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By Caesar S. Europa


Pursuant to Section 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P Blg. 129) and to achieve
an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases referred to herein, the Court Resolved to
promulgate the following Revised Rule on Summary Procedure:

The Ratio Legis Behind the Rules on Summary Procedure

Amparo Farrales, Et Al vs. Judge Ruby B. Camarista,

Adm. Matter No. MTJ-99-1184. March 2, 2000

“to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases falling thereunder”

I. Applicability

Section 1. Scope. — This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases:

(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages
or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney's fees are awarded, the same shall not
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00).

(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff's
claim does not exceed one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest and costs."

B. Criminal Cases:

(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

(2) Violations of the rental law;

(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 1 As amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC.

November 12, 2002 to take effect on November 25, 2002;

(4) Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Checks Law);

(5) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged is
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the
civil liability arising therefrom: Provided, however, that in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00).

This Rule shall not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff's cause of action is pleaded in the
same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal
case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the
ordinary procedure."

Sec. 2. Determination of applicability. — Upon the filing of a civil or criminal action, the
court shall issue an order declaring whether or not the case shall be governed by this Rule A
patently erroneous determination to avoid the application of the Rule on Summary Procedure is a
ground for disciplinary action.

II. Civil Cases

Sec. 3. Pleadings. —

A. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaints,
compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims' pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto.

B. Verifications. — All pleadings shall be verified.

Sec. 4. Duty of court. — After the court determines that the case falls under summary
procedure, it may, from an examination of the allegations therein and such evidence as may be
attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds apparent therefrom for the
dismissal of a civil action. If no ground for dismissal is found it shall forthwith issue summons
which shall state that the summary procedure under this Rule shall apply.

Sec. 5. Answer. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file
his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be filed and served within
ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded.

Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion 2 As amended by
A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC. March 25, 2003 to take effect on April 15, 2003 3 reduce the amount of
damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is
without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two
or more defendants.

Under Section 19 par (e) a motion for extension of time to file pleadings is
prohibited. Can the rules be construed liberally to allow the admission of a late

Don Tino Realty and Development Corp. vs. Julian Florentino

G.R. No. 134222. September 10, 1999

“In the case of Gachon vs. Devera, Jr., we ruled that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule
on Summary Procedure underscores their mandatory character. "Giving the provisions a directory
application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its objective
of expediting the adjudication of suits. Indeed, to admit a late answer, . . ., is to put a premium
on dilatory maneuvers-the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress."

Considering this, the view of the Court of Appeals that such provisions should be liberally
interpreted is misplaced. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies
only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of

Exception: (from the same case)

“In [Bayog vs. Natino 258 SCRA 378 (1996)] we ruled that there is nothing in the said
section (Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129) which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of [a belatedly
filed] answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor, do not
provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be expunged from the records.
As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of default if the defendant fails to file his

In the said case, however, the defendant raised in his answer that the MCTC had no
jurisdiction over the ejectment case as he is a holder of an Agricultural Leasehold Contract and a
Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold. Although this did not automatically divest the court of its
jurisdiction, we held that it should receive the evidence presented for the purpose of determining
whether or not it possesses jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, his defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited

Cross reference with Section 4 of Rule 18

“SECTION 4. Judgment when some defendants answer, and others make default. — When a
complaint states a common cause of action against several defendants, some of whom answer,
and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed
and render judgment upon the evidence presented. The same procedure applies when a common
cause of action is pleaded in a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party claim.”

Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later than thirty (30)
days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in
ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the
provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the
dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be
entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims
shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants
sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the
preliminary conference.

Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. — Within five (5) days after the termination of
the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein,
including but not limited to:

(a) Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;

(b) The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;

(c) Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the
parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the
judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;

(d) A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and

(e) Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. — Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the order,
together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them.

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment.

However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the
said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said
order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last
clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment. Considering the provisions of Section 10, can the court,
allow a survey of the property subject of the case despite the agreement of the
parties to submit the case for decision without need of a survey?

Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, Et Al

G.R. No. 133542. January 29, 2004

“Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides that the said rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of receiving a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceedings. The settled rule is that litigations should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. Every party litigant must be
accorded the complete opportunity for the proper determination of the case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. The Court, in the exercise of equity and jurisdiction, may
disregard procedural lapses to enable the case for its merits based on the records and the
evidence of the parties.”

Is a judgment rendered within 30 days from the issuance of the order submitting
the case for decision a substantial compliance with Section 10?

Conrado T. Montemayor vs. Juan O. Bermejo, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535. March 12, 2004

“Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure which governs
unlawful detainer cases, among others. The latter provision similarly mandates the resolution of
such cases within 30 days after receipt of the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration
of the period for filing the same.

Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of judgment
should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers of the parties, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of
the order by the judge deeming the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by
law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases
beyond that authorized by the law.”

III. Criminal Cases

Sec. 11. How commenced. — The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this
Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided, however, that in Metropolitan
Manila and in Chartered Cities. such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when
the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the compliant and of
his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's
files.If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the care may
be dismissed.

Sec. 12. Duty of court. —

(a) If commenced by compliant. — On the basis of the compliant and the affidavits and other
evidence accompanying the same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently
without basis or merit and order the release of the amused if in custody.

(b) If commenced by information. — When the case is commenced by information, or is not

dismissed pursuant to the next preceding paragraph, the court shall issue an order which,
together with copies of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall
require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as
any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than
ten (10) days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10)
days after receipt of the counter-affidavits of the defense.

Sec. 13. Arraignment and trial. — Should the court, upon a consideration of the
complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to
hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set
the case for arraignment and trial.

If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if
he enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.

Sec. 14. Preliminary conference. — Before conducting the trial, the court shall call the
parties to a preliminary conference during which a stipulation of facts may be entered into, or the
propriety of allowing the accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense may be considered,
or such other matters may be taken up to clarify the issues and to ensure a speedy disposition of
the case. However, no admission by the accused shall be used against him unless reduced to
writing and signed by the accused and his counsel. A refusal or failure to stipulate shall not
prejudice the accused.

Sec. 15. Procedure of trial. — At the trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall
constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who
testified may be subjected to cross examination, redirect or re-cross examination. Should the
affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party
presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose.

Except in rebuttal or surrebuttal, no witness shall be allowed to testify unless his affidavit was
previously submitted to the court in accordance with Section 12 hereof.

However, should a party desire to present additional affidavits or counter-affidavits as part of

his direct evidence, he shall so manifest during the preliminary conference, stating the purpose
thereof. If allowed by the court, the additional affidavits of the prosecution or the counter-
affidavits of the defense shall be submitted to the court and served on the adverse party not later
than three (3) days after the termination of the preliminary conference. If the additional affidavits
are presented by the prosecution, 7 the accused may file his counter-affidavits and serve the
same on the prosecution within three (3) days from such service.

What is the extent of the requirement of an affidavit before a witness may testify?

Atty. Hugolino V. Balayon, Jr., vs. Judge Gaydifredo O. Ocampo

January 29, 1993

In Orino vs. Judge Gervasio, the Supreme Court ruled in a Minute Resolution that even if a
witness has not priorly submitted his/her affidavit, he may be called to testify in connection with
a specific factual matter relevant to the issue. Thus, a medical doctor whose medical certificate is
among the evidence on record may be called to testify. This also applies to a Register of Deeds
or Provincial Assessor in connection with official documents issued by his office.

Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. — The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except
for failure to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be on bail or
on recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court.

Sec. 17. Judgment. — Where a trial has been conducted, the court shall promulgate the
judgment not later than thirty (30) days after the termination of trial.


Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where
the accused was arrested without a warrant.

Fidel M. Bañares II, Et Al vs. Elizabeth Balising, Et. Al

G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000

Equally erroneous is private respondents' contention that the rules regarding finality of
judgments under the Revised Rules of Court do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure. Private respondents claim that Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure allows the revival of cases which were dismissed for failure to submit the
same to conciliation at the barangay level, as required under Section 412 in relation to Section
408 of the Local Government Code. The said provision states:

Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 41 where there is no showing of compliance with
such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases
where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

There is nothing in the aforecited provision which supports private respondents' view.
Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the
same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to
barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no
declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after
the fifteen day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration has lapsed.

Civil Cases covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay:

RA 7160

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. —

The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually
residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; (Read A.M.

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
Justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement.

SECTION 409. Venue. —

(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay;

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, at the election of the complainant.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront
the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the
Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be

Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions or
petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with the preceding

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for opening of trial;

(d) Petition for relief from judgment;

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;

(f) Memoranda;

(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the court;

(h) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(i) Dilatory motions for postponement;

(j) Reply;

(k) Third party complaints;

(l) Interventions.

Marcelo Cueva vs. Oliver Villanueva

March 29, 1999

A motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper is one of the
prohibited pleadings and motions under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Respondent judge
should not have entertained the filing of such motion, considering that the case involved was
summary in nature. After the failure of the 10 defendants to answer the complaint, respondent
should have rendered judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.

Furthermore, the filing of a position paper is not required before the court can render judgment
on failure of defendant to file an answer. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes a
judge to render a decision on his own initiative or upon motion of the plaintiff.

Moreover, a preliminary conference should be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed. 9 In setting the Preliminary Conference on December 20, 1995, from November 8,
1995, respondent set the conference beyond the period provided by law.

It is also a basic rule that a case which is summary in nature should be decided within thirty (30)
days from the submission of the last affidavit and position paper. 10 However, respondent judge
rendered decision on April 8, 1996, or more than one hundred (100) days from the time the case was
deemed submitted for decision. Such failure to decide a case within the required period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.

Leopoldo Sy vs. CA
Aug 2, 1991

Petitioner submits that under the Rule on Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading, the filing of which does not stop the running of the reglementary period to
appeal, hence the notice of appeal of private respondents was filed out of time and the decision of
the trial court became final and executory. He also invokes the rule that if a judgment of an inferior
court is alleged to be erroneous and is sought to be reviewed, the remedy is an appeal to the
regional trial court, not the filing with that court of a special civil action for certiorari. Appeal, whether
from an inferior court or from a regional trial court, is antithetical to the special civil action of
certiorari. We cannot fault his submission that perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the
questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
to alter the final judgment, much less to ascertain the appeal.

Ernesto Catungal vs. Doris Hao

G.R. No. 134972. March 22, 2001

Facts: Ejectment Case. After judgment defendant filed a Motion for Recon while plaintiff filed a
Notice of Appeal. MTC did not resolve but elevated the Motion to the RTC. Did the judgment become

“We disagree. A reading of the order issued by the MeTC will show that said court elevated the
issue on the amount of rentals raised by the petitioner to the RTC because the appeal of respondent
had already been perfected, thus:

Considering the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of this Court dated March 3, 1997
and the Comment and Opposition thereto of the counsel for the defendant, the Court finds the
said Motion for Reconsideration should already be addressed to the Regional Trial Court
considering that whatever disposition that this Court will award will still be subject to the appeal
taken by the defendant and considering further that the supersedeas bond posted by the
defendant covered the increased rental.

In order that this case will be immediately forwarded to the Regional Trial Court in view of
the appeal of the defendant, the Court deemed it wise not to act on the said motion for
reconsideration and submit the matter to the Regional Trial Court who has the final say on
whether the rental or the premises in question will be raised or not.

It will be to the advantage of both parties that this Court refrain from acting on the said
Motion for Reconsideration so as to expedite the remanding (sic) of this Court to the Regional
Trial Court.

When the MeTC referred petitioners' motion to the RTC for its disposition, respondent could have
opposed such irregularity in the proceeding. This respondent failed to do. Before this Court,
respondent now insists that the petition should be denied on the ground that the Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the MeTC is a prohibited pleading and hence could not be treated as a
notice of appeal. Respondent is precluded by estoppel from doing so. To grant respondent's prayer
will not only do injustice to the petitioners, but also it will make a mockery of the judicial process as it
will result in the nullity of the entire proceedings already had on a mere technicality, a practice
frowned upon by the Court”

What kind of Motion for Reconsideration is prohibited?

Gloria Lucas vs. Judge Amelia A. Fabros

AM. No. MTJ-99-1226. January 31, 2000.

“This rule, however, applies only where the judgment sought to be reconsidered is one rendered
on the merits. As held by the Court in an earlier case involving Sec. 15 (c) of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, later Sec. 19 (c) of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure effective
November 15, 1991: "The motion prohibited by this Section is that which seeks
reconsideration of the judgment rendered by the court after trial on the merits of the
case." Here, the order of dismissal issued by respondent judge due to failure of a party to
appear during the preliminary conference is obviously not a judgment on the merits after
trial of the case. Hence, a motion for the reconsideration of such order is not the
prohibited pleading contemplated under Section 19 (c) of the present Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion, nor is she guilty of
ignorance of the law, in giving due course to the motion for reconsideration subject of the present

Can Grounds for Dismissal be raised as affirmative defenses?

Bayview Hotel, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119337. June 17, 1997

“parties are not prohibited from filing an answer with affirmative defenses in cases falling under
summary procedure.
Sec. 20. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only
facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show
their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to
disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from
the record.

Sec. 21. Appeal. — The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate regional
trial court which shall decide the 12 same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The decision of the regional trial court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.

Section 21 of Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules now provides

SECTION 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. — The
judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory,
without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (10a)

Sec. 22. Applicability of the regular rules. — The regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of
Court shall apply to the special cases herein provided for in a suppletory capacity insofar as they
are not inconsistent herewith.

Sec. 23. Effectivity. — This revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be effective on
November 15, 1991. .