional degree of personnel protection only under
normal operating conditions when all doors and covers are closed and properly secured. When a unit door
is open, for example to remove or insert a unit, it is probable that the arc-resistant rating will no longer
provide additional protection.
When using arc-resistant designs, it is important that protective devices and their respective settings are
selected such that they fulfill the parameters of the arc-resistant rating. The duration of the arc-resistant
rating should be selected based on application requirements. For example, an MCC with an arc-resistant
rating of 0.05 s would require a protection scheme able to clear in 0.05 s or less at the expected arcing
current level for the arc-resistant rating to be valid, while an MCC with an arc-resistant rating of 0.1 s
would require the protection for the MCC bus to clear a fault in 0.1 s or less. If the protection is slower than
the arcing duration at which the arc-resistant design was evaluated an unexpected failure could occur;
however, specifying ratings longer than what is required may impose other equipment and design
restrictions.
Arc-resistant ratings are dependent on the integrity of the enclosure, all fastening methods, and all exhaust
systems. Precautions should be taken if equipment enclosure integrity is not assured or confirmed. In any
arc-resistant equipment installation, consideration may be required to be given on how hot gasses exit the
enclosure and if special accommodations, such as ceiling height or energy exhaust system, may also need
to be considered.
25
UL 845.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
The application of arc-resistant designs would not obviate the need for many of the other measures
suggested in this guide, other standards, or recommended practices. Optimum performance from the
perspective of safety can often be achieved by implementing several complimentary characteristics
simultaneously, including arc resistance.
8. Factory tests
Factory testing of complex control schemes and other important equipment characteristics such as dielectric
integrity may be useful for an efficient installation and commissioning. However. damage can occur to
equipment during shipping and installation. Hence it is advisable that factory testing not be a substitute for
proper and thorough commissioning procedures based on manufacturer recommendations, applicable
standards, and good engineering judgment.
9. Interface between specifier, manufacturer, installer, and user

The specification, selection, installation, and use of an MCC assembly may involve multiple parties. The
main tasks will be design, specification, installation, and use. Whether these tasks are accomplished by one
company or multiple companies it is important that documentation be appropriate for the proper hand-off of
responsibility between parties. During all phases of a project, including operation and maintenance of the
equipment, it is important that responsible parties be properly qualified for the tasks. The following
subclauses will address issues of documentation and information required to properly execute a project
involving MCCs for safer operation. Techniques for properly designing controls, sizing conductors,
starters, and other MCC devices are beyond the scope of this guide.
This clause is written from the perspective of a complete MCC specification with special attention to
recommendations that enhance the safety of the installed equipment.
9.1 Equipment specifier
9.1.1 Qualifications
Specifications and drawings should be prepared by, or under the direct supervision of, a qualified person
who meets the requirements of the state and local authorities having jurisdiction. To help improve safety of
the final installation, the person should also be qualified with respect to applicable workplace safety
standards such as IEEE Std 1584, NFPA 70E, CSA Z462, or equivalent national standards. Familiarity with
the intended process and how the user will operate and maintain the equipment will also be useful. It is
important that the designer or specifier understand the implications of design, specification, and
components selections on safety. Once the design is made and specifications are finished important safety-
related factors may no longer be under the control of the specifier. In many cases the improvements that
can be made after equipment is on site are very limited.
During the design and specification stage, documents should fully define all requirements so that the
desired equipment can be procured. When changes in the specifications or equipment design are
contemplated during the design specification, procurement or installation phase of the project, the safety
implications of those changes should be understood and evaluated.
9.1.2 System studies
System characteristics can have a significant effect on arcing current, overcurrent protective device
(OCPD) fault clearing time, and consequently arc flash incident energy. In addition, fault current
magnitudes affect selectivity considerations (refer to Clause 4 for additional discussion on these topics).
Hence it is recommended that design and procurement documents include reasonable estimates of available
fault current for all distribution topologies of interest. Source and motor contributions should be identified
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
separately, as in many cases only the source contribution is germane to main OCPD operation; but both are
important for unit and feeder OCPD operation and incident energy calculations.
9.1.3 Equipment specifications and drawings
Clause 6 and Clause 7 provide discussion of many features that should be considered during the MCC
specification development. These clauses and the results of system studies should be reviewed as the
specifications are finalized. As a minimum, the specifier should provide the following information:
⎯ Load information either in a table format or a one-line diagram.

⎯ Arrangement elevation drawing, if a specific arrangement is required, otherwise this may be left to
the discretion of the manufacturer. Arrangement and whether a unit is plug-in or bolted into the
equipment may have safety-related implications. Consideration should be given to this and how the
equipment may be maintained or operated.
⎯ Horizontal, vertical, and ground bus material and ratings.
⎯ Voltage and grounding requirements.
⎯ Power system phasing and arrangement, “3ph, 4w wye with solidly ground neutral”, or “3ph 3w
ungrounded delta”, etc.
⎯ Short-circuit current rating for the equipment as well as preliminary estimates of available fault
current including motor contributions separately.
⎯ Preliminary information from an arc flash study, if available, including design targets for incident
energy levels at the MCC and information on the upstream protective device, or expected
performance, if known.
⎯ Type of ingress protection as described in this guide to help reduce accidental contact with
energized conductors during maintenance activity.
⎯ Enclosure type or rating.
⎯ NEMA wiring classification: specifier should evaluate the classification selected and how it may
affect the enhanced safety features of the MCC.
⎯ If equipment is to be used for service equipment of the building or structure disconnecting means.
⎯ Any specific device or feature required to enhance the maintenance and operational safety of the
equipment. Where a specific feature is required it should be described. Where a specific function is
desired that may be accomplished in several ways the required performance should be specified
such that a manufacturer supplied featured can be compared or judged against the desire level of
performance.
9.1.4 Selection of MCC wiring type
There are two basic classifications of MCC assemblies. Class I MCCs are a group of devices assembled as
individual units. There are no factory-wired interconnections between the units. Equipment manufacturers
often ship Class I MCCs to OEMs that install additional control devices and the required interconnection
wiring to provide a custom system. By the time the OEM ships the MCC to a user it is a higher level of
wiring and documentation. Class II MCCs are the same as Class I with the addition of factory-installed
electrical interlocking and wiring as specified by the purchaser. Class I-S and II-S MCCs are the same as
Class I and Class II, except they are furnished with custom drawings as specified by the purchaser in
addition to the manufacturer’s standard drawings.
In addition to specifying the class, the specifier must also choose the wiring type. There are three basic
wiring types, A, B, and C. Type A wiring is only available in a Class I MCC. The field wiring connects
directly to the device terminals within the unit.
Type B load wiring is subdivided into Type B-D and Type B-T. For Type B-D, the installer connects the
field load wiring directly to the device terminals, For Type B-T, the installer connects the field wiring to a
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
load terminal block (Size 3 starters and smaller) located within or adjacent to the unit. Type B load wiring
for combination starter units larger than Size 3 and for feeder circuits are connected directly to the unit
device terminals. Type B control wiring is connected to terminal blocks located within or adjacent to the
unit for all starter sizes.
Type C control field wiring is connected to master control blocks located at the top or bottom of each
vertical section. Type C field load wiring for Size 3 and smaller combination starter units is also connected
to master control blocks located at the top or bottom of each vertical section. Type C load wiring for
combination starter units larger than Size 3 and for feeder circuits are connected directly to the unit device
terminals.
Table 2 lists the features for each Class and Wiring Type as described in NEMA ICS 18-2001 (R2007).
Manufacturers may exceed these requirements with their standard product design, so the specifier should be
aware of the features offered by different manufacturers. When selecting the wiring class, the specifier
should be aware of how that affects safety-related work practices. For example, if a vertical section of an
MCC has starters smaller than Size 3 and Type C wiring, it may be difficult to put the master terminal
block area in an electrically safe condition if a person has to access the terminal block for any reason.
Though it may seem convenient to concentrate terminations in one area, if that area is difficult to access
ease of troubleshooting may not be improved. Extensive use of serial or Ethernet communications can
significantly decrease the need for control interconnections and hence make terminal boards at individual
units significantly less crowded.
Manufacturers typically locate terminal boards within starter units or in dedicated compartments. Locating
terminal boards within the vertical wireway may present safety concerns and should be discouraged.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
Table 2 —Wiring features by NEMA classifications and wiring table

Type of power or control termination furnished Class I Class I-S Class II Class II-S
A B C A B C B C B C
Numbered power terminal boards on or adjacent to No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
unit starter, size 3 and smaller
Numbered terminal on unit devices for power Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
connection with no power terminals boards,
greater than size 3
Numbered control terminal boards on or adjacent No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
to unit starter
Master terminal boards (top or bottom of section ) No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
wiring connections, control
Master terminal boards (top or bottom of section), No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
power sizes 3 and smaller
Master terminal boards (top or bottom of section), No No No No No No No No No No
power greater than size 3
Unit terminal boards for feeder tap units and No No No No No No No No No No
distribution panels
Starter-unit-mounted pilot devices internally wired Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
to starter, size 1 through 7
Terminal board points for remote devices No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(excluding extra tie points)
Factory-wired interconnections between units in No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
the same MCC
Type of drawing furnished
Outline and summary sheet (schedule of units) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unit elementary wiring diagrams showing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
numbered terminal points (terminal boards not
furnished on Type A)
Unit elementary wiring diagrams showing No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
numbered terminal points and interconnections to
other units and/or to the first level of remote
devices
Schedule of wires to master terminal blocks No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Custom drawings as specified by user No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
9.1.5 Codes and standards
Equipment consensus standards to be met should be specified. The standard number, date, and title should
be indicated. Where only a subset of the standard is intended to be used to define a subset of the specified
product, it is advisable that pertinent standard clauses or sections be identified as well as the subsystem or
components that are supposed to be defined by the document. When standard references are too broad they
can be confusing and cause manufacturers to provide incorrect equipment.
Local installation codes, if any, should be specified. National codes are sometimes modified by the
authority having jurisdiction. If local codes are different from the national codes in a pertinent manner, that
difference should be identified.
Independent testing laboratory certification or listing requirements should be specified if desired or

required by local building codes.
User’s standard practices and specific requirements should be identified if they have a direct impact on how
the equipment is to be built or installed.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
9.1.6 Environmental conditions
The specifier should list the specific environmental constraints for the equipment, which may include the
following:
⎯ Location, e.g., outdoors.

⎯ Ambient temperature and relative humidity ranges.
⎯ Elevation above sea level, if above 1000 m (3300 ft).
⎯ Seismic requirements. This should include the need for a seismic design for anchoring and describe
how the equipment is expected to survive a seismic event. Should also indicate if the equipment is
expected to be operational after an event or if it must remain fully operational during the event.
⎯ Corrosive atmospheres should be identified.
9.1.7 Submittal requirements
The specifier should list the type and number of submittals required, and coordinate the requirements with
the NEMA Classification of the MCC. The type of submittals may include the following:
⎯ Approval drawings with equipment ratings

⎯ Installation instructions
⎯ Unit wiring diagrams
⎯ Complete unit one-line diagram
⎯ Operation and maintenance information
⎯ Recommended spare parts lists
If a short circuit, coordination, or arc flash study is available prior to the submittal or approval cycle, the
study supplier could include recommendations on how to improve incident energy levels obtained in the
study. It is recommended that prior to final definition of distribution and motor control equipment a
preliminary set of studies be available to guide designers and suppliers in making the best selections
possible.
If arc flash incident energy performance has been specified and a short circuit study provided, or expected
short-circuit levels defined in the contract documents, the manufacturer should provide documentation of
how specified levels of arc flash incident energy will be met at the main equipment bus and branch devices.
9.1.8 Installation requirements
The specifier should provide the installer enough information to install the equipment as intended. The
installation documents may include drawings and specifications or only drawings with the specifications
included on the drawings and not as a separate document. The information should include the following:
⎯ Plan drawings showing the physical location and orientation of the equipment
⎯ One-line diagram that indicates the number, size, and type of conductors to be terminated
⎯ Wiring diagrams or tables that indicate the termination points for each cable
⎯ Specific commissioning and testing requirements, if any
9.2 Equipment manufacturer
It is important that the manufacturer provides proper documentation to the user for the equipment offered,
shipped, and installed.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
9.2.1 Submittal Information
Prior to release for fabrication, the manufacturer should submit the following for approval:
⎯ Electrical ratings, including suitable system grounding configurations (floating, high resistantce, or
solidly grounded) for components
⎯ Enclosure type or rating
⎯ Unit wiring diagrams
⎯ Circuit breaker available setting information for devices with adjustable trip settings
⎯ Overload relay range and available setting information, or element selection information, as
applicable
⎯ Connections and components accessible for IR inspections, number and location of IR windows
and ports, if applicable
9.2.2 Installation instructions
Unless specified otherwise, the manufacturer should ship two (2) copies of the installation manual or
instructions with the equipment—one copy for the installing contractor and one copy for the user. The
user’s copy may be an electronic file submitted via e-mail or CD-ROM.
Instructions should include compartment wiring diagrams that provide termination information to the
installing contractor.
9.2.3 Operation and maintenance instructions
In addition to the normal operation and maintenance information, the instructions for using and maintaining
the enhanced safety features of the equipment should be included. Proper operation of any safety-related
function is crucial to maintaining proper operation of the equipment. Special attention should be paid to
those functions and their maintenance.
9.3 Equipment installer
9.3.1 Qualifications
The installer should be a qualified electrical person that meets the requirements of the authorities having
jurisdiction. The installer should also be familiar with NFPA 70E, CSA Z462, or applicable workplace
safety standards and follow safe work practices.
9.3.2 Installation
The installer should be familiar with the specific requirements of the installation from the design
documents provided by the specifier. If questions arise, they should be clarified with the specifier and
manufacturer prior to the work beginning, if possible.
The manufacturer’s storage and handling instructions should be followed to help prevent equipment
damage prior to and during installation in the permanent location.
The manufacturer’s wiring instructions should be followed to help properly terminate the field wiring. This
includes preparation of the wire and cable for termination and proper torque values for wire terminations
and bus connections between shipping splits.
At the end of the project it is suggested that all power terminations be inspected and evaluated for the use
of insulating covers, sleeves, or tapes that help reduce potential exposure to energized bus by operating and
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
maintenance personnel. All insulation used should meet manufacturer requirements and not negatively
impact equipment or device ratings.
9.3.3 Deviations from design documents
Prior to deviating from the design documents, the installer should bring the proposed change to the
attention of the specifier, user, or both for review and approval. At all times, all contemplated changes
should be evaluated for impact on safety expectations.
The installer should maintain accurate construction record drawings that reflect the actual installation
details. These should be turned over to the specifier or user after completion of the work.
9.3.4 Commissioning
The installation contract may require the installer to provide commissioning services that could include
insulation resistance tests, setting protective devices, checking motor rotation, overcurrent device operation,
and control circuit testing.
9.4 Equipment user
9.4.1 General
Once the equipment has been commissioned and placed in service, the user typically becomes responsible
for the proper operation and maintenance of it. If the equipment user does not have the resources to do so,
this may be contracted to a firm that specializes in this work. Responsibilities of the user typically will
include the following:
⎯ Keeping documents provided by manufacturer in a safe place where they are accessible to
installation, operation, and maintenance personnel as required.
⎯ Following the manufacturer’s instructions for operation and maintenance of the equipment to verify
that the enhanced safety features function as designed.
⎯ Training for personnel who operate the equipment to make them aware of the enhanced safety
features of the equipment and how to use them.
⎯ Proper labeling of the equipment for shock and arc flash hazards, and their control.
⎯ Maintaining accurate records for the equipment that include one-line diagrams, short-circuit
currents, arc flash incident energy levels at a specified distance, and protective device settings,
including proper use of any temporary protective settings that may be used for reduction of arc
flash incident energy.
⎯ Identifying the location of the MCC feeder circuit disconnecting means and posting the information
in a conspicuous location so the equipment can be readily de-energized in an emergency.
⎯ A yearly audit should be performed on the equipment records to verify accuracy.
9.4.2 Markings and labeling
An MCC built to UL 845, or other equivalent national standard will include appropriate labels and
markings related to the equipment as manufactured and specified within applicable manufacturing test
standards. It is important that the user also install any additional labeling required by applicable installation
and workplace safety standards, such as labeling requirements within NFPA 70E and NFPA 70, to indicate
arc flash hazard and any other characteristic that is important for safe operation of the equipment.
When adding labeling in the field, care should be exercised so that the additional labeling does not conflict
with manufacturer’s labeling and is not so complex as to confuse operating personnel.
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IEEE Std 1683-2014
Annex A
(informative)
Bibliography
Bibliographical references are resources that provide additional or helpful material but do not need to be
understood or used to implement this standard. Reference to these resources is made for informational use
only.
[B1] ANSI/IEC 60529-2004. Degrees of Protection Provided by Enclosures (IP Code), Published
by: National Electrical Manufacturers Association, 1300 North 17th Street, Suite 1847, Rosslyn, Virginia
22209.
[B2] Blair, D.D.; Jensen, D.L.; Doan, D.R.; Kim, T.K.; “Networked intelligent motor-control systems”;
IEEE Industry Applications Magazine, Volume: 7, Issue: 6, Publication Year: 2001, pp. 18–25.
[B3] CSA C22.2 No. 14, (1995). Industrial Control Equipment.
[B4] Crawford, K.S., Clark, D.G., Doughty, R.L; “Motor terminal box explosions due to faults,” IEEE
Transactions on Industry Applications, Jan/Feb 1993, Volume 29, Issue:1, p. 72.
[B5] Epperly, R.A., Heberlein, G.E., Eads, L.G.; “Thermography, a tool for reliability and safety”; IEEE
Industry Applications Magazine, Volume: 5, Issue: 1, Publication Year: 1999, pp. 28–36.
[B6] Fox, G.H.;” Methods for limiting arc flash hazards while maintaining system selectivity,” IEEE
Industrial & Commercial Systems Conference, Conference Record 2010, pp. 1–8.
[B7] Heberlein, G.E., Jr.; Higgins, J.A.; Epperly, R.A.; “Report on enclosure internal arcing tests,” IEEE
Industry Applications Magazine, Volume: 2, Issue: 3, Publication Year: 1996, pp. 35–42.
[B8] IEC/TR 61641 (Edition 2.0 2008-01) Enclosed low-voltage switchgear and controlgear assemblies—
Guide for testing under conditions of arcing due to internal fault.
[B9] IEEE Std C37.20.1™, IEEE Standard for Metal-Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker
Switchgear.
[B10] IEEE Std C37.20.7™, IEEE Guide for Testing Metal-Enclosed Switchgear Rated Up to 38 kV for
Internal Arcing Faults.
[B11] NEMA ICS 2-2000, Controllers, Contactors and Overload Relays Rated 600 V, Annex A.
[B12] NFPA 70B, Recommended Practice for Electrical Equipment Maintenance.
[B13] Shipp, D.D. and Wood, D.M.; “Mitigating Arc-Flash Exposure”; IEEE Industry Applications
Magazine, Volume: 17, Issue: 4, Publication Year: 2011, pp. 28–37.
[B14] UL 1998, Software in Programmable Components, Underwriters Laboratories.
[B15] Valdes, M.E., Hansen, S., Sutherland, P.; “Optimizing Circuit Breaker Instantaneous Trip Settings
for Selectivity and Arc Flash Performance Simultaneously,” IEEE Industry Applications Magazine,
May/June 2012, pp. 66–73.
Additional papers on this subject may be found by searching at the IEEE Xplore website:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplore/dynhome.jsp.
33
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Approved 16 May 2014

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The recommendations in this guide complement safety requirements and procedures as

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PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-9084-6 STD98632

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5. Defined operations and safety issues ........................................................................................................ 12

6. Diagnostics and indicators ........................................................................................................................ 17

7. MCC construction .................................................................................................................................... 21

8. Factory tests .............................................................................................................................................. 26

9. Interface between specifier, manufacturer, installer, and user .................................................................. 26

Annex A (informative) Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 33

1.3 Equipment condition and maintenance

1.4 Word usage

⎯ ANCE NMX-J-353-ANCE, Motor Control Centers—Specifications and Test Methods.4

CSA Z462, Workplace Electrical Safety.7

NEMA ICS 18, Motor Control Centers.10

NFPA 70, National Electrical Code® (NEC®).11

NFPA 70E, Electrical Safety for Employee Workplaces.

overcurrent protective device (OCPD): A fuse or circuit breaker.

4.1 Fault location

4.2 Fault current flow

NOTE—MCC shown without tie device is not a recommended

Figure 2 —Multi-source MCC with motor contribution

4.4 Selectivity versus arc flash incident energy protection

⎯ The speed at which the OCPD clears arcing current

4.5 Use of temporary protection settings

4.6 Overcurrent protective device (OCPD) selection

4.6.1 Main bus protection

Cal/cm2, various clearing times, 480V, HRG, 32mm,

4.6.1.1 MCC bus withstand ratings

4.6.2 Starter and feeder protection within the MCC

4.6.3 Motor protection

5. Defined operations and safety issues

Table 1 —Defined operations and exposure

3. Reset motor overload Energized Closed Closed No No20

Energized or de-energized—look at handle to

b) Bus energized—Withdrawable stabs

Table 1 — Defined operations and exposure (continued)

5.1 Pulling conductors

5.2 Recommended test for plug-in unit before installation

5.3 Recommendations for inserting units

5.4 Maintenance with a test position or status to provide control power

5.5 Maintenance tasks in energized units

Maintenance activities in energized units may include the following:

⎯ Repeated resetting of timers

⎯ Tuning of variable speed drive controls

5.6 Overcurrent device maintenance