CRESPO vs.

MOGUL
GR No. L–53373, June 30, 1987

FACTS: An information for estafa was filed against Mario Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary
of Justice for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Leodegario Mogul denied the motion but the
arraignment was deferred to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. Crespo then filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a writ of injunction in the CA to restrain respondent judge from proceeding
with the arraignment of the accused. The Solicitor General recommended that the petition be given due course and the
CA granted the same.

Meanwhile, Undersecretary of Justice Catalino Macaraig reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and
directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the RTC, but the respondent judge denied the same and
set the date and time for the arraignment. Crespo then filed in the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus with TRO
to restrain Mogul from enforcing his judgment, which was again issued by the CA. Later on, the CA rendered a decision
and dismissed the petition of Crespo and lifted the TRO. Hence this present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court, acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and
insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits?

HELD: Yes. It is a rule that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. A fiscal has the authority to file a
motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence after the information has been submitted to the court but it
must be with the permission of the judge.

Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in
Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case
filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of
the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Doctrine: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound
discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to
prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.
PEOPLE v. MARTINEZ et al.
GR No. 191366, December 13, 2010

FACTS: Police officers were tipped by a concerned citizen who is not personally known by the police except for a fact
that he is a jeepney driver. The tip from the concerned citizen, who heard the information from another person,
provides that there was an ongoing pot session at the house of Gonzales, one of the respondents.

The police formed a team and proceeded to aforesaid house without any warrant. As the team entered the house,
accused Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales and other respondents. Seized from the
accused were open plastic sachets containing shabu residue, pieces of rolled –up and used aluminum foils. The accused
were arrested and brought to police station, seized item were sent to the crime laboratory. All accused, except for Doria,
were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL. RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
possession of dangerous drugs during social gathering. The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is illegal and what is its effect?

HELD: The arrest made by the police is illegal thus, the evidence obtained from the incidental warrantless search is
inadmissible because the tipped information is not sufficient probable cause to effect a lawful arrest allowing for a
warrantless search. The case falls under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or plain view search,
both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee.

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or plain view search is not applicable in the case due to absence of
probable cause since the arresting officers had no personal knowledge at the time of arrest, accused had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of
accused Gonzales in order to arrest them and that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just committed an offense. Tipped information is
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search only in cases involving either a buy–bust operation or drugs in
transit. The tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was
reported to the police. Plain view is not applicable since the evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police
officers intentionally entered the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused
with the subject items

Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.

The accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise such issue before arraignment. This
waiver is limited only to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
ABELITA vs. DORIA
GR No. 170672, August 14, 2009

FACTS: Judge Abelita III filed a complaint for Damages against P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that
while he and his family are on their way home, these two officers requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP
Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. He was forcibly taken and was searched without warrant. A
shotgun was found in his possession and he was arrested. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder. The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in Barangay Nursery.
The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds,
that petitioner was involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense was in his
possession. The trial court ruled that petitioner’s warrantless arrest and the warrantless seizure of the firearms were
valid and legal, thus, rejecting petitioner’s claim for frame up.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure?

HELD: No. For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the offender has just
committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case,
P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned
from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited
to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting
the police authorities to give chase.

Petitioner’s act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Hot pursuit arrest “does not require” the arresting officer to personally witness the commission of offense. Personal
knowledge required is not that of actual commission of crime but that of “facts” surrounding the commission of a crime
sufficiently strong to create probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the police officer.

The Supreme Court stated that the seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. The police
authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the
firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was
reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be
evidence of a crime. Hence they were justified in seizing the firearms.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.