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Pathways of Transformation
In the process of increasing income from the second and third streams,
entrepreneurial universities learn faster than nonentrepreneurial counterparts
that money from many sources enhances the opportunity to make significant
moves without waiting for systemwide enactments that come slowly, with
standardizing rules attached. They accept and promote the maxim offered by
two American observers as long ago as the early 1960s: "a workable twentieth
century definition of institutional autonomy [is] the absence of dependence
upon a single or narrow base of support." (Babbidge and Rosenzweig, 1962, p.
158)
The stimulated academic heartland
the development of the other elements. We shall see them in cycles of interac-
tion, themselves developing over time. Organizational values ought not be
treated independently of the structures and procedures through which they
are expressed. An institutional perspective is required. The first four of our five
elements are means by which transforming beliefs are made operative.
More students, and more different types of students, seek and obtain
access. Ever more accessible higher education means endless "clienteles"
entitled to various types of education in their lifetimes. The general trend
of elite to mass to universal higher education is well-known. But its effects
in creating endless demands have not been well understood. This chan-
nel of demand in itself, if left unanswered - as in the case of open-door
universities on the European continent - badly overloads the response
capabilities of individual institutions. And as an "environmental"
demand, the clamor for inclusion is organizationally penetrating: it flows
130 The Problem of University Transformation
d o much research; some grant a few doctorates and do a little research; and
some neither grant doctorates nor d o hardly any research. (Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. 1994) Crossover types readily
appear; e.g., some universities and colleges that are not permitted by state
authorities to award doctorates proceed on their own to develop a research
culture. secure more research funds than some institutions that d o doctoral
work, and link up with other institutions to give a joint doctorate. In Britain,
after the government collapsed the old binary line and allowed polytechnics to
become known as universities. the stretch in meaning of the term became much
greater. A differentiation in resources and teaching and research commitments
that previously took place between two main types of institutions became
greater differentiation within a single formal type.
A "democratization" of titles does not bring full operational convergence:
institutions become known more by what they d o rather than by what they are
called. Hence in national systems and on the worldwide stage we find some
universities heavily concentrated on research and some that hardly d o any at
all; those that give many advanced degrees and others that concentrate almost
completely on the first major degree; those oriented to knowledge for its own
sake and those centered on useful knowledge; some that take u p national roles
and others situated as regional places; and on and on.
Internationally, in the 1980s and 1990s, differential effective access t o
sources of income rapidly became the favorite way to differentiate university
systems. We have seen this national tool operate in Britain, Holland, Sweden.
and Finland. Governmental mainline support with its standardizing effects is
deliberately reduced or allowed to fall as a share of university costs. The system
overall must turn to what we have categorized as second and third streams of
support: each has largely differentiating effects. In research-grant competition.
standardization gives way to winners and losers; research niches occupied by
different universities offer comparative advantage. In exploiting numerous
third-stream sources, universities have different possibilities set by location and
historic capacity. Then as they individually maneuver, struggling to gain more
resources. they widen the differences in specific configurations of external link-
ages. System evolution toward diversified income promotes a dynamic of
institutional diversity and competition. Universities are potentially more
individualized. Patrons are then all the more inclined to think they should
treat unequal things unequally.
In overcoming response inadequacies, national systems of higher education
can go beyond the broadbrush of the differentiation response; they can explore
the utility of reforms by engaging in deliberate institutional experimentation.
In Finnish higher education the process is known as "learning by experiment-
ing." (Vilimaa. 1994) There, recent experiments included the block-grant
budgetary arrangement at Joensuu, the flexible workload scheme piloted at
Jyviiskyla, and several changes explored in other institutions in quality assess-
ment and in the development of a new polytechnic sector. The Finns have
134 The Problem of University Transformation
the growing scale and complexity of the university sector has coexisted with a
structured lack of initiative at the institutional level.
Weak capacity to balance demand and response, we should note, varies
somewhat between one-faculty and multifaculty universities. Although they
do not escape the problem of deepening imbalance, specialized universities are
better positioned than the comprehensive institutions to control demand
around their subject specialization and, with a more integrated character, to
pursue an entrepreneurial response. Their subject concentration helps measur-
ably to solve the growing problem of institutional focus. It is no mystery why
in Europe or America, or elsewhere, specialized universities can more readily
move toward entrepreneurial postures than comprehensive ones, particularly
if their specialty is technology or business. When I sought nominations of
universities for this study, it was no accident that the institutions named by
knowledgeable European colleagues, including ones not chosen for study,
turned out often to be specialized places, for example, the technologically
oriented University of Compiegne in France, the business-administration
oriented University of St. Gallen in Switzerland.
In contrast, the imbalance thesis applies strongly to comprehensive public
universities. Organized around a wide array of subjects that stretches from
classics to medicine, these institutions virtually promise higher officials, legisla-
tors, and the general public they will be all things for all demands. Martin
Trow (1970, pp. 184-1 85) noted a quarter-century ago in an analysis of "elite"
and "popular" functions of modern higher education that responding to
external needs and demands was even then fast becoming an endless task:
If one popular function is the provision of mass higher education to nearly
everybody who applies for it, the second is the provision of useful knowledge
and service to nearly every group and institution that wants it. . . the demand on
the universities for such service is increasing all the time. This in part reflects the
growth of the knowledge-base created by the scientific explosion of the past few
decades. N o t only is much of this new knowledge of potential applied value to
industry, agriculture, the military, the health professions. etc., but also new areas
of national life are coming to be seen as users of knowledge created in the
university.
The implicit commitment of universities to embrace all of the expanding
knowledge core of modern society deepened the commitment both to extend
access and to service the interests of outside groups with diverse bundles of
relevant knowledge and useful training. System management has been unable
to control this explosion in commitments: overloaded universities have simply
become more overloaded.
Other observers have also taken early note of the increasing imbalance.
Based on a study of 17 universities and colleges then under stress, David
Riesman warned in the 1970s against the danger of institutions overextending
their resources in order to be all things to all people. (Riesman, 1973, p. 445)
Two decades later, in the 1990s, the tendency to overextend resources has
136 The Problem of University Transformation
become more marked a n d the results more painful. Based on site visits a n d
interviews in the mid-1990s at 13 colleges and universities in the American
system, Leslie a n d Fretwell found there "was broad recognition that mis-
sions had become too loose, that t o o many different programs were being
offered, and that scarce resources were being spread too thin across too
many activities." (Leslie a n d Fretwell, 1996, p, xiv) Administrators a n d
faculty "reported (and lamented) that they had made t o o few hard deci-
sions" during the previous two decades. Their lament "was frequently
punctuated with one phrase: 'we have tried too hard to be all things t o all
people,' with the unspoken trailer [that] 'we have become t o o diffuse to use
our scarce resources well'." (p. 22) These American observers concluded
that "a theme. . . ran throughout our site visits: being distinctive a n d
purposeful is better than being all things to all people." ( p. 16) And
institutional strain this time, in the 1990s, was seen by participants as
systemically different from periods of stress in the past: "It is a common
refrain among those with whom we have consulted to suggest that things
are not going t o be the same this time, or ever again." (p. xii)
The differentiation response, it seems, finally comes down to the individual
university. Each university has always had unique features that stem from
geographic location, genetic imprints, student backgrounds, idiosyncratic
historical developments, faculty strengths and weaknesses. and the play of
particular personalities. Now, particularly as knowledge outruns resources, a
vniversity's basic departments are under ever greater pressure to commit to
specialties that differentiate them from their peer-discipline departments at
other universities, whether in physics or psychology or history. And what hap-
pens among departments and faculties radiates upward to intensify the need
for entire universities to differentiate themselves in niches of knowledge,
clientele, and labor market linkage. Such differentiation can be left to drift,
and hence to occur slowly; but with accelerating change, the costs of drift and
delay rise - the demand-response imbalance only deepens. Institutional action
then has to be set in motion.
System organizers can help to clear the way by reducing state mandates and
manipulating broad incentives, but only universities themselves can take the
essential actions. The point was made in striking fashion by Clark Kerr in
1993 (p. 33, emphasis added) when he stressed that
For the first time, a really international world of learning, highly competit~ve,is
emerging. If you want to get into that orbit. you have to d o so on merit. You
cannot rely on politics or anything else. You have to give a good deal of autonomy
to institutions for them to be dynamic and to move fast in international competi-
tion. You have to develop entrepretleurial leadership to go along with institutiot7rtl
aLitonotTiy.
Enter the growing necessity of what we can now call "the entrepreneurial
response."
Burton R. Clark 137
If the state and other external patrons cannot exercise the required initia-
tive, how can universities shift from a passive to an active mode? As histori-
cally constituted, their internal faculties and departments cannot separately
d o the job. Oversight of their particular fields and protection of their own
material interests has been their customary mandate. Only an overall
organizational realignment, constructed in a first approximation by the ele-
ments captured in this study, can set into motion a new highly active mode.
The five cases and certain relevant studies can help to place those elements in
the broader framework of the imbalance thesis.
patrons instead of waiting passively for the government to return to full fund-
ing. They work t o diversify income and thereby enlarge the pool of discretion-
ary money. They seek out new infrastructure units that reach across old
university boundaries to link up more readily than traditional departments
with outside establishments, especially industrial firms. The core gives the
institution a greater collective ability to make hard choices among fields of
knowledge, backing some to the disadvantage of others; this in turn shapes
access possibilities and job-market connections. The strengthened steering
mechanism is necessary for the task of cross-subsidizing among the university's
many fields and degree levels, taxing rich programs t o aid less-fortunate ones
that otherwise would be relegated to the corner or even dropped from the
enterprise because they cannot pay their way. Agents of the core thereby not
only seek to subsidize new activities but also try to enhance old valuable
programs in the academic heartland. As much maneuvering among contradic-
tory demands becomes necessary, the agents of the constructed core become
institutionally responsible for doing so.
A strengthened administrative core, then, is a mandatory feature of a
heightened capability t o confront the root imbalance of modern universities.
The new peripheries that enterprising universities construct also take quite
different specific forms. They variously consist of outreach administrative units
that promote contract research, contract education, and consultancy. They
include a varied array of research centers that are generally, but not always,
multi- or transdisciplinary. The new units and centers may be closely or loosely
linked to the steering core and the heartland departments. Like science parks
that become autonomous, some peripheral units may have the name and
sponsorship of the university but then operate much like mediating institu-
tions situated between the university and outside organizations. Again, there is
no one way, n o one model to emulate.
But the developmental peripheries we have observed have a valuable com-
mon outcome: they move a university toward a dual structure of basic units in
which traditional departments are supplemented by centers linked to the
outside world. The matrix-like structure becomes a tool for handling the
inevitable growth of the service role of universities. Department-based
"specialist groups" are complemented by "project groups" that admit external
definitions of research problems and needed training. The new groups cross
old lines of authority; they promote environmental linkages in their daily
practice. We noted at Chalmers that they can even effect reciprocal knowledge
transfer; the university learns from outside firms as the companies learn from
the university. The matrix structure allows for more temporary units, thereby
introducing flexibility amidst stability. With tenured staff mainly based in the
departments and nontenured and part-time staff often predominating in the
Burton R. Clark 139
outreach centers, the more temporary units of the periphery are more readily
disbanded.
Since units of a developmental periphery extend, cross, and blur
boundaries, they can decisively shape the long-run character of a university.
They can develop new competencies close to useful problem solving. They
can generate income that helps to diversify funding. They answer the call
for interdisciplinary efforts. But if not judged by academic values as well as
managerial and budgetary interests for their appropriateness in a university,
they can move an institution toward the character of a shopping mall. A
connected and somewhat focused construction of the periphery requires a
collective institutional capacity to make choices based on educational values.
New outward-looking units can make the problem of overall institutional
focus all the more difficult: research centers contend with old departments,
transdisciplinary perspectives with disciplinary orientations, the useful with
the basic, the outward-looking with the inward-oriented. But when care-
fully monitored, the periphery becomes a second virtually essential element
with which to lessen the imbalance between environmental demands and
response capacity. Traditional departments alone cannot effect all the
needed linkages: in themselves, they cannot add up to an effective focus.
The new periphery is necessary, even if it adds to the organized complexity
of the university.
As a halfway house to the outside world, the developmental periphery
becomes an organized location within a university for the entry and absorp-
tion of whole new modes of thinking. In ideal typical terms formulated by an
international study group in the mid-1990s, their designated "Mode I " refers
to the traditional way of handling knowledge in disciplinary frameworks. A
newly emerging "Mode 2," transdisciplinary and problem-oriented, was seen
by the study group as located largely outside universities in a host of
knowledge-centered enterprises that stretch from major industrial laboratories
to policy think tanks to management consultancies to new small and medium-
sized enterprises. (Gibbons et al, 1994; see also Ziman, 1994) Between the ideal
types there lies a lengthy continuum of different practical combinations. The
peripheries of universities we observed in this study incorporate much Mode
2. Their units are established precisely to go beyond disciplinary definitions:
they extend university boundaries to bring in the perspectives of outside
problem-solving groups; they are prepared to take their leads from the outside
and to work close to application. They are often strongly committed to the
straight-on production of useful knowledge.
An enhanced developmental periphery plays many roles in enterprising
universities, not the least in bringing new modes of thinking and problem solv-
ing within newly stretched boundaries. Organizationally, in Peter Scott's terms,
it helps to stretch the "core" university into the "distributed" university, where
knowledge, the primary commodity, is more "applications-generated." (Scott,
1997, pp. 11-14)
140 The Problem of University Transformation
then the move into entrepreneurial action might well be more trouble than it
was worth: doubters in other universities would be right.
Overall scale and scope are perhaps decisive here. Small to middle size
universities - 6,000 to approximately 13,000 in our five cases - are still
positioned to seek a unified character, even if they stretch from microbiology
to folklore. An integrated identity has much to offer: perceivable gains outweigh
apparent losses. But large universities of 20,000, 30,000, 50,000 and more,
particularly when organized in large stand-alone faculties or schools - the
dominant form in Europe and in much of the world - might well find that
entrepreneurial habits d o not spread well across their major parts. They might
then be forced to operate with an entrepreneurial/traditional split in character,
with minimal interaction and little or no cross-subsidy across major
components. The entrepreneurial side could depend on diversified income and
look to new forms of outreach and knowledge production. The traditional
side could depend on mainline allocation based on student enrollment and
degree output as the foundation for the future.
Impressive in the universities studied was the extent to which the heartland
departments had bought into entrepreneurial change. Their changeover has
not been easy, not even in the specialized institutions most fully based on sci-
ence and technology. Even in science departments professors may be commit-
ted to knowledge for its own sake in a way that excludes applied interests. But
the distinction between basic and applied has steadily blurred and science
departments can typically find foci that combine the two. In the social sciences
and humanities, as we have seen. departments also find new ways to be
educationally useful as they relate to new demands with, for example. policy
analysis and multimedia explorations. One traditional department after
another finds educational as well as economic value in becoming a more
enterprising basic unit.
Stimulated academic departments must find ways to fuse their new
administrative capability and outreach mentality with traditional outlooks in
their fields. Academic norms operate close to the surface: they define whether
changes are "up-market" or "down-market." Departmental entrepreneurship
that leads to shoddy goods, as defined by other academics, can readily set in
motion a vicious circle of declining reputation and less selective recruitment
of staff and students. Departments have to make clear that they are not willing
to respond to all demands that swirl around them in their respective fields of
activities - from potential students, young and old, industrial firms and profes-
sional associations, local, regional, national, and international governmental
departments. They have to select and thereby to focus. When carried out
effectively, a widespread embodiment of entrepreneurship in a university
strengthens selective substantive growth in its basic units.
Burton R. Clark 143
The most difficult part of this study's analysis was t o grasp organizational
ideas and beliefs a n d relate them to structures that support processes of
change. A long-standing popular misconception places a Great Person with
a Large Idea at the front end of change. A modern derivative of this view
depicts a chief executive officer o r management team formulating at the
outset a global strategic plan. Idea becomes purpose, a mission statement
soon follows. and all else becomes means to a prechosen end. But the reality
of change in complex organizations. especially in universities. is different.
New, institutionally defining ideas are typically tender a n d problematic at
the outset of an important change. They must be tested, worked out. and
reformulated. If they turn out to be utopian. they are soon seen as
counterproductive wishful thinking. If found to be excessively opportunistic.
they provide n o guidance: any adjustment will do. Ideas become realistic
and capable of some steering as they reflect organizational capability and
tested environmental possibilities. New organizational ideas are but
symbolic experiments in the art of the possible.
An institutional idet1 that makes headway in a university has to spread
among many participants and link up with other ideas. As the related ideas
become expressed in numerous structures and processes, and thereby endure,
we may see them as institutional beliefs that stress distinctive ways. Successful
entrepreneurial beliefs, stressing a will to change. can in time spread to embrace
much and even all of a n institution, becoming a new culture. What may have
started out as a simple or naive idea becomes a self-asserting shared view of
the world offering a unifying i d e t ~ t i t j A
. transformed culture that contains a
sense of historical struggle can in time even become a saga, an embellished
story of successful accomplishment. Our five universities have moved along
this ideational road.
Such cultural transformation at Warwick started out in the early 1980s with
the tender idea that it would "earn" its way. With growing success, the earned
income approach became a sturdy belief that here was an unusual British
university aggressively developing new sources of income. new patterns of
organization. and new productive relationships with the outside world. True
believers dominated the steering core and became more numerous in a
campuswide culture. Outsiders took special note. By its twenty-fifth year, the
university was uncommonly well-equipped symbolically to celebrate itself with
an enriched story of "the Warwick way." An organizational saga was emerg-
ing.
Twente started its move in the early 1980s with an almost defiant assertion
that it was "the entrepreneurial university," hardly knowing what that would
mean in practice. It turned out to mean that Twente would develop a
strengthened managerial core and a newly devised developmental periphery
and the other operational elements this study has identified. Spreading out in
144 The Problem of University Transformation
the academic heartland, the initial simply stated idea became an embedded
belief, then a widespread culture. By the mid-1990s this small place claimed a
rugged identity formed around a recent history of largely successful struggle:
a saga was on its way. Twente came to believe in itself to the point of making
vigorous efforts to spread its particular attitudes and special operational forms
to others: it took up leadership in an emerging small circle of European self-
defined "innovative universities."
The leading idea at Strathclyde in the early 1980s was not sharply
formulated. A new vice-chancellor felt strongly that the place had to become
more managerial, more businesslike, more able to stand on its own feet. If it
were to prosper it had to be run differently. In time, the initial managerial idea,
expressed in a distinctive central steering group, a productive periphery, and
an entrepreneurial "spirit" in some heartland departments became folded into
a generalized belief system of "useful learning." This doctrine embraced two
hundred years of development while it asserted a will to work with industry
and government to solve current problems. The Strathclyde doctrine of useful
learning only needed to be slightly embellished and romanticized, as exempli-
fied in the bicentennial celebration I described, in order to become an
organizational saga.
Chalmers self-consciously began to assert in the early 1980s a commitment
to "innovation." As the idea and related practices were worked out, a sense of
difference grew. A long-standing Chalmers "spirit" was intensified to become
an embracing culture that helped predispose the institution to take up in 1994
the highly unusual status of a foundation university, an institutional definition
that nearly all other Swedish universities were unable or unwilling to consider.
The sense of distinctiveness was thereby further extended. intensifying overall
identity. In this ideational part of the quest, deeply rooted cultural features
have become parts of a Chalmers saga in which past developments, current
intentions, and future character are depicted as closely linked. Chalmers
enthusiasts could readily say in the mid-1990s that their place was something
different in the state of Sweden. They also had confident reason to believe that
a similar entrepreneurial culture will increasingly appear in other Swedish
universities.
Joensuu in the mid-1980s took to an idea of becoming a pilot institution
that would experiment with an important basic change for the entire Finnish
national system of universities. In its national setting the idea of doubly
decentralizing budget-based control all the way down to the department level
was a radical one. Joensuu effected the idea to the point of departmental
dominance. Early acceptance of a second idea, piloted at another university,
that of flexible workloads, helped to make the institution significantly differ-
ent from those operating in traditional Finnish style. As the "piloting" ideas
worked their way into the fabric of the institution, Joensuu has grown up
symbolically as well as physically, strengthening its sense of self and its place
in the world.
Burton R. Clark 145
We have noted repeatedly throughout this study that the five elements of
transformation become just that by means of their interaction. Each by itself
can hardly make a significant difference. Those who see universities from the
top-down might readily assume that the strengthened steering core is the lead-
ing element. But a newly constituted management group, for example, is soon
without teeth if discretionary funds are not available, new units in the periphery
cannot be constructed, heartland departments fall into opposition, and the
group's idea of a transformed institution gains no footing. The interaction of
transforming elements also largely takes place incrementally over a number of
years. Our results accord strongly with an incrementalist view of organizational
change. (Lindblom, 1959, 1979; Redner, ed., 1993) Particularly for universities,
we stress interactive instrumentalism. Transformation requires a structured
change capability and development of an overall internal climate receptive to
change. As we have seen by reviewing development over ten to 15 year periods,
the building of structural capability and cultural climate takes time and is
incrementally fashioned. Action taken at the center requires faculty involve-
ment and approval. Change in new and old units in the periphery and in the
heartland is piecemeal, experimental, and adaptive. The operational units,
departments and research centers, remain the sites where research, teaching,
and service are performed: what they do and do not do becomes finally central.
As put sharply by David W. Leslie (1996, p. 110) in arguing against linear-
rational views of strategic planning: "change in colleges and universities comes
when it happens in the trenches; what faculty and students do is what the
institution becomes. It does not happen because a committee or a president
asserts a new idea."
Even in the business world, we may note, careful analysts who trace
organizational change over many years observe that successful firms essentially
engage in "cumulative incrementalism": they inch forward by making rapid
partial changes. Firms choose to "spread and minimize risks by initiating many
different projects," rather than try to engage in large-scale strategic change.
(Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994, p. 523) They engage in "concentric
entrepreneurialism." Even in business. leadership is depicted as a diffused
phenomenon: '.Leadership is acutely context sensitive. . . The need may be for
more than one leader over time if performance is to be maintained. Equally
important may be the creation of collective leadership at a senior level. . . which
may then be supported by the development of a sense of complementary
leadership at lower levels. Leading change involves action by people at every
level of the business." (Pettigrew & Whipp. 1991, pp. 280-281) And from a
third careful business analyst: "Capabilities grow through the actions of the
members of the firm - through the behaviors of employees at all organizational
levels." (Leonard-Barton, 1995, p. 28)
146 The Problem of University Transformation